RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00154R000100030005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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LESSONS OF WILSON-TERPIL
25 June 1981
STAT
STAT
1. I have reviewed the events underlying the major two-part article
appearing in The New York Times magazine concerning the criminal activities
of Messrs. Wilson and Terpil, two former Agency employees: The FBI was first
informed of these matters by the CIA immediately after another former employee
reported them to this Agency. This same former employee, pursuant to advice
given to him by the Office of Security at the time, also reported these matters
directly to the FBI. This renewed publicity about the Wilson-Terpil case
unfortunately once again twill focus attention on the actions of former employees
and their apparent ability to trade on their contacts with former colleagues
still in CIA employ. This is especially so in view of implied allegations in
these recent articles that such activities may still be taking place. Certainly,
at a time when we are getting off the defensive so that we can concentrate on
iarprovinj our support of the national interest, criticism of this kind based on
events of long ago can only divert us from our essential job. I am resolved, j,
and I seek your individual commitment, to assure that these kinds of activities,'
reflected by the Wilson-Terpil case, do not recur. I am satisfied that the Agency
acted properly and forcibly when it learned of the Wilson--Terpil activities. We'
will address any allegation of continued or additional misconduct in the same way.
Now, we must see, that all of us do everything we can to see that activities of
this kind do not recur.
2. We must not permit the actions of a few to undermine the efforts and
reputation of the many. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to be alert to avoid
actions, while we are employed at the Agency, in our dealings with former colleagues
and in our post-Agency employment, which may reflect adversely, on the Agency. In
this regard, it is useful to recall the comments and cautions of my predecessor
contained in the June 19.17 notice ~~ set forth below: STAT
"1. Recently, two employees were asked to leave the Agency as a
result of developments growing out of their unofficial relationships
with former employees. This should serve as a reminder of the very
real problems that can occasionally arise in dealings with former employees.
The Agency has been characterized by strong bonds between its employees,
and these bonds often transcend the significant chancres in status that are
brought about by retirement or resignation. It is essential that current
Agency employees realize that resicnees and retirees do indeed acquire a
new status which precludes the access and privileges associated with active
service in the Agency. The vast majority of former employees are well aware
of their new status and scrupulously avoid any situations which might cause
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problems for their former colleagues. Un ortunately, a few former
employees are apparently willing, perhaps without realizing the
potential consequences, to exploit current employees in order to
obtain unjustified personal or profession l advantages for themselves.
2. Employees should be guided by th basic fact that a former
employee with no active official connection with the Agency is not
authorized continuing access to classifies=; information as a result of
his former association. Moreover, former employees are entitled to
no more assistance or service from the Agency than are any other citizens
of our country. For example, should a for Fier employee embark upon a
second career which places him in a position of being a potential vendor
of goods or services to the Agency, he must be treated the same as and
must compete with any other vendor offerino comparable goods or services.
Given the vast number and types of situations that can arise in dealings
with former employees, it is not possible to cite all the examples here.
Agency employees must exercise careful judgment at all times to ensure
that all unofficial relationships with former employees are proper and
above reproach. . . . There are a few basic questions which employees
should ask of themselves when evaluating their unofficial' relationships
with former employees. For example:
"a. Am I being asked to provide Agency information or
other assistance for nonofficial purposes?
"b. Am I being asked to participate in some non-Agency
activity to convey.the impression than the Agency is officially
involved?
"c. Would I conduct this relationship in the same manner
if the other party had not been previously associated with the
Agency?
"d. Am I becoming involved in an activity which may involve
or create the appearance of a conflict of interest with my
official Agency responsibilities?
"3. Employees preparing for a second career which will draw upon skills
and contacts developed while with the Agency must ask themselves the same
kinds of questions.. Upon retirement, they must be fully reconciled to the
fact that their former Agency status must not be traded upon for preferential
treatment in dealings with CIA.
"4. Employees who become involved in relationships with former employees
about which they have questions should seek guidance promptly from their
supervisors. If a supervisor cannot answer the question with confidence,
the employee should be referred to the more specialized offices. The
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MANAGE1 ENT
25 June 1981
Operations and f'anaccment Law Division* of the Office of General
Counsel, the Employee Activity Branch of the Office of Security,
or the Office of the Inspector General should be consulted for
assistance in this regard.
5. All of us value continuing relationships with our former
colleagues, and it is riot the intent of this notice to discourage
such associations. Rather, this notice is intended to point out
that such associations must be conducted in a manner which avoids
actual or apparent improprieties -- improprieties which can cause
serious hare; both to the individuals involved and to the Agency. I
urge your personal and thoughtful attention to this matter."
3. Although the activities now being reported in the press occurred
several years ago, I urge you to continue to be sensitive to these cautions
and request that you immediately bring to the attention of the Inspector
General any information which would indicate that inappropriate actions are
being carried out by any Agency employee or that any former employee may he
abusing his or her previous relationship with the Agency. With your help, I
am confident that we can put this matter behind us, prevent activities of this
kind from recurring, and continue to demonstrate the professionalism, skill,
and dedication i%,hich are the hallmarks of Agency service.
Williar'J .Casey
Director of Cen` al Intel gence
DISTRIBUITON: ALL EMPLOYEES (1-6)
* Current Title - Administrative Law Division
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