REPORT ON GENERAL TAYLOR'S MISSION TO SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000200030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 195
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT ON
GENERAL TAYLOR'S MISSION
TO SOUTH VIETNAM
3 NOVEMBER 1961
USAID, NSC, DOS, JCS reviews completed
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LLL
TAB
Letter of Transmittal, General Taylor to the President A
Personal recornmerdations of General Taylor in response
to the letter of the President to General Taylor of 13
October 1961 (With attacirnents of draft memora. :izt to
the heads of the responsible departments and agencies).
Mission evaluations and conclusions of the situation in
South Vietnam.
Appendices of supporting information (with personal
recommendations of individual mission members)
Military (Appendix A)
Including
General Statement
II - Repuotic of Vietnam Armed Forces
III - Republic of Vietnam Army
IV - Republic of Vietnam Navy
V - Republic of Vietnam Air Force
VI - Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps
VII - Intelligence
VIII - Logistics
IX - Summary
Political (Appendix B)
NSC review(s) completed.
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SUBJECT
Int rnal Political Situation in South Vietnam (Appendix C)
Ec ,aornic Aid to Vietnam (Appendix D)
MiAG and Military Aid (Appendix E)
Fr ,ntier Force, Vietnam (Appendix I')
Ur:onventional Warfare (Appendix CI)
Rcsearch and Development (Appendix H)
Ccvert (Appendix I)
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SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
My dear Mr. President:
3 November 1961
I am submitting herewith the report of the mission which
visited South Vietnam, Thailand, and Hong Kong in the period
15 October to 3 November 1961 in compliance with your letter
to me of 13 October 1961. We avoided Laos on our trip on the
recommendation of Ambassador Brown who, with Brigadier
General Boyle, his MAAG Chief, came to Bangkok to discuss
the Laos situation with us. In addition to Dr. Rostow, the
members of my party included representatives of State, ICA,
Defense, JCS, and CIA.
My recommendations, already laid before you by cable,
represent the emergency program which we feel our Govern-
ment should implement without delay. After you have reached
a decision on this program, it will be a major challenge to our
governmental machinery in Washington to e that the many
segments of the program which involve many departments and
agencies are executed with maximum energy and proper timing.
I would suggest that a formalized procedure be established and
promulgated to assure effective and orderly implementation.
While we feel that the program recommended represents
those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge
of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is
the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon
the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which
Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the
Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South
Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of
guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have
to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance,
The President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
err,
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training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international
boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders.
Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the
party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike
the source of aggression, after the fact of External aggression
is clearly established? It is our view that our government
should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures outlined
herein, but should then consider and face the broader question
beyond.
We cannot refrain from Expressing, having seen the
situation on the ground, our common sense of outrage at the
burden which this kind of aggression imposes on a new country,
only seven years old, with a difficult historical heritage to
overcome, confronting the inevitable problems of political,
social, and economic transition to modernization. It is easy
and cheap to destroy such a country whereas it is difficult
undisturbed to build a nation coming out of a complex past
without carrying the burden of a guerrilla war.
We were similarly struck in Thailand with the injustice
of subjecting this promising nation in transition to the heavy
military burdens it faces in fulfilling its role in SEATO
security planning along with the guerrilla challenge beginning
to form up on its northeast frontier.
It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the
United States must decide how it will cope with Krushchev's
"wars of liberation" which are really para-wars of guerrilla
aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique
which bypasses our traditional political and military responses.
While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report,
it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to
Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack
the source of guerrilla a........1gIession in,North Vietnan,. and
impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating
in the current war which is commensurate with the damage
being inflicted on its neighbors to the south.
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In closing, let me add that our party left Southeast Asia
with the sense of having viewed a serious problem but one
which is by no means hopeless. We have many assets in this
part of the world which, if properly combined and appropriately
supported, offer high odds for ultimate success.
Basically the forces at work in Vietnam, Thailand, and
iHong Kong are extremely ositive in cha3Agra.4. Everywhere
there is new activity and momentum. In the long run there is
no reason to believe that the rate of growth and the degree of
modernization in non-Communist Asia as a whole will be
outpaced by developments in Communist Asia. There is no
need for fatalism that, somehow, Southeast Asia will inevitably
fall into Communist hands. We have the means to make it
otherwise.
Sincerely yours,
TAYLOR
3 D.
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EMPTY WHEN RECEIVED ?
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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
At the present time, the Communists are pursuing a clear and system-
atic strategy in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy of extending Communist
power and influence in ways which bypass U.S. nuclear strength, U.S.
conventional naval, air, and ground forces, and the conventional strength
of indigenous forces in the area. Their strategy is rooted in the fact
that international law and practice does not yet recognize the mounting
of guerrilla war across borders as aggression justifying counter-attack
at the source.
The strategy is a variant on Mao's classic three-stage offensive. First,
a political base for guerrilla war, subversion, and dissidence is
established in each country in the area, exploiting its unique vulnera-
bilities via trained local or introduced cadres. Second, guerrilla war
is begun. Third, a maximum effort is made to translate the Communist
position achieved on the ground, plus the weakness and cross-purposes
in the non-Communist camp, to induce a neutralist interim solution,
blocking the U.S. military presence, as with the proposed renunciation
by Laos of SEATO protection. Complete Communist take-over, by what-
ever means may appear feasible, is the evident ultimate objective.
Mao's third stage -- overt conventional warfare, with guerrillas in an
? ancillary role -- is apparently now judged too dangerous to pursue, on
the grounds that it is likely to trigger U.S. (or SEATO) intervention.
This modified Mao strategy is actually underway in Laos and South
Vietnam. Cambodia, with Sihanouk's anticipatory collaboration, has;
already adjusted to the likelihood (in his view) that the Communist
strategy will succeed. The strategy is clearly foreshadowed in Thailand.
The initial bases for such a program have been laid in Malaya, Indonesia,
and Burma; but they will probably not be exploited to the full until the
South Vietnam struggle is favorably resolved. The Communists
undoubtedly believe -- and with good reason -- that if the strategy
succeeds in Laos and South Vietnam the enterprise will rapidly gather
momentum throughout Southeast Asia.
This is not the only possible Communist strategy in Southeast Asia.
An overt use of Viet-Minh and Chicom divisions is conceivable, although
the terrain and logistical structure of Southeast Asia sets a relatively
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low limit on the scale of conventional engagement in that theater. And
it is in the range of possible contingencies that such a direct attack
might be backed by some Soviet nuclear power. But current strategy
is as described.
COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
In South Vietnam the tactical application of this general strategy is now
in an advanced stage. An internally organized guerrilla war is being
conducted in the South, recently expanded and. strengthened with profes-
sional cadres. A second front of military pressure has been built up
in the Central Plateau, with significant components of infiltration via
Laos and the systematic exploitation of Montagnard and sect dissidence.
In addition, a pocket of reserve strength is organized above Saigon in
Zone D (perhaps 1500 troops), available for a climactic strike in the
context of a political crisis. The Viet-Cong command a capability for
considerable terroristic activity in and around Saigon.
The military strategy being pursued is, evidently, to pin down the ARVN
on defensive missions; to create a pervasive sense of insecurity and
frustration by hit-and-run raids on self-defense corps and militia units,
ambushing the reserve forces if possible as they come up to defend;
and to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build, by the
assassination of officials and the sabotage of public works.
Meanwhile a reserve force of unknown size and capability is being
created in the forests and mountains surrounding the plateau, straddling
the Laos (and possibly Cambodian) border which offers a supply base,
a relatively secure infiltration route, and safe haven. Depending on its
size and capability, this force could be used for a series of demoralizing
raids on the citieis of the plateau, on the model of the raids on Phouc
Thanh. It could attempt to seize and hold the Kontum-Pleiku area,
declaring, as in Xieng Khouang, a new government to be recognized by
Bloc states. It could by-pass the plateau cities and, by infiltration down
to the sea, isolate the coastal cities much as the Mekong cities have
been isolated by the Pathet-Lao.
One of the most important facts about the situation in Vietnam is that
the size and capabilities of the Viet-Cong forces in the plateau are not
known. Its capabilities could range from a mere capacity to continue'
to harrass, to a capacity, when surfaced, of prochicing a Dien Bien Phu.
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On current evidence we lean to a conservative assessment of this force
(perhaps 4000); but it justifies a concentrated intelligence effort, and a
quick-action contingency plan, as well as the specific action proposed
in the appendices. (See, especially, Appendix F, Frontier Force
Vietnam.)
Despite the considerable guerrilla capabilities of the Viet-Cong,
Communist strategy now appears, on balance, to aim at an essentially
political denouement rather than the total military capture of the
country, as in the case of Mao's campaign in China. A maximum effort
is under way to increase political disaffection at every level; among
the sects, the minority groups, the trade unions, the students, and the
intellectuals. Energetic efforts to dramatize the weaknesses of Diem's
regime and to induce discouragement about U.S. policy in Laos and
Southeast Asia generally are being pursued. The enemy objective
seems to be to produce a political crisis by a combination of military
and non-military means out of which would come a South Vietnamese
Souvanna Phoum.a, willing to contemplate unification on terms accept-
able to Hanoi, including disengagement from the U.S.
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT
On the following page is the best evaluation available of the Viet-Cong
Order of Battle in South Vietnam and Casualty and Combat Rates for
1961.
The relatively modest increase in the scale of the Viet-Cong forces in
1961 in the southern region (NAMBO) was accompanied by a sharp in-
crease in organization in which the infiltration of cadres from the north
probably played a significant part. A more substantial increase occurred
in 1961 in the northern region (Inter sector Five). Appendix A(I) suggests
an over-all expansion of Viet-Cong forces from 12, 000 in July to 16, 500
at the present time.
The Casualty and Combat Rate figures, which MAAG believes to be not
grossly inaccurate, indicate the peak in Viet-Cong activity in connec-
tion with the April election and then the second more radical increase
in Viet-Cong attacks in August and September. In September there was
a doubling of Vietnamese casualties and a much less than proportionate
increase in casualties inflicted on the Viet-Cong. This is a statistical
reflection of the situation which helped bring on the present crisis. In
October the increased casualty rate persisted.
Although the main weight of Viet-Cong attack remains in the well organized
southern area (ILI Corps), there was a sharp rise in incidents and casual-
ties taken in the II Corps Area (Pleiku-Kontum) in August and September.
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Estimate of Viet-Cong Strength in South Vietnam
July - October, 1961
REGULAR FORCES
July
October
Narnbo Region
8, 150
9, 000
Interzone 5
0*
0*
Total
8,150
9,000
REGIONAL FORCES
Nambo Region
0*
0*
Interzone 5
6,200
7,000
Total
6, 200
7, 000
Over-all Total
14,350
16,000
*It is assumed VC forces exist in these categories but their presence
is not confirmed by hard evidence.
Casualties and Combat Rate:
Vietnam 1961
Casualties**
Attacks
Viet-Gong Incidents
Sabotage
Viet-
Cong GVN
Terrorism
Jan
2449
615
148
180
89
Feb
1569
583
143
147
106
Mar
2429
610
241
354
118
Apr
2212
850
309
382
149
May
1397
671
124
344
86
Jun
1551
500
163
398
89
Jul
2376
746
189
479
216
Aug
1574
676
408
337
124
Sep
1877
1314.
440
439
100
Oct
2004
1400
N. E,
N. E?
*Figures supplied by MAAG Saigon from GVN data.
**Included - killed, wounded, and captured, for Viet-Cong. Same
categories for GVN, regular, militia, and self-defense corps, combined.
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VIET-CONG WEAKNESSES
Although much in Saigon and South Vietnam recalls vividly the Indo-China
War, the analogy is inexact. The position of the Viet-Cong (and Ho Chi
Minh) is substantially different from that of the Viet Minh forces when
fighting the French in the early 1950's.
-- The Communists no longer carry persuasively the banners of
? national independence against colonial rule.
-- Their guerrilla forces must rely primarily on terror, intimi-
dation, and the notion that U. S. weakness makes the Viet-Cong the local
wave of the future.
-- The Viet Cong cannot safely engage their forces against the GVN
regulars and North Vietnam cannot engage its divisional strength for
fear of U. S. action. The Viet-Cong rely primarily on southern recruits
and southerners trained in the north and re-introduced.
-- The need to conceal Hanoi's directing role imposes important
limitations on infiltration and supply routes and on tactics generally.
It must be remembered that the 1959 political decision in Hanoi to launch
the guerrilla and political campaign of 1960-61 arose because of Diem's
increasing success in stabilizing his rule and moving his country for-
ward in the several preceding years. Meanwhile, word has spread
throughout Vietnam that Hanoi's rule ha s led to brutality and hunger.
Men may believe that Hanoi is the wave of the future and a route to uni-
fication; but the Communist performance in the North is not admired.
The considerable grandeur of the Viet Minh in the early 1950's has been
largely dissipated. By comparison, this is a pretty shabby offensive,
both militarily and politically, although potentially lethal. The maximum
estimate of voluntary, positive support for the Communists in South
Vietnam is about 200,000 or 2 per cent of the population. (Appendix )
This is a Vietnamese estimate. The official U.S. estimate is about
half this level.
Finally, the Communists now not only have something to gain -- the
South -- but a base to risk -- the North -- if war should come.
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THE CRISIS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
It is perfectly evident that South Vietnam is now undergoing an acute
crisis of confidence, stretching from the top to the bottom of the country.
The principal elements involved in this crisis are clear enough:
1. Uncertainty about the seriousness of the American commitment
to defend South Vietnam induced by the Laos negotiation. Many believe
that the U.S. will be prepared to settle for a Souvarma in Saigon.
Z. The September successes of the Viet-Cong, indicating an enemy
capability of outstripping the build-up of ARVN capabilities. (It should
be recalled that the infiltration of one guerrilla imposes the burden of
increasing GVN forces by, perhaps, fifteen men to stay even.) The
military frustration of the past two months has, in turn, made acute,
throughout the administration, a dissatisfaction with Diem's method
of rule, with his lack of identification with his people, and with his
strategy which has been endemic for some years.
3. The flood, imposing a heavy economic and administrative
burden on an already strained government and society.
Beneath the surface of this immediate crisis are two vicious circles
which have been operating for many months in South Vietnam and which
the improvement in atmosphere in tie months preceding September
tended only superficially to conceal.
The first vicious circle is military. The lack of firm and well organized
operational intelligence has helped produce a defensive disposition of
forces to guard against Viet-Cong attack -- a stance perhaps inherited
to some degree from the French and not effectively corrected by subse-
quent U. S. training. This defensive stance has drawn 80 to 85 per cent
of the ARVN, including the bulk of the specially trained Ranger Force,
into essentially static tasks. Thus, initiative has been conceded to the
enemy.
This, in turn, has made worse a bad system of civil-military relations.
The bulk of the military forces remain in control of the Province Chiefs
because it is their responsibility to protect the population and installa-
tions of their areas; a defensive strategy thus automatically puts the
bulk of the military in their hands. When enemy attacks take place,
forces are brought up from reserve too slowly to be effective, due to
a lack of effective command and control, communications, and mobility.
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A very high proportion of ARVN casualties (perhaps 90 per cent) results
from ambushes which derive directly, in turn, from these operational
characteristics. The consequent inability effectively to protect the
people leads, in turn, to a drying up of the basic sources of intelligence
and limits the government's ability to raise recruits.
Thus, poor intelligence, poor command and control arrangements, and
poor mobility reinforce each other, leading to a defensive military dis-
position of resources and a progressive deterioration in the military
position of the ARVN.
The second vicious circle, interwoven with the first, is political. As is
widely understood, Diem's instinctive administrative style is that of an
old fashioned Asian ruler, seeking to maintain all the strings of power
in his own hands, while fragmenting power beneath him. The inability
to mobilize intelligence effectively for operational purposes directly
flows from this fact, as do the generally poor relations between the
Province Chiefs and the military commanders, the former being Diem's
reliable agents, the latter a power base he fears. The consequent
frustration of Diem's military comiranders -- a frustration well known
to Diem and heightened by the November 1960 coup -- leads him to
actions which further complicate his problem; e. g., his unwillingness
to delegate military operations clearly to his generals.
Beyond the military circle, Diem's operating style and the personal
political insecurity it has generated leads him to mistrust excessively
many- intellectuals and others of the younger generation who are badly
needed to give his administration vitality and contact with the people.
Many of these men and women are profoundly anti-Communist and capable
of constructive use in the national effort; but, on the sidelines ( or
frustrated within the administration), they sperrl their efforts in com-
plaints against the regime, while their country sinks towards a Communist
take-over they do not want.
THE ASSETS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Despite these interwoven military and political vicious circles, South
Vietnam has considerable assets in the struggle for its independence.
1. Armed forces of 170, 000 regulars, of better quality than the
Viet-Cong guerrillas, if it can bring the Communists to engagement; a
Civil Guard of 64, 000, of whom about 20 per cent have been well retrained
(but lack officers); a Self-Defense Corps of 53, 000, poorly equipped and
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trained, but capable of improvement; a small but capable Air Force
whose capacities are rendered ineffective by lack of target intelligence
and a frustrating command structure; a somewhat woebegone Navy,
whose potentialities are still to be established; a small, but excellent,
Marine Corps of three battalions. In short, Vietnam has real military
assets if they can be organized to engage the Viet-Cong. (Although it
would almost certainly require external assistance if the North Vietnam
divisions were to attack.)
Z. With all his weaknesses, Diem has extraordinary ability,
stubbornness, and guts.
3. Despite their acute frustration, the men of the Armed Forces
and the administration respect Diem to a degree which gives their
grumbling (and perhaps some plotting) a somewhat half-hearted
character; and they are willing -- by and large -- to work for him, if
he gives them a chance to do their jobs.
4. Within the military and non-military establishment, a new genera-
tion of younger men in their 30's is beginning to emerge with a strong
will to get on with the job. Some of the new military commanders we
met (in divisions, Rangers, Marines) are clearly dedicated, first-class,
modern men of whom any nation could be proud. The same is true at
the middle level of the bureaucracy.
5. The Vietnam economy, in both its agricultural and manufacturing
sectors, has demonstrated, despite the pressures of the insurgency, an
astonishing resilience.
6. Despite the intellectuals who sit on the side lines and complain;
despite serious dissidence among the Montagnards, the sects, and
certain old Viet Mirth areas; despite the apathy and fear of the Viet-Cong
in the countryside, the atmosphere in South Vietnam is, on balance, one
of frustrated energy rather than passive acceptance of inevitable defeat.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly, however, that time has nearly run
out for converting these assets into the bases for victory. Diem himself--
and all concerned with the fate of the country--are looking to American
guidance and aid to achieve a turning point in Vietnam's affairs.. From
all quarters in Southeast Asia the message on Vietnam is the same:
vigorous American action is needed to buy time for Vietnam to mobilize
and organize its real assets; but the time for such a turn around has
nearly run out. And if Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly difficult if
not impossible to hold Southeast Asia. What will be lost is not merely a
crucial piece of real estate, but the faith that the U.S. has the will and
the capacity to deal with the Communist offensive in that area.
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A STRATEGY FOR TURNING THE TIDE AND FOR ASSUMING THE
OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM
The elements required for buying time and assuming the offensive in
Vietnam are, in the view of this mission, the following:
1. A quick U.S. response to the present crisis which would
demonstrate by deeds -- not merely words -- the American commitment
seriously to help save Vietnam rather than to disengage in the most con-
manner p t
ossible.et nam f some u s
. To be persuasive this military
f
commitment must
vslit\ Ilinclude the
sending
2. A shift in the American relation to the Vietnamese effort from
advice to limited partnership. The present character and scale of the
war in South Vietnam decree that only the Vietnamese can defeat the
Viet-Cong; but at all levels Americans must, as friends and partners --
not as arms-length advisors -- show them how the job might be done --
not tell them or do it for them.
3. Through this working association at all levels, the U.S. must
bring about de facto changes in Diem's method of administration and
seek to bring all elements of the Vietnamese Government closer to the
Vietnamese people -- thus helping break the vicious political circle.
4. By concurrent actions in the fields of intelligence, command
and control, mobility, and training, the U.S. must bring about a situation
where an effective reserve is mobilized and brought to bear offensively
on clearly established and productive offensive targets -- thus helping
break the vicious military circle.
5. In a number of fields, U.S. initiative with the Vietnamese can
help immediately to launch certain limited offensive operations.
6. Certain concrete, limited research and development possibilities
must be quickly geared into field operations.
7. The program of economic and military aid to Vietnam must be
focused on measures which will not merely permit Vietnam to survive
and to deal with the flood, but also to support the specific elements in
the strategy outlined above.
8. The proposed program for dealing with the flood is an opportunity
to make headway in a critical southern area, on both military and
political fronts. It involves all action elements, including logistical
elements of the U.S. military task force proposed elsewhere.
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Behind this concept of a strategy to turn the tide and to assume the
offensive lies a general proposition: when an interacting process is
yielding a degenerative situation, the wisest course of action is to create
a positive thrust at as many points as are accessible. No one action --
not even the removal of Diem -- is the key to success in Vietnam. Each
of the elements listed as essential to this strategy must play its part.
The balance of this summary examines individually the specific elements
in the proposed general strategy.
A QUICK LIFT
It is evident that morale in Vietnam will rapidly crumble -- and in South-
east Asia only slightly less quickly -- if the sequence of expectations set
in motion by Vice President Johnson's visit and climaxed by General
Taylor's mission are not soon followed by a hard U.S. commitment to
the ground in Vietnam.
Technically, all that is involved at this stage in these proposals is that
we announce that, due to Viet Minh aggression across South Vietnam's
frontier, we are setting aside our dilute and conditional assent to the
1954 Geneva Accords, lifting the MAAG ceiling, and assuming full free-
dom of U.S. action until that aggression ceases and South Vietnam's
independence is assured.
On July 21, 1954, General Smith declared that the U.S. "would view
any renewal of the aggression in violation of the Agreements with grave
concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."
The Jorden Report provides a clear basis for invoking this proviso. In
combination, these two elements of reservation and evidence should
permit us to present to the U.N. the same kind of case for our actions
as was presented on August 13, 1958, by President Eisenhower, in the
context of the Lebanon-Jordan crisis. (See, especially, Section I of
Eisenhower's speech.)
The sequence we have in mind to implement the strategy and the pro-
posals outlined in this report is something like the following, which we
present for illustrative purposes and to supply some concreteness.
There would be considerable advantage in shortening the timetable.
1. Week of November 5: Study and decision on General Taylor's
recommendations. Completion of Jorden Report. Planning of United
Nations track.
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2. Week of November 12: Indication to Diem that we are prepared
to receive a request for aid along the lines the President may decide;
consultation with Congressional leaders; indication to Allies (including
SEATO) of what we plan to do; exchange of letters between Diem and
President, including understandings which cannot be made public (e. g.
relative to intelligence and covert operations).
3. Week of November 19: Publication of sanitized presidential
letters; movement of first U.S. units to Vietnam (preferably flood task
force, helicopters, Jungle Jim); publication of Jorden Report; Presi-
dential presentation of U.S. case to U. N. (or presidential presentation
to U.S. public and Stevenson presentation to the U. N,), A special
session of Congress to receive a presidential message and to pass a
resolution of support might be considered as one method for preparing
to implement the suggested program. A quiet message to the U.S.S.R.
should be dispatched indicating that we propose to help defend South
Vietnam and urging Moscow to use its influence with Ho Chi Minh to
call his dogs off, mind his business, and feed his people.
Included in the sequence above should be a review of contingency plans,
designed to back the initial steps; a general review of plans with respect
to Southeast Asia in relation to Berlin; and decision as to whether
further call-up of U.S. reserves is required to provide ready forces up
to the nuclear threshold for Southeast Asia as well as for Berlin.
, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this mission's effort is the unanimity
of view -- individually arrived at by the specialists involved -- that what
is now required is a shift from U.S. advice to limited partnership and
working collaboration with the Vietnamese. The present war cannot be
won by direct U.S. action; it must be won by the Vietnamese. But
there is a general conviction among us that the Vietnamese performance
in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are pre-
pared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems.
Moreover, there is evidence that Diem is, in principle, prepared for
this step, and that most -- not all -- elements in his establishment are
eagerly awaiting it.
There is a second conclusion. We have attempted to answer the political
and psychological question: would the more substantial involvement of
Americans be counter-productive (see especially Appendix G)? Our
conclusion -- based on experience and judgment in Vietnam, Laos, and
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Thailand -- is the following. If Americans come in and go to work side
by side with the Vietnamese, preferably outside Saigon, the net effect
will almost certainly be positive. The danger lies in excessive head-
quarters establishments and a failure to do palpably serious jobs.
The record of U. S. -Asian relations in field tasks is excellent.
After all, the United States is not operating in Southeast Asia in order
to recreate a colonial system doomed by history; it is attempting to
permit new nations to find their feet and to make an independent future.
Despite Communist propaganda, this is widely understood. When
Americans work hard and effectively in this area, they meet friendship.
Such side by side partnership requires, of course, men of tact, strongly
motivated to come and to get on with the task. They must be led at
every level by Americans of first rate technical competence, imagina-
tion and human sympathy. It is our conviction that such Americans
exist and can be recruited for the specific tasks listed below. On the
other hand, the selection of personnel for these operations must be
done with extreme care. The operation will fail if the U. S. is not
willing to contribute its best men to the effort in adequate numbers an d
to keep them in the field for substantial periods.
Following are the specific categories where the introduction of U.S.
working advisors or working military units are suggested in the appen-
dices -- an asterisk indicating where such operations are, to some
degree, under way.
-- A high level government advisor or advisors. Gene ral Lansdale
has been requested by Diem; and it may be wise to envisage a limited
number of Americans -- acceptable to Diem as well as to us -- in key
ministries. (Appendices C and G.)
-- A Joint U. S. -Vietnamese Military Survey, down to the provincial
level, in each of three corps areas, to make recommendations with
respect to intelligence, command and control, more economical and
effective passive defense, the build-up of a reserve for offensive pur-
pages, military-province-chief relations, etc. (Appendix B? )
-- Joint planning of offensive operations, including Border Control
Operations. *(Appendices A, F, and I,)
-- Intimate liaison with the Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organi-
zations (C. I. 0.); with each of the seven intelligence services; and with
the intelligence collection process at the provincial level. (Appendix )
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Jungle Jim. *(Appendix A.)
Counter infiltration operations in Laos. *(Appendix F.)
Increased covert offensive operations in North as well as in
Laos and South Vietnam. *(Appendix I,)
-- The introduction, under MAAG operational control, of three
helicopter squadrons -- one for each corps area -- and the provision
of more light aircraft, as the need may be established. (Appendix A.)
-- A radical increase in U.S. trainers at every level from the
staff colleges, where teachers are short -- to the Civil Guard and
Self-Defense Corps, where a sharp expansion in competence may prove
the key to mobilizing a reserve for offensive operations. (Appendices
A and E.)
-- The introduction of engineering and logistical elements within
the proposed U.S. military task force to work in the flood area within
the Vietnamese plan, on both emergency and longer term recon-
struction tasks. (Appendix A,)
-- A radical increase in U.S. special force teams in Vietnam:
to work with the Vietnamese Ranger Force proposed for the border
area (Appendix F); to assist in unit training, including training of
Clandestine Action Service. (Appendices A and I.)
-- Increase in MAAG support for the Vietnamese Navy.
*(Appendix A.)
-- Introduction of U.S. Naval and/or Coast Guard personnel to
assist in coastal and river surveillance and control, until Vietnamese
naval capabilities can be improved. (Appendix A.)
-- Reconsideration of the role of air power, leading to more effec-
tive utilization of assets now available, including release from political
control of the 14 D-6 aircraft, institution of close-support techniques,
and better employment of available weapons. (Appendix A-V)
To execute this program of limited partnership requires a change in the
charter, the spirit, and the organization of the MAAG in South Vietnam.
It must be shifted from an advisory group to something nearer -- but
not quite -- an operational headquarters in a theater of war. The
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objective of this shift is clear. The U. S. should become a limited
partner in the war, avoiding formalized advice on the one hand, trying
to run the war, on the other. Such a transition from advice to partner-
ship has been made in recent months, on a smaller scale, by the MAAG
in Laos.
Among the many consequences of this shift up uld be the rapid build-up
of an intelligence capability both to identify operational targets for the
Vietnamese and to assist Washington in making a sensitive and reliable
assessment of the progress of the war. The basis for such a unit
already exists in Saigon in the Intelligence Evaluation Center. It must
be quickly expanded. (Appendix I.)
In Washington, as well, intelligence and back-up operations must be
put on a quasi-wartime footing.
REFORMING DIEM'S ADMINISTRATIVE METHOD
The famous problem of Diem as an administrator and politician could
be resolved in a number of ways:
-- By his removal in favor of a military dictatorship which would
give dominance to the military chain of command.
-- By his removal in favor d a figure of more dilute power (e.g.,
Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho) who would delegate authority to act
to both military and civil leaders.
-- By bringing about a series of de facto administrative changes
via persuasion at high levels; collaboration with Diem's aides who
want improved administration; and by a U.S. operating presence at
many working levels, using the U.S. presence (e. g., control over the
helicopter squadrons) to force the Vietnamese to get their house in
order in one area after another.
We have opted for the third choice, on the basis of both merit and feasi-
bility.
Our reasons are these; First, it would be dangerous for us to engineer
a coup under present tense circumstances, since it is by no means
certain that we could control its consequences and potentialities for
Communist exploitation. Second, we are convinced that a part of the
complaint about Diem's administrative rxe thods conceals a lack of
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first-rate executives who can get things done. In the endless debate
between Diem and his subordinates (Diem complaining of limited
executive material; his subordinates, bf Diem's bottleneck methods)
both have hold of a piece of the truth.
The proposed strategy of limited partnership is designed both to force
clear delegation of authority in key areas and to beef up Vietnamese
administration until they can surface and develop the men to take over.
This is a difficult course to adopt. We can anticipate some friction
and reluctance until it is proved that Americans can be helpful partners
and that the techniques will not undermine Diem's political position.
Shifts in U.S. attitudes and methods of administration as well as
Vietnamese are required. But we are confident that it is the right way
to proceed at this stage; and, as noted earlier, there is reason for
confidence if the right men are sent to do the right jobs.
BRINGING DIEM'S ADMINISTRATION CLOSER TO THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE
Although Diem's fundamental political problem is his inability to take
the offensive, protect his villages and win the war, at many point
ability to win is, in turn, inhibited by the gap between his government
and the people of South Vietnam. Proposals to narrow this gap appear
in a number of the appendices. Programs underway are indicated with
an asterisk.
-- To press forward, and improve the signal and content of the
Vietnamese radio network and to distribute radio receivers throughout
the country. *(Appendix D.)
? To determine quickly whether it is feasible to create a TV
network, perhaps with Japanese assistance. (Appendix D.)
-- To strengthen, with U.S. support, the scale and quality of the
work of the Vietnamese Rural Reconstruction Teams. (Appendix I.)
.... To use the occasion of the U.S. flood relief effort to encourage --
by cooperation and example -- a closer relation between the Vietnamese
officials and the villagers in the four affected provinces. (Appendix G.)
-- To help accelerate the civil action program for the Montagnards.
(Appendix G.)
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-- By increasing Diem's sense of security and by tactful persua-
sion attempt to bring his government closer to the trade unions, students,
sects, intellectuals, and villagers. The improvement of the Province
Chiefs and their guidance in new directions is an essential part of this
process. (Appendix C0)
-- By using U.S. civil affairs teams in key areas, to demonstrate
how more effective apprce.ches to the villagers can be made. (Appendix
G.)
-- To strengthen the ARVN Civic Action Program and improving
its effectiveness. (Appendix G. )
Although these -- and other measures - should be attempted, our basic
policy must be to diminish the tension arising between the government
and the people stemming from the security situation. The record shows
that the disintegration of the political situation in South Vietnam since
1959 is primarily due to the government's inability to protect its citizens
and to conduct the war effectively.
