BRIEFING FOR PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ON SOVIET GUIDED MISSILES AND RELATED SOVIET CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

" Briefing for Preparedness investigating
Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee
of the Senate on Soviet Guided Missiles and Relate
Soviet Capabilities. "
ILLEGIB
TIM
I Eli' MOW
t
LILLEGf
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Copy provided to OLC for Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence user
6 August 1976
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
2 December 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Colonel Robert Cushman
Office of the Vice President
Bob:
Attached is copy #16
of the Director's briefing for the
Preparedness Investigating
Sub-Committee of the Senate. It
should be noted that the questions
and answers in connection with this
briefing are not included since we
have just received a transcript from
the Committee.
Ex ive 01.11cer
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dtd 26-27 Nov 1957
"Briefing for Preparedness investigating
Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee
of the Senate on Soviet Guided Missiles &
Related Soviet Capabilities. "
Distribution: 30 Nov 57
#1- Gen. Goodpaster, White House
#2 & 3- Mr. Hugh Cumming, State
#4& 5- Lt. Gen. A. P. Fox, Spec. Asst OSD
#6- Gen. Twining, C/JCS
#7 & 8- Maj. Gen. R. H. Wienecke, ACSI Army
#9 & 10- M/Gen Millard Lewis, ACSI, Air
#11 & 12- B/Gen. Richard Collins, DDI, JS.
#13 & 14- R. Adm. Laurance Frost, Navy Intell.
#15- Leg. Counsel
#16- Robert Cushman, O/Vice Pres.
#17- OSI/Scoville
#18- Tracy Barnes
#19- ONE/Stoertz,
#20 - 27 - Gen. Lewis, USAF.
#28- W. P. Rodgers, Atty Gen.
#29- Bryce N. Harlow, White House
#30- ER File
#31- White House, Disarmament Comm.
#32-40- Legislative Counsel.
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BRIEFING FOR PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
ON
SOVIET GUIDED MISSILES AND RELATED SOVIET CAPABILITIES
Presented by the Director of Central Intelligence and by
Dr. Herbert Scoville,Assistant Director. for Scientific
Intelligence, C. I. A., on 26 and 27 November 1957.
INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this presentation is to furnish an
analysis of our current assessments of Soviet guided missiles
capabilities and intentions and to review some of the basic
economic and scientific factors which underlie Soviet tech-
nological strength. In addition, current estimates of Soviet
bomber and submarine strengths will also be reviewed. The
majority of this material will be based on the US intel-
ligence community's latest National Intelligence Estimates.
Where recent intelligence developments have overtaken our com-
munity estimative process, I will so indicate and give you the
current status of our intelligence assessments.
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2. The intelligence community includes the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State,'Army, Navy and Air
Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The C.I.A. has the coordinating responsibility in the field of
national intelligence.
3. Today, I myself will cover the general industrial and
scientific capabilities of the Soviet Union and give a general
summary of the Soviet guided missile program. Dr. Scoville,
head of the Office of Scientific Intelligence in the C.I.A.,
will cover the details of the Soviet missiles program, and there
will be a brief review of Soviet bomber and submarine forces.
GENERAL ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
4. The Soviet economy, though much smaller than that of
the USA, has been growing faster than the US, and Soviet
production of military goods and services is roughly equal
to that of the US. This is due to the high priority accorded
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by Soviet leaders to heavy industry and to military produc-
tion--as instruments of national power. A major difference
between the two economies has been the far greater extent to
which US resources are allocated to consumption.
5. The US retains a significant lead in terms of the
greater size of its economy. However, Soviet Gross National
Product (GNP) has been growing at a rate of 7 percent annually.
This was double the US rate of 3,5 percent annually. As a re-
sult, in dollar terms:
In 1950 Soviet GNP was 32 percent of that of the US
In 1956 it was 40 percent of that of the US
In 1962 we estimate Soviet GNP will be 45 percent of the
US, given presently forecast slower rates of Soviet
growth.
6e As to the Soviet allocation of available resources as
compared with that of the US: --In 1956, with the equivalent of
40 percent of our resources in dollar terms:
Pt6
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Soviet consumption was 25 percent of US consumption,
Soviet investment was 55-60 percent. of US investment,
Soviet production of military goods and services was
roughly the same magnitude as US defense production.
