MEMO TO MARK W. CLARK FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130033-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: December 8, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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12/8/54 Original handed to
ral
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEAGENCYA5ene Clark: this date.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
8 December 1954
KIDIORANDUN FOR: General Nark W. Clark
You have asked for specific proposals for legislation
or other actions for your Task Force to consider. The
following subjects merit your consideration. A brief
discussion of each is enclosed.
I. Legislation Required by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
II. A Congressional Committee for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
III. Justification for a New CIA Headquarters
Building.
Enclosures:
II and III.
oit.% ..ts
Ap5reved FSAPOktice 200YFORP$0.
:1
Allen W. Dulles
Director
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LEGISLATION RE HY CENTRAL IELLIeNCE AGE
In seeking to develop the Career Service of the Central
Intelligence Agency, a detailed study was made of existing laws
in the field of personnel administration to determine their
applicability to CIA, and to ascertain what additional legis-
lation should be sought by CIA in order to strengthen its
Career Service. The basic requirements in this field, and
the supporting data which prompts the recommendations for
specific legislation, are set forth in the staff study of the
Legislative Task ?brae 'which is forwarded herewith. Our
subsequent study of these recommendations for proposed legis-
lation for CIA indicated that it would be highly desirable to
secure the following legislation:
a. Additional medical and hospitalization benefits to be
provided to CIA employees and their dependents when stationed
overseas.
b. Liberalized civil service retirement benefits providing
accelerated retirement credits which will permit retire-
ment at an earlier age than under the Civil Service Retirement
Act for CIA employees with overseas service to their credit.
Precedent exists for accelerated retirement in investigative
positions and would tend to support a credit of l, years for
each yecr of overseas Service and an additional credit of a
year for each year of such service at an unhealthful post.
However, current government thinking in this field is that
such an acceleration will bring about retirement of an
employee at an age where he still would have good productive
years available for the Government. Therefore, it is
believed that current governmental proposals will recommend
an increase of retirement annuity percentages fromli% to
2% for employees on hazardous service or with stated periods
of overseas service but will not accelerate the age of
retirement. CIA feels that the benefits of a Career Service
should include certain benefits for overseas or hazardous
service and, therefore, is prepared to recommend legislation
advocating either an accelerated retirement age or an
increased annuity percentage for its employees.
c. Current accumulations of statutory annual leave are not
sufficient to provide adequate home leave between tours of
duty overseas and still permit adequate annual leave to
employees during their tours abroad. It is our considered
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judgement that C/A employees should receive the same
statutory leave benefits as are now applied to members
of the Irereign Service; namely, the authority to
accumulate one week of home leave for each four months
of duty outside of the United States. Legislation
will be required in this connection.
Ct. Legislation in required to authorize CIA to defray
at least a part of the additional expense to employees
for the cost of primary and secondary education for the
children of employees stationed overseas. This will
serve to defray the high cost of educating children
overseas as opposed to the normal public school cost
in the United States.
It should be noted that the legislative revirement for
exemption for CIA from the provisions of the Performance Rating
Act of 1950 has already been met by inclusion of the exemption
as Section 601 (a) of P. L. 763 of the 83rd Congress,
It should be noted that Miming Persons legislation, Which
provides for the continuation of payments to dependents of those
missieg. in action, is currently in force, but only because the
expiration date of the present Act has been extended on a year-
to-year basis by succeeding sessions of the Congress. The
Department of Defense is charged with the preparation of
permanent Missing Persons legislation, and the Congress has
alsoindicated a desire to receive such legislation. The
necessity for such legislation for CIA employees is readily
apparent, and if it were not to be proposed on a government-
wide basis, it would be necessary for CIA to seek its own
authority in this field. All steps should be taken, however,
to resolve the long standing disagreements between the Depart-
ment of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget on this legis-
lation so that it may be passed in the current Congress. In
connection with the four major items for Career Service
legislation noted above, (medical benefits for dependents,
liberalized retirement benefits, statutory home leave benefits,
and educational allowances for dependents overseas), it should
be noted that the Government in each instance is considering
government...bride action. If a review of the draft legislation
on these government-wide proposals indicates that they will
support the necessities of the CIA Career Service, then separate
CIA legislation on these items will not be necessary. However,
if a finaldetermination is reached not to propose these items
on a government-wide basie, then CIA should be prepared to seek
its own legislation in this field. In any event, CIA is not in
a position to seek independent legislative action now since the
Bureau of the Budget would undoubtedly request the CIA to with-
hold Its proposals pending clarification of the over-all
Government program.
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In addition to the above, it is suggested that there should
be a reallocation of the positions of the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence in the official governmental
structure as established by the Executive Pay Act of 1949
(P. L. 359 - 61st Congress). This should change the position
of Director of Central Intelligence to a position equivalent to
that of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, and raise the position of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence from that of GS-18 to a position
equivalent to an Under Secretary of a Government Department.
