REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 19, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
COPY No.13 ?
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR COLLECT-ION & DESSEMINATION.CIA
REVIEW OF THE WORLD
SITUATION
Published 19 July 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. The unprovoked attack on the Republic
of Korea by the armed forces of the Soviet-
controlled North Korean government opened
a new phase in the power conflict between the
USSR and the non-Soviet world. For the first
time since the end of World War II, the USSR
deliberately attempted to expand the Soviet-
Communist area of control through direct ac-
tion against a non-Soviet state by the organ-
ized military forces of a puppet state. Apart
from the immediate strategic advantages of
Communist control of all Korea, the primary
aim of the USSR in instigating the attack
probably was to discredit the US policy of gen-
eral containment of Soviet-Communism.
US intervention, endorsed by nearly all of
the non-Soviet members of the UN (including
India), marked a line beyond which Soviet-
sponsored aggression could not go without be-
ing challenged. A failure to draw this line
would have seriously discredited the whole US
policy of containment, gravely handicapping
US efforts to maintain alliances and build po-
litical influence with the Western European
powers and with other nations closely aligned
with the US. The Korean incident as a whole,
particularly the virtual collapse of resistance
by the Republic of Korea and the interposition
of US forces in the path of the attack, raises
several problems of the gravest importance to
US security. Outstanding among them is the
possibility, that reverses in the fighting in Ko-
rea may quickly counter the favorable initial
psychological effects of intervention and bring
about a drop in the morale of the Western
world.
2. Whatever turn events take in Korea, the
USSR has the capability of creating a series of
incidents roughly comparable to the Korean
episode, each one threatening either to bank-
rupt the US policy of containing Soviet-Com-
munist expansion or to disperse and overstrain
US military forces in readiness.
Soviet leaders might estimate that the USSR
was warranted in running the risk of global
war inherent in the repetition of the Korean
pattern elsewhere, reasoning either: (a) that
the US would abandon or drastically reduce
its commitments, particularly in Asia, before
it would challenge the USSR directly; or (b)
that the outbreak of global war in which the
US took primary responsibility for enlarging
the area of conflict would leave the non-Soviet
world critically divided and weak. The Far
East (Taiwan, Indochina, Burma) and, the
Balkans are the border areas where signs of
impending military action are mounting.
3. While the early reaction of Western Eu-
rope was to give enthusiastic approval to the
US intervention in Korea, the Western Euro-
pean nations are unlikely to take resolute and
coordinated action to meet the challenge im-
plicit in the "limited war" phase of world
power conflict unless US military power can
be mobilized and deployed in strength that is
plainly sufficient to constitute at least a sub-
stantial deterrent to further Soviet or Soviet-
sponsored military aggression.
Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The information contained
herein is as of 14 July 1950.
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED- STATES
1. Limited War in Korea.
The unprovoked attack on the Republic of
Korea by the armed forces of the Soviet-con-
trolled North Korean government opened a
new phase in the power conflict between the
USSR and the non-Soviet world. For the first
time since the end of World War II, the USSR
deliberately attempted to expand the Soviet-
Communist area of control through direct ac-
tion against a non-Soviet state by the organ-
ized military forces of a puppet state. Al-
though the USSR may claim that the conflict
in Korea was a civil war, it cannot disguise
either the fact that North Korea is a Soviet
puppet or the fact that the attack was
launched against a state whose sovereignty
had been recognized by the UN.
In Eastern Europe the postwar techniques
of Communist expansion have not gone
beyond propaganda, sabotage, subversion, in-
ternal coups, and guerrilla warfare cam-
paigns-supported by Soviet diplomacy and
the threat of Soviet military force. Even in
Greece, Iran, China, and Indochina, Commu-
nist activities have remained within the limits
of insurrectionary fighting in a "revolution-
ary" situation within a single state.
a. The Attack.
The North Korean venture, involving an ad-
ditional step toward open Soviet aggression,
amounts to a laboratory test of the advantages
the USSR might gain by fighting a war of lim-
ited objectives and limited liabilities through
the medium of puppet troops. Soviet objec-
tives were limited in the sense that the North
Korean forces proposed merely to bring about
the "unification" of Korea within its tradi-
tional national boundaries rather than to pro-
voke a global war involving the US. Soviet
liabilities were limited because the USSR
avoided becoming openly and unequivocally
associated with the attack despite the fact
that the North Korean forces were Soviet-ad-
vised, Soviet-equipped, Soviet-trained, and
Soviet-supplied.
