REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE SECURITY RESOURCES PANEL OF THE ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300020003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 7, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy provided to OLC for Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence use$
6 August 1976
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P?'r #4 17
NSC 57211
November 7, 1957
COPY NO. 43
NATIONAL SECM J-D
ITY COUN I L~
REPORT `I0 THE PR SIDENT
by the
SECURITY RESOURCES PANEL
of the
?ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY CONMITTI'EE
CLEARED
FQR OPEN PUBLICATION
7172 17
Pj' ECTORATE Hi SECUriITY REVIEW (OAQp (t Cl p 7
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NOTE BY TILL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
' to the
NATIONAL SECUI2M COUNCIL
on
DXT PRE~TCE AND C'U1WIV_ L IN TILL NUCLEAR AGE
Refercrccs: ? A. I,JSC 5403
D. NsC 56o6
C. NSC Actions Nos. 1642, 1691, 1`x60, 1776 and 1811
D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:
"Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958",
dated January 3, 1957
E. NSC 5709
F. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:
"A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense",
dated July 2 and August Ill., 1957
G. Report by CIA, subject: "Current Appraisal of .
the Civil Defense Shelter Program in the USSR",
dated No reraber 5, 1957
V
H. NSC Action No. 183.4
The enclosed Report to the President on the subject, prepared by the
Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee pursuant to
NSC Action No. 1691-b-(2), is transmitted herewith for consideration by
the National Security Council. -
The National Security Council noted and discussed an oral presenta-
tion of the enclosed Report at its_343rd meeting today. Further Council
action on the enclosed Report will be as specified in the Record of Actions
of the 343rd. Council meeting (NSC Action No. 181)1.).
It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the
handling of this Report, and that access to it be limited on a strict
need- basis.
JAMS S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treacury
The Attorney General V
The Director, Bureau of the Budget V
The Chair man, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to I -Tic President for Disarmament
The Federal Civil DefenseVAdministrator .
The Director, U. S. Information Agency
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
`. is Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
.
The Director of Central Intelligence
T e Chain:ian, Inter departmental. Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
NCC 57211- TOPs!!CRET
SI.'ECTAL EM.liIJVI:G
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DETERRENCE- & SURVIVAL
in the
NUCLEAR AGE
SECURI'T`Y RESOURCES PANEL
of the
SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Washington - Novcmber 7, 1957
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
... November 7, 1957
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
bear Mr. President:
We have the privilege of transmitting to the National Security Council, through the
Honorable Gordon Gray and the NSC Planning Board, the Report of the ODM-Security
Resources Panel. This Panel was established by the Science Advisory Committee
pursuant to NSC Action 1691-b(2), April 4, 1957.
Formation of the Panel began in May, under the able leadership of Mr. H. Rowan
Gaither, Jr., who, regrettably, had to withdraw in September* from further active
direction of the undertaking for reason of health; but not before the study program
was completely organized and the Panel was well under way In carrying out its
responsibilities.
The make-up and organization of the Panel is shown }n Appendix G, attached.
Including advisors and staff, more than ninety persons of widely varying specialties
and experiences participated in its work. Although the membership includes com-
petent scientists and engineers-many with extensive familiarity with military
technology-it was early decided that the Panel would not try for invention but,
rather, would concentrate on the many studies undertaken by large and experienced
groups, within our area of interest, both within and outside the military, and to try
to relate them to our assignment.
Not only have these studies been carefully examined, but our working groups have
spent considerable time with many of the participants in them, the better to under-
stand the basic assumptions on which they were predicated and the methodology
Involved in the more import.a;-," and pertinent war gamings.
*Mr. Gaither recently rejoined the study as a member of the Advisory Panel.
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Special members of our Pancl have received authorized access to particularly
sensitive studies and Jntc))il;encc information, and the implications of these have
influenced our final jucit;~-irnts.
Our membership ha.,; had complete cooperation from and full opportunity to
question civilian and ofllrcr personnel of the Departrner,t of Defense, the Office of
Defense Mobilization, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Civil Defense
Administration, the Treastury, the Bureau of the Budget, and other departments and
agencies of the Government.
