IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00674R000300020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approve%'ff 6Ip4~ jj~j ris
3- r
March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
ATTENTION Executive Officer STAT
SUBJECT Implementation of Executive Order 1165.2
1. Reference is made to the informal discussion on
1 March 1974 between of this office STAT
regarding the responsible component for the implementation
of Executive Order 11652, and more specifically for classi-
fication format, within the Agency.
2. The Information Systems Analysis Staff. DD/M&S, has
been delegated overall responsibility for implementing t
provisions of and monitoring compliance with this Order within
the Agency. This means that the Staff is engaged in a pro-
longed educational effort to ensure that Agency employees
involved in any aspect of the classification/declassification
process are made aware of what is expected of them, providing
procedural guidance as requested, and calling attention to
the originators when errors in format or other aspects of
the classification procedures are brought to our attention.
3. The above responsibilities do not infringe on the
charter of the Director of Security to safeguard classified
information, nor do they give this Staff the right to deter-
mine (as opposed to questioning) the proper level of classi-
fication for materials produced outside this office. Such
determinations would be made by the originating office and,
in case of differences of opinion, by higher levels within
the appropriate Directorate. The ultimate point of deter-
mination within the Agency is, of course, the DCI.
A 71
NIN"IS" -1 1 TIN` ill T , L USE CRY
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4. We hope that this background information provides
a satisfactory answer to your questions in this area.
Please feel free to call on this Staff if we can be of
further assistance.
SIGNED
G. F. Donnalley
Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff
ISAS:JS:slh
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
Vl - ISAS
1
- CPB
1
- Exec. Officer
MA,
L l E ONLY
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 Approved For ReleasgLZ FICATION PROGRAM00674R000300020001-4
EO 11652 on classification & declassification issued 1972. CIA felt it knew all
about classification & was above the law--it didn't apply to us.
Some of provisions of the EO we could not escape like issuance of formal
authority to _classify National Security information, notation on documents as to
w1 exempted it from the General Declassification Sche' FuTe quarterly reporting
to the ICRC.
The ICRC consists of representatives from CIA, DOD, State, Justice, ERDA, NSA,/VS _
the Archivist of the United States and an Executive Director appointed by the
President. All reports to the ICRC ultimately go to the Congressional Sub-
committee on Government Operations which will determine necessary changes in the
The MESSAGE of the Order is clear: a) Less Classification, b) More Declassifi-
cation and c) better protection for what is truly classified. The Order can be
broken down into these three areas.
To decrease the use of classification:
1. Control of those authorized to classify
2. Penalize habitually careless classifiers
3. Maintain accountability controls for classified information.
In the area of declassification:
1. Establish criteria for declassification
2. Systematic periodic review (to ensure prompt & orderly declassification at
the appropriate time, FOR EXAMPLE. . .)
3. 30 year automatic declassification of documents originated after May 1972
(So that a review of these documents must be made prior to 30 yrs)
4. Mandatory review upon request of documents over 10 years old (FOR EXAMPLE...)
5. Publication of declassified documents (Carrolton Press)
To better protect what is truly classified:
1. Establish active training programs to familiarize employees w/requirements
2. Investigate & eliminate unauthorized disclosures
3. Maintain accountability controls for classified documents
4. Set up inspection procedures to eliminate classification abuses
5. Have adequate physical security protection of National Security information
6. Ensure that NS documents are correctly marked
By regulation Mr. Blake has the responsibility for implementation of the
Executive Order in A. My function on the staff is to review the Agency's
classification program to ensure full compliance with the Order where possible,
and to recommend amendments to succeeding legislation in those areas where com-
pliance is impossible or impractical.
I have focused on the Training Requirment as the most critical element in the
Program. I'm working on methods to reach 3 basic groups:
1. Employees on Board
2. New Employees
3. Classifying Officers in particular
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Some of the other areas we're looking into and hope to develop procedures on
include:
1. Accountability controls for classified documents (IS THIS REQMT REALLY
PRACTICAL?)
2. Inspection for abuses of classification authority and penalties for persons
involved
3. Handbook on classification to ensure proper marking & handling of classified
material.
Because
functi onhawelwi Tl reT ueavF 1- onathef R'_ - not,_ s a Records Management
y_ y Records Management Officers in our Program.
Certainly ISAS will-be coordinating with the Directorate RMO's in the development
of procedures to implement the Executive Order.