7. We have estimated that in 1957 Soviet defense expendi-
tures are about 15 percent of GNP in terms of rubles. The com-
parable US figure is 9 percent of GNP in terms of dollars. Yet
I wish to repeat that, despite our larger economy, the Soviets
produce military goods and services with a dollar value roughly
the same as the US. This is because: (a) in the USSR, military
goods are less expensive than ours, relative to consumer goods,
(b) the average level of real pay and subsistence for Soviet
military personnel is much lower than in the US, and (c) produc-
tion for direct or indirect military purposes is from the most
efficient sector of the Soviet economy.
8. If our estimate of military trends is correct, Soviet
defense expenditures will increase gradually, reaching in 1962
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a level 25 to 30 percent greater than at present, but consum-
ing no greater proportion of GNP than at present. Most of this
increase in defense expenditures will be in increased alloca-
tions to development and production of modern weapons systems.
9. The USSR is encountering growing difficulties in main-
taining high levels of military expenditures and of investment
in heavy industry. There are many reasons for these growing
difficulties: One is that since Hungary more attention has had
to be paid to consumer needs. Better living standards are being
sought to stimulate higher productivity and to remove the stigma
of poverty from Communism.
10. Greater priority is now focused on agriculture and
housing. The major agricultural target is to reach American
levels of per capita production of milk and meat. While these
goals cannot be met, agricultural production,which had been
lagging, for many years, is now to be stepped up so as to in-
crease faster than population.
D
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11. One difficulty being encountered by the USSR is the
fact that for the near future the labor force will not grow as
rapidly as before. This is especially true in the next five
years as war-reduced age groups move into employment. Further,
a greater share of investment must be directed to programs which
do not provide immediately high returns in terms of additional
production. These programs include expansion of the fuels and
raw materials, where there has been a chronic lag in terms of
the requirements for continued rapid growth.
12. Soviet leadership has attempted to deal with these
problems by stressing greater efficiency, both of workers and
of management. This has been behind the recent reorganization
in the administration of the economy. There is room in the
Soviet economy for gains in labor productivity and for better
management. We believe the USSR will realize some of these
gains. However, the impetus to growth obtained in this way
will not entirely offset limitations in the labor supply and
the higher cost of investments.
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13. Consequently, the rate of growth of the Soviet economy
is slowing down. The burden of maintaining high defense expendi-
tures, high investment in industry, and still improving the lot
of the consumer has been recognized by some Soviet leaders. They
superseded the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) by a seven-year
plan for 1959-65. The problem of competing priorities, however,
is certain to cause continuing difficulty. Further retrench-
ments may have to be made, but we do not believe that these
retrenchments will be at the expense of Soviet defense programs.
Even at somewhat reduced rates of growth, the Soviet economy
from its lower base will probably continue to grow faster than
that of the US.
GENERAL SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
14. Soviet policy on science and technology is based upon
a determination to accelerate the growth of the material and
political strength of the Soviet Union with the specific aim
of overtaking and surpassing the United States in both respects.
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The Soviet regime has considerable insight into the potentiali-
ties of science as an accelerator of technological progress and
has accepted as axiomatic that generous support of both funda-
mental and applied science will lead to increased national
strength.
15. The Soviet science program continues to be fed by the
Soviet educational system, which is now outstripping that of the
US in developing a scientific-technical manpower pool. You will
hear of the Soviet education system from others. I should like
to stress a few points which I consider fundamental to an under-
standing of their impressive surge in many fields of science.
Every Soviet student by the time he finishes high school has
had to take five years of physics, five years of biology, four
years of chemistry, and ten years of mathematics. These are
not electives - they are required subjects. This broad exposure
to science during the formative years is an important contribut-
ing factor in the aptitude that Soviet young people display in
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science. (Sounded a public note of warning on this subject
2 1/2 years ago.)
16. After high school the better Soviet students enter
higher educational institutions. Those with greatest apti-
tude are channeled into science courses generally in some
relation to the Soviet need for certain skills by inducement
in the form of propaganda, monetary inducements, prestige, or
even the threat of the draft.
