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November 1, 1955
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Approved onRelbase 2007/01/17 : CIA-13WP86B00269R000300120001-4 Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy ? Source Book of Individual Papers Approved .gy Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy Source Book of Individual Papers Shortly after the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference, Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President, convened a panel of knowledgeable persons to consider the psychological aspects of U. S. strategy in the light of the Post- Geneva situation. The findings of this panel have been submitted in a report entitled "Psychological Aspects of U. S. Strategy." Individual papers written for consideration of the panel in the preparation of this report are included in this volume. The terms of reference of the study panel which produced this volume of individual papers are implicit in the world situation. It was thought that "an initial survey of the psychological aspects of the political, economic, social, and military factors affecting [the security of the United States]" would undoubtedly result in the panel focusing attention not only on certain vital areas of governmental activity, but on the major regional problems as well. Background areas of investigation to which the panel turned included: (1) major political trends, (2) the military balance, and (3) Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as geographic units. Likely emerging for- eign policies of various nations, the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc versus the Free World alliance system, the scale and character of the likely Soviet effort in the arms race over the next five to ten years, the likely Communist challenge to the underdeveloped areas over this same time period, and the possible uses to which the Soviets might put arms parity or superiority, or other positions of relative strength, were assessed and considered. The psychological aspects of implementing programs were an important term of reference for the panel. The scale and character of the Free World effort in a number of crucial areas were considered. In addition, the panel accepted the task of how best to integrate its findings in order to provide governmental departments with useful, definitive psychological guidance. All the foregoing considerations are in varying degrees reflected in the indi- vidual papers presented in this volume. These papers were written as a pre- liminary stop before the panel met to deliberate. They served as the basis from which the final panel report evolved. It should be emphasized that each of these papers is the work of an indi- vidual, with varying degrees of assistance from his critic. The substance of each is not necessarily agreed to in toto by the panel as a whole. The letter inviting panel participation and the objectives of the panel are appended. Chairman, Frederick L. Anderson, Major General, USAF (Rot.) C. D. Jackson, Time Incorporated Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Director, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Harvard University Colonel George A. Lincoln, Professor of Social Sciences, U. S. Military Academy Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University Mr. Stacy May, Consulting Economist Dr. Max F. Millikan, Director, The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Dr. George Pettee, Assistant Director, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University Dr. Stefan T. Possony, Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air Force Mr. William Webster, Executive Vice President, New England Electric System PANEL MEMBERS------ ----------------------------- -- INDIVIDUAL PAPERS. Page xv 1. A Post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions by Philip E, Mosely 1. The problem------------------------------------- -------------------- 1 H. Assumptions--------------------------------------------------------- - 1 III. Discussion----------------------------------------- ---------------- 1 2. Thresholds of U. S. Effort by Max Millikan 1. Why are there threshold effects? ----------------------------------------------------- 6 II. Critical thresholds in current policy-------------------------------------------------- 6 III. Outside aid and the threshold effect-------------------------------------- 8 IV. Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 3. Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy by Max Milliken 1. The thesis------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 II. Misconceptions as to the purposes of economic programs---------------------- 9 III. The error that aid will gain us friends______________________ ----------------- 0 IV. The error that aid is to strengthen foreign military capabilities-------------------------- 10 V. The error that Communism springs from hunger--------------------------------------- 11 V1, The positive case for economic programs---------------------------------------------- 13 VII. Requirements for the growth of political maturity-------------------------------------- 13 VIII. How economic programs can promote steps to satisfy these requirements----------------- 15 IX. Economic programs-a way to by-pass political stalemate------------------------------- 17 X. A new policy toward colonial areas--------------------------------------------------- 18 XI. Effect on our more developed allies--------------------------------------------------- IS XII. The conditions for effectiveness of economic programs---------------------------------- 10 XIII. What influence can we have from outside on these conditionsl___________________________ 20 XIV. The threshold of effort required------------------------------------------------------ 21 XV. Economic factors affecting the threshold---------------------------------------------- 21 XVI. Non-economic factors affecting the threshold------------------------------------------ 22 XVII. The relevance of U. S. trade policy--------------------------------------------------- 23 4. General Guide Lines for an American Long Range Psychological Plan by Stefan Possony I. General principles------------------------------------------------------------- 25 II. American behavior---------------------------------------------------------- 28 III. Central concepts of a psychological warfare plan--------------------------------------- 29 5. A Positive Position for the Third Phase of the Cold War by George Pettee I. Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------- 33 II. The general position------------------------------------------------------------ 34 III. The cold war---------------------------------------------------------------- 35 IV. The free world reaction ------------------------------------------------------------- 37 V. The world situation of the twentieth century------------------------------------------ 38 VI. The backward areas: revolution without Communism---------------------------------- 43 VII. The place of Communism----------------------------------------------------- 46 VIII. The position of the U. 5--------------------------------------------------------- 50 IX. Conclusions-------------------------- ---------------------------------------- 57 The immediate situation -------------------------------------------------------- 57 The general situation----------------------------------------------------- 58 The backward areas ----------------------------------------------------------- 58 Communism ------------------------------------------------------------------ 58 The United States---------------------------------------------------------- 50 Summary ---------------------------------------------- ----------------------- 59 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 CONTENTS SECRET Page 6. The U. S. Public-A Matter of Orchestration by C. D. Jackson I. The problem------------------------------------------------------------- ----- 61 H. The need--------------------------------------------------------------- 62 III. The proposal-------------------------------------------------------------- 62 7. The Discrete Problems of the Far East by Paul M. A. Lineberger Prefatory------------------------------------------------------------------- 65 1. Prologue------------------------------------------------------------------- 66 II. Draft statement of a ten-year policy____________________________________________ ____ 69 Statement of the problem ------------------------------------------------------ 69 Facts bearing on the problem-------------------------------------------------- 70 Discussion------------------------------------------------------------ 72 Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------- 72 Recommendations-------------------------------------------------------- 73 III. The overseas Chinese --------------------------------------------------------------- 73 8. Policy and Opinion in South and Southeast Asia by Paul M. A. Lineberger. Prefatory------------------------------------------------------------------ 75 1. Indochina----------------------------------------- 75 The present situation in Vietnam________________________________________________ 76 The promising area of Cambodia ------------------------------------------------ 78 Laos--------------------------------------------------------------- 79 II. India_______________________________________________ ______-__________ 70 III. The relations of the British to American policy in this area______________________________ 81 British domestic policies affecting the U. S. position in the world____________________ 81 British policies in the international scene affecting the United States_________________ 82 9. The Middle East and Africa-A Working Paper by George A. Lincoln 1. The problem------------------------------------------------------------------- 83 General description of area_____________________________________________________ 83 II. North Africa and the Middle East___________________________________________________ 83 Current threats to the situation_________________________________________________ 86 The Communist hazard_____________________________ -------------------------------------------------------- 87 III. Things to do in the North Africa-Middle Eastern area__________________________________ 87 The Arab-Israeli situation______________________________________________________ 88 The colonial problem __________________________ 88 Regional organization ____________________________________________ 80 Operation of private organizations_______________________________________________ 89 Flexibility, suitability, and rapid action in our Middle East operations_______________ 00 IV. Africa south of the Sahara__________________________________________________________ 90 French colonies ---------------------------------------------------------------- 91 British colonies---------------------------------------------------------- 91 Other colonies________________________________________________________________ 91 Some problems and hazards of progress__________________________________________ 91 The Communist threat__________________ --------------------------------------------------------- 92 African leadership----------------------------------------------------------- 92 V. The U. S. problem in Africa on colonialism------- -------------------------------------------- 03 VI. What's the U. S. program?____ ---------------------------------------------------------- 93 A possible program ------------------------------------------------------------ 04 Appendix A-Notes on U. S. Policy Formulation for Middle East and North Africa__________________ 95 Appendix B-The Current Crisis_ -------------------------------------------------------------- go 10. Latin America-As a Demonstration Area of U. S. Foreign Policy in Action by Stacy May 1. Introduction-the thesis of the paper_________________________________________________ 99 II. If. S. and Latin American interdependence____________________________ 09 III. Heroic objectives and human performance___________________ -------------------------------------------- 100 Capital investment_ _________________________________________ 101 Trade ---------------------------------------------------- 102 IV. Communist subversion efforts in Latin America 103 V. Conclusions----- --------------------------------------------------- 104 SECRET 11. The National Costs and Policies Required to Maintain a Modern Weapons System by Ellis A. Johnson I. The problem----------------------------------------------------- --------------- 107 II. Assumptions----------------------------------------------------------------- 107 III, Facts bearing on the problem________________________________________________________ 107 TV. Discussions------------------------------------------------------------------ 107 V. Conclusions----------------------------------------------------- - -------------- 118 VI. Recommendations---------------------------------------------------------- 119 Appendix A-Results of Illustrative Game______________________________________________________ 121 Appendix B-Defense of Continental U. S. Against Air Attack____________________________________ 125 Appendix C-Defense of NATO Against Air Attack______________________________________________ 126 I. Current military posture of NATO___________________________________________________ 126 IT. Analysis of the problem------------------------------------------------------ 126 III. The threat-------------------------------------------------------------- 128 IV. Defensive weapons systems--------------------------------------------------------- 130 V. Nike----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 131 VI. Employment of Nike--------------------------------------------------------- 131 VII. Production feasibility --------------------------------------------------------------- 132 VIII. Costs---------------------------------------------------------------------- 132 IX, Personnel requirements----------------------------------------------------------- 132 X. Special problems---------- --------------------------------------------- 133 12. Arms Equation by George A. Lincoln in collaboration with William Webster 1. The problem---------------------------------------------------------- 135 II. Assumptions and guide lines --------------------------------------------------------- 135 III. Nature of maned force--------------------------------------------------------- 137 Arms race or great power maneuver-arms equation --------------------------------- 137 Characteristics by which to judge military power---------------------------------- 138 "Nuclear superiority''__________________________________________________________ 138 Two equations--------------------------------------------------------------- 138 Equation A-------------------------------------------------------------- 130 Equation B----------------------------------------------- ---------------- 140 Allies, Geneva, and nuclear standoff---------------------------------------------- 141 The importance of NATO--------------------------------------------------- 142 IV. Integration of military force with other arms of national policy__________________________ 142 V. Things to do---------------------------------------------------------------- 144 VI. What is the price tag?-------------------------------------------------------------- 146 13. Crucial Problems of Control of Armaments and Mutual Inspection by Ellis A. Johnson I. The problem--------------------------------------------------------------- 147 II. Discussion ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 147 Appendix A-Science Advisory Committee Comments on Control of Armaments and Inspection-----_- 149 I, Questions for discussion on armament reduction--------------------- - - ---------- 149 IT. Topical outline for a study of the technical and scientific background for a U. S. position on reduction of armaments---------------------------------------------------- 151 III. Related Memoranda---------------------------------------------- ----------- 153 14. Thresholds of Armament Effort-U. S. and USSR by Stacy May 1. Current U. S. and USSR comparisons-total economic output and military expenditures--- 165 The United States---------------------------------------------------------- -- 166 The USSR------------------------------------------------------------------- 165 Comparison of the two------------------------------------------------------ 165 IT. The Soviet breaking point---------------------------------------------------------- 166 III. Conclusions ------------------------------------------------------------_ 167 16. Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR by Henry A. Kissinger I. The Problem----------------------------------------------------------------- 169 IT. The implications of the Geneva summit conference------------------------------------- 171 III. Outline of a future strategy--------------------------------------------------------- 172 IV. Notes on the arms race---------------------------------- ------------------------- 174 SECRET 16. The German Problem by Henry A. Kissinger 17. Soviet Evolution by George Pettee 1. The problem___________________________________________ ____________ II. Sub-problems----------------------------------' -- I11. Facts and assumptions ------------------------------------------------------------- IV. Discussion------------------------------------------------------------------ The USSR in the present world political system___________________________________ The primary characteristics of the USSR as a community--------------------------- Factors tending toward a favorable development___________________________________ Factors tending toward an unfavorable development_______________________________ Alternative forms of struggle____________________________________________________ Possible U. S. courses of action-------------------------------------------------- 18. Investigation of NATO by Stefan Possony 1. The problem----"------------------------------------------------- 189 I1. Assumptions-------------' ----------------------------------- 189 III. Discussion 190 Security problems--------------------------------------------------------- 190 Peaceful collaboration---------_ ______ ________ 191 -joint studies--------------------------------------------------------- 191 -joint ventures___________ ______________________________________ 195 -adaptations----------------------------------------------------------- 198 -reporting organs_________________________________________________________ 199 IV. Conclusions 201 V. Recommendation--------------- --" 201 19. The Atoms for Peace Program by Stefan Possony 1. Electric power program---------------------------------------------------------- II. Difficulties -----------'----------'------------------------------`--- III Conclu i . s on 20. The Purpose, Requirements, and Structure of an American Ideological Program 1. Introduction------------- by Stefan Possony 211 ------------'-- II. Discussion 211 The current situation_______ 216 III. Summary''---------------'- 220 IV. Conclusions 221 V. Recommendation 222 LETTER OF INVITATION 224 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES OF THE PANEL 225 Paper 1 A Post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions 1. THE PROBLEM The problem is to estimate both the, possible and probable range of Soviet intentions now and in the near future, e. g., during the next twelve to eighteen months. H. ASSUMPTIONS For purposes of this discussion, it is not assumed that the Soviet leaders now in com- mand of Soviet decisions are entirely new people, devoid of Soviet experience or Bol- shevilc ideology, but are people who have struggled to the top within the Stalinist system, and that Khrushchev was sincere, in his ex- promptu speech of September 17, in asserting his devotion to Leninist ideology. It is also assumed that, although the present leaders have demonstrated a greater flexibility and adaptability in their tactics than at any time since 1946, they are fully aware of the limits within which their ideology allows them to maneuver, as well as of the limits set by the concrete interests of the Soviet state in the pursuit of its foreign policy aims. It is further assumed that the present leadership is well aware of the earlier periods of relative flexi- bility, demonstrated particularly in the mid- 1030's and during World War II, and that they have not exhausted the range of adaptations which they can introduce into the immediate conduct of Soviet policy. It is assumed like- wise that the experience of the past two and ono-half years suggests that it is relatively fruitless to attempt to identify a "hard" or "soft" policy with this or that individual within the ruling group. For purposes of this estimate it is assumed that the Soviet leadership understands, better than did Stalin, the impact of the atomic age, the nature of new weapons, and therefore the dangers which inhere in the race for supremacy. It is also assumed that the Soviet leaders are better aware than previously of the difficult choices which they must make in the allocation of resources to various purposes. It is clear that the now leadership is showing a much sharper awareness of the actual and potential reactions abroad to their policies, together with a growing skill in manipulating these reactions. The Free World, and particularly the United States, can no longer rely on massive Soviet hostility of expression to provide the basis for our own decisions. These decisions must be planned skillfully to seize and retain the initia- tive in the face of a greatly expanded Soviet arsenal of political warfare weapons. III. DISCUSSION The new Soviet tactic of relaxation has dis- tinguished carefully between trivial and essen- tial interests. The long-overdue Soviet accept- ance of the treaty with Austria has initiated profound shifts in the popular estimate, within Europe, of the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. Without sacrificing any important interest, the Soviet leadership has achieved an important change in the international atmos- phere. The abandonment of the useless quarrel with Tito has probably moved Yugoslavia to CONFIDENTIAL the position of a neutral, one which on many international issues will support the Soviet position. This gesture, together with the out- break of Greek-Turkish antagonism, has greatly reduced, at least temporarily, the defensive value of the three-power Balkan alliance. The withdrawal from the Porkkala base will relieve the fear of renewed Soviet aggression widely felt in Finland, and will reinforce neutralist trends in the other Scandinavian countries. At the same time the Soviet government has made it amply clear, if it were not clear before, that it has no intention of abandoning its valuable colony, East Germany, and that neutralism is designed only for export beyond the boundaries of the Soviet bloc. The effects of the new Soviet tactic are favor- able within the Soviet Union. It creates a far stronger basis for popular acceptance of the regime's claims to be pursuing a peace-loving policy. If a reversal comes, and it can cone over night, a new policy of tension will be ac- cepted with greater credence by the population at large as well as by the Communist Party. At home the Soviet leadership has traditionally followed apolicyof alternate tension andrelaxa- tion, realizing that an unrelenting state of ten- sion leads to many unfavorable results, deple- tion of hope, pessimistic expectations for the future and other morale-depressing results. Within the satellites the new tactic is also favorable. It tends to strengthen the position of the Communist ruling groups and to discour- age expectations of an early liberation, which previously has been expected, as the result of an early clash between the two major blocs. A policy of relaxation, which could have been risky in earlier years, offers no substantial risks today to Soviet control, for during the years of sharp tension the Communist apparatus has been recruited, disciplined and given confidence in its ability to rule, with Soviet backing. Within Western Germany the effects of the new tactic are favorable to the Soviet position. Those who oppose rearmament can now assert that the new Soviet policy makes it unnecessary for Germany to incur the economic costs and political risks of rearming. It reinforces the hopes of those who believe that reunification can be achieved through a policy of weakness. It discourages those who support rearmament and cooperation with the West because the general atmosphere of relaxation makes it ap- pear that, no matter what efforts Germany may make, the prospect for reunification becomes dimmer. In Western Europe and Japan, social and political resentment of the cost of defense and political resentments over the inevitable frictions of alliances promote indifference to the common aims of the free world and leave the way open to revive many domestic and intra-alliance squabbles. Within the United States the willingness to make sacrifices to maintain and strengthen the free world alliances and to give the primary to international aims over domestic ones is likely to be diminished. Has the Soviet leadership exhausted its bag of Christmas presents? There seems to be very few further "concessions" which it can make in order to retain the initiative in the course of relaxation. Cultural exchanges offer an insubstantial and undramatic ground for new gestures. The development of trade between the Soviet bloc and the free world is likely to be slow and to be fraught with more disappointments of expectations than with ful- fillments of hopes on the part of the free world countries. One possibility is that the Soviet leadership expects the tendency of relaxation to be of relatively short duration and is there- fore willing to spend its chips somewhat lavishly at this time, in order to achieve a maximum short-term effect upon opinion abroad. A second possibility is that, though the Soviet leadership may intend to continue the policy of relaxation into an indefinite future, the outside world will come to realize that the basic position and demands of the Soviet regime remain un- changed and will therefore recover gradually from the immediate impact of the Soviet policy of relaxation and will come to take a more balanced view of the medium-range prospect for better relations between the two blocs. If the Soviet leadership is sincere in seeking a long-range relaxation, followed by genuine co-existence, it would do exactly what it is doing now. However, in order to continue the strengthening of the mood of relaxation abroad the Soviet leadership would have to provide new and stronger proof of its long-Tango inten- tion. The most important single sphere of such proof would be in the field of inspection and limitation of armaments. And it is pre- cisely in this sphere that the Soviet leadership is least likely to display any genuine evidence of seeking a long-range relaxation of tension. That is why the question of control of arma- ments must be pursued with a maximum of energy and the greatest possible clarity of statement for the public at large, both in the United States and abroad. Is the Soviet leadership engaged in one of its classical maneuvers, designed to reduce tension and allied unity in Europe, in expectation of sharpened tension in Asia? There is no ques- tion but what the Soviet and Chinese Com- munist leaderships consider Southeast Asia a highly favorable field of expansion during the next few years. They also believe that a further shaking of American prestige in Asia may give them control of Formosa and of South Korea, together with the neutralization of Japan, and that they must strive to minimize the risks of war in pursuing these aims. The Chinese communists are preparing intensively the capability for seizing the offshore islands and, if they carry this out with direct damage to American prestige, they may hope to shake the Chinese Nationalist regime on Formosa. The important thing for them is to be as certain as they can that the United States will be deterred by its allies from retaliation. Strength- ening the mood of relaxation in Western Europe is the best way to achieve a separation between the American position in Europe and that in Asia. American policy will be confronted shortly with the question of whether to permit "free elections" for the unification of Vietnam; if it decides not to permit them, in order to prevent a further territorial expansion by the Com- munist bloc, it will then face the problem of creating a viable regime in South Vietnam and of defending it by American land power. A refusal of "free elections" will be followed by a renewal of guerrilla warfare, conducted by a vastly strengthened Viet Minh force without direct Chinese Communist participation. Over this issue, as well as over the question of retalia- tion against an attack on the offshore islands, the Soviet leadership presumably hopes to isolate the United States from its allies. It may hope, beyond that, that the fear of a major war breaking out in the Far East may lead the allies of the United States to request the with- drawal of American forces from their territories, perhaps for the period of the Far Eastern crisis. The Communist aggression in Korea was followed by a sharpened fear of aggression in Europe and thus provided an important stimu- lus to the efforts for self-defense and mutual defense. The Korean outbreak had been preceded by several years of extreme pressure against vulnerable points along the European periphery of the Soviet bloc. A similar but more confusing Communist outthrust, for example in Indochina, may not have a similarly stimulating effect on self-defense efforts in Europe, since it will have been preceded by a systematic pattern of minor but locally impres- sive concessions. The "concessions" which are being used as counters by the Soviet leadership in its present tactic are of slight or no importance to the Soviet bloc but have an impressive impact on the peoples beyond its borders. It is necessary to negotiate actively on the really difficult problems in order to make clear to European peoples that the basic Soviet position in respect to Germany and the satellites remains unchanged. It is desirable to take an initiative in lessening trade barriers, except in carefully defined strategic lists, in order to prevent this card from being played against the American and free world position. It is important to establish a broader free world position on the principal issues in the Far East, since otherwise CONFIDENTIAL the United States alliances elsewhere in the world may be nullified in practice through the pursuit of a separate policy in the Far East by the United States, There is no sign whatever that the Chinese Communist leadership or the Soviet leadership have relaxed their immediate awns in the Far East. It is more likely, on balance, that, by diversifying their tactics in Europe and in Asia, they are striving to secure local political and perhaps military advances in the Far East, hoping at the same time to weaken or destroy the U. S. system of alliances and to achieve their basic aim: the retraction of American power from its advanced positions to the territory of U. S. allies. ;Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 Thresholds of U. S. Effort Originator: Max T. Millikan Critic: George Pettee The drafters of basic policy statements at the level of NSC papers are confronted with a serious dilemma. On the one hand if they make these statements too detailed and specific, they will make inadequate allowance for the innumerable variations of circumstance and event which must condition the detailed im- plementation of a broad policy. On the other hand if they are to be drawn so as to cover all contingencies and still be short, they are in danger of being so general and platitudinous as to be of almost no use in Providing selective guidance in deciding between two alternative specific courses of action. The requirements of brevity and interdepartmental compromise usually force the drafters to seize the second horn of this dilemma and escape their obliga- tion to be helpful to those charged with de- tailed implementation by the use of such phrases as "where appropriate," "when re- quired by the national interest," "unless clearly dictated by security considerations," and the like. In part this is a weakness which is inherent in the very nature of a basic policy paper and cannot be avoided by the most conscientious and unambiguous drafting. It is part of the essence of "policy" that it cannot be fully defined in general terms and can be recognized only after the fact as a series of consistent specific acts taken in a particular context, designed to produce cumulatively a major general result. It is the obligation of drafters of basic policy proposals, however, to reduce to an irreducible minimum the degree to which implementation must be played by ear. There is one particular respect in which there is both a possibility and an urgent need to improve Paper 2 practice in this regard. This has to do with giving indications of the order of magnitude of effort required if a recommended course of action is to have, even qualitatively, the result it is designed to achieve. Some activities are of the "some is good, more is better" variety; that is, there is a small benefit to be derived from a small effort and the benefit increases in a fairly regular fashion as the effort increases. The decision as to how much effort to expend in view of all the circumstances is one which results from a balancing of rising costs against rising benefits. The precise amount decided upon is a matter of judgment and there is little in the way of objective rules to tell the decision-maker whether it should be more or less. There are other activities, however, in which a minimum threshold of effort must be crossed if the result is to be even qualitatively in the right direction. Lesser effort does not produce merely a lesser result; it produces no desirable result at all. One can drive a car at any speed from a creep in low gear to eighty miles per hour and got where. one wants to go at a varying cost in time. But if one is flying an airplane, one must achieve a certain critical velocity or the plane will never leave the ground. Where one is dealing with what the mathe- matician would call the case of continuous variation there is some defense for the drafter of basic policy who refuses to attach numbers to his recommendations on the ground that the precise degree of effort justified must de- pend on complex considerations outside the scope of the policy under review. The only question the policy leaves unsettled is the degree and not the kind of effect to be achieved. But CONFIDENTIAL where there is a discontinuity in the relation between effort and benefit, specifically where there exists a threshold effect of the kind de- scribed above, the policy is not really defined even in broad terms unless some indication is given of the minimum scale of effort required to get the kind of effect one is aiming at. It is the contention of this paper that thresh- olds of this sort characterize a number of key areas of our cold war policy, that we are expend- ing some effort in all these areas, but that the effort is currently well below the threshold and that in consequence we have the illusion of a pol- icy rather than the policy itself. Whether one agrees with this judgment of the effectiveness of current efforts there can surely be no quarrel with the principle that where a minimum threshold of effort can clearly be shown to be required to achieve a result in the right direc- tion the identification of that threshold (at least to an order of magnitude) is a necessary part of any basic document purporting to describe the policy. 