Against this background, we turn to the specific recommendations con-
tained in the Appendices with respect to the interlocked questions of
intelligence, command and control, mobility, and training. These are
the technical areas where GVN improvement must be achieved if a
successful offensive is to be launched.
INTELLIGENCE
The GVN has been, almost literally, fighting blind -- awaiting attack
before it responded and then responding slowly, awkwardly, and
ineffectively. Guerrilla operations are designed to present few and
fleeting targets. The successful conduct of guerrilla war requires a
highly sophisticated intelligence effort, intimately geared to operations
at every level from the villages to the planners. Vietnam has been
served by a primitive and fragmented intelligence system, only obliquely
linked to and focused on the problem of finding and seeking targets.
Aside from U. S. encadrement of the intelligence system, and the
strengthening of the U.S. Evaluation Center (earlier noted), Appendix
A, VII, suggests the following two broad and urgent measures:
-- Assign clear national responsibility for intelligence collection
and evaluation to the Central Intelligence Organization.
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-- Create a joint U.S. -RVNAF Intelligence Group.
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Further specific recommendations are contained in Appendix A, VII,
and in Appendix I.
Given the acute lack of qualified U. S. personnel, the suggestions in
these Appendices will require careful and urgent screening to ensure
that U.S. advice and influence is applied selectively at crucial points.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The ambiguous role of the Province Chief -- at once commander of the
militia, "sector commander" nominally subject to the military, and
Diem's political agent, with direct access to him, is a familiar and
fundamental weakness on the Vietnam scene. The recommendation in
Appendix A is: "remove Province Chiefs from the chain of command
of the ARVN forces." This could prove to be the answer. But the
immediate proposal of the mission, already accepted by Diem in prin-
ciple, is that joint U. S. -Vietnamese teams examine command and
control relations (and other aspects of the military problem) in each of
the three Corps areas, province by province, beginning with those
provinces where the security situation is most acute.
It may prove to be the case that arrangements will be required some-
what more complex than a clean separation of Army and militia chains
of command, for the following reasons:
-- Continued intimate cooperation between the Army and the
militia will be necessary for both offensive and defensive operations.
-- The Army can be progressively disengaged from static duties
(and thus from the Province Chiefs) only over a period of time.
-- Continued intimate relations between the Army Commanders
and the Province Chiefs will be required, since the Province Chiefs
will remain a basic source of intelligence for military operations.
In short, we would anticipate that best results will be achieved by some
combination of greater freedom of acticn for the regular forces and
more effective cooperation between the civil and military at the province
level. But a definitive conclusion awaits the results of the joint survey.
An essential ingredient in the command and control (as well as the
intelligence) problem is that the U.S. establish a parallel communica-
tions system (as in Korea and in Laos) linking American elements
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encadred in the field with MAAG headquarters. Such a system is essential
both to permit the MAAG staff to have a reliable picture of field opera-
tions and to provide the basis for timely U.S. intervention or persuasion
at high Vietnam level.
MOBILITY
The requirements of quick response in defense and surprise in attack
combine with the terrain, distances, and the inadequate roads of Vietnam
to justify a radical increase in the availability of helicopters and light
aircraft, and in work on ground mobility techniques. Although command
and control problems would have to be solved if this new force were to
be effectively used, we believe the best way to force the necessary
changes is to introduce U. S. helicopter units, attached to each of the
three corps, with U. S. officers maintaining control under MAAG. Even
if desirable, there is no way of introducing this kind of force except
as U. S. military units, given the shortage of pilots and maintenance
personnel. (See Appendix A.)
Although the existing airlift in Vietnam is now not used with full efficiency,
it is likely that an increased requirement for C-47 (or similar aircraft),
as well as for lighter supply and personnel aircraft will rapidly emerge,
if the recommendations in this report are adopted and yield some
success. Basically, an effective operation against the Viet-Cong requires
ample air supply, as well as ample troop-lift capacity. (Appendix A.)
RESERVES
As noted earlier, the reserves available for systematic offensive action
in the Vietnam armed forces are shockingly low. There is one battalion
in reserve in the First Corps; two each in the Second and in the Third
Corps. Evidently ways must be found to increase this reserve. One
major purpose of the proposed U. S. -Vietnam joint survey of the military
situation is to find out, in one region after another, how this might be
done. The major elements in the process of expanding the reserve are
already reasonably clear:
-- To find means more economical in troops to protect the villages
and the major installations;
-- To accept an increased degree of risk in the protection of
installations not of first importance;
-- To induce among the militia and the troops still assigned to pro-
tective missions a more aggressive stance, and, by local attacks on the
Viet-Cong, to reduce Viet-Cong capacity and freedom to mount local
raids.
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-- To build up as rapidly as possible, via training and re-equipment,
the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps so that the army can be pro-
gressively released for offensive action. (Appendix A.)
Appendix A suggests as a target that at least 50 per cent of the regular
armed force now on static posts di ould be released for offensive opera-
tions. If intelligence can be made to yield useful targets and mobility
is provided, a force of this kind could radically reduce the Viet-Cong
menace. This would constitute a force of some 70, 000 men. Whether
this force can be freed for RVNAF offensive operations without unaccept-
able risk to the population and essential installations remains to be seen.
In addition to measures taken by the Vietnamese to improve their reserve
position, it is an evident requirement that the United States review quick
action contingency plans to move into Vietnam, should the scale of the
Vietnam offensive radically increase at a time when Vietnamese reserves
are inadequate to cope with it. Such action might be designed to take
over responsibility for the security of certain relatively quiet areas, if
the battle remained at the guerrilla level, or to fight the Communists if
open war were attempted.
TRAINING
It is our clear impression (Appendix A) that, by and large, training and
equipment of the Vietnamese armed forces are still too heavily weighted
toward conventional military operations. There has undoubtedly been a
shift towards guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training, but it has not
gone far enough. Even the Rangers are not adequately trained or equipped
for sustained jungle warfare. MAAG must use its influence steadily and
strongly towards increasing the component of counter-guerrilla training
at all levels in the Vietnamese armed forces.
The Vietnamese require U.S. assistance in training at all levels, from
the War College down. They are constantly faced with the painful choice
of allocating good young soldiers either to combat units or to instruction.
In both areas tle need is great. Given the acuteness of the crisis, we
must be prepared to ease this choice by the generous provision of U.S.
instructors,
As a first priority, the training of the Civil Guards should be accelerated.
About 20 per cent of this force has passed through infantry training, and
the results are encouraging. However, the retrained Civil Gla r d.s will
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not be able to operate at full efficiency until the grave shortage of
officers and NCO's in the Civil Guards is corrected (Appendix A). To
help fill this gap as well as to encourage the Civil Guards to undertake
more aggressive tactics, including night patrolling, we should consider
assigning MAAG officers and, in key areas, special forces teams to
work with the Civil Guards on whose increased efficiency the possibility
of generating an army reserve partially depends.
It should also be noted that the cost to the GVN in local currency of
training a Civil Guard is substantially less than for a regular soldier;
the annual cost to the GVN for a regular, Civil Guard, and a member
of the Self-Defense Corps is 28, 000 piasters, 17,500 piasters, and
10, 800 piasters, respectively.
With respect to the expansion of the Vietnam regular forces beyond the
present approved level of 200, 000, no decision is immediately required;
although we should promptly approve the increase from 170, 000 to
200, 000 if the GVN accepts its role in a program of the kind proposed
here. (Appendix E.) To deploy effectively an expanded regular army
will require progress in the inter-related measures outlined in this
report. Until the basic problems of intelligence, command and con-
trol, and mobility are on their way to solution, a mere expansion in the
army will be of little help. Under present circumstances, the Viet-Cong
could pin down a much larger army than Saigon now commands. But to
cover the transitional period, the expansion to 200, 000 is necessary.
TAKING THE OFFENSIVE
The object of these proposals, as a whole, is, of course, to permit the
ARVN to assume an effective offensive against the Viet-Cong. An
offensive campaign in Vietnam involves a number of different elements:
-- The widespread development of an offensive initiative at the
local level.
-- The development of an offensive against infiltration and infil-
trators in the plateau area via the Frontier Ranger Force (Appendix F)
and the Clandestine Action Service (Appendix I).
-- The liquidation of Zone D; the Viet-Cong redoubt on the boundary
between I and II Corps; the training areas near the Cambodian frontier,
etc.
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-- The systematic clearing of the Viet-Cong from less firmly held
areas; and, above all, learning how to hold an area by a mixture of
military and civil measures once it has been swept.
The assumption of the offensive will thus be a many-sided process,
involving progress in all the various directions set forth in this report.
When the conditions for an offensive are established, a concrete
offensive plan might be put into operation, with clear-cut priorities
for particular missions, designed systematically, by phases, to clear
the country of the Viet-Cong. Planning to this end might well now
begin. (Appendix A.)
A NOTE ON THE NAVY
As indicated in Appendix A, V. the Vietnam Navy is in poor shape, having
played only a minor role in counter-insurgency operations. It suffers
in extreme form from a lack of proper intelligence and command-control
?relations to the total effort. A substantial increase in the MAAG
advisory effort will be necessary to get this force to play its proper
role, as well as a concentrated intelligence enterprise to find for it
effective targets.
In the meanwhile, there are urgent naval requirements to be met in
coastal and river surveillance and control. Our conclusion is that U.S.
Naval and/or Coast Guard forces may need to be moved in to supple-
ment the Vietnamese Navy until it can find its feet.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The U.S. -Vietnam Combat Development and Test Center has been at
work for some months. Its objective has been to establish whether
various more or less available U.S. technology could assist the
Vietnamese in fighting the Viet-Cong. The unit has worked under the
usual administrative difficulties attendant upon a new venture, including
poor liaison with certain elements of the Vietnamese armed forces.
Nevertheless, three significant conclusions have emerged:
-- First, current and foreseeable special techniques will offer
no quick magic for defeating the Viet-Cong. The basic military, political
and administrative problems outlined in this report must be solved with
the help of R and D, but not by R and D alone, if. the Vietnamese are to
win.
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-- Second, there are a range of limited concrete devices which
could assist both militarily and psychologically in the war against the
Viet-Cong. These deserve urgent and careful operational considera-
tion, notably the following: the use of chemicals to attack the rice and
manioc crop in carefully selected mountain areas where the Viet-Cong
buildup depends on their own plantings to supplement a thin local food
supply; the rapid expansion in the use of dogs for patrolling; the
installation of the village alarm system; and the use of Lazy Dog for
attack on certain relatively fixed Viet-Cong targets.
In addition, the possibilities of the AR-15 rifle should be explored as
well as of a plastic swamp boat.
A case for their usefulness having been established, the exploitation
of these devices should be pushed with great operational vigor on both
the American and the Vietnamese sid.es. (Appendix H0)
THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT OF THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY PLAN
Given the fact that we do not yet know how much damage the flood will
cause, it is impossible to form a clear view of the approximate total
level of the U. S. aid to Vietnam over the coming year. Nevertheless,
certain basic propositions about the Vietnamese economy and the rela-
tion of economic aid to this program can be asserted with some confi-
denc e.
The fundamental economic fact about Vietnam is that the government
has exhibited a considerable capacity to execute important projects in
the fields of health, education, agriculture, and public works; and
the private sector has shown a surprising virility and momentum.
These have been significant stabilizing factors in an otherwise treacher-
ous situation.
The momentum of the Vietnamese economy must be supported for a
further technical reason. As pointed out in Appendix D, the conduct
of war against the Viet-Cong requires an increasing supply of local
currency. That currency cannot be generated merely by giving the
Vietnamese dollars. It would be counter-productive if our dollars
should be used for the buildup of monetary reserves or unused pipelines,
for luxury imports, or for the imported commodities which compete
with their rapidly growing private industrial sector. The problem is,
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therefore, to design a program of aid which will generate local currency
while encouraging civil domestic enterprises which support the total GVN
effort.
With respect to the private sector, the most promising way to do this is
to increase the import of capital goods for industrial development. With
respect to government projects, the GVN must devise measures which
generate local currencies in conjunction with government projects.
Appendix D suggests a series of such projects where the local currency
component might be raised by public bond issues. This appears the
principal new device by which the paradox could be ended in which only
private sector projects supported by the United States develop local
currency for the GVN budget.
In addition, it is clear that the Vietnamese must press forward with their
present considerable improvements in tax collection. Further, in time,
the Vietnamese must move on from the exchange rate arrangements to
which they have agreed in principle but which are not yet in force -- which
would yield an average of 74 piasters (including customs duties) to the
dollar -- to a more straightforward exchange rate of about 80 (plus
customs duties).
On the U.S. side, we must be prepared to provide whatever level of
dollar aid may be necessary if we are assured that the dollar aid is being
used for productive purposes which support the total effort.
Some of the concrete projects which USOM should support which are
directly related to the counter-insurgency plan are the following; the
feeder road program; development, if proved feasible, of a TV system
around Saigon, which would link government and people more closely
in a crucial region; push to completion the present plans for the Viet-
namese radio system, including provision for widespread distribution
of cheap battery-operated receiving sets; support for the Montagnard
program; village communications. In addition it would be appropriate
for USOM to join with our MAAG and the Vietnamese in considering
systematically the civil action component required if areas cleared of
the Viet-Cong are to be consolidated. Operations in the flood areas
should give an opportunity to learn in a practical way how this might be
done.
THE FLOOD
The present flood is a disaster, enveloping two provinces and substan-
tial portions of two others; but it is, at the same time, a major oppor-
tunity for the Vietnamese and for the joint LT. S.-Vietnam partnership
which this report proposes.
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In general it offers to the GVN a chance to mobilize all anti-communist
elements in a common constructive national effort. For the United
States it offers an opportunity to introduce limited but still meaningful
military forces to assist in the emergency and reconstruction effort,
making available within the country for further use precisely the types
of engineering forces which the logistics part of Appendix A recommends.
Although the exact contours of the job cannot be discerned until the flood
waters recede, it is clear that a reconstruction effort will be required
for many months. This effort offers to the Vietnamese government an
opportunity to get closer to the people in the villages in an important
southern area and to see if it cannot reconstruct the area with military
and civil arrangements which prevent the re-entry on a large scale of
the Viet-Cong. In a sense the flood is a sweep; and the problem is to
consolidate after the sweep.
The presence of American military forces in the area should also give
us an opportunity to work intensively with the civil guards and with other
local military elements and to explore the possibility of suffusing them
with an offensive spirit and tactics.
The introduction in this area of substantial American forces raises, of
course, the problem of their protection. The precise nature of the
risks run can only be assessed on the spot by the local U. S. commander.
It is evident that a certain risk will be run of daytime sniping and ambush
and of night raids. With intensive cooperation with the local military
and militia and certain elementary precautions, these risks appear
capable of control. The precise techniques for dealing with these risks
must rest with the Task Force Commander; but he should be supplied
with units and other resources required to do the job.
Although further staff work will be required to assess the size and compo-
sition of an appropriate U.S. flood reconstruction force, we would now
envisage a unit of perhaps 8000 men.
CONTINGENCIES
The U. S. action proposed in this report -- involving as it does the overt
lifting of the MAAG ceiling, substantial encadrement and the introduction
of limited U. S. forces ? requires that the United States also prepare
for contingencies that might arise from the enemy's reaction. The
initiative proposed here should not be undertaken unless we are prepared
24
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to deal with any escalation the communists might choose to impose.
Specifically we must be prepared to act swiftly under these three cir-
cumstances: an attempt to seize and to hold the Pleiku-Kontum area;
a political crisis in which the communists might attempt to use their
forces around Saigon to capture the city in the midst of local confusion;
an undertaking of overt major hostilities by North Vietnam.
As noted earlier, the present contingency plans of CINCPAC must
embrace the possibility both of a resumption of the communist offensive
in Laos and these Vietnamese contingency situations. Taken together,
the contingencies in Southeast Asia which we would presently choose to
meet without the use of nuclear weapons appear to require somewhat
more balanced ground, naval, and air strength in reserve in the U. S.
than we now have available, so long as we maintain the allocation of
the six divisions for the Berlin crisis.
Therefore, one of the major issues raised by this report is the need to
develop the reserve strength in the U. S. establishment required to
cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold in that area,
as it is now envisaged. The call up of additional support forces may
be required.
In our view, nothing is more calculated to sober the enemy and to dis-
courage escalation in the face of the limited initiatives proposed here
than the knowledge that the United States has prepared itself soundly
to deal with aggression in Southeast Asia at any level.
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The views expressed in the following
Appendices are those of the respective authors.
They have contributed substantially to the
conclusions expressed in the two preceding
papers and, evidently, reflect a broad concensus;
but no effort was made to adjust the various
perspectives represented in the several sections
of the Report.
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ilLft SECRET.
MILITARY APPENDIX
'10 MEI
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INDEX
Summary and Major Recommendations
General Statement
II RVNAF
III ARVN
IV VNN
V VNAF
VI Civil Guard/Self Defense Corps
VII Intelligence
VIII Logistics
IX Summary
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IX SUMMARY
In summary, it is the concensus of the military committee that inter-
vention under SEATO or U.S. plans is the best means of saving SVN and indeed,
all of Southeast Asia. Should this prove impossible for non-military reasons
we consider there are two general ways in which the combat effectiveness of
RVNAF can be increased substantially. The first and most immediate require-
ment is to assure that GVN makes maximum effective use of its' current re-
sources. Its present conduct of military operations leaves much to be de-
sired. By taking certain corrective measures and developing more effective
procedures, it is our opinion that the combat effectiveness of RVNAF could
be improved by an estimated 25 to 40 percent. The second method involves
determining reasonable courses of action within United States resources
short of military intervention or direct combat support by air and naval
combat elements which can appreciably improve both the immediate and
long term fighting capabilities of the RVNAF.
We feel that rapid approval and implementation of the following recom-
mendations will improve the combat capabilities of the RVNAF, upset the
Communist timetable and prevent a rapid take-over in SVN by Communist
forces:
a. Intelligence
(1) One intelligence agency be designated as a central control
point for direction, collection, interpretation, collation, and dissemina-
tion of all intelligence. (Detailed recommendations are contained in
Intelligence Section of military appendix.)
b. Command and Control
(1) That the U.S. Government insist that a single inviolate chain
of command be established and practiced. This must include the removal
of Province Chiefs from the chain of command.
(2) That the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and Organization be
reworked to provide for proportionate service representation to include
the seating of all service chiefs as members.
(3) That special efforts be made at the highest USG levels to
compel President Diem to adhere to an effective chain of command and to
cooperate more fully with the United States in the combined efforts of
the two governments to forestall the communist threat to SVN.
c. National Planning
(1) An effective national plan for counter-insurgency be developed
and systematically and effectively implemented'.
d. Other
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(1) That the U.S. provide RVNAF with additional helicopter and
fixed-wing airlift as required, consistent with the maintenance of essential
U.S. military posture worldwide.
(2) That projects aimed toward increased mobility to include road
and small airstrip construction, and communications for more effective re-
sponse and control be undertaken.
The foregoing broad recommendations are considered of primary
portance. Of only slightly less stature are those below that require early
action. It is recommended that:
(1) The general welfare of the enlisted man, to include diet, pay,
promotion, leave and awards, be greatly improved at once.
(2) A crash program be implemented to train officers and NCO's in
adequate numbers to provide a solid base for accelerating the increase of
RVNAF forces.
(3) MAAG advisors participate in all planning and operations.
(4) Resources be relocated as necessary throughout the RVNAF to
provide each service the means to increase its effectiveness and morale.
(5) Much greater emphasis be placed on indoctrination of the
individual Vietnamese soldier through means of political action officers
assigned down to company level to conduct continuous and vigorous instruc-
tion designed to stimulate the individual soldier to fight.
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I. GENERAL STATEMENT:
The enemy continues his buildup within South Vietnam (SVN) through
infiltration of up to battalion sized units while simultaneously increasing
his guerrilla forces by recruitment within SVN. In addition to the ever
worsening internal situation, the developments in Laos are recognized
as presenting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) or other com-
munist oriented forces with the opportunity for greatly increased covert
infiltration of personnel, supplies and equipment through southern Laos
to the Viet Gong (VC) forces in SVN. They also deny the Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the United States or SEATO the con-
siderable period of warning time formerly expected prior to an attack by
the DRV or other communist forces (Pathet Lao! Chi Corn) through Laos.
The enemy's estimated strength within SVN has increased from approxi-
mately 12, 000 in July to an estimated 16, 500 to date, and he is expected
to continue to expand his forces. Incidents have increased from 960 per
month prior to July to 1, 300 per month in September and the scope of his
unit offensives have recently increased from company to battalion sized
operations. His shift of activity to the I and II Corps areas during the
past month and a half gives additional cause for concern. He is expected
to step up the tempo of operations, with increasing incidents and attacks
in the Nam Bo and delta regions when the dry season starts around
1 November 1961.
The RVNAF, which has been increased in strength from 150,000 to
nearly 170, 000 since June 1961, is almost fully committed in containing
the VC threat at its present scope of activities. Static security and
pacification operational requirements within respective provinces and
operational areas under current RVNAF missions and operational con-
cepts make obligatory the constant employment of 80 to 85 percent of
Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. This leaves only small
dispersed local reserves to meet an extensive threat or to conduct large
scale operations throughout SVN under national level operational control.
The grave military situation in SVN is further complicated by the
critical flood conditions existing in the rice-rich delta area. This
requires diversion of RVNAF units and effort for flood relief. This
disaster, if not handled by GVN in a wise, farsighted and aggressive
manner, could provide the VC with powerful operational and propaganda
tools.
In recognition of these conditions President Diem on 19 October 1961
declared a state of national emergency throughout SVN.
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If the current political-military hiatus in Laos continues (and it can
be logically concluded that it will), thus permitting the VC the uncon-
tested use of southern Laos as a route into the heart of SVN, the resul-
tant threat will rapidly far exceed anything RVNAF can be expected to
handle without the introduction of sizable military forces from the outside.
From the military viewpoint, the defense of Southeast Asia must be
considered as one problem, not the defense of each of the several
countries or areas comprising the whole. As a corollary, any concept
for the defense of SE Asia which does not include Laos or substantial
parts of it is militarily unsound.
?
We recognize that the mission of this group is to determine how best
to assist SVN in her struggle against communism and not to study specifi-
cally the solution of the broader SE Asia problem. However, in this con-
nection, we consider that there is no feasible military alternative of lesser
n.agnitude than SEATO or U. S. intervention, which will prevent loss of
SVN. We further consider that the method of saving SVN by intervention
offering the greatest chance of success is to cut off the southern Laos
corridor into SVN. We believe the implementation of SEATO Plan 5, or
a suitable variation thereof, is the best available means of initiating this
action. The bonus benefits are obvious since we believe this to be the
only military way to prevent the loss of Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and
ultimately all of Southeast Asia.
In advocating such a course of action, the possibility of escalation
and the effects of world opinion were not ignored, but rather, to the
contrary, they were seriously considered.
However, in the light of current events and the future role of the U.S.
in world affairs, we consider retention of SE Asia as a member of the
western block of nations to be indispensable.
Should the implementation of SEATO Plan 5 prove to be impossible
for non-military reasons, we consider that the next most desirable course
of action to be the implementation of the plan involving the introduction of
U.S. forces into SVN, possibly in the Ban Me Thout Pleiku-Kontum plateau
area (SEATO Plan 7 or modification thereof) currently being developed by
CINCPAC. It is the general concensus that such forces should be large
enough to do the job, and that they should be sent in at an early date. This
course of action would not contribute substantially to the over-all problem
of SE Asia but would provide a degree of assistance to SVN in regaining
"control of its territory and free SVN forces for offensive actions against
the VC.
t Il,J'
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Or NI'tit
Based on their limited observations in the field, in general members
of the military committee found the fighting capabilities of the RVNAF to
be significantly less than their previous estimates which were based on
reports, and that the shortcomings which degraded their former opinions
on the subject can be attributed largely to the failure of the GVN to make
effective use of its resources. A state of apathy seems to pervade all
levels observed in the RVNAF. It appeared as though SVN forces are
in a state of suspended animation except when reacting with limited
effort against threats to static posts or to the civilian populace. They
seem to consider the VC to be "will o' the wisps" and that efforts to
find, fix and kill them are doomed to futility.
The remainder of this military appendix is devoted to a brief analysis
of the RVNAF, ARVN, VNAF, VNN, intelligence and logistics with
discussions of problem areas and recommendations for their solution.
RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that
SEATO Plan 5, or suitable variation thereof, be implemented, or
if this is impossible for non-military reasons,
The Plan for introduction of U.S. Forces into SVN, SEATO 7 or
suitable variations thereof, be implemented.
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IL REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES:
Several serious deficiencies were found to exist in RVNAF which
if corrected would improve their combat effectiveness substantially.
The reasons and contributory factors were checked to the extent per-
mitted by time available and it was determined that most major troubles
stemmed from political-military considerations rather than from the
purely military.
At the national level the major problems confronting the RVNAF fall
into two categories, i. e. (1) failure to make the most effective use of
resources currently available due to faulty operating procedures, impro-
per command arrangements and lack of coordination in certain fields and
(2) additional outside assistance required in the form of special equipment,
construction effort, supplies, technical assistance and logistic and other
type support.
Correction of the deficiencies in the first category can be accomplished
only by the USG taking a firm stand with the GVN and insisting certain
actions be taken to rectify the situation. This is absolutely essential since
it is doubtful if unlimited assistance of the second category could appre-
ciably improve the situation in SVN without first putting the operation on a
sound footing by taking remedial action to correct shortfalls in the first
category.
The following discussions will cover a few of the "in-house" deficiencies
which must be corrected in the RVNAF. There is no single intelligence
agency or group responsible for the collection, analysis, collation, dis-
semination and direction of intelligence efforts, and there is no effective
combat intelligence reporting system in the RVNAF.
Intelligence channels go directly from province level to Saigon?some-
times directly to the President himself, cutting out all intermediate com-
mands. There are numerous collecting agencies operating in SVN receiv-
ing various types of raw intelligence which considered and evaluated col-
lectively could result in a useful product. This includes combat intel-
ligence. To date very few hard targets have been located and operations
are undertaken without precise enemy targets as objectives because very
little is known of his location, numbers, equipment, plans, etc.
The existing command and control structure is faulty. Apparently
the President himself exercises arbitrary control of military operations
and by-passes command chan.4,t4e_joint general staff, corps and
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divisions. The most classic example of this deficiency results from the
dual role of the Province Chiefs who as Sector Commanders command all
troops in their area, including ARVN, Civil Guards, SDC and Rangers.
Though theoretically with his military hat (Sector Commander), he is
under the command of the Division Commander, by putting on his Province
Chief hat and going through his other (political) channel he can go over
the heads of Division, Corps and Field Commanders and even CG ARVN.
This happens frequently and has a most deleterious effect in planning,
operations and training and other vital aspects of the conduct of military
operation.
There is no effective national plan for counter-insurgency. National
planning has proved to be a difficult hurdle for the GVN. The lit ernal
Security Council by virtue of its organization could, with only minor
adjustment, fulfill the present void in National Planning and Policy Direc-
tion. Another ex isting office, that of Permanent Secretary General for
National Defense, could well be expanded to become an adequate National
level coordinator and executive agency to implement the council's direc-
tive. Unfortunately, despite repeated urging to the highest GVN levels,
almost nothing has been done in this area. The Ambassador and MAAG
have continually pressed the President as to the importance of a National
Operations Plan which adequately employs the coordinated use of military-
political psychological-civil and economic powers.
In the purely military field of national planning, some small progress
has been made. A preliminary military counter-insurgency plan was pub-
lished by Field Command in February 1961, however, it did not satisfy
the requirements of the U. S. Counter-Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam.
In July 1961, Field Command published planning instructions to subordinate
elements and is currently engaged in the production of a countrywide mili-
tary counter-insurgency plan upon which it is hoped and expected the GVN
will pattern the National Counter-Insurgency Plan as a coordinated whole
with the military as a part thereof.
U. S. advisors do not fully participate in planning for and conduct of
operations. In order to be successful, operations against the VC require
most careful planning, coordination, as well as determined, intelligent
and energetic follow-through in the implementing phase. Vietnamese
officers in general are not as well qualified in this area as available, U.S.
military advisors who, by their experience, schooling, and higher profes-
sional standings, could supply the much needed know-how, techniques,
knowledge of joint and combined operations and vigor required. To have
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U. S. personnel working around the clock in the various operations centers
would enable JUSMAG to know the true situation at all times and to keep
abreast of any new requirements, etc. The exact opposite situation has
prevailed in the past and advisors learned of operations after the fact.
There has been a slight improvement in this situation in recent weeks, but
no where near the desired degree of U. S. participation has yet bedn
realized. It must become SOP for U. S. officers to plan and operate in
Vietnamese operations centers on a 24-hour basis during operations.
The Vietnamese Armed Forces do not make use of Joint Operations
Centers, Tactical Operations Centers, etc., for effective control of
operations. Current procedures do not provide to the degree required
an effective system of coordination providing for effective use of support-
ing units in support of ground combat. Much more timely and effective
use could be made of combat support units and operations against the VC
by establishing a JOG or TOC, as appropriate, with G2/G3, air, artillery,
engineer and other required agencies represented. JUSMAG has pushed
this idea but to date Vietnamese have accepted with lip service only.
Commanders of the Air Force and Navy are not in the Joint General
Staff nor are these services commensurately represented on the Joint
General Staff, The Joint General Staff in its present charter provides for
representatives from all three of the services. If it were actually con-
stituted as its authorized membership provides, there would be an element
of a joint staff in it. Of the 253 officers assigned, two are from the Air
Force and one from the Navy. Of the 307 enlisted men assigned, seven
are from the Air Force and none from the Navy.
President Diem himself constitutes a most serious problem to effective
operations. He does not choose his subordinates for their competence but
rather from considerations of politics and personal loyalty. He accepts
advice from the MAAG only when he likes the advice and once having
acquiesced to a suggestion feels no compunction whatsoever in reversing
himself.
One of the most glaring deficiencies that strikes the observer is the
apparent lack of enthusiasm and dedication for their cause on the part of
officers and men in the RVNAF. Based on several discussions on this
subject with unit advisors and impressions received from discussion of
operational matters with Vietnamese officers, there appears to be no
driving determination to find, fix and kill the VC. On the other hand, it
is generally conceded that the VC are completely indoctrinated in their
purpose and will undergo privations, personal hardships and anything
required to defeat the SVN. There is an urgent requirement, in the opinion
of the military committee, for s ecial and continuing emphasis by SVN on ?
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the objectives of the VC and the communist objective to destroy SVN as
an independent nation. Admittedly, this must not be attempted by
direct effort of "white faces" but must be accomplished in some way
if we are to imbue the Vietnamese with a real desire to win. Perhaps'
use could be made of naturalized CHENTATS for this purpose since there
are half a million SVN citizens of Chinese extraction.
There are numerous other shortcomings and deficiencies within the
RVNAF which can be corrected by "in-house" action and many of these
are discussed in the remainder of this report.
In regard to the second category, i. e. actions to enhance the combat
effectiveness of RVNAF by outside assistance, a few of the major ones
are discussed below and others are discussed in the coverage of Army,
Navy, Air Force, Intelligence and Logistic Sections of this report.
Due to the unusual nature of the terrain, method of operating, the
paucity of roads and railroads, and inadequate airlift and other factors
peculiar to this part of the world, operational flexibility can only be
achieved through provision of a high degree of flexibility including air
mobility. This means acquisition of additional airlift-helicopter and
STOL aircraft, and construction of air fields, roads and other communi-
cations facilities. The VC is a fleeting and elusive enemy and remunera-
tive targets are hard to find and short lived. Therefore, it is absolutely
essential that targets be struck immediately when found by crew served
weapons, artillery, air strikes and helicopter delivered troops. This
type of coordination can be realized only through effective use of radio
communications and smooth working FACts, JOC' s, and TOCTs, etc.
Just to mention a few items of equipment requiring Ti. S. assistance are
appropriate helicopters, light fixed-wing aircraft, patrol craft escort,
modern radios, radar, airstrip facilities and construction of access roads
and numerous air fields strategically placed about the countryside. Other
suggested items in this category calling for outside assistance are covered
in appropriate inclosures to this appendix.
RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that:
1. One intelligence agency be designated as a central control point
for direction, collection, interpretation, collation, and dissemination of
all intelligence. (See detailed recommendations in intelligence inclosure. )
2. The USG insists that a single inviolate chain of command be
established and practiced. This must include the removal of Province
Chiefs from the chain of command.
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3. An effective national plan for counter-insurgency be developed.
4. Steps be taken at Field Command level to instruct unit commanders
to allow U. S. advisor s to participate in the tactical planning for and con-
duct of operations as an integral part of various operations centers.
5. Joint Tactical Operations Centers wherein G2/G3, air, artillery,
engineer and other required agencies participate in planning and conduct
of operations be established at appropriate command echelons.
6. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff charter and organization be
reworked to provide for proportionate service representation to include
the seating of all service chiefs as rrembers.
7. Special efforts be made by the highest USG levels to compel
President Diem to cooperate more fully with the United States in the
combined efforts of the two governments to forestall communist threat
to SVN.
8. A program be designed to orient and indoctrinate the Vietnamese
fighting men and officers as to the nature of the threat to them and to their
country.
9. The United States provide RVNAF with additional helicopter and
fixed-wing airlift as required, consistent with the maintenance of essen-
tial U. S. military posture worldwide.
10. A study be made of the communications requirements and more
sophisticated and higher performance equipment be made available to
RVNAF as necessary and consistent with U.S. military posture elsewhere.
11. The U.S. assist Vietnam in establishing and operating a tactical
air-ground system.
12. The U. S. assist Vietnam in a road and air field construction pro-
gram designed to exploit air and ground mobility.
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III. ARMY REPUBLIC VIETNAM
The performance of the ARVN is disappointing and generally is
characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and at most levels is devoid
of a sense of urgency. The Army is short of able young trained
leaders, both in the officer and NCO ranks. The basic soldier, as a
result, is poorly trained, inadequately oriented, lacking in desire to
close with the enemy and for the most part unaware of the serious
inroads communist guerrillas are making in his country.
As indicated in the case of the RVNAF the intelligence effort of
ARVN is entirely inadequate, uncoordinated and mismanaged and
suffers from inertia and lack of appreciation at many levels. A special
section of this military paper discusses the status of the ARVN intel-
ligence effort in some detail. (See intelligence in.closure.)
As discussed above in the RVNAF portion of this report next in
importance to the absence of an effective intelligence system, the most
chronic weakness in the ARVN is the denial of clear-cut military
authority to the Commander of the Field Forces. While he is charged
with the responsibility for the nation's security, he does not enjoy the
commensurate authority to accomplish his mission.
At the national level, President Diem remains the sole font of
power and few military decisions of any stature can be made without
his approval.
Currently he imposes his will through the Chief of Staff of the Joint
General Staff, who has the authority to dictate military operations,
organization, and command structure without regard for the recom-
mendations of the Commanding General of the Field Command - the
top military echelon of the ground forces.
Through his system of direct appointment of Province chiefs, the
President can assure for himself obedience at the grass roots. These
Province chiefs, some of whom are military, have direct access to
and personal support of the President. They often by-pass and ignore
local military commanders, very frequently to the detriment of
effective operations and training.
In addition, combat commanders from Corps down are often
required, over their objections, to release additional units to the
control of the Province chiefs who use them at their discretion, thus
further diluting combat capability.
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The Province chief usually has better communications than most
military commands and often transmits urgent tactical information
directly to the President or through civilian channels without referral
to the local military commander most vitally concerned.
Equipment problems are few and perhaps the most immediate need
is suitable aircraft at Corps and Division for daily reconnaissance and
better control and for combat lift into areas inaccessible to heavy
aircraft. At present the VNAF allots flying time for specific and
scheduled missions. This system does not always provide the Corps
and Division commander "on hand" aircraft for quick response to
tactical situations.
Other minor problems in the logistic field are included in a separate
logistic section of this military report.
Tactically, 80 to 85% ARVN troops are dispersed on static security
and pacification operational requirements. In the III Corps, the Corps
Commander has a reserve of only 2500 marginal troops out of a total
of 92, 000 ARVN, SDC and CG forces in his zone of responsibility. The
maintenance of 1684 static posts detrimentally affects training, tactical
deployment, unity of command, and drains logistic resources.
The situation in the I and II Corps is similar.
A major deficiency in ARVN which could be corrected with little
effort is the failure to include MAAG personnel in the planning for and
conduct of operations. Despite continuing efforts by MAAG, it has
only been in recent weeks that certain MAAG advisors have begun to
participate in the planning for operations. It must become SOP for
U.S. advisors to participate fully in planning phases of operations
and around the clock participation as members of the operations center
teams in actual operations.
Artillery support during operations is often applied with unobserved
artillery fire. Due to a shortage of 1:25, 000 maps, 1:100, 000 maps
are often used. Observation aircraft are located at ARVN and Corps
level and are not immediately available to Divisions.
There is a widespread tendency to halt operations at night and
retire into static posts. Patrol activity is not taken seriously enough
and is not of the scale or degree of vigor required.
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A recent so called "SWEEP" operation involving use of four
battalions and lasting for 30 days never saw a single V. C. Its results
were distruction of 16 empty huts and a small rice supply.
There are airborne and airmobile Immediate Ready Forces on 24
hour air field alert. However, they have not yet been employed
promptly or regularly enough to test their real potential.
Many ARVN personnel have been on operations for one to three
years without leave rotation and/or retraining. One objective of the
increase in forces from 150,000 to 170,000 was to provide new units
which would alleviate this situation through a system of rotating units.
However, in order to meet the increased VC threat, it is planned to
employ these troops on operations as they become trained rather than
have them relieve operationally worn units for R&R. Retraining and
re-equipping of units "on the line" is a most serious problem for
which there appears to be no complete solution in the immediate future.
However, the situation can be greatly improved by establishment of
proper command and control procedures and more effective conduct
of operations. Early increase of the RVNAF is one means of cor-
recting this condition but accomplishment of many improvements within
current resources should be accomplished first.
The ordinary soldier gets little personal attention from his
superiors. His pay is woefully low, promotion opportunities few,
leave is almost a myth, little if any provision is made for his dependents
and the adequacy of his diet is questionable. It is small wonder that
his morale is low and he finds it difficult to whip up an aggressive spirit.
Since the abortive "coup" of November 1960, only special mission
training and operational exercises have been conducted within the
Special Forces. Special mission, medical and communications
training varies from adequate to superior. Recruit and individual
training is inadequate due to lack of facilities. In the majority of
cases, the Special Forces have been properly used due to American
insistence. However, these forces are controlled by President Diem
and he uses them for his own non-military purposes at times.
Recommendations:
(1) The combat intelligence system should be reorganized designating
one agency responsible for direction and coordination of the Intel-
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ligence effort (See Intelligence Section for detailed recommendations).
(2) A single inviolate chain of command should be established and
practised. This must include the removal of Province chiefs from the
chain of command.
(3) At least 50% of the ARVN troops on static and pacification
duties which tie them to a piece of terrain should_ be released for combat
operations. Those remaining should be augmented to the minimum
essential extent by Civil Guard and/or SDC personnel.
(4) MAAG personnel should be included in planning at all levels
and in operations centers during operations.
(5) Provide each division its own complement of L-19 aircraft and
pilots on a permanent basis.
(6) All recruits should receive extensive training in counter-
guerrilla operations and tactics and new units should be tailored to
meet the actual conditions to be faced. Tactics of all units should
stress surprise, deception, ambush, extensive reconnaissance and
heavy combat patroling and night operations. The unprofitable
"sweep" as currently practiced, should be discontinued and effort con-
centrated on finding, fixing and destroying the enemy.
(7) More effective use be made of air support and the Airborne
Immediate Ready Forces. Their use should be considered in every
plan and used wherever feasible.
(8) Pay of the enlisted man should be increased, an honest and
realistic promotion and leave policy enforced, and his lot improved
in general.
(9) Complete small airstrips in strategically located areas and
make maximum use of light and STOL aircraft.
(10) Trails, passes and lines of drift known to be used as LOCis
by the VC should be mined.
(11) In order to speed up the increase in ARVN (and RVNAF)
GVN should accelerate the action by retaining critically needed
specialists in service for an indefinite period; reduce length of
training courses by eliminating all "nice to know" features; improve
personnel management; provide the RVNAF with sufficient qualified
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instructors to increase the officer and NCO training; send large numbers
of potential officers and NCO's to off-shore training and obtain funds now
to be used for increased housing and training facilities.
(12) Extensive use should be made of Technical Representatives and.
Mobile Training Teams to overcome initially the shortage of trained
technical personnel and to imbue troops with the will to fight and to
insure sound planning and effective implementation of operations against
the VC.
(13) "MEO" type units should be created in the pan handle to conduct
guerrilla warfare against the VC. The Montagnard Plan should be
implemented.
(14) President Diem should be urged to release all special forces
engaged in operations for which they were not designed for appropriate
mis sions
(15) More Mobile Training Teams (Special Forces) should be
placed with the ARVN, especially with those units stationed in the
Laos-VN border area.
(16) The importance of civic actions should be stressed in order to
help the civilian populace in remote areas and to promote their support,
especially in reporting information on VO hideouts, plans, etc.
NOTE: Numerous recommendations made in other sections of the
military appendix apply to the ARVN also.
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IV. VIETNAMESE NAVY:
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The Vietnam Navy (VNN) to date has played a relatively minor role
in counter-insurgency operations. Its full capabilities have not been
exploited on a national level.
The Commander of the VNN is junior to a number of his officers,
does not accept advice readily and appears to suffer from a lack of
urgency in having the Government utilize naval capabilities in a coordinated
manner with the other services. At the same time, the Commander is
close to President Diem and because of this tends to work separately
rather than to coordinate his efforts with the Army and Air Force.
The Navy has only one liaison officer on the JGS. To date the Army
has planned all operations and has only brought the Navy into the picture
at the last moment. It is essential that the Navy be given full representa-
tion on the JGS.
The Navy has a complete lack of intelligence organization. It has
neither an organization for intelligence nor is supplied with intelligence
produced by the other services or intelligence organizations. It has no
plan for making its own contribution to the national intelligence effort.
Logistic support for the Navy is centered around the Saigon Naval
Shipyard. The shipyard does not produce to its full capabilities due
principally to faulty management. The MAAG advisor continually has
been frustrated in trying to increase the efficiency of the shipyard in
that his advice is either ignored or, once accepted, is not acted upon.
A small boat facility is being improved at Cantho to act as a boat repair
base for the River Forces. MAAG has finally gotten some action in
getting this base completed. At the present time all river craft must
go to Saigon shipyard.
Morale within the Navy forces suffers from lack of promotion for
either officers or enlisted personnel. Training is of a low level due to
operations, guard duty and special missions. The Navy does not make
any particular effort to look out for the families of Navy personnel.
Food and diet are below the minimum requirements. The food
shortage is aggravated by very low sanitary standards in the preparation
of the food. U. S. Naval officers who have gone on coastal operations
with the VNN have endured a number of days without eating because of
the low quality and scarcity of food provided. Their own reactions in
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this situation closely parallel the lack of energy and alertness which seems
to characterize many of the naval personnel.
A combination of these factors which has resulted in low morale in
the Navy has, at the same time, made penetration by the VC possible.
There have been incidents where naval personnel have either left the Navy
to join the VC , or have stayed in the Navy as VC spies. Within the last
several weeks there has been a transfer of sea force personnel to tie river
force to replace such defectors.
In the planning for coastal operations, the VNN has been steadily
improving. There is still no planning contact with MAAG, except in very
general terms and usually just prior to implementation of the plan. There
are indications, at the lower levels, that closer liaison and exchange of
views with MAAG advisors would be welcome but there is still some opposi-
tion at higher VNN command level.
Coastal Operations:
A major problem of the Navy is the interdiction of Viet Cong sea traffic.
There is regular inshore traffic by sea-going junks which supply the VC
with agents, special material, medical supplies and other needed items.
These operations appear to be controlled by the special 603rd Maritime
Unit at Dong Hoi, located just above the 17th parallel, but there is very
little hard intelligence as to the amount and scope of this traffic.
The information on the supporting organizations indicates there may
be a "bridge-head" base at Hue, to receive or dispatch agents to and from
Dong Hoi. In addition, there may be an organization at Tourane to receive
personnel and material and pass it on. Further south there are probably
specific landing sites. The little intelligence available indicates that the
system is very flexible and that material and personnel are moved by sea
and land making contact at the organization points along the coast. The
sea routes apparently are not used for large-quantity infiltration but are
used for transit of agents and other special individuals.
To intercept the junk traffic, the Vietnamese Navy uses a junk force
supplemented by coastal patrol naval vessels. The Vietnamese plan involves
contiguous junk patrols along the full length of the coast. The patrol areas
laid out would require 420 sail and 80 motor junks. At the present time,
there are 80 sail junks in use and 1 motor junk undergoing final trial.
The progress of the sail junk force program is highly unsatisfactory
and MAAG efforts to have this program expedited have met with no success.
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The design for the motor junk has not yet beenfirmed and the proto-
type is awaiting further sea trials in rough weather in November. The
motors are available.
In addition to the junk patrol the VNN maintains small ship patrols
in the north and off the delta area. They use their 7 patrol craft for this
duty, but not their small amphibious type vessels. To permit a con-
tinuous patrol in the designated areas, additional PCE' s are required.
Three PCE's are scheduled for MAP delivery between now and October
1962, along with four amphibious type vessels. The delivery of the PCET s
should be given the highest priority and the delivery of the amphibious
vessels delayed accordingly. Although the amphibious vessels could be
utilized for coastal transport should land communications be disrupted,
such coastal transport could always be maintained by US assistance, by
charter or hire. The development of an improved amphibious capability
within the RVNAFappears to be of second priority to the interdiction of
VC sea traffic. The requirement to weigh relative priorities is due to a
shortage of personnel to man new ships.
Consideration should also be given to the delivery of additional PCE
in place of amphibious craft during the current year, if such PCE are
available in the US reserve fleet.
Although the patrol force has made many intercepts in the past year
(the Junk Force made 40 intercepts during June and July), the Navy has no
information on the results of these intercepts since intercepted craft are
turned over to the security force ashore. There is no coordinated Army/
Navy effort to increase the effectiveness of the patrol. Setting up a proper
command to control and coordinate interdiction operations should be a
matter of priority.
While it would be impossible to supplement the coastal patrol with
U. S. Naval effort, such is not recommended at this time, in that the VNN
has not yet utilized its full capabilities. Also, before U. S. Naval effort
is utilized we must have a better intelligence estimate as to whether or not
the enemy traffic warrants such diversion of U. S. forces. U. S. aerial
reconnaissance is also not recommended since the dispersed pattern of
junk operations and impossibility of identification in the air would make
this effort futile. There is an argument however for token U. S. participa-
tion as a means of getting the VNN to conduct a more intensive, continuing
patrol. With a Flood Task Force, for example, one DE or DD could be
assigned to an offshore patrol station.
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The River Patrol:
The Navy has a major responsibility for assistance in the delta area
in transporting marine and army troops, in patrolling the waterways against
VC efforts, and in protecting rice, charcoal and pig shipments to Saigon.
The Navy River Force has 114 craft (with an additional reserve of 30) for
these purposes. Additional troop transport boats are required for light
troop movement. The design of a shallow draft small boat has been fixed
upon and measures are underway to expedite construction and delivery of
50 such craft.
MAAG has proposed the formation of 17 Civil Guard boat platoons,
each to be equipped with eight personnel landing craft (LCVP). The
LCVP can be made available faster than personnel can be trained to use
and maintain them. This Civil Guard program should be expedited and
necessary personnel trained and made available. It is most important
that the Civil Guard operations be fully coordinated with those of the
River Force. This would free VNN boats for direct support of Army
operations. Again, command and control procedures will be a matter of
importance.
The maintenance of the River Force craft will be improved when the
small boat force at Cantho becomes operative. Necessary equipment
should be installed at Cantho to do as much maintenance as possible on
the river, to avoid river craft being sent to Saigon.
Offensive Operations:
The VNN has the capability of conducting raids against North Vietnam.
A small swimmer force is now organized within the Navy. The Marine
Corps capability is enhanced through the presence of many Marines
originally from North Vietnam who are familiar with its geography.
Initial raids would have ample chance of success due to surprise. In
addition, intelligence and subversive agents could be introduced along
the coastline. Ranger units could be introduced by the Navy north of
the DMZ where the mission could be accomplished under cover of dark-
ness. Units could be used for raids., ambushes, propaganda and intel-
ligence purposes. No planning has been done for such operations. It is
recommended that this be undertaken. Again, proper Naval representa-
tion in the JGS and in the joint intelligence effort, as recommended
elsewhere in this appendix, would be required.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
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1, The VNN should be properly represented on the 3GS.
Z. The VNN must be included from the start on all military planning
which involves the use of Naval or Marine forces.
3. An intelligence organization should be established in the VNN and
its efforts integrated into the over-all GVN intelligence efforts, in order
to utilize the intelligence capabilities of the VNN.
4. MAAG should increase its advisory assistance by:
a. Physically locating MAAG naval advisors at the shipyard,
in the staff sections of the Navy headquarters, and in selected sea and
river staffs.
b. Providing mobile training teams to improve electronics,
ordnance, and engineering, maintenance, food quality and service, and
leader ship.
c0 Investigating the food situation in the Navy and determine if
provided rations are being properly used and if inc reased aid or VNN
action is required.
5. Advance the delivery of PCEi s at the expense of delayed delivery
of amphibious ships, and take action to increase the number of per sonnel
available to man new ships.
6. The Operations Evaluation Center in Saigon should make a maxi-
mum effort to determine the scope, pattern, and effectiveness of VC junk
traffic so that more effective counter action can be undertaken.
7. We should urge the RVNAF to allocate proper resources, human
and material, to the VNN, in order to raise its effectiveness and morale.
8. U. S. Naval participation should not be considered at this time
for assistance in the coastal sea patrol, except in connection with possible
Flood Force operations.
9. Through increased MAAG "partnership" in the VNN command
structure, as recommended above, take action to expedite the procurement
of sailing junks and the building of motor junks.
10. Naval planning should be instituted for possible covert and overt
military action against North Vietnam, and VNN Navy ships, on a regular
basis, should steam north of the 17th parallel.
? ?AttgitilgAgsloAiorgi shouldthevNbNe
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coordinated with the several Civi
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for direct support to the Army.
1Z. Organize a joint command with naval, ground, and security
forces to counter infiltration along the coast by all possible means.
13. Institute improved supporting procedures to hamper infiltra-
tion by sea, i.e., security zones not restricted to territorial waters,
strict control of movement in and out of harbors with priority attention
to those ports suspected to be part of the infiltration organization, and
restriction of fishing in areas suspected to support regular VC traffic.
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;1'; rx ;-;.;
V. VIETNAM AIR FORCE
During the past three months, the VNAF has received some long overdue
personnel and morale attention.
The commander was promoted and a large number of promotions were made
throughout the service. The VNAF was also allotted some additional person-
nel spaces which were sorely needed, but not enough to solve their problems.
The ARVN has the mission of guarding VNAF air fields but does not fulfill it
and the VNAF must use personnel trained in other specialties, including main-
tenance, for guard duty. This practice reduces the effectiveness of an al-
ready strained maintenance capability. The VNAF is rarely included in the
high echelon planning and is subject to the sometimes questionable actions
of the Chief of Staff, JGS. There is definitely a feeling of dislike and
distrust between the Chief of Staff and the Commander, VNAF, a capable and
hardworking officer.
The AD6 squadron at Bien Hoa does not suffer from a shortage of pilots
or maintenance personnel. It has 24 combat ready pilots and 12 pilots tak-
ing a combat crew course within the squadron. The in-commission rate of
the AD6 is acceptable and the 500 hours monthly flying program is easily
accomplished.
Tactical Operations: The VNAF is capable, with its state of training,
maintenance capability, and airplanes, of carrying out effective air-ground
operations? They are not doing it, although they have complete control of
the air. There appear to be a number of reasons why air is not making a
significant contribution to the counter-insurgency campaign. Chief among
these are:
1. Targets - Until the recent missions flown by the U.S. Navy and
the U.S. Air Force, there has been very little photography, and hence great
uncertainty as to target location and identification. While the very nature
of a guerrilla war makes good targets hard to find, sophisticated aerial
reconnaissance should find such good targets as there are. There is a real
requirement for continuing reconnaissance. Because of the late hour in the
war, there is not time to train the Vietnamese to do this. The missions
must continue to be flown by the United States. Aircraft based in Bangkok
could do the job.
2. Lack of Effective Organization - There is none of the controlling
structure necessary for effective tactical operations. Everyone realizes
this and the MAAG has made recommendations to correct it. It is most unlike-
ly that a reorganization alone, however efficient on paper, will result in
the quick and responsive use of air strikes the situation requires. While
the organization is needed, the Field Commander must have the authority
necessary to control all elements of the Field Forces, U.S. Army and Air
Force personnel, trained in joint air-ground operations, must come in and
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run the JOC, AOC, and ASOC's at the various levels. They should operate
these facilities, presently non-existent for all practical purposes, in
conjunction with .the RVNAF. However, the U.S. must run them. It would
be useful if an air-ground operations school could be conducted at the
same time.
Given this machinery for the control of their tactical operations and
given good reconnaissance, the RVNAF should be able to exploit with profit
their air supremacy.
If we cannot put in the control
use of tactical air, we should think
Jim," or additional helicopters. To
it all in together; the aircraft and
to operate them.
organization necessary to the proper
twice about introducing either "Jungle
put it more positively, we should bring
the organization and communications
The VNAF is operating its C-47's at a daily utilization rate of 1-1/2
hours, a rate fair for a troop carrier outfit, but unacceptably low for an
airline. It would be a slow and painful process to increase this utiliza-
tion. While it is hard to prove more airlift is needed, partly because the
requirements appear tailored to the known capability, it is fair to assume
that more airlift could be put to very profitable use in a war where sur-
face transport is extremely difficult and in many places non-existent.
CAS has some evidence that more airlift is badly needed on occasion.
If additional airlift is to be given SVN, it should probably be on a
contract basis and it should operate under the MAAG with a proper transport
control organization to assure efficient use of the generated lift.
The Delaware Corporation, through its subsidiary, Air America, is the
obvious choice for such a contract. (The Delaware Corp. is a holding company
owning 40% of CAT, 100% of Air America which in turn owns Air Asia. Head
office is in Washington, D.C.)
Air America is currently operating in Laos. Its' assets in Laos are:
10 C-46's
5 C-47's
5 L-28's (Helio couriers)
14 11-34 Helicopters
If the situation in Laos permits it, these would be immediately avail-
able for operations in Vietnam. Without diverting anything from Laos, Air
America has only limited assets (2 C-46's, 2 DC-4's, 1 C-47) which probably
could be diverted from other sources for Vietnam. With authority to lease
military aircraft, it would take Air America about 60 days to get an effective
operation in being.
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dt
Recommendations:
269R000200030001-5
a:, U.S. reconnaissance in Vietnam should be placed on a continuing
basis.
? b. The U.S. should set up, and operate, the tactical air-ground system;
to make this suggestion palatable, it should be presented as a training program.
c. The "Jungle Jim" unit to be very useful should come equipped with a
liberal mission directive or, at least, one that is not too specifically
restrictive.
d. Additional airlift would certainly be useful and may even be required.
e. Improvement of VNAF air facilities should have a high priority.
(The new strip at Pleiku is badly needed.)
Helicopters: Due to the topography of SVN, the tactics of the VC and
the lack of LOC's, it is imperative that adequate helicopter lift be at the
disposal of the RVNAF. The present VNAF capability which is based on 10
H34's and 8 1119's is inadequate for moving sufficient troops to action spots
rapidly. The squadron's operations have been reduced by a lack of special
tools, a shortage of qualified pilots and maintenance personnel and the
fact that administrative missions are often given precedence at top echelon
over operational requirements. The helicopters are for all practical pur-
poses controlled by President Diem.
This small unit is hindered by the fact that it is flying and maintain-
ing two types of helicopters. Due to the shortage of pilots and crew chiefs,
many personnel have to be qualified on both types. Supplies for each must
be catalogued, stored and maintained, creating an additional workload for
a shorthanded unit. Replacement of the eight H19's with eight H34's would
eliminate the foregoing situation and increase the lift capability at the
same time.
There is no doubt that additional helicopters are required but they
should not be provided to the VNAF until present resources are used properly.
Since the H34 is in short supply, it might prove difficult to replace the
H19's. If this proves the case, it might be more advantageous to remove
the H19's from the VNAF squadron and bring in what is really needed -
a U.S. manned, maintained and controlled H34 squadron.
There is no possibility that Air America, or any other contractor, could
take on a substantial helicopter contract. The market for pilots is just not
there, according to Mx. Grundy of CAT. Any helicopter operations would have
to be military, sheep-dipped, if necessary.
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In the VNAF most of the helicopter pilots trained in the past two years
have been "washouts" from regular pilot training and some of them have never /
been able to check-out as first pilots in helicopters.
Recommendations:
a. That all 'requisitions for special tools be filled at once and the
tools airlifted to Tan Son Nhut.
b. That at least three additional well-qualified U.S. maintenance ad-
visors be sent to the helicopter squadron.
c. That criteria for helicopter pilots in the VNAF be raised and they
be sent to CONUS for training.
d. That consistent with maintenance of essential U.S. posture else-
where, two 1134's be delivered every month to the squadron and two 1119's
removed at the same time until all the 1119's have been replaced.
e. That consistent with maintenance of essential U.S. posture else-
where, a U.S. helicopter squadron, 1134 or better, be moved to SVN complete
with personnel and equipment and controlled by CHMAAG to provide much
needed airlift.
Beyond these recommendations and reconnaissance there is, at this
stage of the war at least, no other profitable missions for U.S. air units.
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VI. CIVIL GUARD AND SELF DEFENSE CORPS
(1) Civil Guard.
E4jAI
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The Civil Guard with an organizational strength of 68,000 and
actual strength of 64,000, supplements the Army. In general, units in I
and II Corps areas are poorly organized, equipped, led and trained, while
III Corps area have been re-equipped and the majority have been trained.
Individually, Civil Guard Personnel are of fair quality, with many being
ex-Army.
ChMAAG has recently approved the organization of 17 boat platoons
of eight LCVP's each. These boat platoons are to be used in a like number
of provinces in the delta area where transportation is often more feasible
upon the waterways than on the roads. Programming action for the boats is
being expedited.
The Civil Guard is under the Department of Defense. There is a
commander in each Division Tactical Zone. Individual battalions and
companies are under the direct control of the Province Chiefs. The Civil
Guard is employed in platoon and company sized units in static guard duty
throughout the country, including outposts near the frontier, although
units occasionally accompany the ARVN on offensive type operations.
A study now underway by the Civil Guard will determine the
feasibility of using dogs for detection and warning.
Operational deficiencies of the Civil Guard (CG) are readily
apparent. They still retain the old French fort concept as a basis for
mapping defense posts. They have only about one-third of required officers.
Until recently, some Province Chiefs have refused authority for ARVN
inspectors to check on guard posts. This was changed after a recent suc-
cessful VC attack highlighted local CG deficiencies.
In that CG units remain in one province, they form a valuable
contact with the people and can be a good source of basic intelligence.
On the other hand, Province Chiefs are very reluctant to release units for
training or for operations outside the province.
The major deficiencies of the CG are in its equipment, training
and low utilization for intelligence purposes.
Eguipment: Until re-equipped under the present program, CG
units remain armed with old French and British weapons. Ammunition is poor.
Personal equipment is limited.
Units receive new U.S. equipment as they go through training. At
the present time all units in the III Corps area are equipped, with the ex-
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ception of some shortages in vehicles and radios. Equipment for complete
outfitting of the CG is either in the country or will be received during
the next eight months. Since it is not desirable to issue new equipment
to units until they have received training in its use, major problem exists
in the delivery of MAP equipment.
LCVP's for the 17 CG Boat Platoons can be made available faster
than personnel can be trained to use and maintain them, and deliveries will
be scheduled to match the training.
Present CG uniforms are of poor quality. ARVN is providing new
uniforms, but the CG takes priority of delivery after ARVN.
Training: Training is the major problem facing the CG.
The present CG training program was undertaken about 10 months ago.
Recruits were given 16 weeks individual training and established companies
24 weeks of individual and unit training. Approximately 7,000 Civil Guards-
men have been trained under this plan, with another 4,000 now in training.
Present conditions require that the CG training program be expedited.
The first step is to cut the course to 12 weeks. This has been
directed.
MAAG also has proposed that training be conducted at eight addi-
tional sites throughout Vietnam. The JGS/RVNAF would not agree, on the
basis that this would pull too many units out of the provinces and away
from operational missions (static guard) and that eight additional training
sites could not be supported with ARVN trainers. However, they did agree
to start training at four additional sites and to double the input at
Quang Trung - Song Mao. Training is commencing in November at three of
these sites. Additional U.S. advisors are en route to assist in this train-
ing. However, it will still take two years to train the remainder of the CG.
In addition, the desire of Province Chiefs to retain their security forces
and not release them for training, as well as overriding operational commit-
ments, may further prolong the program.
Thus, as a matter of necessity, the present and planned training
may have to be supplemented by on-site training within the provinces. It
is probable that Province Chiefs will be more willing to release CG, if only
a company at a time, for such training, since their forces would remain
readily available within the provinces.
Training on-site could not be undertaken since many posts are re-
mote, security is doubtful, favorabll terrain is not always available9 and
operational requirements of actual sucurity duty would preclude the release
of personnel for the unit training required. Therefore, on-site training
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would be feasible only at a central location within each province. In many
cases, Self Defense Corps training sites could be used.
U,S. advisors being ordered for duty with the Military Sector
Commanders (Province Chiefs) and at Self Defense Corps Training Centers
could supervise the training. Additional MAAG advisors probably would be
required. Some of these could also serve as advisors to the CG Battalion
Coamanders. Interpreters also would be needed. A possible source for these
would be the RVNAF Language School. Equipment used for training would be
the actual equipment issued to the personnel. Necessary training aids could
be made available. The big obstacle remains the shortage of ARVN officers
to act as actual instructors.
The conclusion reached is that the present concept for training
CG at well organized training centers should be actively pursued. Since
time is of the essence and the number of units that probably will be made
available for this training is limited, supplementary emergency on-site
training should also be conducted at the provincial level, to the extent
practicable in light of available ARVN instructor personnel, available
provincial sites (including SDC training areas) and available advisory and
interpreter personnel.
Personnel: The CG has only 377 of officer and 557 of NCO auth-
orized strength. This is a major weakness. Officer and NCO training has
been stepped up, but the prospects are dim for remedying the situation in
a relatively short time. ARVN is also understrength in officers and NCO's,
and can ill spare them for the CG. The only course of action which appears
feasible is to continue all possible officer training and to press ARVN
to allocate to the CG its equitable share of available talent.
Advisors: To do the job that needs to be done in a short time,
we need an advisor with each Battalion Commander. The most important fields
to be covered by such advisors would be operations, intelligence, training
and civic action. This last has been a much neglected area in the CG.
(2) Self Defense Corps (SDC)
The Director General, CG and SDC is the over-all commander. He
reports to DOD on CG matters and to DOI on SDC matters. At the region,
province and district levels, SDC matters are administered by CG personnel
detailed to such duties. SDC operational personnel are in two echelons,
the canton (group of villages) and the village. Since Province Chiefs may
and do make changes to this organization, it has no real uniformity.
Authorized strength is 59,000, actual strength about 53,000, of
whom only 76 are officers.
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There is no uniform training plan, training being conducted accord-
ing to the desires of the individual Province Chiefs.
The CG does conduct a 5 week training program for the SDC at Tan
Hiep. Other training is conducted at province level, with assistance pro-
vided by U.S. advisory detachments as local resources allow.
There are actually 38 SDC training sites throughout the country of
varying capabilities. Use of these sites is irregular.