17. By systematic efforts, going back 20 years or more,
the Soviet Union has now a total of 1.5 million college graduates
trained and currently employed in scientific and technical fields.
In the US,, there are now 1.3 million similarly trained and
employed. In the year 1957, the Soviet Union added 140,000
graduates in science and engineering, compared to only 10.0,000
in the US. Our rate of growth is thus appreciably lower and
unless this trend can be reversed, which would be very difficult,
if not impossible, within the next five years, the US. will be
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placed in an increasingly unfavorable technological position
vis-a-vis the Soviets.
18, As in the United States, scientific research in the
Soviet Union is mostly in applied sciences. However, the im-
portance of adequate fundamental research in the Soviet Union
is well understood, and such work has been well supported. For
example, the Academies of Sciences of the USSR and of the Union
Republics, which employ about one tenth of the country's
scientists, including many of world scientific prominence,
concentrate on fundamental scientific problems. Great universi-
ties such as those of Moscow, Leningrad,and Kiev also conduct
fundamental research. The Soviets have attached major value
to fundamental science as a prestige element both at home and
abroad.
19. Specific fields in which the Soviets have extensive
and high quality fundamental scientific programs include
mathematics, theoretical physics, high energy physics,. solid
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state and low temperature physics, and geophysics. The Soviet
Union has a very extensive and high-quality program in connec-
tion with the International Geophysical Year (IGY),
20, Currently, Soviet science is undergoing organizational
changes in accordance with the law on economic reorganization
adopted in May 1957. An objective of these changes is to achieve
a well-balanced research effort as well as to increase still
further that effort. An attempt will be made during the next
five to ten years to guide fundamental research as much as pos-
sible into fields which may be expected to lead ultimately to
application, although pure research of no foreseeable applica-
tion will not be excluded. The changes being made are expected
to result in an even stronger fundamental science program than
has existed in the past.
21. In summary, all evidence suggests that the Soviets have
realized the importance of science and research to their military
and economic future. Also, in their development of highly skilled
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technicians, they are taking into account not only their own
economy but supplying a large reservoir of skilled technicians
which they can send as advisers to support their economic,in-
dustrial, and scientific programs of penetrations in the under-
developed areas, They have approached the field of technological
development with the attitude that this is a race against the US
which they are determined to win. That such rapid changes in rel-
ative technological strength are possible was demonstrated in
the thirties when, in a space of 10-15 years, the US moved from
a position of scientific inferiority to one of overwhelming
dominance in relation to Western Europe. The Soviets will en-
deavor to duplicate this feat vis-a-vis the US.
GUIDED MISSILES
22. The Soviet Union had no known guided missile program
at the close of World War II but there can be no doubt of their
great postwar interest in guided missiles. Situated as they are,
they must view the ICBM as an ideal weapon. Immediately after
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World War II, they thoroughly and systematically exploited the
German guided missile program. From this exploitation, the
Soviets derived four general benefits: (a) operational and
prototype missiles, with ranges up to 200 miles in the ballistic
field, research and production facilities and equipment, and
approximately 400 German missile specialists; (we got some
specialists) (b) complete reports on German missile developments
up to the war's end; (c) the familiarization of their personnel
with German techniques of research, development, testing, and
production of missiles and components, and (d) advanced tech-
nical studies and some development of hardwarl components, which
German scientists performed in the Soviet Union to as late as
about 1953.
23. As a result, the Soviet Union was able by 1948 to raise
its guided missile knowledge to that which existed in Germany
at the close of World War II. We believe that 1948 marks the
beginning of a concerted and continuing native Soviet missile
research and development program.
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24. This native Soviet effort is of great scope. Vigorous
postwar scientific training programs have contributed large num-
bers of well-qualified scientists and engineers. Two test ranges
with multiple launching platforms and with facilities for a great
variety of testing and other developmental work have been estab-
lished and are operating at a high pitch. In the shorter ranges, 25X1
at least 300 ballistic missiles have already been test fired
The effort is largely con-
centrated on ballistic missiles but other categories have not
been neglected as will be brought out later.