Thus the Panel, in the preparation of this report, has benefitted from information
sources of extreme scope and depth; and the membership, in full and vigorous analysis
and discussion, has as:;c:,:;ed the implications of this knowledge and has directed its
findings to the problem confronting the Panel. However, the Steering Committee,
? which includes the Director, the Co-Director, and the heads of the four Working
Groups, have full responsibility for this Report.
We are grateful to the many who have worked and cooperated with us.
Respectfully submitted,
Steering Committee
Security Resources Panel
Robert C. Sprague, Director
William C. Foster, Co-Director
James P. Baxter Robert C. Prim
Robert D. Calkins Hector R. Skifter
John J. Corson William Webster
James A. Perkins Jerome B. Wiesner
Edward P. Oliver, Technical Advisor
Y
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Letter of Transmittal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Assignment .
II. Nature of the Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
A. Economic
B. Military
III. Broad-Brush Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 5
A. Measures to Secure and Augment Our Deterrent Power
B. Measures to Reduce Vulnerability of Our People and Cities
IV. Related Concerns . . . . . ... .
A. Improvement of Management of Defense Resources
B. Strategic Warning and Hard Intelligence.
C. Integration With U.S. ;i'oreign Policy
V. Costs and Economic Consequences
A. Costs
B. Feasibility
C. Economic Consequences
VI. Public Education and Political Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
VII. Deterrence and Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Time Table . . . . 15
B. Passive Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. Approximate Increased Costs of Defense Measures (1959-19G3) . 23
D. Projected Federal Receipts and Expenditures (1959-1963) . . . . 25
E. An Early Missile Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
F. Active Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
G. Organization and Poster of Security Resources Panel . . . . . . 30
Vii
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D E TERRI-NC { & SURVIVAL,
in the
NUCLEAR AGE
I. ASSIGNMENT
The Security Resources Panel was asked to study and form a broad-
brush opinion of the relative value of various active and passive measures to
protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking
into account probable new weapon systems; and to suggest which of the various
active and passive measures are likely to be most effective, in relation to their
costs. While fulfilling its assignment, the Panel was also asked to study the
deterrent value of our retaliatory forces, and the economic and political con-
sequences of any significant shift of emphasis or direction in defense programs.
The Panel has therefore examined active and passive defense measures
from two standpoints: their contribution to deterrence; and their protection
to the civil population if war should come by accident or design.
We have found no evidence in Russian foreign and military policy since
1945 to refute the conclusion that USSR intentions are expansionist, and that
her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of Soviet
defense. We have, therefore, weighed the relative military and economic
capabilities of the United States and the USSR in formulating our broad-brush
opinions, basing our findings on estimates of present and future Russian capa-
bilities furnished by the Intelligence community.
The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become
critical in 1959 or early 19G0. The evidence further suggests the urgency of
proper time-phasing of needed improvements in our military position vis-a-vis
Russia. A time table distinguishing four significant periods of relative mili-
tary strengths is given in detail in Appendix A.
II. NATURE OF THE THREAT
A. Econorn;c
The Gross National Product (GNP) of the USSR is now more than one-
third that of the United States and is increasing half again as fast. Even if
the Russian rate of growth should decline, because of increasing difficulties in
management and shortage of raw materials, and should drop by 1980 to half
its present rate, its GNP would be more then Half of ours as of that date. This
'f O P i HT
inn ' i
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FIG.I
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED CAPITAL & CONSUMER GOODS: 1956
CAPITAL GOODS
500 120 .100
i ..
5.8
COQ+SUMER GOODS
4.4
COAL
(MILLION MT)
MACHINE
TOOLS
(THOUSAND UNITS)
STEEL
(MiLL4ON MT)
AUTOS MOBILES V/ASH I NG REFRIGERATORS
(IAIUION UNITS) MACHINES (MILLION UNITS)
(} ILLION UNITS)
U. S.. AS MULTIPLE OF USSR
1.4 0.5 2.0 58 49 25
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FIG. 2
PAST AND PROJECTED RELATIOP+SHIP
BETWEEN U.S. AND U.S.S.R. MILITARY EFFORT
1950
N
FUTURE
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growling Russian economic strength is concentrated on the armed forces and
on investment in heavy industry, which this year account for the equivalent
of roughly $40 billion and $17 billion, respectively, in 1955 dollars. Adding
these two figures, we get an allocation of $57 billion per annum, which is
roughly equal to the combined figure for these two items in our country's
current effort. If the USSR continues to expand its military expenditures
throughout the next decade, as it has during the 1950's, and ours remains
constant, its annual military expenditures may be double ours, even allowing
for a gradual improvement of the low living' standards of the Russian peoples.