Present equipment is a collection of unreliable French rifles and
ammunition, plus some old Malayan shotguns. U.S. Carbines, ammunition and
communications equipment have been programmed for the entire SDC. 25,000
Carbines are now en route to Saigon. The remaining carbines, all the
AN/PRC-10 radios and sound power phones are expected to be delivered during
1962.
At the present time, MAAG advisors to the CG also have SDC respon-
sibilities. However, an additional 15 officers and 30 NCO's have been re-
quested, to arrive in the next three months, to take over SDC duties at
training sites throughout the country.
(3) Intelligence
The CG and SDC remain on duty in one area. They know, work with
and stay with the people of that area. They, therefore, are in a much
better position to gather grass-roots intelligence than the ARVN, whose
units move about much more. This intelligence asset has not been exploited.
Although a beginning is being made in getting intelligence to the Province
Chiefs, it is not always passed on through the proper channels. Improved
organization for intelligence, instruction in intelligence collection, and
emphasis on getting information promptly to the proper intelligence author-
ities all need emphasis.
We should, therefore, assign to each CG Battalion Commander an
intelligence specialist advisor.
(4) Civic Action
The CG has great potential for an effective civic action program
on a people-to-people basis. If properly utilized, it could be of great
assistance in assuring the support of the populace of Vietnam, as well as
pay a real bonus in the intelligence effort. Due to its looser organiza-
tion and very limited equipment, the SDC has much more limited opportunity
to undertake a civic action program. As with all RVNAF units, it is im-
perative that the CG exploit all aspects of civic action. This will be a
major task with U.S. advisors soon to be assigned to the CG.
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(5) Recommendations
CUPe
a. CEMAAG should maintain pressure on GVN to require Province
Chiefs to continue to make CG units available for training at the five CG
training sites in commission or being commissioned.
b. As ARVN instructors can be made available and additional U.S.
advisors arrive, additional emergency training should be organized at the
provincial level, and new equipment issued when sufficient instruction in
its use has been given.
c. As soon as practicable, a military and an intelligence advisor
should be assigned to each CG Battalion Commander.
d. As part of the over-all increase in intelligence effort, em-
phasis should be placed on making maximum use of the capabilities of the
CG and SDC for obtaining and reporting basic village.plevel intelligence.
e. In line with an over-all civic action program, exploit the
capabilities of the CG in this field.
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VII. INTELLIGENCE:
DISCUSSION:
1. General:
a. The RVNAF's military intelligence program lacks effective
direction and control.
b. The ground forces intelligence effort is centralized on paper
at Field Command level to provide for a flow of information from the
lowest unit level. In practice, however, the system is ineffective. The
front line soldier is generally unaware of his potential for collecting mili-
tary information. In the rare cases when timely information is available
at lower echelons, it sometimes stagnates there because of lack of know-
ledge or equipment to relay it to interested headquarters.
c. The Air Force reconnaissance capability is limited. Two C-45
aircraft provide the primary photo reconnaissance capability. The 32
s and 18 helicopters are allotted visual reconnaissance missions for
corps and divisions. The system, however, does not provide the corps
and division commanders with sufficient "on-hand" aircraft to insure
timely and continuous reconnaissance operations.
d. The Navy with its River Forces, Sea Forces, and junks has
sufficient equipment for a moderate volume of visual reconnaissance and
has limited radar capabilities. As in the other services, the Navy weak-
ness in the intelligence field lies in a lack of appreciation of intelligence
at command level which results in a lack of basic intelligence training for
the individual seaman.
e. There is no clear cut policy for passing military information
from the various paramilitary and civilian organizations. Province Chiefs
and other government agencies sometimes route military information
through their own channels without referral to lateral military organiza-
tions.
f. Much of the clandestine effort, for example the 1st Observation
Group, is under the direct control of the President and tactical intelligence
is not always directly available to the military.
Z. Counter-Intelligence: In the security field, the RVNAF is also
weak. Currently, the counter-intelligence programs are the responsibility
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of MSS, an RVNAF unit, which is responsible to the Minister of Defense.
The counter-intelligence effort for the Armed Forces has a low priority
in current planning.
3. Communications:
a. There is no tactical intelligence net. Corps, Divisions, and
Regimental G-2's depend on the command net for intelligence dissemina-
tion. During periods of Viet Gong activity, when the rapid flow of intel-
ligence is imperative to sound operations, the over-loaded command net
cannot always accommodate the G-21s which results in the loss of timeli-
ness in intelligence reporting. Advisors in the field stated there is no
radio communication of any kind lower than regimental level. This further
hampers the ready flow of tactical intelligence.
b. To solve the latter problem ARVN companies have recently
been authorized one AN/GRC 9 radio per company. These radios are in
the country and available for issue.
4. Intelligence Training:
a. Intelligence training is centralized at the Joint General Staff
level. An intelligence training school for NCO's and officers is in opera-
tion in Saigon. Corps and Divisions also run periodic intelligence schools
but combat operations make unit commanders reluctant to release men
for intelligence training. The effectiveness of this training depends on
local conditions, but it is believed to be marginal at best. The failure to
train adequately the individual soldier in basic intelligence is a weakness
that needs priority correction.
b. A detachment (of four officers and two EM) of the U. S. 500th
Military Intelligence Detachment is training Vietnamese agents for clan-
destine collection missions deep in enemy territory. The first group of
these new agents will be operational in mid-November.
S. Intelligence Relationship Between ARVN, Civil Guard and Self
Defense Corps:
a. Relationship between ARVN and the other Vietnamese security
forces in the intelligence field is ill-defined, sometimes casual, often
non-existent and always dependent on the status or personality of the
Province (Sector) Chief. There is no set pattern and apparently the
Province Chief has no requirement to establish liaison procedures
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between the military and para-military units in this area of responsibility.
U. S. advisors in the I Corps area stated that in their zone there was a
good flow of tactical information between the various elements in most of
their provinces. This willingness to cooperate was often hampered by
lack of communication facilities at low levels where security units were
often dispersed over wide areas making timely physical contact impossible.
b. A corollary problem at the provincial level is the absence of
any standard Village Alarm System. Village defense and warning systems
appear to be left to the discretion of the individual villages. Some areas
have developed barricades of pointed bamboo with para-military or civilian
roving guard posts with some success. There is no national or regional
program underway to encourage these villagers to contribute to their own
protection nor to make use of the vast information collection potential of
the local populace.
6. COMINT-ELINT:
a. The RVNAF COMINT effort is conducted by an element of
Vietnamese military personnel trained in Saigon by elements of an Army
Security Agency (ASA) company. The current RVNAF COMINT effort is
considered adequate and is limited only by the availability of qualified
personnel who can absorb the training. There is no Vietnamese ELINT
effort and none is anticipated.
b. In separate communications, the Commanding Officer of the
ASA unit is making specific recommendations to improve the U. S. effort
in the COMINT field. If implemented, his recommendations would require
an augmentation of 75 personnel and a moderate amount of new equipment.
7. MAAG Role in Intelligence Field:
a. Most of the MAAG effort in the intelligence field is directed at
the Joint General Staff level and at the various intelligence schools. Cur-
rently, there are no MAAG advisors at any level of combat commands
solely responsible for intelligence. In the field units, including corps,
the intelligence advisory role is performed by an officer who is also
responsible for advising in other fields.
b. The MAAG personnel are aware of the weaknesses of the
Vietnamese intelligence effort and plans are underway to improve intel-
ligence capabilities. Some progress has been made and more is promised.
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Additional intelligence advisors are on requisition with the aim to assign
them down to battalion level eventually.
c. Accomplishment of such a comprehensive intelligence coverage
would require substantial augmentation of MAAG strength. To do the same
job more economically personnel wise, it has been suggested that intel-
ligence advisors be placed at province level.
d. Since the Province Chief actually controls the Division and
Corps troops released to him in his province, an intelligence advisor at
this level would, in effect, be reaching all the troops with the possible
exception of Corps reserve troops (which are usually only token forces).
In addition, the intelligence advisor at province level could have the
added responsibility to advise the commanders and staffs of other combat
units in their areas who have not been released to the Province Chief.
e. An intelligence advisor at province level would also have an
opportunity to advise Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps on intelligence.
In some cases, the intelligence advisor may be able to exert his influence
in mobilizing the villagers themselves to participate in the intelligence
collection effort. These aspects alone weigh heavily on the side of
assigning advisors at this low level.
f. The problemsof assigning intelligence advisors to provinces
are formidable and start with getting approval of the President. Language
ability, communications and logistic support, and security are other
aspects that present obstacles that will have to be overcome.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Attached are discussions of a proposed Joint
U.S. - RVNAF Intelligence Group and a U. S. Evaluation Center recom-
mended by General Taylor and concurred in by J-2, MAAG. These dis-
cussions are similar to those submitted to General Taylor on 24 October in
Saigon, but have been somewhat refined and contain minor changes in the
proposed organization.
Within the framework of these two proposed organizations most of
the deficiencies of the current intelligence effort in SVN will be corrected.
The following recommendations are those that require most urgent atten-
tion. In making these recommendations, it is realized that MAAG has
already initiated actions that, if completed, will correct some of the
weaknesses discussed.
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(1) Establish within the RVNAF an effective plan for the timely
flow of Spot Intelligence Reports to include specific reporting on fleeting
targets.
(2) Clarify intelligence command lines to insure that all mili-
tary intelligence is provided military units at all levels.
(3) Assign intelligence advisors at province level.
(4) Organize Mobile Intelligence Training Teams to conduct
intelligence training at ARVN, Self Defense Corps and Civil Guard
company level.
(5) Increase the photo reconnaissance capability of the VNAF.
(6) Provide suitable aircraft at division level for daily visual
reconnaissance missions.
(7) Establish an intelligence communications net down to bat-
talion level and increase communications capability at company level.
(8) Create a separate counter-intelligence organization
responsible to .1-2, RVNAF.
(9) Establish a joint Photo Processing Center manned by U.S.
personnel to improve the capability of the photo reconnaissance effort.
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VIII. LOGISTICS
86600269R000200030001-5
PROBLEM: Lack of U.S. control over logistics procedures and RVNAF command
supervision over logistic matters.
I. The control of RVNAF logistic operations by MAAG is considered to
be adequate with certain exceptions. Although direct U.S. control is
limited to preparation of the FY MAP program and MAAG approval of the RVNAF
force structure and resultant TOE's, the acceptance of U.S. advisors guidance
on the part of RVNAF logistics personnel generally produce effective and
"working" control by MAAG over RVNAF logistics operations. It must be
emphasized, however, that there is no direct control over operations, supplies
and equipment after material is turned over to GVN. This sometimes results
in a patient acceptance of advice and a later course of action independent
of same.
2. There are two specific problems that hinder RVNAF command super-
vision over logistic operations. These are:
a. The RVNAF J-4 (for all intent and purpose also the ARVN G-4)
exercises no direct control over the Chiefs of the ARVN Technical Services
as would be the case on U.S. staffs. He does issue overall policies and
directives but the Chiefs of Technical Services report direct to the C/S
ARVN. As a result, the Technical Services Chiefs sometimes are not respon-
sive to guidance from the J-4 and many staff actions by the Technical
Services are unilateral in nature with little or no coordination with or
through the J-4. This matter has been the subject of many conversations
and much correspondence between MAAG and GVN at the highest level concern-
ing an over-all reorganization of the GVN DOD. No concrete results on this
specific problem have been forthcoming to date. The matter appears to be
one of RVNAF politics rather than an understanding of command relation-
ships. Continued pressure on GVN at the highest level should eventually
overcome this problem.
b. A GVN DOD agency, Administration, Budget and Accounting Office
(ABA), exercises direct and absolute control over all fiscal matters per-
taining to RVNAF. This includes all functions relating to budgeting, pro-
curement and all other financial operations. This control is exercised by
ABA direct to the ARVN Technical Services, Air Force and Navy completely
by-passing the RVNAF J-Staff. As a result, in logistic financial operations
the J-4 has practically no influence or control and can affect little or
no coordination. Perhaps the most glaring problem resulting from this
ABA autonomy is the cumbersome procurement procedures ABA has imposed on
the RVNAF, which have in turn discouraged Vietnamese contractors from doing
business with the RVNAF. This matter has been the subject of many con-
versations and letters between the MAAG and the highest GVN official (Mr.
Thuan, Assistant Secretary of State for Defense corresponds to the U.S.
Secretary of Defense). In this respect it should be noted that within
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the past few weeks President Diem has appointed a new Director of ABA, this
may be an indication that there is to be a relaxation of the present ABA
rigid control over RVNAF financial matters. MAAG indicates that this
problem will be vigorously followed up.
Recommendation: (1) That NAG continue to take positive action with respect
to influencing sound logistics actions within his advisory capacity. Should
this problem continue, action (political) should be taken at a higher level
to effect more direct U.S. control of MAP furnished resources.
(2) That pressure be placed on GVM at a high level to put his
logistics house in order by providing for proper chain of command and staff
control and coordination over logistics matters.
PROBLEM: To determine improvements to facilities necessary to enhance the
military capabilities of South Vietnam in order to provide a base of opera-
tion for successful operations against insurgency within SVT. To improve
and establish new lines of communications, airfields, ports and communica-
tions.
1. Extensive improvements are presently programmed and funded in
part in FY 62. These programs include airfield improvements, POL facilities,
road improvements and construction, communications facilities, port and
terminal facilities. It is emphasized that construction programs are
relatively long range and will not in the immediate future provide direct
support to the counter insurgency effort. CINCPAC established priorities
for these projects are considered valid, but increased emphasis will be
necessary to assure timely effectiveness. Two additional requirements
have been recently developed, one of which is the Pleiku-Kontum-Ban Het
Road including extention to Attopeu in Laos; the other being Pleiku air-
field improvements which will provide C-130 aircraft capability for logis-
tics support beyond C-47 capacity and increased AD operational capability.
2. There are some critical items which are not programmed and are as
follows in order of priority:
a. Pierced steel planking and pierced aluminum planking for im-
provement and construction of airfields. (Request for program deviation
has been sent to CINCPAC - 10,500 tons PSP and 500 tons PAP).
b. Need for numerous small (STOL) airstrips at selected strategic
locations.
c. Additional electric power and water facilities for RVNAF
medical facilities. (Survey of detailed requirements will be completed
in the near future and request placed through CINCPAC for program deviation.
Work desired accomplished in CY 62).
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d. Ammunition Storage Areas (Additional Igloos)
(1) Bien Hoa
(2) Phu Bai (Hue)
(3) Duc My
(4) Pleiku
(5) Can Tho
(6) Da Nang
3. Items considered necessary which will require additional funds
and expedited actions in order to be accomplished in CY 62:
a. Single side band radio stations
(1) Can Tho
(2) Nha Trang
b. Naval Base Improvements Cam Ranh Bay
(LST Ramp and access road, water supply system, base roads,
bridge, electric power system and diesel fuel storage facilities).
c. Naval Base Improvements Saigon Shipyard
(Pier andsea wall improvements).
d. Additional equipment facilities for Air Force at Tan Son Nhut
Air Field for tactical air-ground operations.
e. Medical Training Center - Saigon.
f. Signal Refrigerated Warehouse - Saigon.
g. Hospital - Can Tho.
h. Water system and sanitary facilities Cuu Long (Saigon) for Marine
units.
i. Emergency electric power - Vinh Long.
j. Replacement of emergency generator Saigon Shipyard.
Recommendation: That support be given at the Washington level for projects
programmed with a view towards expeditious implementation commensurate with
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importance attached to the retention of SE Asia as an area allied with the
Western World. Also that emphasis and support be given those unprogrammed
projects with particular urgency attached to those directly identified
with the counter-insurgency effort. These are considered to be road and
airfield construction and improvement for needed mobility and communica-
tions for more effective response and control.
PROBLEM: Additional equipment required for RVNAF.
1. With certain exceptions additional equipment is not needed by RVNAF
at this time to counter the insurgency. The priority requirement here is
that the RVNAF and MAAG must make a concerted effort to see that proper
training is conducted and experience gained to efficiently operate the
equipment in hand now. Exceptions to this are:
a. Air mobility for tactical as well as logistical purposes is
urgently needed to successfully prosecute the counter-insurgency effort.
However, introduction of additional aircraft at this time must be care-
fully considered in regard to other command and operational factors con-
tained throughout this report. A requirement has been established by MAAG
for a helicopter battalion consisting of three transportation light heli-
copter companies (63 H-34s) with necessary maintenance and supply support
to provide this required mobility. There are certain factors to consider:
(1) A plan for utilization and control of helicopters.
(2) The present critical shortage of the H-34/HUS-1 helicopter
in U.S. military assets.
b. In country forces are not authorized a maintenance float but
must use current austere TOE allowances to operate and accomplish repairs
thereby creating shortages in using units. The establishment of a main-
tenance float at base and field depots would permit direct exchange of
major items.
c. There is a requirement for immediate procurement of 50 Swimmers
Support Boats with 40 - 50 HP outboard motors. Marine Corps units require
means of getting ashore more effectively and quickly during amphibious raids
and assaults. These boats would be particularly effective in the delta area
and would provide capability to put two companies ashore on one lift, will
nest on LSMs and are easily launched by hand. Action is being taken for
program deviation and expedited delivery.
d. Nine L-28 or L-20 aircraft are required for command liaison
(3 for each corps).
Recommendation: That action be taken to make the above equipment available
by type and in amounts compatible with operational ability to profitably
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employ. In regard to the H-34 type helicopter, these should be phased into
the area in numbers compatible with employment capability. The Army is no
longer procuring the H-34, therefore if the U.S. Army provides required
helicopters replacement by type is not possible. It HUS-1 type helicopters
are obtained from a Navy/Marine Corps source it is recommended that immediate
replacement funds be made available on a crash basis in order to allow im-
mediate increased production for replacements in U.S. inventories.
PROBLEM: To determine construction and training projects necessary which
could be accomplished by US Logistical and Engineer Units or US Contractors
for construction and logistic actions.
1. There is an urgent requirement for the accomplishment of many
projects in order to enhance the lines of communication, provide support
in other areas and increase training of RVNAF. Security problems will exist
in many areas of South Vietnam and combat support would therefore be re-
quired. Assistance could be directed in the following projects:
a. Building and maintenace of roads, bridges and airfields.
b. Assist in training of ARVN engineer units.
c. Establish and operate organizational and field medical evacua-
tion service by air using helicopter units.
d. Establish and operate medical field hospitals.
e. Establish and operate signal communication systems.
f. Advice and assistance in stock control activities from depot
to using unit.
g.
Advice and assistance to RVNAF in maintenance activities.
h. Maintain US equipment required for employment indicated above.
i. Provide supplies and equipment for US forces in SVN.
j.
ally located throughout SVN.
Construct numerous small air strips for STOL aircraft, strategic-
k. Out-of-country construction and engineer supervisory personnel
(military or civilian) to perform essential naval construction projects.
1. US Naval personnel to assist in Navy Supply Center Activities
and to assist in management and supervision of the Saigon Naval Shipyard.
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m. Shore party to train VNN units in over-the-beach operations.
n. Use of CAT contract or other acceptable contract personnel to
fly Air Vietnam aircraft and release VN pilots for service with VNAF.
0. CAT or other contractor to provide air logistic support.
2. CINCPAC has recommended to JCS that an Army Engineer Construction
Bn and a Navy Construction Bn be deployed to expedite construction needed
to support US combat forces when and if introduced into SVN. Priority jobs
listed were: completion of Qui Nhon POL facilities, Pleiku airfield and
Attopau - Ban Het road. The latter would throw a "fire break" across the
Ho Chi Minh trail.
Recommendation: Regardless of introduction of US combat forces into SVN,
that consideration be given to the introduction of support forces listed
above to accomplish necessary tasks and to add impetus and the means to
effectively combat the VC threat.
6'2 7-ri'
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1. Intelligence Flow Charts
Z. Abbreviated Mission. Statements
3. Abbreviated Organization Discussions for
JOINT U. S. - RVNAF INTELLIGENCE GROUP
AND
U. S. EVALUATION CENTER, SAIGON
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1 Civil 1 I SDO
I Guard
IN C
All U. S.
collection
agencies
in area
U. S.
Users
* NOTE: The Province Chief will normally report to Division but will
transmit tactical information to using military units at any level.
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RVNAF - US
JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Sits at ChIVIAAGI Joint General Staff Level
MISSION:
Directs the military intelligence effort.
Collects, collates, interprets, evaluates and disseminates all
Vietnamese military intelligence.
Reports all military intelligence directly to RVNAF for action.
Reports all intelligence to U. S. Evaluation Center, Saigon.
AUTHORITY:
ChMAAG is responsible for the operations of the Group.
The Group has final authority for the accomplishment of a national
military intelligence effort.
Has access to and has authority to process military information
from all sources including that from technical sources.
RELATIONSHIP TO GVN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:
Coordinates activities and programs with CIO.
Transmits non-military intelligence to CIO without processing.
Reports finished military intelligence to CIO for information and
appropriate users for action.
PARTICIPATING AGENCIES:
MAAG, CAS, ASA, State (when needed), JGS, Field Command,
VNAF, VNN.
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MISSION:
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U. S. EVALUATION CENTER
Sits at Embassy Level
Collates, evaluates, interprets and disseminates all military
intelligence from all U. S. and indigenous sources, including
technical sources.
Processes non-military information having a direct effect on the
security at Vietnam. An example of this type of intelligence is
that bearing on potential anti-government coups.
PARTICIPANTS:
MAAG, CIA, ASA, State, Service Attaches.
AUTHORITY:
The U. S. Ambassador is responsible for the establishment of the
Evaluation Center.
In his discretion the Ambassador will appoint a senior member of
the Vietnam Task Force Saigon as Director, U. S. Evaluation
Center.
Participating members of the Evaluation Center will furnish spaces
and personnel designated by the Director of the Center.
The Director of the Center will disseminate selected intelligence to
appropriate users, including RVNAF and CIO.
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JOINT U. S. - RVNAF INTELLIGENCE GROUP
LOCATION:
As decided by ChMAAG in consultation with RVNAF.
MISSION:
Direct the national military effort using all sources of Vietnamese
intelligence.
ORGANIZATION:
ChMAAG will be responsible for the establishment and operations
of the Joint U. S. - RVNAF Intelligence Group. Participating full
time members will be provided by MAAG, CIA, ASA, JGS, Field
Command, VNAF, VNN. State will provide support as requested
by ChMAAG. U. S. Agencies and Vietnamese agencies will provide
intelligence specialists in sufficient numbers as requested by Ch
MAAG to accomplish the mission of the Group. Initial organization
will include Order of Battle specialists, Prisoner of War Interroga-
tors, Photo Interpreters, technical intelligence personnel, area
analysts, and editorial support.
Additionally, U. S. air and sea reconnaissance resources will be
earmarked to support the group.
AUTHORITY:
Military intelligence from all Vietnamese sources at all levels will
be transmitted to the group for processing.
The U. S. Evaluation Center will provide the Group with pertinent
intelligence from U. S. resources.
ChMAAG will determine exact size and organization of the Group
and requisition specialist personnel as required.
ChMAAG will follow established procedures to obtain CINCPAC
approval for actions as appropriate.
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a
THE PROPOSED U. S. EVALUATION CENTER
LOCATION:
Most appropriate location offering security for and access to all
sources of intelligence, including technical sources.
MISSION:
Center will develop tactical targets, based on Viet Gong Political/
Military situation, from all available sources of information for
presentation to ARVN through Chief, MAAG, and subsequent ARVN
tactical action and destruction. In addition, Center will produce
for local, theatre and national level consumers (1) periodic intel-
ligence reports on current Viet Cong Political/Military develop-
ments, operations and posture, and (2) appropriate studies,
estimates, Order of Battle and other comprehensive data on the
Viet Cong in the frequency, form and substance determined to be
necessary or of use at the local, theatre and national level.
ORGANIZATION:
The following suggested organization represents the minimum con-
sidered necessary to satisfy needs for the initial implementation of
the Center using present resources of the Evaluation Center now in
operation in the Embassy. It is tl-e responsibility of the U. S.
Ambassador through Task Force Saigon to recommend a revised
organization as the operations center becomes solidified.
Coordination, Requirements and Direction: 1 Officer, Director of
Center
1 Officer, Assistant
Director
1 Admin NCO
This element will direct and coordinate the operations of the Center,
coordinate the intelligence and information input with all contributing
local, theatre and national agencies, coordinate all outgoing requirements
and insure fulfillment action thereon.
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OPERATIONS:
File, Index and Map Posting - Drafting: 2 Intel Opns NCO's
This element will provide the center all posting and cartographic
as well as drafting support.
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: 2 Officer Analysts (Nambo area and Saigon)
1 Officer Analyst (Intersector V)
2 Officer Analysts (Projects and Studies)
This element will provide the basic research cell of the Center and
will effect exchange of information and data among themselves for
properly coordinated and balanced content in reporting vehicles.
REPORTING, PUBLICATION AND DISSEMINATION: I Officer Analyst
2 Admin NCO's
This element will provide for the necessary editing, sanitizing and
publication of target data, wrap-up and coordinated studies and
estimates to include Order of Battle, the publication of these vehicles
and the dissemination of these products to appropriate consumers. In
addition, will effect Intelligence Control responsibilities to insure ful-
fillment of request and response to queries and requirements levied
by outside agencies and consumers.
SECURITY:
Security for the area, the associated operations and the incoming
and outgoing special intelligence materials and products, and the
electrical and courier means of transmission of these products will
be provided by the Army SSO.
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SUMMARY
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In summary, it is the concensus of the military committee that
intervention under SEATO or US plans is the best means of saving
SVN and indeed, all of Southeast Asia. Should this prove impossible
for non-military reasons we consider there are two general ways in
which the combat effectiveness of RVNAF can be increased substan-
tially. The first and most immediate requirement is to assure that
GVN makes maximum" effective use of its current resources. Its
present conduct of military operations leaves much to be desired. By
taking certain corrective measures and developing more effective
procedures, it is our opinion that the combat effectiveness of RVNAF
could be improved by an estimated 25 to 40 percent. The second method
involves determining reasonable courses of action within United States
resources short of military intervention or direct combat support by
air and naval combat elements which can appreciably improve both the
immediate and long term fighting capabilities of the RVNAF.
We feel that rapid approval and implementation of the following
recommendations will improve the combat capabilities of the RVNAF,
upset the Communist timetable and prevent a rapid take-over in SVN
by Communist forces:
a. Intelligence
(1) One intelligence agency be designated as a central control
point for direction, collection, interpretation, collation, and dissemina-
tion of all intelligence. (Detailed recommendations are contained in
Intelligence Section of Military Appendix.)
b. Command and Control
(1) That the US Government insist that a single inviolate chain
of command be established and practiced. This must include the removal
of Province Chiefs from the chain of command.
(2) That the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and Organization
be reworked to provide for proportionate service representation to include
the seating of all service chiefs as members.
(3) That special efforts be made at the highest USG levels to
compel President Diem to adhere to an effective chain of command and to
cooperate more fully with the United States in the combined efforts of
the two governments to forestall the communist threat to SVN.
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(4) At least 50% of the ARVN troops on static and pacification
duties which tie them to a piece of terrain should be released for com-
bat operations.
(5) MAAG personnel should be included in planning at all
levels and in operations centers as team members on a 24-hour basis
during operations.
c. National Planning
(1) An effective national plan for counter-insurgency be
developed and systematically and effectively implemented.
d. Other
(1) That the US provide RVNAF with additional helicopter and
fixed-wing airlift as required, consistent with the maintenance of
essential US military posture worldwide.
(2) That projects aimed toward increased mobility to include
road and small airstrip construction, and communications for more
effective response and control be undertaken.
The foregoing broad recommendations are considered of primary
importance. Of only slightly less stature are those listed below that
require early action. It is recommended that:
(1) The general welfare of the enlisted man, to include diet,
pay, promotion, leave and awards, be greatly improved at once.
(2) A crash program be implemented to train officers and
NCO's in adequate numbers to provide a solid base for accelerating the
increase of RVNAF forces.
(3) MAAG advisors participate in all planning and operations.
(4) Resources be relocated as necessary throughout the RVNAF
to provide each service the means to increase its effectiveness and
morale.
(5) Much greater emphasis be placed on indoctrination of the
individual Vietnamese soldier through means of political action officers
assigned down to company level to conduct continuous and vigorous
instruction designed to stimulate the individual soldier to fight.
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MEMORANDUM F R GENERAL TAYLOR
27 October 1961
FROM: STERLING COTTRELL
A44$ P
SUBJECT: VIET-NAM
RECOMMENDATIONS.
k6(-0"1-t
1. The Diem regime is not organized nor operated
sufficiently well to meet the Communist threat successfully. A new
response must be developed.
2. Given the virtual impossibility of changing percept-
ibly the basic weaknesses of Ngo Dinh Diem, and in view of our past
unsuccessful efforts to reform the GVN from the top down, we
should now direct our major efforts from the bottom up, and supply
all effective kinds of military and economic aid.
3. Since it is an open question whether the GVN can
succeed even with U. S. assistance, it would be a mistake for the
U. S. to commit itself irrevocably to the defeat of the Communists
in SVN.
4, Since U. S. combat troops of division size cannot be
employed effectively, they should not be introduced at this stage,
despite the short range favorable psychological lift it would give the
GVN.
5, U. S. combat forces of CINCPAC' s command should
be maintained in their present state of readiness for employment in
SVN if the present guerrilla war evolves into a conventional type
operation.
6. The world should continue to be impressed that this
situation of overt DRV aggression, below the level of conventional
warfare, and must be stopped in the best interest of every free
nation.
7. If the combined U. S.-GVN efforts are insufficient
to reverse the trend, we should then move to the "Rostow Plan" of
applying graduated punitive measures on the DRV with weapons of
our choosing.
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THE IMMEDIATE THREAT.
The best intelligence we now have reveals a pattern of
well organized supply points for infiltrators, much like the Civil
War "underground railway", from the 17th parallel roughly through
the center of Viet Nam to the South. It also reveals similar points
through Laos into SVN re-routing centers. Infiltrators move with
almost no opposition or detection to points of concentration, where
with local recruits they are organized for attacks, mainly at this
stage on poorly defended villages and farms.
The curve of Viet Gong organization, communication
and combat effectiveness is apparently rising sharply in contrast to
the slower rising curve of effectiveness of the GVN Armed Forces.
The conclusion is that unless this trend is reversed,
the Viet Cong will ultimately destroy the GVN, moving from control
of villages, to districts, provinces and finally to attack the Armed
Forces,
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING U. S. ASSISTANCE
TO THE GVN.
Certain conditions inherent in the situation must be
recognized in any consideration of what kinds of U. S. assistance
can be effective.
1. The Communist operation starts from the lowest
social level?the villages. The battle must be joined and won at
this point. If not, the Communists will ultimately control all but
the relatively few areas of strong military concentrations. Foreign
military forces cannot themselves win the battle at the village level.
Therefore, the primary responsibility for saving the country must
rest with the 'GVN.
2. For the above reason, the U. So should assist the
GVN. This rules out any treaty or pact which either shifts ultimate
responsibility to the U. S., or engages any full U. S. commitment to
eliminate the Viet Cong threat.
3. Uo S. responsibility without control would be
disastrous. Although control over SVN forces, as in Korea, might
theoretically be possible, the Communist attack on VN is radically
different from the attack on Korea. If this were a situation in which
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the chances were good that application of U. S. military force
could solve the problem, then responsibility and control might be
desirable. But it is not, so U. S. control should not be sought.
APPROACHES.
The ways we can assist the GVN successfully are
governed by certain characteristics of the Diem regime, which must
be recognized so long as the Diem remains in power.
1. Diem, like Sukarno, Rhee, and Chiang is cast in the
mold of an oriental despot, and cannot be "brought around!' by threats,
or insistance on adoption of purely Western concepts. To be success-
ful, the approaches must be made on the plane of advisors, not as
adversaries, with emphasis on Diem's primary responsibility and
control.
