AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, 15TH ANNUAL SEMINAR, 16 - 18 SEPTEMBER 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00244R000200260009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 22, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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22 September 1969
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SUBJECT: American Society of Industrial Security, 15th Annual Seminar,
16 - 18 September 1968
1. Icy main interest in attenc~.ing the Tuesday session was the
Communications Security lecture scheduled for 2;~+0 p.m. Not having
been pre-registered, it was necessary to pay the one-day fee of
~2~.00 and complete the registration at the desk. Time permitted a
brief forenoon tour of the exhibits. 25X1A
2, The luncheon speaker, Assistant
llirector of the Federal Bureau az lnvastigation, gave an interesting
talk on "Extremism and the New Left," and warned of major disturbances
expected in the near flzture.
3. After a ~0-minute break, the Communications Security Session
commenced. ene Barnes introduced the first speaker,
of the National ;security Ageney tNS~), who warmed
up ie au ence a it and then turned over the proceedings to the
main speaker, Chief of the Procedures Branch, NSA..
~. Mr. gave a rather broad-brush treatment to the
subject of cryptograp y, transcending the times from the ancient Romans
up to the present. The ~+5-minute talk was directed primarily to the
industrial interests and commercial Firms holding U, S. Government
contracts and from our point of view, was rather elementary; however,
it was well received by an appreciative audience.
5. P~lr. read and re-ree.c a. definition of "Communication:
Security" and a. so stated NSA's responsibility iri this field.
6. Mr. t he was not related to the famous
cryptanalyst of whom it has been said that,
"everything he touches turns to p ain text."
7. With the aid of charts ~r illustrated cryptographic
systems which were based upon monoa p and polyalpYiabetic
substitutions and emphasized their vulnerability to cryptanalytic
attack. He also touched briefly upon the relative merits of book
codes, transposition systems, various mechanical devices, and the
advancement to the "one-time'" systems. He said little about the pre.~ent
state of the art except that electronic computers are now being used,
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SUBJI~';CT: American Society of Industrial Security, 15th Annual Seminar,
l~ - 18 ~;epternber J_~)E>9
~1. Next was the discussion on the mayor types of contracts;
R & D, Production, and Testing,, which have "COMSEC" implications.
In addition, he mentioned the stringent security requirements which
iriust be met when it becomes necessary to establish a secure com-
r~unications link bet~~reen a. c:~ntractor and the U. S. Government Agency
concerned.
`~. He concluded by pointing out some security pitfalls encour~~cered
by contractors and cited the case of the firm that published, for
advertising purposes in a popular magazine, a photograph and description
of a machine which it had. developed and produced in quantity for the
U. S. Government under a classified contract.
10. The meeting was then thrown open to a question and answer
session. A few examples follow:
Q. 47hat is the relationship betweerA DCA (Defense Communica-
tion AE;ency) and. NSA {Igational Security Agency)?
A. DCA lays out the transmission paths and is responsible
for the operations of the circuits. NSA is responsible far fu11-
filling security requirements i_~? classified information is to be
passed aver these carcuits.
~~. You stated tki.r~t ~zrypto devices, 'before being accepted
for use in the protection of classified i:nfoxtiia.tion of the U. S.
Government, must weet the highest standards established by IdSA.
Why does NSA forbid U. S. riaxiufs,eturers to mass produce crypto
equipment for sale within t13e U. S, boundaries when these machines
a.re in great demand by iric?ustry? It is foolish because similar
equipment can be x~urchasec~ overseas.
A. In accordance with the terms of its charter NSA is
responsible for insuring thy:. security of classified transmissions
of the U.S. Government. If it is necessary to restrict produc-
tion of certain mechanical devices in order to acoamplish this,
then it must be done,
~. Does NSA provide a last containing the names of manu-
facturers of crypto equipmcsn.t ti~rhich could be used by commercial
(non U, S. Government} interests? This list would be very helpful
in obtaining the best equipment which:tiae believe is necessary
in order to protect braprietary information from the eyes of our
competitors.
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,U&J'L`CT: l~erican Society of I,~xdustrial Security, 15th Annual Seminar,
16 - 1~3 September 1969
A. iVSA could not publish ~r such list. Zb do so coup.
easily be misconstrued as NSA endorsement of a product.
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13ui]_ding Planning Staff, OL
Distribution;
Orin; - OL~BPS/Subject File - Security
1 - OL/BPS/Chrono File
25X1A9a oL/BPS/~:~ep/3553
(23 September 1969}
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