This extraordinary concentration of the Soviet economy on military power
and heavy industry, which is permitted, or perhaps forced, by their peculiar
political structure, makes available economic resources sufficient to finance
both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability and their
politico-economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, propaganda and
subversion, they seek to extend the Soviet orbit. (See Figs. 1 and 2.)
B. Military
The Soviet military threat lies not only in their present military capa-
bilities-formidable as they are-but also in the dynamic development and
exploitation of their military technology. Our demobilization after World
War II left them with a great superiority in ground forces, but they had no
counter in 1946 for our Strategic Air Force nor for our Navy. They had no
atomic bombs, no productive capacity for f..sionable materials, no jet engine
production, and only an infant electronics industry. This situation was com-
patible with a then-backward country, so much of whose most productive
areas had suffered military attack and occupation. Their industrial base was
then perhaps one-seventh that of the United States.
The singleness of purpose with which they have pressed their military-
centered industrial development has led to spectacular progress. They have
developed a spectrum of A- and H-bombs and produced fissionable material
sufficient for at least 1500 nuclear weapons. They created from scratch a long-
range air force with 1500 B-29 type bombers; they then substantially re-
equipped it with jet aircraft, while developing a short-range air force of 3000
jet bombers. In the field of ballistic missiles they have weapons of 700 n.m.
range, in production for at least a year; successfully tested a number of 950
n.m. missiles; and probably surpassed us in ICBM development. They have
developed air-to-surface and probably submarine-launched cruise missiles;
built 250 to 300 new long-range submarines and partially modernized 200
others.- They have created an air defense system composed of 1500 all-weather
and 8500 day jet fighters; equipped at least GO sites, each with 60 launchers,
for a total of over 3600 launching pads for surface-to-air missiles provided
with a sophisticated and original. guidance system and a ground environment
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of 4000 radars. At the same time, they have maintained and largely re-
equipped their army of 175 line divisions, while furnishing large quantities of
military equipment to their satellites and Red China.*
III. BROAD-BRUSH OPINIONS
The Panel has arrived at the following broad-brush opinions as to the-
present situation:
A. In case of a nuclear attack against the continental United States:
1. Active defense programs now in being and programmed for the
future will not give adequate assurance of protection to the civil popula-
tion. If the attack were at low altitude, or at high altitude with elec-
tronic countermeasures (jamming), little protection would be afforded.
If the attack should come at moderately high altitude and without elec-
tronic countermeasures, some considerable protection will be afforded the
2. Passive defense programs now in being and programmed for the
future will afford no significant protection to the civil population.
B. The protection of the United States and its population rests, therefore,
primarily upon the deterrence provided by SAC. The current vulnerability
of SAC to surprise attack during a period of lessened world tension (i.e., a
time when SAC is not on a SAC "alert" status), and the threat posed to SAC
by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial
action.
The Panel has arrived at the folio ;wing conclusions as to the value, relative
to cost, of various measures for protecting the civil population.
* By the very nature of the sources of intelligence information, none of the specific
numbers cited above can be precisely known. The approximate size of each number,
however, and more importantly the over-all order of accomplishment, are well estab-
lished by the available data.
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d. Protect a large part of SAC's planes by providing 100 to 200
psi shelters, and equivalent protection for weapons, personnel, and
other-needed supplies and facilities.
e. Provide SAC bases with an- active missile defense against
ICBMs, using available weapons such as Nike-Hercules or Talos and
the improved long-range tracking radars now existing in prototype.
3. To increase SAC's strategic offensive power (to match Russia's
expected early ICBM capability) :
a. Increase the initial operational capability of our IRBMs (Thor
and/or Jupiter) from 60 to 240.
b. Increase the IOC of our ICBMs (Atlas and Titan) from 80 to
600.
airfields in the ZI.