In planning the Korean invasion the USSR
probably did not expect the US to intervene
with its own military forces. In the absence
of US intervention, Soviet leaders could antici-
pate a quick Communist victory that would
present the US and the UN with an accom-
plished fact, undermine the confidence of non-
Communist states in the practical value of US
moral commitments, and give political and
military momentum to the further expansion
of Soviet-Communist influence in the Far
East. Apart from the immediate strategic ad-
vantages of Communist control of all Korea,
the primary aim of the USSR in instigating
the attack probably was to discredit the US
policy of general containment of Soviet-Com-
munism.
b. US-UN Reaction.
Whatever the original intent of the move in
Korea, the prompt US commitment of its own
military forces in a "police action" on behalf
of the UN automatically converted the Korean
incident into a critical issue. The US inter-
vention, endorsed by nearly all of the non-
Soviet members of the UN (including India),
marked a line beyond which Soviet-sponsored
aggression could not go without being chal-
lenged. A failure to draw this line would have
seriously discredited the whole US policy of
containment, gravely handicapping US efforts
to maintain alliances and build political influ-
ence with the Western European powers and
with other nations closely aligned with the
US.
The immediate psychological reaction of the
Western world to US-UN intervention in Korea
was almost uniformly favorable, and the mo-
rale of nations committed to the containment
.Of
of Soviet-Communist expansion received a
lift. Nevertheless, the Korean in-
cident as a whole, particularly the virtual col-
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lapse of resistance by the Republic of Korea
and the interposition of US forces in the path
of the attack raises several problems of the
gravest importance to US security. Outstand-
ing among them is the possibility that US re-
verses in the fighting in Korea may quickly
counter the initial psychological effects of in-
tervention and bring about a drop in the
morale of the Western world.
c. Effects of a Prolonged Battle in South
Korea.
The efficient military performance of the in-
vading forces in the first three weeks of battle
indicates that there is little probability that
the North Koreans can be quickly driven back
to the 38th parallel. The USSR can supply
material aid in sufficient quantities to pro-
long the fighting and deeply involve the US in
Korean military operations. Chinese Com-
munist troops can be brought into action
covertly and, if necessary, openly. The USSR
might consider that the risk of provoking a
global war was not substantial so long as no
Soviet forces were openly committed.
A prolonged battle in South Korea, which
now seems probable, would seriously damage
US prestige. The Western European allies
and other nations aligned with the US would
steadily lose confidence in the military value of
US commitments to assist them against armed
aggression and would be increasingly reluc
tant to take energetic measures in support of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program (MDAP). While some credit might
redound to the US for initially honoring its
commitments, more anxiety will arise about
US ability to counter threats of Soviet aggres-
sion than about US intentions to do so. A
major commitment of US forces and equip-
ment in Korea would seriously limit US capa-
bilities for taking military action elsewhere,
and Western European nations in particular
would feel dangerously exposed. While the
US would encounter all of these disadvantages
from a local but prolonged war in Korea and
the USSR would reap corresponding advan-
tages, the USSR could also register propa-
ganda gains in non-Soviet countries. where
"peace" propaganda has a strong appeal by
emphasizing Soviet non-interference (in the
technical legal sense) and portraying the US
action as an imperialistic Western aggression
against an Asiatic people.
d. Effects of a Military Reverse. for US
Forces in South Korea.
The immediate consequence of a failure of
US forces to hold South Korea, a possibility
that cannot be ruled out, would be a damaging
blow to US prestige. The US would then vir-
tually be forced to try to regain as much of its
lost military reputation as possible by com-
mitting substantial US military resources in a
difficult and costly invasion of an area that is
not in itself of primary strategic importance to
the US. Whatever the US did to redeem its
military reverse, US foreign policy and espe-
cially US military capabilities would be seri-
ously discredited.