25. This extensive ballistic missile flight testing in-
dicates an orderly, well-conceived,and vigorously prosecuted
program from which they have acquired a large amount of experi-
ence - experience which has aided them tremendously and will
continue to be vital to the success of their earth satellite
and ICBM programs and, of course, to their military deployment
of missile systems.
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26. The industrial base and industrial experience in the
Soviet Union can support series production of the missile systems
which the scientists and engineers develop. There is one excep-
tion to this picture of great industrial strength as related to
guided missiles and that lies in the field of electronics. We
believe that, in view of competing demands, a limited availability
of electronic equipment will seriously restrict the extent and
variety of Soviet guided missile production, particularly in the
mass-produced air defense missile categories, until about 1958.
Thereafter, expanding electronic production will probably make
this restriction much less severe.
27. The Soviet atomic energy program is progressing to the
point where suitable nuclear warheads will doubtless be developed
for missiles as required, though the availability of fissionable
material will impose some limitations on the extent of Soviet
nuclear warhead production between now and 1966. Production
of warheads for ICBMs will not suffer, however, if sufficient
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priority is given to such warheads - which we believe will be
the case.
28. Now, before we get down to the details,I should like
to say a few words about how we make our estimates. As you well
know, an effective security surrounds the entire Soviet military
complex, and particularly around sensitive areas such as their
guided missile program. While we have much hard evidence, we are
seriously hampered in gathering intelligence about the details of
specific missile systems. Therefore, in order to estimate par-
ticular capabilities in a field where positive intelligence is
limited, we are forced to develop our estimates from: (a) all
available evidence of Soviet missile activity, including their
exploitation of German missile specialists and personnel; (b)
general knowledge of the state of the art in the missile field,
both in the Soviet Union and the US; and (c) known and estimated
Soviet capabilities in related fields. Since it is likewise
difficult to determine the scope of the Soviet missile program,
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we make an estimate of this on the basis of probable Soviet
military requirements for missiles in relation to other mili-
tary weapons systems.
29. The dates of availability of various missiles that you
will be given this afternoon are the earliest probable years
during which a limited number of missiles could have been serially
produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of one op-
erational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for opera-
tional employment. It should be noted that an additional period
of time, varying from a few months to several years depending on
the missile system, would be required before we are faced with a
major threat in terms of actual employment in a general war.
Our current estimates are also based on the judgment that the
Soviet Union does not now intend to initiate general war
deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of a
particular date.
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30. Lastly, in viewing the Soviet missile program, it is
important not to overlook the other elements of their military
strengths - aircraft, naval forces, etc., or the possibility
that the Soviets might desire to direct our attention so ex-
clusively to military, missile, and nuclear matters that we
would overlook their techniques of infiltration, subversion,
and economic penetration. These latter today are their chief
weapons in attempting to advance Soviet domination, particularly
in what we call the undeveloped areas of the world, and in the
former colonial areas.
And now, Dr. Scoville will present our detailed estimate
of Soviet guided missile capabilities.
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have been flight-tested at Kapustin Yar.
OFFENSIVE MISSILE CAPABILITIES
A. Ballistic Missiles
31, The USSR has been engaged in an extensive ballistic
missile research and development program. In 1947, a guided
missile test range was established at Kapustin Yar (See Chart),
and the Soviets, with German assistance, fired about 12 captured
V-2 missiles in the fall of that year. Our evidence now indicates
that a ballistic missile development program has been vigorously
pursued since this date.
32. Since mid-1953, at least 300 ballistic missiles
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34. Our current estimates on the shorter-range ballistic
missiles are as follows:
a. We estimate that the USSR could now have in operational
use, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with maximum ranges
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of 75, 200, 350, and 700 nautical miles, respectively. We
have, however, no firm evidence of the operational deployment
of any of these missiles.
b. We estimate that a ballistic missile of about 1,000-
nautical-miles nominal range could be available for operational
use in 1958.
Our current belief is that
the USSR is probably temporarily satisfied with a 1,000 nautical
mile ballistic missile as their "IRBM" and is placing top
priority on achieving an operational ICBM.
