REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 20, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

COF T. `;NO.
.VOR THE. GRIEF,,.
ADMINISIRATIV& OFIIC,E', u9ITION._;.soARD
REVIEW OF THE WORLD
SITUATION
CIA 9-50
Published 20 September 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
a. While it is doubtful that either Soviet
or Chinese Communist forces will be com-
mitted south of the 38th parallel, both Mos-
cow and Peiping have the capability of send-
ing organized military units to reinforce the
North Koreans at any critical juncture. They
are much more likely, however, to aid the
Communist cause in Korea by releasing large
numbers of trained Chinese Communist
(Manchurian "volunteer") units, perhaps in-
cluding small air units, for incorporation in
the North Korean forces.
b. There is still no conclusive evidence
ties, these preparations do not necessarily in- _ whether political warfare over Taiwan will be
'followed or perhaps accompanied by a mil'
dicate that the USSR intends deliberately to
1. Nearly three months after beginning its
venture into war-by-proxy, the USSR retains
the strategic initiative to some extent locally
in Korea and to a much greater extent glob-
ally.
2. The USSR is probably not yet prepared
for international military operations designed
to defeat the US and its allies. Nevertheless,
the USSR has been vigorously preparing its
armed forces, its economy, and its political-
control system for the eventuality of a major
war. In view of the traditional preoccupa-
tion of the USSR with its defensive capabili-
provoke a global war. Nevertheless, the time-
phasing of some parts of this war-readiness
program suggests that the USSR made an
urgent effort to be ready in case large-scale
expenditures of military materiel should be
necessary in the fall of 1950 or the spring of
1951.
3. Whereas the US and its allies have been
able to contain Soviet efforts at expansion in
Europe and the Middle East during the past
two years, the USSR has steadily gained
ground in Asia. In large measure it has suc-
ceeded in identifying Communism with local
nationalist ambitions, anti-Western senti-
ment, and economic discontent.
4. As a result of Communist seizure of
control in China, the USSR has in the Peiping
regime a disciplined lieutenant in the inter-
national Communist program of eliminating
Western influence and establishing indigenous
Communist governments throughout the Far
East.
Note: This review has not been coordinated
partments of State, Army, Navy, and
herein is as of 15 September 1950.
tary assault on the island. 4
c. At the present time opportunities for ex-
pansion of Communist influence in Southeast
Asia appear to be more promising than more
openly belligerent ventures (such as formal
Chinese intervention in Korea). Moscow and
Peiping probably will prefer to maintain the
fiction that Communist aggression is merely
local revolution or civil war (as they claimed
in Korea) and to rely on the efforts of in-
digenous "liberation" movements rather than
on open employment of organized forces out-
side their own territory. Thus the Chinese
Communists would continue to limit their aid
to Ho Chi Minh to indirect or covert though
substantial military assistance.
The spread of Communist influence in
southeast Asia probably will continue, at least
in the short-term future, acquiring new mo-
mentum with every local triumph, in default
of: (1) development of an indigenous Asian
regional association capable of resisting the
expansion of Soviet influence in the Far East;
with the intelligence organizations of the De-
the Air Force. The information contained
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(2) Western success in convincing the local
populations that "colonialism" is not a
threat and that Soviet control is a direct
threat to national independence; (3) effective
US aid.
5. While bringing heavy pressure to bear
on many non-Soviet countries, reaching a peak
in the Korean attack, the USSR has recently
been pursuing a soft policy toward such coun-
tries as Iran, Afghanistan, and India, which
the Kremlin evidently wishes to neutralize
for the time being. In Iran in particular, this
soft treatment poses a more difficult problem
for the Iranian Government than would a
harsher attitude and may yield considerable
advantages to the USSR without further re-
sort to pressure tactics.
6. Concurrently with its integrated cam-
paign of aggression, pressure, and political
enticement around the borders of the Soviet
sphere, the USSR is vigorously prosecuting its
propaganda warfare in the UN. During the
coming parliamentary maneuvering in the
SC the US may be able to counter Soviet
propaganda moves and to prepare the ground
for what will probably develop into the most
solid anti-Soviet front yet displayed in the
UN General Assembly.
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Current Soviet Policy Patterns.