Z. Diem, having been subject to military coups, cannot
be expected to delegate concentrated authority to the military. Ways
must be found to solve the military problem without insistance on
full delegation, no matter how desirable or necessary delegation may
be.
3. Diem is not a planner, in the Western sense. He
avoids elaborate paper plans. Speculation on the reasons are many,
but the fact remains. Therefore, the U. S. should not insist on
national plans as a prerequisite to any assistance. Military plans
might be forthcoming, albeit painfully, from military sources.
4. Diem is not a good administrator, in the Western
sense. In the oriental despotic tradition, he rules everything from
his own desk. Suggestions for radically changing this pattern run
contrary to Diem's basic nature and can be suggested, but should
not be set forth as the conditions of U. S. assistance.
5. Our history of dealing with Diem makes it quite
clear that a time lag must be anticipated between Diem's acceptance
of a foreign proposal, and his fulfillment, if the action depends
solely upon the GVN. In the present situation, time is of the essence,
and fast action is required on many fronts, but GVN action is always
slow and many times incomplete.
3
ANSWERS TO CERTAIN POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
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ANSWERS TO CERTAIN POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
1. The stability of Diem's regime is roughly propor-
tionate to the success of the military in controlling the Viet Gong
threat. Since 1955, when Diem took over from Bao Dai, his regime
has survived constant threats of varied intensity from religious
sects, villagers, the intellectuals, government offices and the
military. At the present moment, the most serious threat is posed
by military officers, who might combine at any time with govern-
ment officials to depose Diem. Whether they move or not will be
largely conditioned by their estimate of whether they can win against
the Viet Gong under the Diem regime, or whether they believe a new
regime is indispensible to victory. If successful operations are
registered against the Viet Gong, the threat of a coup will recede. -
Z. Bearing in mind the above limitations on corrective
measures to modify the Diem regime, the political base for the
counter-insurgency program could be improved if Diem would use
the already created Internal Security Council. This body includes
the President, Vice-President, Ministers of Interior and Informa-
tion, the Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, the Chief of the
ARVN Joint Staff, and other senior security officials.
The base could also be improved by an overall GVN
national plan, integrating all fields of activity related to the security
problem.
A comprehensive phased military plan is now in
preparation although apparently it is being done reluctantly.
It must be recobnized that these administrative
changes and planning will proceed slowly, if at all.
3. The internal political effects of introducing U. S.
Forces should be considered. On the oiatiz. hand, the danger exists
that U. S. or SEATO combat forces would be equated in the minds
of the villagers with the previous unfortunate French experience.
This would be hammered home by the Communists. On the other
hand, even opposition parties in the National Assembly have recently
expressed a desire for U. S. troops, and the evidence on balance
indicates that:
a. Special tailored forces for specific missions of
assisting the GVN should produce no violent unfavorable reaction.
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b. Larger units of division size could probably
be introduced without trouble, but U. S. combat operations against
the Viet Gong could raise a host of problems with the villagers.
4. A political settlement in Laos has largely been dis-
counted in advance. GVN officials frankly state that the U. S. has
abandoned Laos. They are concerned that the U. S. may abandon
SVN when the going gets rough. They are keenly aware of the effect
of infiltration from Laos and are certain it cannot be stopped by any
weak "neutral" Laotian government nor by an ICC, no matter how
effective. At the same time; a Lao settlement will not cause the GVN
to abandon their efforts.
5. A major increase in U. S. military and economic aid
would be most welcome to all levels of the people and to the GVN.
It would supply further reassurances and proof of U. S. backing.
However, this does not mean we should supply it unless it can be
used effectively. The greatest effectiveness would be achieved by
accelerating the training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the
Self Defense Corps if ways can be found to do this a very difficult
problem. Increased economic aid at the village level would produce
the greatest impact on the security situation.
6. The principal considerations related to a bilateral
treaty were discussed above, and the conclusion drawn against this
action. The GVN would naturally welcome, as Thuan said, "such a
proof of U. S. real determination to stay with the GVN in its fight".
On the other hand, negotiation of such a treaty would represent a
direct violation of Article 19 of the Geneva Accords, and ratification
by the U. S. Senate would be time consuming at best.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE, AND HOW.
First, while not minimizing the need for coordinated,
evaluated intelligence at the national level, it strikes me that the
most urgent need is for development of an extensive net in the villages,
feeding into the Province Chiefs. The province organization seems to
me to be the lowest level at which you can expect quick local reaction--
if the SDC and the Civil Guard can be organized to react. Since Diem
insists on authority being retained by the Provincial Chiefs, why don't
we try to turn this necessity of dealing with them into a virtue, and
help these officers do a better job? To my mind, this flows logically
from a conviction expressed previously that the battle will be won or
lost primarily at the village level. So let's all get down on our bellies
5
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to fight the problem from the bottom up rather than entire concen-
tration from the top on down. For years we have been trying
unsuccessfully to "reform" the system at the top, while virtually
ignoring the "rice roots". We've been erecting various "scare crows"
as deterrents to certain kinds of threats, while the gophers have had
a field day building underground runways, multiplying, and gnawing
away at the roots.
Second, I favor improvement of the intelligence collection
and analysis at the national level, and believe the new Evaluation
Center should be enlarged.
Third, I favor an attempt to insert Americans into as
many of the seven GVN intelligence units as possible. This may not
be easy.
Fourth, I think the MAAG "charter" should be amended
to permit their resources to be fully exploited in the intelligence
field.
Fifth, I think MAAG "section chiefs" should be supplied
with intelligence reports pertinent to their work. For example,
Captain Easterling of the Navy Section, MAAG, should have the CAS
reports on DRV infiltration organizations and operations along the
coast.
Sixth, I believe the USOM "charter" should be amended to
exploit its natural access to information vital to the security situation.
Its personnel should be instructed on the need for an intense intel-
ligence effort and channels should be established for relaying this
information to the Evaluation Center.
JOINT SURVEY OF PROVINCES.
I am strongly in favor of this, because it fits with my
"village battle" concept. I think it must be done very carefully---
not with the attitude of an "inspector general" listing all the faults
of the Province Chief and his organization, but as a friendly,
constructive listing of what each Province Chief needs to do his job
better. The fact that there are some Province Chiefs who have done
excellent jobs is proof that it can be done. I trust that these success-
ful tactics and techniques can be transplanted. I would hope the
survey teams could study and be briefed on these tactics before they
undertake their surveys. The composition of these survey teams is,
of course, something to be decided locally, but if I were doing it, I
would not send large delegations. Ideally, a team should be one U. S.
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officer and one GVN. At maximum, it should be two of each in the
military and intelligence fields. One team should be sent to each
Corps area. Later, if the results are favorable, USOM and USIS
people could visit the provinces.
After the surveys, we should "break our back" to
supply what is needed. If we could get a MAAG advisor to the Civil
Guard and an intelligence n-ian assigned at each Province Chief level,
I think it would greatly facilitate an effort from the bottom up,, It may
be a problem to find 38 French speaking officers of each type, but I
think the effort should be made --- perhaps by sending present
MAAG officers out to the field on these jobs and replacing them with
fresh officers from CONUS.
GENERAL LANSDALE AS ADVISOR TO DIEM.
I heartily endorse this idea. Earlier in this paper I
pointed out the limitations we face in "reforming" Diem. Any asset
we can use to influence him should be applied. The fact that Diem
has asked for his services is an ideal entree. Because of the
confidence Diem has in Lansdale, some progress might be registered
from the top down.
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POLITICAL
APPENDIX "B"
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INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
APPENDIX "C"
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30 October 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR
FROM: William J. Jorden
SUBJECT: The Political Situation in South Viet Nam
SUMMARY
I. The Problem.
Pressures for political and administrative change in South Viet
Nam have reached the explosion point. Without some badly needed
reforms, it is unlikely that any program of assistance to that
country can be fully effective.
11. Conclusions.
The U. S. can pursue a variety of courses ranging from giving
full and unquestioning support to the present Government in Saigon,
to engineering a coup against the Diem regime.
III. Recommendations.
A. We should identify ourselves with the people of Viet Nam
and with their problems rather than with a man or a regime.
B. There should be an early U. S. -SVN meeting at a high level
at which U. S. thoughts on the necessity of administrative changes
are expressed with firmness.
C. We should encourage formation of a National Emergency
Council in South Vietnam, composed of the most able and talented
Vietnamese, to bear the main burden of policy making.
D. U. S. advisers of great tact and competence should be
selected to work with key Vietnamese agencies, including the
Presidency and the NEC.
E. The purpose of these advisers should be to guide, encourage
and expedite, not to dictate.
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Any program of assistance to South Viet Nam must take
into consideration that country's internal political situation and its
administrative structure. This is true for two reasons: first,
because the pressures now at work appear certain to erupt into
demands for a change, whether by means of a coup or through some
less drastic method. Second, there is good reason to think that without
some badly needed reforms, any program of military or economic aid
from the United States will be less than fully effective.
This confronts the United States with a choice: to give its full
backing to President Diem and do what it can to frustrate any moves
to alter the present system; to stay neutral and hope that the changes
that come will be orderly and constructive; to encourage changes that
might be acceptable to both sides, i.e., the President and his critics;
to back administrative changes that would reduce sharply the role of
the President and his family in the day-to-day conduct of govern-
mental affairs; to back a coup that would remove Diem from power.
The situation provides an opportunity for the United States to stand
once again for change in this part of the world, to press for measures
that are '...Doth efficient and more democratic. We must identify our-
selves with the people of Viet Nam and with their aspirations, not with
a man or an administration. We must do what we can to help release
the tremendous energy, ability and idealism that exist in Viet Nam.
We must suggest, not demand; we must advise, not dictate; but we must
not hesitate to stand for the things that we and the Vietnamese know to
be worthwhile and just in the conduct of political affairs.
The Present Situation.
One after another, Vietnamese officials, military men and ordin-
ary citizens spoke to me of the situation in their country as "grave" and
"deteriorating". They are distressed at the evidence of growing Viet
Gong successes. They have lost confidence in President Diem and in
his leadership. Men who only one or two months ago would have
hesitated to say anything critical of Diem, now explode in angry denun-
ciation of the man, his family, and his methods.
There is near paralysis in some areas of administration. Small
decisions that would be handled by minor officials in one of the minis-
tries of most governments are taken to the Presidency for personal
approval by Diem or one of his top advisers. Major decisions some-
times go unconsidered for days or weeks. Ministers are reduced to
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? role of expediters and "yes men". Men with no elective or even
:.-iipointive office often have more influence and power than the
recognized officials.
Many men of intelligence and ability have been kept out of
g, over nria ent or been forced to resign if their complete loyalty to the
President came into doubt. The National Assembly has become a
rubber stamp for the President's measures. Elections are a
m.eaningless exercise that can only produce contempt for the demo-
cratic proc es s
A chance remark in a cafe can produce a jail sentence. Those
who express political opposition are harassed. Men are held indefin-
itely without indictment or even the placing of charges. One member
of the National Assembly has been in jail for almost a year without
his legislative immunity from arrest having been lifted.
The role of the President's family is well-enough known to
require little elaboration. Brother Nhu holds power second only to
that of Diem himself. Brother Can rules the northern provinces like
an oriental satrapy from his base in Hue. Archbishop Thuc, as the
President's elder, is listened to respectfully by the President.
Luyen, Ambassador in London, returns to Saigon regularly to "mend
his fences!'and check on his organization. Madame Nhu presides
over the women of South Vietnam like an Empress.
The activities of the brothers are a source of deep resen nient
among people at every level. The Communists have used this
resentment skillfully in their propaganda against the regime. Many
of the allegations made against members of the Diem family are true;
many are false. What matters in this context is what is believed.
Intrigue, nepotism and even corruption might be accepted, for a
time, if combined with efficiency and visible progress. When they
accompany administrative paralysis and steady deterioration, they
become intolerable.
All of this has produced a steadily mounting demand for change.
Even persons long loyal to Diem and included in his official family
now believe that South Viet Nam can get out of the present morass
only if there is early and drastic revision at the top. They admit
ti-at a series of dramatic political and military successes might-- .
just might?alter the present mood somewhat. But they see little
or no chance for that kind of success unless the Government's
decision-making and administrative apparatus is reorganized first.
The -Vietnamese would like to see this kind of change come
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peacefully and with U. S. encouragement. There are many who
believe, in fact, that it can come peacefully only if it is urged by the
U. S. Government. If change does not come in an orderly way, it
will almost certainly come through forceful means carried out by an
alliance of political and military elements.
The Dangers
It is obvious that the present tense situation could produce
violence and a period of serinus internal confusion. It could divide
the Army as well as the bureaucratic machine. The Communists
can be expected to move swiftly in any such situation, combining
military with political moves aimed at a quick takeover. At best,
an attempted coup that failed would produce retaliation that would
deprive Viet Nam further of some of its be:)... brains and talents.
The United States would face a serious dilemna should violence
erupt. Given the large and growing U. S. involvement in Viet Nam,
we would almost certainly have to intervene directly. This would
produce resentment on one side or the other, perhaps both, and
would expose us to large-scale criticism in other countries.
These are dangers, too, in the continuation of the present uneasy
situation. It means appalling waste in terms of energy, ability, and
patriotism. The prevailing administrative stagnation means that any
new program of aid will be less than fully effective, It means, too,
that the U. S. becomes increasingly identified with an unpopular and
ineffective regime.
The Choices
The arguments in favor of change, almost any change, are
impressive. The situation in South Viet Nam is far too serious to
permit that country the luxury of depriving itself of any of its
available skills, intelligence, imagination, and hope. Those commit-
ted to helping the Vietnamese in this critical hour have an equal
interest in seeing that everything that can contribute to victory is
done.
The choices for the U. S. Government in this situation were
listed earlier. My judgement of those choices follows:
1, To give unquestioned backing to Diem and to try to
frustrate any pressures for change in his method of rule is to court
disaster,
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. To stay neutral and hope for the best means an open
invitation to an explosion that would probably benefit the Communists
more than anyone else.
3. We are obliged, I think, to encourage in a variety of ways
reforms in administration, from the highest level to the villages,
that will be acceptable to both the President and his critics.
4. If this kind of compromise approach fails to produce
promising results, if reforms are frustrated by backsliding into old
ways and attitudes, if the "back door" continues as the preferred way
to influence, if criticism produces harassment, then we must con-
sider backing changes that would reduce sharply the role of the
President and would alter his status to that of figurehead and symbol.
5. Engineering or backing a coup involves large risks in both
the local situation and in the broader framework of world opinion.
It is not something we do well. It has little to recommend itself.
Specific Recommendations
1. As a matter of general policy, we should avoid identifi-
cation of President Diem or his regime as the focus of U. S. policy.
Our public concern should always be with the people of Viet Nam,
with their problems, and their aspirations.
Z. There should be an early meeting either between President
Diem and a carefully selected personal representative of President
Kennedy, or between President Kennedy and a high-ranking personal
representative of President Diem, possibly his brother Nhu. This
meeting should be used to outline U. S. thoughts and attitudes on the
problem of administrative reform. The urgent need for delegation
of authority and for inclusion of Viet Namis best talents in public
office should be stressed.
3. Using the recent declaration of a national emergency in
South Viet Nam as a lever, we should press for immediate formation
of a top-level National Emergency Council that would include repre-
sentatives of the leading Government organizations such as Defense,
Budget, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Security. This body would have
the combined function of recommending actions and programs to the
President and assuring that top-level decisions are carried out.
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4 o In agreement with the Vietnamese Government, a group
of highly qualified (by talent as well as temperament) Americans
should be sleeted to work with key Government organs, including
the Presidency and the proposed National Emergency Council. They
could serve an invaluable function as friendly advisers and expediters.
5. The purpose of these advisers would not be to impose our
ways or methods or political institutions. Rather it would be to
encourage the Vietnamese to find their own solutions within the
broad framework of principles and ideals which we share. They
< should promote the idea of selection on the basis of ability and
advancement on the basis of merit. They could stimulate the assump-
tion and delegation of authority at all levels. By example and by
guidance they could promote many elements in political administration
that are essential to success and that now are missing in the govern-
mental structure of South Viet Nam,
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ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM
APPENDIX "I)"
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ECONOMIC AID TO VIET NAM
SUMMARY OF
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The economy of Vietnam is progressing. Economic factors
are probably not a very important cause of the current crisis.
Nevertheless, the economic programs can and should be used to
support the counter-insurgency. Specifically it is recommended
that:
A. The proposed level of commercial aid of $140 million be
negotiated with the Vietnamese as soon as possible.
B. The Vietnamese be assured that the U. S. will make every
effort to support all worthwhile projects which contribute to the
solution of the immediate crisis.
C. Special efforts be made to expedite those projects which are
particularly useful in the short run including village communications,
radio broadcasting, village radio receiving sets, special action with
1Viontagnard tribes, the telecommunications system, emergency flood
relief, and to the extent desired by the GVN, Agrovilles, Agroham-
lets, and feeder roads.
D. Successful projects which contribute to long range economic
development be continued if they are not too expensive but in general
new starts in this area be deferred for the time being.
E. Long range projects whose effectiveness is being reduced by
Viet Gong activity should be reviewed for possible modification or
termination.
F. Special efforts be expedited to increase the ability of private
enterprise to absorb capital imports into industrial expansion.'
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I.
ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM
The Economy of Vietnam
The most surprising thing about the economy of Vietnam is its
robust health. In spite of the widespread terror throughout the
countryside, there are everywhere evidences Of economic growth...
Vietnam's economy is agricultural, depending primarily on rice
and rubber. In recent years considerable diversification has taken
-place. Farmers increasingly now are able to supplement their
income with such cash crops as pigs, ducks, kenaf, jute, and ramie.
The price of rice to the farmer has seldom been better. The
average farmer has a health unit where he can take his family for
elementary treatment of the most common diseases and a maternity
room where his wife may have their baby. His child can look forward
to enough education to become literate and perhaps more. Credit,
although inadequate, is available to some farmers through the National
Agricultural Credit Association. An increasingly rich variety of daily
-essentials and some meager luxuries may be found at the village store,
and he has money in His pocket with which to buy. A land reform pro-
gram has been implemented which has corrected the worst of the evils
of land tenure. Better seeds and methods are producing more rice than
ever. In these respects, at least, the farmer of Vietnam is living
better than his ancestors?better perhaps than they dreamed.
In the cities the economic picture is brighter still. Attractive
store windows display everything from radios to automobiles. Attractive
houses are under construction. Education and health services are
widely available to the laboring classes. Hunger is rare in Vietnam.
An industrial boom is in full swing. Economic infrastructure has
multiplied rapidly. Bridges and canals destroyed by war and disuse
are being restored. A new highway network nears completion. The
railroad is restored. Airports are opening up over the entire country.
Schools and public buildings are dedicated almost daily.. Modern
telecommunications are on the way.. Power will soon be plentiful.
But there are danger signals. In the country disease is still
widespread. Housing is miserable. The contrast between the bleak
existence in the country and the relative opulence of the cities is not
unnoticed and the Viet Gong make capital of it. Underemployment is
everywhere. In the cities there is un.em.ployment. The laboring
classes live in houses without water or toilet facilities. Migration
from the countryside into Saigon is said to be expanding at a rate
which presses further on the city's limited facilities. The problem
of economic inequality is everywhere and may one day be a major
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Nevertheless, despite these discordant notes, there can be no
doubt that the economy of Vietnam is strong and is improving at a
rapid rate. Given reasonable security and political stability there is
every reason to expect the gifted people of Vietnam to continue and
accelerate this trend.
II. The Role of Economic Aid
A. The Mechanics of Economic Aid
Two kinds of economic aid are given Vietnam. The larger,
consisting of about 80% of the dollar value of the total U.S. economic
aid is called commercial aid. It consists of furnishing dollar foreign
exchange to private importers of goods and services. Importers pay
for these dollar authorizations with their piasters which go into the
Counterpart Fund. This Fund, which is jointly controlled by the
GVN and the U.S, is used for the most part (about four-fifths) to pay
the local costs of the armed services. About one-fifth has been used to
pay for the local costs of public works and the other economic projects.
Since commercial aid consists of imports purchased by
private importers, it follows that both the type and magnitude oi such
aid are influenced very greatly by the willingness of private merchants
to import. In general the private demand for essential imports has
been fully financed and in fact as of June 30 last, a backlog of
$40 million of aid authorizations had not yet been taken up by private
demand. On the other hand it seems apparent that if the aid program
were to make available funds for less austere items including in
particular consumer durables, the market would absorb more imports.
Because of the favorable exchange rate under the aid program, it
would also be possible to increase imports of some essential items
such as coal, sugar, and textiles which are produced locally. However,
this is not done because it would compete unfairly and perhaps destroy
these local industries.
Commercial aid is now confined for the most part to pro-
ducers goods, e.g., industrial machinery and raw materials. Chief
exceptions are pharmaceuticals and U. S. farm surpluses.
The second type of U. S. aid is called "project aid". It
differs from commercial aid chiefly in that it is granted to the Govern-
ment of Vietnam whereas commercial aid is sold to the private sector.
Included are projects in agriculture, education, health, public safety,
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public administration, transportation, power, and communications,
among others. Project aid has always been much the smaller kind
of aid. Its size is limited chiefly by the ability of the Governments
of Vietnam and the United States to conceive, develop, and administer
projects. Last year, for example, ICA tentatively authorized up to
$25 million of which only $10 million was lased. A major reason for
this shortfall, for example, was the Northern Bridge Program which
the GVN eliminated to save piasters and security guard for construe.o
tion crews. Project aid consists of commodities, contract services,
technical advice and training in the U.S. or third countries.
B. The Functions of Economic Aid
Commercial aid serves U.S. objectives in two ways. First,
it provides the imported resources necessary to keep the economy
stable, permitting per capita consumption of imported items to remain
about constant and also supplying the sinews of growing industrial
strength. Second, it withdraws piasters from the private sector and
places them at the disposal of the Government. This is necessary in
a young government such as the GVN which has not as yet developed
adequate means of obtaining piasters from the private sector.
Project aid serves U.S. objectives in both the short and long
run. In the short run certain projects directly support the struggle
against the communist insurgency. Included in this group are village
communications, radio, telecommunications, the Montagna,rd project,
training of provincial administrators and perhaps others. In the
long run, certain projects are building the preconditions for sustained
economic growth. These include education at all levels, public health,
power, transportation, government statistics, agricultural research,
extension, production, credit and education, industrial advisory
services, police training, and many others.
III. Commercial Aid
A. Determining the Level of Commercial Aid
The outstanding difference of view on economic aid between
the U.S. and the GVN has concerned the level of commercial aid.
Until the summer of 1959 the dispute had not amounted to much. Then,
however, the U.S. changed the method of calculating the level. 13p
until that time the aid level had been designed to generate the piasters
needed to help the GVN balance its internal budget. Thus, for example,
if a budget deficit of seven billion piasters were anticipated, the
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commercial aid level could be obtained by dividing seven billion by
35 (the official exchange rate is 35 piasters equals one US dollar).
The result would be a commercial aid level of $200 million. Several
major defects in this system led to its abandonments
1. Critics of the program were quick to point out that a
change in the evaluation of the piaster to 70 or lower could cut the
commercial aid program in half thus exposing the arbitrary nature
of the system.
2. The aid level was excessive resulting in unused aid
authorizations of about $80 million and increases in GVN foreign
exchange reserves to $220 million.
3. The system destroyed self-help incentives. By taxing
more and spending less the GVN got less aid and vice versa.
Consequently this system was abandoned and, instead, commercial
aid was determined on the bais of the need for help in paying for
essential imports. This system works as follows:
a. The total level of imports is estimated using most
recent level as a basic but modifying it for known trends.
b. Total GVN exports are estimated based on detailed
analysis of each major export commodity.
c. Aid from: Japan and other sources is estimated.
do The resulting deficit (item 3a minus items 3b and 3c)
is the level of US aid required.
Because the level of total imports dropped as domestic pro-
duction took over and because the level of exports increased, the
external deficit and hence the level of commercial aid decreased in
FY 1960 and 1961. This led to the difference of view between the GVN
and the US over the level of aid. Elements of the GVN interpreted the
decline in level of aid as .a decline in US support for and confidence in
the present Government. Efforts to convince the GVN that this is a
wholly desirable trend merely reflecting their own growing economic
independence have not been fully successful.
? What is needed on the GVN side is a confidence that the US
will supply whatever resources are required and that changes in levels
of aid follow changes in resource requirements and do not indicate
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changes in US confidence in the government. There are indications
at the ministerial level and below of increasing understanding of
these facts, particularly in recent weeks.
What is needed on the US side is to recognize that if the level
of aid declines too rapidly the GVN has a problem which, although not
a resource problem, is, nevertheless, a genuine problem. It is a
problem first of a psychological nature: A hard-noSed attitude on the.
level of aid would add a further demoralizing blow to the hard-pressed
Government. Second, it is a problem that time is required for the GVN
to prepare the fiscal steps necessary to produce the piasters needed to
Support essential defense and other activities.
Using Aid to Produce Piasters Beneficially
The easy answer would be simply to lay aside economic
considerations and put in the level of aid needed to meet the C;VN's
problem even though this level exceeded the resources required. But
the answer is not this easy. There are dangers in exceeding the
resource level. The danger is that if the aid takes the wrong form it
can actually hurt GVN and US objectives. Three harmful effects are
possible:
? I, It is possible that the aid would not be used but would
simply increase either the pipeline of unused US aid or would add to
GVN's unused reserves, In either case, the aid would not produce
piasters and would subject the program to justifiable attack by its
critics,
2. Aid might be used to increase imports of non-essential
items such as consumer durables, This would produce piasters but
by further widening the gap in the levels of living of the poor and the
urban rich, it would strengthen the hand of the Viet Cong. Moreover,
by distorting the economy it would delay the pace of economic
developrn ent.
3. Aid could be used to import essential items in competition
with local industry. This would have obvious disadvantages oath in the
short and long run for US and GVN objectives.
How then can we reconcile the need to recognize the GVN s
problem with these hard economic facts of life? The answer is that
we must find a way to use aid to generate piasters with a beneficial
effect. The one obvious thing to do is to increase the level of aid for
capital imports for new or expanded industrial projects. This
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approach suffers from none of the disadvantages cited above and has
a number of advantages. It produces piasters immediately required
by the Government to meet its critical expenses; it does not place any
additional administrative or managerial burden on the Government;
it constitutes an expanded tax base which will continue to supply the
Government with critically needed piaster revenues; it creates as
nothing else can create a psychology of success, of confidence in the
future of free Vietnam and finally, by increasing domestic production,
it hastens the day of economic independence for Vietnam, thus, in the
long run actually saving the U. S. taxpayer money.
Hence the best way to use aid to meet the military costs is to
help accelerate private in.vestment. This is indeed a surprising con-
clusion! Instead of economic development and military outlays being
in conflict as is usually the case, here we have a situation where the
one reasonable way to obtain the piastres for military costs is through
a process which brings economic development. Thus military strength
and economic development go hand in hand reinforcing one another.
What are some of the ways in which we can stimulate further
willingness on the part of private sector to use our imported goods
for expansion of productive facilities?
a. ICA should proceed without delay to sign a contract with
a major industrial management advisory firm which will supply to the
USOM. and the Government of Vietnam a broad array of industrial and
technical know-how to be used in helping private entrepreneurs put
together and implement sound projects.
b. The Industrial Development Center of the Government of
Vietnam has recently been given a new lease on life by the appointment
of a fulitime director. Both the U. S. and the GVN should give this
institution all possible support in order to help it grow into a strong
organization which, drawing on the services of the U. S. contract men-
tioned above, can supply the leadership so badly needed by the private
sector in finding new opportunities for investment.
c. A proposal has been made for the creation of a consortium
of private bankers which would supply urgently needed credit on med-
ium and long-range terms to entrepreneurs who are not able to fully
finance sound new projects. The commercial aid program fully supplies
the dollar requirements of such new projects. This proposal would
close an important gap by helping to supply on reasonable terms a
minor but vital percent of the corresponding piastre requirements
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for sound new projects. The U. S. has been asked for such piaster
support as we may be able to supply. The Government of Vietnam
Has appointed a director of this consortium, in which both govern-
ment and private funds are mingled. The U. S. should thove
immediately to furnish piaster support to this project. Three
possible sources are: (1) PL. 480 Cooley Funds; (2) Repayments
of IDC loan funds; and (3) Repayments of old Mutual Security
Loan Funds.
d. There is some evidence of increasing unwillingness on
the part of Vietnamese entrepreneurs to order industrial machinery
and equipment from the U. S. in those cases where the cost of such
machinery is significantly above the cost of equivalent machinery of
non-U. S. sources. We find that increasingly entrepreneurs have
completed their calculations for a given project and have concluded
they can make a profit only to discover that if they must pay
exorbitant prices for their imported industrial equipment, their
profit margin is narrowed and accordingly the project becomes
unattractive to them. Until now Washington has been reluctant to
grant waivers of the limited worldwide procurement policy (fre-
quently referred to as Buy American policy). We believe that this
important obstacle to industrial expansion could be significantly
reduced or removed altogether if the executive agencies in Washing-
ton were to authorize the director of USOM to waive the Buy
American requirement in the following cases:
1, Wherever American businesses have been Cir-
cularized and have not indicated any reasonable interest in supplying
the industrial machinery or equipment required for a given activity;
and
2. Wherever the cost of such equipment and machin-
ery in the U. S. exceeds the cost from non-U. S. sources by 25% or
more.
e. There are a number of specific opportunities for inves
rnent which are completely ready to move and lack only Washington
approval. These include, for example, .expansion of two textile mills
by an aggregate of 45,000 spindles plus equivalent looms and finishing
and dyeing equipment. Action on such pending cases should be
expedited.
C. Recommendation on Level of Commercial Aid
Washington agencies have approved a level of commercial
aid of $140 million. This can be defended on the basis of resources
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1. Total kaborts: The private sector took only $214
million last year. Some decline is expected in demand for imports
this year due to .increased domestic production and to the depressing
effects of the flood and of Viet Gong activity. Nevertheless, if
maximum efforts are made both by the U. S. and the GVN to
encourage private industrial development, it is believed the total
cc2,naniercial in-e2o.:-Ls in 1962 might amount to $220 million.
Ex-Isorts: CNN agencies are still estimating total exports
at $70 million. We may accePt this figure tentatively but the J, S.
should be prepared for the possibility that exports may fail short due
to the flood.
aid and adjustments in pipeline: It mar he
assumed mat aid erom other countries together with minor adjust-
ments in the pi3eJjne of unused aid will amount to about $10 million.
t. Ecalt$220 less $70 less $10 is $140, which is the
a,D?roved level of aid.
It is recommended that we negotiate the $140 million package
with the GVN, It is further recommended that the U. S. recognize a
contingency reoliirement of up to $25 million in the event of a short
fall in Ci-V-I\T exports.
IV, Economic Aid to the Public Sector
to the Current Crisis
`21-,ose projects directly supporting the counter insurgency
effort should be strengthened and speeded up as much as is feasible.
A special priority needs to be assigned both in Washington and in the
field. to the ine--.1el-nenta.tion of these projects.
-21cod Aelief, The immediate new project which must
occuPy our highest priority is relief for the victims of the flood. The
current floods are of almost unparalleled proportions. They have com-
pletely disrupted life and destroyed property and crops for thousands
of people. Immediate, imaginative, and hard-hitting action is called
for, not only from a humanitarian point of view but also in order to
capitalize on the opportunity presented by this challenge to meet the
needs of this distraught people in a way which will favorably influence
their attitudes toward the Government of Vietnam and will bring credit
internationally upon the GVN. Successful action in this respect could
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significantly alter the balance between the Government of 'Vietnam
and Viet Conff influence in this important Delta region.
This disaster may offer President Diem an opportunity
to work constructively with a number of non-communist elements in
the country who have heretofore either refused to be associated with
the Government or on the other hand have be7en considered dissident
elements by the. Government of Vietnam. The President might seek
the support and advice of intellectuals within the country. He might
use this as an occasion for a rapprochement with the Cao Dai and
Hoa Hao and other groups. If the President could take the leadership
in pulling these groups together, it not only would support the relief
program but might offer an occasion for the beginning of an era of
good feeling between the President and these currently uncooperative
groups.