Looming on the horizon is le islation in Congress to change the laws on classifi-
cation and declassification (NOT REALLY CHANGE THE LAW, BECAUSE THERE IS NO LAW,
JUST THE EXECUTIVE ORDER). One proposal would have documents declassified and
released after 2 years! We must get on the ball and Classify Less & Declassify
More.
I sit with RAB in 5B 2828 and I'm on extension I hif you have any questions. STAT
.'Cx a cY.C t -
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In the preparation of documents, what programs., if any, have you instituted:
STAT H f`
Approved
1. To prohibit unnecessary and overclassification (EO Sec 4; HR
. To discipline careless classifiers (those who habitually over- or
incorrectly classify)(EO Sec 13B; HR
To maintain accountability for Top Secret Secre and Confidential
documents and materials (EO Sec 6E;
4. To insure correct marking of documents and materials containing
national security information (EO Sec 4A; HR
I I b )STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
5. To restrain reproduction of Top Secret, Secret and Confidential documents
(NSC Directive, May '72 Sec VI G4; F_ I STAT
What programs, if any, have you developed or guidelines have you issued on
the following:
,1. A systematic review of documents, other than for FOI or PA, to insure
prompt and orderly declassification when such time comes (EO Sec 6F & G;
HRI
2. In connection with the systematic review, documents written after 1 June
1972 should be reviewed prior to the 30 year mandatory limit (EO Sec 5E;
3. In connection with FOI and PA requests, any criteria for declassifica-
tion fa of documents 9 (EO Sec 5C; HR STAT
4. TG=iftettne Correct marking of downgraded or declassified documents
(HR
What programs, if any, have you developed with regard to:
Active programs to familiarize all employees with the Executive Order,
the National Secu' a and the Hqs Regulation, plus:
(EO Sec 7B(3); HR'
a. Briefing of new employees,
b. Periodic reorientation of all employees,
c. Briefing of officers with National Security Classification Authority,
d. Debriefing od termination or prolonged (more than 60 days) separa-
tion, other than that provided by the Office of Security
Does youroffice receive and review its list of National Security Classifica-
tion Authorities (quarterly)? Is it sent to the individual offices for
review and updating? (EO Sec 2)
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STAT EO 11652 H l~._...__...~1~1
Prohibit unnecessary and overclassification
Sec 13B I VI i(2) Discipline careless classifiers (those who habitually over-
or incorrectly classify)
Sec 6E V b Maintain accountability controls for Top Secret, Secret
and Confidential documents & materials
Sec 4A II d(2)(5) Insure correct marking of documents and materials containing
national security information
NSCD SecVI G4 V c(1) Restrain reproduction of Top Secret, Secret and Confidential
Sec 6F & G III c(2) A systematic review program other than for FOI and PA, to
insure prompt and orderly declassification when such time
comes
Sec 5E III a(4) In connection with systematic review, documents written after
1 June '72 should be reviewed rp for to the 30 year mandatory
limit
III a(3) In connection with document review, criteria for declassifi-
cation and/or downgrading
--- } III c(4) Correct marking of downgrading or declassified documents
Sec 7B(3) VI a(l)(2) Active programs to familiarize all employees with the
Executive Order, the NSC Directive and HR 0 plus STAT
1. briefing of new employees
2. Periodic reorientation of all employees
3. Briefing of officers w/NSCA
4. Debriefing on termination or prolonged (more than 60
days) separation
III c(5) Annual action to make declassified documents available to
the public
VI W) Eliminate unauthorized disclosures
Sec 6C
S HRI Insure physical protection of National Security information
IV b Provide access to former Presidential appointees
Sec 2
WD Sec I D Limit number of officers with NSCA to minimum and maintain
>. list of those officers
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WILLIAM E. COLBY
Director of Central Intelligence
before
HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNII NT INFORMATION SUBCC IITTEE
August 1, 1974 (y~~,
1r1r. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on
H.R. 12004, introduced by you and others, to replace with a statutory
classification system the existing system established by Executive
Order 11652, and to discuss the operations of this Executive Order
within the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want you to know that while we in
the intelligence profession do have some special security needs, we
fully recognize that the bedrock of our system of government is an
open society and an informed public.
In a report issued last year your committee stated that "...there
is an unquestioned need'for Federal agencies to avoid the release or
dissemination to the public of certain sensitive types of information,
the safeguarding of which is truly vital to protecting the national
defense and to maintain necessary confidentiality of dealings between
our country and foreign nations." The necessity to safeguard certain
truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the
Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence in
the National Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
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There are special problems involved in protecting intelligence
sources and methods which I believe bear directly upon H.R. 12004
and Executive Order 11652. These problems flow from the very nature
of intelligence information - its substance and the means by which
it is obtained.