35. Soviet ICBM and earth satellite activities have been
the subject of much attention and our greatest concern during
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the past few months. Although the earth satellite is not
presently a military weapon, Soviet activities in this field
are extremely important for acquiring basic scientific data
and for their propaganda value. Additionally, they provide us
with indications of the developmental status of the Soviet ICBM.
Today, I an considering the Soviet satellite program only in its
relation to the ICBM program. The term ICBM as used herein does
not connote a specific range, but does mean a range of 3,500
nautical miles or more, which is required to cover most targets
in the US from bases in the USSR.
However, we have estimated for several years that an ICBM was
probably a top-priority aim of the Soviet Union. A summary of
evidence bearing on the ICBM question follows:
a. Soviet interest in. the ICBM field has been evident
since 1947 when Stalin stated that he wanted a weapon which
could bombard New York.
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b. In 1951 a large rocket engine of about 220,000
pounds thrust was being fabricated. This engine could have
been static tested in 1952 and ready for incorporation into a
missile system in 1953. The thrust rating of this engine
could have been increased by now and the coupling of two
or more such engines is within Soviet capabilities, although
we have no evidence that either advancement has been accomplished.
c. The existence of a new 3,500-nautical-mile ballistic
missile test range has been firmly established. (See Chart).
We believe that two ICBM vehicles have been flight tested on
this range and that both Soviet satellites have been launched
from here. The official Soviet announcement on 26 August of the
successful test firing of an ICBM,'and Mr. Khrushchev's state-
I
nessed the successful trial of the second Soviet ICBM on 7
September are further support of the two ICBM vehicle flight
tests. The two satellites are conspicuous to the world; the
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that he (Khrushchev) had personally wit-
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first was orbited on 4 October with a reported weight of 185
pounds, and the second was orbited on 3 November with a reported
weight of 1,120. pounds. At present, we do not doubt the reported
weights or that a dog is carried in "Sputnik" number two.
d. Numerous public Soviet statements, official and un-
official, have been made in recent weeks regarding their ICBM
and earth satellite activities and capabilities. Although
these statements are too numerous to include, each is carefully
evaluated in terms of our related evidence. I might say that
the majority are aimed at reaping the maximum propaganda gain
from their two satellite achievements.
37. An understanding of the relationship between the
Soviet ICBM and earth satellite program is necessary to a full
appreciation of Soviet ICBM capabilities. Our evidence clearly
indicates that the Soviet earth satellite program is based upon
usage of reliable military missile hardware. We believe that
the Soviet earth satellite program developed concurrently with
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and was superimposed upon their ICBM program and that both
programs are being prosecuted at extremely high priority -
if not actually on a "crash" basis. We estimate that at least
the first two stages of the launching vehicles for the two
satellites were essentially the same and, further, that
the first and second stages of the satellite launching vehicle
are essentially the corresponding stages of their announced
"ICBM.'.' From known or estimated parameters, we can make
extrapolations from their satellites to their ICBMs:
a. Propulsion: A single, 220,000-pound-thrust engine
with a second stage could have orbited Sputnik I; a three
stage vehicle would have been required for Sputnik II. Such
a system could be used to send a 2,000-lb. warhead about
4,000 miles. By coupling two 220,000-pound-thrust engines
as the first stage, both Sputnik I and II could have been easily
orbited as far as the first-stage thrust requirements is con-
cerned. This system could send a 2,000-lb. warhead 5-6,000
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miles. We do not know whether a single or double engine was
used in the first stage of their ICBM vehicle flight tests
or their earth satellites.
b. Guidance: Guidance errors permissible in orbiting a
satellite would not be acceptable for guidance of an effective
ICBM. Thus, while it is obvious that the Soviets can place
a satellite into an elliptical orbit, this does not of itself
indicate an acceptable guidance capability for an ICBM.
C. The present satellites do not provide us any evidence
of Soviet success on the ICBM re-entry problem.
d. We do not believe their earth satellite program will
interfere with their ICBM programs; rather, it will probably
provide valuable test data thereto.