Nearly three months after beginning its
venture into war-by-proxy, the USSR retains
the strategic initiative to some extent locally
in Korea and to a much greater extent glob-
ally. Chances that the North Korean forces
alone might drive UN troops out of Korea
have been materially reduced in the past
month, and it is doubtful whether the North
Koreans can still draw upon enough reserve
military resources to permit them at once to
maintain pressure on the major UN-held per-
imeter around Pusan and simultaneously con-
tain other UN forces. The concentration of
Chinese Communist troops near the Korean
border in Manchuria, however, constitutes a
powerful secondary reserve which, if Moscow
and Peiping should agree on it despite the at-
tendant risks, could enter the battle and ma-
terially change its course at any time. The
Chinese Communist armies are also capable
of attacking Taiwan and Indochina without
seriously weakening their position confront-
ing Korea. Meanwhile, the USSR and Com-
munist China are conducting a major UN
propaganda offensive emphasizing their dedi-
cation to "peace" and castigating so-called US
"aggression" in Asia.
2. Soviet Readiness for War.
These particular manifestations of an ag-
gressive Soviet foreign policy appear against
the background of rapid advancement of a
general war-readiness program in the USSR.
The USSR is probably not yet prepared for
international military operations designed to
defeat the US, and its allies, mainly because
of its limited stockpile of atomic bombs, its
relatively weak strategic air arm, and its rela-
tively weak surface navy. The USSR has,
however, been vigorously preparing its armed
forces, its economy, and its political-control
system for the eventuality of a major war. In
view of the traditional preoccupation of the
USSR with its defensive capabilities, these
preparations do not necessarily indicate that
the USSR intends deliberately to provoke a
global war. Nevertheless, the time-phasing of
some parts of this war-readiness program sug-
gests that the USSR made an urgent effort to
be ready in case large-scale expenditures of
military materiel should be necessary in the
fall of 1950 or the spring of 1951. This time-
phasing may well reflect a policy designed to
protect the USSR from the risk of global war
which is implicit in the instigation of local
operations by non-Soviet forces on the pe-
riphery of the area of Soviet influence.
There is still no conclusive evidence as to
whether the USSR will resort to further out-
right military aggression through the medium
of non-Soviet forces or, what may be more
likely, will adhere to its standard policy of
extending Soviet influence by propaganda,
subversion, internal coups, and guerrilla war-
fare-supported by Soviet diplomacy and the
threat of Soviet military strength. The cur-
rent Soviet war-readiness program could,
however, be an indication of Soviet prepara-
tions to meet the eventuality of general war
if it actually should come in 1950 or 1951 as a
result of US reaction to further Soviet or So-
viet-sponsored aggression. In the event of
war in this period the USSR could use its
enormous ground army and tactical air force
to occupy most of the Eurasian continent.
The USSR then could: (a) mount a strategic
air bombardment campaign against the UK;
(b) deny US access, at least partially, to for-
ward base areas from which US strategic air
attacks could most effectively be mounted;
(c) employ against the continental US the
supply of atomic bombs available, thus weak-
ening the US capability to retaliate; (d) add
the resources of Western Europe to the Soviet
war potential, permitting the USSR in time
to absorb heavy damage from US strategic air
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attacks without destroying Soviet capabilities
for continuing hostilities; and (e) set the
stage for a politico-military offensive designed
to bring the remaining non-Soviet countries
into an accommodation with the USSR.
3. Offensive in Asia.
Increased Soviet war-readiness greatly
strengthens the position of the USSR in pur-
suing its current campaign to expand Soviet
influence and extend the area of actual po-
litical control in Asia. Whereas the US and
its allies have been able to contain Soviet ef-
forts at expansion in Europe and the Middle
East during the past two years, the USSR has
steadily gained ground in Asia. In large
measure it has succeeded in identifying Com-
munism with local nationalist ambitions, anti-
Western sentiment, and economic discontent.
As a result of the "revolutionary situations"
created by the breakup of the colonial im-
perial system, the USSR has had an oppor-
tunity gradually to extend its hold over large
areas in Asia and at the same time to weaken
the Western Powers indirectly by diverting
their critically needed military resources to
the Far East. The year 1950, as anticipated,
has been a year of crises in Asia, and the West-
ern world has been suffering serious losses as
a result of Communist accretions of power in
the Far East.
(Current Soviet concentration on Asia does
not, of course, alter the fact that the rebuild-
ing of political, economic, and military
strength in Europe continues to be of primary
importance to the security of the US. The
USSR can be expected to return to the of-
fensive in Europe whenever vulnerabilities
there warrant it, a fact which makes the de-
cisions and procedures only now being worked
out by the NATO powers the most critical de-
velopments of the next year or two so far as
US security is concerned. The direction
and import of these decisions and procedures
will have to be studied in the context of ef-
forts to put them into effect rapidly and effi-
ciently during the next few months.)