1. WHY ARE THERE THRESHOLD EFFECTS? There are three sorts of reasons for the existence of threshold effects. In the first place the United States may be engaged in an endeavor whose outcome depends upon the relative scale of our effort compared to that of another power. Conventional military com- bat falls in this category. The threshold is set by the opposing power to be overcome or frus- trated. If the effort is too small, the result is defeat; if it is adequate, the result is victory or effective deterrence. The difference between the results is clearly one of kind and not of degree. In the second place an effort on our part may have as one of its objectives stiffening the resolve of an ally to continue to undertake actions we believe to be in our interest. In the post-Geneva atmosphere whether our allies maintain a burdensome military effort and a politically unpopular support for NATO may depend critically on what kind of an example we set. The threshold of our effort necessary to set an example for them is perhaps much harder to estimate with precision than the mili- tary threshold described above, and it may be a hand of values rather than a single sharply defined one. Nevertheless there is likely to be a reaction from them which will be qualita- tively different if they believe we are signifi- cantly relaxing our efforts than if they believe we are continuing to carry our just share of the load. In the third place there are actions of ours whose effectiveness may be subject to this threshold effect wholly apart from any compari- son with the level of effort by others. An ex- ample might be air defense. A level of air defense which gives. us a reasonable assurance of survival in the face of atomic attack is quali- tatively and not just quantitatively different from one which does not provide this assurance. This is a field in which there may be several thresholds. Small levels of effort may be suffi- cient somewhat to reduce the amount of dam- age we?suffer but inadequate to provide either effective deterrence or assurance of survival. A somewhat larger effort, inadequate to give reasonable, assurance of survival, may still be enough effectively to deter a potential enemy from taking the risk of failure. Finally a still larger effort might reduce the risk of annihila- tion to a very,,small figure. H. CRITICAL\,THRESHOLDS IN CURRENT POLICY It is perhaps worth elaborating a bit three areas in which the estimation of a threshold of effort may be particularly vital in the current phase of the cold war. The first of these has to do with the shape of the arms race over the next decade. One clear purpose of our policy may be to persuade the rulers of the Soviet empire that our resources and our determina- tion are such that they simply have no reason- able hope of being able to establish sufficient military superiority over us to use military power as a principal instrument for extending their area of influence., One purpose of their lApproved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 CONFIDENTIAL THRESHOLDS OF present line of approach is undoubtedly to see whether by softening their manner they can induce a relaxation of our efforts sufficient to permit them over a number of years to achieve such a degree of superiority. As long as they believe they can do this at a bearable cost to themselves the chances that they will agree to a really effective system of arms control which will remove military instruments from the arena of international conflict are negligible. There is a minimum and quite high level of effort in arms production, in the maintenance of forces, and especially in aggressive research and development which will be necessary to persuade them that they cannot gain on us in the long run. The estimation of this threshold level is clearly difficult. It places a very high priority on intelligence as to Soviet achievements, since this is clearly in the category of thresholds which are determined by relative effort. Never- theless it should be possible, within a fairly wide band of possibilities, to get some indica- tions of what we must spend in money and effort to keep far enough ahead to persuade them that this particular game is not worth while. The stakes are so high and the long- run gains from success so great that we should be willing to err on the side of exaggerating the height of this threshold to avoid a risk of defeat. It is worth emphasizing that the threshold here defined is a different and probably higher one than that defined by considerations of our own short-run security. It is not sufficient merely to keep abreast or to deter current attack if the hope is nourished in the Soviet Union that there is a good possibility that they will gain an edge in the future. The demonstration that they cannot win must be sufficiently decisive and sufficiently sustained to persuade them to alter a basic policy they have pursued for some time. The second critical threshold in current policy relates to the same area of effort, namely defense expenditures in the United States, but is defined by the necessity to set a persuasive example for our allies. The countries of Western Europe have, under our prodding, U. S. ErroRT 7 been maintaining military establishments which are relatively speaking a greater burden on their poorer economies than we suffer from our military effort. There are important elements of public opinion in those countries which hold that this level of military effort is both un- bearable and unnecessary. The effort to hold the alliance together in the faco of the relaxation of tensions inaugurated at Geneva is going to require on our part convincing evidence that Ave regard the threat as still great enough to justify a major outlay on our part. If we shave our own defense budget and reduce taxes in this country at the same thne that we are pressing the NATO countries for more rapid fulfillment of their commitments, we will bring about either the defeat of our friends or their defection from our causo. A level of effort which would exceed the first threshold described in paragraphs toll and cloven above would almost certainly be sufficient to exceed the one just described, but the two constitute separate reasons for insisting that a policy of maintaining our defensive guard is meaningless unless a price tag is attached to the policy with some specific numbers on it. A third critical threshold exists in an entirely different area of policy, that of economic aid to the underdeveloped areas. Troia is explained in greater detail in Draft Paper Number Four, but a summary of the argument may help to illustrate the threshold concept. In the first place there is a minimum level of investment which countries with expanding populations must undertake merely to prevent their stand- arcls of living from declining. This level will be quite inadequate to produce any of the economic or political results which it policy of encouraging economic development is do' signed to produce. '111e people of these areas have acquired, on a scale never before ap- proached in history, a belief that change and improvement in their lot is possible. This revolution of rising expectations is inducing leaders to explore what forms of society are likely to have the best promise of satisfying those expectations. If voluntarist and domo- CONFIDENTIAr Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 cratic forms do no more than hold their own with population increase, they will almost certainly not survive in the face of skillful persuasion accompanied by example from behind the Iron Curtain. This means that in many of these areas investment must be suf- ficient to produce at least a rate of growth of national product in excess of 1%% percent per year, which is a commonly found rate of increase of population. Actually the threshold is substantially higher than this. The process of growth is a cumula- tive one. If a country is poor, it has great difficulty in raising the resources required to expand its physical plant in order to become richer. But once the process of growth gets under way, the increments of new product forthcoming each year provide new resources for reinvestment and thus for continued and expanded growth. Beyond this resource con- sideration, there are many intangible reasons why growth is a self-reinforcing process. It must attain a certain scale and momentum in order to capture the imaginations and enlist the energies of the vigorous elements in the population. If it becomes sufficiently evident that progress is being made not just in one or two spots but widely throughout the country, the pursuit of economic change may become a symbol to which increasing numbers of citizens attach their national and their personal aspira- tions. If it occurs on too small a scale, it will not provide the escape valvefornewly awakened energies which will pour, instead, into much more politically and socially destructive channels of protest, III. OUTSIDE AID AND THE THRESHOLD EFFECT So far we have spoken of the level of effort required within a country if its own desires to expand its economy are to be even partially met. Unless there is local effort, of course, no amount of outside capital or assistance will be successful in launching self-sustaining growth. And unless growth is in the end self-sustaining it cannot be the basis for political stability and development. But if the local will is present, an injection of resources from the outside on a sufficient scale and over a long enough period can make the critical difference between a country's exceeding the threshold of effort which will launch it on a long-term, upward path and falling short of that threshold with resultant deterioration of both its economy and its body politic. Thus a level of outside aid which is insufficient is likely to create a vicious spiral in which the amount of aid called for to save a country from imminent crisis keeps rising until at last no amount will prevent disaster. On the other hand a level above the critical one in the early years can lead to growth which will in time make the recipient quite independent of the need for further foreign capital resources. It is worth emphasizing that the upward and downward spirals described above are likely to be social and political as well as economic, and that the thresholds of effort required of us relate not only to amounts of money to be spent but also to amounts of American energies to be put into developing local leadership, assisting in the most effective use of the resources we supply, providing political support to governments which give promise of being domestically effective, and the like. IV. CONCLUSION There are, of course, serious clangors in putting numbers into basic policy papers. It is impossible to justify any particular sot of numbers as being precisely the right ones, A policy with. numbers runs the risk of being attacked on, the details of its computations rather than on its essential elements. But the argument of this paper is that there are many policies for which at least the order of magnitude of the effort recommended is an essential-in some cases the most assential-olonialit of Clio policy. To avoid including this element is to avoid stating a policy at all. This may make agreement easier in an interdepartmental body, but it does not advance the national interest, Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 Paper 3 Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy 1. THE THESIS The thesis of this paper is that a much ex- panded program of American participation in the economic dovolopuiont of the so-called undordevolopod areas can and should he one of the most important oloumnts in a program of expanding the dynamism and stability of the Free World and increasing its resistance to the appeals of (Jonlilt] nism. I boliovo such a program can bo so designed as to be a principal and effective instrument in our efforts to produce political, social, and psychological results in our interest. Specifically I believe that Buell it program is one of the few eoneroto ins trunmu i tali ties available to as for luohioving the twofold result of (l.) developing viable, ener- getic, and confident democratic societies through the Free World and (2) increasing the realiza- tion elsewhere in the world that tilt) goals, aspirations, and Values of the peoples of other countries are in largo part the same as ours. TO be effective such it program would require the expenditure by the U. S. Government of somewhat larger sums than we are currently spoiling for economic aid, but the amnounis needed would be small compared to what we will have to spend in desperate efforts to put out additional brush fires if they get started. and insignificant compared to the costs of waging limited wars, II. MISCONCEPTIONS AS TO THE PUR- POSES OP ECONOMIC PROGRAMS This thesis has been pub forward frequently over the past, few years and has equally fro- - _ ,. ` ----------------------- 4.8 23.3 ------ 46.6 1 260. o o r s ng ex p e t c ti a ons i s certainly generated in part by modern com- Irammn Statistics for 1954 are meaningless munications coupled with disparities in ways of bt?i su c of the Mu sadegI incident, life resulting from the belated equivalent of the It is apparent that a west e enmrent e h rn Industrial capital is revolution. Poplulation pros- ' ;uzco: Tke b'c rsno nisi, July 2, 1055. sores generated i11 art b P by western hygiene, a rapid lttnt?nnou ;.. ...-t-__ , e yprus problem may develop as not too dissimilar from Vonotia Giulia or Alsace-Lorraine-Uut with the cle- velopments decades. compressed into years rather than The revolution f i i DD roved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 markets except for oil, continuation of the land- lord system in many areas, lack of raw materials other than oil, lack of capital and lack of eco- nomic systems to procure and use it according to western capitalistic methods-these and other aspects increase the hazards presented by the "rising expectations." We have prob- ably made the primary contribution to building the expectations to a level incapable of ful- fillment-even in the oil states. Israel and Turkey, now overextended on borrowed money, are good examples. But a projection of popu- lation increases and probable capital develop- ment supports the judgment for all states except perhaps some of the oil states. Capital development must far outstrip population in- crease if the expected gains are to be made. The Middle Eastern-North African area has no frontiers to exploit except oil, improved irrigation, and the individual productivity of the people. A rapidly moving social and economic situation requires a high degree of political competence to give reasonable assur- ance against disaster. If the government is a democracy, the competence must exist on all levels and is derived from both literacy and experience. The required competence prob- ably does not exist. There is disunity inter- nationally and probably all governments except Turkey are of questionable stability and of questionable continuity as to policy. Peoples and leadership are volatile and emotional in reactions to situations. The unsuitability of the social and economic base line is a matter turning on the time ele- ment. If the area had 350 years to make the changes accomplished in western Europe since 1000 (some portions of the area are starting from the time of St. Patrick!) all might be well. But this change seems now scheduled for a few decades at most-starting from about 1940. The progression from an agricultural to a mixed economy, the consequent development of a large laboring class, even though those in the oil fields are well paid, the development of a middle class and the problem of satisfying its aspirations, the problems created by minorities traditionally remaining unified and separate from the remainder of the local people; these are some of the continuous hazards of the area. The unnatural boundaries from a geographic and political standpoint are even more un- natural from the standpoint of probable eco- nomic requirements of the future. Israel is an international fact of life. The Arab world views Israel, in varying degrees, as a foreign intrusion into their land (a form of colonialism), an outpost of, and supported by, western imperialism, and a future threat to Arab territories. The Israeli view their situa- tion as a return to a traditional home from which they may again be ousted by the Arabs. Theirs is a military state with power to conquer quickly in any direction-but with questionable stamina to hold unless supported. Furthermore, the Israeli have started a state on an economic level far above the Arab lands and of the indigenous capabilities of their land's resources. It can be sustained only by outside subsidy, by an industrialization dependent on assured markets (as Japan and U. K. are dependent), or by both methods. Israel is in the dilemma that she needs to get off the western bandwagon, get rid of the reputation in minds of her neighbors that she is pot of western world, and be ac- cepted as part of local national community; yet she has no present formula for the transi- tion. We should not be shocked if, in her en- lightened self-interest, she makes the change. The Arab refugee problem is one of the most potentially explosive situations in the world. Progress toward solution of the three prob- lems mentioned in the preceding paragraphs is gravely hampered (at times paralyzed) by the Arab-Israeli problem. This problem hobbles the U. S. internationally (and by internal politi- cal factors) in seeking solutions assisting the developments in the area along a course which is not too hazardous to U. S. interests. Which way might the area go in the next decade? It seems reasonable to expect as much change as since 1945. That would be a lot of change. There is a rapid drift toward elimination of every form of colonialism. CONFIDENTIAL French North Africa and Cyprus are the only remaining directly colonial areas. There seems certain to be increasing pressure to dilute for- ther the situation sometimes called indirect imperialism-Jordan and some of the oil com- pany relationships being good examples. A leader or leadership group able to demonstrate an ability to push the foreigner around, has great popular appeal. Some lessons might be learned and applied from a study of the history of Mexico and some other Latin American countries. Pressures due to increasing popu- lation and urbanization will increase. There will be great difficulty in keeping in phase the markets, the demand for capital, and the political arrangements for capital import. Lit- eracy and political aptitude will not keep pace with political and economic requirements. Truly democratic governments are likely to be the exception rather than the normal. Dicta- torships and oligarchies are more likely, and perhaps more suitable from many standpoints. Such governments are prone to generate local disturbances, external and internal, in order to rally adherents and distract attention from unsatisfactory conditions. The white collar class is likely to be ahead, in number and aspira- tions, of the political, social and economic opportunities needed to keep it from being an increasingly hazardous element. Yet, tradi- tionally, a relatively large middle class is needed to give stability in a democracy. In turning to the U. S. concern over the area, it may be helpful to split this problem into two related parts: (a) military; (b) other. The U. S. military approach to the area is deeply rooted in analysis of 5-8 years ago. It would be sound to analyze our military interest and needs in light of the probabilities of the next ten years. How long, for instance, will our security require land bases in the area? Is the "northern tier" concept for a general war? or for a peripheral war in the area? or to create a psychological position of strength in the area? or to give a reason for our presence there? or for some combination of reasons? Is there any hope, over the next decade, for development of CONFIDENTIAL indigenous military power (other than Turkey) beyond that needed for internal security? If so, what? If one premised their speculation on an assumption of a very low probability of general war during this decade, and that it would probably be nuclear if it occurred, what then? As to aspects other than military, the United States is interested in a progression toward stable governments friendly to the free world, But this progression may be similar, although more rapid, than that of Latin America. The U. S. is interested in the oil of the area, pri- marily, at the present time, because of depend- ence on this oil of parts of the world other than the U. S. But the U. S. may become much more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. It is interested in the friendship and political as- sociation of the countries. Current Threats to the Situation Now what are the threats in the situation? They are both immediate and long-range. The "era of perpetual crisis" is likely to continue for us in this geographical area even if it is partially dissipated in nuclear matters. First, the Arab- Israeli problem is most explosive. Second, French North Africa and Cyprus will continuo to place our interests in jeopardy in many ways and may explode any time with practically no warning. The Soviet Union, while continuing to radiate Geneva spirits, can fish openly in these troubled waters. Third, the values of the "northern tier" can be turned into liabilities by the success of a bland friendly Soviet gesture accepted by a country in rear of the tier. The Arab-Israeli situation gives opportunity for such penetration which the USSR is able to under- take without placing any outwardly visible strings thereon. Fourth, the Egyptian-Sudanese problem is potentially explosive, Fifth, the rapid and unsteady pace of political and economic advance can easily bring revolutions of violence in one or more countries. Com- munism is in the happy position of finding its cause furthered merely by helping these people to do what tends to come naturally. Sixth, there is a great hazard in the building of leader- ship to fill the gap between the peasant and new working class on the one hand, and the tradi- tional feudal-landlord leadership on the other. It seems that the old leadership must catch up with the times or be eclipsed. Currently the leadership in Egypt comes from the military- and there are worse alternatives, also better ones. The equivalent of Ataturks may arise. A frustrated educated class would be a great hazard. The Communist Hazard It seems unlikely that the area under discus- sion (except Turkey and perhaps Iran) will feel that the threat of Communism is so overriding that peoples and states should not deal with Russia. Even Turkey and Iran will probably deal on details and on a limited basis. While Iran may continue to be sobered by the Azerbaijan incident, there may be a probability of a policy of playing the USSR against the west. There is one hazard that needs close examination. Taking into account the ex- panding economy of the Soviet Union, the estimated limitations on Soviet oil reserves, the possible increasing restiveness toward foreign companies, coupled with the yearnings to show independence, and the surplus of Middle Eastern oil production capability, could the USSR, again blandly, initiate an oil deal in the Middle East? The Communist appeal and way of going in North Africa and the Middle East seems un- likely to be a doctrinaire and ideological appeal except to dissatisfied intellectuals (and this is admittedly dangerous). Rather, it is likely to be an economic and social force, per- haps, if successful at all, deliberately postponing attempts to seize power openly. It is also likely to be a political force operating openly in the colonial issue and with quiet effectiveness in the Israeli matter. One of our difficulties is that the optimum Soviet way of going initially may be approximately the same as it would be if they honestly had the same general objectives as the Free World, and were participating actively in a "Colombo Plan" for the area. Finally, the USSR with its considerable Moslem population, having experience and cultures similar to those peoples in this area, is in an excellent position to launch a Colombo Plan or a TCA. The Soviet actions in Afghanistan are sobering and may be a pilot run. The western powers can object, but not without suffering the adverse political impact of strongly imply- ing that the Middle East is considered to be their sphere of great power influence. As a summary statement at this stage in the discussion, we and our allies have at times engaged in local power politics on a short-term basis for short-term advantages since 1946. We probably had no other recourse. But, in the revolutionary situation, the short-term tends to be very short indeed and the price of a short-term advantage may prove very high in the mid-term and long-term. The short-term diversion incident to entrance of Turkey into the Cyprus problem may cost high in the long run. It is obviously desirable to discard, as rapidly as possible, the expediencies adopted to attain short-term objectives, pointing instead more directly at longer term objectives. In doing so, we may more often have two or more alternatives open to us when the crises arise. III. THINGS TO DO IN THE N. AFRICA- MIDDLE EASTERN AREA Something new has been added to the situa- tion. First, such motivation and check as was occasioned by fear of the USSR has been decreased by Geneva. This trend will almost certainly continue. The trend is exemplified by the raising of the Cyprus question and by current Greek-Turkish difficulties. These things would not have happened two years-or even one year-ago. Second, the USSR is turning to use outside the Iron Curtain of economic, technological, and social means which, up to now, have been almost a monopoly of the West. The ball game, primarily military, CONFIDENTIAL may be about to become a political, economic, psychological and military Donnybrook affair. The Arab-Israeli Situation The Secretary of State has made a wise major proposition to the opponents. Time appears to work against Israel, once the U. S. 1956 elections are passed. Dependent on subsidies, with a high cost in money and in manpower for armed forces, with Soviet support almost certain to be given progressively, on an out- wardly legal basis, to the Arab countries, the outlook is bleak if the current stalemate continues-unless (and this is important) the U. S. continues subsidies. The hope might be that the Western Powers would, by the develop- ment of circumstances, be left with no military base possibilities in that portion of the Middle East except Israel. But the Geneva develop- ments do not further the likelihood of this sort of happening and, from the Western Powers' standpoint, such a military situation would be bleak and perhaps of little value. Hence, on any rational analysis, the Israeli ought to be willing to come to a reasonable settlement if properly pressed. But there is no assurance of rationality and, at the other end of the spectrum of possibilities, a military flare-up might leave an expended Israel in the U. S. alignment and the Arab states taking counsel and resources from the USSR-with U. N. votes against as, The Arab situation seems more difficult from our standpoint. The Arab leadership and peoples are likely to be emotional and irrational, they may sense correctly that time is on their side, and are unlikely to move on propositions that appear to be U. S. pressure. Put bluntly, the Arab countries concerned may exact a considerable quid pro quo from the western allies-and a settlement would be worth a considerable cost to these allies. The details to be considered include the Gaza strip, the possibility of a freeway across the Negev, the water problem, Lgcarno type treaties, continued U. N. policing, assurances on immigration curtailment, and Great Power guarantees. The foregoing incomplete list seems drastic. CONFIDENTIAL But we can afford to pay a high price and the hazards are great. In spite of the immediacy of the problem, particular caution will be required until late fall of '56. The Soviet Union may be clever enough to devise a way to utilize internal U. S. politics to give us a serious setback in the Middle East. Perhaps a formula can be devised for initiation through the U. N. that the Soviet Union, consistent with their Geneva spirit, would be unable to oppose. The Colonial Problem There is an old rule that it is better to go gracefully than to be kicked out. In retrospect, a great part of our problems in the world come from having our allies kicked out of their colonial areas, and this without having made preparation for a stable friendly government to follow. Of the 800 million people, one-third of the world, in some form of colonial status in 1945, only 200 million so remain. Most of the latter, except those in Central Africa, and some islands, seem certain to move to self-dotermina- tion (not necessarily sovereignty) within the next decade. The United States has lost to the Soviet its traditional raiment of support: of independence movements. It has incurred some distrust and dislike through being grouped, in the minds of most newly freed peoples, will, the colonial powers. The reasons for this uninvited situation are well known and perhaps there was no better course. If the current "soft" Soviet policy continues; there will be seemingly less reason for the fence walking ap- proach we have taken during the last few years. The United States should reexamine its ap- proach to the colonial problem in light of Geneva, and Cyprus may offer an opportunity needed. This is not to suggest that the solution is either annexation by Greece or continuation in the present status. Some other formula should be considered (and is apparently already beingproposed-late-by the U. IK.). Certainly all concerned would probably like to see one produced. The North African situation is more difficult. But the likely long-run direc- tion of its movement seems to pose a hazard to the U. S. if we become firmly associated in African and Asiatic minds with opposition thereto. France needs North Africa; equally, North Africa needs France. Out of this truth some better modus vivendi might be developed. The antipathy toward colonialism and the colonial powers tends to be carried over into the conditions of autonomy and independence of newly formed states. This statement is more often true when all the conditions on which independence is granted are not accepted by the free will of the state concerned. If this inde- pendence is achieved on the basis of imposed treaty obligations implying intervention if the obligations are not kept, there is a tendency to build up extremes of nationalism. Jordan and Xuweit can be categorized as somewhat co- lonial, but their peculiar situation makes cur- rently for stability. Iraq's remaining colonial characteristics are diminishing rapidly. Tunis and Morocco are colonial in that there are conditions which are not self-determined. This matter is psychological as well as legal and needs to be considered in connection with military bases and stationing of armed forces. In Finland, for instance, the USSR has given up nothing that it did not impose on the Finns. The Soviet base in Finland was a form of colo- nialism. The U. S. bases and forces in Europe are in an entirely different category in that the indigenous governments determined of their own free will that these forces should be there. If an allied government ever comes to feel that it cannot successfully invite us to leave-we will have grave difficulties and there may be a resultant impetus to the local "American Go Home" movement. The Soviet Union has the capability of en- gaging in a give away contest with the U. S. Furthermore, in the long run, it can attain the facility to live up to its promises. Arms are the most dangerous give away. They must be obtained from outside the area since manu- facturing facilities do not exist, except a few in Turkey. Up to the limits of a very ade- quate internal security, the least undesirable alternative seems to be to stay ahead of the Russians in this "arms race." But it carries with it a continuing commitment. Arms re- quire industrial support not existent in the Middle East. Promises of this support are part of the bargaining hazards of the present and future. Regional Organization In the over-all give away program in our enlightened self-interest, it seems that we should look to the possibility of a Middle East Colombo Plan or OEEC type of arrangement. This is bound to have a very unsettled early voyage. But it may help to help these people help themselves and may make them feel more their own masters. There is a need to develop some center for study, planning and exchange of information, which transcends the unnatural geographic compartments. Even the oil com- panies have had an inadequate interchange, partly due to British-American rivalry and the U. S. anti-trust laws. Our free world stakes in the Middle East are too high to let such matters (called "inherent contradictions of the capitalistic system" by our Communist oppo- nents) be a barrier to effective action. Politi- cal and military regional organization probably does not lend itself to the purpose. But a social, economic and technological institute type of organization might be successful. The U. S. should consider a U. S. regional organization for guidance of our operations. A close look may show a disturbing lack of re- gional knowledge, regional team work and support of overall U. S. objectives (as com- pared to local aspirations) on the part of our personnel. Such parochialism as exists has to be combatted by a definite program. Integra- tion of our regional efforts requires more than a policy statement. It probably depends pri- marily on provision of funds for travel and conference purposes and on assignment of adequate personnel to embassies and missions. Operation of Private Organizations Operations of church and other educational organizations and foundations have long fur- CONFIDENTIAL thered U. S. interests in the Middle East. The oil corporations have undertaken useful programs incidental to their activities. It may well be that this way of going should be further stressed and expanded. These companies are the managers of the "one crop" (oil) economy, from the standpoint of money earnings, of six governments. This resource, located in the possession of about 30 million people, is of vital importance to hundreds of millions. The oil companies have a tremendous and a very difficult task important to free world security. We might recognize that they are, and have to be, instruments of that security. An energetic program of association of U. S. universities, including engineering colleges, with institutions of learning in the Middle East, financed in part by government funds, may pay appreciable dividends. This idea is not new. The Rangoon association with Johns Hopkins University seems to set a successful pattern to follow. The rapid transition of the Middle East results in a need for economic and social planning which these countries are unable to accomplish on their own. The Soviet methods are bound to appeal to some. It would be wise to offer alternatives which are superficially separated from great power political control. Flexibility, Suitability, and Rapid Action in Our Middle East Operations We should. study and draw lessons from the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. They have shown a willingness and capability to use quickly many of the techniques and programs we have developed with painful slowness throughout the world. When technical ad- visory personnel arrive in the capital city a few days after being invited, pray in the mosque for an afternoon and produce what it takes to pave the main street the next day, the favorable impression achieved is likely to be enormous. We should consider: a. The shifting of our administrative pro- cedures and organization to take "quick tricks" when the opportunity offers. We should have a policy to this effect. A good, and perhaps sole, example of this typo of action was the flying of pilgrims to Mecca. Such a policy requires "mobile forces" in being and is probably best carried out by giving the missions to a going U. S. govern- ment organization or a private firm. In the technological area, the Bureau of Reclama- tion, the Corps of Engineers, and civilian engineering firms are logical instruments for consideration. b. How to avoid becoming identified too closely with existent regimes. Some of these are bound to change, perhaps accom- panied by violence. c. The future hazards of a crisis such as the Mossadegh affair. In the future, the Soviet Union may well have a "mobile force" and an attractive program to offer-as they did in Afghanistan. IV. