TASK FORCE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000100020004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 240
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 JUN 1977
STAT
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive Registry
FROM
Chief, n orma ion and Privacy Staff
SUBJECT Transmittal of Saniti4ed Copies of
Intelligence Community Studies
1. Per your telecon of 8 June with of this 51AI
Staff, we are transmitting for your retention t e sanitized STATINTL
copies received from the National Security Council of four
intelligence community studies
2. The four studies are as follows:
a. W.H. Jackson, President's Committee on Inter-
national Information Activities, Report to the President,
30 June 1953.
b. J.H. Doolittle, Report on the Covert Activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency, 30 Sept. 1954.
c. Mark Clark, Commission on the Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government. Task Force
Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955.
d. M.D. Sprague, President's Committee on Infor-
mational Activities Abroad, Conclusions and Recommen-
dations, Dec. 1960.
3. It is believed that it will be more useful to lodge
these documents with your record and reference set of such
reports than with our case files in the Records Center.
STAT
Enclosures: As noted
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Report on
:C LLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
in the
FEDERAL GOVERNr ENT
Prepared for the
0O:4-1ISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNNNT
by the
TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
MAY 3.955
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COP' i ISSI Obi ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE: BR N CH '
THE GOVE I%'NT
Washington, D.C.
May 1955
The Honorable Herbert Hooter,
Chairman, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government,
Washington 25, D. C.
My dear Mr. Hoovers
We have the honor to present to you the reports of the Task Fors
on Intelligence Activities of our Government,, In these reporte,the
task force analyzes the national intelligence effort and makes recom=-
mendations with a view to correcting the weaknesses, improving the
quality, and increasing the efficiency of this vital operation.
The aggressiveness of the Soviet bloc, their methods of infil-
tration,, subversive activities, and propaganda employed in the cold
war now in progress, as well as the difficulty of penetration of their
security b ara: iers, point up the. f act that our intelligence effort must
be the best in our history. This, added to the advent of nuclear woapons,
together with their advanced delivery systems., has made adequate and
timely intelligence imperative to our national security. The task force
is fully aware of the grave responsibility implicit in its assigned
mission.
In carrying out this =11--lion, the task force was soveraly hampered
by the security restrictions imposed upon it in its survey of the
clandestine operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. While
the necessity for carefully safeguarding sensitive material, is well
recognized, the fact remains that the restricti complicated the
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conduct of the survey of this Vital s ..,. ca zur qn al intelligence
coseuunit y . In future surveys, the legal restrictions should be waived
and no .imitations placed on the members of the task force or its staff.
Security requirements have wade it necessary that the task force
depax in some degree from the form of the report proscribed by the
Ooamdssion. Two reports are submittedi one, unclassified; the others
classified TOP SECRET, with two appendices. Each appendix requires a
special clearance over and above that required for access to the TOP SR " "
report.
It is to be noted that in the TOP SECRET. report there is some dupli
coat, son in the subject matter between sections of the report. This dupli-
cation is deliberate, in order to facilitate the distribtuion of certain
sections to various deepart ent s and agencies to which they apply.
In submitting these reports, we wish to express our perso>al anpre-
ciation for the wholehearted and enthusiastic cooperation given us by the
departments and agencies surveyed.
Respectfully submitted,
Mark W. Clark, Chairman
?= rRa chid e Conolly, Merab~ ? a
Ernest F. Hollings, Member
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PREFACE
"xntnll,ence'a AA Defni;~ an
The fate of the nation well may rest on accurate and complete intelli-
gence data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for top-level governmental
decisions on policy and action in a troubled world where so many forces and
ideologies work at cross purposes.
The Congress has recognized the importance of the role of intelligence
in our national security. It has authorized the expenditure of vast sums of
money by appropriate departments and agencies to carry on this work.
Immediately after World War II, at the suggestion of the Chief
Executive of our Government, the Congress approved the creation of a new
agency unique and in many ways strange to our democratic form of government.
It, is `known as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The CIA operates without the customary legislative restraints and reins
under which other departments must function. Its work is veiled in secrecy,
and it is virtually a law unto itself.
In order to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of intelligence as
carried out under these conditions, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities
found that it was confronted at the outset with the problem of arriving at
a common understanding and agreement on the meaning of the word "intelligence,
as applied to its own areas of work and investigation.