4. Communist Capabilities in the Far East.
As a result of Communist seizure of control
in China, the USSR has available in the Pei-
ping regime a disciplined lieutenant capable of
furthering the international Communist pro-
gram of eliminating Western influence and
establishing indigenous Communist govern-
ments throughout the Far East.
a. Korean Venture.
While there is no clear evidence that either
Chinese Communist or Soviet armed forces
will be used in Korea, the USSR and its Asian
lieutenant will probably try to prevent the
loss of the political and military advantages
already won by the North Koreans. "While it
is doubtful that either Soviet or Chinese Com-
munist forces will be committed south of the
38th parallel, both Moscow and Peiping have
the capability of sending organized military
units to reinforce the North Koreans at any
critical juncture. They are much more likely,
however, to aid the Communist cause in Korea
by releasing large numbers of trained Chinese
Communist (Manchurian "volunteer") units,
perhaps including small air units, for incorpo-
ration in the North Korean forces. In addi-
tion, the Chinese Communists may try to fore-
stall or at least interfere with a major UN
counterattack in Korea by mounting an op-
eration either against Taiwan or in Indochina.
If the USSR and Communist China should
adopt either of these courses of action, it prob-
ably would either bring local military ad-
vantages in Korea by diverting US forces or,
in default of effective US intervention, would
promote general Soviet strategic objectives by
extending Communist influence elsewhere in
Asia.
b. Taiwan.
Formal lodgment of charges against US
"aggression" in Taiwan (as well as on the
Korean-Manchurian frontier) has marked
this theme as a key element in Soviet and
Chinese Communist propaganda. There is
still no conclusive evidence whether political
warfare over Taiwan will be followed or per-
haps accompanied by a military assault on
the island. The remaining time for weather
most favorable to an amphibious attack is
only a few weeks, but the Chinese Commu-
nists are capable of mounting a powerful in-
vasion force in a matter of days. In any
case the Taiwan issue will be pursued relent-
lessly in the UN. The USSR will attempt in
this way to split the solidarity of the nations
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(India, UK, and France in particular) that
supported US policy on intervention in Korea
but are reluctant to become associated with
the Chinese Nationalist regime or to risk in-
volvement in a virtually endless war with Com-
munist China. The USSR and Communist
China, in addition, may hope to secure con-
trol of Taiwan as part of an eventual settle-
ment of the Korean situation.
c. Indochina.
At the present time, opportunities for ex-
pansion of Communist influence in Southeast
Asia appear to be more promising than more
openly belligerent ventures (such as formal
Chinese intervention in Korea). There have
been many indications that Ho Chi Minh's
forces are preparing for an early major mili-
tary offensive. The Chinese Communists are
already assisting the Indochinese rebels by
giving them materiel, technical assistance,
and training. They are capable of invading
Indochina and occupying all of Vietnam ex-
cept Cochin China within a few months. Mos-
cow and Peiping probably would prefer, how-
ever, to maintain the fiction that Communist
aggression in Indochina is merely local revo-
lution or civil war (as they claimed in Korea)
and to rely on the efforts of indigenous "lib-
eration" movements rather than on open em-
ployment of organized forces outside their
own territory. Thus, the Chinese Commu-
nists would continue to limit their aid to Ho
Chi Minh to indirect or covert though sub-
stantial military assistance. In this case,
China would be doing for Indochina some-
thing like what the USSR has done for Korea.
In such a case the USSR would not only be
waging war-by-proxy (as in Korea), but would
be waging war-by-proxy-by-proxy.
The Ho Chi Minh forces probably will in the
near future launch an offensive designed to
seize or destroy key French border posts, re-
duce French strength by attrition, and pre-
pare the way for a decisive campaign some-
time in 1951. If they had substantial num-
bers of artillery pieces and armored vehicles,
the Communist-led rebels would have a good
chance of driving the French out of Indo-
china within the next year or two. Regard-
less of whether Ho Chi Minh receives ' aid in
the form of open military action by Chinese
Communist troop units, Indochina is likely
to pass into the Soviet sphere unless the
French in the meantime receive considerably
more foreign assistance than is presently pro-
grammed and (by greater political concessions
in the direction of national independence), win
over the support of the Vietnamese people.
The slow pace of measures to set up effective
defenses against Communist control in Indo-
china is especially grave because the advent
to effective power of a Communist regime
probably would induce the other independent
states of Southeast Asia to assume a protec-
tive Communist coloration and a generally
pro-Soviet alignment in foreign affairs.