38. With this brief background on the relationship
between the Soviet earth satellite and ICBM programs and bearing
in mind the extensive Soviet ballistic missile experience factor
mentioned earlier, I will now turn to our current assessment
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of Soviet ICBM capabilities. We have much data which take
time to analyze and we have not yet completed the resolution
of differences of interpretation of these data. As of today,
the estimates of the date at which the Soviets will have the
first operational ICBM capability vary between 1958 and some-
time in 1960. This missile could deliver a 2,000-pound,high-
yield nuclear warhead with an accuracy (CEP) of 5 nautical
miles at a range estimated between 3,800 and 5,500 nautical
miles, depending on the propulsion system used in the first
stage. The significance of this threat to the US is indicated
on this Chart (See Chart). I should like to emphasize, however,
that we have no firm evidence of construction of bases for
launching ICBMs or of their deployment.
39. The dates by which the USSR could have significant
numbers of ICBMs available for operational use are dependent
on a number of factors and the best we can do now is to give an
estimated range. We would assume that before going into
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production,a considerable number of test vehicles would be
fired. Of course in a field like this where perfection always
lies ahead,the time during a test period when one goes into
production depends upon the absolute urgency of the particu-
lar program. You can cut off at various stages during the
testing period if you are willing to compromise on a weapon
which has reasonable operational proficiency, but which at
the same time falls short of the optimum desired.
The intelligence community is not as yet in agreement
as to the probable dates when the USSR will have varying amounts
of ICBMs and the dates and amounts given below cover time spans
embracing the varying estimates and are examples, rather than
firm estimates, as it is possible that the USSR itself is today
adjusting its time schedules. With these reservations, we
state our belief that:
a. The Soviets could have an initial operational
capability (ten ICBMs - prototype) between the latter half of
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1958 and early 1960; and assuming the foregoing,
b. one hundred ICBMs could be available for operational
use between the middle of 1959 anu late 1960 and
c. five hundred ICBMs could be available for operational
use between the middle of 1960 and 1962.
CIA at the present time believes that the earlier dates are
the more likely but the whole projlem is under urgent review
at this moment.
B. Cruise-type Missiles
40. We believe the Soviet surface-to-surface missile
program also includes submarine launched missiles. Although
we have very little direct evidence of Soviet activities, in
this field. Khrushchev has repeatedly mentioned this type.
Such a weapons system would pose a very serious threat to the
US and our overseas bases, and as such is estimated to be a
Soviet military requirement. We estimate that the USSR could
now have supersonic cruise-type missiles capable of maximum
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ranges of about 500 nautical miles and that in 1962 a supersonic
cruise-type missile of up to 1,000 nautical miles range could
probably become available for operational use. We further
estimate that these systems would be augmented or replaced
by submarine launched ballistic missiles of intermediate
range in the period 1964-66. Each of these missiles could
carry high-yield nuclear warheads.
41. In the air-to-surface missile category, we have
firm evidence of Soviet interest in and development of such
a missile system. In 1955 the USSR could probably have had
a 20-nautical--mile subsonic air-to-surface missile available
for operational use. A 55-nautical-mile subsonic-missile could
now be available and a 55-nautical-mile supersonic missile
could probably be available in 1958. These missiles, designed
primarily as antiship weapons, could also be employed against
isolated and well defined radar targets on land. In 1961,
a 100-nautical-mile supersonic missile could probably be
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evidence of Soviet air-to-air missile activities. Our efforts
to improve our knowledge in this area have continued at high
priority.
We estimate that, for improving the effectiveness of its inter-
ceptors, the USSR could now have available a short range (2-3
nautical miles) air-to-air missile equipped with high explosive
warheads capable of tail-cone attacks in good weather. We
believe that they could also now have a 5-nautical-mile all-
weather missile. A 15-20 nautical mile all-weather
missile capable of employing a nuclear warhead could be available
in 1960.
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of critical areas, and with low and high altitude capabilities
for defense of static targets, field forces, and naval vessels,
could probably become available for operational deployment.
Sometime between 1963 and 1966, the USSR could probably have
in operation a surface-to-air system of some capability
against the ICBM.