The word has many definitions and is subject to ~arying shades of inter-
pretation and meaning. In a certain context it might refer to "ability to
learn"; in another context, "intellect," or perhaps "ability to meet a-new
situation"; and in yet another sense, "common sense."
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In the search for an acceptable definition as applied to oue own
field of study, it was found that each depart nt or agency surveyed
had its own definition. any of these definitions were lengthy, and
involved use of words requiring additional interpretation or delisii
Cation to get at their precise application.
The task force sought a definition as simple and clear as possible
arO. arrived at the following:
"Intelligence deals with all the things which should be
known in advance of initiating a course of action."
Useful for our p sos,, also, as a supple ntal and expanded
definition is that given in the Dictionary of United States Military
Terms for Joint Usage:
"INTELLIGENCE - The product resulting fro the
collection., evaluation, analysis, integrat ion, and inter-
pretation of all available inf or ation which concerns one
or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations,
and which is ismediately or potentially significant to
planning."
Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission or the Hoover Commission, to study and
mr 'x. + recommendations as to the structure and administration of the'
Central Intelligence Agency and other kindred intelligence activities.
IM
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Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission to
embrace studies of all intelligence activities of the Federal
Government and to submit recommendations to effect changes con-
sidered necessary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved
service in this field.
The task force gave thorough consideration to the decision of
the Commission to broaden the scope of the task-force studies to
include all intelligence activities of the Federal Government. It
developed that there are at least twelve major departments and
agencies which, in one manner or another, are engaged in intelligence.
Among these are the Department of State, the Department of Defense
(including the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff), the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture. In
addition, there are ten or more minor agencies or activities which
expend public funds directly or indirectly on behalf of the intelligence
effort of the Government.
Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference, the task
force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and reporting
on more than twenty major and minor departments and agencies. It
readily became apparent that any attempt to spread the efforts of the
task force over such a large area would mean either that only minor
results could be expected within the allotted time or the work period
should be extended beyond the date contemplated for dissolution of the
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Co=im~ission on May 31, 19559 Therefore, it was apparent that the scope
of the task-force work had to be refined if any useful. results were
to be derived from its efforts and expenditure of funds
pgeif; ve 'arei n Ipi;ellxgenee ~itt~l
The most pressing need under present conditions is for those
officials in responsible positions in Government, especially those
responsible for foreign policy, to have readily available full and
factual foreign intelligence. The word "foreign" as used here denotes
the target of information as distinct from the geographical source.
T1nus, it appeared to the task force that within the given time
limit the best interests of the Government would be served if the task
force directed its attention to the departments and agencies whose
entire or primary responsibilities lie in the field of positive foreign
intelligence as it pertains to national defense and security, and in
whose care vast sums of money and unique authority have been entrusted..
These are the Department of State, the Departent of Defense, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (to the extent that it deals in security
intelligence), and the intelligence activities of the Atomic Energy
Commission,
Directive to the f'aO Eage
Accordingly, a proposal to delimit the scope of the task-force
studies was made to and approved by the Commission, as follows:
1. imvev the work of the Central f I i?~ e? e Agency.
Cover all activities of CIA, wherever 1ocated including but
not limited to collee ti?n, eval.uat io -and dissemination of
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of auditing of funds, security, personnel, projects carried
out through other agencies, relationship and coordination with
other governmental intelligence agencies, conmcunications, supply
-M stage.; a determination of the responsibilities of the
agency, as prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative
action, and a study as to whether the responsibilities .have been
adequately defined and are being implemented.
2. Serve the intelljgerzce activities
of Defense. Cover all intelligence activities, wherever located,
of the Department of Defense,, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National
Security Agency, Array, Wavy, and Air Force, including, but not
limited to, collection, evaluation, and disseminatian of
intelligence, obligation and expenditure of funds, security,
personnel, projects carried out through other agencies,
coax unications, relationship and coordination with other
governmental intelligence agencies, supply and storage; a
determination of the responsibilities of the Departament and
all its elements for intelligence, as prescribed by legislative
enactment or administrative action, and a study as to whether
the responsibilities have been adequately defined and are being
implemented. No survey will be made of the organization or
organizational structure of tactical units in the Army, Navy,
and Air Force engaged primarily in producing tactical or combat
intelligence.