A voluntary withdrawal of US forces to
avoid the military risk of being driven off the
Korean peninsula would not reduce and prob-
ably would increase the damage to US strate-
gic interests all over the world. Voluntary
withdrawal not only would show US moral
commitments to be unreliable when put to a
severe test, but in addition would leave
grounds for considerable doubt as to the abil-
ity of the US to back up any of its commit-
ments with adequate military force. Besides
shaking the confidence of the Western Euro-
pean allies and other nations on whose
strength and cooperation the policy of con-
tainment depends, withdrawal from Korea
would damage US standing in UN affairs and
would undermine the effectiveness of the UN
as a device for mobilizing Western resistance
to Soviet-Communist aggression. Pro-US
governments, particularly in areas where the
USSR could initiate limited military aggres-
sions without openly using Soviet forces,
would suffer serious losses of prestige. In
some cases (for example, Indochina or Iran)
these governments might lose control of the
country altogether or feel compelled to seek
an accommodation with the USSR. The total
effect of voluntary withdrawal on world-wide
US security interests would be a reverse prob-
ably more calamitous than the effect of a US
failure to hold Korea.
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2. Soviet Pressure on Other Border Areas.
Whatever turn events take in Korea, the
USSR has the capability of creating a series of
incidents roughly comparable to the Korean
episode, each one threatening either to bank-
rupt the US policy of containing Soviet-Com-
munist expansion or to disperse and overstrain
US military forces in readiness. Without di-
rectly and openly involving Soviet military
forces, the USSR could engineer the outbreak
or (where guerrilla fighting is already going
on) the rapid intensification of local wars in
Taiwan, Indochina, Burma, and the Balkans.
The effects of incidents in these areas could
be aggravated by renewed pressure in other
places bordering the Soviet sphere. In Iran
in particular the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and
other subversive elements either within the
country or in adjacent Soviet territory are ca-
pable of creating disorders which the USSR
might use as a pretext for invoking the 1921
Irano-Soviet Treaty and "restoring order" in
Iran with Soviet troops.
The use of puppet forces (or Soviet forces
in the special circumstances in Iran) would
involve some risk of global war. The USSR
probably will not deliberately initiate global
war at this time in view of : (a) the general
superiority of the US in total economic and
military power potential; and (b) doubts
about whether the newly developed Soviet ca-
pability for atomic attack is as yet capable of
neutralizing US atomic retaliation and pre-
venting the US from mobilizing its economic
and military power.
Nevertheless, Soviet leaders might estimate
that the USSR was warranted in running the
risk of global war inherent in the repetition of
the Korean pattern elsewhere, reasoning
either: (a) that the US would abandon or
drastically reduce its commitments, particu-
larly in Asia, before it would challenge the
USSR directly; or (b) that the outbreak of
global war in which the US took primary re-
sponsibility for enlarging the area of conflict
would leave the non-Soviet world critically di-
vided and weak.
Whatever Soviet intentions may be, signs
of impending military or quasi-military action
on a large scale are mounting in nearly all the
border areas. These signs may be part of
the war of nerves or a concerted deception
plan designed to prevent US concentration of
effort on the Korean operation. Some of them
may be feints to draw attention away from
new moves in just one of the trouble spots.
It is conceivable, however, that the USSR
plans aggressive action of some kind at all
these points within the next year or two. In
any case the pressure continues to be heavy,
and possibility of early initiation of new Ko-
rean-style incidents by non-Soviet Communist
troops cannot be excluded.
a. The Far East.
It is not yet clear whether the USSR will
force the Chinese Communists to give open
military support to the Korean operations or
to start a new operation elsewhere in the area.
The Peiping regime is unlikely to commit mili-
tary forces to operations outside China on its
own initiative, but almost certainly would
comply with a Soviet request for military ac-
tion. Chinese Communist troop strength and
dispositions would permit intervention in
Korea and military action in a number of
other places as well with little or no warning.
Forces in considerable numbers apparently
are being staged on the mainland opposite
Taiwan, and possibly opposite Hong Kong.
Although no significant changes have oc-
curred in the strength of troops stationed
along the Southeast Asian frontiers, these
forces are capable of crossing into Indochina
if necessary to strengthen Ho Chi Minh's fight-
ing forces or into Burma, where the presence
of a few fugitive Chinese Nationalist troop
units would give a show of legality to a mili-
tary incursion.
b. The Balkans.