A. Measures to Secure and Augment Our Deterrent Power
Since the prevention of war would best protect our urban population, we
assign the highest relative value to the following measures to secure and aug-
ment our deterrent power. These would protect our manned bombers from
surprise attack, increase our forces available for limited military operations,
and give us an earlier and stronger initial operational capability (IOC) with
intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Basic elements
in this program are:
1.- To lessen SAC vulnerability to a Russian surprise bomber attack
in a period of low tension (a present threat) :
a. Reduce reaction time so an adequate number (possibly 500)
of SAC planes can get off, weapons aboard, on way to target, within
the tactical warning time available. This can be done by promptly
implementing SAC's `.`alert" concept.
= b-. Improve.and insure tactical warning. Radars in the seaward
extensions need to be modernized to assure tactical. warning at high
and low altitude, and the extensions need to be lengthened to prevent
."end runs."
c. Provide an active missile defense for SAC bases (Nike-Hercules
or Talos) _against bombers.
.2. To lessen SAC vulnerability to an. attack by Russian ICBMs (a late
1959 threat)
a. Develop, to an operational status, a radar early-warning
system for an ICBM attack.
b. Further improve SAC's reaction time to an "alert" status of 7_
to 22 minutes, depending on location of bases. .
C. Disperse SAC aircraft, to the widest extent practical, to SAC
and xion-SAC military bases in the ZI and possibly also to* commercial
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c. Accelerate the 10C of the Polaris submarine IRBM.system,
which offers the advantages of mobility and greatly reduced vul-
nerability.
d. Every effort should be made to have a significant number of
IRl3Ms ol*)crational overseas by late 1958, and ICBMs operational in
the ZI by late 1959.
e. Hardened bases for the ICBMs should be phased in as rapidly
as possible.
4. Augment our and Allied forces for limited military operations, and
provide greater mobility, to enable us to deter or promptly suppress small
wars which must not be allowed to grow into big ones. The Panel sug-
gests that a study be undertaken, at the national rather than at a Service
level, to develop current doctrine.on when and how nuclear weapons can
contribute to limited operations.
B. Measures to [:educe Vulnerability of Our People and Cities
The main protection of our civil population against a Soviet nuclear at-
tack has been and will continue to be the deterrent power of our armed forces,
to whose strengthening and securing we have accorded the highest relative
value. But this is not sufficient unless it is coupled with measures to reduce
the extreme. vulnerability of our people and our cities. As long as the U.S.
population is wide open to Soviet attack, both the Russians and our allies may
believe that we shall feel increasing reluctance to employ SAC in any cir-
cumstance other than when the United States is directly attacked. To pre-
vent such an impairment of our deterrent power and to ensure our survival
if nuclear war occurs through miscalculation or design, we assign a some-
what lower than highest value, in relation to cost, to a mixed program of active
and passive' defenses to protect our civil population.
1. A massive development program to eliminate two major weaknesses
in our present active defenses:
a. The vulnerability of the radars in our ground environment
and in our weapons control to "blinding" by enemy electronic coun-
termeasures (ECM).
b. The small probability of kills against a low-level attack.
2. Further strengthening of our active defenses as soon as their vul-
nerability to ECM and.;ow-level attack is removed. Current research af-
fords hope that at least our weapons-control radars can be made proof
against ECM. ' Radars can b located at high points. to guard against
low-level attacks, and a barrage-type defense aainst low-level attacks from
the sea Inight; prove a stopgap. An effective air defense system is so im-
portant to ensure continuity of government, and to protect our civil
population, our enormously valuable civil property and military installa-.
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ti.ons, that these development programs we suggest should be pushed
with all possible speed.
3. A nationwide fallout shelter program to protect the civil popula-
tion. This seems the only feasible protection for millions of people who
will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel has
been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more
lives for the same money in the event of a nuclear attack.
The construction and use of such shelters must be tied into a broad
pattern of organization for the emergency and its aftermath. We are
convinced that with proper planning the post-attack environment can
permit people to come out of the shelters and survive. It is important to
remember that those who survive the effects of the blast will have adequate
time (one to five hours) to get into fallout shelters. This is not true of
blast shelters which, to be effective, must be entered prior to the attack.
We do not recommend major construction of blast shelters at this
time. If, as appears quite likely, an effective air defense system can be
obtained, this will probably be a better investment than blast shelters.