Immediately the President should appoint a full term
domestic director of relief activities who should be a man of highest
energy and ability.
The U. So for its part should be prepared to support
with every means at its command this relief operation. We should
make available appropriate equipment and supplies currently on hand
and we should press hard to bring additional relief items from the
U. S. under such programs as Public Law 480, voluntary contri.
bution.s, surplus stocks, and to the extent necessary, purchases
with aid funds.
2. Radio. This project is now moving forward with all
stations of the new network in operation except for the 10 kilowatt
station at Quang Ngai. The 50,000 watt transmitter for Saigon remains
to be installed, pending action by the Presidency to make a new site
available for the expansion of Radio Vietnam's facility at Thu Duc.
While it has been suggested that the power of the Saigon Station might
be increased, the U. S. should continue with plans to install this 50 kw
station in Saigon. If expert opinion so indicates, it will always be
possible later to increase the power of this station. Any change at
this time could only mean delay.
3, Radio Receiving Sets. With a strong radio signal soon
to blanket the country it will be necessary to assure that there are
radio sets throughout the country to receive these signals. USOM has
fortunately been aware of this problem and has been preparing to
meet it. After considerable exploration it seems to be agreed that the
best way of assuring distribution of the sets is by fully supplying the
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market with a set which costs less than 1,000 piasters so that it
can be bought by increasing numbers of people throughout the country.
Two possibilities are being pursued. One is the importation of parts
to be assembled by several existing private companies in Vietnam.
The other iS the importation of a cheap but adequate radio now being
produced in Japan. USOM is working out the details of these
approaches. Washington agencies should be prepared to quickly
support those solutions to the problem which are technically best.
4. Monaagnards. The estimated 300,000 Montagnards in
the highland 1 F.,-t e a u area reflect a problem of long-standing that
requires prompt solution in the interest of immediate regional
security. Long neglected and discriminated against, .their loyalty
and support to the government is rapidly vanishing, Recognizing
the decisive role of the Montagnarci a the security of the highlands,
a special task force encompassing all official U. S. agencies has
prepared a proposed program of direct assistance for presentation
by Ambassador Nalting to President Diem. The proposed program
is designed to re-establish and strengthen Montagnard loyaitles and
active support of government through specialized aid involving physical
security, socio-economic development assistance, psychological
warfare measures and information-propaganda techniques.
The plan proposes that primary responsibility on the
GVN side be assigned to Secretary of State for Civic Action who
would have basic responsibility for organization, implementation,
and coordination for all national level aspects. At the provincial
level teams composed primarily of Montagnards with perhaps one
or two carefully selected Vietnamese would be organized? trained
and equipped and operate under the direction and supervision of the
Chief of Province. Civic Action Teams would be composed of ten or
fifteen such persons who would be given special training at appropriately
selected places within the relevant province in the rudiments of agri-
culture improvement, simple rural health sanitation and first
information, and propaganda, etc. Additional functions of the teams
would be in the field of psychological warfare and intelligence. If at
all possible, the teams should be armed and equipped with two-way
communication facilities. After initial training, indoctrination and
orientation, the teams would be assigned to a particular area within
the province; would be provided with limited quantities (personally
transportable) of such items as seeds, medical and first aid supplies,
information materials, etc., and started on a circuit of designated
villages within their assigned area. Each team would be expected to
spend a week or 10 days in each village, carrying on the activities
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indicated above?and in addition seeking to determine most pressing
physical needs for subsequent supplies. After a week or ten days in
the village the list of most urgently required materials would be
dispatched. back to provincial headquarters and the team would in
turn proceed to the next scheduled village. In this fashion each team
would visit all of the villages within the area assigned to the team
and as they proceeded from one village to another, provincial
authorities would both replenish team supplies and forward to each
particular village concerned the additional supplies indicated by the
team survey.
The security of the team is to be solved partially by the
arming of individual team members and their training in the use of.
arms.. The r easan for such arming is based upon the belief that
ARVI\T and Civil Guard units are fully engaged in other activities and
would not be available for guard duty. Two-way communications
recommendatiche are based upon the belief that the teams -,;.Tould
need to be in coehia.ant two-way communications with provincial head-
quarters in order to transmit intelligence and other inforrnat:eon as
coil ected.
CJee of the important functions of the Ministry of Civic
Action would be to maintain liaison with other appropriate ministries
of the GVNto insure luiciloatiori in training of IViontagnards Civic
Action Teams in furnishing of necessary supporting materials and
equipment -and alerting the. particular ministry to needs beyond
the scope of team action0
Pros ent plans .of the Ministry of Civic Action are to
initiate such a program ha each 01 the ten highland plateau provinces.
- At the beginning, an average of 17 teams of ten-man each_ are proposed.
for each province. These teams would include seven selected Montag-
,
:lards and three Vietliiamese who would serve as leaders. It is
asserted that the Ministry of Civic Action could recruit immediately
at least 700 Montagnards and that an additional numiDer up to pernaps
2,, 000 or more could be included without special difficulty. .I"rie
operation would be sonievenat similar except in ethnic composition,
to the large number of Civic Action Teams now operating in aL pro-
vinces but on an unarmed, much restricted basis.
Toth U, S. dollars and local .currency funds should be
made available to support an intensive effort in the highland plateau
area commencing almost immediately. In addition we Should offer
technical advice and supplies from USOlvi's resources in agriculture,
health, education, and communications mediae, USOM is gearing .up
to meet these challenges.
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5. netare Communications. This all important project to
provide two-way radio communication to villages is being pressed
forward at too speed. It must continue to receive highest priority.
The status of the project is as follows:
12
Delivery schedule for the sets is described below:
50 sets in 120 days FAS (20 Feb 1962) by Air
1 00 sets in 150 days FAS (20 March 1962) by Air
200 sets in 180 days FAS (20 April 1962). by Air
2 0 0 sets in 240 days FAS (20 May 1962) by Surface
2 5 0 sets in 270 days FAS (20 June 1962) by Surface
b, Installation schedule:
It is anticibated that installation of the Village Sets
will be phased to the delivery schedule. That is,
the sets delivered in any 3,3-day period will be installed
during the following 30-day period.
The C.:7?,7-1\T is in the process of transferring appropriate
pers3nnel to the Department of Information (DC.l.):Q
Combined Telecommunication Service (CTS) wino will
be trained for installation and maintenance in several
grouf,s over the next eight (8) months. Each group will
receive from 2 to 6 months training depending upon the
level of maintenance to which they will be assigned, i.e.,
senior tecnnician, technician and technician's helper,
A sieeedup in delivery could result in a backlog of
installation because sufficient trained personnel, will not
be available. Increased rate of training would require
larger classes (not desirabie)or more instructors (not
available),
c. Oioeeational Use of Village:
The Village sets located in the Villages will be operated
as a radio-phone unit by the Village Chief, his assistant
or the Self Defense Corps in the Villages.
The ''..Tillage Set located in the District Headquarters
(the other end of the Village net) will be operated by
radio operators or technicians of the CTS or District
Government officials.
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5, Village Communications. This all important project to
provide two-way radio communication to villages is being pressed
forward at top speed. It must continue to receive highest priority.
The status of the project is as follows:
12
a. Delivery schedule for the sets is described below:
50 sets in 120 days FAS (20 Feb 1962) by Air
1 00 sets in 150 days FAS (20 March 1962) by Air
2 0 0 sets in 180 days FAS (20 April 1962) by Air
2 0 0 sets in 240 days FAS (20 May 1962) by Surface
2 5 0 sets in 270 days FAS (20 June 1962) by Surface
b. Installation schedule:
It is anticipated that installation of the Village Sets
will be phased to the delivery schedule. That is,
the sets delivered in any 3Q-day period will be installed
during the following 30-day period,
The GYN is in the process of transferring appropriate
personnel to the Department of Information (DOI)
Combined Telecommunication Service (CTS) who will
be trained for installation and maintenance in several
groups over the next eight (8) months. Each group will
receive from 2 to 6 months training depending upon the
level of maintenance to which they will be assigned, i.e.,
senior technician, technician and technician's helper.
A speedup in delivery could result in a backlog of
installation because sufficient trained personnel will not
be available. Increased rate of training would require
larger classes (not desirable)or more instructors (not
available).
c. Operational Use of Village:
The Village sets located in the Villages will be operated
as a radio-phone unit by the Village Chief, his assistant
or the Self Defense Corps in the Villages.
The Village Set located in the District Headquarters
(the other end of the Village net) will be operated by
radio operators or technicians of the CTS or District
Government officials.
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6, Television:
No recommendation is made herein with respect to
the proposed television system pending further exploration of the
costs of such a system in money, in further burdening the GVN
with security guard requirements, in maintenance, and the potential
benefits in relation to those costs. It may be found that to go all out
for the television would place an unacceptable strain on the limited
energy and talent of the GVN without reasonable prospects for
success -within a reasonable time span. To reach the village and
town levels such a system would confront formidable obstacles such
as the absence of electricity to name only one. Accordingly, it is
urged that this proposal be fully and soberly considered before
commitments of scarce talents and resources are firmly made.
Telecommunications:
The engineering has been essentially completed on a
telecommunications network linking Saigon to the cities in the south.
Technical and security problems must be solved in desig-ning tie
system from Saigon to the north. Once these problems are solved,
the actual construction of the project should be expeclitied since it
will make a contribution to military communications.
So Other Projects:
Other projects such as feeder roads, agrovilles, youth
corps economic projects have been proposed.. In each case these
projects consist mostly of local costs and the contribution which the
U. S. can make is limited to minor equipment imports plus technical
advice. In each case 'action is pending in the GVN. The cumulative
effect upon the GVN of taking on the burden of all of these enormous
projects is so difficult to assess that I recommend the U. S. be
diffident about attempting to push the GVN to take action. The
Government already suffers from having bitten off more than it can
chew. These projects n-lay make sense but this is a decision which
can best be made by the GVN. The U. S. should make clear its
willingness to be as helpful as possible on any of these projects
which may be decided upon, We should not thoughtlessly push the
GVN into attempting at once every new idea which may be proposed.
B. Projects Related to Long-Term Economic Development
Because Vietnam needs to focus its energies for the critical
immediate future upon those activities of a short run nature it is not
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recommended that any new long-range activities be commenced unless
they require little -;op level attention and few piasters.
On th.e other hand, it would be defeatist and unwarranted to
begin to dismantle those going activities which are designed for economic
development. It ?could start a highly adverse psychology of panic.
Given an assumption of ultimate victory the sensible thing to do is
continue those economic development activities which are successful
and not too expensive.
The GVN now has these projects under systematic and critical
review. The U. S. should encourage them to make this review and we
.should take their conclusions seriously. In addition U-SOM has under
review the malaria eradication project to determine whether the
activities of the Viet Cong have reduced its effectiveness to the point
where it should be abandoned, in addition it is recommended the U. S.
explore with the C-VN whether Viet 'Gong actions against the railroad
suggest that orders for rolling stock about to be placed under a Di.Jlir
loan should be postponed or modified.
Actions by the GVI,
. Fundamentally the most important economic actions required are
those which can only be taken by the GVN. These are discussed below:
,
To ?..:ie,e_ib-ate the burden of s ecurity ex.pereiitur as Jt ii
among toe -Vietaameee puop.C. to obtas.e.i. :sea-ally the local e esedic es
reaceeeary to line nce ees eeeee._ eecurity? economic aeu social measarz.,,s, and
to mak.e best uee 01 the re,ioteeces avaiiable from 'Vietnam's ::eiends
abroad,. -eeceeree - ea_ ef. es a:2,a... required to re,forna the foreepie enchae.ge
eee-some maes aa. -/ietearn. This, has long been reco,,-,eizCi
i.naaoiexreee
not only in the United States and in the but also
ay Commie ica re pert,.
he decision was made el overriea of v-ietnam to ete.ei; the
revisions in the casto_rhe ciat_ee that might be advisable Le oefing the
imposition of foreign exchange premium tax of "LE) piasters per dollar's
worth of foreign exchange it was the intention of the Goverierient to
increase the average yield of the American aid dollar from 1.,e to 74
piasters. _Ado-otion of such a measure would increase the goveen-
mental revenues by approximately 10 million piasters daily-, say
three billion piasters annually. It would appear that this Vra..; tae
minim-ern level to put the CTVIs's financial house in order to ::et on witdi
the war. The best financial advice to us would call for still :chore
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drastic measures, and the suggestion made by Dr. John Loftus,
presented in detail by his thoughtful analysis dated October 5th,
is that a foreign exchange rate of 80 piasters to the dollar is
advisable. Not only is it economically advisable, but, in the
opinion of Dr. John Loftus, such a measure would go very far
indeed in solving financial ry2..-oblems that otherwise appear insuperable
to Vietnamese officials. However, in order not to add still another
item in the long list of changes the U. S. is pressing on. the GVN,
no recommendation is made to press, the GVN to do more than they
have already agreed to, i.e., effective devaluation to 74 to 1.
We should make it clear that the amount of aid that we will
make available for the commercial program will be the same no
matter at what level this rate is set. The amount of project aid,
however, which can be made available to the Government of Vietnam
is in part a function of the availability of piasters which can be
married with dollar grants from project aid to pay the local costs
of a project. It is therefore clear that the volume of project aid can
attain a considerably higher level if the Government is adequately
equipped with piaster funds. For example, we could justify the
supply of more tractors and more road-building materials if it were
clear that the highway department were adequately funded to pay the
salaries and wages of the Vietnamese who are going to drive the
tractors and apply the asphalt.
B. Taxes
Vietnam is progressing in its attempt to improve its
assessment and collection of domestic taxes, which is essential to
pay for the increasing costs of security. We should encourage the
GVN to give high priority to this program and fullest support to the
taxing authorities.
C. Bonds
The Government should be encouraged to proceed with the
proposed bond issue suggested by the Staley Group. In addition it
should endeavor to capitalize on its other important projects by
issuing a series of project bonds to the public, rather than absorbing
all these expenditures in the current national budget. The Da Nhirn
power development, for example, is obviously the type of project
which Might be financed in part by bonds sold to the
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In a less underdeveloped society, this would appear standard
operating -orocedurc.... The Saigon water supply system now under
construction is another possible example. The PTT, which is
expanding its telephone and telegraph facilities, might also consider
this possibility.
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MAAG AND MILITARY AID
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lvIAAG AND MILITARY AID
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions:
I. On the whole, the Military Assistance Program has been
providing military aid to South Vietnam at about the optimum rate of
absorption by the RVNAF. Deficiencies in RVNAF command and con-
trol procedures have resulted in less than optimum usage of MAP
equipment, particularly aircraft.
Z. The present emergency requires an urgent further increase
in the RVNAF. This buildup cannot await the development of a GVN
national geographically phased strategic plan for counter-insurgency,
although the preparation of such a plan should be pursued vigorously by
the GV.N.
3. .1,,./IA2-1-G advisory effort needs to be extended further into the core
of the RVNAF, with advisors being provided to smaller units. Intel-
ligence specialist advisors are badly needed. In order to provide the
numbers of US personnel required, as well as those with the desired
qualifications, special efforts will be required.
4. Additional Military Assistance funds will be required to under-
take critical improvements in facilities to support the increased effort
required, and to take advantage of technological developments.
Major Recommendations:
1. Waive our previous stipulation that a national geographically
phased counter-insurgency plan be prepared before we would support
a force increase to ZOO, 000 in order to sustain the present impetus of
RVNAF force buildup.
Z. Give highest priority to providing M_AAG advisory personnel,
both in increased numbers and with required qualifications, increasing
training of US personnel as necessary.
3. Make available additional military assistance funds to under-
take critical improvements in operational and supporting facilities,
particularly road, air field and communications facilities, and to take
immediate advantage of technological developments.
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MAAG AND MILITARY AID
I. GENERAL STATEMENT
In that the MAAG is the means of transmitting vital US military
assistance to the GVN, it is most important that its organization,
personnel, and operations be the best that we can provide. Our advisory
effort must not only be professionally competent, and readily adjustable
to the needs of the RVNAF, but it also must be done in such a manner
as to achieve the greatest degree of acceptance of advisors by their VN
counterparts. When there is full acceptance, RVNAF officers rely a
great deal on their advisors. It is, therefore, incumbent on the US to
give the same priority of treatment to number, types, and qualifications
of MAAG personnel as is given to the provision of material assistance.
The quality of individual personnel assigned is excellent. We must
keep it so. Problem areas exist in qualifications in certain areas and in
getting personnel on board as augmentations or changes are approved.
The special situation obtaining in Vietnam requires MAAG personnel
to get into RVNAF operational planning and to participate in the intelligence
field. ChMAAG also must exercise varying degrees of control over other
US units ordered into the country. The terms of reference of Chief MAAG
need revision to insure that no hindrance is being placed on the actions of
MAAG personnel and to ensure that MAAG resources are fully exploited
in the intelligence field.
Military aid generally has been provided to Vietnam at about the optimum
rate of absorption by the RVNAF with certain specific exceptions. The
present program is generally adequate in light of existent circumstances;
the terrain, and the kind of war being fought limit the types of equipment
needed. The war will have to be won with basic weapons, supplemented in
individual cases with more sophisticated equipment, of which the best
example is the helicopter. Top priority is being given to the filling of
Vietnam requirements and MAP material generally is arriving as required.
However, once naterial is turned over to the RVNAF, MAAG no longer has
any direct control over it, and faulty RVNAF logistic procedures frequently
hamper optimum distribution of equipment. MAP equipment is not be*.ng
used most advantageously, in all cases, particularly aircraft. Operational
command and control procedures are deficient and cumbersome, helicopters
are pre-empted for administrative missions, and strikes are not made
expeditiously on known targets. Defects in command relationships, planning
and maintenance procedures also inhibit full realization of the capabilities
of naval equipment provided.
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Additional funds will be needed for the current military assistan ce
program as requirements develop. However, dollars alone will not win
the war. We have to insure that the RVNAF knows how to use the equip-
ment provided, that they make optimum use of this equipment in training
and operations, and that they have the will to use what they have to the
fullest extent.
II. PROBLEM AREAS
a. Increase in RVNAF Force Level from 170, 000 to 200, 000
At the time that the US informed the GVN we would support a
force increase from 170, 000 to 200, 000, it was also stipulated that the
US and GVN should satisfy themselves, before the level of 200, 000 was
reached, that:
1. There exists a mutually agreed upon geographically phased
strategic plan for bringing VC subversion under control
2. An understanding exists on the use of the 30, 000 additional
men.
lhar, 3. The rate of increase from 170, 000 to 200, 000 will be regulated
to permit the most efficient absorption of personnel.
Despite efforts of the US mission, the GVN has not yet developed
a national geographically phased strategic plan for counter-insurgency.
The Field Command is developing a counter-insurgency plan, upon which
the three Corps Commanders are basing their plans. The GVN increas-
ingly is becoming aware of the need to pull together its efforts to counter
the insurgency and to -proceed on a logical, planned basis at the national
level.
The strength of the insurgency effort is increasing faster than
the ability of the GVN to muster its efforts to combat it. Additional
military forces are clearly needed, and raising these forces cannot be
delayed while an over-all phased counter-insurgency plan is being
developed and refined.
ChIAAA.G and the JGS/RVNAF have now agreed on all but one unit
in the composition of the proposed 30, 000 increase. Basically, two new
infantry divisions will be formed, logistic support units added, and the
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force given appropriate increases.
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The force increase from 150, 000 to 170, 000 has been accom-
plished faster than originally expected. There is every reason to believe
that the additional 30, 000 increase will be accomplished efficiently and
rapidly.
A clear requirement exists now for additional forces to combat
the accelerated insurgency. The 20, 000 force buildup has gone well
and we need to maintain and even expedite the impetus of this progress.
While we should continue to take all possible measures to induce the
GVN to accomplish the necessary counter-insurgency planning at the
national level, we should not stand upon our previous stipulation that a
national geographically phased plan be prepared before we will support
the buildup to 200, 000.
b. 1VIAAG Advisory Personnel
1. Level to which assigned
Present advisory effort stops at the regimental level for
combat units, with a single advisor provided for each regiment. The
war is being fought by battalions and companies. The best units are
those who have an advisor present full time. With battalions spread
throughout the country on counter-insurgency commitments, regimental
and higher level advisors have restricted opportunity to work with the
troops. To get optimum results, we need advisors at battalion level
for combat units. Due to the language problem, our lack of combat
experienced and competent advisors at the company level and the opera-
tional difficulties involved, placing advisors at the company level for
combat units would not be productive. However, we could use some
advisors at the company level for selected logistic units where technical
advice could often be accomplished by experienced NCO's.
Battalion advisors (one for operations and training and one
for intelligence) also should be provided for the Civil Guard, where
added effort is greatly needed in training, intelligence and promotion
of civic action.
2. Counter-Guerrilla and Special Forces Training
All ARVN combat unit advisors should be proficient in
counter-guerrilla and jungle warfare, either through schooling or
experience, if they are to be fully effective. At present there are only
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43 MAAG officers who have had counter-guerrilla or special warfare
training. Ideally, this number should be increased to a total of over
500 by June 1962. Despite other world-wide requirements, including
those of US Forces, it is apparent that a major effort must be made to
accelerate the outflow of such officers, and priority must be given to
their assignment to Vietnam.
? 3. Language Training
While advisors at the higher levels usually have counter-
parts who speak English, as we expand our advisory effort to lower
levels, and to training sites in the provinces, there will be an increasing
need for officers who have a knowledge of either Vietnamese or French.
The effectiveness of advisory effort is diminished whenever interpreters
have to be used. In addition, it is doubtful if sufficient interpreters
would be provided for the expanded effort being undertaken. While
personnel due to arrive by March 1962 should not be delayed for language
training, it is possible, by starting now, to provide language trained
personnel among later arrivals. The Department of the Army can give
such training in accelerated 5 week French and 10 week Vietnamese
courses. Selected personnel, as requested by MAAG, should be scheduled
now for such training.
4. Intelligence Advisors (Also see Intelligence Section of
Military Appendix)
The intelligence effort of the RVNAF is highly unsatisfactory
in every phase. Intelligence organization, training and operations all
need immediate improvement. In addition to establishing a Joint Intel-
ligence Group, intelligence specialists must be provided for assignment
down to combat unit regimental level, and to each Military Sector Com-
mander (Province Chief). Only through such coverage will we be able
to get the needed training started and the proper organization established
and operating. Some intelligence specialists are included in the MAAG
augmentation now approved. These should be ordered as soon as possible.
5. Augmentation of MAAG Personnel
An augmentation of 318 MAAG personnel has been approved.
These personnel are required by 31 December. CINCPAC has recently
recommended a second augmentation of 406, for personnel to be on sta-
tion by 31 March 1962. This second augmentation needs approval earliest,
so that necessary action may be taken to get the people in country by the
required time.
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In the past, approved MAAG augmentations have been slow
in arriving due to the many factors that inhibit personnel changes. We
cannot afford this now. Fast action, appropriate priority and continued
follow-up by personnel administrative echelons are required to get the
people in-country where they are badly needed.
?
c. MAAG Terms of Reference and Control of US Effort
The present terms of reference of ChMAAG adequately cover
only routine MAAG responsibilities in the advisory field. They make
no provision for MAAG direct participation in a joint intelligence effort
and as an active partner in RVNAF operational planning. ChMAAG role
in the event of the introduction of US forces into SVN has not been
delineated.
.At this time it appears that ChMAAG would be the logical choice
to command all US military effort, both advisory and operational, in the
country, but it is recognized that some considerations may dictate
otherwise,
In order to clarify ChMAAG's authority and responsibilities in
light of the various contingencies that may arise, and to permit MAAG
resources to be _fully exploited in the intelligence field, it is recom-
mended that the JCS take immediate action to:
(1) Change ChMAAG terms of reference to allow MAAG direct
participation in RVNAF and joint military planning and intelligence
functions.
(2) Delineate ChMAAG authority and responsibility in the event
of the introduction of US forces into SVN.
It is not intended that these changes to the ChMAAG terms of
reference would alter his present position as a member of the country
team in SVN.
d. Expedited Delivery of Selected MAP Items
In general, sufficient priority has been assigned to delivery of
MAP material, and items are arriving as needed. However, as noted
in other sections of the report, expedited delivery is required for the
following:
1. Special tools for H-34 maintenance. Helo operations have
been hampered by a lack of these tools.
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2. Heavy equipment for pioneer battalions. These battalions
will be working on the vitally needed road program.
3. Pierced steel planking for improvement and construction of
airfields.
4. Individual combat equipment for the Marine Corps. This
requirement is particularly urgent in that the Marine Corps can recruit
and train its expanded force faster than the present schedule of material
deliveries will support.
D. Communication equipment.
6. Two of the three patrol vessels scheduled for delivery in
1962.
7. The ten additional patrol vessels funded in the 1962 M. A.
Program.
8, Additional L-19 and H-34 aircraft contained in the 1962
M. A. Program.
As an aid in resolutions of problems concerned with CONUS
support and expedition of supplies and equipment, it would be helpful
if each US military service would designate a single office which would
monitor the CONUS support actions in Vietnam.
e. Additional Military Assistance Requirements
The 1961 and 1962 Military Assistance Programs have provided
equipment for the increased force levels, the Civil Guard and Self
Defense Corps, and for increased capabilities throughout the RVNAF.
In general, assistance is being provided at the rate at which it can be
absorbed. However, a review of the program in light of the situation
existing now reveals additional requirements which must be met in
order to bring the best effort to bear upon the insurgency.
1. Aircraft
Additional liaison and reconnaissance aircraft are required
in order to carry out recommendations contained in other sections of
this report for improved reconnaissance at the Corps and Division
levels. Firm requirements are being developed by MAAG and will be
submitted shortly.
Perhaps the most important single requirement is increased
helicopter capability. The nature of the guerrilla war and of the terrain
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make these aircraft indispensable for both troop lift and support. At
the same time the helicopters presently in Vietnam are not being used
properly, with administrative missions being given priority over com-
bat requirements. Until the unsatisfactory usage and control of
helicopters presently in Vietnam is remedied, it appears that only
additional helicopters under US control could be used advantageously
enough to justify. divesting US forces of helicopters in order to provide
them to the RVNAF.
2. New Developments
The work of the Combat Development and Test Center is
now reaching the point where we may expect the military value of
certain projects to be clearly shown. Two examples are the use of
dogs and of defoliants. At such time as the decision is made to place
new developments into continued operational use, military assistance
must be prepared to provide the funds. These may be considerable.
3. Improvements to Facilities
Extensive improvements are presently programmed and
underway. However, to match the increased effort in other fields and
to increase the efficiency of all operations, there are some critical
items, not now programmed, which will have immediate effectiveness
and which need to be undertaken. They include airfield improvement,
roads, additional equipment for medical facilities, increased ammuni-
tions storage, radio stations and other individual items for improved
support to naval and air activities. A detailed listing of these items is
set forth in the Logistics Section of the Military Appendix. Detailed
justification and firm requirements are being established for forwarding
through military channels.
Additional military assistance funds will have to be made
available to meet these critical requirements.
TIT. RECOMMENDATION
a. Continue the present impetus of RVNAF force build-sip, to a level
of 200, 000, waiving our previous stipulation that a national geographically
phased counter-insurgency plan be prepared before we would support a
force increase from 170, 000 to 200, 000.
b. Provide advisors to all combat battalions, civil guard battalions,
and some selected logistic companies.
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c. Take necessary steps to provide a greater proportion of advisors
with counter-guerrilla or special forces background or training.
d. Give selected advisors accelerated French or Vietnamese
language training prior arrival in Vietnam.
e. Provide intelligence specialist advisors for Corps, Divisions,
Regiments, Civil Guard Battalions, Province Chiefs, and Navy and Air
Force Headquarters.
f. Expedite implementation of recently approved MAAG augmentation
of 318 to ensure arrival by 31 December 1961. Approve second augmenta-
tion of 406, and take necessary action to have people in-country by
31 March 1962.
g. Modify 1VIAAG terms of reference to allow full participation in
joint US-GVN intelligence activities and full assistance to C-VN in opera-
tional planning. Delineate ChMAAG authority and responsibility in the
event of the introduction of US forces into SVN.
h. Expedite delivery of selected programmed items, including
liaison aircraft, patrol vessels, Marine Corps equipment and road
construction equipment.
i. Provide additional military assistance funds to undertake
critical improvements in operational and supporting facilities, particularly
airfield, road and communications facilities.
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FRONTIER FORCE, VIETNAM
APPENDIX "F"
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FRONTIER FORCE, VIETNAM
The Problem: To establish a force in Vietnam. which will deny
the northwest frontier bordering Laos to Communist infiltration and
which will have the capability of penetrating Communist dominated
areas outside South Vietnam to disrupt Communist lines of communi-
cation.
Considerations:
a. The strength, disposition, and intention of the Communist
enemy in the frontier area are not known precisely. Reports indicate
the 325th North Vietnam (NVN) Division is just north of the 17th
Parallel Demarcation Line and the 304th and 324th NVN Divisions are
in the vicinity of Route 9, having crossed the border from the Tchepone
Area, The VNA at Kontum believes there are three NVN regiments
west of Kontum, towards the border. Since top Vietnamese officials,
including President Diem, believe the northwest frontier is a Commu-
nist pipeline to the south and east, and there is some confirmation of
this belief, it is not known how much of the estimated 8400 Commu-
nists in their Interzone V are in the northwest frontier, whether they
are in transit elsewhere or are disposed in the area for quick assembly
to mount an attack on Kontum.
b. It is known that Communist forces cross the Laos-Vietnam
border. Four such routes are known, including Routes 9 and 12.. It
is possible that other routes could be identified, since they are known
to the inhabitants, given better intelligence collection methods in
Montagnard tribal areas. One MAAG plan indicated 103 miles of
border as "hot, " where crossings are most likely; the figure included
areas in the south.
? c. Without the willing help of the Montagnards, initially in intel-
ligence and later in securing their own areas, any practical denial of
the northwest frontier to Communist infiltration becomes almost
impossible. There are serious problems to be overcome in gaining
Montagnard help. The Communists got to them first, years ago.
Communist hard-core political cadres have been living as tribal
members in Montagnard villages, at least since 1954. It is estimated
that 1700 Montagnards in the II Corps area alone have been recruited
by the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese have looked upon the Montagnards
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as something almost sub-human, and this is known to the Montagnards.
On the other hand, the Viet Gong need for food and services apparently
has led to increased Communist use of terrorism to get these quickly
from the Montagnards. The Montagnards are now seeking weapons
for self-protection. Americans serving in the High Plateau and French
missionaries long resident there believe the Montagnards should be
armed for village self-defense and can be used far more extensively
for intelligence collection. CIA is currently planning to arm and train
up to 1000 Djarai in the Central and South II Corps area for this pur-
pose. In addition to intelligence collection, these men will be available
as scouts for any force in the II Corps area, and will have a potential
to assist any Special Force operations along the border. In that these
men will not act in organized units, they will best be controlled through
CIA and II Corps ARVN liaison.
d. General McGarr has expressed concern at the further depletion
of Vietnamese divisions to obtain manpower for special units, such as
ranger companies. Since special units are manned by volunteers, the
drain is in the best manpower, of quality as well as quantity. Divi-
sions which have personnel most familiar with the border terrain are
presently stationed in the High Plateau, have the mission of border
area defense now, and would be needed to back up any frontier force
which would operate as rangers on extended patrols.
e. The present range_' companies have a strength of 132. MAA.G
officers consider that this should be upped to 142, with the additional
strength being used for communications and a mortar section.