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA This vast area is entirely colonial except for the Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South Africa. No political unit has more than 20 per cent non-African population except the Union of South Africa. The remainder, except for Southwest Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Eritrea has less than 5 per cant non-African population. The Union of South Africa has definitely adopted a segregationist policy (Malanism or apartheid). There are differing opinions as to the likelihood that this policy will succeed, some knowledgeable individuals contending that the economic realities alone will cause its failure. The policy has certainly aroused a great deal of adverse world comment and will result in increasing difficulties as colonial Africa moves further along the direction it appears to be going. The British portions of colonial Africa are at the crossroads between integration and segregation. The French, Belgium and Portuguese have a policy of integration of those who have reached a certain level of what is called civilization. The current outward direction of political movement varies considerably. The Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Togoland and the Cameroons are on their way to African self-government. French tropical Africa and Madagascar (which has a strong tradition of nationalism) are destined (by the French) to a developing status in the French Union. French Colonies The French political concept of the French Union is a difficult one because no such ar- rangement has ever existed. Lilco the unicorn, people talk about it but no person has ever seen one. Hence, it faces the initial difficulty of competition with the better understood concept of nationalism. The Union concept envisages progressive development of colonial areas either to departmental status or to the status of "associated states." The point is made here and stressed again later that the element of time may be the determinant of success or failure of this concept-and the French can be fairly judged as being slow thus far. It would be most unwise for the U. S. to base its policy on an assumption of success of the French Union concept. We must provide for other alternatives-which are probably more likely. We should recognize that the French have, thus far, a consistent record of disturbance and various degrees of failure in their arrangements for keeping political institu- tions in step with evolution of colonies. The British, on the other hand, have a fairly uniform record of success-even though their policies have been much more pragmatic. British Colonies The British colonial territories are developing toward self-government but without an as- sumption of ultimate African control and with locally exercised political power in the hands of non-Africans. As an example, less than a quarter million whites exercise the local political power in the British Federation of Central Africa (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland) which contains over six million blacks. This current situation exemplifies the difference of opinion as to whether the relation- ship between white and black should be one of "trusteeship" or one of "partnership." This situation, illustrative of the situation through- out Africa, calls to mind that color conflict can be as much of a disturbing force as economic and other factors, and that the Soviet Union and Communist doctrine can perhaps be even more persuasive in this area than in economic and social problems. Other Colonies The Belgium, Portuguese and Spanish territories do not have any developed method and direction for their future course. Ob- viously, their course, like the others, lies within the spectrum of possibilities ranging from an African state through various types of multi- racial political structures to close political supervision by the current colonial power. Currently the Belgians seem to be progressing well in the Congo. But the likely rapid increase in the African laboring and lower middle class, due to mining and other economic development, may quickly bring problems. Some Problems and Hazards of Progress There is considerable basis for a generalization that African political participation and progress toward self-government increases from south to north. In the current revolutionary situa- tion, the tendency is likely to be toward acceleration of the laggards toward the pace of the foremost. And the foremost may tend toward increasing pressures for greater speed. Also, there is a basis for the generalization that denial of political action leads to conspiracy. There is no attempt made here to discuss illit- eracy, shortage of land, shortage of labor, and several other important African problems. The discussion is limited narrowly to certain national security and political aspects. These are greatly conditioned by the natural drives for modernization and racial equality. These CONFIDENTIAL drives do not necessarily generate a demand for national sovereignty. The French formula could give the objectives desired. But na- tional sovereignty is the traditional formula. The multiracial societies (even though the European components are small) are likely to generate increasing African nationalistic move- ments. With the introduction of modern in- dustry (including agricultural methods in some areas) and communications, and an assured rise of a literate leadership class among Africans, the multiracial approach to political institutions is bound to have progressively tougher sledding. Much of this part of Africa stands no further forward than French North Africa, with its current acute multiracial problems, stood ten years ago. Perhaps if the French had moved seven years ago to the point to which they have now been forced, there would not have been the recent and current troubles in North Africa. The principal religion in a great part of this area is Islam. It is judged by many to be in- creasing its converts. There are judgments that the Moslemism of most of the people is not deep-nor for that matter is the Christianity of the Christians. The disquieting, perhaps very improbable, speculation is offered that an alliance between Islam and Communism in this areas is a possibility. The Communist Threat It is very questionable that the U. S. should key its policy and objectives in the area pri- marily to the threat of Communism. Even if there were no Communism in the world, the possibilities of unrest, disturbance and power political maneuver connected therewith, are sufficient to give concern. If tropical Africa moved happily to self-government tomorrow, there might, within ten years, be a major dis- turbance due to economic problems, or due to a Moslem drive of conquest to the south, or a com- bination of these and other developments. But Communism and the Soviet regime are interested in Africa and Communism is already there. The situation is not one for mass parties such as the French and Italian Communist parties. It is a situation where small cells of indoctrinated and deeply dedicated individuals are the best instruments. The appeals are not ideological but rather are economic, social, and nationalistic. Two of the principal methods for acquiring, training, and introducing party zealots into the area are the labor union move- ment and the education of natives abroad. The French CGT is a channel to French Africa, the Egyptian labor unions to the Sudan. It is logical that Communism proselyte native students abroad. Parenthetically, French edu- cation on the Paris left bank, even disregarding Communism, is not today likely to build friends for America. African Leadership This area, like the Middle East, has a prob- lem of developing an adequately educated African leadership class. And it has the related problem of moving rapidly enough to satisfy their social and economic aspirations after they are educated. The development of any African people through various stages of self-government to national sovereignty, status of an "associated states", etc., is almost certain to be materially different from the usual U. S. idea of develop- ment of a democratic state. The useful ex- amples are most likely to be found in Latin American history. The "hero" or messianic type of leader is more likely than the Wash- ington or Jefferson type. There is some pos- sibility that an African educated elite will develop while the mass lag far behind in literacy and political competence. But even a small proportion of the total population can be very vocal and can sway the remainder. There have been recent examples on the rimland of Asia which support this last point. Unsuitability for independent status of cur- rent geographical units. The current bound- aries in Africa bear only a limited relationship to ethnic groups, communications, resource sufficiency, security, and other characteristics Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 desirable for the stability and continued ex- istence of a nation-state. Every current polit- ical unit is bound to be materially dependent on the developed countries for a long while for markets, capital and technical assistance. These conditions add hazards to early autonomy. If granted too soon, there is bound to be shopping among great powers for the best deals-and the USSR can even now give a good deal, witness its rapid action in Afghanistan. Obviously, from the economic and security standpoints, continued association with a developed country is the best solution, The alternative might have to be long-term subsidies such as Libya and Israel are receiving. Once the white man dictated, he now must deal. Africa now stands at a very definite phase line, Previously, the colonial powers could dispose of the local peoples' affairs. Now they must deal with them about those affairs. The vision and wisdom with which this dealing is clone will determine whether in the next decade we have crises and major concerns about African impact on our security. It is not yet too late but time is running out. V. THE U. S. PROIBLEM IN AFRICA- COLONIALISM The U. S. problem and the predominant issue is the colonial issue. There are other aspects such as raw materials, military bases, etc. But the objectives involved will be achieved or fail of achievement depending on the handling of this issue. We have two lines of interest: (1) our traditional anticolonialism; and (2) our strategic interests in our allies, bases, raw ma- terials, etc. It is suggested that a doctrinaire adherence to either line is likely to be disas- trous. A middle course is a better course. But it is not a simple course. The United States faces the almost certain hazard of being required to stand up and be counted within the next few years on matters pertaining to Africa. Our close association with the colonial powers, the policy of India particularly to beat the anticolonial drum at every opportunity, the precedent given by the newly sovereign Arab states to African areas which are predominantly Moslem, the un- impeded movement toward independence of certain western African areas, the strong so-called anticolonial propaganda drive of the Soviet Union, and finally, the opportunities presented in the U. N. forum, seem to assure that our country will soon have to be much more definitive about this problem. One might even speculate about the possibility of internal political pressures within the United States. Fortunately, no area in Africa, except the Union of South Africa, is moving in a direction materially different from that which appears consistent with our interests. The problem seems primarily one of coordination and accel- eration rather than of change of direction. Any acceleration would be in the direction of generating a feeling in peoples that, by their own efforts and political decision, they are progressing toward their social and economic goals. The peoples, particularly their leader- ship, need to feel that their grievances, real or imagined, are receiving reasonable attention. If this pattern and progress do not come about, then a nationalism of a type we now little foresee or understand (witness the Mau Mau movement), may overflow the land. This nationalism would be characterized by un- predictabilities, emotional as to policy, which would make the irrationality of some Arab politics seem no cold logic. VI. WHAT'S THE U. S. PROGRAM? With respect to colonialism, this paper obviously cannot and should not suggest more than a direction of policy and areas for further investigation. The direction of policy needs to be a shift away from our comparative silence on specifics concerning colonialism and toward more of a middle ground. The Geneva develop- ments, if sustained, are almost certain to bring acceleration of pressures (as they already have in Cyprus). This approach requires prior notice to allies-which is a leverage. It CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 requires a climate reflected to those allies through all U. S. officials concerned. And it requires that we speak with constructive suggestions ahead of the Soviet Union and India now and then. How much should we enter the African scene? This is a very troublesome question. There are related ones. If the inclination is to act as an observer enunciating a few pious principles periodically, we must face the question of whether we can accept the hazards of such action. Our interests have been seriously impaired already by the ineptitude of our allies in some colonial matters. If we decide to take an active part in our enlightened self-interest, what's the program? A Possible Program 1. Better intelligence. This is a must. 2. More knowledge about Africa in higher education and U. S. intellectual leadership. There should be at least one adequately en- dowed, and active Institute of African Affairs in the U. S. It should be a part of a university, thereby facilitating education of African stu- dents. 3. Emphasize the activities of non-govern- mental agencies in non-political areas such as the position of women, health measures, changing undesirable local customs and taboos, etc. This means U. N. agencies and also private foundations. The more that can be done through private enterprise, the better. 4. Related to the foregoing, there should be a feasible way to operate Point 4 type of programs in Africa through contract with universities, foundations, etc. 5. A search should be made for ways to assure careers to educated Africans, particularly those educated abroad. Such careers might well be in efforts of universities, foundations, and the U. N. in the area. 6. The U. S. should spend some money on the area as insurance against problems of 5 to 10 years from now. This might be a few tens of millions and probably not over 100 million a year. 7. The way of going of colonial powers in the area needs to be coordinated before a crisis situation arises. Something like an Institute for African Development, tied to a Political Council for African Development with the latter forcing consultation and an exchange of views on the governmental level, may be desirable. Such an Institute would really be, in part, a study center for problems of non- Communist revolutionary change. 8. Maximum use in any U. S. operations in the area of U. S. citizens of African descent. 9. Consideration of counter-action to Coin- munism in the trade union movement using U. S. trade unions. 10. Increased participation of the U. S. in education of Africans. 11. In general, try to lower the barriers and reduce the conflicts found to exist due to color and religion. Nationals of countries such as Turkey and Mexico may understand the local problems better than Europeans and Ameri- cans, and may have more of an appeal as technological experts, etc. P 4pproved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 Paper 10: Appendix A Notes on U. S. Policy Formulation for Middle East and North Africa 1. Support for Communism in the Middle East and North Africa is minimal at present: a. Proximity of Russia b. Successful programs by U. S. c. Influence of Islam d. Failure to create effective local Com- munist parties. 2. However, conditions favor increasing support of Communism: a. Growing social awareness among under- privileged classes b. General instability among governments c. Populations highly susceptible to irra- tional propaganda d. Rising labor and middle classes, largely without voice c. The tradition of oriental despotism is more akin to Communism than it is to the alien concepts of democracy and freedom 1. Decline of Islam as a force for unity, stability, and order g. Improving communications. 3. U. S. policy since World War II has em- phasized change in the Middle East: a. Mutual defense agreements b. Israeli state created c. Economic development emphasized d. Modern military forces created e. Democratic institutions attempted. 4. There are many obstacles to orderly change in the Middle East that may have been underestimated by U. S. planners: a. Lack of resources b. Corruption within governments c. Popular suspicion of government as an innovator d. Hostility among ethnic and religious groups e. Uncooperative attitudes between na- tional governments f. Power of vested economic, political, and cultural interests Minimal educational standards and gen- eral illiteracy h. Inexperience in self-government. 5. Because of these obstacles, some of our policy has worked to our disadvantage, although immediate successes have been gained: a. Distrust between national states has been fostered b. Political instability has not been alle- viated c. Greater economic expectations have been fostered among masses d. Islam-the one unifier-has been in- creasingly challenged e. Military power has been thrust into a vacuum, with minimal political controls over it f. The U. S. has allowed self to become scapegoat for failures. 6. U. S. policy in the future must be conditioned by the above experiences: a. Greater emphasis should be placed on the emotionalism that characterizes Middle East reaction to U. S. policies.. Policies that save pride and salve emo- tions may be just as important as policies which grow wheat. b. Excitement over some present prob- lems must be abated as soon as possible, for the U. S. is held primarily respon- sible. The Arab-Israeli dispute espe- CONFIDENTIAL cially, the French North African dispute secondarily. c. Policies that.generate radical and rapid change in the area may create as many problems as they solve. d. Policies that "use" the Middle East to satisfy requirements of other areas may very well undo all that is done for the area directly. Best example is alleged support of French in North Africa to save NATO, etc. e. Policies which aim at fostering Western concepts-such as "human freedom" and "democratic institutions"-must be interpreted loosely for the Middle East if they are to be useful, f. Policies which openly advertise U. S. sponsorship redound against the U. S. if failure occurs. Policy failure in the post-Geneva world may have greater consequences than in the past. 7. In view of the above considerations, thor- ough study should be given to the selection of target groups and areas for U. S. policy. It is difficult to maintain support of the mass populace and the special power interest groups in Middle East areas. It is difficult to maintain support of discontent opposition groups and groups in power in the rapidly changing Middle East. Ultimate success of U. S. policy may depend largely upon the ability of the U. S. to counter USSR influ- ence with vital segments of the population who hold the power to direct local govern- mental policy. Paper 10: Appendix B The Current Crisis All of the preceding pages concerning the Middle East and North Africa may be only on theperipheryof our current pressing problem. In hindsight, the outcome of World War II almost certainly had to include the ousting of the colonial powers from most of the Middle East. This ousting has occurred. It was bound to be accompanied by instability, a power vacuum and a distrust for the great powers only recently lords in the area. A great opportunity existed for the United States-a "neutral" great power without imperialist trap- pings-in its enlightened self-interest, to serve as a stabilizing factor and fill the power vac- uum. That opportunity was partially elimi- nated by the appearance of Israeli. It was further reduced by the "Geneva spirit" and by CONFIDENTIAL not finding some action capable of dealing with Egyptian concern over the military situation. The United States now seems to have lost the initiative in the boiling area of Middle Eastern affairs. This loss is, in itself, not critical. But who has it? It appears that it may be shared by the USSR, Israel, Egypt, and perhaps unpredictable Arab political entities such as Yom en. The sight of the USSR moving to fill the place in the Middle East that might have been ours should cause some soul searching as to the who and why of responsibility and some appraisal of how much we ought to be willing to pay to reverse assuredly this trend. The ap- praisal should not stop at a "let the sand settle" conclusion but should face the hazards Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 of major USSR infiltration and figure the costs of meeting it successfully; then decide whether our country wants to pay the cost. We now have two emerging alliances in the Middle East: (1) The so-called Northern Tier (2) The hinterland less Israel behind the Northern Tier The hard facts of the situation include, first, a currently friendly association and possible increasing affinity of the second alliance toward the USSR, and second, a sympathy of the Northern Tier for the hinterland alliance on any problem concerning Israel. Stated mildly, this is an unstable and explosive mixture. The Middle East does not have much strength vis-11-vis Communist advance except the two alliances can be molded together in the stand for regional security in the Middle East. The situation has considerable potential for friction and intrigue. And the Arab-Israeli situation is a sputtering fuse. There is of this writing a policy of military retaliation being pursued by both Israel and Egypt, general talk of war, talk of "preventive war" by Israel leadership, and talk of maintain- ing an arms balance between Arab states and Israel, as well as mention of other distasteful subjects. It may be that the United States has to "bite a bullet" on the Middle East in order to avoid a high probability of very adverse happenings. But the alternatives currently facing us are bleak. Fighting with adverse developments for the Israelis is certainly con- trary to our objectives. And the outcome would be fraught with hazards. Fighting with major reverses for the Arabs is now likely to result in disastrous developments from the standpoint of our interests. We should face seriously the possibilities of the Egyptian situation. This hinterland alli- ance already has ties across North Africa. Some success against Israel might well set a fire to Arab nationalism. A reverse could both set fire to Arab nationalism and create a close affinity with the USSR. Looking to the longer range of three to ten years, Africa south of the Sahara may look increasingly to people of the same color and religion for leadership and assistance. If Egypt and its hinterland alliance adopted as a policy the active support of anti-colonial movements throughout Africa, our Communist opponents' prosperity would increase and so would our troubles. The concept of maintaining an arms balance between Israel and the surrounding Arab states makes questionable sense in the long run. Considering areas, populations, and the loca- tion and numbers of states concerned, the concept seems parallel to a similar concept for Luxemburg or Switzerland. Our policy and programs must, it seems, move to eliminate this concept of arms balance. The elimination must be accompanied by the substitution of something else. Our security guarantee, in association with Britian and France, may have to evolve, and soon, to an active posture for actual "police action", perhaps under UN aegis. In summary on the current Middle Eastern situation, the directions of policy and the foundation costs which must be paid to reverse the adverse trends to our interests are: a. First, and the easiest, U. S. and British efforts must be and remain together; this includes matters pertaining to oil. b. A formula must be sought and applied to bring the two Middle Eastern alliances together. c. The Arab-Israeli situation is a crux in the matter. In our hard-headed self- interest we can afford to pay very highly for some alleviation of the adverse position in which the situation continually places our country. Paper 11 Latin America-as a Demonstration Area of U. S. Foreign Policy in Action Originator: Stacy May 1. INTRODUCTION-THE THESIS OF THIS intensification of the attention and effort that PAPER we are directing toward Latin America, without The threshold concept has extraordinary great substantive change in existing procedures, relevance to our Latin American policies. might carry their effectiveness over the thresh- Important to that concept is consideration of old that marks the division between moderate the critical factor of size or intensity of an and spectacular success in the achievement of otherwise well-conceived effort that must be our aims. achieved to make it effective, and anything short of which is doomed to yield disappoint- ingly II. U. S. AND LATIN AMERICAN INTER- Our negative e. Our aims ms and objectives with respect to the DEPENDENCE area are exemplary and for the most part The importance of Latin America to the clearly defined. The programs and courses of United States in political, strategic, and eco- action that have been developed for forwarding nomic terms should notrequire a great amount our objectives are generally intelligently con- of documentation. ceived to cast an influence in the direction of On the political front, our relationships with our aims. the 170 million peoples of the Latin Americas The results, while far from negligible and (a population that is growing faster than that seldom negative, cannot objectively be ap- of any major area of the world) have about the praised as conspicuously successful, or at least most venerable roots that U. S. foreign policy they seem to fall far short of realizing the full has produced. They have evolved in a pattern advantage to United States interests that would that has shaped and influenced our arrange- accrue from a fuller realization of our objectives ments and accommodations with nations in in an area that is: other areas. The smoothness of their function- 1. Inherently of more direct importance ing is inextricably entwined with the reputation to the United States than the relative atten- and prestige of the United States in the foreign tion given to its affairs in our political, policy field. We count heavily upon support economic, and psychological strategy and of the twenty Republics for U. S. positions in action would imply. the U. N. 2. Probably of greater potential signifi- On the strategic side, while the military cance to the broad strategy of our inter- potentials of the several Latin American Re- national relations in the period immediately publics, or of all of them collectively, are as ahead than has been overtly recognized in yet inconsequential, there are obvious impera- our foreign policy formulation as a whole. tives for us in seeing that no potentially hostile There is a considerable and persuasive body forces obtain a foothold in the Hemisphere, in of evidence to suggest that a relatively modest protecting the canal, and in assuring our access (fl?) SECRET to imports of materials upon which both our peacetime and wartime economies are impor- tantly dependent. It is in the sector of economic inter-relation- ships that the community of interest between the United States and Latin America has been most underrated. The two-way trade between these two areas now approximates 334 billion dollars in each direction. Latin America affords the United States an outlet for well over a fifth of its exports and supplies about a third of its imports. We in turn supply almost half of their imports and purchase about 45 percent of their exports. Even more impor- tant is the unmistakably evident trend toward an increasing degree of interdependence in the two areas, shown by the growing importance of their inter-trade as a percentage of the total trade of each. Upon the basis of the growth trends of the economies on either side, there is reasonable expectancy that the trade inter- change will double by the mid-1970's, an an annual growth rate of 3% percent. By that time, the population of Latin America may total 275 million, outstripping our own by a considerable margin. There are many eco- nomic indicators to suggest that the Western Hemisphere as a whole, with Canada of course included, is evolving upon a growth trend that is importantly outstripping that of the rest of the Free World, in total and per capita outputs and even in the volume of its inter-trade as a percentage of world trade. III. HEROIC OBJECTIVES AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE It is impracticable here to spell out the detail of stated U. S. objectives with respect to Latin America, and that of the many programs that have been established to give substance to our aims. It must suffice to summarize the former in the statement that it is our purpose to pro- mote a maximum degree of hemisphere soli- darity of purpose and procedure, a vigorous growth of strong and democratic governments, security forces competent to afford protection SECRET SECRET severally and collectively against outside ag- gression or internal subversion, and sound growth economies that yield increasing living standards and assure reasonable stability. It is a definite part of our aim to progressively strengthen the Hemisphere political and security programs to make them increasingly effective in the part that they play in the whole Free World system. The point that may warrant emphasis here is that the weight given to Latin American affairs in our over-all foreign preoccupations is neither commensurate with the intrinsic im- portance of the area to our interests nor suffi. cient to convince Latin Americans that we re- gard their status as of first-class moment. In the straight political field, where we have had really remarkable success despite the gen- erally instable and embryonic state of demo. cratic institutions in many Latin Anroricna countries, there is considerable justification for their chronic complaint that Latin American affairs are given relatively small attention in the highest echelons of the State Department and the Executive Office. For a considerable period, consideration of Latin American affairs has been relegated to last place upon almost all of our Government policy dockets, and the pro. emptive demand of emergency situations upon top-level personnel has too often resulted in "last-minute" resolution of Latin American issues that have given the impression of hasty improvisation. On the stragetic front, Latin Americans can learn from the Annual Report on the National Security Program that their share of poet-war direct military assistance provided by the United States has been about one percent of the total. It is avowedly to our advantage to see that the military equipment employed by Latin American countries is of U. S, origin, particularly to assure that our military missions are relied upon to furnish training in its use. Nevertheless, in spite of our declared objectives to meet foreign competition in this field, it would appear that about half of Latin American armanent purchases since 1950 have been made from European suppliers. The order of mag- nitude of such foreign purchases would appear to have averaged around $25 million per year. It is on the economic front, however, that Latin Americans have been most vocal in their expression of feelings of neglect, or lack of appropriate consideration. Certainly, the voicing of a complaint does not constitute its justification, but the objective record shows that the Latin American share of U. S. eco- nomic grant and loan assistance has been very small when compared to that area's claims upon U. S. interest based on the relative weight of its trade. Thus, of the (non-military) grants and credits extended by the U. S. Gov- ernment from July 1, 1945 through March 31, 1955, the Latin American share accounted for only 2.4 percent of the total. In the year 1954, it amounted to 2.5 percent. In the field of international educational exchange, Latin Americans received about 6 percent of the total U. S. grants in fiscal years 1953 and 1954, and 11 percent in 1955. Even in the matter of U. S, Information Administration expenditures, whore the importance of promoting solidarity and combatting Communist subversion ef- forts would seem to warrant particular em- phasis, the share attributed to Latin American programs has averaged under 3% percent in the past three fiscal years, Capital investment Latin American countries generally have managed to mobilize some 15 to 16 percent of their Gross National Products for capital in- vestment use in the post-war period. This, together with certain windfall benefits in the terms of their generally thriving foreign trade, has resulted in an over-all growth rate in total economic output for the area considerably greater than that shown by the United States- sufficiently greater even to show a comparative advantage in per capita output as well, despite the markedly higher rate of Latin American population increase. The U. S. contribution to Latin American capital formation in the post-war period has played a far more important role in this growth record than its relative percentage propor- tions-less than 10 percent-would imply. The preponderant bulk of U. S. capital contri- butions to the area have been in the form of direct private investments. These particu- larly have focused in high-yield fields of pro- ductive investment to a much greater degree than has Latin American domestic investment. It has been estimated, for example, that U. S. direct investments in Latin America, which cumulatively amount to not more than about 6 percent of total stock of the area's capital accumulation, produce not less than 30 percent of Latin America's total foreign exchange, through the export items they generate for shipment to the United States market alone. The over-all record since World War II would seem to imply a very healthy status for the Latin American economy as a whole, and equally to testify to the adequacy of the over-all U. S. economic program directed toward that area. Unfortunately, a closer scrutiny of the situation reveals grounds for disquietude. There seems to have been a marked slowing up in the tempo of the area's economic growth since 1950-51, when compared to its exuberance in the earlier post-war years. Progress has not halted, but its rate has fallen sufficiently to change the picture of improvement in per capita living standards from one that considerably exceeded the long-term growth rate in the United States to one that is far lower than that upon which we have counted in this country. This lowering of growth trend rate has been concurrent with a considerable falling off of the direct U. S. private investment of capital funds in Latin America, which has been compensated only to a minor degree by the modest but steady growth of the level of Export-Import Bank and IBRD loan disbursements to the area. It would be spurious to impute a controlling influence to U. S. capital contributions in the total Latin American economic record, but it is reasonable to assume that it has had a con- tributory effect. At least, it would be ac- SECRET 102 LATIN AMERICA cepted as a mark of U. S. earnestness in seeking Trade to foster growth economies in the t t en QY Republics, if we adopted the general goal of It has been contended by some that the keeping over-all U. S. capital exports to Latin significance to Latin America of its $3% billion America moving up at a rate that would L atin trade account with the United States dwarfs sus- rain, in a continuing economic growth trend for the importance of all other considerations. This the area, the same relative influence that it Position probably does less than full justice exercised over the earlier post-war years of to the influence of capital contributions vigorous growth. titularly in view of their crucial role inP n. Obviously, no such commitment could be increasing the production base and the dis. made in unqualified terms. The "climate" for Proportionately heavy influence that has been domestic and foreign investment in Latin noted of U. S. direct private investments upon America necessarily would be a controlling Latin America's export capacity. However, factor. But the enunciation of the aim would portance of there can of be no trade doubt opppport tun the ities compelling to the o tiim. do much to convince Latin Americans of the the a area's seriousness of our interest in their economic development prospects. progress. This would be enhanced if our ex- In the trade field, the United States record pression of purpose were backed up by concrete with respect to Latin America is generally proposals for action on our part to make direct unassailable. Most of our major imports U. S. investment abroad more attractive (most from that area are subject to very moderate hopefully through tax concessions or through tariffs if any at all. But there have boon quick amortization privileges) and for stepping sufficient uncertainties about our import policies up the level of Export-Import Bank and IBRD with respect to oil, and suflicient question of loan commitments and disbursements. There the equities of our sugar policy (which would has been recent and quite vigorous action along be partly removed and partly intensified by the latter lines that is a hopeful sign, and the the Pending Administration legislative establishment of the International' Finance Posals in that field) to undermine full con- Corporation is a further constructive step, fidence on the part of Latin Americans in the There also have been a number of promising degree to which their interests will be given recent developments in the establishment of weight in U. S. trade policy discussions. In private institutions to furnish intermediate the important trade field of coffee, as well, the and long-term credits and equity capital for United States has not been able to make a the area, very positive contribution to current and It should be noted that the objective sug- prospective Latin American difficulties. There gested for the U. S. in the field of capital con- is also a heritage of rather unhappy tributions is far from grandiose. To con- of trade opportunities it memorems total U. S. capital contributions-both ously promoted d by es the U U. . S. during r iing ng viorld by private and public-in the same relative mag- War II, and which quicldy evaporated at war's 's nitude to a continuing growth trend in Latin end. Further, our disposal of agricultural ur- American economies would imply an increase Pluses gives rise to fears, if not to actual by only an additional $200 million between damage, in a number of Latin American now and 1958, the $50o million annual level countries. of net direct private investment flows, rein- Again, it is far from clear that Latin American vested earnings, and Export-Import Bank and criticisms of U. S. trade policies are fully IBRD disbursements combined that has been warranted, or that some of them could be the post-war average. alleviated by any practical action that we could take. The point is that we have been Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 less than successful in convincing them that the essential magnanimity of our stated ob- jectives toward them in the economic field will be maintained in the face of opposing pressures. From their view of the record, we regard them as poor relations, toward whom our intentions are benign, and to whose interests we will afford consideration other things being equal (which they seldom are). IV. COMMUNIST SUBVERSION EFFORTS IN LATIN AMERICA Although the case for an intensification of U. S. effort to cultivate increasingly firm and satisfactory relations with the Latin American Republics rests primarily upon positive moti- vations, there are evident signs of intensified subversion efforts by international Communism that require effective countering. The political instability that has been chronic to most of the Republics and their still retarded and often insecure economic status provides a fertile field for Communist subversion efforts aimed at exploiting unsatisfied aspirations. Although the Communists have had only meager and temporary local successes in capturing effective control of national govern- ments in Latin America (as recently in Guate- mala), they have persistently and often success- fully adopted the tactic of permeating various "front" movements of labor, youth, student, women, racial, and peace groups and of dis- torting valid aspirations for political, economic, and social reform toward Communist-oriented solutions and particularly toward anti-United States sentiments. Despite the Hemisphere-wide collaborative efforts to counter Communist subversion formal- ized at the Caracas Conference, Communist Party (card carrying) strength in Latin America is estimated at 250,000, with two-thirds of the total concentrated in Brazil and Chile. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, there has been a marked step-up of Communist effort in Latin America, fostered by covert transfer of funds and propaganda material from inter- national Communist headquarters. This has been channeled largely through Soviet Bloc missions to Latin American countries. There is evidence of abnormal expansion of the per- sonnel and activities of such missions, particu- larly in Mexico and the River Plate countries. Dramatic evidence of recently increasing effort to build a more effective Communist apparatus in the area is offered by the record of Communist-sponsored trips of Latin American nationals to the Orbit. Less than 100 such trips were sponsored in 1950; this number had increased to 1,000 in 1953, and, while it de- clined somewhat in 1954, it appears that the operation will attain record levels in 1955 with particular emphasis on cultural and labor missions. The field of trade also presents a picture of stepped-up Soviet effort at Latin American permeation. While trade with Soviet Bloc countries still represents a very small fraction of Latin America's total trade, there have been disquieting signs of an increased upward trend that, if continued, soon would lead to an uncomfortable degree of trade interdependence between certain Latin American countries and Soviet Satellites. There are now 19 bilateral trade agreements in effect between Latin American and Soviet Bloc countries. The actual amount of this inter-trade increased from a $70 million level in 1953 to between $200 and $250 million in 1954. The great bulk of this trade-80 percent of the total-was concentrated upon exchanges between Argen- tina and Brazil with Soviet Bloc countries. Argentina's trade with the Bloc quadrupled in 1954, and Brazil-Bloc trade doubled. Trade between Uruguay and the Bloc also showed an upward trend in 1954. While it is true that over-all trade levels fell far short of bilateral agreement goals, and while Latin American shipments to the Soviet Bloc were restricted to non-strategic items-coffee, cacao, cotton, frozen meat, and wool-in return for manufactured goods exports from the Bloc (and minor shipments of machinery and equipment against much larger Bloc promises of deliveries in these items that were that our policy is not one of offering carrots to unfulfilled), the trade record is one that we recalcitrants while preserving the stick of cannot afford to view with complacency. It is discipline for good performance. Even within part of a fabric of evidence that all points to a Latin America, our record has been one of heightened level of Soviet Bloc effort to drive a offering the most generous assistance to those wedge into United States-Latin American nations that have departed most widely from interdependence and the mutual regard it has what we regard as sound practice, helped to engender. It calls for an increased 4. Although the "public relations" approach effort on our part to see that the Bloc intentions to Latin America will not suffice of itself to are thwarted before rather than after they have change the currently widespread resentment of achieved substantial success. our alleged neglect to an attitude of enthusiastic cooperation, the demonstration of a deeper and V. CONCLUSIONS more consistently maintained concern for the twenty Republics is an important part of the 1. It is difficult to suggest remedies in formula. The recent global broadening of our generalized terms, particularly since our objec- international interests and commitments is of tives with respect to Latin America are gen- itself a factor that induces an older-child, erally beyond criticism. new-born-baby complex in Latin America that 2. The chief shortcoming that may be cited requires an exaggerated demonstration of affec- with some degree of fairness is that our action tion as a therapy. The base of good will upon programs, particularly in the economic field, which we can draw is sufficiently established while consistent with our objectives, are not to give genuine hope of success if our gestures genuinely adequate for their effective accom- of interest are accompanied by positive actions plishment either in conception or execution. to demonstrate: The remedy lies in a meticulous re-examination a. that we are willing to endure a con- o a strengthening siderable amount of domestic political heat of f action programs. of a wide variety a in order to accommodate com etitive Latin 3. While it is understandable that the more p acute problems in other areas should have American exports to our market; commanded a disparate claim upon our atten- b. that we are intelligently and resolutely tion and resources, the result has been a neglect prepared to take stops to keep U. S. capital of Latin America not only relative to other contributions, private and public, flowing to areas, but in terms of its inherent importance Latin America at a rate that keeps pace with to U. S. interests. This has been keenly felt in their commensurate influence upon the eco- Latin America, to a degree that prejudices our nomic growth of that area in the 1945-51 relationships in that area. As in our early period, provided always that there is local administration of the ECA program in Europe, effort to make such flows tenable; our current procedure with respect to Latin c. that we do not apply stricter criteria to America versus other areas tends to throw the Latin America than we employ elsewhere; weight of the incentives that our programs d. that we take Latin American potential offer on the side opposite to our intent and contributions to Hemisphere and Free World interest, since unsatisfactory performance be- security seriously. comes the criterion for attention and assistance. 5. The dimension of increased cost to the Clearly we cannot refrain from taking action United States of implementing such a program to eliminate trouble that is presently or pro- appears to be relatively modest. Importantly, spectively threatening our interests. But this it is a matter of intensifying concern and mak- calls for counterbalancing measures to certify ing our attitudes more conspicuous. As has SECRET been indicated, the dimension of appropriately increased capital contributions is not formi- dable (a stepping up to an additional $200 mil- lion annual flow over a five-year period) par- ticularly since the great bulk of such increase would be in the area of private direct invest- ments and the increase in public. funds largely in the form of loans that should be sound. Again on an over-all basis, Latin American resources for servicing foreign equity and loan investment debt would seem to be adequate for any expansion reasonably in sight. 6. Finally, it is suggested that we might profitably regard Latin America as a demon- stration economic area, the continuity of whose growth record is usefully exploitable in the current struggle between political and eco- nomic systems for the adherence of under- developed areas. If we are correct in apprais- ing the Communist strategy as giving ex- tremely important weight to the subversion of underdeveloped areas with the lure of the claim that Communism can offer them a quicker route to the development they seek, it is of major importance for democratic-enterprise countries to rebut this claim effectively. For all of the qualifications that must be made, the twenty Republics are generally oriented toward political democracy and enterprise eco- nomics. Among all of the broad underdevel- oped areas of the world they can show the most convincing evidence of having escaped dead center and entered into a period of gen- uinely dynamic growth. There are somewhat disquieting signs of a slackening off in pace, but as yet these are not sufficiently serious to question the validity of the growth trend. If, as is here argued, a reasonably temperate in- tensification of U. S. effort promises to con- tribute usefully to a resumption of their economic vigor, the effort would appear well worth the making. The conscious and overt alignment of United States interest in Latin American economic dynamism as a demonstra- tion of the advantages of adhering to our type of institutions has evident hazards. But the odds of success appear to be good, and the gesture would focus our national attention on something that is important to our interests quite apart from cold war strategy. It might serve both to crystallize our own purpose, and to carry greater conviction of its sincerity and continuity to Latin Americans than could be done in any other way. Paper 11 The National Cost and Policies Required to Maintain a Modern Weapons System Originator: Ellis A, Johnson 1. THE PROBLEM To determine the effect of economic limita- tions on the weapons systems of the U. S. and Soviet Blocs in order to indicate the policies required to maintain a superior U. S. strength. II. ASSUMPTIONS The long-range intention and actions of the Soviet Union will be such as to cause them to attempt to retain relative military superiority over the U. S, Bloc. III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM a. The U. S. and Soviet Blocs are at present approximately equal in the technological quality of weapons systems. b. Unless vigorous corrective action is taken by the U. S. Bloc, present trends will give the Soviet Bloc a 3- to 5-year technological advan- tage by 1965. c. In view of the relative technological equal- ity between the U. S. and USSR, their relative military strengths depend primarily on the relative magnitudes of their military establish- ments. d. The gross national product of the U. S. is probably three to seven tunes as great as that of the Soviet Union. e. The U. S. military budget is determined primarily by political rather than economic and military considerations. IV. DISCUSSIONS The military effectiveness of two opposing military establishments depends on three prin- cipal factors. First, it depends on the relative tactical effectiveness of the two establishments in both offensive and defensive actions. In the ques- tion of tactical effectiveness, the quality of the weapons systems is very important but may not necessarily be decisive by itself. Second, the relative effectiveness obviously depends also on the relative magnitudes, in the same way that a good big man is always better than a good little man. Furthermore, because a modern military establishment must attack and defend itself simultaneously on land, sea, and in the air, and since critical parts of the land-sea-air battle may determine the outcome of a war even though the remaining strengths remain proportionately great, both the over-all relative magnitudes of the military establish- ments and the relative strengths of the opposing attacking and defending forces are important. Third, in the build-up and planning prepara- tory to a general war, the economic bounds of the two opponents determine the limitations in a military-economic game, and it is the success- ful play in this gains that ultimately determines strategy and the probable outcome of the war. Since either side can vary the six semi-independ- ont parameters of land-sea-air attack and defense, and since offensive and defensive forces in critical factors must be matched (but in an unsymmetrical way between the two opponents), destruction and lowering of motivations to the military-economic gaming is critically continue the conflict. dependent on the quality and timeliness of The outstanding feature of modern weapons intelligence, especially with respect to the fore- systems is their growing complexity and cost, cast of the production of the opponent in each For example, in 1937 a U. S. destroyer operated category and the reporting of the quality of with no more than 60 vacuum tubes to run its weapons systems and of tactical doctrine, various mechanisms. Today one piece of which together should result in an estimate of equipment on a destroyer may contain as the offensive-defensive exchange rates by the many as 2500 vacuum tubes. Most of these combat units. mechanisms are absolutely critical to the The importance of lead times cannot be over- combat missions of the destroyer. Not only emphasized-in particular the lead times re- has this complexity increased cost (as is. shown quired for training, production, and decision- in Figs. 1, 2, and 3, which give the cost of making. Since all information with respect to Army tanks, Air Force aircraft, and Navy the opponent is imprecise, the gamble taken in aircraft carriers as a function of the models every decision-making move involving large and time), but there has also been a tremendous expenditures in weapons systems is great, by increase in the logistic requirement for support. the very nature of the need to forecast. It is Most weapons in combat before and during like a poker game with deuces and treys wild, World War II could be expected to perform played by two gamblers, each of whom has a without failure for times ranging from clays to very limited stake that he must risk on a single months without breakdown, Today many of hand, guessing at what hand he will getl the critical weapons can be expected to operate There are, of course, important interactions only for minutes, hours, or a few days before between these three factors. For example, the breakdown. For example interceptor aircraft exchange rate between offense and defense and modern guided missiles, as well as much determines the rules for the military-economic electronic equipment, have an expected life play. But the exchange rate itself is deter- before failure that can be measured in minutes, mined by tactical effectiveness, and tactical and complicated weapons, such as the M48 effectiveness itself depends on a complex of tank and strategic bombers, require continuous military factors that includes very importantly and heavy maintenance and have failure rates the quality of the weapons systems. Thus in that can certainly be measured in days. Thus playing the military-economic game, one must the tremendously increased effectiveness of the bear in mind the whole complex problem of individual new weapon, as compared to its tactical effectiveness in exchange rates and its predecessor, only partly compensates for its complicated dependence on the quality of great over-all increase in cost, primarily the doctrine, training, and weapons systems. logistic cost in manufacture and maintenance, So far as is known a satisfactory military- It may be argued that the potency of thormo- economic game has not yet been devised, nuclear weapons is so great that this very although some progress has been made by the effectiveness will make it less costly to defeat RAND Corporation and by ORO. One major an opponent. This indeed might be so if difficulty is that of making an adequate forecast delivery were unopposed and there were no of costs and of tactical exchange rates; other strategic and tactical reaction to this threat. difficulties are those concerned with human For example, if the Soviet Union were undo- factors-in particular the levels of damage to fended against modern high- or low-altitude populations, troops and economies, which bring bombers, then perhaps 100 bombers carrying about defeat by a combination of physical thermonuclear weapons would be adequate to SECRET 40 42 44 46 YEAR destroy the USSR. These might even be bombers of a relatively obsolete type. Such a bomber force could be supported at it cost of 2 to 3 billion dollars a year. Unfortunately the universal reaction to the delivery of atomic weapons has led to the design of incredibly effective air defense systems. These have now progressed to the point where the forecast can be made that after paying a certain admission price to establish warning and control nets, the air attack, in order to keep its ability to destroy, will be required to spend between 2 to 10 dollars for every dollar that is spent in the opposing air defense. Thus in a symmetrical game of air attack-air defense between the U. S. and the USSR, such as now exists, the outcome will be determined by the funds spent in the prior 6 years to establish levels of attack and defense. The lead time to bring an effective system into being is of the order of 5 to 8 years, Thus in this gaming the imprecise forecast, and there- fore the gambles taken 6 to 8 years previously and pursued vigorously, determines the out- come of the combat at the time of war. The rapid turnover of air weapons systems shown in Fig. 4 illustrates the dynamic nature of weapons systems and the rapid rate of obsolescence. Figure 4 also illustrates the increasing competitiveness of the Soviet Union in the race for a modern air attack system. Note that the Soviet lag, as in the Tu-4 to the B-29, changed to a forecast lead for the ICBM. A good part of Fig. 4, of course, is based on intelligence information with respect to USSR and U. S. weapons planning. The nature of the relation between an air defense budget in billions of (equivalent) dollars on the one side and an air offense budget in billions of (equivalent) dollars on the other side with respect to the outcome of the air battle is shown in Fig. 5. This applies only to the battle between manned bombers of the type shown in Fig. 2, and guided missiles of the type now being installed by the U. S. and the USSR. (By equivalent dollars is meant the amount the U. S. would have to spend to produce the given weapons systems. The conversion of equivalent dollars to rubles is complicated not only by the lack of free-currency exchange ratios, but also by the fact that the ratios of labor to capitalization are different in the U. S. and the USSR. The USSR may to some extent substitute labor for capitalization. The uncertainties in the present analysis make refinements of this sort unprofitable. It is assumed here that equivalent dollars may be X40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 YEAR Figure 2: Unit Costs of U, S, Heavy Bombers. SECRET 0 L 38 48 YEAR converted to rubles by a ratio near that of the diplomatic currency exchange. The uncer- tainties of the methodology are thus pushed back to a determination of the maximum feasible "peacetime" military budget.) The linearity of the relations in the main part of these curves may be subject to refinement, and even the slopes of the lines may be some- what in error. One essential feature of these illustrative curves is the threshold phenomenon indicated by the horizontal segments at the SECRET lower ends. The exact nature of this threshold phenomenon is but poorly known. The pres- ence of these segments is due to the fact that a minimum defense budget is required (for radar systems, etc.) before any real protection can be afforded and a minimum attack budget is required before any appreciable damage can be inflicted even on an undefended ZI. Incre- ments to the offensive budget above the mini, mum level produce an immediate appreciable gain in damage until adequate defense above the threshold limit has been provided. The slopes of the curves in Fig. 5 indicate that an advantage of over 10 to I for the attack budget over the defense budget is necessary to achieve high probability of high damage to the ZI; on the other hand, a defense budget half the enemy's attack budget will give high probability that little damage may be inflicted on the ZI attacked. In Fig 6 the relation between submarine and antisubmarine budget is shown. The presence of a nearly horizontal segment in the curve giving high probability of controlling the sea lanes again indicates that there is a minimum defensive expenditure before control can be assured even against light attacks. On the other hand the curve delimiting mar- ginal disruption of sea lanes crosses the hori- zontal axis to the right of the origin, indicating that sea attack must exceed certain minimum levels before any appreciable effect can be produced. The slopes of these curves indicate that defense budgets must exceed 4.5 times the attack budget to completely protect ship- Tu?4(B?29)// t-y B?36- ping and maintain U. S. control of the seas, provided the offensive budget exceeds the threshold. Moreover, the defense budget must exceed 3 times the budget for the offense to maintain even marginal control of shipping lanes and the ground war in Europe or the Soviet periphery. In Fig. 7 the relation between opposing ground forces is shown. For these curves, it is postulated on a relatively inadequate basis that for equal budgets land-combat effective- ness is approximately the same on both sides, averaged over a war. Under this assumption equal budgets lead to stalemate, whereas an advantage of 3 to 2 in favor of either side leads to a reasonably high probability of victory. Whether there is a threshold effect for this latter case is debatable. Any such threshold would be relatively small ($0.4 billion, say) and has been neglected here. An implication of the preceding illustrative curves is that to ensure U. S. victory, including heavy damage to Soviet PVO, adequate pro- tection of U. S. ZI, victory in the European and I- 39(B?47) / I \ / I B.52 -7--- \E- ICBM - 1< 37(B?52) ICBM - -f --- B-50 B?29 I I I I I I 1 1 56 58 60 62 64 66 YEAR Co 3 0 2 / 1 u (heavy (moderate (light as damage) ?3 damage) / damage) ,dA / ;. -0 o 0 9. / a r Q (essentially .a no damage) e r a / ~o 6 / ?c 3 / 3 / o >a / 'a 0 JI / 01 1 I ( 0 I I 10 20 30 AIR DEFENSE BUDGET, BILLIONS OF (EQUIVALENT) DOLLARS Figure S.-Relation between Air Attack and Air Defense Budgets. (The numbers Identify the regions designated in the game matrix results in Appendix A. The bend in the curses for lower budgets Indicates the minimum effectiyq offense and defense budgets-or "threshold effect.") Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET I I I I I I 10 20 30 USSR SEA ATTACK BUDGET, BILLIONS OF (EQUIVALENT) DOLLARS Figure 6,-Relation between Sea Attack and Defense Budgets. (The dotted lines and numbers Identify the regions used for scoring the games in Appendix A.) 10 20 USSR GROUND BUDGET, BILLIONS OF (EQUIVALENT) DOLLARS Figure 7.-Relation between Ground Budgets. (The doffed lines and numbers Identify the regions and scoring of the games In Appendix A.) peripheral ground wars, and complete suprem- acy at sea with unchallengeable control of shipping lanes, the U. S. budget should cover SAC forces exceeding the Soviet air defense budget by a ratio of 10 to 1, an air defense budget exceeding 0.5 times the Soviet LRAA (Long-Range Air Army) budget, an army budget exceeding 1.5 times the Soviet army budget, and a sea defense budget exceeding 4.5 times the Soviet submarine budget. A Russian budget of any specified size is thus most effective if most heavily concentrated on sub- marines and least heavily on SAC. On the other hand, if the U. S. were content to maintain the status quo and merely defend with a smaller budget, the U. S. air defense budget should exceed 0.5 times the Russian SAC budget and the naval budget should exceed the Russian submarine budget by a factor of about 3 to 1, Again the Russians can best force a larger U. S. budget by concentrating largely on naval forces. The advantage of air defense expenditures over air offense expenditures makes for stalemate (easy parity) in the air battle or for a quick surprise attack with Trojan-horse tactics. Thus in searching for good strategies, the most attractive budgets tend to be balanced-or are even slightly directed toward predominantly naval expenditures. The general conclusions based on the slopes and shapes of the assumed curves, imprecise and inaccurate though they may be,. can be further explored by simple military-economic games, as indicated in the matrix of cases tabulated in Appendix A. Such games can be established to determine whether or not the best solution for the U. S. lies in a high, inter- mediate, or very low budget, and to determine the general nature of these budgets. The proposed model would consist of a symmetrical air attack-air defense model with exchange rates based on Fig. 5; included in the air offense budget would be the use of Navy and Air Force strategic delivery. That other part of the naval effort that is concerned with transportation of the Army overseas and with amphibious landings could be allocated to land-war budget. The relative exchange rates shown in Fig. 6 relate to the USSR attempt to prevent transport of U. S. forces overseas and the attempt by the U. S. to counteract and eliminate Soviet attack. Accepting these relations, then, one plays a set of military- economic games with different budgets on the U. S. and Soviet sides. For illustrative purposes these games have been played with the budgets ranging from $3 billion to $80 billion in ratios from 4:1 to 1:4. For budgets sufficiently above the threshold levels the ratios are most important. The game matrices are illustrated in Appendix A, where various combinations of U. S. and USSR budgets of fixed amounts are compared. A "good" strategy for each side is then selected according to the minimax game principle based on subjective estimates of the values of the outcomes. Four striking sets of facts tend to emerge from these games: First, by expanding reasonable funds on air defense it is relatively easy to achieve an atomic stalemate in which neither side can make effective use of strategic delivery of thermonuclear weapons. Second, the pay-offs have an antisymmetry (introduced principally by the naval exchange ratios) favoring the USSR for low budgets, and to a lesser extent favoring the USSR for high budgets in ratios from 2 (U. S.) to 1 (USSR) on through those of high USSR budget ratios. Considering that the maximum budget in a cold war condition (without decreasing cap- italization rates) that either side may expend on defense is much greater for U. S. than USSR, the high U. S. budget expenditure gives the U. S. its most advantageous position vis-d-vis USSR. These conclusions (as implication of the ex- change ratios of Figs. 5, 6, and 7) are illustrated in Fig. 8, where the outcomes resulting from the good strategies are plotted. The contours of equivalent results have been constructed from the outcomes for specific budgets, where each 1951 IP51 rubles, billions I dollars, billions' 1948-_________ 66. 1 66. 3 85. 0 1949___________ 79. 1 70.2 1950___________ 79. 4 82. 9 1951___________ 96. 4 93. 4 1952___________ 113. 8 108. 6 1953___________ 110. 2 P) 1954___-___-__ 100. 3 (s) 127. 0 23. 8 1955___________ 112. 1 (a) 136.0 1956___________ 4 110 to 115 (') I Ruble figures do not include hidden or undisclosed defense expenditures. ' Dollar figures include hidden expenditures. ' Not announced. ' Estimated. TABLE 2.-U. S. Gross National Product and Yearly Defense Expenditures (Unclassified) [Billions of dollars] side is assumed to follow the "good" strategy selected from a game matrix like that in Appen- dix A. Third, extreme strategies of the type "put- ting all the eggs into one basket" tend to be dangerous strategies easily countered by a balanced force on the other side. Fourth, that advantage for the U. S. is not achieved at low budgets until complete dis- armament is approached. The recent estimated budgets of the two countries are shown in Tables 1 to 3. An estimate of the maximum defense budget each side is willing and able to expend under cold- war conditions is subject to many uncertainties. It is considered that this maximum would not interfere with the present rate of capitalization, but would result from decreasing civilian con- sumption and (for U. S.) achieving a maximum of production per unit capitalization. These maxima are estimated to be about $60 billion for U. S. and about $30 billion (equivalent) for the USSR. These estimates are given here more for illustrative purposes. The consequences of these limits can be seen from Fig. 8. These figures are not firm estimates of maxi- mum capability. The $30 billion figure for the Soviet Union represents the Middle of a SECRET 1956'__ 40.5 8 .85 16. 6 9.70 1955'__ ' 3S0 40.6 8 . 90 15. 2 0. 78 1954___ 360.5 46.5 12 . 91 15. 7 11. 29 1953___ 364.6 5 0.3 16 . 24 16. 1 11, 88 1952___ 345. 2 4 3.8 15 . 63 12. 8 10. 10 1951___ 328.2 2 2.3 7 . 47 6. 35 6, 58 1950--- 285.1 1 3.0 3 . 99 3. 60 4, 10 1949-- 257.3 1 2.9 5 .24 1. 76 4.89 1948 --- 257.3 I t. 8 6. 34 1, 12 4, 20 1947___ 232.2 1 4.4 6.28 (point Ar and Al') my 5. 50 Extrapolated values based on 1953 maximum defense expenditures _--___ ______- ' 425 n ax. max. "Survey of Current Business" (National Incomo Number), July 1955. The Budget of the United States, RY 195a, Estimated. USSR: Consumption -------- Government_________ Investment__________ Defense_____________ U. S.: Consumption-------- Government --------- Investment ---------- Defense_____________ range of USSR defense expenditure estimates for 1955 and 1956 increased approximately 5 percent annually until 1060 to suggest a rather optimistic rate of growth in national product.' The working figure of $60 billion for the U. S. relied on both an extrapolation of the trend of ' CIA/RR 23 (ORR Project 26-52-I), "The Economy of the Soviet Bloc: Production Trends and 1067 Poten- tial," 20 May 1953. C' V . _E c 3- oos d`a._L`o Ly cn D~ ~a iE oo p o Cko $ ooE p X. .oo e~ lno? 0 tooz d w~r~ alndt0sm to u5S4y pV us meSto`o5 sea and 9soun O fib oaesd? doma9? US con cois6\ castrol sea and 9soduc8 m US con 10:1 us dominates all offensive 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 US MILITARY BUDGET, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS Figure 8.-Results of Best Strategies on Both Sides in Illustrative Game, the GNP through 1960 (Table 2) and an esti- mate of 1960 gross national product amounting to $425 billion.' This defense expenditure would amount to about 15 percent of the esti- mated GNP, the same relation that existed between the two quantities in 1953, the year of highest defense expenditure in peacetime. The $54 billion USSR defense Expenditure in 1054, from which the $30 billion was extrap- olated, constituted about 20 percent of the Soviet budget in that year. There is some reason to believe, however, that the CIA esti- mate of Soviet product considerably overesti- 2 CJ. Gerhard Cohn. The American Economy in 1960, National Planning Association, pp. 30-42, mates the true picture. It should be empha- sized that the $30 billion figure is used for illus- trative purposes only, but the uncertainty over the proper figure to use serves to point out the necessity for a more convincing estimate. It is recognized that these particular games represent only a mockup or simulation of more accurate informative and extensive games that might be played in order to determine the best strategy for the U. S. This kind of qualitative analysis is a form of operational gaming, and to be meaningful requires a more accurate determination of the economic and military bounds of the U. S. and the Soviet Bloc. It can be seen that if the economic capability of the SECRET Soviet Bloc can be established at a particularly low level, this provides the U. S. with the unique opportunity to outgame the Soviet in a military economic sense and therefore to deal with it out of a real strength-Air, Navy, and Army budgets being equally critical. From the same argument it is clear that if the Soviet Union recognizes the nature of this game it should make a maximum attempt to bring about a world-wide reduction of military budgets to the lower level, where it will have a superiority. The difficulties in determining the gross national product of the Soviet Union and the U. S. are apparent to anyone attempting to make this estimate. A reasonably accurate estimate of gross national product and estimate of the Soviet military budget including break- down by services must be determined before significant results can be obtained through this kind of analysis, since this is critical to the level of the U. S. budget if war is to be deterred. Even more important, a rough analysis of the input-output systems of the two economies is required. An analysis of such input-output systems sufficient for this kind of gaming could be established, but so far as is known this has not been adequately done. It is also clear that the present cursory attempt to establish military models, especially for exchange rates, is not adequate, but it is considered that such models (which could be crude and aggregated for the purposes of this kind of gaming) could be designed on the basis of existing knowledge in the military establishments. In view of the importance of air defense in this gaming, the effectiveness of air defense for the continental U. S. and NATO is dis- cussed in Appendices B and C. The results of the illustrative games are strongly dependent on the military-economic exchange ratios. Obviously these will not be static quantities; they will constantly change with the technological evolution of the weapons systems. The exchange ratios illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6 are consistent with the prognosis for the immediate future (1960-1962), assuming SECRET that the U. S. as well as the USSR can have adequate air defenses by this period. When the ICBM becomes operational the great ad- vantage of air defense over air attack will be lost, and the situation with respect to the air battle will revert to that which has existed in the immediate past. When the air attack is favored, the good strategies lead to high air- attack budgets; when the air defense is favored the good strategies lead to balanced or even low air-attack budgets with higher ground and naval budgets. Not only will the situation with respect to budget strategies be changed, but also it is predicted to swing much more favorably for the Soviet Bloc. For the period when the USSR has ICBM and the U. S. does not (1962-1964), the air offensive will be dominated by the enemy until the U. S. Bloc can restore parity by making its own ICBM operational. V. CONCLUSIONS 1. High-level military budgets provide a far more favorable chance for the U. S. to win and a far greater deterrent to war in it conflict between the U. S, and the USSR than lower budgets. 2. The Soviet Union at intermediate and lower budgets would have a relative advantago and therefore would tend to attempt to bring about sufficient reductions in world armaments to bring their system into a favorable zone of competition. S. In order to get a good estimate of a relatively favorable military budget for the U. S. an input-output analysis for the Soviet Bloc and the U. S. Bloc is required. Such an analysis is feasible and could be relatively crude. 4. An aggregated military model designed in terms of economic parameters is also required in order to obtain useful results. Such a model could be constructed on the basis of existing information. 5. Only complete disarmament in offensive weapons systems approaches a high-level budget system in relative advantage to the U. S. 6. Intermediate-level military budgets are regarded as especially dangerous to the U. S., and care should be taken to achieve either a high military budget or complete disarmament with a minimum of time of transition through intermediate budget levels. In fact until such a time as the U. S. is completely assured of the good intentions of the Soviet Union, it would be extremely dangerous to consider a prolonged transition from high budget levels to complete disarmament. 7. The NSC could make a sufficiently ac- curate analysis, of the type described herein, by a cooperative effort of existing agencies. 