The flight characteristics of a foreign fighter plane, the
accuracy and numbers of a foreign ballistic missile, or the plans
and capabilities of a foreign country in the economic or political
fields are examples of substantive intelligence information. Very
often such intelligence information can be a benefit to this nation
only if our potential adversary is unaware that we have such knowledge.
On this basis such substantive intelligence information is deserving
of protection as affecting our nation's vital interests.
But inherent in the substantive information itself are clues
to the means through which it was obtained - intelligence sources
and methods. Unless these means are protected, countermeasures can
be mounted to nullify or impair collection efforts. It was
this concern, I believe, which led to the statutory directive that
the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
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-- Clearly a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile
climate must be protected -- not only to enable him to con-
tinue to supply intelligence, but also because the freedom
and lives of individuals may be at stake. The exposure of
an agent obviously ends his immediate usefulness. It may
or may not expose his sub-agents and any networks for
collecting information he may have established. Finally it
may affect our ability to obtain assistance from others.
Credibility in protecting our sources is the sine qua non
of the intelligence profession.
-- Foreign intelligence services and security agencies
are also positive contributors to our intelligence and counter-
intelligence programs abroad and continued cooperation often
depends upon confidence that the existence of the relationship
will be protected.
-- Revelation of methods of technical intelligence collection
may result in countermeasures to mislead or obstruct methods
of collection and render ineffective costly programs.
-- While a particular piece of intelligence information by
itself may not be revealing of sensitive sources and methods,
accumulation of bits of intelligence information may well
eventually lead back to the sources or methods relied upon for
its. collection.
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In view of these considerations, I believe Congress acted wisely
when in the 1947 National Security Act it identified a focal point
to assume the responsibility to protect against the unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
Recently I testified before the Intelligence Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 15845, which amends the
charter of the Central Intelligence Agency in the National Security
Act of 1947. One amendment in that bill would reinforce the charge
in the original Act by requiring the Director to develop appropriate
plans, policies and regulations for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. In that testimony I pointed out that I do not
believe the present statutes provide sufficient measures to enforce
this responsibility, and that proposals are under consideration in
the Executive Branch to remedy this weakness.
The Central Intelligence Agency is not a public information
agency, but was established to provide our government with information
and assessments to assist policy decisions about developments abroad
affecting the United States. Much of this material is necessarily
classified as it comes from sensitive intelligence sources. It is
thus made available in classified form to the members of the Executive
Branch concerned with these questions. Such material is also made
available to the Congress, in executive session, to endeavor to assist
the Congress in its role in decision making under the American Con-
stitution. To the extent feasible, moreover, the Agency's information
is made available to the publics directly or indirectly, in a number
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-- Where possible the Agency identifies for public release
information resulting from. its efforts. A recent example was
the China Atlas published in 1972 and an atlas on the Middle East
published in 1973.
- The Agency briefs appropriate committees of the Congress -
the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Armed
Services Committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in executive session in order to provide the fruits of our nation's
intelligence investment. To the extent possible, such information
is later cleared for publication. A recent example of this pro-
cedure was the detailed testimony on the economies of the Soviet
Union and China provided to the Joint Economic Committee and
published on July 19th after appropriate screening. We also fully
brief the CIA oversight subcommittees of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees on budget and operational matters.
-- We are completing a review of nearly 1,000 cubic feet of
classified OSS records in the custody of the Archivist and over
90 percent of them are being declassified. Moreover, we have
reviewed and declassified nearly 250 OSS films.
-- The Agency responds affirmatively whenever possible to
requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act
and Executive Order 11652. Of requests received and acted on in
1973, affirmative action was taken in 80 percent of the cases.
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In our efforts to screen our information to decide what can
be made available to the public,we must depend upon the training,
background, and experience of professional intelligence officers
to identify those matters which might appear innocuous but which
could reveal to a foreign intelligence service our intelligence
sources or methods.
With this background, I would now like to address myself to the
provisions of H.R. 12004.