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3. Suxv 1,hQ anslii enae actvits~s a3~e Darrt~t
se A. Grover all intelligence activities related to national
defense, wherever located, of the Department of State, including,
but not limited to, collection, evaluation, aid dissemination of
intelligence, obligation and expenditure, of funds, security,
personnel, projects carried out through other agencies, communi-
cations, relationship and coordination with other governmental
intelligence agencies, and supply; a determination of the
responsibilities of the Department for intelligence, as
prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative action,
and a study as to whether the responsibilities have been
adequately defined and are being implemented.
the Rational
4u, Suev he nte ;l M ce act vit es of
?ecurit: Council, Include a study of the history, legislation,
development, organization, and operations of the National
Security Council as they affect intelligence activities.
Include study of the -Operations Coord3na-bi g Board, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee, and related activities.
Surva i_ecc~d..s~n ofh? iz e37genee e etaas
5.
of other a on ies. The segments to be studied would be developed
as the task force gathers information.
6. General Considerations. Determine -which of the
intelligence services, activities, and functions performed by
any of the agencies surveyed are (a) essential; (b) not
necessary; (c) of similar nature, and what consolidations are
in the public interest; (d) non-esse:atial, and which are
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cCMT-Seti tive with p, iv rate entarrcise; and (e) duplicate or
czvicerlsrap those of other agencies.
This requires a determination in the basic eUMM outlined in
paragraphs 1 to 5 as to what services, activities, and functions
are being perfoxsd by each agency studied. Upon completion of
the basic surreys,. a functional survey oft work done by the
agencies would be ertaken from the data developed. With such a
scope, the task force would cover, among other things s
(1) The intelligence function of the National Security
(2) The value and effectiveness of the information
supplied by the operating agencies.
(3) The effectiveness of the coordination of
intelligence activities.
(4) The organization, procedures, s thoda, and
performnee of the several Goverment agencies in the field
of evert and covert intelligence.
(5) An exmination of the operation and physical plant
of the agencies as to econor, adequacy, effect on efficiency,
and utilization.
(6) The various program of the several agencies in
such fields as training, research and dsvolo nt, otock-p!LlI.Yag,
xeferanoe we.terial, and ,oc-+ ity.
(7) The personnel policies and manpower utilization.
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( ) All programs and procedures for the collection,
development, and dissemination of information to include
collection apparatus and dissemination media.
(9) The interrelationship between the several areas
thus assigned and actual areas of coverage, mutual support of
One another.
in the execution of this extensive undertaYing, the task force s
in certain areas, had to employ the 1"sampl3ng" method, particularly
in the case of the study of those activities of the agencies
overseas
na-i lye, Portions of Agencie. a q c
in giving its approval of the foregoing proposal. the Commission
directed that a first par?agra. h be added
411, The study and survey of the sensitive portions
of the agencies will be undertaken by General Clark with
miniram staff on a Qnec d?to-knows basis."
Fmesuant to the foregoing directive, arrangements were made orally
between Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and General Mark W. Clark, chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence
Activities, initially for General. Clark and Colonel Herman C. Lane, a
member of the t;- sk-force staff, to have access to CIA activities, both
avert and covert. Shortly after this arrangement was implemented, it
developed that a requirement existed for at least one additional member
of the task force to have access to covert activities of the agency.
Accoa ding l;y , Adr0 ral fi;icharci L. Conol.ly's name was added to the list.
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This arrangement continued until a decision was made that certain
members of the task force and staff should inspect intelligence
activities in the European and Far East areas. Since General Clark
was unable to take part in one of these inspection trips, the problem
confronting the task force, as a result of the existing restrictions
on the clearance of the task force to sensitive material of the agency,
was presented to the Director of Central Intelligence. The following
quoted letter was received from the director:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D.C.
Office of the Director
Gone:al J.G. Christiansen
Staff Director
Task Force on intelligence Activities
Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government
Washington; D.C.
27 January 1955
With further reference to your let-ter of 20 January 1955,
and our telephone conversations of yesterday evening and today's
I have arranged clearance for Mr. Henry Kearns and for you to
have access to CIA activities, both overt and covert, in
connection with your trip to the Pacific area. It is also
understood that all members of the Task Force and you, yourself.,
will be cleared to consider the report with respect to both
overt and covert activities of the CIA which may be submitted by
those members of your staff who have been cleared for on-the-
spot investigation of those activities. I quite appreciate that
this is necessary in connection with the preparation of the Task
Force report.