There have been a number of indications of
an acceleration of Soviet and Satellite troop
movements in the Balkan area. Soviet mili-
tary equipment and supplies have been flow-
ing into the Balkans for several months in
quantities that appear to be in excess of the
needs of Soviet forces available there. The
number of Soviet troops in the Balkans has
not changed significantly in the past six
months, but the efficiency of Balkan puppet
forces has probably been increasing as a result
of a tightening of Soviet control and the acqui-
sition of Soviet materiel.
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While it is still probable that Soviet-Satellite
troops in the Balkans are inadequate to mount
a successful armed offensive against Yugo-
slavia, it would be possible for puppet troops
with covert Soviet support at least to start a
local war on a considerable scale by moving
across the borders of Yugoslavia, Greece, or
Turkey. Soviet propaganda is emphasizing
the imminence of hostilities in this area
(through Greek and Yugoslav "aggression" of
course). The initiation of any kind of armed
aggression in this area by Soviet puppet troops
would present the basic issues of the Korean
incident all over again, forcing the US either
to abandon some of its commitments or to dis-
perse its military strength.
3. Western Europe.
While the early reaction of Western Europe
was to give enthusiastic approval to the US in-
tervention in Korea, as time goes on sober sec-
ond thoughts are bound to occur to the NATO
nations. If the fighting in Korea is prolonged,
as seems probable, or spreads to other border
areas, Western Europeans are sure to fear that
the US programs of military and financial as-
sistance will be limited to present levels if not
reduced because of the strains this peripheral
fighting would put on US resources. On the
other hand, fear of global war will be increas-
ing, as will fear that the time may be short to
prepare for defense against Soviet aggression
in Europe. The Korean situation will bring
sharply home to Western Europe the fact of
its defenselessness against direct military ac-
tion and may provide the US with an oppor-
tunity to press for an increased defensive
effort and more effective mutual aid and bal-
ancing of forces. Resolute and coordinated
action along these lines will be required if the
Western European nations are to meet the
critical issues that will confront them so long
as Soviet-sponsored aggressions continue.
The prospects of such action are not alto-
gether reassuring in the light of the halting
progress made to date in unifying Western
European military and economic efforts. De-
spite the strong resolutions adopted at the
London conferences of May, the projected
strengthening of NATO has hardly begun.
The Schuman plan for integrating the Euro-
pean coal and steel industries, one of the most
promising economic integration schemes, is
moving slowly. The French have proceeded
vigorously to the heart of the economic unifi-
cation problem by proposing to establish
supra-national organizations and clearly rec-
ognize supra-national authority. This radical
departure from traditional political patterns
alarmed the Benelux countries and caused
them to retire for governmental consultations.
Only the Germans, who have no sovereignty
to lose at this point, and the Italians, whose
industrial stake is comparatively slight, are
inclined to accept the Schuman plan more or
less as presented. The British, who are not
negotiating but are being kept informed, con-
tinue to make it plain that the UK would not
participate in the plan the French have ad-
vanced. The influence of France as a leader
in Western Europe, which otherwise would
grow as a result of the development of the
Schuman plan, has remained uncertain be-
cause of the protracted difficulties of forming
a new French cabinet.
The Western European nations may avoid
giving way to apathy or despair and vigor-
ously meet the challenge implicit in the "lim-
ited war" phase of world power-conflict inau-
gurated by the Korean incident. They are
unlikely to do so, however, unless US military
power can be mobilized and deployed in
strength that is plainly sufficient to consti-
tute at least a substantial deterrent to further
Soviet or Soviet-sponsored military aggression.
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Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN
itary Conquest of all of Korea S
We were unable to find a copy of this memorandum. The follow-
ing is a digest made in April 1951 by the Office of National
Estimates.7
Although an invasion of North Korea by UN forces could, if successful,
bring several important advantages to the US, it appears at present that
grave risks would be involved in such a course of action. (1) It is
doubtful that US allies and other non-Soviet nations in the UN would support
such a course of action. Asian nations, particularly India, would react
unfavorably, and many Asians might be convinced that the US is, after all,
an aggressive nation pursuing a policy of self-interest in Asia. (2) The
invading forces might become involved in hostilities with the Chinese Com-
munists. As it became apparent that the North Koreans were being defeated
in South Korea, the Chinese might well take up defensive positions north
of the 38th Parallel. The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any
stage in the fighting, but their participation would be especially useful
at the 38th Parallel where UN members could legally discontinue their
support of the US policy. (3) Inasmuch as the USSR would regard the in-
vasion of North Korea as a strategic threat to the security of the
Soviet Far East, the invading forces might become involved, either directly
or indirectly, in hostilities with Soviet forces, under conditions which
would alienate most of Asia from the US UN cause in Korea.