Very simply, H.R. 12004 would conflict severely with the re-
sponsibilities of the. Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods. Under the bill all SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL information must be declassified in two and one years,
respectively. A great deal of our intelligence product, even of our
sources and methods would not meet the standard under the language
of the bill to be classified as TOP SECRET. All such information
thus would be declassified in no more than two years. I would find
it very difficult, in good conscience and in terms of practicality,
to urge a foreign intelligence service or a strategically placed
individual in a foreign government or a foreign country to cooperate
with this Agency and to provide information in confidence if the law
of this country required that such information be made available to
the public two years later.
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All TOP SECRET information would be declassified under the bill
in three years, unless it falls within one of several categories,
one of which is information which would disclose intelligence sources
and methods. But even this information could be declassified by the
Classification Review Commission which the bill would establish.
Moreover, the Commission could do so in the face of and notwithstanding
a written detailed justification by the President himself "for the
continued safeguarding of such information based upon national defense
interests of the United States of the highest importance." This
would seem to raise constitutional questions and it surely would impair
my ability to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Under the bill information may be classified only in the interest
of "national defense," as contrasted with "national defense or foreign
relations of the United States" as now provided by the Executive Order.
I believe it important that the bill be in terms which make it clear
that the information. which may be protected is not limited to strictly
defense information.
The bill requires that the names and addresses of all persons
authorized to classify must be furnished quarterly to the Classification
Review Commission and, upon request, to any member of Congress or the
Comptroller General. This feature would hamper severely the operation
of the intelligence-gathering function of this Agency, since it would
serve to identify many employees whose duties and prospective duties
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require that their status as employees of CIA not be revealed. It
would also be in conflict with the provision of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 which exempts the Agency from the provisions of
any law which require publication or disclosure of certain information
concerning Agency personnel.
The requirements for downgrading and declassifying existing
information in the first and succeeding years after enactment would
pose tremendous administrative burdens. The requirement to transfer
to the Classification Review Commission information downgraded from
TOP SECRET likewise would be administratively burdensome. Further,
it would impinge on my responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods.
My final point with respect to H.R. 12004 concerns the impact
its enactment would have on the authority departments would retain
to withhold information based on one of the exemptions of the Freedom
of Infonrmation Act. Exemption 1 of that Act permits withholding of
information classified pursuant to executive order. Exemption 3 permits
withholding of information which is "specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute." If enactment of H.R. 12004 resulted in the re=
scission of Executive Order 11652, as I assume it would, the protection
of Exemption 1 would be gone. And it might be contended that classification
actions made under H. R. 12004 and the regulations of the Classification
Review Commission are made "pursuant to" rather than "by" statute and
therefore are not to be withheld under Exemption 3. If this contention
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is sound it would mean that classified information requested under
the Freedom of Informtion Act could not be withheld. Clarification
by appropriate revision would be highly desirable.
I turn now to Executive Order 11652. That Order, and H.R. 12004
as well, obviously represent an effort to overcome the problem of too
much classification and for too long. I believe responsible opinion
is in agreement that there are problems in this area. Executive Order
11652, the first major change in classification practices in nearly
20 years, was an attempt to make a turn-around in the government's
classification practices which date back to World War II, and to deal
with the untold volumes of documents which remain classified. This
is a major undertaking. It will require time and much work.
The Order of course has impacted on CIA operations in a number
of ways, some of which I mentioned earlier. I propose now to summarize
certain others, Mr. Chairman,and, with your permission, I will submit
for the record a supplementary statement which provides certain
statistics and details.
To meet the requirements of the Executive Order, we have made minor
modifications in our data index system, which we had developed through
the years as an aid in locating and retrieving information. We have
made significant reductions in the numbers of persons authorized to
classify information.
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We have conducted a number of seminars and briefings to familiarize
employees with the Order. The Order, the Agency implementing regulation
and other written materials are readily available within the Agency and
some of this is circulated periodically as required reading.
As a final point, Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the
principal purpose of H.R. 12004 is to replace the existing executive
order system for classification with a statutory system. It is my belief
that a statutory basis for classification by CIA already exists. Congress has
declared in the National Security Act of 1947 that the Director of Central
Intelligence must protect foreign intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. Later it declared in the CIA Act of 1949 that
information relating to such Agency areas as organization, functions,
and identities of personnel is protected information. In general, then,
H.R. 12004 as it applies to such areas in CIA is in conflict with ex-
isting statutes relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, and would
dilute my responsibility and ability to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
To summarize, Mr. Chairman, my particular concern with respect to
H.R. 12004 arises from my statutory charge to protect intelligence sources
and methods. We are working to carry out the requirements and objectives
of E.O. 11652 but its full implementation will take time and it is too
soon to conclude that it is entirely satisfactory. And finally, Mr. Chairman,
I am committed to the view that the intelligence investment is to be fully
returned to the taxpayer in the form of quality intelligence for the govern-
ment's policymakers and for the public, to the extent possible while
protecting intelligence sources and methods, the duty charged to me by the
National Security Act of 1947.