44. We estimate that series production of surface-to-air
guided missiles is now under way in the USSR, and that such
missiles will probably be produced in large quantities. (A
Soviet surface-to-air missile resembling our Nike AJAX was
observed in the recent Moscow parade.) Nuclear warheads
could now be incorporated into a limited number of surface-to-
air missiles. We estimate that some percentage of surface-
to-air missiles will be so equipped between now and 1966.
45,
we have practically no
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available for employment by heavy bombers. Each of these missile
types could employ nuclear warheads.
Nuclear Tests and Warheads (oral presentation from charts)
DEFENSIVE MISSILE CAPABILITIES
A. Surface-to-Air Missiles
42. We estimate that surface-to-air missile systems have
had one of the highest priorities among Soviet missile pro-
grams. At Moscow, an extensive system of surface-to-air
missile sites has been constructed, and all sites are probably
now operational (See Chart). Similar installations appear to
be under construction around Leningrad. This surface-to-air
missile system can probably direct a very high rate of fire
against multiple targets at maximum altitudes of about 60,000
feet and maximum horizontal ranges of about 25 nautical miles.
43. During the period 1958-1961, surface-to-air systems
with increased range and altitude capabilities for static defense
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SOVIET LONG-RANGE BOMBER
AND
SUBMARINE FORCES
Long-Range Bomber Force
46. The USSR started almost from scratch at the end of
World War II, during which it had no real strategic bombing
force, and has since built up a force of at least 1,500 long-
range bombers, with necessary supporting facilities. In form-
ing a first nucleus for this force, the USSR took advantage
of our B-29 design, copying it in the BULL medium bomber.
(The term BULL, incidentally, like the other aircraft desig-
nations I will refer to, is a nickname used by US intelligence
for convenience: the Soviets call their version of the B-29
the TU-4). BULLS were produced in large numbers - peak Soviet
operational strength in BULIs was between 1,100 and 1,200 in
1954 and early 1955.
47. While BULL strength was being built up, Soviet de-
signers were working on native long-range bombers in both
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the medium and heavy categories. (This chart shows the
results of their work.) By 1954 they had developed and
began to have in operational units the BADGER jet medium
bomber, approximately equivalent in performance to our B-47.
As BADGERs began to enter service, a gradual phase-out of
the BULL was begun. By 1955 they had developed and began to
have in operational units two different heavy bomber types,
the BISON jet heavy bomber, approximately equivalent to our
B-57 and the BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber. (The chart gives
our estimates of some key performance characteristics of these
newer bombers. These estimates are at present under review
in the light of accumulating evidence. It is probable that
there will be some downward revision in estimated perform-
ances,at least with regard to the speed and altitude capa-
bilities of the BISON.)
48. With regard to capabilities to attack targets in
the continental US -- in general terms, the BADGER with a
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10,000-lb. bombload can reach most such targets on one-way
missions from staging bases in the Soviet Arctic. Inflight
refueling would increase BADGER capabilities against US tar-
gets, but would still offer little prospect of return to the
USSR. However, the BISON, launched from Arctic staging bases,
could reach some US targets on unrefueled two-way missions,
and could reach considerably more of such targets if refueled
en route. The BEAR, with its greater range capabilities,
could reach virtually all US targets on two-way, unrefueled
missions from staging bases, and with inflight refueling
could accomplish the same missions from bases well inside
the USSR.
49. Soviet Long Range Aviation, as of mid-1957, includes
at least 1,500 bombers, of which we estimate about 550 are
BULLS, about 850 are BADGERS, and at least 90 (possibly as
many as 150) are BISON and BEAR heavy bombers. We have just
completed an estimate on the Soviet long-range bomber force,
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in which we devoted special attention to a thorough re-
view of all the evidence on the heavy bomber program, as
of mid-1957. Good evidence indicates that a minimum of
about 90 heavy bombers (BISONs plus BEARS) are now avail-
able for operational units, and the majority view in the
intelligence community is that this is likely to be the ac-
tual strength. Beyond this point of good evidence, however,
there is an area of considerable uncertainty, and there is
some evidence suggesting that operational heavy bomber
strength may be as much as 150 aircraft.