In the short-term future, at least, the spread
of Communist influence in Southeast Asia
probably will continue, acquiring new momen-
tum with every local triumph, in default of :
(1) development of an indigenous Asian re-
gional association capable of resisting the ex-
pansion of Soviet influence in the Far East;
(2) Western success in convincing the local
populations that "colonialism" is not a
threat and that Soviet control is a direct
threat to national independence; (3) effective
US aid. Even if India and the lesser states
of South and Southeast Asia began to cooper-
ate effectively with one another and if they
could be persuaded that the Western Powers
had completely renounced the old Far Eastern
colonial system, a firm military (and political)
front against Soviet and Chinese Communist
influence could be maintained only on the
basis of a comprehensive economic develop-
ment program designed to give the popula-
tions as a whole a stake in their national evo-
lution. There is very little time to organize
such an effort to save Southeast Asia and the
difficulties in the way appear almost insuper-
able. The other alternatives, however, are
either to write off Southeast Asia at once in
order to concentrate on areas of more vital
strategic value to the US or to accept the
probability that it will be lost after a period
in which it drains off French, British, and US
resources badly needed elsewhere.
5. Middle East.
The flexibility of Soviet tactics is revealed
in the current turn of Soviet behavior in the
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Middle East, particularly toward Iran. While
bringing heavy pressure to bear on most non-
Soviet countries, reaching a peak in the
Korean attack, the USSR has recently been
pursuing a soft policy toward such countries
as Iran, Afghanistan, and India, which the
Kremlin evidently wishes merely to neutral-
ize for the time being. In Iran, as a matter of
fact, this soft treatment poses a more difficult
problem for the Iranian Government than
would a harsher attitude and may yield con-
siderable advantages to the USSR without
further resort to pressure tactics. The USSR
has returned Iranian soldiers previously held
prisoner, entered into negotiations for a trade
agreement and the return of impounded
Iranian gold, and proposed to set up a com-
mission for frontier rectification.
These appeasement moves, though they
have not been accompanied by any slackening
of Soviet-inspired separatist agitation in
Azerbaijan and among the Kurds, will stimu-
late the traditional Iranian desire for a for-
eign policy dedicated to neutrality. The new
Soviet approach is well-timed, since the firmly
pro-Western Razmara Government is en-
countering grave difficulties in its chosen
policy of rehabilitating the Iranian economy
with US help. While Premier Razmara is not
likely to relax his vigilance toward ultimate
Soviet designs on Iran, these Soviet gestures
of friendship will encourage criticism along
the line that Iran has become too closely as-
sociated with the US and too dependent on
US aid that was not forthcoming. Should
the combination of Soviet maneuvering and
the anticipated economic hardships of the
winter months cause Razmara's downfall, the
present cabinet might well be replaced by a
government much less firm in its opposition
to the extension of Soviet influence in Iran
and even, after a time, by a government openly
in favor of appeasement of the USSR.
6. Propaganda War.
Concurrently with its integrated campaign
of aggression, pressure, and political entice-
ment around the borders of the Soviet sphere,
the USSR is vigorously prosecuting its propa-
ganda warfare in the UN. Soviet obstructive
tactics in the UN Security Council have re-
sulted in no spectacular victories, since there
was no way to invalidate the June Security
Council resolutions that formed the basis of
UN intervention in Korea. Nevertheless, the
USSR succeeded in broadening the Security
Council agenda to include Communist charges
of US aggression, thus obscuring somewhat
the issue of North Korean aggression and in-
troducing a bargaining point of possible use
in a future settlement of the Korean war.
Chinese Communist charges of US aggres-
sion, both on Taiwan and along the Korean-
Manchurian frontier, and charges of French
and British border "violations" as well, could
of course be used as "justification" for Chinese
Communist intervention in Korea or else-
where. At present, however, the USSR is us-
ing the threat of Chinese Communist inter-
vention in an attempt to intimidate the US
and its UN allies and divide them from one
another.
Soviet tactics in UN meetings during Sep-
tember will probably continue in the pattern
evident since the return of Soviet delegate
Malik on 1 August. However, US willingness
to have charges of "US aggression" placed on
the SC agenda and to have UN commissions
make on-the-spot investigations has consid-
erably deflated these potentially dangerous
Soviet propaganda efforts. The impact of
these charges will be further reduced if the
US backs a UN solution for the eventual dis-
position of Taiwan and follows up its present
meticulously correct attitude on the charges
of violations of Chinese territory by US air-
craft. A continuation of such parliamentary
successes in the SC would enable the US to
counter Soviet propaganda moves and to pre-
pare the ground for what will probably de-
velop into the most solid anti-Soviet front yet
displayed in the UN General Assembly.
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