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Supplementary Statement of
WILLIAM E. COLBY
Director of Central Intelligence
August 1, 1974
A brief description of some of the specifics of CIA implementation
of Executive Order 11652 might be useful to the Committee.
One of the major requirements under the Executive Order, and one
which has attracted some interest, is the establishment of a data index
system. The implementing NSC Directive calls for such a system for
classified information in categories approved by the Interagency Classifi-
cation Review Committee "as having sufficient historical or other value
appropriate for preservation." Happily the CIA was in a relatively good
position when this requirement was established. For some time the Agency
has had a sophisticated, computerized data index system, improved and
refined through the years, by which it has indexed, among other documents,
finished intelligence reports. Such reports have been approved by the
Interagency Classification Review Committee as a category of information
appropriate for preservation. Only a few relatively minor adjustments
in the system were necessary to completely conform it to the requirements
of the NSC Directive.
The principal purpose of the index system was to retrieve information
and it is highly efficient for this purpose. As modified, it also can
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be useful in the review and declassification process. It is anticipated
that usefulness in these areas will increase as the years go by and as
the data base of an ever-increasing proportion of the indexed documents
includes the now required classification data elements. The data index
system, on the other hand, can be of little or no value in guarding
against or tracing leaks of classified information, and this is especially
true in this day of the copying machine.
In concert with other departments, CIA has experienced a significant
reduction in the numbers of authorized classifiers in each of the three
classification levels. The initial reduction was in excess of 40 percent and
there has been an additional small reduction. One factor which limits
the Agency's ability to reduce these numbers is that its people are
located in so many places abroad. In all such installations, even if
there is only a one-man component, that individual must have authority
to classify information. Nevertheless, it may be possible to make
further reductions in the future.
Under the Executive Order, any person may request a review for
declassification purposes of any sufficiently identified document
which is at least 10 years old. CIA has had a number of requests for
review and declassification. In 1973$ 110 declassification requests
were received, 50 of which were granted in full, 19 granted in part,
18 were denied, and action on 23 was pending at the end of that year.
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A number of requests have originated with other government depart-
ments in connection with their consideration of declassification requests
to those departments. Requests have come in from the press, from current
and former employees, from professors, graduate students, high school
and college students, and from individuals who have not revealed their
occupation or position. Perhaps the greatest number of requests originated
with other departments, with the press and scholars constituting the second
and third largest categories.
Requests revealed an interest in World War II and OSS activities,
in CIA involvement in Guatemala and Cuba, and -- probably the greatest
number -- in Agency involvement in Vietnam. Denial of reauests is hised
on the nature of the information as measured against the standards of
the Executive Order. Documents have been denied which reveal a con-
fidential intelligence source or agent. Information received from a
foreign government with the understanding that it be kept in confidence
has been denied. Documents have been denied which would disclose that
an individual whose duties and career require that his CIA employment
not be revealed, in fact is a CIA employee.
It has been possible to approve the request for over 200 OSS
documents made by a historical researcher who was writing a book on
his experience as head of the OSS mission to Hanoi. A number of
requests for documents concerning certain Indonesian matters from a
Vassar professor doing research on U.S./Indonesia relations during
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the early 1960's have been approved. The French Broadcasting System
requested the OSS film "Mission to Yenan." This was made available to
them, and to the public, by declassifying it and transferring it to the
National Archives.
In the area of training, security briefings are given new employees
covering the standards and procedures established by the Executive Order.
A series of meetings were held in 1973 for 160 key personnel for the
purpose of briefing these supervisory personnel on the requirements of
the Order. Overseas assignments and job requirements would preclude
training for all employees, but the CIA regulation contains the require-
ments of the Executive Order and is readily available throughout the
Agency. The security and records management features of the Executive
Order are treated in various Agency lectures and seminars, including
the regular Mid-Career Executive Development Course and the Management and
Services Reviews. Basic information pertaining to E.O. 11652, including
the criteria for classifying information,.. is included in required reading
which is circulated periodically to all personnel.
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