However, because of present uncertainties, on both active and passive
fronts, it appears prudent to carry out promptly a research and develop-
ment program for such blast shelters since we must be in a position to
move rapidly into construction. should the need for them become evident.
A more detailed statement of the Panel's findings on passive defense is
included as Appendix B.
4. A program to develop and install an area defense against ICBMs
at the earliest possible date.
5. Increased emphasis on the R&D program to improve the Navy's
anti-submarine effort; including defense against submarine-launched
missiles. The principal protection against these latter may have to be
provided by air and ballistic missile defense systems.
IV. RELATED CONCERNS
A. Improvement of Manag'e'ment of Defense Resources
The Panel has been im,_,ressed with the supreme importance of effective
control and management of the resources allocated to defense.
The new weapons systems, in cutting across traditional Service lines, have
caused management problems which have been difficult to resolve within
existing legislative and organizational restrictions. We have lost ability to
concentrate resources, to control performance and expenditures, and to
change direction or emphasis with the speed that a rapidly developing inter-
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necessary.
national situation and rapidly developing science and technology make
We are faced by an enemy who is able, not only ruthlessly to concentrate
his resources, but rapidly to swvitclh from one direction or degree of emphasis
to another.
A radical reorganization of the Department of Defense might cause
such confusion, at least temporarily, as to weaken our defense. However, some
immediate steps to more effective control and management of our defense
resources are urgently needed and appear practicable.
Some such steps can be taken without new legislation and certainly they
would be timely, even before the return of Congress in January. A further
step would appear to be a decision within the Executive Branch to seek from
Congress the amendment of present legislation, which freezes the organization
of the Defense Department along lines that may have been appropriate before
the evolution of present weapons systems, but which are clearly inappropriate
today and may become intolerable in the near future.
Changes in the Defense organization might take the following lines:
1. An increased focusing of responsibility and authority in operational
commands, with missions appropriate to integrated weapons systems.
2. The concentration of research and development responsibilities for
the two or three major integrated and complete Weapons systems in man-
ageable organizational units.
3. A more effective concentration of the military departments and de-
partmental staffs upon training and logistics.
4. More direct command channels between the Secretary of Defense
and the operational commands.
5. A command post-type staff, responsible directly and solely to the
Secretary of Defense to assist him, both in the essentially managerial task
of control and command, and in the long-term planning his responsibili-
ties require. .
a. Such a staff should be organized as a staff, not as an inter-
agency committee. Policy should be established to encourage the
objectivity of officers serving on such a staff; and rotation would
enable them to keep abreast of appropriate developments bearing on
the mission.
b. Officers serving on such a staff should be selected and relieved
directly by the Secretary of Defense. Satisfactory service on this staff
should, as on certain other joint staffs, meet one of the preliminary
requirements needed for consideration for promotion.
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Through such evolutionary development, the functions of planning,
budgetary control, and operational command could increasingly be brought
together and responsibility focused and delegated, rather than bucked.
The Panel further believes that coordination in depth between the Defense
Department and those responsible for other aspects of our national policy, par-
ticularly the State Department, can be improved, especially in the field of
forward planning.
Existing plans to protect and care for people in the event of attack have
become obsolete as a result of the growing threat, and are therefore ineffective.
Provisions for relocating government officials and for evacuating civilians are
unrealistic in many respects. The plans of many states and metropolitan areas
for handling local police, fire, health, water, sanitation and related problems
are primitive in many areas.
Protection of the civil population is a national problem requiring a na-
tional remedy. We urge the re-evaluation of the existing organizational
structure that distributes responsibilities among the Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the military, and state and
local governments.
B. Strategic Warning and Hard Intelligence
Strategic warning-information obtained and correctly interpreted prior
to the actual launching of an enemy attack on the United States-would be
of immense value to this country. Further, it will become even more valuable
as the maximum achievable tactical warning time shrinks to. a matter of
minutes in the case of a ''missile attack. At present, however, we have no
assurance that strategic warning will be received.
We.have too few solid facts on which to base essential knowledge of USSR
capabilities and too few solid facts to learn how they are changing with time.
From such observations, intentions may often be deduced. More positive
and direct intelligence of USSR activities and accomplishments can be ob-
tained by vigorous use of presently known techniques and available methods.