In addition, authority similar to that granted in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 which authorizes the establishment of not
exceeding ten divisions, each to be headed by a Director, should
be given for the six principal assistants to the Director. These
six statutory positions would be allocated to the positions
presently designated as Deputy Director for Plans, Deputy Director
for Intelligence, Deputy Director for Administration, Special
Assistant for Plana and Coordination. Inspector General, and
General Counsel. It should be noted in the case of the General
Counsel that many agencies have the position of the principal
legal officer established by statute with appropriated compen.
elation in excess of the General Schedule. This has been continued
by recent statuatory actions placing the position of general
Counsel of the Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the
Legal Advisor of the Department of State at the Assistant
Secretary level. It is felt that this statutory reallocation
of Central Intelligence Agency positions will serve to place
them at a level commensurate with their responsibilities.
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17.
ICHAL CCHM1TTEE FOR THE CENIIRAL ISTELLIOENCE AOEHCY
1. There are four present proposals being considered in
connection with a "Watch DOg" Congressional Committee for the
Central Intelligence Agency.
2. The first proposal involves no change from Current
procedures. The Central Intelligente Agency requests for
appropriations are handled by special subcommittees of the Committees
on Appropriations and this procedure will be continued even if a
Joint Committee were established. Central Intelligence Agency
requests for substantive legislation are normally presented to
the Armed Services Committees of both Houses, except in those
instances where the legialation specifically falls within the
jurisdiction of other Committees. Thus, the 83rd Congress, the
legislation authorizing the position of Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, as well as the nominations of the Director and Deputy
Director, were handled by the Armed Services Committee. However,
certain exemptions for the Agency in connection with foreign atomic
energy information were quite properly included in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and certain
personnel legislation for CIA was included in legislation, before
the Committees on Post Office and Civil Service. Even tr a Joint
Committee on Central Intelligence had been in existence, the Atomic
Encrgy and personnel items would have been properly before these
other committees. It should also be noted that the status quo
appears to be preferred by the leadership of both Armed Services
Committees and the House Appropriations Committee, all of whom
have expressed strong opposition to a Joint Committee on Central
Intelligence.
3. The second proposal would be to have the Armed Services
Committees of both Houses establish subcommittees on Central Intel-
ligence composed of three members in each House, if the committee
meets jointly, and five members if they meet separately. (In those
instances where the Senate Armed Services Committee has held sub-
committee bearings on CIA in the past, the subcommittees have
consisted of five weer*. A three man subcommittee of the thirty-
six-man House Armed Services Committee may not be deemed to give
a sufficient spread). The proposal that the Armed Services Comaittees
set up a special subcommittee on Central Intelligence has merit as
all functional legislation for the Agency comes before these committees.
Therefore, it would appear that theme committees could best exercise
a "Watch Dog" position with regard to CIA. With appropriate aggressive
leadership, such subcommittees could request the referral of any
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complaints regarding CIA to themselves, and could rise to the
defense of the Agency when the latter is publicly attacked by
stating that they have already, or will immediately, look into
the subject matter of the attack.
4. The other two proposals involve the establishment of
special committees on Central Intelligente. One suggestion is
that a special joint committee be selected by the Vice President
and the Speaker of the House, and the second is that its members
be drawn from among the members of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of the two Houses.
5. In order to establish a joint Congressional committee,
it is necessary to have some form of legislative enactment. Thus,
the joint Congressional Committee =Atomic Energy is established
by the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954. However, the majority
of such committees are established in the individual Houses by
Senate or House resolutions, or by concurrent resolutions where
the committees are joint. These resolutions are expressions of
the will of the Congress and do not require. Presidential approval.
If a resolution is passed to establish a joint committee on
Central Intelligence, the standard language would authorize the
appointment of the Senate members by the President of the Senate
and the House members by the Speaker of the House. AS a normal
procedure, the majority and minority leaders are consulted in
these appointments, and their recommendations carry considerable
veight. The establishment of such a committee would normally
carry with it the standard authority requiring the production
of all testimooy, books and records, the holding of hearings
and the authority of subpoena. The Committee would also have
the authority to appoint a staff.
6. If the resolution provides specifically that the members
of such a joint committee Should be drawn from the members of the
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, it should be noted
that there is a general reluctance, at least in the House, for
Appropriations' Committee members to serve on joint committees,
where their substantive action might be considered binding on their
subsequent appropriation, action. The, appropriations authority
in so, jealously guarded that the sUbcommittees normally require
complete review of Agency activities rawness of the acts of
substantive committees authorizing such activities. The fact that
three or five senior members of the Appropriations Committee
were to sit as members of a Joint Committee on Centel Intelligence
would in no way Obviate the need for full hearings before the CIA
Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition, a resolution limiting
such a special subcommittee to selected members of the Armed
Services and Appropriations Subcommittees might well meet objection
from the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary, and
possibly from a new Joint Committee on Internal Security if one
were established.