The conquest of North Korea would not provide assurance of peace
throughout the country or of true unification. Continued threats of
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aggression from Manchuria or the USSR would produce instability, requiring
the continued presence of large numbers of US or UN forces. Syngman Rhee
and his regime are unpopular ai ong many -- if not a majority -- of
non-Communist Koreans. To establish his government throughout all Korea
would be difficult, if not impossible; even if this could be done, the
regime would be so unstable as to require continuing US or UN military
and economic support. If a UN trusteeship were established, it would be
unstable. Korea once more would become the cat's-paw of international
politics, and its ultimate status would be dependent upon the comparative
strength and ambitions of the countries whose representatives supervised
the trust administration.
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CI NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE cy
IPi`I'ELLIGEIJCE IJE11.11
NO, 321 8 September 1-950
SUBJECT: Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea
RIOllLEM: To assess the probability of an open Co 1-.t ,ient of
Chinese Communist armed forces in Korea,
SCOPE: The corr:dtuent of both regular and local Chinese Corn-
present.
(2) The ,provision of overt assistance by the Chinese
Communists would require approval by the USSR and such
approval would indicate that the US t is prepared to
accept an increased risk of precipitatir; general
hostilities.
monist ground forces, and the use of the Chinese Corgi
munist Air Force in support of the North Korean
invaders are considered,,
(1) Limited covert Chinese Communist assistance to the
North I-orean invaders, including the provision of
individual soldiers, is assumed to be in FrrcL;ress at
In Conclusions.
Although there is no direct evidence to indicate whether or not
the Chinese Communists will intervene in North Korea, it is evident
that the Chinese Communists or the USSR must supply trained and
equipped combat replacements if the North Korean invasion is to
achieve complete control over South Korea before the end of the yearn
Reports of an increasing Chinese Cormnunist build-up of military
strength in LTanchuria, coupled with the known potential in that area,
make it clear that intervention in Korea is well within immediate
Chinese Communist capabilities. Ltoreover, recent Chinese Comm unist
accusations regarding US "aggression" and "violation of the
Manchurian border" may be stage-setting fcr an imminent overt move,
This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence
organizations of the Depart-ients of State, Arrry, Navy, and the
Air orco?
The memorandum was prepared in accord with the request of the
M rector of Intelligence, Headquarters? United States Air
Force,
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In vievr of the momentous repercussions from such an overt action,
however, it appears more probable that the Chinese Corunun.st
participation in the Korean conflict will be more indirect., al-
though significant, and will be limited to integrating into the
North Korean forces "Manchurian volunteers," perhaps including
air units as well as ground troops.
2. Present Status of North Korean Forces.
The decision i nether or not to commit Chinese Communist forces
will depend in part on the availability of Korean manpower, both in
Manchuria and that part of Korea now in Communist hands. Current
estimates by the Department of the 11rrrXr state that 40,000 trained
Korean veterans who had served with the Chinese Con unists in the
I?.anchurian campaigns of 1916 to 19W3 remain in Manchuria and there
constitute a strategic North Korean reserve. It is noteworthy,
however, that (1) since 1 itugust North Koreans have been using
canbat replacements with as little as two week's training; and
(2) the North Koreans would logically have committed all available
organized Korean units soon after UPI forces had been comni Lted
because at that time the impact of 40,000 trained troops probably
would have been decisive.
The foregoing considerations indicate either that any Korean
reserve in 11anchuria was so dispersed that it did not constitute
an effective reserve or that this reserve never in fact existed.
Moreover, the possibility that Korean reserves in Manchuria have
now been collected and reorganized and that some are now enroute
to the combat area tends to be discounted by the fact that the
time elapsed since 25 June should have permitted the organization
and commitment of the majority of this reserve which would have
been far superior in quality{ to those virtually untrained North
Korean troops that have actually been utilized in the fighting.