8. Research and development needs to be kept at a high level in order to prevent establishment of an unfavorable tactical ex- change rate for the U. S., with the resulting unfavorable effect on the budget required to maintain deterrence. The U. S, should seek through research and development to correct the unfavorable exchange ratio between the enemy naval attack and the U. S. defense. The U. S. should seek to maintain a favorable ex- change for air defense (or air counterattack) over enemy air attack, particularly with respect to ICBNI. 9. The U. S. air defense budget requires the most immediate and urgent national attention. VI, RECOMMENDATIONS Consideration should be given to making an analysis of the relative U. S. advantage of military budgets at various levels and at various future times, and of the land, sea, and air offense and defense budgets most suited to provide the greatest deterrent against war. Paper 11: Appendix A Results of Illustrative Game This appendix contains the working sheets for the outcomes of the illustrative game. To emphasize the game character of the problem, and to organize the results, the outcomes have been laid out in rectangular matrices. Because of the simple linear nature of the assumed curves of exchange ratios, much of the results can also be obtained analytically. The selection of the "good" strategies-that is, the combination of strategies when each side is pursuing his preferred strategy-depends not only on the outcomes but also on a sub- jective estimate of the relative preference among the alternatives. Each budget mix for the U. S. must be selected in the absence of information concerning that mix-or even that budget-selected by the USSR. These uncertainties led to conservation and to more nearly equal mixes. The outcomes are coded according to the code numbers on Figs. 5, 6, and 7, which plot the exchange ratios for air attack-air defense, U. S. sea defense-USSR sea attack, and ground interaction, respectively. The outcomes based on these approximate and illustrative curves imply that the U. S,, even for budget ratios twice as great as that for the USSR, could have its sphere of influence re- duced to that of the North American continent, if challenged, in the period when the weapons systems described are in effect. The games illustrated here far from exhaust the investigation of possible strategies. How- ever, for budgets above $20 billion (effective) the outcomes and relative budget mixes are determined more by the budget ratios than by their absolute values. Outcomes are coded in Table Al according to code numbers in Figs. 5 to 7. The figures in parentheses at the top of each box give the out- comes of the air battles (see Fig. 5); the first number being the effect on the U. S., the second the effect on the USSR. The number 3 repre- sents high probability of heavy damage, 2 an expectation of moderate damage, 1 of light damage. Thus the combination (2, 1) repre- sents moderate damage to U. S. expected, but only light damage to USSR. The number in the middle gives the probable result of the ground battle (see Fig. 7), where the interpre- tation is as follows: 2, U. S. wins; 1, U. S. can possibly win; 0, indeterminate; -1, USSR can possibly win; -2, USSR wins ground battle. Whenever a ground outcome favorable to the U. S. but a Navy outcome unfavorable to the U. S. is indicated, the number is put in parenthe- ses, indicating that the ground battle can be lost from lack of capability of LofC. The Navy outcomes are coded according to Fig. 6, where, the interpretation is: 2, U. S. controls seas; 1, U. S. can achieve local control of seas; 0, inde- terminate; -1, USSR can deny local areas of sea to U. S.; -2, USSR controls seas. Prefer- able strategies (in judgment of the writer) are indicated by ellipses. ILLUSTRATIVD GAME) Table Al $3 billion 35 billion (equivalent) (equivalent) V .3 2.0 LO 2.0 2.0 B.Q 1.0 0:5 OS LO 2:0 0.2 0.5 1.0 15 ? Air Atk .5 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) o Air Del 2.0 ground .2 0 -2 .-2 -2 .?j Navy .3 0 0 0 a Air Atk 2.0 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) Air Del 2:0 Ground OS 0 0 -2 +-2 S Navy 0.5 0 0 0 0 AirAtk1.0 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) Air Del2.0 Ground 1.0 2 2 0 =2 Navy 1.0 1 0 0 -2 0 Air Atk .5 (0,0) (00) Air Dal 1.0 Ground 2:0 (::2 2 2 0 Navy 1:5 0 0 0 US Preferre Strata Air Atk .3 (0,0) (0,0) (0.0) (OM Air Del 1.0 Ground 1.5 2 2 2 Navy 2.2 0 0 0 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 S7R. t5 billion 410 billion .budgets N (equivalent) '(egdnleol) .Air Ark 2.0 0.5 0.5 4.0 3,0 -0.5 03 03 4 Air Del 2.0 1.0 3.0 8.0 '3.0 3.11 8.0 2$ 8.7 US Ground 0.5 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 :3:0 2.0 4.0 3.4 budgets Navy 03 1.5 OA 2.0 2.0, 33 .43 3,0 2.6 Alr 4&kt2.0 ($ ,0) (0,0) (0,0) . (O,0) (0,0) (010) Air. W-2.0 Ground 0'3 -2 '2 w -2 b -2 -2 -2 Navy 05 -2 -2 -2 rn 0 -2 -2 -2 9 m -Atk 1.0 (2,0) -(0,D) (0,0) (0.0) (0,0) (0,0) Air.))ef 2.0 Ground.1.0 (0) -2 .?. -2 $j -2 -2 -2 S4 Navy 1.0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 . Air. Atk .3 05 C (,Q) (3,0) (0,4) (U0) (0,0) AirDel 1.0 3:0 ea 0:5 (2') -1 rq -2 YJ -1 -2 -2 Ground 1,5 Sbgtegy -2 -2 , -2 -2 -2 -2 Navy 2.2 1.0 Air Atk A.0 . (0;2) (013 (0,0) (0,0) oa~ (0,0) (010) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) Air Dof 8.0 Grouodl.0 2 -2 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 2 Navy 2.0 . +2 -2 -2 -2 -3 -2 -2 +-2 2 S Air Offene Air Atk3.6 (0,0) '(0,8) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)? (0,01 (0,0). (0,0) (0,0) Air Def'3.0 Ground 2 0 2 (0) ? (2) (2) tr a -2 (0) -2 w . Wavy 2.0 -2 2i -2- -2 2 ? -2 r2 -2 Air Atk 0.5 0,0 O,U US steered Str 0. gy Air. Del 3.0 2 (2) E11 2 (2) -1 Gmund.3,0 Navy .3:5 2 +2 -2 1 -1 L-2 -2 -2 -2 USGro d Olfene[v tegy Usm W11. 320 billion (equivalent) $40 billion (equivalent) Al, Aik (0 2 5 4 4 4 4 4 10 5 10 l0 ES AG Def 2 10 5 4 4 4 S 5 10 5 5 5 12 US Gourd 4 4 S 10 2 7 7 8 10 5 5 (5 0 bad a Navy 4 4 5 2 10 5 4 3 10 25 20 10 5 Air Auk 10 (3,3) ,0 (2+,1) (2,1+) (2,1+) (2,I+ (2,1) (2,1) (3,0) (2+,1) (3,1) (3,0) Al, Daf 2 Ground 4 0 0 0- -2 (2) -2 -2 -2 -2 0- o- -2 -2 Navy 4 -2 -2 -2 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 Ak Ask 2 ,31 (0,0 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) qo) (01 10) 010) 0,0 0.0) 010 Air Oaf 10 12 1 Preferre Strategy U5 P oIerr.d S i stogy Ground 4 0 0 O 0- -2 (2) -2 -2 _2 -2 0- 0- -a Navy 4 0 -2 - -2 _l -2 -2 -2 -2 - -2 -2 -2 ? Air Ask 5 (1,2+) (010)e (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1,0) (0,0) (1,0) (1,0) (2,0) Air Def. 5 Ground 5 N 0+ 0+ p~f 0 -2 (2) -1 -1 (-2) -2 0 0 -2 -1 avy 5 -2 -2 y -2 It -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 4 Akof (I+, z) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1+,0) (0,0) 11.0) (t+, of (2,0) 4 Ground 10 (2) (2) (2) (0) (2) (1) (I) 0+ 0 (2) (2) -2 D+ Nary 2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 Ac Ask 4 (I+,2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,01 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1+,0) (0,0) (1+,0) (11,0) (2 0) A Oaf 4 , Go?d 2 -2 -2 -2 -2 0 -2 -2 -2 _2 -2 -2 - 2 -2 Navy 10 -1 1 -2 2 -2 -2 -1 -2 '-2 -2 -2 .y _q Air Ask 10 (0,3) ,0 (0,1) (0,1+) (0,1+) (0,1+) (0,1) (0,1) ,0 (0,1) (0 1) (0 0) (0 0) Al Del l0 , , 1 Ground 10 2 (2) (2) 0 (2) (1) 1 Of 0 (2) (2) -2 (0+) Navy I0 _I _1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 2 -2 -2' -2 -2 -2 Air Ark 5 A (1,2+) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1,0) (0,0) (1,0) (1,0) (2 0) ir Def 5 , Canoed 5 0+ 0+ a 0 -2 (2) -1 -1 -2 -2 t 0 0 -2 -(~ Navy 25 2 2 +2 2 -2 +2 2 2 -2 g -2 -2 -2 +2 - Air Atk 10 AG D f (1,2+) (o,0)E (0,1) (0,1+) (0,1+) (0,1+) (0,1) (0,1) (1,0)v+ (0,1) (1,1) (l l) (2 0) e 5 , , w Cooed 5 0+ 0+.. U -2 (2) -1 _I _2 _2 0 I Navy 20 2 2 t +2 2 -2 2 2 2 -2 V -2 -2 2 _ _ 2 Air Alk 5 f 10 13) (0,01 (Op) (0,0) S Preferr (0,0) Strate (0,0) (0,0) (0, 10) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0 Gomd M + -2 gy US I oforr?d St otogy Navy 20 2 2 2 2 -1 -1 -2 -2 0 0 -2 -1- 2 _2 2 2 2 2 -2 -2 -2 2 A0 Ask 20 A4 Def 10 (0,3) (0,1-) (0,2) (0,2+) (0,2+) (0,2+) (0,2) (0,2) (0,1-) (0,2) (0,2) (0,2) (0,0) Crouud 5 (0+) 0+ 0- -2 (2) -1 d -1- -2 0 0 Navy 5 -2 -2 -2 1 + -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 USSR $20. billion $60 billion burgers (equivalent) (equivalent) Air Ark 3 3 2 1 40 20 15 40 Air Def 10 8 8 a 10 10 15 5 US Ground 3 4 5 5 5 5 15 10 budgets Navy 4. 5 Ft. 6 5 15 i5 5. Air Ark 3 (0) - , 0 2,0 Air Oaf 10 US Preferr d Strategy Ground 3 ' r2 -2 -2 _2 Navy 4 -2 -2 -2 -2 Air Ark 10 (3,0) N (2,0) '(2r0) Air Def 3 a a Ground 3 - 2 -2 -2 7 Navy 4 . - 2 1 . .,.2 2 Ali Atk 5 (2+ ,0)` (2,0) 01,0) Air Daf s 4 Ground. 5 0 0 -2 Navy 5 -2.~ -2 . -2 Air' Ark 3 (3,0) (2,0) (2-,0) Air M 4 Ground '3 -g '-2 -2 Navy 10 - -2 -2 Air Ark 30 Air Def. 5 US Preferro Sirete (2+,b0 2,1? 1- US Preferred Ground 5 +2 0+ gy 0 0 o 0 0 -2 Strategy Balanced Navy , 20 .+2 Of OF 0 PF -2 -2 Air Atk 20 (0,1) (0,1) (0,1). (0,h) (2,U (1, 1)? (Qf,0) Air Daf 10 " 5 Pround 10 +2 +2 +2. i-2 +2 ?i2 -U-) 0 Navy 20 +2 OF OF 0 0+ -$ -2 (tit Ark .40 Defl0 ?Ir (0,2)- (0,2) (0,2) (0,2) a +~j (2,2) 2) (0i, I) fir YA (2,2N Ground 5 2 1- 0 0 P 0. '0 -2 Navy 5 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 - -2 Air Ark 50 0,2 0,2 0,2 ,2 Air Def 15 Ground. 5 2 0r- 0 r 0 Navy 10? 1 -2 -2 11 2 o Air Atk40 Ali Def 10 (0,2) (0,2) (0;2) (012) ~i A w Ground 'S 2 01 P 0 1 'Navy 25 2 2 tL Air Atk-40: Air Del '5 , U$ Pcafgrr Strategy Ground - 10 2 2+ 2 2 Pif Navy 25 2. ,y 2 Paper 11: Appendix B Defense of Continental U. S. Against Air Attack (Because of its security classification, this paper is not included in this volume, It may be obtained on a "need-to-know" basis from the Director, Operations Research Office, Johns Hop- kins University, Washington, D. C.) . SECRET SECRET Paper 11: Appendix C Defense of NATO Against Air Attack 1. CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE OF Europe by time and distance. The most NATO promising air defense system must be based on The current military posture of NATO has surface-to-air missiles. Of these, NIKE is an especially crucial aspect: the feasibility of currently available and offers in being a weapon obtaining an adequate defense of Western that can at once supplement existing weapons Europe against airborne nuclear attack by and serve as the nucleus from which a high- 1958-60. level defense system can be evolved, This aspect of U. S. military policy is held to A level of defense sufficient to render the be crucial for one outstanding reason-the cost of an air assault nearly prohibitive and viability of the NATO alliance depends on the give visible evidence of a modern delouse in willingness of the people of Western Europe to being could be achieved by the employment of face up to the fearful implications of modern 81 NIKE battalions in Western Europe, war. There are of course other reasons, among Greece, Turkey, and North Africa, them the necessity for defending U. S. andAllied The initial over-all cost would approximate bases, lines of communication, and ports $2.2 billion, of which the U. S, would probably against air attack. But since these purely bear about $1.5 billion, Annual operating military considerations would be of little costs after installation would total $240 mil- moment should the NATO alliance fail, major lion, of which the U. S. share would amount to attention has been directed to the question of $100 million. Western European morale. L7?om these conclusions it is proposed that It has been concluded that by 1958-60, immediate steps should be taken to obtain through an accelerated surface-to-air guided- approval for and direct the implementation missile production and training program, all of all requisite actions to effect the deployment antiair defense system could be erected that of NIKE B guided-missile battalions for use would render an air assault on Western Europe in the air defense of NATO Europe, very costly and, more importantly, would give the people of that area visible assurance that they were not to be left to bear the brunt of if ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM nuclear attack. A program capable of effect- In the absence of clear assurance that tho ing a very high level of defense, although desir- current policy of nuclear retaliation would in able, is probably not feasible within the given fact be decisive in the event of war, and in the time frame, However, a "high level" defense face of possible stalemate or neutralization, the is not absolutely essential to achieve the pri- role of land armies in Europe cannot be disre- mary objective, specifically garded. In the initial phase of it general war -lore it is concluded that current the principal NATO strength on the ground and projected NATO defensive measures are necessarily would be the armies of Western inadequate to meet the magnitude of the Europe. known air attack threat and that manned Thus the validity of current national policy interceptors alone are inherently incapable of rests in large measure on the will to light of the meeting it under the limitations imposed in people of Western Europe, Not only is their SECRET (126) military contribution to NATO land power at stake; equally important is the safety of United States forces committed in Europe at the outbreak of hostilities. Defection of one or more allies would weaken already inade- quate land forces, would threaten Unitee States lines of communication, and would posd the possibility of internment of those U. S. troops in, or dependent for escape on passage through, the defected country. Without seeking to bring into question the soundness of existing policy, there must be emphasized the possibility that the air cam- paign might be stalemated, or prove indeci- sive, or be prohibited by exigencies that may be conjectured but not predicted. In any eventuality, NATO military success and the political and economic survival of the NATO nations would necessarily depend on the ability and willingness of all members of the alliance to continue an initially unfavorable contest on land. The foregoing considerations relate to possi- bilities in case of actual war. They bear with equal or greater force on any period of tension preceding war or the imminent probability of war. Terrible as the threat of nuclear devastation may appear to the people of the U.S., it is even more fearful to the people of Western Europe. Distance and time limits the numbers of bomb- carriers that may be directed against the North American continent; Western Europe is within range of literally thousands of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. From the standpoint of morale, the question of long- range surface-to-surface missiles, aside from the technological aspects of attack and defense, falls into the identical frame of reference. In the course of development of such missiles there is precedent for the assumption that mis- siles capable of reaching Western Europe targets would precede those capable of attack- ing targets in the Western Hemisphere, These facts, magnified by apprehension that is in turn magnified by propaganda and sensa- tionalism in politics and journalism, are very real to the people of Western Europe. They are complicated both in immediacy and magni- tude by the publicity given the probable destructiveness of nuclear weapons. As reports of more powerful bombs (in being or projected) and the lethality and inescapability of fall out reach the people of Western Europe, it is not unreasonable to suspect that their apprehen- sions must approach the proportions of genuine psychosis. Much of what the people of Western Europe believe may be fantastically unrealistic, but these beliefs influence their actions, and upon their actions depends in large measure the viability of the NATO alliance. It hardly comports with logic to expect already war-weary people to achieve unanimity in accepting certain death as the price of a freedom that even their children would not live to enjoy. Yet all these people except the British have tasted. dictatorship in recent years. Some- where between the extremes of resignation to atomic obliteration and resignation to slavery lies a mean on which all could rest in hope and relief. The most acceptable moan, of course, would be a state of world peace, whether attained by good will or by a firm stalemate in military power. If the possibility of war must be accepted and lived with, the alternative mean appears to be a defense against the delivery of nuclear weapons sufficient to promise each man a bettor chance of survival. The importance of the hope and promise of an adequate defense cannot be too strongly stressed. Whatever decisions the people of Western Europe may make in the event of war, these will rest on foundations laid before war begins. People convinced prior to war that resistance is synonymous with annihilation could hardly be expected to put their conviction to the test. Conversely, people convinced that defense against nuclear devastation is possible, and confronted with the physical evidence of such a defense in being, should be more ready to risk the chances of war. It must be assumed that these considerations are not obscure to the enemy. They provide him with a psychological weapon of such importance that its application may well determine the alignment of forces against him and even the course of a war. This weapon is atomic blackmail. To undefended people the threat of nuclear bombing as the alternative to deserting the NATO alliance must be persuasive indeed. Such a threat might be preceded by sample attacks on a few chosen cities, though the genuine fear of undefended people would seem to render such tactics hardly necessary-the threat alone should suffice. Since it would appear to be in the interest of the Soviet Union to restrict warfare to a contest on land with more or less "conventional" means, consideration must be given to Russia's capability of using atomic blackmail to achieve this result. A land assault in Europe, ac- companied by a declaration that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons unless the U, S. initiated their use and that retaliation would be against the major cities of Europe, could place the U. S. in a dangerously equivocal position. Should this form of blackmail succeed, the U. S. would be faced with the choice of abandoning long-range air warfare in favor of an unequal contest on the ground or of withdrawing from Europe and conducting an intercontinental war of attrition from its own final base. One countermeasure for this sort of black- mail is the establishment of a reasonably adequate antiair defense of Western Europe in time to forestall the contingencies cited above. The problem is simplified in heavily populated Europe by the proximity of population centers and most military targets, Thus defense of populations and defense of military targets will in many cases coincide, with consequent reduc- tion in the requirement for defensive in- stallations, The necessity for providing an antiair defense of military installations in addition to that in support of the integrity of the NATO alliance must be considered. Without such a defense, no war in Europe would be possible, whether SECRET or not the NATO alliance remains intact, An air attack against enemy bases, whether offensive or defensive in purpose, would be severely handicapped, if not impossible, with- out secure and protected NATO bases. No land army could fight for long at the end of lines of communication under constant inter- diction by nuclear weapons. Nor might the latter consideration be material if a surprise attack disrupted NATO command echelons and decimated NATO troop units at the outset. Although attention has been focused here on one weapon system and to a lesser extent on one weapon, there has been no intent to suggest that this weapon system necessarily would supplant any or all others. It is regarded as a valuable, even essential, addition to the antiair defense of Western Europe. It should fill a gap now existing between the capabilities of interceptor aircraft and AA artillery, while performing more effectively some of the functions of both. It should provide useful augmentation, em- ployed in its surface-to-surface role, to the air attack on enemy bomber and missile bases, thus favorably influencing the exchange of nuclear stockpiles. Its release to the armies of friendly nations should stimulate missile R&D in the labo- ratories of friendly nations and ultimately should lesson the cost burden on the U. S. through indigenous production, More immediately, its presence on site, as a product of dynamic science, should go far to reassure the people of friendly Europe that they have not been forgotten in the titanic implications of nuclear warfare. Available estimates of Soviet Bloc air strength leave little doubt of the enemy's ability to deliver an air attack capable of over- whelming defenses now in being and projected for the period 1968-60. Pertinent estimates follow; (a) The Soviet Bloc during the period will Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 possess a total of approximately 18,000 military aircraft, of which not less than 6,200 will be bombers. (b) Bases will be available within range of NATO targets for approximately 2,800 light bombers and approximately 4,650 fight- ers, exclusive of interceptors for the defense of Soviet Bloc territory. (c) By 1958-60 the Soviet Union is be- lieved capable of producing nuclear weapons adapted in size and weight to delivery by fighter aircraft. (d) By 1958 fighters capable of carrying low-yield nuclear weapons will be available. Employed as bomb-carriers, these aircraft would be reduced in range to an estimated 70 to 100 nautical miles. It appears,, there- fore, that their use as bomb-carriers neces- sarily would be limited almost exclusively to short-range tactical missions in support of ground forces. (e) The Soviet Union during the period will have developed not only improved ver- sions of the V-1 and V-2 missiles but a super- sonic missile with a range estimated at 880 nautical miles. Of the 18,000 aircraft expected to be available to the Soviet Bloc, 3,600 to 3,800 will be light bombers (11-28 and an improved successor) and 10,000 to 12,000 will be fighters. The latter, including both fighter-bombers and intercept- ors, will consist almost exclusively of MiG-17s and a new aircraft capable of performing as a day or all-weather fighter according to con- figuration. The number of aircraft actually available for attack on NATO targets would be limited pri- marily by the capacity of Soviet Bloc bases within range. A second limitation would be imposed by the magnitude of logistical prepa- rations for attack as a factor affecting surprise. An attack by aircraft normally assigned to bases within range of NATO targets could be carried out with little or no advance warning of its imminence. Any material increase in the light-bomber strength within range, or preparations to stage large numbers of aircraft through forward bases, probably could not escape detection and evaluation as an indication of Soviet intention to attack. The probability of success in an initial attack would be so nearly in direct ratio to the degree of surprise that it is hardly conceivable that the enemy would deliberately sacrifice surprise except to gain some greater advantage. No such greater advantage can now be envisaged except the possible one of attack in overwhelm- ing numbers. Aircraft normally within range of NATO targets would themselves constitute overwhelming strength against currently pro- jected defenses. In addition an obvious build- up for attack might provoke preventive strikes by NATO air forces. It appears, therefore, that the logical Soviet course would be to attack with those aircraft initially within range, stag- ing aircraft forward for successive attacks to the extent that logistical support could be maintained. On this basis the Soviet Bloc would have available 1,410 light bombers for the initial attack on targets in Western Europe without prior redeployment of aircraft. These light bombers would be capable of reaching targets in all but minor fragments of NATO Europe from their home bases, 720 returning to those bases and 690 returning to fighter bases near the border. Additional light bombers would be available for follow-up strikes by staging the number dependent on the extent to which supplies, especially POL, could have been stock- piled at staging bases without compromising surprise. For attacks on Turkey and Greece, an esti- mated 670 light bombers would be available without prior redeployment of aircraft. Thus an estimated total of 2,080 light bombers could be committed in the initial assault without telegraphing the attack by unusual activity at bases. In all the foregoing instances, aircraft available must be multiplied by a factor of 0.70 to 0.75 to account for those temporarily out of commission. Of those available and sortied, another 5 percent or more may be expected to s tt Soviet intentions with rested ko any light on the complete air-do1, ors fensotn lo a for to Wporfo 11 P Missile de- Europe. o ostorn abort. Therefore 1,400 to 1,500 of the estimated velopment, and no definite numbers availability 2,080 light bombers available may be accepted has as yet been established. as representing the magnitude of the actual initial threat. Fighter support of these light-bomber strikes, IV. DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS exclusive of interceptor defense of Soviet Bloc territory, could be provided by an estimated Within the next 10 years the major weapons 3,290 aircraft without prior deployment. In systems that are in being now, or will come into addition to limited support by short-range being as fully operational defensive units, are nuclear bomb delivery, these fighters would be manned interceptors and four families of available for escort, gunfire, rocket, and light surface-to-air missiles. The latter are NIKE, bombing attacks on NATO bases, and as decoys TALOS, BOMARO, and a system that could to degrade NATO early-warning and target- be evolved from the IIAWK I weapon, which acquisition radar. Support for light bombers shall be designated herein as the IIAW.IC-typo attacking targets in Greece and Turkey could weapon. be provided by an estimated 1,360 fighters Obviously defense of NATO would not be without prior redeployment. This over-all carried. out with any single weapons system, total of 4,650 must be degraded not only by the Several weapon typos are required, each with availability and abort factors cited above but its own sot of advantages and disadvantages, also by the requirement for close support of To develop a nearly uniform capability against Soviet Bloc land forces should the air attack be the various possible attack strategics and accompanied by a simultaneous assault on land. tactics, it is essential that the defense be a Even in the latter event some portion of the mixture of weapons. On the obhor bland ground support interdiction campaign no doubt availability of the various weapons systems is would be directed against targets whose destruc- not the same; thus the best air defense cannot tion would result in concurrent support of the be achieved all at once. For the purposes air campaign. already examined the NIKE system is the In addition to its capability for nuclear obvious choice, principally because of its attack by manned aircraft, the Soviet Union availability. Features of the NIKE system may he expected to have operational by the will be examined briefly: period under consideration several surface-to- Conditions of space and time prevailing in surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear Europe place serious limitations on the efPoc- warheads. At the present time, improved tiveness of manned interceptors. Of the 26 versions of the V-1 cruise-type and the V-2 aircraft assigned to the interceptor squadron, ballistic missile are believed operational. The 17 are ordinarily considered to be on ready known Soviet concentration on ballistic rather status. Of these, 4 are on 5-min alert, 4 on than cruise-type missiles leads to the estimate 25-min alert, 4 on 50-min alert and 5 on 2- to that a further improvement of the V-2, the G-2 3-hr alert. Under the conditions of warning type With a range of 340 nautical miles, is now time available or planned for most of Europe in process of phasing out earlier models. By it is apparent that only the aircraft on 5-min 1957 it is expected the USSR will have opera- alert could be involved in the air battle, or 10 tional a single-stage ballistic missile with a percent of each squadron. In some areas a Low range of 880 nautical miles and a CEP of 3.5 of the aircraft on 25-min alert could be engaged. nautical miles. It trust be emphasized that information This handicap alone, regardless of other limita- currently available throw l lions, renders intorco 1' Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 V. NIKE This weapon, the first in the U. S. guided- missile systems, already is operational in continental defense. It has a maximum range of approximately 25 nautical miles and can engage targets up to altitudes of 60,000 feet, traveling at velocities up to 1,200 miles per hour. The time of flight varies from 90 seconds at maximum range to 20 seconds at close range, averaging roughly one missile per battery per minute. Its single-shot kill probability has been assessed at from 0.6 at close range to 0.2 at extreme range. The first major modification of NIKE will be conversion to NIKE B, a missile with it range of 50 nautical miles and an altitude capability of 80,000 feet. NIKE B will be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and may be equipped with a seeker on which it would home on its target in the final stage of flight. NIKE B with conventional warhead is accorded a single-shot kill probability of unity at close range, dropping to 0.5 at maximum range. The single-shot kill probability of NIKE B with seeker installed should be unity at all ranges. Equipped with a nuclear warhead, the missile would inactivate any nuclear weapon carried by the target, The principal disadvantages of the NIKE missile are its relatively low rate of fire and its limited capability against targets at low altitudes, features particularly important in defending against saturation-types raids. It is possible, however, that both capabilities of the ]NIKE system may be improved by already known techniques. In studies of missile effectiveness, many simulated battle problems have, been run on high-speed computers, The results of these, while not put forward as definitive, at least provide a basis for estimating the effectiveness of a NIKE B defense of Western Europe. Should 81 battalions be deployed in Europe, the enemy loss before effective penetration of all of the defended areas should total nearly 1,100 aircraft, or two-thirds of the light-bomber foea initially available. With nuclear warheads Cho 131 cost to the enemy on the above basis should be more than 1,400 aircraft, or very nearly 100 percent of his initial light-bomber striking force, It is recognized that this effect is not of a high order against the maximum threat including ballistics missiles. With 300 battalions the ]till would reach up to a minimum of 5,500 aircraft with HE warheads. And, it is emphasized, the NIIIE and other future SAM weapons alone have a potential effectiveness against the ballistic- missile threat. VI. EMPLOYMENT OP NIKE '19nc method adopted for determining the best employment of guided missiles in the air defense of Western Europe proceeds from these assumptions: (a) The optimum air-defense sysboni nlti- matoly will rely on surface-to-air guided missiles as the principal ,kill'' weapons, (b) An early start, on training personnel in the developing electronics technology is ossonknl. (c) First stops needed to be taken at once, fixing on the specific weapon that will be, available within the pertinent Limo frame, 'Phe weapon that best meets these require- ments is NIKE 13, which will have phased out the present NIKE by bile time under considera- tion. To arrive ab the best feasible deploy- nnonL, a barrier two or tluco batteries deep was erected along the East-West border. Than protection was allocated to the principal popu- lation-industrial cenLors, and finally batteries Cuero assigned to U.S. SAO bases and other U, S. military installations. The total is 81 bat- talions, of which 51't would bo allotted to defense on non-U. S. military and civilian tar- gets, and 26.5 Lo U. S. installations, This total is 75 more than the 6 battalions approved in the Prose],b program for deployment to Europe. This total is not presented as representing an optinrun or adequate missile defense of NATO Europe. It represents Clio deployment believed to ho politically acceptablo in the U. S. and at the same Limo sufliciontly effective to SEORET render excessively costly an air attack on West- ern Europe. The 54% battalions allotted to non-U.S. targets are fewer than the 61 currently approved for defense of the continental U. S. Yet to the people of Western Europe they would be tangible evidence of interest in their welfare and, as representative of scientific achievement dedicated to their defense, exert a psychological influence far greater than their intrinsic military worth. To achieve an Europe, as many as 300 NIKE battalions might be required, a figure not believed attainable at this time. It is true enough that 81 battalions are not 300. But they are 81 more than none, and the critical demand at the present time is that something palpably reassuring be presented to Western Europe as the alternative to sur- render as the sole means of survival. VII. PRODUCTION FEASIBILITY Because of the magnitude of the threat, the total NIKE B requirement for Europe would be about 14,300 missiles, including a 20 percent augmentation for reserve. Addition of 75 bat- talions to the 79 currently planned would present a requirement for 325 battery sets, Neither the requirement for missiles nor that for battery sets, which was considered jointly with the U. S. requirement, could be met at currently scheduled production rates within the time limit under consideration. By some minor shortening of lead times, increasing plant shifts from one to three, and transfer to Char- lotte Ordnance Depot of modification of NIKE I to NIKE B battery sets, the requirement for battery sets could be met by mid-1960 and the missile requirement by 1956. Under a greatly accelerated program, with major compression of lead times, expanding the missile source at a cost of about $250 million, placing missile source an a 3-shift, 24-hour day, 6-day week basis, expenditure of about $100 million on accelerated R & D, and increased tooling level for test facilities, the missile requirement could SECRET be met by mid-1959, about the same thno estimated for the battery sots. VIII. COSTS An 81-battalion NIKE B defense in NATO Europe could be provided by 1960 at an osth mated cost to the U. S. of approximately $1.55 billion. This figure includes initial costs over the 5-year period as well as operating costa as battalions are activated during the period. About $625 million of the cost to the U. S. would provide defense for U. S.-NATO forces and SAC bases. The total cost of the 81-battalion program is estimated at $2.15 billion. Of this total, approximately $600 million would be borne directly by the defended countries themselves or would come from NATO intrastructuro funds. The annual operating cost, once the program was in full operation, is estimated at $240 million, of which $100 million would be borne by the U. S. IX. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS Allocation of 81 NIKE battalions to NATO Europe would require 75,200 officers and men. Of these, 49,400 would be indigenous personnel, members of national forces assigned to the 54% battalions defending population-industrial con- ters. The remaining 25,800 would be U. S. per- sonnel, required by the 26% battalions assigned to NATO forces and defending SAC bases. Current Army planning foresees a lead time of not less than 24 months from the decision to activate a missile battalion to its movement to site, for training the highly skilled personnel that form an essential part of its strength. Although these technicians are relatively few in number, they are vital to the operation and maintenance of the battalion's equipment, All of them must be school-trained in courses re- quiring 7 to 43 weeks in addition to basic and other military training. This requirement for specialist training, acuto enough in the U. S. Army, would be increased by Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 several magnitudes in the case of battalions formed from European manpower. Not only must the U. S. technician first be trained, but he must then be given time to impart his training to the European. Some time might be saved, although the language barrier would impose serious limitations, by training European spe- cialists in U. S, schools. Until indigenous bat- talions have been trained, the program un- doubtedly would impose onerous manpower requirements on the U. S, Army. If the program is initiated promptly, this burden could be carried with acceptable dislocation. By delay it would be increased to the point where it might not be supportable without significant increases in U. S. Army strength. Equipping the NIKE B missile with an atomic warhead would impose a requirement for an additional 68 special-weapon specialists in each battalion, or 5,508 (324 officers and 5,184 EM) for the total program. Whether these additional specialists need be U. S. person- nel or could be drawn from the indigenous popu- lation would be principally a question of security. Assuming that sufficient trainable personnel could be procured in each country affected, their assignment to this specialty world be contingent on the action by the Atomic Energy Commission or international treaty. In the absence of assurance that such arrangements could be promptly made, it is safe to assume that these technicians at least initially would be U. S. personnel, increasing the U. S. manpower requirement for the 81 battal- ions from 25,800 to 31,308. X. SPECIAL PROBLEMS In addition to the questions raised by inclusion of nuclear warheads in the NIKE B armament, other essentially political problems would be posed by the allocation of missile battalions here proposed. None of these prob- lems is essentially new in NATO experience, and none appears insuperable. One question is that of control of weapons in the hands of NATO troops other than U. S. This question, though it deals with command, is fundamentally political. Antiair measures con- template the defense of national targets from national territory by national forces. Yet since attack on any NATO nation involves all of them, antiair defense is equally an inter- national affair that requires a degree of coordi- nation if it is to return maximum effectiveness. Once batteries and battalions have been or- ganized in national components of NATO forces, and their personnel trained, national pride should be assuaged and local political requirements met by their designation as mili- tary units ruder national command. Coordi- nation by SHAPE of their tactical employment would not be an unreasonable provision; its extent should be the subject of agreement at the outset. Such agreement should be rendered less difficult than may have been true, in other cases, since coordination and not command is the object. In any event, coordination of communica- tions, especially the information net, should be settled without possibility of misunderstanding or cavil. Continuing tests then should serve to maintain coordination as a real rather than illusory condition. Land acquisition for sites, while no simple matter in land-hungry Europe, should present less than the usual difficulties, since the land would be designed for the direct defense of cities and their populations. The majority of battery sites could be located on land already devoted to military purposes. Whatever the relative advantages and de- ficiencies of the various available and projected systems of air defense in Western Europe, it is essential that steps be taken to provide a defense in which the people affected can place reliance. The NIKE system, of those now available, offers the greatest promise of achieving this aim at the earliest time. And time is the decisive factor. Paper 12 Arms Equation Originator: George A. Lincoln Collaborator: William Webster 1. PROBLEM The problem is to examine the purposes and uses of military power over the next decade in the light of developments marked by the Geneva conference and for the purpose of developing guidance for portions of the U. S. national strategy. This problem needs to be approached within certain dimensions which are accepted U. S. policy. One of these is that the unity and strength of the Free World be maintained and increased. Another is that there be an orderly, democratic development of nations outside the Communist bloc. This would provide a strong, perhaps the strongest possible, attraction to the satellites. It has been suggested that the guidelines should also include (1) retention of the moral issue of freedom versus the spiritual oppression of Communism; and (2) provision of some other motivation than fear. These latter two dimensions are mentioned here at the beginning because the creation and employ- ment of armed force tends to involve actions and processes difficult to keep within these two dimensions. The discussion that follows does not cover the strategy of a general nuclear war. It applies to a no-general war situation, which is the likely situation over the next decade. going on in the world today and what the world maybe like over the next decade. Some of these are discussed in the following paragraphs. The Soviet Union is very unlikely to choose general war as a policy course unless free world military power dwindles to a comparative level where there is a high possibility of quick success without major damage to the USSR. Or, the USSR would be likely to choose general war if, through a rapid development of events, it appeared that the Free World might attempt to extinguish the current Soviet system. This last point is really a statement to the thesis that a cornered rat will fight and that you must not press your enemy against a locked door unless you are ready to take the consequences. The term "general war" does not necessarily mean initiation by surprise intercontinental atomic attack. The Soviet Union is likely to continue its current Geneva type policy line for some time. This would be in the classical Communist tra- dition with its precedent from the Party Congress ending in 1928 and called after the failures in China and Hungary and the apparent effective containment of Communism, The decision to await and exploit the alleged inherent contradictions in the great power capitalistic system bore fruit, by 1939, in a great de- pression, a global capitalistic war, a major Communist advance in Middle Europe without cost, and a rapidly crumbling colonial system. II. ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDELINES There is a reasonable probability, which must The discussion on this paper accepts certain be guarded against in our military program, of assumptions and guidelines as to what is really a sudden reversal of this policy line. Such Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 reversal would again be in the classical Com- USSR, are aheady publicizing their views that nnuist tradition. But, there is this time a the Soviet climate warrants reduction of U. S. reasonable probability that the current policy Forces. line will continue, at least throughout the The general tendency in the U. S. toward decade, without sudden drastic change. military expenditures (and all security expendi- The policy line cuts two ways, both to the tures except perhaps atomic energy) and per- probable advantage of the Soviet Union: sonal military service will be one of nibbling a. If it brings disunity in the Free World reduction. The real impetus will be and a lowering of defensive positions so that cutting, budget balancing, our current varieties a reversal of the policy may reap great of isolationism, reluctance toward personal benefits, it is successful. military service, etc. The alleged reasons will b. If not successful along the line just be various and conflicting, e. g., reduction of described, it still gives the maximum oppust war threat, shifting burden to allies, improved tunny for (1) building the economic and technology and management give "greater political strength of the Communist orbit; security at less cost", "cut time fat while leaving (2) Communist advance by a "helping hand" the muscle", etc. The initial decline will program for the underdeveloped. probably be in readiness to doter "creeping expansion" and local war. The Soviet Union now shows some chance of The Chinese Communists, while not moving growing within a decade or two to a power in direct opposition to the Soviet Union, are center which might quickly overwhelm EurAsia capable of following independent lilies of action. and Africa, politically, economically, and pay- They will pull together when it helps them, chologically- if the western world got into especially in use of threats, and go outwardly difficulties. The difficulty hoped for, of course, separate ways when such works to their is a recurrence of a great capitalistic depression, advantage. The current revolutionary change in the Technological advance in nuclear matters middle third of the world, often called under- will continue rapidly. Both the U. S. and developed, will continue, may accelerate, and USSR are in sight of enough unclear explosives, will almost certainly involve periodic occur- No acceptable way will be found from the renees of violence. The technological and operational standpoint to Soviet Union's captive instrument of give an adequate guarantee that nuclear woap- revolution, the international Communist party, ens will not be used if war occurs. The while retaining its traditional nature and psychological and political reluctance toward purpose, may be kept under wraps except when such action will increase. No way will be opportunities for quick favorable decisions found for an adequate defense against such appear. It will operate through front organ- weapons which will be accepted psychologically zations and will strive to capture mass or- and politically by the mass of peoples, Some ganizations in underdeveloped areas, e, g., theoretically practical formulae may be evolved. nationalist parties and labor unions in tropical The drive for limitation of armaments, partic- Africa. This superficially more separate oper- ration will be harder to ularly in the nuclear area, will be continuous counter. and probably increase in magnitude. In the free world there will be a definite There is increasing reluctance, a real danger that any progress whatsoever will uctance, G so long as the Soviet cause an undue trust in too many hopeful Geneva spirit continues, toward major military people. Hence, there is a task for education expenditures and personal military service. and for direct countering of undue trust-while The countering of this is a major psychological placing a maximum effort on search for seine task. Legislative leaders, after 9 days in the effective progress on regulation. SECRET III. NATURE OF ARMED FORCE Armed force is what people think it is. Until actually put to active use, the nature of armed force is what statesmen and peoples think it is. This situation makes armed force a psychological factor and a psychological instru- ment in political affairs, both internal and inter- national. The emotions it arouses run the gamut from apprehension to fear insofar as armed force in the possession of a potential enemy is concerned, and from concern to confidence insofar as armed force in the posses- sion of ourselves and allies is concerned. It seems unlikely that within the next decade we will stand at either and of either of those two defined spectra, If a situation develops where we do stand at some extreme, it probably will be fear. The clement of fear, traditionally and now, is the ]over generating armed forces in most states. The concept of armed force as a carefully controlled instrument in support of policy is overly sophisticated for most peoples and many statesmen, oven though this is the traditional use of armed force, The immedi- ately foregoing points are made here because part of the problem facing the United States and the Free World is the maintenance, with the current dilution of the element of fear, of an adequate structure of armed force. Looking to history, states have, in the past, appreciated the combined advantages and cheapness of maintaining in being enough of the right kind of military strength, e. g., the legions of Rome and the British Navy in the 19th Century. There are even instances of appreciation of the need for continuous strength and toughness on time part of small states, e, g., Switzerland, Arms Race or Great Power Maneuver-Arms Equation? Sloganized short-cut descriptions of com- plicated situations are often misleading. The term "arms race" can be clangorously mislead- ing. It is dangerous if only that the concept weakens. the unity and strength of the Free 'Vorld. We know that the very highest 137 military people do not consider that we are in anything as simple as an arms race. The true situation is a different one and a much more complicated one, (The term "competition" seems much more meaningful.) First, the struggle going forward in the world is essentially it power struggle. Advance and retreat as a result of military action are most unlikely to occur unless there is prior deterioration in the political, economic and psychological fields. Conversely, military power must be viewed as an aid, most of the time, to political, economic and psychological measures rather than as an instrument used alone. For the first time in history no nation can be strong enough mili- tarily to have absolute security, Even a I to 2 or 1 to 3 statistical superiority does not guar- antco against a gravely damaging blow. Such race as exists is in the sum total of relationships among nations and even extends to develop- ments within nations, such as the rate of increase of strength of the economies in the western world and the Communist world, A more correct analogy, rather than a race which implies a finish line, is a contest of team against team in It chase match in which all boards are played at once and moves on one board can influence pieces on another. Some of the pieces could be described as military, others as economic, others as psychological; the pay-offs are always political, The nuclear rooks counter each other and opposing Collins rarely, if over, dare to move than, So the military movements in the dread gang are the pawns of peripheral and brush fire wars. If one cares to carry the analogy further, ono can think of time chess boards as representative of different areas of the world, or of some other categorization. The dynamic situation is materially affected by the time element. It is too customary to project some single factor forward five or ton years, for example, technological advance, and then to make judgments thereon, Single factor analysis can of ton be projected in mathe- matical terms that are superficially prophetic- and hence a clear guide to action, It is hn- possible to state the complete flow of advance in mathematical terms. The best that can be done is to envisage an ever widening span of possibilities as we look into the future, and to program a method and direction of policy which will cover the maximum of this span while having a flexibility permitting adjustment to include any portion initially uncovered if a turn of events happens to be that way. Characteristics by which To Judge Military Power These are closely related among themselves and include magnitude, readiness, location, mobility, endurance or capability for sustained action (bases, etc.), cost as a relationship to the economic base, suitability, versatility and flexibility, and political aspects (applicability to political problems, ability of the state to make political decisions needed to use its avail- able power, etc.). As an example, massive atomic power is a very specialized capability both in actual use and in support of the inter- play of international political actions. It has magnitude but limited versatility and suita- bility. Conversely, conventional military power has great suitability and flexibility but probably would not have the magnitude to be an ade- quate deterrent to general war. There is a dangerous tendency to equate the deterrent to general war with adequacy for all other purposes for which military power is needed. This leads to concentration on prepa- ration and planning (which is necessary) for the unlikely event of general war with a fixation that results in blindness to the requirements and characteristics of military power to meet the more likely and more immediate problems of creeping expansion. This psychological phenomena is as old as the activities of the first amateur magician who misled his audience by fixing their attention on an item unrelated to the action lie was actually undertaking. An essential purpose of military forces is to win military victories if war comes, but another essential purpose is to create strategic illrpres- SECRET sions in support of prevention of both war and creeping expansion. Thera is no priority among these essentials, particularly when there will shortly be little possibility of strategic victory if war comes-even though some battles may be won. "Nuclear Superiority" "Nuclear superiority" fulfills only one facet of security need. The phrases "nuclear superi- ority", "nuclear parity", etc., are rapidly be- coming of limited meaning. A state equipped with nuclear weapons but with "nuclear inferi- ority" now has, or will soon have, enough to offer such a hazard to a potential opponent that the opponent will seek other moans than nuclear war. For the first time in history, no Bend of state, whether democracy or dictatorship, can promise the man on Main Streets (sio) clearest and certain victory in war. (General Twining at Air Force Association Convention, San Francisco, August 12, 1958.) It is misleading to speak of our current and footing nuclear superiority as contributing materially to our current position of strength. The Soviet Union has recently decided not to continue playing, for the time being at least, on that playing field. We do not have the political resolution to continuo playing on it since Geneva, nor did we before-witness Dienbienphu. Evon if we did, we would prob- ably logo thereby because of the disunity which would be generated in the .Free World as a result. If there is any true race, it is a race to find and offer proposals for some control of armaments-the objective being to achieve a political advantage through psychological im- pact, even though nothing substantive, results. This situation could go on, with fluctuating emphasis, for a decade. Two Equations It may be useful to think of the arms equa- tion as two separate but closely related aqua- tions: (a) the massive nuclear destruction equation applicable to general war, which in- cludes defense against nuclear weapons (Equa- tion A); and (b) other armed force (Equation B), primarily applicable to local and limited war, creeping expansion, and suitability in support of political action. We can be optimistic about avoiding a third world war, and we can also hope with sound logic that we will avoid local wars. But as prudent men we cannot rule out the possibility that situations may arise again sometime in which force will have to be used locally and specifically and controllably as the modern army, accompanied by sea and air power, can do it. (Ambassador Lodge, U. S. Representative to the United Nations, spoke at a reunion dinner of the Second Armored Division, of which lie was a member in World War II.) Shortly, both the U. S. and USSR will possess the power of mutual devastation. With sur- prise, one side might achieve a situation called "victory" relatively unhurt, unless the other has maintained strength and vigilance. Hence, the likelihood of long-term nuclear standoff, unless one side is driven to desperation or both sides are so maladroit as to pull down the tent of nuclear destruction on the world. Accept- ance of this situation may for a time be only tacit. There is likely to be probing with limited wars. Hence, the simultaneous equa- tions must provide (a) strength and alertness for a nuclear war while not expecting to use this ability, and (b) readiness to handle a great variety of brush Piro wars and situations requir- ing military power in support of policy, Equation A Equation A-general war-has a major elo- ment of time therein. The march of technology may at times seem to give somewhat of an advantage to one nation over another. But exploitation of any advantage requires a co- ordination of technology, production, psycho- logical and political action, which seems very unlikely, Furthermore, the cost of a mistaken estimate is much higher than that paid by Germany in World War II. The overriding fact is that, for the foreseeable future, both the western world and the USSR will not trust each other enough to drop their nuclear guard below some materially high level, giving a mu- tual deterrence. The five main national subprograms for deter- rent to general war appear to be: a. A long-range massive nuclear force. b. Technological advance-if the analogy of a "race" has any validity, it is in the technological area, On a 2-5 year leadtime basis, as we are, the failure to keep up in both attack instru- ments and counters thereto could be disas- trous-and the disaster could occur through political and psychological developments only. c. Defense. This is part of the deterrent and also a confidence-building program. But na- tions may choose to depend primarily on offen- sive nuclear power, a course of action more suited to the USSR in time of tension than to the U. S. Even a mere facade of defensive power would be an important asset in time of crisis. It may be argued that a technological breakthrough may give a near perfect defense. Even if such is developed on a laboratory and theoretical basis, it should be viewed with extreme scepticism from the standpoint of both practical operational and budgetary considera- tions. As a final comment, what we can do, the USSR can do eventually. A 100% sure defensive system for the USSR, atomic invul- nerability, might face us with as great a political predicament as the conning nuclear standoff. d, international action to reduce the immediacy of the nuclear threat. Readiness and cost thereof have an exponential, rather than a straight line, relationship. A reduction in immediacy might enable us to shift priorities for military forces (within approximately the same budget) so as to provide more atomic defense and other means, such as deterrents to creeping expansion, thus far not provided in reasonable adequacy. Also, a reduction in immediacy of the threat makes an even further reduction in probability of general atomic war since more time is thereby SECRET provided for political action to save the situa- tion. This subprogram must be carried out on a basis that no trust can be placed in paper agreements alone. The program must continue in the USSR a fear of retaliation and a mistrust of ability to win. The initial dividend of this subprogram may be development of a high de- gree of public realization concerning the realities of the current security situation. e. A political and psychological program con- sistent with the above points and directed both externally and internally. We might well (1) search for ways to acquire the necessary effort from our own people and others; (2) while at the same time following the rule that national security is the program that statesmen should do the most about and say the least about. If we can find a formula for these somewhat con- flicting objectives, we will go far toward in- creasing the unity of the Free World and pro- moting a confidence that furthers great progress. Time may be on our side if our people become educated to, and accept, the necessity for alert- ness, strength, endurance, patience and under- standing. Equation B Military Power for Equation B-deterrent to limited war and counter to creeping expansion. What are the subprograms? a. Forces to deter peripheral and local war through or by associate and satellite. We have recoiled from the thought of American boys dying in limited war and this reaction has generated, among other things, a policy called massive retaliation. Some (including allies and neutrals) interpret this policy as meaning likely resort to major atomic action if we take any action at all. Thereby we have tied our hands. If we have in being the power, other than mas- sive atomic forces, to intervene militarily against creeping expansion, we have the most effective deterrent against that expansion. The obscurity in the enemies' minds of what we might do with atomic power, either locally or generally, adds to the strength of our deter- rent. We paid too high a price in Korea for lack of readiness for local war-and perhaps a higher price in Indo-China. b. Forces to influence a deteriorating inter- national situation. If. we have nothing but general war nuclear capacity, the enemy realizes that the situation can be pressed a long ways without real danger of general war. If we have only specialized nuclear forces able to act, our allies and neutrals will be quick to counsel caution and concession. We will not have acceptable alternatives to offer them or to choose from ourselves. c. Internal security against infiltration, local disorder, and palace revolution. This must generally be initially a matter for the indigenous governments concerned. The United States can, and can afford to, provide the arms, mis- sions, etc.-the more inconspicuously the better. In addition, governments should have always present the hope, or better still the confidence, that quick assistance is available. In a world where propaganda is a powerful instrument, an appearance of legality is useful. Hence, we should search for increased facility in working through regional arrangements and the U. N. In hindsight, Indo-China might have been made less of a defeat by use of the U. N. d. The support of an atmosphere of confidence in Free World, and of a feeling of respect (not necessarily fear) in Communist, statesmen. We need that power corning from (1) realization that strength is there, and (2) it will be used properly, intelligently, and discreetly. This is the strategic impression we need to make. The U. S. negotiator at the conference table, sitting militarily only with bomb in hand, is very inadequately equipped for the next Lou years. Our opponents know we are most un- likely to use this weapon except 'in case of general war, which they are not going to pre- cipitate if we maintain an adequate nuclear posture. They know that if they can trick its into flaunting atomic power, they will gain through disunity of our allies and antagonism toward us of neutrals, We should have a program of suitability, flexibility and versatility which (a) leaves a choice to our own statesmen; (b) gives increased confidence to allies and neutrals that we will not be forced (by an all or nothing program) to either (1) atomic war, or (2) knuckling under; and (c) keeps the opposition a bit unsure. We have to have a readiness for situations such as Inclo-China and even hostilities or near- hostilities in mid-Europe (the German unifica- tion problem has such possibilities) after possible initiation of the Eisenhower arms inspection approach. The characteristic of suit- ability needs to extend to allied action. The political and psychological climate of friends avd neutrals is likely to turn more and more to a condition necessitating allied (including U. N,) action if any effective action is to be launched. As it final, and very important, point under this Equation 13, we think readily of historical instances of technological changes, battlefield maneuvers, and other shifts which have, often quickly, neutralized major increments of mili- tary force and major elements of military policy. We should bear in mind that the turns of international political action over the next decade (which we may find we must accept even though we dislike them, and might find to our advantage if we have retained the mili- tary vo,satility) may have such effect on cur- rently important portions of our military program, If anyone wishes an example of the march of changes overtaking a portion of a program, consider the history of U. S. coast defense. Allies, Geneva, and Nuclear Standoff Under this heading the allies divide broadly into two categories: (a) European (NATO); (b) the rest. The changing situation created by Genova and the coming nuclear standoff is probably not going to be drastically different from the present for countries other than European (Japan is a possible exception). Their military problem is one of internal security and defense against local aggression. For European countries, we have had a psychological problem engendered by nuclear power ever since Hiroshima. These peoples and their statesmen are deeply conditioned by a history of conquering armies and of forces designed to stem the advance of such armies. How will they react to the changing future? There has been, and will be, a thesis that the only real threat and need for armed forces is a general nuclear war. Hence, a. the U. S. nuclear power is a sufficient deterrent and little else is needed. b. western Europe will be devastated if involved in nuclear war, hence the U. S. nuclear forces are not wanted in the area since they bring the hazard of nuclear attack which might otherwise be avoided. With the decline, real or fancied, of the likelihood of nuclear general war, European peoples and statesmen will, more and more, ask what their armed forces are for. This wavering is already apparent. While not taken within the scope of this paper, it would be sound to examine a number of hypothetical situations as of 1960. Suppose, as one situation, that U. S. forces withdrew from the continent. Would the U. S. then hazard American cities over a repetition of some situation such as Czecho- slovakia (38 or 48)? We would be in a very inflexible position to choose any other timely alternative. An examination of the Swiss way of national security may show a pertinent precedent. The Swiss have, without fighting, maintained the integrity, except for one short period, of their country for centuries. This is due, in great part, to their reputation for readiness to put up a time-consuming fight, their continuous posture of readiness and resolution, and the probability that military action against the Swiss would trigger other adverse military actions which could be brought to bear before SECRET proved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 a fait accompli was achieved. Switzerland has not needed alliances to give assurance of help in case of attack. The realities of the inter- national political situation assured that help. Perhaps the military future of western Europe is as a confederation of "Switzerlands", but with the added deterrent of ready arrangements for U. S. aid. If Europe moved militarily to an inflexible situation where the choice apparent to peoples in time of tension was between nuclear war and knuckling under, the weaknesses of the European political system in time of crisis would create a grave danger of the latter choice. The United States has here, over the next decade, a very sensitive psychological-political problem. Changes in our military deployment, the planning approach of our officers on allied staffs, the public and private statements of our leaders, etc., these will be very important and should "speak with one voice." Published reports do not support any belief that NATO countries are really expending a high proportion of resources on preparation for a possible long war of attrition. Nevertheless, a new look at the balance between readiness on the one hand, and depth of military power measured in combat day capability, might produce some helpful variations in programs. The Importance of NATO The current change in Soviet attitude has been brought about in great part by the exist- ence of NATO. The importance which the Soviet Union ascribes to NATO is indicated by the openly stated intention of the USSR to destroy NATO. Any complacency about the Soviet Union striving with perseverance and ingenuity to carry out its stated intention, is extremely unwise. It sloes appear that, unless the NATO powers led by the United States take some positive actions different from those in the recent past, the NATO may be badly weakened. A method and direction along the following two mutually supporting lines is suggested: a. There must be a material increase in use of NATO as an international political institution. The concept of NATO as a purely military institution is completely in- consistent with the modern realities where things military cannot be separated from things economic and things political. The ties that have bound NATO can be readily loosened by (1) a succession of events giving aid and comfort to the enemy such as the Cyprus affair and (2) a succession of open differences among NATO members aired in other international organizations such as the U. N. If NATO is to continue as a suc- cessful military alliance it must become a successful diplomatic alliance also. b. The United States must give leadership to NATO on the basis of being "first among equals". This requirement placed on the U. S. for leadership exists in the political and economic areas as much, perhaps more, than it does in the military areas. Here the biblical warning "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" is a particularly sobering bit of strategic guidance to the United States. There is some question that our country has given to NATO the most "certain sounds" that it might have given over the past few months. We can and should do better. IV. INTEGRATION OF MILITARY FORCE WITH OTHER ARMS OF NATIONAL POLICY The classical and generally accepted primary objective of armed force in this country has been the achievement of victory in tear. Relatively little attention has been given to other objectives until within the last decade. The obvious existence of other necessary objectives has been dealt with too often with the thesis that maximum possible preparation for victory if war comes (and it has been usual to define the expected types of employment rather narrowly) will ipso facto achieve all other objectives. Giving priority, sometimes overriding, to conserving existent military power for use in a possible general war, and never having enough to assure strategic victory, it is customary to resist, as maldeployment, the commitment or programming of military power as a deterrent to creeping expansion-unless the action required happens to fit the estimated optimum readiness for a narrow range of possibilities. We are deeply conditioned by our past military experience, which has tricked its twice recently (Pearl Harbor and Korea). We have written our histories that "we always win" and we now tend to assume that winning again means winning in the usual way. Some military men and American statesmen are turning to a broader view. But time may be running out. The generation of psychological strength and confidence is a main objective of our armed force and that of our allies over the coming decade. We must stand before others to command both respect and a reasonable amount of trust. This is a variation of the power for peace theme. It is not inconsistent with, in fact it requires, such programmed components as readiness and technological progress. The application of armed forces to national policy is determined in great part by the policy statements made concerning them and by the general attitude in connection with the handling of them. As an example, the USSR reduces its effective military strength, or says it is going to, with the implication that the world is a safer and more peaceful world. A few weeks later, different members of the Executive Branch of the U. S. Government generate public discussion of a reduction in U. S. armed forces in the interests of economy and with the implication that it is cutting the fat while leaving the muscle. Those policy statements and policy actions come not only from our Road of State but from a groat many people whose remarks and actions are noticed abroad and within the United States. We need to have a much bettor party line and much more of a party 148 line as to what we are doing and why we are doing it. Operation through regional arrangements and the United Nations seems likely to get further in many matters connected with mil- itary force, in spite of the exasperating aspects of action in cooperation with other nations. This method usually contributes to unity and gives added opportunity for useful political effects. Furthermore, we must consider and develop ways to use our military international arrangements in closer collaboration with political and economic measures. This ap- proach may well make the needed allied mil- itary collaboration and effort more palatable to allies and neutrals. As an example, Para. 2 of the NATO Charter should be dusted off and ways sought to put it to use. From a practical political standpoint, this evolution of arrange- ments originally entirely military may draw support from foreign ministers and prime ministers in discussions and negotiations which are too often heavily conditioned by the points of view of economic ministers. Maximum emphasis on suitability and ver- satility should characterize the maintenance and evolution of armed forces. To pick an exaggerated hypothetical example, if we moved to complete dependence on massive nuclear long-range power for our military posture, and a seemingly feasible method of regulation of such power were evolved and generally accepted by other nations, we would then probably suffer a reverse in the world only exceeded by the fall of a major area to Communism. We must have armed forces and a military policy which give our statesmen maximum latitude in the uncertain future. Definite thresholds must be topped if our military power is to be of the needed value in supporting political action. As an example, only a token force in Germany would not have been enough during the last few years and would not be enough today. There must be a force in position so adequate that it is ap- parent to the western Europeans that we have to stand steady in time of acute tension and There should be an examination of the require- ments of the "thresholds" in connection with our policy. Our reserve policy, although in- adequate, is a desirable move toward one