General "Big" Minh is currently developing a plan to combine two
ranger companies into a Mobile Forest Groupement which would create
a base area, with a landing strip or cleared area for air drops; exten-
sive patrols would be undertaken from the base area.
f. There is now a total of 86 ranger companies in the ARVN. Of
these, 26 have completed unit training. An additional 11 will complete
unit training by January 1962. The remainder of the 49 ranger
companies, all formed early in 1960 and committed to operations with
little or no formal ranger training, will have completed unit training
by the end of 1962. There are no current plans to form additional
ranger companies.
g. There are four Vietnamese provinces bordering Laos: Quang
Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Kontum. The first three are in
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the I Corps military area, and Konturn in the II Corps area. In the
MAAG concept of border control, apart from the zone for the 17th
Parallel, there are five border patrol zones suggested.
Concept:
a. The command will be known as the Northwest Frontier Force.
it will be a component of II Corps, but will operate in both I and II
Corps areas, as a special force, with its own distinctive insignia. It
will be a force of jungle rangers, teamed with air elements and a
special civil section. There will be US encadrement, under a US
military chief, with US personnel acting as advisors-collaborators
(similar to Army Special Forces operations in Laos). The US en-
cadrem..ent will include both military and civilian personnel, and will
have its own communication net.
b. The mission of the Force will be to secure the frontier zone
by pacification of the territory on the Vietnamese side of the border
and by disrupting the enemy's lines of communication outside the
border, through long-range combat patrols. Pacification will employ
techniques of attracting the support of the inhabitants in a limited
area, as employed successfully before in Vietnam. Pacification
includes security screening, establishment of intelligence collection,
initiating governmental services and control, then training and arming
the villages for self-defense. When an area is secure, the Force will
move into the next area for pacification operations, and continue doing
so until all Vietnamese territory in the Frontier zone is secure.
c. Each sector of Vietnam in the Frontier zone will be divided
into defined areas for pacification, depending upon terrain and in-
habitants. Two ranger companies will move into the pacification
area, while the third company moves into the next area beyond, as
a security screen. As the two companies establish physical security,
a civic action civilian unit will move in behind them, establishing
working relations with the village council, a dispensary, a school,
an information center with a radio receiver, and the unit will then be
under the self-help public projects (the first being the construction
of a landing strip for eight aircraft, and then feeder roads as requi red).
Public welfare, such as salt and blankets, will be distributed. As the
support of the population is won over, they will be readied for self-
defense, for intelligence reporting, and enlisted as scouts for patrOls.
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d. Patrols will enter an area to win over the tribal inhabitants,
obtain information of the location of enemy elements in the area, and
then seek out the enemy to destroy him. Initial contact with the enemy
will be to gain information about him, which will be promptly reported
by radio. The patrol commander will make the decision on whether to
attack, using hunter-killer tactics, to call up an air strike and follow
it by attack, or to call up additional forces for the attack.
e. The Northwest Frontier Force operation calls for close military-
civilian teamwork, to enlist the support of the overwhelming majority
of the Montapmards and to make the entire frontier zone a hostile area
to Communist incursions. This will re quire a definite change in
Vietnamese attitude towards and relations with the iViontagnard.s. The
Civic Action civilian unit will have a Vietnamese cadre, but be com-
posed of two-thirds Montagnards as rapidly as they can be screened
and trained.
f. In Konturn province, operations will be assisted by the Djarai
(Montagnard) scouts now being recruited. This will be accomplished
by the II Corps Commander,
4
Force:
a. Vietnamese Military
Headquarters/Operations Center at Konturn.
Reserve strike force, of five ranger companies, strengthened
to 142, at Konturn.
Air force composite squadron at Kontum, under Frontier
Force Operational control.
Special Weapons Unit, for field use of CDTC equipment, at
Kontum..
Three long-range patrol ranger companies, based at Kontum.
Five Sector Headquarters/Operations Centers, one for each
pacification sector.
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Fifteen ranger companies, strengthened to 142, for pacifi-
cation of the Vietnamese side of the Frontier zone (divided
into five sectors, with three companies per sector).
The 23 ranger companies will be withdrawn from the 59 com-
panies now assigned to the III Corps area. Other military
personnel will be provided from throughout the RVNAF, to be
replaced as the 30,000 force increase is implemented.
b. Vietnamese Civilian (Civic Action)
Headquarters/Operations Center at Kontum, with the Chief
of the Civic Action Unit being Deputy to the Frontier Force
Commander.
Five Civic Action units, one for each pacification sector, con-
sisting of public health, welfare, information-(radio, motion
pictures), education, and public works (an engineer element
for helping build air strips).
Four small Civic Action Units, one stationed with each
province chief, for coordination of all civil operations.
c. U. S. Personnel
At Kontum, Chief of the U.S. element, who also will act as
collaborator-advisor to the Commander of the Frontier Force.
He will have a team of specialists who will act as collaborator-
advisors to the Vietnamese in. running the intelligence/operations
center, in logistical support, and for training of Montagnards
in self-defense. A small U.S. eleme nt for administrative
support of U.S. operations in the Frontier Zone will be under
his command, since base facilities will be needed to support
temporarily assigned specialists from the CDTC, MAAG,
CAS, USOM and USIS.
Small U.S. liaison elements, for advice and collaboration on
Frontier Force operations, will be established at II Corps and
Field Corrirra nd.
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One "cell" of the 4400th COTS will be stationed with the
Vietnamese Air Force squadron in the Kontum area.
One split FA team (six men, USA Special Forces) will be
stationed with each ranger company. One FB team will be
stationed with each pacification sector and with the long-
range patrol unit.
One U.S. Foreign Service Officer will be the Political Deputy
to the Chief, U.S. Element, at Kontum, to run the civilian
portion of the U.S. team, and to act as advisor-collaborator
with the Regional delegate and the four Province Chiefs. He
will have a small staff of CAS, USIS, and USOM personnel
who will be field workers, visiting their Vietnamese opposite
numbers in the pacification sectors and in the provincial
capitals, where they will act as advisors-collaborators with
the Vietnamese. Chief MAAG will have over-all responsibility
for direction of the U.S. effort.
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UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE
APPENDDC
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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR
From: Brig General Lansdale
Subject: Summary of Recommendations
Declaration of Sub-Limited War. In order to meet the Communist
threat adequately, the U.S. needs a way of action short of war but more
dynamic than merely the bolstering of peacetime measures. The
situation in Vietnam cries for something better than what we have been
doing. So, my recommendation was that the U.S. find the way to
declare and support a sub-limited war in Vietnam. This can be done
by Presidential proclamation, a Congressional supporting act, and a
new streamlined organization within the Executive, headed by a
Presidential Assistant to upgrade its authority and decisiveness.
U.S. collaborators-Advisors. The heavy bureaucratic machinery
1
of the Vietnamese government is not working effectively.
There should be a U. S. political-psychological-
military-economic encadrement in Vietnam. The concept is of a U.S.
team with its own chief and its own radio communications to all U.S.
elements in Vietnam. Individual Americans would act as advisor-
collaborators at the key decision points in the top of the Vietnamese
government. Military-civilian teams would work with Vietnamese
organizations at critical trouble spots in the field. When one trouble
spot is cleared up, the field team can be moved to the next trouble area.
The work in a trouble spot would be what the Vietnamese call pacifi-
cation; this means that the military establishes physical security, with
civic action (health, welfare, information, education, etc) teams
following on the heels of the troops. Self-defense is organized and
activated. When the area is secure, (able to defend itself against all
but large enemy units) the U.S. team moves out. Vietnamese forces
encadred can either be transferred to the next trouble zone or be
released for other duties.
Northwest Frontier Force. The border zone of Laos is now an
area of Viet-Cong infiltration into Vietnam from the Laos panhandle.
To meet this, a Northwest Frontier Force (a ranger force sup-oorted
by air and civic action teams) should be created. It will have a long-
range patrol element to strike the Viet-Cong lines of communication
in Laos and a pacification (military-civilian) team for the frontier
zone inside Vietnam. Pacification areas will be designed to fit
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inhabitants and terrain. Ranger teams, with prompt civic action follow-
up, will attract the support of Montagnard tribes and establish a
capability for self-defense. The teams will then move to the next
pacification area, and so continue until the whole frontier zone is
capable of resisting Viet-Con.g infiltration and is keeping the Vietnamese
promptly informed of all Viet-Cong activities in the area. U.S. encadre-
ment will include Special Forces (down to company level), Jungle Jim
(to ensure effective air support), a Foreign Service officer (deputy to
the military commander to run the civilian side and to collaborate with
regional delegates and province chiefs), and CIA, USOM, and USIS
personnel o collaborate with Vietnamese civic action/intelligence
operations.
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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR
? From: Brig General Lansdale
Subject: Vietnam
General
Vietnam is dangerously far down the road to a Communist takeover,
against the will of its people. Since my visit last January, the situation
appears to have grown more critical, despite generous U.S. help.
President Diem believes that the key moment which will determine the
future is between now and Christmas.
As in any society under great stress, some cracks have appeared.
The most apparent one during our visit was the very human one of
looking for somebody else to blame for the situation. Big Minh's
rather desperate comments to you were an example. This same type
of comment was prevalent in many other quarters, including some in
which Big 11/linh was the target. Mistrust, jealousy, and the shock of
Communist savagery have contributed to making a none-too-certain
government bureaucracy even more unsure of itself. Pride and self-
protection still cover this unsureness, but the cover is wearing thin.
Yet, what is happening is against the will of the people. Communist
terrorism has brought compliance; Communist assurance of victory
has induced hopelessness. This can be changed. Given the means to
fight back and some hope in the future of a Free Vietnam, the people
will start responding. With popular support, and with an infusion of
new spirit in the government and the armed forces, a turn can still be
made against what now looks like an inevitable Communist takeover.
It is time that we in the free world got angry about what is happening
in Vietnam and about what is happening elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
With our anger, there should come a deep commitment to stop the
Communists in their tracks and hit back hard. Frankly, there are a
lot of Americans who are angry and are willing to be committed to
victory in this struggle. But, there is no place and no means by which
they can join up to strike a blow for liberty. Certainly there are
dedicated Americans in Vietnam now who would like nothing better
than to give the Communists a licking. They are prevented from doing
so by our self-imposed restrictions of a peace time governmental
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machinery, made clumsy by its complexity, which has been jury-
rigged to meet a critical situation when it really needed to be revamped
to meet a new kind of war.
A new infusion of spirit is needed in Vietnam. With new spirit,
the way will be opened to defeat the Communists, even though the way
probably will be long and hard. This spirit will come only through
dedicated action. Both the Vietnamese and the Americans need to be
freed to undertake such dedicated action.
The U.S. Role
A humanitarian task force of U.S. military to help in the flood
areas of Vietnam probably will result in enough psychological effect
and enough physical security in its zone of operation to delay the Com-
munist time-table. The Communists will be forced to change their
strategy and this takes time. Thus, it would be wise for us to recog-
nize that such a task force effort is a way of buying some badly needed
time. We then should determine how best to use the time purchased at
such great effort.
Thus, in Vietnam, with the time bought by a humanitarian U.S.
military task force in the flood area, and by the continuing work of
the present U.S. organizations in Vietnam, we should phase in a
Vietnamese-American partnership for action against the Communists,
by a special and temporary encadrement. It will take Americans who
are willing to stake all on the outcome, who know their tasks, and who
can act with great understanding in collaboration with the Vietnamese.
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This U. S. role requires acceptance by the Vietnamese, starting
with President Diem, and a new resolution of problems by the United
States. Both can be done, if we determine to do so. Applied effectively
in Vietnam, we will have found the means of meeting similar Communist
threats elsewhere. With proper psychological preparation, including
our firm intention of pulling out again as soon as the threat has been
overcome, this fuller U.S. role in helping free nations remain free
will give a new spark to freedom throughout the world.
The U.S. Structure
The U.S. needs to declare a "sub-limited" war on the Communists
in Vietnam and then to wage it successfully. Since such an action is
not envisioned by our Constitution, a way of so doing must be found
which is consistent with our heritage. The most natural declaration
would be a proclamation by the President, which would state U.S.
objectives and clearly outline the principles of human liberty involved.
The U.S. Congress would vote support of these objectives and
principles. Implementing actions would then be carried out by Executive
Order.
The executive agency to carry out the President's desires needs
realistic consideration. The agency must be able to devote all of its
time and energies to the task. It must be elevated high enough to
demand and get effective contributions from all U.S. entities, including
State and Defense, and be quickly responsive to the Executive will.
The present Task Forces have neither the stature nor the permanent
personnel required. It would be preferable to have a small task force
headed by a Presidential Assistant, with members from each U.S.
department and agency assigned to it full-time, with its own channel
of communication to the field, with complete control of the budget to
counter the emergency in the country involved, and with a clear state-
ment of its priorities in drawing on the men, money, and materiel
needed.
For Vietnam, after consideration of the needs elsewhere, such as
Berlin, a new Presidential Task Force would be created. It would
need small, streamlined counterparts, particularly in State and Defense.
It would need an active liaison unit at CINCPAC. In Vietnam, it
should act with Presidential authority under the general guidance of
the Ambassador, but with its own responsible chief. It would need a
small staff in Saigon to see that the U.S. effort is coordinated, to
provide an adequate war room for current knowledge of the situation,
and to ensure administrative and logistic support. The field group
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should be looked upon as going into a new type of combat and be so
supported, including duty status, discipline, and recognition. In
Vietnam, it would be the operations task force.
Paper work between Washington and Saigon should be cut to a
minimum. An aircraft should be assigned at the Washington end, for
quick trips to Vietnam to get first-hand information and to cut down
the need for time in the field which would have to be devoted to
reporting and administration.
The operations task force field personnel would operate on two
levels. One is at the executive level; the other is at the local trouble
spot, such as the northwest frontier.
At the executive level, there should be an American collaborator
at each key position in the Vietnamese government where decisive
executive action is required. The American would give the firm
guidance of a friend to the Vietnamese official in that position, with
the American remaining very much in the background and encouraging
Vietnamese initiative.
Local trouble spots should be selected for special U.S. effort.
The most obvious ones today are the northwest frontier, the sea
frontier, and Zone D. There are others, along the Cambodian border,
in the Long Hai area, in the center, and so on. Each requires unique
treatment, with its own local U.S. task force directed from the U.S.
task force in Saigon, with its own communications net, and with its
own task goal which would determine its term of deployment. If need
be, priorities can be assigned to trouble spots so that they can be
cleaned up one by one with the most effective U.S. team possible to
concentrate on an area.
While each trouble spot is somewhat different, the local task
force is conceived as having a local U.S. director. Under him would
be a military team, having an advisor-collaborator with the Vietnamese
division commander, a Special Forces team with each battalion, and
a Jungle Jim cell to guide Vietnamese air support to the division's
operations. U.S. military intelligence, psychological warfare, and
civic action personnel would work at division level, to guide the
Vietnamese effort. A junior Foreign Service officer would be the
advisor-collaborator with each Vietnamese province chief in the trouble
area, and would be part of the U.S. communications net. In each
province, there would be a CIA officer to establish the collection of
intelligence, a USIS information officer to guide the Vietnamese
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psychological operation and to direct the USIS information center if
this is required to bolster the Vietnamese effort, and USOM officers
as needed to guide public health, public works, education, and self-
help programs.
There is a great deal already in existence in these trouble spots.
The local U.S. task force would mostly give it some dynamic spark
and direction. In the northwest frontier, this would include a different
attitude towards and use of the Montagnard tribes.
In Laos, Special Forces teams are relieved after six months duty
in the jungle. General Boyle is in full agreement with this policy,
although he believes that the teams in some of the more settled areas
could remain longer without relief. In Vietnam, the problems are
quite different. A special rest and rehabilitation center could be
established in Saigon or Nha Trang, where teams could rest up. In
an area such as the northwest frontier, personnel could be rotated for
duty with the reserve at Kontum after an extended jungle patrol. It
would be smart to establish a similar system for Vietnamese combat
forces.
The concept noted above would place American talents and spirit
directly into position to be most effective in Vietnam. It would commit
them to the action, since Americans mould share the hazards of the
struggle. A U.S. communications net would bring American "can do"
into the Vietnamese scene in a way which could be decisive. Much of
the present Vietnamese bickering and hesitancy would disappear as a
new sense of direction is given them.
Other Comments
a. U.S. presence. It is believed that the Vietnamese would
accept the presence of Americans favorably, if this is done correctly.
Included in "doing it correctly" would be an expression of President
Diem's desire for such U.S. help, the individual Americans earning
their way by friendly devotion to unselfish duty, with exemplary
behavior, and a firm understanding of U.S. withdrawal to let the
Vietnamese run their own affairs once the emergency is over. U.S.
actions would speak louder than words in countering Communist
propaganda.
b. Prisoners. The handling of Communist prisoners needs improve-
ment. The present system has dangerous aspects which weaken the
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psychological effort among the people and against the enemy. Use of
Puolo Condore, with its connotation of the worst of French colonialism,
is an example. The decision role of the province chiefs is another
example. After the rehabilitation period, of 6-12 months, the province
chief is asked if there are any other charges against the prisoner, or
can he be released? All too often, the province chief, hearing that
there is secret Communist organization and training going on among
the prisoners, simply replies that the prisoner is too dangerous to be
returned home. The prisoner then Settles down to a life where he
doesn't have to work and where he is better fed than the soldiers.
Secretary Thuan states that there are about 10, 000 such Viet Gong
prisoners held by the Vietnamese. The Philippines' experience with
Huk prisoners and EDCOR rehabilitation indicates that much more
can be done with Viet Cong prisoners.
c. The Vietnamese Will to Resist. Viet Cong terrorist methods
have alienated the people deeply, although they are too scared to show
it unless given at least the hope of security. So far, they haven't been
given such a hope by the Vietnamese government and armed forces,
except spottily. Too many villagers are treated with equal suspicion
by both sides in this struggle; the Communists cut off heads, while
the Army keeps people for days of interrogation away from supporting
their families, once information is given about Viet Cong activity.
Improved relations with the people, (such as a return to the "ten corn-
ma-ndrnents" formerly obeyed by the Vietnamese armed forces), and
improved military patrolling backed by more responsive government
work, should release the expression of popular will. It would be
actively anti-Communist.
Indicators of this popular will are many. The people of Phan Thiet
fed the marines five meals a day, voluntarily, during recent operations
when the marines undertook aggressive patrolling, and offered to
support them if they would stay. Catholic priests from three different
areas of the south became excitedly enthusiastic when I asked them
if there were youths in their villages who would volunteer to fight the
Communists; in their enthusiasm, they promised to raise 20, 000
volunteers quickly, if they could become "fighters" and not "soldiers."
Americans working in the High Plateau assured me that many of the
Montagnards are desperately angry at the Viet Gong and are ready to
help in the fight if treated as men and not as sub-human; President
Diem noted a similar feeling of Montagnard hatred of the Viet Cong
from recent talks he has had with French missionaries, (although he
wants to regroup the Montagnards into large settlements in the Malaya
pattern).
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The Viet Gong have broken the rules laid down by Mao Tse Tung
for success. This mistake needs to be exploited hard.
d. Secretary Thuan. If the U.S. is to go into a fuller effort for
victory in Vietnam, one of the key people we will have to bet a blue
chip on is Secretary Thuan. As his stature and executive control have
grown, so have grown the suspicions that he is self-serving. Some of
the top officers in the armed forces, along with other government
officials, view him with distinct antipathy. Several are quite active
in "character assassination" of Thuan.. Perhaps having an American
collaborator working closely with Thuan will tend to quiet the talk about
him.
Thuan always has been the man "to get things done." He has risen
to his present position largely on his own merit as an executive, with
some help from Nhu and against considerable opposition from Hue.
His real ambition is not known to me. When I have questioned him
about his future hopes, he has laughed and said that what he enjoys
most is to travel and hopes to earn the right to have leisure for so
doing. However, he has questioned me at times about Magsaysay,
(who moved from Secretary of Defense to the Presidency); such
questioning always has been on how Magsaysay acted as the civilian
executive in military affairs, and not on how he achieved political ends.
Thuan is plainly over-burdened with tasks. His health, (he suf-
fered a heart attack some months ago), has improved, but he is com-
plaining of back trouble. President Diem has expressed concern
about ThuanTs back, explaining that he is suffering from "minor
fractures of the back-bone" and is under medical care. Continuing
U.S. medical assistance for Thuan is indicated.
Some relief from his multiple duties also is indicated for Thuan..
He is already acting to overcome this problem, by pushing for the
creation of an Executive Council for National Security and by appointing
more competent assistants. The latter action is complicated by the
political connections of some less-competent assistants, but Thuan is
moving decisively to weed them out and to appoint officials to whom
he can entrust further responsibilities.
Thuants continuing worry is about the competence of the military
commanders. This is an area of concern where an American collab-
orator could do much constructive work, in clearing up misunder-
standings and in working intimately with MAAG to strengthen the
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command structure into real effectiveness. When asked about military
leadership, Thuan rattled off a fast comment about many individuals;
the following are his personal views:
Colonel Nguyen Due Thang - the coming military leader, he fights
and also knows how to run things; a future chief of staff. Good back-
ground in science and math. Very dedicated man. Marches on foot
when he leads his troops. A moral man who doesn't worship money or
playing around.
General Ty - a figurehead.
General "Big" Minh - always complaining, and doesn't take action
when he has the opportunity; his plans never seem to be complete; he
does such things as send airborne troops into combat by truck when
air envelopment would be more effective.
. General "Little" Minh - intelligent, very smart, but hard to under-
stand.
Joint General Staff - very good, as playboys.
General Don - an excellent staff officer who is misplaced in a com-
bat command.
General Ding - zero, no good.
General Kim - good staff officer.
Neurn, III Corps - gets his old division, has a few tricks, don't
like him.
Colonel Khiem, CO Zi st Division - good, .but a little lazy; he is
not truly a partisan of the offense, because he likes fortifications.
. The three coming men are the Airborne Commander, the Marines
Commander, and Colonel Thang.
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? f. Psychological Operations. Despite good organizations and
some dedicated Vietnamese and Americans in psychological operations,
it seems that the Communists still have the psychological edge in
the struggle in Vietnam. This is expressed in terms of deep belief
in inevitable victory, which is catching and effective even among
staunch anti-Communists. On the other hand, given a real U.S.
stiffening in Vietnam, a Hope of victory, and better yet, the hope of
lifting the yoke of Communism from their brothers in North Vietnam,
the Vietnamese would. catch fire, as would many others in Asia and
elsewhere in the world.
An immediate irnoroverne n.t can be made by closer U.S. col-
laboration with the Vietnamese to get some joint mutual thernas and
then to exploit them thoroughly, with U.S. help. This feeling was
expressed inforrnally in a meeting. with the U.S. Psychological Sub-
Committee of the Task Force, with general agreement of those
present?all of whom would like to see more follow-through and
better means of operating. Vietnamese government actions often
need much more thorough planning and exploitation, which present
joint efforts do not satisfy.
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In day-to-day work, there is a continuing theme of Viet Con.g
excesses in behavior which can be exploited to damage Communist
political claims. At the same time, there are many constructive
actions by the Vietnamese which need much fuller exploitation,
including recognition of individuals and organizations. However,
there are equipment and use needs which require expedited action.
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R. D. T.& E. ANNEX
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RESPECTING R. D0 T. 8zE.
ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM AND SOUTH EAST ASIA.
It is concluded that:
1. The Combat Development and Test Center activity in
Vietnam, and also that in Thailand, should be continued and expanded
as planned with surveillance to ensure their continued effectiveness
and to determine the desirability of continuing or modifying the
present effort.
2. Procedures must be worked out for expedited acquisition
of operational quantities of materiel and equipment; using procure-
ment rather than RDT8zE channels, once test quantities have dem-
onstrated their value for operations.
3. Effective action must be taken to integrate the MAAG
and RVNAF staff work in areas other than R. D?o To & E. in a manner
similar to that being done at the Combat Development and Test Center.
It is recommended that:
1. A test model program of border surveillance and control
developed by the Combat Development and Test Center in Vietnam
be instituted as soo.n as it receives the approval of President Diem
and Chief, MAAG.
2. Consideration be given to using anti-personnel chemical
warfare agents in selected areas where the population is essentially
100% Viet Cong.
3. The proposed introduction of an element of the 4430th
"Jungle Jim" Squadron into Vietnam be implemented immediately,
that it serve both as a training and operational Development Unit,
and that it operate in cooperation with the Combat Development and
Test Center, Viet Nana.
4. That operational quantities of Lazy Dog munition be
introduced to Vietnam concurrently with the introduction of 4403th
Wing personnel or whenever trained instructors in its use are
provided Vietnam; and that policy consideration be given to the desira-
bility of introducing special fragmentatio-a weapons either for U.S.
use or otherwise.
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5. That the previously approved Civic Action Armed Forces
"Flying Doctor" pilot model program be executed without further
delay; to achieve greater rapport between the military and civilian
populace; to provide a means of improved intelligence gathecring;
and to provide a base for medical research and assistance in
disease conditions that will be of great trouble to Uo S. forces opera-
ting in the field.
6. The following items be made available for immediate use in
Vietnam:
a. 20,000 gallons of defoliant (butyl 2, 4, 5 T) and four
H-34 spray equipped helicopters by airlift within 10 days Liar use
against rice crops. If available, 10,000 lbs of cacodylic acid
should be airlifted at the same time.
b. Two C-119 spray equipped aircraft should be sent for
experimental defoliation of selected strips through Zone D.
C, 80,000 gallons of defoliant should be sent by sea lift.
d. Up to 800 trained patrol dogs should be shipped to Vietnam
in increments of 80 per month until current training and kennel
facilities can be expanded, at such time monthly shipments may be
accelerated. Dogs in this quantity must be procured in England,
Germany and possibly Honk Kong since U.S. Capacity is unsufficient.
e. Village alarm coded pulse type signal transmitter
compatible with standard AN/6RC9 military receivers. These should
be air shipped as they become available; the total requirement is
estimated by GVN to be 675. Development work will have to be
continued concurrently with procurement to extend the effective range,
f. Outboard motors for . and materials forms and instructor
personnel for, the construction in South Vietnam of 250 swimmer type
support boats capable of transporting 6 - 8 personnel. Both conven-
tional outboard motors and long shaft types should be subjected to
evaluation.
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THE CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH? DEVELOPMENT TEST AND
EVALUATION TO COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
I. INTRODUCTION:
RDT&E activities in Vietnam are conducted through a joint
Vietnamese/United States Combat Development and Test Center.
This Center, the first of its kind in Asia has been in existence
since June 1961. Despite the fact that the Center is only three months
old, and the fact that much of its acti..ty has been devoted to the
collection of staff, the development of an inventory and the estab-
lishment of working relations, the Center has already introduced
test quantitie,s of new equipment and materiel which offer promise
of making a significan,t actual and psychological contribution to
operations against the Viet Cong.
The fact(is that Conventional forces, conventionally organized
with conventional equipment can be successful against insurgencies
only at excessive cost in terms of time, men. and money. Should
the techniques popularly ascribed to the British in Malaya be the
only solution to combat operations against insurgencies then the free
world is in difficult position indeed. p. Malaya more than 150, 000
troops required seven years and on the order of six billion dollars
to reduce a wholly self-contained insurgency the personnel strength
of which at its peak did not exceed eight thousand armed rebels.
The Communists have utilized the same tactics in Laos. A similar
situation seems to be developing in Vietnam and is potentially
present in Thailand. It requires little analysis to determine that
Communist Bloc activity of this nature in only a limited number of
additional countries would, if alternative techniques are not derived,
result in further very serious losses to the free world. It is there-
fore, the primary objective of the Combat Development and Test
Center in Vietnam and in another similar but somewhat more broadly
based Center in Thailand to give substance to the Presidential in-
junction that the United States and its allies develop alternative
responses than those presently available with respect to the threat
posed by such Communist activities.
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After intensive study of "On-the-Shelf" hardware as well as
Research and Development items and projects within DOD and
industry, we are convinced that not sure-fire, absolute,and very
few "secret weapons" are on the immediate holzon. There are
a number of promising ideas in the field of limited war, but the
Pipe-line of projects with even a meagre degree of development
is very spotty. The most promising ideas will, even under accel-
erated priorities take up to a year or more to develop,'
On the other hand, the mere fact that the U.S. has been
willing to enter into the first truly joint effort in Vietnam in the
field of RDT&E; the fact that a very limited number of projects
have already proved their usefulness; and the fact that an imagin-
ative group has.beg-u.-n consideration of the discrete problems con-
fronting the Vietnamese Armed Forces has already made a- con-
tribution to morale and has provided a psychological boost at all
levels of the government including President Diem, the senior
military officers and, indeed that limited number of ordinary
soldiers who have been involved in the Center's test activities.
II. The Organization of RDT&E Activities in Vietnam and South
East Asia.
Organizationally, RDT&E in South East Asia is based upon two
joint combat and development test Centers. The first of these
Centers in Vietnam presently comprises approximately 10 U.S.
military and civilian personnel on permanent duty, and about 15 ?IN
professional personnel together with administrative and clerical
support. The Center, unlike any other military activity in the
country is wholly integrated into the armed forces of Vietnam. It
is currently housed in Joint Command Headquarters. However, at
the request of the President, it will be moved into a secure area
devoted exclusively to RDT&E. Effective 1 November, the Center
will assume responsibility on the Vietnamese side for all of the
ordnance, chemical and quartermaster research that had been
previously established in the country.
?The Center develops projects by consultation with the armed
forces, and submits its proposed study areas for approval to the
government of Vietnam, MAAG and to OSD. Upon approval of
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a given project, a preliminary survey of the technical nature of the problem
is undertaken-. Equipment, tactics, and technicians that might be suited to
the problem are identified and a supplementary shopping list for non-existent
-material prepared. Thereafter, test items are. requested and.a test program
initiate& As a result of such test, recommendations are made for the
introduction of operational quantities through regular channels.
The Center in Thailand is similar to that in Vietnam; however, by
agreement between the U4 S. and Thailand, this facility will commencing
1 January 1962 concern itself with combat problems on. a selective basis
throughout Asia as well as in-country. It is now concerned with certain
problems origin.ated by Ua Sa Embassy and Chief MAAG, Laos. The facility in
Thailand will ultimately become the parent office to that in Viet Nam. It
will contain a significantly larger staff and will involve more facilities. The
two facilities can be expected to be com.plementary. That in Thailand will have
a longer term orientation; that in Viet Nam will be more concerned with
evaluation of equipment that is,or can quickly be made,immediately available.
Also, of course, many test)can better be performed in areas where one does
not need to worry about sec.,.urity of test personnel during operations (Thailan.d);
other evaluation can. be made only in actual combat situation.(Viet Nam)
M. Fundamental Problems of Warfare in South East Asia: the mid term
Potential of RDT&E Activities toward their Solution:
It is inherent in RDT&E activities that their contribution is somewhat
longer range in character than is the case for example with military assistance.
For this reason, the Combat Development and Test Centers in Vietnam,
and particularly in Thailand,should be viewed as a long term investment
, intended not only to improve the capability of the indigenous forces to resist
- the immediate threat to the security of the several countries of South-East
Asia, but also to provide a mechanism through which the special talents of
the U.S. Scientific laboratories and industry may be brought into physical
contact with the problems of South East Asia on a continuing basis. By
this means it may be anticipated that significant new technical developments
directly relevant to the character of combat in this area may someday be
brought into being.
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Although the precise character of such new developments cannot
be predicted with accuracy, some more intensive work is clearly
indicate&
Basic studies- in radio propogation have never been undertaken
for South East Asia; despite the fact that the inability of standard U.S.
? military radios to provide adequate communications in the jungle has
been well known for 20 years. Without such a basic building block the
prognosis for the achievement of an effective air ground/ground to ground
command control system is dim indeed.
There have been many better "mousetraps" proposed as a solution
to the problem of off-road mobility, and some of these have had certain
application. On the other hand, substantially no work has been done
in. fundamental soil mechanics within the peculiar environment of South-
East Asia. The result has been and is that vehicles reasonably suited
for a different environment are provided to forces in South East Asia
where they will work at submarginal efficiency and in many cases not at all.
In terms of costo the U. S alone even the simplest operations
analysis backed up by scientific examination of terrain mobility con.-
siderations, offers promise of extensive savings through the cancellation
of deliveries of unsuitable motor transports and the introduction of
better simpler vehicles suited to the environment. ?
