AGENCY MILITARY RESERVE UNITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-01129R000100030014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 19, 1981
• Content Type: MF

Is J, ICAET'
Approved Fd lease 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP86-0112)0100030014-5
MhMORANIDUt FOR: Director- of PerscnneJ.
l OR.11
SUBJECT
Agency Military Reserve. Units
1. The Agency Reserve units were established in the 1950's based on a str.r)ng
belief that military personnel would be required during any eas r ency or a.
full mobilization. The. Agency had great. numbers of World War- 11 and i:.oreax).
vete=r_ans, as civilian employees, who were holding reserve co:rnu.ss:i.ons. Any
mobilization at this time would have created havoc. for the Agency unless a
mechanism existed within the Agency for their active partici.pati on in the
military reserves and for any future mobilization. Many of these reservists
were in key positions and they had a vested interest of 8 to 1.2 year,.,, in the
military reserves. Coupled with this group was a half hearted attempt to
establish war plans for the utilization. of Al ency rc servists. The p' an .
cit.e.d. Ia.rge numbers of military personnel that would be needed upon -mobil_izati.on
and these figures were impressive. Another:- consideration was the. Draft and the
Agency was hiring numerous pe~opl.e with mi 1.itary reserve obligat.Ions and they
were, accommodated in these reserve. units with a mob .lizatlon. assi4g)1mT:e7").t to the
Agency. Throughout O)e-sc years the Agency Reserve units have functioned
rather smoothly and they were secure reserve a.~sigx)ment_s for those who der; .r.ed
to remain active. (U)
2. The benefits to the Agency fo.r sponsoring these units ilnclude complete
career control (civilian/military) over the :Lndi.v:idua.l_ reservist:. Any cover
or security considerations can be handled without difficulty. Another benefit
the Agency gains is the related experience of active duty military training
received by these people. Although difficultt, to pin--point any component
gaining a. precise benefit, collectively this training;, in many cases, ties,
in with the individual's civilian position. Perhaps the strongest benefit to
the Agency is the availability of a pool. of individuals with expertise in both
the. Agency and military operations for ut.i.] ization in any mob-.lization. .,:Led
with these benefit:,-, is a sicl'e product of. public relations and the contribution
Agency reservists make to their respective military service. (U)
3. Despite the benefits there are minor problems for the Agency associated
with the reserve units. Covert and overt people. are mixed together in their:
military active and inactive duty training.,,. Covert: personnel are known to
military departments. Military records mai.!)tainccl by the. services raf.lect unit
designation and can easily be traced bacl,. to Agency ties. The longer Agency
WARNING NOTICE:
S1:NSI'TIVTE I.NTELlI.GENCE SOURCE'S
AND T?il ;TU.ODS l.NVOLVEI)
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units exist: the greater the risk of compromise of covert personnel. The
training and administration of Agen.c:y reserve units and personnel creates
minor problems for the Agency. Initially, when the Agency activated these
units the training consisted of primarily unconventional warfare subjects.
Then it progressed to counterinsurgency and eventually driftcd into a general
subjects program. E
4. The military departments have demonstrated a casual interest with the
Agency's reserve units but would support any reasonable request from the
Agency to maintain the units. They seldom questioned or requested justi_fi--
cation for the units. Perhaps the absence of computers and the war in Vietnam
contributed to a lack of interest and a more thorough review of how the Agency
was ut:i_1izi.ng military reserves and how they planned to use them in a wartime
situation. (U)
5. There are. no specific wartime plans to justify the Agency sponsored reserve
units. The plans do not exist and without an approved Agency-JCS plan or agree-
ment as to how, where, and why military reservists would be utilized during
wartime the units cannot he justified, nor should they he supported by the
military departments. (U)
6. After heavily weighing all known facts and based on my close association
with both the Agency and Military Departments, and considering the guidelines
for this paper, it would be my recommendation to discontinue the Agency's
Military Reserve Program. The discontinuation would create individual problems
for the reservists but they would not be penalized because of the numerous
training opportunities available with otter military reserve units. The premise
that any Agency reservist mobilized with all. outside Reserve unit will be lost to
the Agency during mobilization is questionable. The Military has an excellent
record of assigning military personnel to this Agency on a by-name basis. The
same would be done in any emergency. In any event, the total assigned reserve
strength if lost to the military certainly would not create a catastrophe for
the Agency. Incidentally, the numbers keep going down. (U)
7. During this study I talked with I land discussed the Agency
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Reserve Program. his comments and interest in retaining these reserve units
were appreciated and carefully considered. Notwithstanding his strong interest
and his suggestion that plans would be prepared and sent to JCS within six.
months to justify the retention of these units, I would recommend that Agency
Military Reserve Units, including Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force be discontinued
no later than 1 October 1982. It will take time for Agency reservists to locate
suitable outside reserve assignments. Military Reserve Headquarters are equipped
to handle reassignments expeditiously. I see no major problems for MPB in
locating suitable assignments for Agency reservists by working closely with
these reserve hee.dquar.ts:::s. However, an early decision should be made on this
recommendation in order La have the lead time for MPB to affect changes by
1 October 1982. The th[..king, of the 1950's for mobilization has changed
dramatically for Lhe 19ti?'s and to prolong the existence of these units will
only postpone the decision to terminate them. (U)
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