Because of their utmost importance to our actual survival, we urge exploi-
tation of all means presently at our disposal to obtain both strategic warning
and hard intelligence, even if some risks have to be taken, together with the
vigorous development of new techniques. .
C. Integration With U.S. Foreign Policy
The reduction of the vulnerability of the United States and its population
should be made part of a broad program to improve the security and political
position of the Free World as a whole, in accord with the enlightened self-
interest of the United States.
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If not so integrated into our foreign policy, any substantial program to
reduce the vulnerability of the United States might be widely interpreted as
signalizing a retreat to "Fortress America." The USSR would be sure to
fully exploit the resulting uncertainties.
Such an integrated program might include:
1. Measures, some of which are already under way, to pool and make
more effective the economic, technological and political resources of our-
selves and our allies.
2. Supplying NATO with nuclear weapons, to remain in U.S. custody
in peacetime, for use in wartime under NATO command-as a means of
increasing confidence. -
3. Measures designed to assure the uncommitted nations that their
national interests are truly a matter of continuing concern to us.
Such an integrated and comprehensive program could significantly raise
the level of hope, confidence and strength in the Free World, and could give
renewed prospect of securing Russian agreement to safe arms control and
regulation.
V. COSTS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
A. Costs
The added defense measures to which the Panel has assigned relative
values will probably involve expenditures in excess of the current $38 billion
defense budget.
The measures of highest value, to strengthen our deterrent and offensive
capabilities, are estimated to cost over the next five years (1959-1963) a total
of.$19 billions.
Additional measures of somewhat lower than highest value, for the protec-
tion of the civil population, include a strengthening of active defenses, a fallout
shelter program, and the development of a defense system to protect cities
from missile attack. The estimated costs of these items total $25 billions
over the next five years.
More detailed cost estimates are shown in Appendix C. To initiate the
measure- of highest value will cost $2.87 billions in 1959; and $3.0 to $5.0 billions
per annum in the following four years. The entire program, including the
lower-than-highest-value additional measures, would cost approximately $4.73
billions in 1959, and annual expenditures rising to a peak of $11.92 in 1961 and
dropping; to $8.97 billions in 1963. Several of these measures will involve
further outlays in excess of operating and maintenance costs after 1063.
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B. Feasibility
These several defense measures are well within our economic capabilities.
The nation has the resources, the productive capacity, and the enterprise to
outdistance the USSR in production and in defense capability. This country
is now devoting 8.5% of its production to defense, and 10%/% to all national
security programs. `.['he American people have always been ready to shoulder
heavy costs for their defense when convinced of their necessity. We devoted
41% of our GNP to defense at the height of World War II and 14/o during the
Korean War. The latter percentage is somewhat higher than would be
required to support all our proposals. .
C. Economic Consequences
The additional expenditures for measures of highest value are barely
within the estimated receipts from existing taxes in the first three years, and
more definitely within estimated receipts thereafter, assuming continued
and uninterrupted high employment and growth. To the extent that econ-
omies can be achieved in existing defense or non-defense programs, the increase
in total expenditures could be minimized. An increase in the debt limit would
be necessary. This would be a precautionary measure against the possibility
that revenues may initially fall below the estimates based on high employment
and because expenditures normally run ahead of revenues during a portion
of the fiscal year.
The demands of such a program (measures of highest value) on the
nation's economic resources would.not pose significant problems. Aside from
its psychological impact, increased defense spending would have some influence
on capital investment. If a moderate recession is impending, tax receipts
would decline, but the increase in Federal expenditures would help to sustain
production and employment. Under conditions of full employment, the pro-
gram would have some inflationary effects, requiring a continuation of mone-
. . .
tary and credit restrictions.'
To undertake the whole program of active and passive measures would
involve outlays of $4.8 to $11.9 billions per annum over the next five years,
and further unestim.ated expenditures thereafter. Except as economics can
be achieved in defense and non-defense expenditures, these sums would repre-
sent additions to the Federal budget.
Large additional expenditures of this sort are still within the economic
capabilities of the United States. They would necessitate, however, an increase
in taxes, a somewhat larger Federal debt, substantial economies in other gov-
ernment expenditures , and other curbs on inflation. Additional private invest-
ment would be required, especially to carry out the shelter program which
would impose heavy requirements for stool, cement and labor. In all prol3abil-
ity, this program would necessitate some slow-down of highway construction
and other postponable public works.