Similar pilot model operations analysis in tactics and organization
as well as equipment are required in bther areas.
Until the establishment of CDTC activities in Asia, it is fair to
say that no organized U. S,; RDT&E effort has ever, been devoted to the
needs and peculiarities of the Asian soldier as distinguished from the
American, nor since World War II to the problems of Asia as distinguished
from Europe. It is not clear that a single item of MAP equipment has
ever been issued in response to an analyzed Asian combat requirement;
only rarely has a local "inventor" sought to improve the equipment for
the troops he is advising by cutting off stocks of rifles etc.
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At its worst, the MAP Program has been, insofar as the South East
Asian area is concerned, a device to give away obsolete U.So gear in order
that a demand can be established for newer models for U. So forces. At
its best, MAP has sought to remake the supported armies of Asia over into
the U. So image,. "well and truly" equipped with heavy artillery, tanks,
elaborate but non-functional communications gear, high performance aircraft
and 10,000 foot runways, and picket boats, none particularly suited to the
operational problem.
And yet there are fundamental differences in Asian combat operations,
the physical characteristics of the people, the nature of the terrain, the
climate, the weather, the means of communication, and perhaps most ?
critically of all the energy and technology available for warfare, and their
effect on U. Sa as well as native forces.
An American or European combat soldier is assumed to weigh 175 lbs.
He can carry a 90 lb pack in a reasonably cool environment; a 90 lb
Vietnamanese is surely less effective in a high humidity, high. disease
environment with the same 90 lbs.
It is current practice to provide the bulk of South East Asia MAP supported
personnel with a "standard" Ua S. Army field hat- which fails to keep off the
rain and causes the South East Asian soldier to expose his neck to the sun, a
serious morale factor in a race that prides itself on. being light rather than
sun-tanned.
The U.S. still provides standard U0 S, model leather boots for many
of its South East Asian allies despite the fact that the U.S. last is entirely
different from that required for South East Asian feet; despite the fact
that leather is almost totally unsuitable for South East Asia operations;
and despite the fact that locally made rubber and canvas jungle boots can be
substantially less exoensive.
The U.S. provides World War II landing craft designed for a totally
different purpose, to river forces in South East Asia, simply because the
U.S. has done nothing about river and lake boats since the Civil War.
One of the most pressing longer term problems in which a great deal
of work must be done lies in the Social Science field. Leadership, and basic
knowledge or techniques in motivation and persuasion, both as to psychological
warfare, and, indeed as to
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US personnel on duty in Vietnam or in South East Asia generally exist
almost by accident where they e.:id.st at alle
The list of such items can be extended almost indefinitely; the case
for detailed examination of the problems of those we expect to fight for,
and with us, in South East Asia is unassailable.
The case for involving the technical capability of the US Scientific
industrial and military community is equally strong. The problem has
been to create an awareness that a problem exists and to expose the US
technicians thereto on a systematic basis.
This has now been started with the CD8ETC activity on the Indo-
Chinese Peninsula.
IV. Specific RDT&E Projects Recommended for Immediate Action:
1. Manioc and Rice Plant Dessicant:
a. The original requirement under this task was for a manioc
(tapioca) plant killer deliverable by aircraft. The requirement was later
%me expanded to include the spraying of rice and sweet potatoes. This is
necessary since abandoned or wild manioc groves are used by the Viet
Cong as a major source of food. In addition, rice and sweet potatoes, either
planted by the VC or in areas under their control will provide a major share
of food for future VC operations if harvested.
b. Chemicals used in this operation are commercially produced
in the U.S. in large quantity and widely employed there for selective weed
control and similar commercial uses. A request was submitted to OSD/
ARPA on 3 October for airshipment of 20,000 gallons (220,00C1)pounds)of
this chemical and 4 H-34 helicopters equipped for spray operation. An
additional request was made to OSD on 13 October for 10,000 pounds of
cacodylic acid for use against rice crops, specifically. Being a relatively
new product the commercial supply is not known. Inquiries are being made
by Fort Detrick.
c. Most of the rice grown in the mountain regions and on high
plateau will be ready for harvest by about mid-Novembe. For this reason
it is necessary that the operation be conducted as soon as possible, if the
VC are to be denied this source of food. Consideration is being given to
using napalm bombs as a means of burning these rice crops that become
ready for harvesting prior to arrival of chemicals and spray equipment.
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b. An area of this size is equivalent to 64,000 acres. At one gallon
of chemical per acre, 64,000 gallons would be required. One gallon of a
50-50 mix of 2 unformulated pure liquid chemicals weighs about 11 pounds
and 64,000 gallons would weight about 705,000 pounds. At a price of about
$1.25 per pound,. the cost of chemical would be of the order of $900,000 to
one million dollars. Recent information from the U. S?; indicates an adequate
commercial supply of this chemical is on hand.
e. The above poundage (estimates at 775,000 pounds when the weight
of the empty drums is included) airlifted from the U6S0 at a cost of $1 per
pound would be $775,000. Thus the total cost to obtain the supply of chemical
and transport it to Vietnam is estimated at $1,775,000.
d. This proposal is consistent with a RVNAF and MAAG proposal of strip
clearing in D Zone and the related border. It is not yet clear how effective
such chemical will be in clearing strips through undergro-wth. It may be ?
that burning 'using Napalm probably) will be required. It is not known how
quickly this could be done after spraying nor what the quantitative requirements
for Na.palin would be. It is, of course, obvious that defoliant.::: alone will be of
no value, at best it can open up strips or areas so that friendly forces may
Wkosiol move through them more quickly with reduced possibility of ambush.
e. Summary of estimates:
Area:
Gallons of chemical:
Pounds per gallon:
Chemical (Pounds):
Total Weight:
Cost of Chemical:
Cost of airlift:
Estimated cost of chemical
plus airlift:
About 100 square miles.
64, 000
11
705, 000
775,000 (To he shipped in drums
using 50 pounds of container
weight per 50 gallons of chemical
@ $1. 25 /lb - $900, 00 to 1 million
@ $1.00 /lb - $775,000
$1, 775, 000 (U.
f. To expedite this program the quantities of chemical indicated
will perhaps exceed the current supply of a single U.S. company. If pur-
chase of the chemicals can be accomplished without having to resort to
"low bids", much valuable time can be saved. Informal estimates of costs
have or are being obtained by Fort Detrick. It has been indicated that
chemicals and equipment is considered essential.
Six C-119 or C-123 aircraft with MC-1 Spray Units installed have
been requested with -crews, maintenan.ce and support.
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d. An. additional 80,000 gallons of chemical have been requested
for surface lift to be used to kill manioc and other VC food crops while
operations against rice fields are being conducted.
e. Summary of estimates:
Chemicals
Biityl 2, 4, 5 -T
Airlift @ Sl/lb
b. Cacodylic Acid
(If available)
Airlift @ $1 Jib
c. (See a. above)
Surface lift
Gallons Pounds Dollars
20,000 220,000 275,000
220, 000
10, 000 15, 000
10,000
80,000 880,000 1,100,000
TOTAL (Plus 10%) S1,780, 000
f. To expedite this program dir,ected procurement of chemicals
instead of the "low bid" procedure will save valuable time. It is doubt-
ful that a sole source can provide the quantities required. Fort Detrick
has itlready made informal inquiries of chemical suppliers and is prepared
to conduct negotiations. Four 11-34 aircraft equipped for spray operations
are needed for this effort in addition to numerous pieces of minor support
(-fear.
ZQ Defoliants and Dispensing Gear:
VN intelligence indicates that a hard core ofIC is based in D Zone.
Their strength varies from time to time and depending upon. the situation,
approaches 60 to 70 percent of VC regular and guerilla troops currently in
South Vietharn, The VC are indicated as conducting a relatively massive build-
up in the D Zone to gain control Of key provinces in the vicinity of, and, if
possible, the seat of the free government, at Saigon.
a. An estimate of the D Zone area to be sprayed, including the
adjacent border area , is. about 100 square miles, if swaths of 200 meters -
(about 65.0 feet)/ wide are considered. .Estimates below are based on this
swath width and a single spray. If other widths, or a second spray in the
densest forest are required, direct proportional adjustment of these estimates
is ne_.cessaryo
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rifle under controlled test conditions, that it offers unqualified advantages
as a lethal, light-weigla, ground combat individual weapon.
(3) Enlisted men of the Airborne Brigade who have fired the
.rifle are exceptionally enthusiastic in their praise and desire to use this
weapon against the Viet Cong.
d. Approximately 5,000 Armalite AR-15 rifles, with spare parts,
.ammunition, and follow-on spares and ammunition have been requested.
4. Border Surveillance and Control:
a.. There are some 850 miles of largely undefined and unmapped border
separating Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia. This border area varies
geographically from mountains, high plateau to the delta.e.7egion now almost
completely under water.
. b. There is no single device or tactic that will be wholly successful
in sealing off this area from Viet Cong or Vietminh infiltration. On the
other hand a series of integrated and mutually supporting measures can
seriously impair this region as a source of infiltration, logistics supply
and command and control. ?
It should be noted that no actual survey of the border area exists.
Neither Viet Nam, nor its neighbors can determine whether a given action
takes place in Viet Nam or outside its national terriroty. This permits
the "adjustment" of the border to take advantage of terrain in large sectors
of the country. It should also be noted that the area is not homogeneous in
character. Perhaps 1/3 of the border is relatively open grass land. Other
sectors are rather well populated with "Beau Geste" forts manned with both
regular Army and Civil Guard some of which can only be resupplied by air.
There are at least Z fair sized agrovilles and in the It Corps area at least
significant military deployment. Along the Cambodian Border there is an
excessive deployment of Ranger forces, a portion of which are essentially
immobilized by the absence of water transport rather than by assignment to
static ,defense
c. Under this condition it is suggested that an integrated a-oproach
entailing the use of a series of RDT&E and standard items plus aggressive
tactics will be required to effect a reasonably effective sea.l. For these
purposes, the following concept is proposed:
(1) Obtain from U S., Photography a reasonably detailed strip
map of the entire border area 20-50 miles wide. At a minimum this photo-
graphy should be annotated to indicate all existing VN and any identifiable
VC or Laos installations. (about 5 airfields; training centers, 1 or more;
communications sites, etc.) It should identify heavy jungle, open swampy
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3. Individual Weapons:
In response to an urgent RVNAF request a development task was
addressed to the problem of a suitable individual weapon for the ARVN
soldier. This task was approved for inclusion in the precept which
established the CDTC. The basic and very obvious problem in. the small
arms area is one of providing the ARVN soldier with a weapon compatible
with his smaller stature and body configuration, and the en.viroriment in
which he must fight.
al Ten AR-15 rifles with accessories and ammunition were furnished
the CDTC for functional Ind operational suitability tests to be conducted
by the airborne Brigade. Criteria for selection of this unit were based
on the additional hazard imposed on parachutists by jumpting with the M-I
rifle and the 136 Aa R., and the outstanding combat record of this elite
fighting unit.
b. Results of functional suitability tests indicate that:
(1) The Armalite AR-15 rifle, with its light weight, short barrel
and low recoil force is an ideal weapons for the Vietnamese parachutist.
(2) In. all the CDTC tests the Armalite AR-15 equalled or exceeded
performance tests of the M-1 rifle up to 4:00 yards. Tests included firing
at silouhette targest, obscured by light to heavy brush and bamboo typical
of the region, coconuts, and other targets similar in substance to the human
anatomy.
(3) It is deemed desirable to .conduct a full scale combat rest and
it was recommended that the Airborne Brigade be fully equipped with the
AR-I5 rifle.
c. Compelling psychological and political reasons exist to support the
above request. High ranking MAAG, RVNAF, and OVN officials believe
that the Armalite AR-15 rifle will provide an exceptional psychological
stimulus to a group of dedicated soldiers. In this connection, USaadvisbrs
report:
(1) President Diem stated: "I am familiar with the characteristics
of the A3:malite. All I want to know is when will we get them for the Air-
borne. Brigade ? "
(2) It has been the unanimous opinion. of all senior Infantry officers
of MAAG, Vietnam, who have fired and observed the performance of this
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%tan, (2) A detailed -Dian should be developed jointly with the ARVN to:
(a) Construct a number of observation towers designed es-
pecially for border surveillance using laminated Doron or similar material
for roof and sides, these towers to be located at strategic points within
the selected area to be guarded.
(13) Ensure active dog guarded patrol between border forts
in open areas.
(c) Ensure air attack against major visible enemy installations
Napalm and Butterfly bombs against ai-rfields. Napalm and Lazy Dog against
manned installations.
(d) Mine with air droppable Butterfly bombs all open areas
and with'other mines where permanent closure is acceptable, such areas
to be backed up with mobile forces. This should be supplemented with
hand sown mines (M-14) and/or Leesona-Moos fuzed moulded plastic
mines along trails leading from or to principle lines of communication
within Vietnam. These mines can be sanitized, recharged and reused as
required.
(e) Build-up defensive capability of border villages and
agrovilles through adoption of the "Israeli Kibutz" techniques ernlo-ying
mines and mobile forces with dogs, defoliating as necessary to create
adequate fields of fire and trails between installations.
(f) Enforce through use of dogs and defoliants, plus aggressive
advisor training, "all night" patrols by Civil Guard and ARVN forces along
border between outposts.
(g) Provide through booby traps, trip wires, and sentry dogs
an alert warning system to augment village alarm communication between
selected border points and mobile forces. These forces should be deployed
outside of forts and should be cited for all round defense. Regular forces
in 2 company size should spend 2 weeks in the field and 2 in barracks along
the border.
(h) In the Southern Delta area employ a combination of new
equipment and modified tactics such as "boat-borne cavalry." Mobile
Reserves should be mounted on "Body Armor Boats" and should be pro-
vided with individual man-portable matericl floats for off-boat operation
in attack situations.
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d. To expedite such a program the following actions will be
required:
Careful planning by a special US/VN Joint Team.
(2) Overflight photography and effective
(3)
(.4)
2-5 million pounds of defoliant @ 3-6 million dollars.
150-300 village alarm transmitters with perhaps 50
receiving sets compatible with PRC-10 and equivalent military receivers
$400,000.
(5) 300-500 dogs with mixed sentry and attack training_ $2,000,000.
(6) Delivery of quantities of available M-14 and M.-18A1 mines,
expanded procurement of available Napalcp stocks and delivery of Lazy Dog.
(7) Physical participation of U. So Advisors in Border Patrol
operations.
(8) Procurement and development of armored "Shower Curtain
Boats" and simple floating platforms for 10-15 companies of Rangers
about 2 million.
eo In order to prove the effectiveness of such a program, it is rec-
ommended that ARVN and CDTC augmented by selected personnel from
MAAG identify one or more critical areas- perhaps between Zone D and
the Cambodian Border, and another West of Konturn - (and 1 Agroville)
to build up a pilot project upon which the complete Border Surveillance
and Control System may be based.
5. Patrol Dogs:
a. Experience by the U. So throughout the world and by the British
in Hoak Kong and Malaya indicated that properly trained sentry dogs
would be a real asset to RVNAF operations. The implementation of this
task began with the receipt of two German Shepherd dogs and one dog
handler/instructor from the Uo So The training of two ARVN dog handlers
with, these dogs was followed by a request for 6 additional dogs from the
U6 So for a comparative evaluation with a like number of dogs procured
locally. This training program is now about 50% complete& Because
of the urgency of the situation and the immediate requirement for a
larger quantity of trained dogs and handlers, a request was submitted
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to OSD/ARPA for airshipment of 60 trained dogs and six. dog handler/
instructors from the U. S. Sentry Dog Training School. A message
received from Headquarters. USAF on 18 October stated tht.:. the first
shipment of these clogs would arrive by 1 November and that the final
shipment would arrive about mid-November. Upon receipt of these dogs,
training will commence with RVNAF handlers selected from combat
units having a requirement for sentry or patrol dogs. Upon completion
of a four to .five week program, the trained do.g handlers, along with
their dogs will be returned to their parent units for combat duty.
b. By using this approach RVNAF units will be supplied with trained
sentry and patrol dogs much sooner than was originally planned in the
MAP Program. The dogs to be procured under the MAP Program will
be used to provide replacements for dogs lost in combat and to provide
additional dogs to combat units. Consideration is now being given to
changing the approved TO/E for the ARVN Dog Company to a Replacement
Training Center, and to provide at least 000 to 1,000 dogs during the
next few months0 instead of the 60 originally programmed. Funds for
the purchase of these additional dogs would be requested from OSD under
the emergency provision of recent State-Defense message 337, at a cost
estimated to be approximately $250,000 plus air transport. Animals in
this quantity are not available in the U.S. Procurement is required in
Europe - particularly France, England and Germany.
c. To expedite this program the following actions are required:
(1) Wholehearted support by the RVNAF to provide eualified,
volunteer personnel for dog handlers; and to complete the training of
handlers with dogs now being purchased from CONUS.
(a) Immediate procurement action as requested to include
foreign acquisition of up to 800 dogs to permit a continued flow of animals
into training center at a rate of 80 per month.
6. Village Alarm System:
The initial concept of providing a clandestine radio transmitter
for use by agents or loyal Vietnamese to warn mobile quick reaction
forces of Viet Cong attack has been broadened in scope to include:
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a. A miniaturized radio transmitter capable of transmitting
a coded pulse-type signal over a range of 15 kilometers. This fire-
alarm type radio wieh !Dower source and antenna must be of such
configuration as to permit it to be completely hidden in an accessible
location.. It must be capable of transmitting by a simple on-off switch
or button. Two signals must be available, one for indicating a minor
attack, one for a major attack. - Operation must be silent and the
power. source must possess long shelf life. In order to facilitate
introduction of such a transmitter in an unfriendly or passive village,
it has been suggested that the ultimate design configuration should
resemble a flashlight, with flashlight configured power packs probably
fitted with prongs to plug into transmitter. The antenna should be
capable of being inserted in the typical bamboo-thatch type dwellings
of South Vietnam. The RVNAF estimates that approximately 675
clandestine transmitters will be required.
(1) The .WESLARM, Model 2 prototype on loan from the
Varesrnon.t. Manufacturing Company is currently under concept test.
Results to date indicate that the concept is sound and the technical _
approach satisfactory, although the desired range has not been achieved
with this prototype. To be very useful the range must be extended
either by increasing transmitter output or receiver sensitivity. This
set utilizes the standard AN/GRC-9 radio as a. companion receiver,
and transmits on 4.10 :megacycles.
b; A two-way voice radio Semi-clandestine CW transmitter
suitable for use in friendly, semi-secure villages. Set should be
fabricated in a sealed box to meet environmental conditions and
should be capable of operation when partially buried in the ground.
Companion receiver should have a coded automatic alarm device and -
should be capable of distinguishing between several hundred trans-
mitters with relative security against spoofing. RVNAF?estimates
that a total of 2,550 transmitters will be required.
(1) General Electric Company has furnished on. loan 6 each
? coded two-way radios and one console receiver. Due to rupture of
a water pipe, in the storage room, this system was water-soaked.
The RVNAF Signal Depot has been requested to check out andlor
repair the system.
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c. System will include the use of flares, air-ground signal panels,
etc. where feasible and appropriate.
d. Conclusions:
(1) The requirement is valid for a clandestine radio trans-
mitter to be used to alert a quick reaction force, as part of a village
alarm system, The concept is feasible but will require a moderate
degree of development.
(2) The requirement for a to-way voice radio, CW trans-
mitter to be used in semi-secure 1.villages is valid, but can be met
by use of the USOM Village Communication System.
e. Recommendations:
(1) The Village Alarm System be fully implemented under the
emergency assistance program by the development and procurement
of 675 flashlight configured clandestine type radio transmitters.
(Approximate cost $1 million)
(2) Consideration be given to the use of a two-way voice
radio /CW transmitter after further test by CDTC.
7, Delta Mobility:
a. Military movement in the delta region is very difficult,
especially during and shortly after the rainy season each ye..-ar. There
are broad areas throughout the delta covered with mud of a consistency
too thick for boat operation but too thin to operate tracked vehicles,
at least conventional ones. The road network is meager and is easily
cut in a few hours to the extent that vehicular traffic is denied. There
is however, an intricate system of rivers, creeks and canals throughout
the ,delta. A military force which could move across the country
without dependence on roads would possess a tremendous advantage.
Short of that, even boats, if suitable ones existed in quantity, would
provide a very great improvement in mobility to the VN in the southern
Delta,
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b. There is a pressing need for extensive research and development
in delta mobility. Very little qualitative work has been done in this
field, either in the U. So or elsewhere. For example, rivers and canals
are often clogged by weeds and plants, yet only a few of the types are
familiar to Uo So botanists. Without knowledge about these plants, it
L t difficult to formulate plans to clear them or chemically control their
growth without harming animal life. More informatibn must be developed
concerning design and operation of propulsion systems for boats. Design
and test of a vehicle or boat capable of cross-country operation in.
the delta could have far-reaching military significance in Southeast
Asia.
ce To deal with the problem of delta mobility, the CDTC has
initiated a three-phase program. One part is the long range R.DT&E
effort which will include work of the type described above. Another
share of the effort is being addressed to the immediate problem, that is,
achievement of significant improvements in delta mobility in the
immediate future.
d. Several boats have been undergoing functional test by MAAG
with varying degrees of suc.cess. Of these, the Swimmer Support
boat (unsinkable, carries 6 to 8 troops, powered by commercial out-
board motor) appears particularly promisin.g? However, only two
have been built so far, and about 30 would be required for a satisfactory
operational evaluation. This number would permit test of the boats in
actual operations, where test of only two would be inconclusive.
e. Thirty boats could easily be manufactured locally, provided
the materials were procured from the Uo So and a person who is
familiar with the manufacture of styrofoam/fiberglass.boats brought
to VN to show the VN how to use the materials, Manufacture of this
test quantity would require establishment of a small production line,
After the test quantity were completed, the VN would not only have
the test boats in hand, but also they would have the capability to build
locally other types of fiberglass boats for test. In addition, this
RDT&E production capability could easily be expanded into a full
scale production line of fiberglass boats if the situation requires.
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f. the third field of endeavor is development of a concept of
operation for "Boat Cavalry" units in the delta. Hopefully, these
units might bring a new degree of mobility to RVNAF operations in
the delta.
g.? In Summary: CDTC is conducting a three phase program
in delta mobility. Part is directed toward long range problems;
the remainder is being applied to short range problems. For partial
solution of short range problem, there is a need for materials, tools,
motors and an expert advisor for styrofoam/fiberglass construcdon
of 30 boats. Estimated cost of this program for test purposes is less
than $100,000. Operational quantities required will involve several
hundred boats @,$500 each.
h. To expedite the program, procurement should be initiated,
or required by Chief MA.AG, of materials and equipment required
for the local manufacture of up to 250 Swimmer-Support boats with
the first 30 utilized by CD&TC for further test modification, and
Tactics Development.
8. 4400th Jungle Jim Special Squadron:
a. Although the requirement for significantly more effective use
of airpower in guerilla operation against the Viet Gong is apparent,
it has been largely overlooked in Vietnamese planning and operations.
MAG personnel and much of the equipment provided for them to
work with are in many respects unsuited to the task. Despite a rela-
tively high number of sordes per mo-nth, it is unlikely that many
Viet Cong have been killed.
b. Chief of Staff, USAF, has created recently a specially organized,
trained, and equipped unit called Jungle Jim,. ?He has requested DOD
to permit the introduction of an element of this force into Vietnam.
Such introduction is intended to be largely directed toward RDME into the
nature of problems involved in the use of airpower in operations of this
character; but also to provide a significant.trainin.g and operational
augmentation for combat operation. The 4400th Units are trained and
organized for both overt and covert combat operations.
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C. CDTC arid representatives of the 4400th Wing have reached
agreement that 8 B-26 , 4 C-47's , and 6-8 T-28 nomads should be
stationed in Vietnam for training:, Chief iVIAAG and GVN have agreed.
It has. also been agreed that certain newer weapons and equipment such
as Lam,/ Dog and a new hi-performance machine gun pod should be procured
by CDTC and made available for ? test with Vietnamese Air Force and 4400th
personnel.
d, It is recommended that this proposa.1 be approved and exoeclited to
insure the early arrival of these units in Viet Nam,
0
a Lazy ...)o and Special Weapons:
a, There are two weapons that fall into a somewhat special category.
Ti.oe first of these is the :_o-calied Lazy Dog ;an air droppable flechette,
b, Recent tests in the 1:1;S,; have again demonstrated that this weaoon
can be effectively a,,TpLied with either straffing or dive bombing rne.diods,
The AD-6 aircraft now stationed in Viet Nam can utilize Lazy Dog without
further modification.
c. This wea7pon was belatedly used at rien Bin Phu and has been. tested
with good res.._uts asrainst junk traffic off of Ouernoy. Recent test results
demonstate an 85t,e probability of kill or incapacitation against troops in
exposed areas, Even in -2.-eascnable jungle cover, there is a hit probj.lity
of 18% in a single "-::-)orrib" over an area 240 feet by 720 feet, The weapon
exists in operational quantities in the Pacific Tha,ater, CINCPAC has under
consideration a decision to recommend its utilization.
d, In addition to Lazy Dog, the use of special fragmentation weapons
should be considered as a matter of policy. These weapons are under
special security restrictions and no decision has been taken to pern-1:',t their
useS. While they should perhaps not be employed, by indigenous :pilots,
their use should certainly be considered if US aircraft including the 4400th.
Wing are deployed for combat operations in Viet Nam?
10, Arii-Personn.c1 Chemical Warfare Agents:
In selected areas (perh4i7s part of Zone D)'the population may be essentially
100% Viet Gong LE such areas can be identified, consideration should probably
be given to using chemical warfare agents,
Two things are immediately required:
(I) A technical analysis to estimate requirements for coverage of
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various types of terrain with different agents, and the feasibility of
dispensing them -through jungle over-growth.
(2) A determination as to the political acceptability of using such
3.-neasures0 It is important in this connection to recognize that the usual
objections may not apply since this proposed application would be in ?nets
own country; for example, a part of Zone D might be used as a proving
ground with perhaps advance notice being given by broadcast from aircraft
or with leaflets.
From the point of view of political acceptability, incapacitating agents
are probably to be preferred to lethel agents, but on the basis of technical
feasibility, only the latter may be possible. This remains to be determined,
11. "Flying Doctor" Military Medical Support Program:
a. CDTC has with the support of GVN developed a plan to utilize
the existing Military Medical and Sub Doctoral personnel in outlying
regions to provide civilian outpatient service on a time available basis;
and to provide medical evacuation for cases too serious to be treated in
BataIlion Level Aid Stations.
b. This effort called the "Flying Doctor" program will be initiated
on a pilot model basis with a flight of 3 hello couriers, jeep, ambulances
and boats together with significantly improved communications as
rapidly as the Materiel can be delivered.
c. Since the program has very great psychological and intelligence
as well as medical potential, and since it can also serve as a base for
medical :support of U6 S. personnel for whom disease problems in outlying
areas of Vietnam will range from Severe to Critical; it is recommended
that plans for the operational expansion of the pilot model program be
expedited.
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COVERT ANNEX
t7111 C'Ert$7,',717.T
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2. The sympathy of the populace among which the communist guerrillas
exist must be denied to the communists and won to the side of free forces.
This involves a whole variety of programs in the political, psychological,
economic realm, basic to which is the friendliest possible relationship
between the free forces and the civilian populace.
3 To the maximum extent feasible and possible, the fight must be taken
to the enemy. The enemy must be given cause for concern for his own home area
.
.and thus restricted in his capability to provide for the needs of his guerrilla
movement in another area.
There have been many suggestions made in the Counter-Insurgency Plan
For Vietnam, in the reports and the recommendations of the Vietnam Task Force,
.and in individual recommendations by Ambassadors Durbrow and Nolting, which
are well-designed to implement programs constructed in conformace with the
objectives listed above. By and large these plans and recommendations have
not been implemented because of blockage in the Vietnames Government. The
?
first task, therefore, is to get the Vietnamese Government working again.
General Lansdale hes discussed with me his idea for the establishment of a
group of dedicated and experienced Americans within the various high levels
of the Vietnamese Government to act as expediters and to speed up the processes
of decision and action. It is my understanding also that the commitment of
helicopters in fairly substantial number and under American control is now
contemplated to aid the mobility and striking capability of the Vietnamese
army. While we would support these measures, they are outside the competence
of this paper. One additional suggestion not directly related to covert
activities is also offered.
clOrn
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This suggestion is that members of the National Assembly be put to work
at the province level as counterparts to American advisory teams in the prov-
inces to aid in securing the decision and action of the Vietnamese Government.
A state of National Emergency has been proclaimed. The National Assembly
delegates, therefore, are not required in Saigon, except on an occasional
basis, as most matters are handled by presidential decree. It is suggested
that if President Diem could be persuaded to request the services of these
National. Assembly Delegates, during theperiod of the emergency, as Presidential
agents in their respective provinces, these delegates could add substantially
to lubricating the machinery of government without usurping the prerogatives
of province chiefs or military commanders. They could work side by side with
American teams and province officials to advise and counsel and where neces-
sary to plead with the President for programs needing urgent action. To
initiate their designation as Presidential agents it might also be well to
construct a joint Vietnamese-American training course of three or four weeks'
duration during which time the new Presidential agents would form an
acquaintanceship with their American counterparts, be given some understand-
ing of their mission and informed concerning varieties and channels of avail-
able aid. Hopefully also the delegates could be persuaded to stump their
provinces in behalf of the government and thereby impart a better understand-
ing of the communist threat. The Assembly Delegates have some natural advan-
tages for this task since they are elected, have some understanding of the
function of government, and have a personal stake in preventing further
communist inroads.
The important point is that the government must begin to function effec-
*of tively again. The only alternatives are to ride roughshod over the organs of
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The most important covert operational effort now needed is the observa-
tion and harassment of Viet Cong transiting South Laos into Vietnam. Opera-
tions presently directed against this target, while qualitatively well con-
ceived are quantitatively too small in numbers of personnel and striking
force available to accomplish more than a small part of the job to be doneo
.Operations against North Vietnam are also still small quantitatively, and
their expansion can only be obtained by extensive and costly efforts.
A subject eminently related to the improvement of Vietnamese intelligence
collection and covert action operations is the availability of trained and
experienced personnel.
This deficiency can be overcame in part by training of Vietnamese.
Available trained and experienced personnel can also be augmented by the use
of third country nationals. Some of these are:
MT SECRET
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
It is recommended that:
DP86600269R000200030001-5
1. Discussions be undertaken with President Diem concerning the
validity of present Vietnamese intelligence and recommendations be made
to President Diem as follows:
a. The CIO be specifically empowered to receive and collate
intelligence from all Vietnamese intelligence services, to evaluate
any intelligence operation or source and to levy requirements on the
intelligence services.
b. That General La of NPSS be replaced by a more professionally
qualified intelligence officer.
c. Concurrently with the replacement of General La, an expansion
of the NPSS Special Police be undertaken to provide critical counter sub-
versive information.
2. The U.S. expand efforts to secure better intelligence by the use
of its technical advantage through:
a. Continuing the current Radio Direction Finding effort.
b. Establishing a USAF photo collection and interpretation activ-
ity in Vietnam as proposed by 13th A.F.
c. Augmenting the evaluation center in Saigon by the assignment
of additional U.S. intelligence personnel with the specific responsibility
of providing collated studies of all source information.
3. Representations be made to the Vietnamese Government:
a. To adopt the plan for establishment of the Clandestine Action
Service as proposed by CIA.
Approved For Release 2005/06 p c B00269R000200030001-5
18
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86600269R000200030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86600269R000200030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86600269R000200030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86600269R000200030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86600269R000200030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86600269R000200030001-5
UNCLASSIFIED when blank ?TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document ? Automatically downgraded
to SECRET when 911Pproivesirifog &douse Skfit5Allega1letll 86600269R000200030001-5
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White Housed:km -7,.... A
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173059
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DOC. DATE 3 Nov 61
7 Nov 61
COPY NO. #18
LOG rn BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 169t
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or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
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