50. In either event, the Soviet heavy bomber program
has again fallen somewhat behind our projections of the pre-
vious year. This is true of at least BEAR production, and,
if the lower figure is the more accurate one, of BISON pro-
duction as well. On the other hand, BADGER production has
somewhat exceeded our expectations. While we are still
checking to determine the amount of short-fall in heavy
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bombers, and the reasons for it, it does seem that the
strenuous Soviet efforts to get heavy bombers into produc-
tion, in the period up until 1955, have not been confirmed
in the past year or so.
51. The explanation may be in part in the field of
technical problems. For example, it is possible that larger-
scale production has been delayed pending the availability
of higher-thrust engines or other developments expected to
improve performance characteristics. But there is also
serious question regarding Soviet intentions in the heavy
bomber field. Soviet planners are aware, of course, that
they already have a strong medium bomber force which they
could employ in case of need. They also probably have great
confidence that advanced weapons systems, including ICBM's,
will become available to them in the relatively near future.
In this connection, we have noted statements of Khrushchev
and others, stressing the view that the manned aircraft is
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declining in importance as contrasted with guided missiles.
Such statements have been publicized extensively in the So-
viet press, and may in part be intended to cover up for de-
lays in heavy bomber production or to pave the way for a
de-emphasis in the bomber program. However, they are also
clearly part of an effort to take maximum propaganda advan-
tage of Soviet successes in the missile and earth satellite
field, and are probably also a deliberate effort to degrade
the capabilities of present US retaliatory forces in the eyes
of the Soviet people and the Western world.
52. While long-term Soviet policy with regard to heavy
bombers is thus in doubt, on balance we believe the USSR will
retain a strong,long-range,manned bomber force (I am here re-
ferring to both medium and heavy bombers), at least until
new weapon systems are proved and a substantial capability
has been acquired.
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53. In any event, Long Range Aviation is the major
current threat, and its capabilities are still increasing.
Specifically, heavy bombers are in production, and medium
bombers are being produced at a rapid rate. The total force
has increased by at least 200 bombers in the past year. An
inflight refueling capability has been developed, apparently
using convertible tanker-bomber versions of the BISON and
BADGER, and we believe it is in at least limited use by op-
erational BISON units.
Submarine Force
54. Dr. Scoville has described Soviet capabilities in
the field of cruise-type missiles suitable for launching by
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submarines. The USSR has a large force of submarines avail-
able for modification or conversion to guided-missile use, and
could already have suitably modified submarines in operation.
55. Through a postwar building program unprecedented in
peacetime history, the USSR has built a submarine force which
(as of mid-1957) numbers approximately 475 boats. This strength,
incidentally, is more than eight times the submarine strength
with which Germany entered World War II, and is greater than
Germany's peak sub strength in May 1943. About 250, or more
than half, the USSR's subs are snorkel-equipped, long-range
units of postwar design and construction.
56. Soviet subs are deployed in the four major fleet
areas - Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific, and Northern. We are par-
ticularly interested in the large concentration of 115 long-
range subs in the Northern Fleet area. This area has unre-
stricted access to open seas; its waters are normally navig-
able the year round.
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57. We noted with interest Khrushchev's statement, in
1955, that "a submarine equipped with guided missiles is the
most suitable naval weapon, and its development will be em-
phasized by the Soviet navy." Any of the present Soviet long-
range submarine types could be equipped to carry one or two
cruise-type missiles in topside stowage, and as an interim
measure, the USSR would probably equip them in much the same
manner as those of the US Navy - with storage housings and
launching ramps on deck. We have not yet confirmed the ex-
istence of such Soviet submarines, but we have received re-
ports from widely separated areas describing subs with sus-
picious looking topside installations. The USSR could also
construct nuclear-or conventional-powered submarines, about
the size of their present long-range boats, to accommodate up
to four cruise-type missiles internally.
58. In this connection, we have recently become aware
of a significant change in the Soviet submarine construction
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program. It now appears that construction of conventional
long-range submarines has been sharply curtailed this year.
This, we believe, probably signals the termination of this
program and a shift to the construction of new types, prob-
ably including nuclear-powered and guided missile launch-
ing designs.
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