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7. The fact that a substantial nuMber of Senators have proposed
a joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence reflects
Congressional feeling for greater Congressional knowledge of the
activities of CIA. This would tend to indicate that the first
alternative.namely the retention of the status quo in CIA--
Congressional relations it no longer advisable. On the other heed,
it should be reiterated that there are leaders in the Congress
who feel that there should be no change in the current relationship.
a. In connection with the alternative to establish a Joint
Committee on Central Intelligence, the following points Should be
noted:
a. If such a Committee were established, its jurisdiction
should be United to organizational and administrative matters
and not include review of CIA operations as such. /f a Joint
Committee were to attempt to substitute its judgement for that
of the Executive Branch, or exercise a veto power over specific
operations, a serious Constitutional problem involving the
doctrine of separation of powers would certainly arise.
b. The greatest care would have to be taken in selecting
the members of this joint Committee, and for security reasons
it Should be kept to the smallest possible size, preferable
three members from each House.
c. A Joint Committee would require a special staff which
would eventually come into possession of more information
regarding the secret operations of the American intelligence
service than is possessed by any but a few of the most senior
officials of the Agency. This presents a serious security
problem.
d. The workload of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence
mould be comparatively smell. The Central Intelligente Agency
averages about one piece of legislation a year as opposed to the
Atomic Energy Commission which has about twenty bills a Session.
The many pane facets of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission
includes the operation of towns, adjudication of ;stint claim
peacetime applications of atomic energy, etc. This presents a
heavy workload for the joint Committee on Atomic Energy Which
would not be present in connection with CIA. A light workload
would tend to justify a separate joint Committee and staff,
but would tend to support the proposition that existing
Congressional Committees--namely Armed Services--could include
CIA within their own jurisdiction.
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9. In view of the above, it would appear to be preferable
if the Armed Services Committees would exercise jurisdiction
(either jointly or separately) over CIA. This jurisdiction is
amply supported by the standing rules or the Senate and the House.
These Committees could!, be informed on the general activities of
the Agency, and its administration, and could continue to handle
the Agency's substantive legislation. They could be focal points
for complaints forwarded to the Congress and serve as the Notch
Dog" of the Congress in connection with the Agency. The forthright
acceptance by the Armed Services Committee of this responsibility
would go a long way toward answering the implied criticisms of
those who feel that the Congress is not sufficiently informed
regarding the Agency, and would not raise the serious problems
which would be inherent in a separate Joint Committee on Central
Intelligence.
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Il (A). BILLS TO =AMISH A JOI1 COMMITTES ON
J.:110ka3?xilb INTO Tit 83rd COMMRitt
Several bills were introduced into the 83rd Congress to tab-
a Joint Committee with supervision of the Central Intelligence
y or the intelligence function generally.
(1) S. Con. Res. 42 (introduced by Senator Mansfield) and
H. Con. Res. 167 (introduced. by Congressman Patterson) established
a Joint Committee_ on Central Intelligence to be composed of nine
members each from the Senate and the Rouse. ?. Con. Res. 69 (intro-
duced by Senator Mansfield with twenty-four co-sponsors) and H. COn.
Use. 216 and 217 (introduced by Congressmen Richards and Browuson
respectively) were identical, except the membership was to be
composed of five members from each House. These bills provided
that the Joint Committee study the activities of CIA and problems
relating to the gathering of intelligence relating to the natinrs1
security and of its coordination and utilization by the various
agencies of the Government. CIA Shall keep the joint Committee fully
and currently informed with respect to its activities. All legielation
and other matters relating primarily to CIA shall be referred to the
Joint Committee.
The Director of Central Intelligence has held several extremely
cordial conversations with Senator Mansfield regarding his legislation,
'which the Senator introduced with a firm conviction that it would be
most helpful to CIA. rolloving the introduction of S. Con. Use. 42
which called for a. Joint Committee of eighteen members, Senator
Mansfield came to the conclusion that such a Committee would be too
large in view of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter. As a
result, he introduced S. Con. Res. 69, which called for a ten member
Joint Committee. Subsequent conversations with Senator Mansfield
Indicate that at present he would tend to prefer a small Joint Com-
mittee appointed by the Vice-President and. the Speaker, or selected
from the membership of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.
(2) H. Con. Res. 168 and 169 (introduced by Congressmen Kelley
and Zablocki respectively) established a Joint Committee an Intelligence
Matters to be composed of nine members each from the Senate and the
House. These resolutions were similar to those on the Central Intel-
ligence Agency alma, except that they were broadened to include
related intelligence services" as well.