On balance, therefore, it appears highly probable that if a Com-
munist victory in Korea is to be achieved by the end of the year
the North Korean forces must now rely on either Soviet or Chinese
Communist resources for decisive augmentation.
3. Chinese Communist C-abilities for Intervention.
The Chinese Communists have approximately four million men under
arms, including regulars, Military District troopsp and provincial
forces. Following the fall of Manchuria there were approximately
565,000 IIlitaxy District troops in Manchuria (including 165,100
ex Nationalists), and possibly 100,000 to 125,000 of these 1)
troops have now been integrated into the regular army and organized
as combat forces. These units, as well as the remaining ID troops,
probably are Soviet--equdpped. In addition,, reports during the
past three months have indicated a considerable increase in regular
troop strength in L nchn.nia., It is estimated that the major elements
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of Lin Pine's 1._ `h Field Army -totalling perhaps 100?000 combat
veterans----are now in :::anchuria and are probably located along or
adjacent to the Korean bord r, in position for rapid commitment
in Korea.
Approximately 210,000 Communist regulars under I1ieh Jung-chent8
command are presently deployed in the Borth China area. Some of
these troops have been reported enroute to Lia.nchuria.
The Chinese Communists are believed to possess an air force
totalling 200 to 250 operational ccxnbat aircraft, some units of
which are reportedly deployed in Manchuria.
14, Indications of
Chinese Communist Intention to Intervene.
A. Pr22aaandlal..
Numerous Chinese Communist propaganda attacks on the US
during recent weeks, charging the US with "intervention"s and
s"aggression" in Taiwan, have been climaxed by two new protests to
the UN claiming US air attacks in violation of the Manchuria-Korea,
border. It is possible that these charges,, besides serving a use-
ful propaganda function, may be aimed at providing an cause for
Chinese Ca nist intervention in Korea.
b. I111.itary Activity.
Since the fall of Hainan in April 1950, reliable reports
have indicated that elements of Lin Piao' a 4th Field Army noire being
moved northward from the Canton areal 1.1ajor elements of the 4th
Field Army are now believed to be either in or enroute to Manchuria.
Other reports indicate that military construction is in progress
near Antmung and along the Yalu :liver. Strengthening of Manchurian
border defenses might either be a logical security development in
view of the Korean conflict or a prelude to the offensive employment;
of forces in the area,
Reports of increased activity at Antung on the I.anchuria-
Korea barer include the reported arrival of Chinese Communist
aircraft. Antung has also been reported as the main base of the
1. Reports of preparation for this move were received as early as
February 1950, well in advance of the assault on Hainan by LIN t s
forces. Although these preparations may have been part of
announced CCF plans for demobilization, it appears more likely
that these elements were Korean troops of Lin Piao t s army being
released to the North Korean Arras.
2, The three airfields in the Antung area could handle a total of
300 aircraft.
111M'
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North Korean Air Force, where that depleted force can seek refuge
from UII air attacks. Numerous reports of recent North Korean
activity, including revetment, construction at airfields south of
the 38th Parallel have been received. These construction reports
could indicate the imminent forward movement of air reinforcements
for the North Koreans. Although some of this anticipated air sup-
port might be provided by the as yet untested Chinese Cozmmini.st Air
Force, there is no firm evidence to support such a contention.
5. Factors Ii?i.lifiating -aims- Chinese Communist Intervention.
The conani.tment of Chinese Communist armed forces in Korea would
clearly transform the Korean conflict from an ostensibly "internal"
dispute to an international struggle. The decision to commit
Chinese Communist troops to the Korean conflict would significantly
affect the Soviet position in China as well as in Korea, and Soviet
influence over both Peiping and Pyongrang might be jeopardized.
Other factors which might tend to deter Chinese Communist interven-
tion in the Korean war,, but which would be of minor consequence in
so momentous a decision, are: (1) Chinese national and Wh itery
pride might cause friction if Chinese troops were placed under
Soviet or Korean command; and (2) Chinese Co unist intervention
would probably eliminate all prospects for China's admission to the
United Nations.
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