This procedure has been cleared with Governor Adams.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Due les
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COST OF '11M, IMPELLIGENCE EFFORT
Precise figures on the cost in money and manpower engaged in
intelligence activities in the interest of national defense and security
are not a matter of record. Any attempt to compile such data accurately
would require the expenditure of money out of all proportion to the
value of the findings. The task force estimates, however, that the
annual expenditure is in the order of
ORGANIZATION OF THE TASK FORCE
5ecur 3.i:v Irrmac?c ?rs ~3.~etx~n~c ar ~'c~rsrsRe~
The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last to be
authorized by the Hoover Commission. The director and deputy of the
staff assumed their duties on October 1, 1954. The limited pool of
available personnel in the United States with prior experience in the
telligence field influenced to some extent the structure of the
staff and its methods of operation.
Personnel of the intelligence Task Force and of the staff had to
be screened carefully for background security and possible prejudicial
interest arising from prior association with departments and agencies
under investigation.
Before a member of the task force or staff could have access to any
material, a security background investigation was conducted and the
Individual declared by proper authority to be eligible for access to
"Top Secret" information. In each case where the inquiry involved
access to stornic energy data, a special clearance was obtained.
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it was found that each department and agency had evolved its
criteria, practices, and standards for clearance. The task force
adopted a policy in conformity with the policies and requirements of
the department or agency involved in each specific investigation..
In the interest of security and economy, the task force also
decided to keep its staff as compact as possible, Sensitive material
was studied generally on the premises of the agencies.
S Ga.f Ox? slz: , tin
After careful consideration by the task force of the possible methods
of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided that the most
practical course would be to assign some teams composed of one or two
staff members to study specific agencies, and to delegate to other
teams specific across--the-board survey functions. Individual task force
members wore assigned across.-the--board responsibilities paralleling
the work of designated staff teams. Thus, all members would be in a
position to interject their influence and guidance in the staff
activities and at the same time obtain valuable first-,-hand knowledge
of the overall problem.
Initially, five staff study groups were organized. Some were
assigned responsibility for study of a single departments others; where
feasible, covered two or more agencies.
T ho restrictions i posed on the stwaf in i su vey of the
Central Intelligence Agency necessitated that the work be broken
down into two classifications, with one group studying the covert
aspects of CI.APand the other surveying the overt operations of the
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Agency. These two teams carefully coordinated and correlated their
tudies, except where infor: .t on 4 #-Q-tom=_?e sensitive areas, of
the Agency's work was restricted to designated individuals. This
arrangemnt proved very eumbsreoma , was time-consuming, and seriously
interfered with the conduct of the curve
As each task group completed the study of a particular depr to execute its Mission al' I
disc r 1taa _.a, n3. rasp onsibilition.
t` a r e . the p duction and dissmination, in CoOrdinatiOn with
:embers of the ZAC, of ticn l intelligence.
f, For requesting of and re iving from other agencies a wwh
SPOC-II&I eeti ' a, reports, and periodic biieafas or amen vies prepared by
such o z ar ageaacies in their fields of d rdmant interest or in acco`rdan
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i h their
pro action capabilities, as may be necessary in the production
of ?intelligenc reports or eiptimtes.
g. For the amai.nten x ce of adequate research faoilitie;, not
only to accomplish the inteUlgence production tasks allotted to Lh CX1,
but alEe to provide such additional intelligence reports or of t i '-rat s
within its field of dominant interest as may be necessary to sat'-Lsfy the
refoants of the other agencies under such allocations.
h. For the collection abroad of such economic, a olentif`ic, and
technological intelligences, as MaY be ne ssary for its own g eade?
I. For the preparation, in collaboration with other V1.0 agencies
o aerned, of a cca cprehensive outline of national intelligence ob je tives
applicable to foreign cos ntries awl areas to Serve an a guide for the
coordinated collection and production of national intelligence; and for
the e$stablieshont of priority interests in items comprising the outline
;f national, iftelligenee objecti'ee
For the conduct of all organized Federal and certain a peeial
operations Wttctde the United States and its possession for the ..,ofleetion
of foreign intelligence infor; tion required to at eet the weds of all
departments and agencies concerned, except for certain agreed act! itiea
'by other departments and agencies a
k. For the conduct of all organized Federal e res Y .a:
operations outside the United States and its possessions and in occupied
areas, w: ceZtiin provisos.
L For the coordination of covert and overt tatelligonLe
collection aetivitiee.