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The early announcement of such a program would be a stimulus to the
economy and would have an inflationary influence. Measures to cope with
the inflationary problem pose d by such an increase in defense spending should
be planned as part of the program.
VI. PUBLIC E IDUCATION AND POLITICAL CONSEQUEN.CIES
The Panel urges an improved and expanded program for educating the
public in current national defense problems, in the belief that the future secu-
rity of the United States depends heavily upon an informed and supporting
public opinion. We have been heartened by the recent announcement that
positive steps will be taken to initiate what we hope will be a broad and sustained
program of such education. We must act now to protect, for this and succeed-
ing generations not only our human and material resources, but our free
institutions as well. We have no doubt of the will and capacity of the American
people to do so if they are informed of the nature and probable duration of the
threat and if they understand what is required of them. Only through such
enlightment and understanding can we avoid the danger of complacency
and the enervation of our inherent strengths.
VII. DETERRENCE AND SURVIVAL
The measures advocated by the Panel will help to unite, to strengthen ' nd
to defend the Free World, and to deter general war which would expose our
cities and bases to thermonuclear attack. They would improve our posture
to deter or promptly to suppress subversion or limited war, which may be more
likely in the years immediately ahead. No one of these lesser enemy moves
night directly threaten our survival. Yet, if continued, they might nibble
away the security of the Free World as Germany undermined the superior
military power of Great Britain and France between 1936 and 1939.
If deterrence should fail, and nuclear war should come through miscal-
culation or design, the programs outlined above would, in our opinion, go far to
ensure our survival as a nation.
To illustrate the urgency of prompt decision and rapid action, we submit
in Appendix A a time table of relative strengths under our present programs
and the assumed Russian ?-?on'rams. As this appendix indicates, the United
1, C?
States is now capable of making a decisive air nuclear attack on the USSR.
The USSR could make a very destructive attack o.i this country, and SAC is
still vulnerable to a surprise attack in a period of lessened world tension.
As soon as SAC acquires an effective "alert" status, the United States will be
able to carry out a dccisive attack even if surprised. This could be the best
time to negotiate from strength, since the U.S. military position vis-a-vis Russia
might never be so strong ag ain.
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By 1959, the USSR may be able to launch an attack with ICBMs carrying
megaton warheads, against which SAC will be almost completely vulnerable
under present programs. by 1969.-1962, at our present pace, or considerably
earlier if we accelerate, the United States could have a reliable early-warning
capability against a missile attack, and SAC forces should be on aL\7 to 22
minute operational "alert." The next two years seem to us critical. If we
fail to act at once, the risk, in our opinion, will be unacceptable.
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APPENDIX A
'TIME TAI3I,L
(Under Our Present Programs and Assumed Russian Programs)
Period A--Present Phase (starting now and ending 1959/early 1960)
Characteristics
1. U.S. has an adequate capability to make a decisive air nuclear attack
on Russia.
2. U.S. has an inadequate retaliatory capability if SAC bases are surprised
at a time of lessened world tension, i.e., a time when SAC is not in a state of
combat readiness. Prompt and aggressive implementation of the SAC "alert"
concept would cure this defect.
3. USSR has capability to make a destructive attack on the U.S.
4. USSR has an inadequate retaliatory capability if SUSAC bases are sur-
prised at a time of lessened world tension.
5. Although Russia will probably acid to her inventory of long-range jet
bombers during this period, the small number of these produced in recent
months and the apparent lack of air-refueling of her large number of medium
jet bombers indicate the Soviets are probably taking a calculated risk during
this period and are shifting a large part of their national effort from manned
bombers to long-range ballistic missiles.
Effects
1. A surprise attack by either SAC or SUSAC in a period of lessened world
tension might almost completely disarm the other's long-range air atomic
strike capability, unless and until either side has successfully implemented
an adequate "alert" concept.
2. During this period, a surprise attack could determine the outcome of
a clash between these two major powers.
3. As soon as SAC acquires an effective "alert" status, the U.S. will be
able to carry out a decisive attack even if surprised. This could be the best
time to negotiate from strength, since the U.S. military position vis-a-vis
Russia might never be as strong again.
Period B-(starting 1959/