(3) H. J. Res. 473 (introduced by Congressman McCarthy) was even
broader and established a Joint Committee on Information, Intelllgence,
and Security.
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(4) H. FL 9660 (introduced by Congressman inghuysen) estab-
bed a Commission on United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,
composed of five members to be appointed by the President and two
each from the Senate and the House. The Commission was to make a full
and complete investigation and study of the foreign intelligence activities
of the United States and of the security of our intelligence agencies
from penetration by subversion. It was also to study the questions
of overlapping and duplication, staffing, and efficiency.
None of these proposals were reported out of Ccamittee.
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III. JUSTlYICATION FOR A NEW CIA HEADQUkRTERS BUI ING
1. A new CIA headquarters building in which office space would
be provided for the entire Agency would result in improved security,
increased efficiency, and greater economy.
Security:
a. Office space for the Agency is now located in thirty-
three separate, dispersed buildings, twenty-nine of
which are temporary, converted-type structures.
b. There is a substantial security risk in the transfer of
many highly sensitive papers between these various,
widely dispersed offices on a continuing basis.
c. No reasonable expense or effort would secure these tem-
porary structures sufficiently to insure against force-
able entry by unauthorized persons nor is it possible
to maintain a satisfactory standard of fire prevention
in these structures in which some of the most sensi-
tive and vital clandestine documents in or available to
this Government are housed, It would be virtmeny
in-
possible to replace these documents and to attempt to
do so would necessitate undertaking a program involv-
ing years of operations and an expenditure of money in
the millions of dollars.
Efficiencv
a. For security reasons, perhaps as much as fifty per cent
of the Agency's business cannot be conducted over the
telephone but must be conducted in personal conferences.
For example: Considering time in transit, a minimum of
one hour is necessary for an individual located in the .
Potomac Perk area to conduct one-half hour's business
with an individual located in the Administration
Building.
b. During Fiscal Year 1954 six Agency shuttle buaee an
twenty passenger vehicles transported more than
passengers in the conduct of Agency business.
mated ninety-five per cent of the time lost in transit
would be saved if the entire Agency were quartered in
one building.
C. Timeliness in intelligence is of paramount importance.
Meaningful reports can, in many instances, only be made
after consulting central files and library facilities
which it is impossible to make easily accessible to in-
telligence analysts in our present dispersed situation.
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d. The design and deteriorating condition of presently
assigned temporary buildings are prejudicial to good
management, efficiency, morals, and working conditions
in general.
Boon
Tensible monetary annual savings as estimated below could
be expected from the consolidation of headquarters
activities in one building. It is also emphasized that
either the additional savings or additional productivity
to be expected from such consolidation are not included
in these estimates.
Item
Present Cost
Btt.Cost in
One ButldLn
Est, Savings
in One Bldg.
Guard Service
Reception Staff
401,1730000
110,000
$320,000
304000
$853,000
8of000
Shuttle Service
36,800
--..
36,800
Couriers & Messengers
213,200
143,300
69,900
Telephone Mileage
32,800
--__
32,800
Building Services
Officers
125,000
75,000
50,000
Rents
133,500
MP NW 110. ??
133,500
Maintenance &
Alterations
11332,000
300,000
10032,000
Loss. of Time
607,000
----
607,000
TWX Service
45,000
20,000
25,000
TOTALS
41,868,300
?
853,300
$2,920,000
2. Considerations inherent in the situation outlined abcme have
long indicated the high desirability of providing headquarters space
for the Central Intelligence Agency in one permanent building. This
matter is now acute because of recent Congressional approval for the
construction of a new highvay bridge across the Potomac River which
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would result in the removal of several of the temporary structures
to which CIA is now assigned. In addition, there are concerted efforts
to cause the removal of the remaining temporary buildings assigned to
this Agency in the west Potomac Peek area. It is our understanding
that the Secretary of the Interior has in fact been charged with the
removal of these temporary structures at the earliest possible date.
Inasmuch as the Oeneral Services Administration has indicated that
there is no other "'pace available for assignment to this Agency
new construction appears to be absolutely essential.
3. Permanent enabling legislation has been granted by the Congress
for the construction of a new CIA headquarters building in the amount
of $ 81o00,000. nada, however, have not been appropriated for this
purpose. Conferences with the &meal Services Administration and the
Bureau of the Budget indicate that such new construction could be under-
taken either through the use of appropriated funds or a lease-purchase
arrangement.
4. It is essential that the Director be immediately available to
the President and the National Security Council. There are also an
estimated fifty to one hundred of CIA's senior staff who must be in
close daily oontact with personnel of other agencies, particularly
the Departments of State and Defense, and who must also be immediately
available to the Director as well as to those components of the Agency
under their supervision and upon Which they are dependent for support.
The necessity for such close and expeditious coordination within the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Conumnity dictates
that the entire Agency be at one location not more than a few miles
distant from the White House.
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