Z6,
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n. For the exploitation, on a highly saleetive basis within
the United States, of buai.ness concerns, other non.- verntal organiza-
tions a Individuals as s ces of foreign intelligence information.
.oo For the maintenance., as a matter of pri xy respo ibil.ity,
of biographical data on foreign scientific and technological p onalitiet .W
p. For the. detera.nfaticn of those c vries which have iofor i-
ti l potential in fields of basic and applied sciencael, as related to
the national seo rity,
q. For the production, as a yatrcer of pr , j ivsponsibility
bof Intelligence on frnda *ntal reseer h in the basic s leneee on
cv? ent . fic Tes roes, as d on madiedne (except liter medicine), pl
intelligence on pertinent applied research and develop nth
rQ For the c dination of policies c ceraing the protection
-'f intelligenos sources and thoss, within the limits established by
Section 102 of the National Security At of 1947, except: here p . caio
has already be~n made by, the National Security C .cil; and to be raided
in this by the principle that covert or sensitive infor Lion, either
+ 2e i atad or as an intelligence prodnet, shall go - only to those whose
official duties td'e such biowled e; and, f%rUherv any referen to
Una GIA mho ld. ei ha.size its duties as the e a to,a of
i x l
rather than its seeret intelligence activities, and preferfab that no
tin ats ver of this Agency should be made unless it to unavoidable
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?. pop the p evont1c , as c of the w. % of the IBC,
of the utiaor surd dieclom??, by written g
info Lion c cern .ng intelligence or intelligence activities; and
nce . irg this, it is to be ceded by the policy of the HSC to the effect
that the IBC ooneide that er^ publicity f actatal ? r fictional, cone r nlng~
intelligence is potentially detrimental to the off ctivereee of an
intelligence activity an. to the national eec^arit y.
S. For the indi. ceient of the defecti4m of potential defectors,
except in the gasses where it is manifestly in the interest of suit
effthiency that rep' s entativea of other agencies mdertake such
act ,on
v. For the intenance of a c tinting review of the require-
nts of the U.S. Gowr nt for foreign ownowlc iix"alligance --elating
to the national sec .ty, and of the facilities and & angemeir
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available to meet those. requix nts; for the Inwi-anam:, through
r e g u l a r p r e me d s, that the f u l l a as e v edge and technical
talent available the Govr rent to br ht to 1a on important
issues Involving national seeuit7; for the ovaluatlou;through regular
pr lures, of the pertgnaacc, extent, and quality of the frig
e o .e data available bearing s f national seourit"Y '.ssrues; for the
dtvelop nt of waIn rich quality czild b 1.rnprcved and gaps co 3.d be
filled; and for the c tduct., a s . a matter of c= ooncerffa, of such. forei gn
e o e research,, and the production of such f? i.gn eooo is intolli-
g noe am-may be required t e l nt that produced by other agenciest,
? ither in the appropriate discharge of their rag l r departmental
missions $, in f lfillnant of assigned intelligence responsibilities, or
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z. For the conduct of certain cold-war., cover v, and other
clandestine functions as directed by the NSC.
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Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100020O*
 Approved For Release 2003/Mf)
In addition to the foregoing duties, functions, and requirements,
the CIA mrform the following activities t
a. Maintains a central reference library, a map library,, an.
industrial register, a graphics register, a special register, and a
factory markirge service and register; all for its own use and for the
use of the intelligence comity..
b. Produces geographic intelligence for its own use.
o. Provides the a mIrmsn and secretariat of eau h IAC working
coinnittee and of the Economic Defense Intelligence Co aittes of the
Economic Defense Committee.
d. Provides sons perconnel for annd participates in the
functions of the National Indications Center.
e. Conducts Its own adrdnistrati aid logistic duties and
Q+ani$ai- n CAA
Prior to 1951, the CIA was organized and staffed primarily to
performs its statutory functions concerning the coordination of the
production of national intelligence. In that sear, it became engaged
in more extensive cold war operations and the at-rength of the Agency u so
rapidly built up until by the end of 1.952 it was approximately doubled.
At the present tom, the CIA is organized into a small hoadgaaarto
office consisting of the
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Assistant (Secretary) to the Director
Special Assistant for Plwming and Coordination
inspector General
Historical Staff
Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : C 4-RDP86B00269R0001000itnt -4-.4'
AMT
 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100020004-4
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