threshold which may be needed to give assur- ance of the direction of our intentions and of our steadfastness to our allies. A scientific study of ways to utilize. U. S. military power on political targets, in addition to its narrowly military mission, should be made. An excellent example, of course, was the flying of pilgrims to Mecca by the U. S. Air Force. Another possibility, perhaps worth considering, is the use of the Army Corps of Engineers organization and experience. The line of thought in this paragraph comes from the two generally accepted theses that (1) the struggle in the world is a power struggle for the way of government, thinking and living of over a billion people; and (2) that peoples, no matter how friendly, get tired of foreign forces within their midst. The responsibility now rests on executive leadership. Support of military power fluctu- ates with threat. This truism for a democracy is an axiom closely related to the axiom that military power, until used, is what statesmen and peoples think it is. It is also a political axiom that.a decrease in military power, usually generated through cutting budget and personal service, in a democracy is not recovered until and unless there is a clearly discernible increase in the threat to security. Put another way, we have had to be scared in order to build back and we probably have had to be scared a bit now and then in order to maintain a level program. The next decade requires a sober public under- standing of the realities. Increases and de- creases in our military program, usually meas- ured in terms of dollars allocated, should be carefully keyed to external political operations and should certainly not be a matter for internal politics. This thought may be ignoring the past realities of public opinion and politics. But leadership. in the Executive Branch can, currently, achieve the indicated objectives. SECRET The preceding discussion suggests a philos- ophy of approach and some specific things to do. The following paragraphs outline additional don'ts and do's which flow from this philosophy, The dangers of the coming decade include: a. We'll lower our guard because of trust, underrating opponent or softness (both in the head and in way of life). b. We'll build an unsuitable or inade- quately flexible program-as was the Maginot Line. c. Our design will be too costly for support and hence will fall short of the thresholds of effectiveness. d. Our program will not be adequately designed to mesh (inter-lock) with (1) U. N., regional arrangements and other states, (2) non-military factors. The military agencies need more clear and more specific guidance for planning and also for the security philosophy they presont to the U. S. public and to the world external to the U. S. This statement refers to two different but related programs of guidance. If the likely situation is as suggested in the preceding pages, then there is a grave question that all services and the Department of Defense are planning on this basis, and on the same basis, for the next decade. Parenthetically, it is believed that the approach outlined in the preceding pages provides an adequate basis for shifts in time to meet the possible but improbable that may de- velop. As to the way of speaking, our military people and their civilian superiors should speak with more of one voice, leaving to the colum- nists and the technical and parochial military magazines the arguments as to comparative merits and demerits of particular weapons systems. A military program with a minimum of un- expected fluctuations is a vital need. Even with maximum efficiency, lead-times are long indeed. The dollar and the man, programmed and spent hurriedly, cannot have the maximum possible military effect and may be a political liability rather than a political asset. The sud- den shift in direction of a program is wasteful in money, readiness and other military charac- teristics. A sudden downward shift in scope of a program is even more destructive. The num- ber of dollars saved on paper is almost certain to be matched by a loss in readiness, mobility or some other characteristic which is measured by many times the same number of dollars. There are current examples. Furthermore, that these sudden shifts can have grave external political and psychological repercussions. How, for instance, can General Gruenther expect to persuade the European countries to continue their current military programs when the head- lines from the United States record both that the economy of the U. S. is at its highest peak in history, and rising, and the U. S. is cutting its military program? What we say and what we seem to do should have a close relationship. Withdrawal of some forces from some parts of the world must be considered as a proba- bility of the next decade. We should examine particularly our forces located in colonial areas to see if better political arrangements can be made consistent with political trends. Military aspects of our Japanese situation need to be continuously examined with a view to seeing whether it would not be wise to get ourselves into a position where we could be openly pressing the Japanese for arrangements permitting withdrawal of some forces at least. It would be much better to be ahead of the pos- sibility of a movement from the Japanese people that our forces leave. Suppose the USSR soft policy is prolonged, What's the suitable and feasible program? If the effort is not underway already, the National Security Council should press the preparation of a military program and a military policy pointed at 3 to 5 years from now and which assumes a continuation of the Geneva spirit and some success along the line of limitation of armaments. Such a study, if it provided no other dividends, might well develop useful courses of action guiding our national psycho- logical and political policy. Are the priorities in our readiness program suitable to the next decade? The traditional national security readiness program of the United States to include industrial mobiliza- tion, preparations for a long period of hostilities, large stockpiles of materials and the finished items, provisions for transportation and support of huge numbers of personnel and huge tonnages, etc., may well not be in accord with the reason- able probabilities of the next decade. Certainly our continental defense arrangements and our civilian defense are not currently consistent with our military inventories and many of our other preparations. At the other extreme, there is, of course, a thesis that practically none of these inventories, etc. would be used if hostilities broke out. Rather, the decision would be reached in a matter of hours, if not days, and in so short a time that there would not even be opportunity for rapid promotion of the surviv- ing young officers in the Air Force. Conceiv- ably, the course of wisdom is a middle ground with somewhat less emphasis on support of lengthy hostilities and more on ready mobile forces suitable for limited war. If this matter has not been examined incisively in light of the reasonable probabilities of the next ten years, then such an examination should be undertaken, stepping off from guidelines which do not at present seem to exist with sufficient definition on the National Security Council level. A scientific costing review of the current al- location of effort may be indicated shortly. The headings for the analysis include: a. Now-near future-long term. b. massive nuclear power-defense-nro- bile forces-follow-up c. R & D-hardware-bases, etc.-men d. readiness-mobility-flexibility-politi- cal applicability e. Other Any shift in our military program, such as the recent budget-balancing proposals, should be undertaken in light of such an analysis. A Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 close analysis could conceivably show that we are over-insuring in one area compared to the hazards being accepted in another. Are we buying the equivalent of overseas bases twice, of nuclear devastation of the USSR more than once, of R & D less or more than once? The suggestions in the preceding three para- graphs are admittedly particularly difficult of achievement and require the best of profes- sional knowledge combined with judgment. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that such analyses immediately crosses the most important vested interests and runs athwart firmly held objectives of military, fiscal, and other individuals and departments in the Executive Branch. VI. WHAT IS THE PRICE TAG? At best, this can be discussed only in gen- eralities and not in absolute figures. It might be that savings in some areas, rising out of the subjects in the immediately preceding para- graphs, would be about balanced by needed increases in other areas. It seems almost obvious that a reduction in U. S. military expenditures from those programmed at the beginning of this year, particularly if reductions are conspicuous ones, will trigger at least pro- portionate reductions in military effort on the part of our allies and will reduce the chances that our statesmen will be able to achieve political ars'sngements justifying such reduc- tions. The net effect may be a need for in- creased cost to the U. S. Costs of equipment and of men are bound to go up during the decade. The price of increased readiness and mobility for limited and peripheral war should now be accepted and paid. There are great psychological dangers in relating (1) disarmament to (2) the political desires for balancing budgets while at the same time cutting taxes. The political wish can very readily father fallacious judgments in the national security area. If the U. S. policy approach is consistently that we are willing and able to pay the price of security, including the non-military measures required about the world, we will better lead the free world in the efforts it needs to make and will avoid giving aid and comfort to Communists. This memorandum does not pretend to under- take any economic analysis of our capabilities or of the problems of reconciliation of eco- nomic capabilities and political realities on the one hand with national security requirements on the other. It is noted, however, that our country's gross national product is expanding rapidly and that the free world is materially better off than it has been before since World War II. On the other side of the coin the costs of military power are steadily rising on an item by item basis and are also rising due to the rapid rate of obsolescence forced upon us by the racing pace of technological change. There is a basis for a judgment that, in maintaining the present level, (1) cost measured in monetary units such as dollars must almost certainly rise if adequate security is provided and (2) cost measured as a proportion of gross national product is manageable and may fall slightly. The most important aspect of the price tag point is not the exact number of dollars. The question is: Can we afford it if necessary? There is no doubt that the U. S. economy can support materially more than it is now support- ing without adverse impact. The additional amount needed, if any, would not be more in the near future than 10 to 20 percent of the current military budget. This is available, and possibly available from the current tax structure while still approximately balancing the budget. Paper 13 Crucial Problems of Control of Armaments and Mutual Inspection Originator: Ellis A. Johnson Critic: Stefan Possony 1. THE PROBLEM To determine the critical inspection problems if a surprise attack is to be prevented. II. DISCUSSION Appendix A reproduces the varied opinions of invited scientists covering the principal centers of the United States. It is clear that no consensus was reached and that the diffi- culties of designing a good inspection system are great. An important point is that strategic aircraft spend 5% of their time in the air in training flights lasting, on the average, 8 hours. Since only about 70 aircraft are required for a sneak attack, U. S. and USSR aircraft would have to be accounted to within about 2% at least every two hours. If both sides have 1500 aircraft this seems a most difficult task. Surreptitious arming on super highways appears feasible. Diversion of the following numbers of nuclear weapons for clandestine use by the USSR would be required: 30 percent in 1955 10 percent in 1960 2 percent-5 percent in 1965 This seems easy to do prior to establishment of inspection without possibility of detection, especially in the later years. A fail proof communications system appears to be difficult to design. The value of an inspection system appears to be illusory unless the United States and NATO has an air defense that when warned can with- stand the surprise attack which is to be de- tected. Otherwise, what difference does it make. No final conclusions were reached. Science Advisory Committee Comments on Control of Armaments and Inspection 1. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION ON ARMAMENT REDUCTION A. What are the purposes, from the U. S. point of view, of a program of armament reduction? 1. To increase relative strength of U. S., now, and in the projected future. Remark: Present position relative to U. K. and USSR probably satisfactory. 2, To increase absolute physical security of continental U. S. Remark: present position in this regard clearly needs improvement; U. S. is vulnerable to surprise attack, and fear of such attack plays a strong role in national thinking, leading, for example to talk of preventive war and to great stress on massive retaliation con- cept. Possibly major objective of program should be to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack. 3, To create bettor international atmosphere for normal development of democratic institu- tions by reducing tension and fear. 4. To open the Soviet bloc and permit pone- tration of democratic institutions and ideas, Remark: Our best security would be a hole in the Iron Curtain, 5, To reduce the economic burden entailed in heavy armament programs, Remark: This especially applies to Germany and France whose economics are unable to support a large military program, (On the other hand, abrupt curtail- ment of U. S. Defense expenditures could have severe impact, both abroad and at home.) Remark: Present situation of almost total ignorance of Soviet capabilities and intentions requires preparation on the part of the free Paper 13: Appendix A world for all possible kinds of attack. Not infrequently, our plans and policies must be based on exaggerated intelligence estimates, with the consequence that expenditures all out of proportion to the real threat are required. With better intelligence and elimination, through control and inspection of certain weapons systems, great economies could be achieved and much effort now devoted to meeting threats that do not actually exist could be directed to more useful purposes. 6. To establish a position of moral leadership for the U. S. 7. To further progress in underdeveloped countries. B. What can be predicted about the conse- quencies in the next 10-25 years of present U. S. policy? 1. Is relative strength of U. S. increasing with time? 2. What is the rate of technical advance of the USSR? Is our being ahead enough to guarantee security? 3. What will be the effect of technical ad- vances in other countries; specifically growing atomic weapons capabilities of small countries? 4. What will be the effect of increasing independence of smaller countries: Japan, SE Asia, Germany, Arab states? Effect of chang- ing political complexion on our strategic position? 5. Weakness of India? Spread of neu- tralism? 6. If threat of surprise attacks continue, what is cost of dispersion economically and socially? 7. What will be the effect on our security of foreseeable technological developments as guided missiles, high-performance aircraft, ICBM, CEBAR? 8. Is reduction of armament a political, economic, and military necessity for the free world? (Adenauer) For the Soviet bloc? 9. To what extent is reduction of interna- tional tension necessary to preserve our way of life? Does external tension feed back and generate internal tension, and can this lead to a warlike orientation within our own country? 10. Will our present policy be interpreted by USSR and neutrals (and Allies) as preparation for aggression? C. What would be the consequences to the U. S. of a general arms reduction? 1. What is the purpose of a military force? a. to promote national aims and support diplomacy, or b. to deter aggression, prevent war, win war, minimize losses. Remark: current policy is apparently directed entirely toward (b); Soviet policy has been successful in both (?). 2. Can a reduced military force meet the demands of Is and b? What would be the composition and purpose of such a force as regards a. offense b. defense c. contribution in alliances. 3. What other means can be used to pro- mote national aims or settle disputes if military forces are reduced? U. N.? World Court? World opinion? Restraint of trade? (Is re- duced military force correspondingly reduced in effectiveness if balanced by equal reduction on the other side?) 4. Economic impact on duction? D. What are the obstacles arms reduction? arms reduction would be detrimental to the interests of the U. S." Is this a representative view of DOD? WHY? 2. Position of Department of State favoring negotiation? Reasons for difference from DOD point of view? Relative importance of DOD/ DOS in determining national policy? Possible reconciliation of views? 3. USSR proposal of May 10, 1955: a. relation to their previous position? b. reason for sudden change? Remark: possibly increased respect for nuclear weapons, possibly internal economic difficulties. c. what parts are unacceptable to us? d. views of our Allies? Remark: formulation of a suitable an- swer to the May 10 proposal is surely a matter of greatest urgency. 4. What U. S. commitments must be main- tained? U. N.? NATO? SEATO? Japan? South America? 5. What can USSR reasonably require as residual forces for international commitments, internal security? 6. What will be the reaction in the U. S. to proposal? How deal with DOD, SAC? E. What are the technical problems involved in arms reduction? 1. Feasibility of obtaining strategic warning? a. value of such warning? b, assessment of reliability? c. how much warning can be expected? d. how define critical terms: "breach, viola- tion, aggression"? 2. Feasibility of absolute control over or knowledge of a. nuclear weapons b. weapons systems c. delivery systems (aircraft, commercial aircraft, ships, submarines) Remark: high-performance aircraft, Maclr 0.8, and missiles may require control even in R and D stages, d. land armies (how count reserves, in- ternal police) 1. Clarification of position of the Depart- ment of Defense: "any negotiation and any a. capability for surprise attack f, overall capability to exploit surprise attack g. clandestine activities h. infiltration, subversion. 3. Will it be necessary to permit a retaliatory capacity in being? Should each nation retain a stockpile of nuclear weapons for this purpose? 4. Nuclear weapons a. Is complete elimination necessary or possible? Can a fixed number be con- trolled? Remark: with present development of the art a stock of a few hundred could constitute a serious threat. Production of weapons-grade material on a massive scale could probably be controlled, b. How coordinate reduction in nuclear weapons with reduction of conventional weapons? c. Effect on our forces of elimination of nuclear weapons? d. Can Pu be eliminated? Remark: unthinkable thatexistingstoelcs would not be used for peaceful applica- tions, o, g., in brooders, but question- able whether production would continue; cost of separation is very groat, 5. Control techniques a. international vs. national teams? b. international research center? c. mechanism of communication? d. access to "objects of control"; meaning of language of May 10 proposal? o. usefulness of open information via press, trade, travel? F. The purpose of a program for the reduction in armaments should be: 1. To increase the relative strength of the U. S. now and in the projected future. 2. To provide a more absolute physical secu- rity for the continental U. S. and its possessions. 3. To create a better atmosphere for the normal development of our institutions and way of life in the U. S. and in the free world, 4. To open up the Soviet bloc so that dome- cratic institutions can grow and survive in that area, and the reduction of mystery and threat from that area. 5. To reduce the economic pressure of arma- ment in the free world. 6. To obtain for the U. S. a position of moral leadership in the world working for an exten- sion of freedom and democracy to help the underdeveloped countries make economic and political progress. 7. To reduce tension and fear all over the globe. IT, TOPICAL OUTLINE FOR A STUDY OF THE TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND FOR A U. S. POSITION ON REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS A. Projection of relative free world and Com- munist positions if present policy continues- 10 years, 25 years. New weapons, etc. Is the security of the U. S. increasing or decreasing as the cold war develops? What strains develop in the economic, political, and military situation in the free world allies and in the Soviet bloc? Query: is reduction of armament or rate of growth a political, economic, or military necessity for the free world or for the Soviet bloc? Important in this topic is increase in atomic stockpile, peaceful uses of atomic energy for powers all over the globe, Now aircraft and ballistic missiles, dispersion problems and increasing independence of smaller coun- trios. The rise of Asian political consciousness. The future of Japan, China, India, SE Asia. The increasing power of the U. K. and the rising power of Germany. Above all, the increasing economical growth of the USSR. Can our position of leadership and superiority if true) be maintained under the changing circumstances? Is being ahead sufficient for the physical protection of the U. S. and the U. S. way of life? B. What U. S. commitments must be main- tained? (a) What U. S. forces must exist even if there were no overwhelming threat of Soviet ex- pansion? What military power must the U. S. possess to fulfill its commitments in the U. N. and to keep peace in the world, i. e., vis-a-vis, China, the Arab states, SE Asia, France, Germany, change in Japanese attitudes, weak- ness of India, etc.? In short, what military strength and organization is necessary to promote the national interest and support national policy? (b) What military strength could be per- mitted to USSR so that it can fulfill its require- ments for self-defense without being a powerful threat to its neighbors and to the world? C. Problems of the reduction or abolition of the stockpile of atomic weapons. (a) With the destruction of the stockpile and plants for the production of plutonium, U" and diffusion plants for the enrichment of uranium. 1. Effect on the infant atomic industry. The direction of development of nuclear power. 2. Inspection problems, intelligence in gen- eral. Technical devices for inspection. 3. What military capability we would have left in peacetime military establish- ment and in case of emergency. (b) Reduction of weapons but with contin- uation of plants for production of fissionable material. D. Technical problems arising from reduction of armaments. (a) Purpose and composition of forces for each important industry: Interest of L. S. A. (continental) 1. Diminution, of surprise and maximum utilization of U. S. natural defenses, wide oceans, northern wastes, effective elimina- tion of long-range surprise attack on U. S. by aircraft, submarine, and ships and missiles carrying large atomic warheads. 2. Strong defensive power and strategic and tactical early warning through radar, intelligence, etc. 3. Retaliatory force in being under proper control. Interest of D. S. A.'(allies and free world) 1. Protection of Western Europe warning systems, neutralized zones. Compositions of land armies and tactical air forces. 2. Outlying possessions and allies, Japan, Philippines, Hawaii, etc. 3. Keep sea lanes and communications open and safe. 4. Mobility and easy transportability. (b) Enforcement, inspection, and control: To achieve the objectives of D. The reduc- tion in armament cannot be on the basis of percentages or numerical strength or a formal abolition of some weapon such as atomic weapons, but must be on the basis of weapon systems and the inspection enforcement and control will vary with the different weapon systems. (a) Land armies and armored troops- straight forward method. (b) Navies, ships and submarines-not difficult to check, must watch out for conversions. (c) Aircraft 1. Ordinary aircraft easy to defend. 2. High performance at long or short range and high speed over 0.8 Mach very thoroughly controlled. 3. Missiles-thorough control even in research and development stages. 4. Atomic Weapons Elimination impossible with certainty. Massive production difficult with in- spection. Techniques for detection of diversion, not certain but will diminish surprise. III. MEMORANDUM IDEAS DEVELOPED IN DISCUSSION RELATING TO D. Z. BECIU ER'S LETTER OF JUNE 3 ON DISARMAMENT Participants: Bronk, Haworth, Fisk, Beckler, and Berkner at meetings of June 30-July 1, 1955. A. What are the relative advantages to the free world of control of armaments per Be compared to the situation as it is and will develop in the absence of control? On the side of control: 1. Are we willing to continue the present great tensions which the threat of almost unlimited destruction by nuclear weapons poses to both sides? 2. Is it possible that the present armament activity will shortly lead us to either a financial or a technical situation from which we acquire growing weakness rather than a continuance of strength? (Relative strength must be measured in terms of a time scale but our planning must not only consider our present situation but the future development of this situation in both the political and technical sense.) 3, Even if we can succeed technologically in retaining our military strength in the game of measure and countermeasure, will the economic strain tend to destroy the American ideals of freedom and progress that differentiate it from the "isms"? In other words, even if we can afford the necessary uncontrolled arms race in new weapons, will not the pressures of the race destroy our free culture? 4. Is it possible that negotiation on, and steps toward, disarmament could lead to the disintegration of the "Iron Curtain" thereby supplying us with new strength in new direc- tions to replace the advantage of present military strength? On the side of status quo: 1. Would not any form of control over disarmament tend to diminish our present strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union? 2. Would not disarmament perpetuate the captivity of the Satellites and endanger Western Europe or other strategic areas? 3. Is not the apparent Russian position evidence of the fact that our military strength is having a powerful, persuasive effect in modifying certain of their undesirable ideas, and, if so, would it not be unfortunate at the present time to curtail our military activity? In other words, if we have them on the run, should we weaken our hand now? 4. Are we necessarily going to lose our strength advantage at any time? 5. Must we assume that a nuclear war would lead to almost unlimited destruction or can technology contain nuclear destruction in the future? 6. What is the relationship of disarmament to consequent increase in power and influence of third parties? B. Quite independently of limitations in armaments, the establishment of mutual inspection operations may have merit. This could be an important step toward the ultimate breakdown of the Iron Curtain. In particular, an inspection, if it can be devised, which would reveal the onset of immediate preparation for a passive blow with nuclear weapons would have the following benefits. k tt i ac . se a 1. It would greatly diminish the possibility of surpr 2, It would generally reduce the possibility of widespread armed conflict. 3. It would induce stability by reducing extent of unfounded suspicions. 4. It would reduce the need for excessive armament in the face of the unknown. Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 154 CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION SECRET We are under no illusion that inspection could be obtained without some cost to us. But we should evaluate cost in terms of gains. Inspection and control need not be tied together. It is valuable to think of them separately. It would be unwise to agree to a control system based on inspection until we know how to make inspection work and can evaluate it. C. Basic questions that might be answered by the Science Advisory Committee to aid the U. S. Government in assessing, developing and evaluating plans for inspection and control. 1. What are the relative strengths derived from various combinations of weapons systems in relation to different conditions of armaments control. (a) Which combinations from our point of view are superior, tolerable, and intolerable? (b) What (numerically) would be the effect on U. S. position now and in the future of abandoning nuclear weapons? (1) altogether (2) retain for air defense (3) other (4) does control necessarily require control of nuclear matter? (c) Is inspection of nuclear materials technically feasible? (1) What would be precision of estimates? (2) What is tolerance in accuracy of estimate? (d) Is "inspection" of means of "long-range" delivery technically feasible? (1) What would be precision of estimates? (2) What is tolerance in accuracy of estimate? (e) What kind of inspection of other than nuclear weapons is necessary to make a control or disarmament plan feasible; is the necessary inspection technically feasible? (1) conventional (2) B & CW (3) other unconventional (f) How does one develop and adapt inspection procedures necessary to reveal the de- velopment of any unanticipated (or now) type of weapons and weapon systems? 2. Is a "fail safe" communications system technically possible? 3. What are the values of inspection and how can we arrange it? (a) Assuming the Iron Curtain to be one of the great military weapons of all time, can we evaluate the value of "inspection" as a major means of destroying it? (1) intelligence value of inspection U. S. vis-d-vis USSR. (2) negation of surprise (3) social effects on "climate" (These points require amplification.) (b) What type of inspection would best accomplish these ends? (c) How could the USSR be induced to join an inspection system that is completely satis- factory to us? (1) Having evaluated independent values of inspection, what would we be willing to trade for it? (2) Could inspection be presented with sufficient attractiveness to obtain Soviet alliance without undue cost to us? Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 jl Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION 155 IV. MEMORANDUM REPORT OF CAMBRIDGE MEETING ON CONTROL OF ARMS SPONSORED BY SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE A two-day meeting was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 20 and 21, to discuss in a preliminary manner possible technical approaches to the control of arms through an inspection system. Those in attendance all or part of the meeting were: David Z. Beckler----------------- Science Advisory Committee Ivan A. Getting------------------ Raytheon Manufacturing Company Edmund A. Gullion______________ Stassen Staff Marshall G. Holloway ------------- Lincoln Laboratory, M. I. T. James R. Killian----------------- Massachusetts Institute of Technology & SAO Edwin H. Land__________________ Polaroid Corporation Allen Latham, Jr----------------- Arthur D. Little, The, Max F. Millikan_________________ Institute International Studies, M. I. T. Bruce S. Old_____________________ Arthur D. Little, Inc. & SAC Emmanuel R. Pioro_______________ Avco Manufacturing Company & SAC Edward M. Purcell--------------- Howard University Hartley Rowe____________________ United Fruit Company Earl P. Stevenson---------------- Arthur D. Little, Inc. Roger S. Warner----------------- Cambridge Corporation William Webster_________________ New England Power Company Jerrold R. Zacharias______________ Massachusetts Institute of Technology & SAC 1. The major Soviet strategic threat was its capability of launching a surprise attack. Thus, the major purpose of an inspection system must be aimed at detecting and blunting any such move by the Soviet. 2. Massive buildup of army and navy forces could probably be detected by inspection of depots, combat supply points, and naval bases as long as ninety days before an attack. 3. SAC inspection is an entirely different situation, since its dedicated purpose and its opera- tions are aimed at maintaining a constant capability of surprise attack or instant retaliation. Therefore, the majority of the time was spent in discussing means of inspection to prevent surprise air attack. The general conclusions reached and observations made were: 1. A limited inspection system can be devised which will increase the probability of detecting hostile intentions two to twenty-four hours before the launching of a surprise air attack, Detection of hostile intentions as long as ninety clays prior to such an attack would require cortain limitations in armaments which would probably have to be violated in order to build up a surprise capability. Some Elements of Short-Term Detection a. Observers at Large Air Bases. An inspection system limited to this alone would provide little or no warning of a surprise attack, However, it would have intelligence and other values as an important stop in international inspection. 156 CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION SECRET b. Right to Unlimited Scheduled Overflight, This is essential to any inspection system for minimizing surprise attack going beyond paragraph a above. Such overflight would be carried out in an inspected, identified international plane. c. Inspection of Long-range Aircraft Traffic. A system of scheduled flight plans for all long-range aircraft, commercial, tankers or SAC bomber practice flights, and a reporting and tracking system would be required to account for long-range aircraft in order to detect devia- tions and possible hostile intentions. Electronic beacons might be devised to assist in the accounting. Limitations of total number of bombers in the air may be required. d. Inspection of Payload. Detection of the marrying of weapons to airplanes is one of the big inspection problems. All long-range aircraft would have to be inspected, especially for nuclear weapons. This would be valuable despite the possibility of concealed weapons and secret staging bases. e. Observers at Delivery Vehicle Production Centers. This would make available production figures and minimize the possibility of clandestine modification of aircraft. f. Reliable "Fail Safe" Communications. This is a problem of authentication as well as communication. Cryptographic means of identification as well as arrangements for inspectors and their location require study. g. Inspection and Control of Nuclear Materials and Weapons. Inspection and control sufficient to keep illegal diversions to within the accuracy of normal accountability (Sec con- clusion 2.). The importance of limited inspection will increase with time as the USSR approaches nuclear and delivery parity with the U. S. Although such inspection can reduce both the possibility and probability of surprise attack, it cannot be relied upon to the exclusion of tactical warning devices. It can be importantly supplemented by unilateral intelligence activities. We cannot afford to pay a high price for one- to two-day warning (as by giving up European bases). Although these inspections and controls can be circumvented or spoofed, they may introduce such uncertainties into Soviet planning as to discourage the launching of a global war. To be effective the inspection indicated above would have to be extended to the entire Soviet bloc. It would require hundreds of U. S, nationals; although, representatives of neutral nations could also be used, Although a surprise attack could be mounted without detectable activity in the army and navy, such activity might precede an attack. In any case, the posting of inspectors at central points involving these services would be useful as a source of intelligence for us and a restriction on Russian preparations to follow up a surprise attack. 2. Any inspection system involving inspection of fissionable materials production should be based on the assumption that a certain small percentage of the total production (about one to three percent) cannot be accounted for and could be secretly diverted to illegal uses. However, an inspection system capable of accounting for fissionable materials down to even a few percent would be highly worthwhile in refining our estimates of USSR production and would be essential to control and/or inspection of the distribution of fissionable materials for weapons use. This conclusion assumes that clandestine nuclear production facilities in the USSR and her satellites would be detectable through inspection. The quantity of fissionable materials which could be diverted over the next five years without detection could be sufficient for some ton to one hundred weapons, including thermonuclear. If our retaliatory power is decreased or con- centrated on few bases during this period, the diverted weapons could decisively cripple our retaliatory power if not our population and industry. Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 4 CRET CONTROL Or ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION 151 To the above estimate of unaccountable material must be added the irreducible error in '-counting for past production of fissionable materials. It follows that there can be no absolute safety in inspecting and controlling fissionable mate- als production per so; although, such inspection would complicate preparations and plans for a ^rprise attack and would restrict the number of weapons available for delivery. The danger roan such secreted material can be substantially reduced through control and/or inspection of Jr delivery systems coupled with strengthening the defensive systems of the countries involved, 'his is a point the Science Advisory Committee will have to consider further. 3. We do not believe that the dangers of secret diversion of weapons materials are such as o require a cessation of the production of fissionable materials. This would seriously stall the loveloping nuclear power industry. Some compromise with the State Department moratorium des might be possible by continuing U-235 but halting Pu-239 production, as there is at present -to power use for plutonium. Continued production coupled with a reasonable inspection and 3ontrol system over production and delivery could minimize the dangers attendant to continued production of fissionable materials. It is worth investigating the possibility that inspection and control of the flow of fissionable material could be facilitated through the addition of a long half-life radioisotope which could signal the presence of fissionable material to an inspector in the vicinity who is equipped with a radiation detection device. 4. Control of one delivery system may convert other uncontrolled delivery systems from secondary to primary threats duo to the transfer of energies of the secret aggressor, Restrictions on aircraft delivery would require special attention to the detection and possible control of clan- destine delivery within the U.S., delivery by ships and submarines, and the use of biological, chemical, and radiological warfare. 5. In addition to proposing inspection arrangements for lessening the possibility of a surprise attack, consideration should be given to the following actions which, if necessary, could be taken apart from inspection of air delivery capabilities. All of these actions would necessarily require verification through specialized types of inspection and would be implemented in progressive phases. This could be preceded by general discussions with the USSR on. types of activities and plants which require inspection: a. Open nuclear power plants to the public, disclosing total capacity and fuel, b. Disclosure of size of nuclear stockpile, c. Disclosure of numbers of aircraft. d. Nonproduction of high supersonic aircraft. e. Nonproduction of intercontinental and other strategic missiles and limitation of test facilities. Since this weapon and the aircraft of paragraph a are not yet in existence, and there is a good chance of detection in numbers, there might be advantage to the U. S. in proposing nonproduc- tion at this time. f. Nonproduction of bacteriological warfare agents. This could have unique good will value and provide a basis for cooperation in the life sciences, Anticrop agents would not be included in this prohibition. BW might be a good guinea pig area in which to initiate international inspection. B. Inspection and control should not extend to research and development of new weapons nefit This.1imitation is necessary to avoid the technological surprise and leacktime which might SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 158 CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION SE ORE, T the country which carried on clandestine research and development in violation of a control agreement. 7. In assessing schemes for inspection and control of armaments and related activities, em- phasis should be placed in the over-all probability of success in detection indications of hostile intent rather than on absolute reliability in every step of inspection and control. Even though the chances of deception and evasion in any given step may be ninety percent, a chain of five Buell steps would have an over-all probability of success of less than sixty percent. Secondly, the in- spection plans must be measured against our present knowledge of the USSR rather than solely on the basis of what information would be ideally required. Third, the plans must be evaluated against the 1960 conditions of nuclear and delivery equality rather than against our fading weapons superiority. Any presently conceived system of inspection and control can be circumvented to a clangorous degree by massive deception practiced by a vast country with a totalitarian government. There- fore, it is highly important that the U. S. not place confidence in any inspection and control systonl at the expense of maximum military preparedness under the agreements and of constant national alertness. 8. Inspection of indicators of national productive capacity such as, the stool, petroleum, aluminum, power, coal, etc., industries, is not a promising avenue for detection of hostile intentions. The USSR has already in being an industry capable of supporting a war. Such an inspection of China would be more to the point. There was some difference of opinion as to whether the U. S, in spending twelve percent of GNP for arms was thereby keeping inordinate pressure on the USSR to the extent that the USSR is talking peace to gain relief, or whether the U. S, current arms spending is more to be considored a drain on our progress in our world-wide fight against Communism. 9. There was a plea that the Science Advisory Committee try to set down what it considered to be the ideal control of arms system. Then one might be able to tailor properly an efl'ectivo inspection system. In general, one could consider as a bare outline for the ideal case: a. Strong national defensive capability with limited inspection. Make attack obviously unprofitable. b. Limited offensive retaliatory capability with full inspection. c. Brush fires to be handled by a UN Brigade. BRUCE S, OLD, August 8, 1965. Distribution: Members and Consultants, SAC Attendants at Cambridge Meeting as listed on Page 1. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE of DEFENSE MOBILIZATION V. MEMORANDUM WASHINGTON 26, July 2#, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SUBJECT: Washington Seminar on Inspection and Control of Armaments In accordance with the wishes of the Science Advisory Committee, an informal discussion on inspection and control of armaments was held on July 11 and 12, 1956, The following persons participated in this discussion, full or part-time: David Z, Beclder, Ralph Clark, Hugh L. Dryden, Captain Donald W. Gladney (Mr. Stassen's office), Colonel A. J. Goodpaster, Lawrence J. Hendcr- SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 son, Jr., Ellis A. Johnson, Stefan T. Possony, Herbert Scoville, Jr., William Shocldcy, Merle A. Tuve, and Alan T. Waterman. A summary of the opinions expressed is enclosed. This summary has been checked with selected members of this group, but it has not been possible to circulate it to all who were present. DAVID Z. BECKLnn, Executive Officer, Science Advisory/ Committee. ODM-12733 VI. SUMMARY OF VIEWS AD HOC GROUP ON INSPECTION AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS MEETINGS IN OFFICE OF THE ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTED, July 11 and 12, 1955 1. The development of multimegaton thermonuclear weapons and long-range aircraft have greatly increased the risk of a surprise attack. Fifty to one hundred well-placed bombs on U. S. targets would at least effectively cripple if not defeat this country. 2. An inspection system could somewhat increase the probability of warning and reduce the risk of surprise attack. There is no practical inspection system which can assure warning. Even though unreliable from a warning standpoint, the experimental, intelligence and psychological value of inspection would be highly advantageous to the U. S. Acceptance of an inspection system requires considerable build-up of our defense posture, including non-military defenses. Strong measures would need to be taken to be sure other intelligence activities were improved and strengthened. 3. Although the group was pessimistic that both a reliable and mutually acceptable inspection system could bq devised, it felt that the potential importance of developing such a system justifies serious study. 4, Three levels of armaments require further study in terms of the risks of surprise attack and its probable consequences (a) the uncontrolled armaments raco, (b) intermediate levels of disarma- ment, and (c) very low levels of armament, It was agreed that level (a) would be unstable because the groat destructive power possessed by both sides might lead to an irrational decision to attack because of a temporary technological advantage accruing to the aggressor nation, Level (b) would likewise be unstable because the possibility of deception and the availability of reliable information on relative capabilities would make a favorable outcome probabilistic for the U, S. Level (c) would require some means of neutralizing the manpower of the USSR with her advantage of interior lines of communication. 5. The group felt a need for a more precise quantitative, estimate of the degree of accuracy required in estimating violations of an inspection system in terms of capabilities for surprise attack. 6. Several suggestions were made for limited inspection possibilities to determine what is required for adequate inspection and warning time and to develop techniques for more general inspection arrangements, a. Experimentation within the U. S. employing U. S. nationals to inspect SAC operations, and U. S. industry. b. U. S.-USSR inspection of a specific weapons system, e. g., strategic air forces, c. U. S,-USSR inspection of agreed upon selected geographical areas within each country. 7. A brief examination of possible combinations of inspection and controls to facilitate inspec- tion (as contrasted with limitations) did not disclose any scheme which could not easily be circum- vented by a determined enemy to prevent warning during the interval required to launch a surprise attack. Further, any inspection scheme must consider the possibility that weapons, troops, ma- teriel and production could be concealed in China or the Soviet Bloc, SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 8. There was agreement that a tight inspection system for fissionable material production would be unrealistic because of the manifold possibilities of diversion, and that controls over de- livery vehicles were more practicable than over nuclear production. 9. However, there was lack of agreement on the need for inspection and control of nuclear production. One view rejected nuclear inspection and control as impractical and misleading, Another view was that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons should be limited to a large but limited number (such as 500) whereby expected errors in inspection would not be dangerous, but total destruction in the event of global war could be somewhat restricted as compared with unlimited stockpiling (thousands of atomic weapons). 10. An inspection and control arrangement must be time-phased to accommodate changes in weapons systems (as in going from long-range aircraft to the ICBM). 11. There is no basis for hope in being able to control the design or performance characteristics of weapons systems or to outlaw weapons because of the possibilities of designing around and circumventing such restrictions. The psychological advantages of outlawing large-scale fallout through agreements to control the employment of thermonuclear weapons requires study. 12. A possible alternative to control of arms is to balance military power such as by promoting atomic capabilities on the part of other nations including neutrals. VII. COPY OF LETTER C THE RAND CORPORATION C 0 1625 Eye Street, N. W. 0 P WASHINGTON 6, D. C. P Y Y August 11, 1965 WL-1054 Pursuant to your suggestion, I have written Dr. DuBridge and enclose a copy of my letter for your information. With respect to the summary report you prepared, which I think is excellent, I havo only two comments: 1. Concerning the second paragraph, which discusses the advantages to the U. S. of inspection, I should like to point out that there may be hidden disadvantages to us which have perhaps not been fully examined. It is by no means clear to me that I would want, for example, to agree to mutual inspection of SAC and SUSAC bases, even though we know very little about the outward aspects of SUSAC and they know a great deal about SAC. This involves operational and political intelligence considerations in an important way, not simply the question of intelligence on physical objects. I think this is a fairly important point. 2. With respect to the paragraph on the three levels of armament, I would not be too sure that the high level would be unstable because of temporary technological advantage on the part of the aggressor. It may well be unstable for other reasons, but I doubt that Soviet policy makers at a high level would initiate an attack, say, because they had an ICBM and we didn't and had no Mr. DAVID Z. BECELER Executive Officer Science Advisory Committee Office of Defense Mobilization Executive Office of the President WASHINGTON 25, D. C. DEAR DAVE: defense against it. It is too risky from the operational standpoint to rely on this kind of thing in the case of a really serious policy decision. Besides, I don't see the relation between level of arma- ment and technological advantage. Wouldn't the latter be more important in the case of lower levels of armament? I hope I was able to be of some help and appreciate the fine job you did in preparing the summary. Best regards, Sincerely, (s) LARRY L. J. HENDERSON, JR. Attachment Associate Director. VIII. COPY OF LETTER C THE RAND CORPORATION C 0 1625 Eye Street, N. W. 0 P WASHINGTON 6, D. C. P Y Y August 11, 1955 WL-1053 Dr. L. A. DuBRrnGE Science Advisory Committee Office of Defense Mobilization lxecutive Office of the President WASHINGTON 26, D. C. DEAR Lnn: As you may know, Dave Beclder asked me to join with Hugh Dryden, Alan Waterman, and Merle Tuvo, among others, in a session held here in July on the subject of the control of armaments, for the purpose of possible assistance to your Committee. Dave tells me the summary report of our meetings is being made available to your Committee, and when I told him that I had some _additional notions which might possibly be of assistance in your deliberations, he suggested that I write to you. I should first like to say that this letter is purely an expression of my personal views and is being submitted solely in the hope that it may possibly call the attention of your Committee to some aspects of the problems you are considering which may not otherwise have been brought to light. I certainly have no specific proposals to make nor even any suggestions as to solutions of the very complex and difficult problems involved. However, the general matter of control of armaments and inspection appears to me to be so critically linked to the security of the free world that I felt impelled to set down some of my thoughts, however ill-considered, in the hope that I might perhaps contribute something, DISARMAMENT Disarmament, or limitation on armament, seems to me to be a subject on which there are in some quarters a good many misconceptions. Most of us have perhaps been conditioned to believe that limitation or reduction of armaments is something to be desired in itself. It is not at all clear to me that this is necessarily so. For present purposes, lot us assume that what we really wish is to avoid war or at least a cataclysmic war. We might say. then that this is the end, and disarma- ment simply one conceivable means to this end. Disarmament or control of armaments is, not SECRET. therefore an end in itself. It is conceivable, in fact even quite possible, that means other than disarmament may be preferred. Until recently this has been the position of our government since the Korean war. It seems to me, therefore, that we should examine the control of armaments objectively in terms of probable pay-off and cost in comparison with other means to the same end. Perhaps an analogy is the local police force. Here the end is the reduction or control of crime. The reduction of the police force is not an end in itself, although if the end can be achieved while at the same time reducing the police force without adding other burdens upon the community, then sometimes the reduction of the police force might be justified. However, in practice such instances appear to be rather rare. Considering the end of avoiding or reducing the probability of a catastrophic war and looking at control of armaments as a means to this end, we then must determine how we can get the ammo or better protection against the probability of war, at a lower cost, while disarming. If this condi- tion could be achieved, then disarmament might appear desirable. However, there are certain facts of life which we must face. In the first place, in the opinion of many responsible people, our protection is now inadequate. Our present and planned military capability does not look very impressive in the light of the growing Soviet atomic stockpile, long-range Air Force capability, and missile development programs. It might, therefore, well be argued that even our present armament program is grossly inadequate to achieve the protection we require. A second problem is that in the atomic and thermonuclear era, as opposed to earlier eras, where mobilization and leisurely preparation after the outbreak of war were possible, reduction or control of armaments would almost certainly have to be supplemented by other measures such as passive defense, dispersal and hardening of our remaining forces, etc. These additional meas- ures might in fact cost as much as a higher armament level and might not necessarily give us as much protection. This, I am afraid, is a point which has not been adequately considered by those who see in disarmament a step toward reduction in government expenditures. Furthermore, we all know how difficult it is to persuade people to take the kind of supplementary action required to maintain our safety at even the present level. Measures looking to the reduction of vulnera- bility in our military are woefully slow of adoption and certainly our civil defense program has not been outstandingly successful. If the political or other considerations which have caused those programs to lag are of a permanent or seimipermanent nature (i. e,, we just won't make up our minds to do these things) then disarmament or control of armaments might in fact be suicide from a practical standpoint. One aspect of control of armaments which has perhaps not received as much consideration as it should relates to the relative ratios of types of armament or weapons systems. This is of course a familiar problem when put in terms of USSR manpower vs. U. S. air-atomic technology, but it is more complex than this and should probably receive considerable study. Clearly the Soviets have studied it or they would not have come out with the rather specific proposals they have made. As a corollary, much is said nowadays about the higher probability of peripheral or limited war vs. total war. It seems quite conceivable that some forms of control or limitation on arma- ments which might appear desirable from the standpoint of total war could be very undesirable in terms of the free world's capability to deter, or, if necessary, wage limited or peripheral wars. INSPECTION In looking at the inspection problem, which perhaps can best be considered separately from the disarmament problem, one is struck by the fact that here also the Soviets seem to have a SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 ~pproved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET CONTROL 01" ARMAMEIMTSI ANT) TUTTIMAT. TVQ~~MTnm notion of what they want which is more concrete than any we have officially adopted. I under- stand that Charlie Lauritsen has suggested that a careful analysis be made of the Soviet proposals in an attempt to determine what it is they want or expect to learn from their inspection in the U. S. This would appear to be an extremely desirable study to have made. I am not at all sure that we know what it is we want to know about the Russians. This should certainly be given very careful study in terms not only of objectives but of feasibility and reliability. In looking at USSR inspection in the U. S., I think we perhaps tend to exaggerate Soviet knowl- edge of our true operational capabilities. Undoubtedly, they have much better intelligence con- cerning us than we do concerning them. On the other hand, the confidence they can place in the information they have may be low enough so their doubts greatly restrict their freedom of decision. I submit that it is eminently desirable for us to avoid any reduction in these doubts, for reasons which I shall not go into here but which I shall be glad to discuss with you at any time. Outward appearances, even on a fairly detailed basis, are very different from a real and accurate knowledge of true capabilities. There is a brief suggestion in the summary report of our meetings here in Washington relat- ing to the balance of military power. This has to do with the possibility of changing the bi-polar world, at least in military terms, to a multi-polar one. This is an extremely complicated and difficult problem but perhaps should be studied much more. carefully than it has been, There are a variety of possibilities. Even if we took no action, the U. K. and almost certainly some other European nations will acquire an air-atomic military capability before too long. There are things we could do about this natural growth. We could accelerate it by support of various kinds or we could, conceivably, actually create an atomic capability on the part of our allies, or even neutrals, such as India. Perhaps the existence of multiple atomic capability would not be an unmixed blessing; on the other ]land, it might reduce the confidence of the Soviets that they could achieve all their objec- tives by a massive blow against one nation, such as the U. S. It seems to me that this is an area which requires searching examination. There is one aspect of disannament which might be mentioned here as it is related to the question of multi-polar capability. Some armament control schemes which might look attractive to us or be in our interest might not be in the interest, say, of the U. K., because of the difference in the state of their atomic or military programs. Presumably such angles are being considered by the U. S., but there has been very little mention of them to my knowledge. I am afraid this is a rather disjointed and fragmentary letter, but I hope it may perhaps contribute to your discussions in a small way. With best regards, Sincerely, /s/ LARRY L. J. HENDERsoN, JR. Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET Thresholds of Armament Effort U. S. and U. S. S. R. Originator: Stacy May Critic: George A, Lincoln Paper 14 The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibilities of increasing the volume of armament production to a point where there would be a good prospect of straining the Soviet economy to the breaking point by inducing a competitive effort beyond that which its economy could support, 1. CURRENT U. S. AND USSR COMPARI- SIONS-TOTAL ECONOMIC OUTPUT AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES Perspective upon the question at issue is furnished by comparing the rough magnitudes of the two economics and their respective military expenditure commitments, The United States 1. The Gross National Product of the United States is currently about $385 billion. 2. Our total military outlays are of the order of $40 billion, or between 10 and 11 percent of the GNP. 3. Our annual expenditures on military hard goods amount to somewhat less than one-half of our total defense outlays, The USSR 1, The Gross National Product of the USSR is estimated at around $125 billion, or about one-third that of the U. S. 2, Its total military outlays are estimated at something over $20 billion, or 10 to 18 percent of the GNP. 3. Its annual production of military hard goods is estimated at around $10 billion, Comparison of the Two In proportion to the size of its economy, the USSR is spending about 50 percent more than we are for military expenditures as a whole and for the sub-category of military hard goods, although the absolute amount of the expend- itures in each case is only one-half as large as ours. The latter statement, taken at face value, is apt to lead to erroneous conclusions, for: a. With only about half of the "soft item" expenditures of the United States, the USSR supports far larger military contingents than we do. Among the factors that make this possible are their far lower pay and sub- sistence scales and their comparatively large concentration of military personnel grades in the lower rank and pay brackets, b, Similarly, in the matter of military hard goods production, the USSR appears to get a larger quantitative return than is indicated by expenditure figures of currencies theoretically reduced to a common base. Intelligence estimates of comparative arma- ment production seem to indicate a Soviet production roughly comparable in over-all magnitude to ours, although the comparison is admittedly difficult because of wide dis- crepancies that fall one one side or the other in various weapon categories, and of qualita- tive differences that are hard to appraise. Seemingly, a much greater degree of stand- ardization in a variety of major weapon types on the part of the USSR is an important factor in producing this result. At any rate, upon the basis of prevailing practices and methods of comparing expendi- tures in the two currencies, it is reasonable to assume that the USSR could match an ex- pansion in our overall military outlays at half the cost represented in our budget. It is not so clear that this would hold true for a matching of military hard goods expenditures alone, particularly if such matching were called for upon a selective basis. In a number of fields, such as electronic equipment, the ratio of Soviet expenditures to American seems to work out much closer to a 1-to-1 ratio. Comparatively large capital equipment expenditures on the Soviet side might also be involved. How large an expansion of military effort could the USSR economy support? It is logical to start from this end, since the U. S. economy, without reference to internal or external political considerations, is clearly capable of supporting a greatly augmented military program. Intelligence estimates indicate that, again measured in purely economic terms, the USSR could mobilize without collapse as much as 40 percent of her total annual production for military outlays in a cold war setting, and per- haps as much as 60 percent under all-out war conditions. If this appraisal is accurate, the USSR could support total military outlays of a $50 billion dimension without intolerable economic strains if the competitive pressure were deemed to de- mand it. That would mean a multiplication of her present military outlays by two and one- half times. Upon the basis of existing U. S: USSR expenditure ratios of something like 2 to 1, it SECRET would take a $60 billion dollar increase in total U. S. military outlays to invoke this Soviet competitive response. Since a U. S. expansion of anything like that dimension is far beyond the range of practical acceptance in the present domestic and Free World political context, the concept set forth for exploration in this paper appears definitely unpromising, at least if the challenge is offered through an over-all military outlays approach. But the prospect of inducing strains in the Soviet economy appears less fanciful if the competition is visualized as one that focuses sharply upon selective military hard goods fields. If, for example, the United States were able to achieve a substantial developmental break- through in major weapons of offense, such as intercontinental guided missiles, and were willing to devote considerable additional sums to their production, there would assuredly be a considerable pressure upon the USSR to answer the challenge. The same result might be obtained by a United States breakthrough in defensive weap- ons-particularly in weapons that assured us of substantial immunity from enemy bombs delivered by manned aircraft at a time when the USSR still was vulnerable to our delivery potential and had not yet developed a massive capacity for guided missile attack upon us. Obviously, any breakthrough that would give us precedence in establishing additionally effective protection against guided missile attack would be of even greater significance, It is by no means clear that the USSR could expand its output of military hard goods by anything like 2% times (to a $25 billion level) in a short period. A recent appraisal estimated that Russian military hard goods production at its $10 billion level mortgaged approximately one-third of her $30 billion per year metal working industry capacity. By contrast, the U. S. military hard goods production absorbed less than 15 percent of our capacity in the same field. The requirement of matching an additional $8 or $10 billion expansion of hard military output would probably cause consid- proved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET THRESHOLDS OF ARMAMENT EFFORT enable internal readjustment of Soviet internal arrangements that might induce embarrassing if not untenable strain, if it were of a type that called for Russian expenditures somewhat com- parable to ours. The optimism of the preceding paragraph should be qualified, however, by a number of considerations. It would take a developmental breakthrough of genuine strategic importance to offer sub- stantial assurance of sufficient pressure to re- quire a Soviet response in kind. Thorn are a number of visualizable clevelop- monts of this nature that might logically call for a diversion of current expenditures on either side, the substitution of now weapon production for that of weapons currently manufactured, rather than a not addition to output or ex- penditures. The speed with which the USSR would feel called upon to respond is problematical at best. In substance, she is in the enviable position of having control of the trigger. She can be rea- sonably corlain that, unless she overtly forces the issue, we will not aggressively attack even though the aclvantago rests with us. We can have no such assurance. Therefore, although such it development as has been promised would undoubtedly evoke a response, the tempo of such response could be importantly of Russia's choosing. The pace could be timed to fall within the limits of accommodatablo internal adjustment. Unilateral action on the part of the United States to considerably stop up its military ex- penditures would meet with formidable internal, allied, and neutralist opposition. The net po- litical consequences of such repercussions, and their Communist exploitation, would have to be carefully weighed. However, it should be noted that increased U. S. military expenditures of the type outlined in section II above, could be rationalized as having a purely defensive connotation, even though in fact they could alter the entire balance of massive offensive potential as a deterrent force. Expenditures for "defense" could probably be increased with a minimum of political repercussions. III. CONCLUSIONS 1. On balance, it does not appear that the concept put forth at the beginning of this paper holds sufficient promise at the present juncture to warrant high precedence in our current strategy. 2. Time and a change in political climate could radically alter the appraisal, 3. The potentials of the idea, particularly in its selected application as suggested, are worthy of intensive study against a time when the approach may have greater applicability than now. 4. Meanwhile, it is significant that our most hopeful means for inducing at least embarrass- ing strain in the Soviet economy would seem to lie in the area of radically increased expendi- tures for new weapons relating to delivery and defense against delivery of atomic and hydrogen bombs, A breakthrough in either of these fields would be of crucial importance upon solely strategic considerations. It has the added virtue of offering the type of production com- petition that is comparatively most costly for the USSR to match. Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET Paper 15 Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR Originator: Henry A. Kissinger Critic: Stefan Possony I. THE PROBLEM The series of negotiations which started with the Geneva summit conference are forcing the U. S. to examine again its diplomatic and psychological posture, to assess the nature of the process in which we are engaged, and to determine the moans to deal with its pitfalls. Perhaps the best way to approach an under- standing of current negotiations is to compare them with their counterparts during the hey- day of "secret diplomacy" in the nineteenth century, At that time negotiations played a determinate role: to delimit the area of at- tainable agreement and to find formulae to reconcile divergent points of view. Because no power considered the existence of another as a threat to its own survival the penalty of diplomatic defeat was the loss of a tactical position and not national catastrophe, And because the risks were smaller, no power felt it necessary to maintain force levels of a magni- tude which required intensive preparations of public opinion, either domestic or allied. The flexibility of diplomacy was, therefore, much greater than in an era of imminent nuclear destruction, In framing his proposals, the diplomat was more independent of domestic support and for reasons which can be sum- marized in these propositions: (1) no gov- ernment attacked the domestic structure of any other state; (2) the demands on the population either in peace or in war were relatively negligible, Nothing could be more different from the situation today. We are confronted by a power which for over a 'generation has claimed for its nation both exclusiveness and uni- versality of social justice; which has based its domestic control apparatus on the myth Of a permanently hostile outside world; and which is building a nuclear capacity to inflict catas- trophic blows on the U. S. In these circum= stances the whole pattern of international relations is transformed. In the face of sub- version by the Cominform the freedom of action of many governments is being circum- scribed. In the face of the demands of the technological race the U. S. Government must fight a war on three fronts: domestically, to generate enough support to build the force- levels without which we cannot negotiate; toward our allies, in order not to trade whatever freedom of action remains to their governments; and toward the Soviet Bloc, to prevent its splitting the U. S. system of alliances or to expand its sphere even further. In this manner, "normal" diplomatic relations have changed their meaning. What is at issue is no longer the adjustment of local disputes between pro- tagonists agreed on a basic framework, but the basic framework itself. Diplomatic confer- ences become sounding boards which attempt to harmonize conflicting considerations: the possibility of continuing a domestic consensus and the relationship of the U. S. to its allies while determining the area of possible agreement with the USSR. All this is another way of saying that the predominant aspect of the new diplomacy is its psychological dimension. If the U. S. in the process of attempting to establish a better atmosphere lulls its own people into a false sense of security it may paralyze itself in the next round of negotiations. If in order to hold allies in line the U. S. appeals to its most de- featist elements, it may gain a propaganda victory but erode the basis for any decisive action that may prove necessary. If a detente is achieved in Europe it may remove the only incentive of our European allies to support us in case of a crisis in Asia. The more the Soviets succeed in giving the impression that there exists a "third alternative" in the con- test between the U. S. and the USSR the more difficult our coalition effort becomes. And the psychological element is no less true vis-a-vis the USSR. Let us assume one of two motives behind recent Soviet maneuvers: (a) that the USSR sincerely desires an accom-, modation with the U. S. or (b) that it is simply playing for time until its nuclear capacity is more nearly commensurable with that of the U. S. and until the constellation of forces in the non-Communist world becomes more fav- orable. It is true that in case of eventuality (a) an intransigeant U. S. attitude may lead in turn to a hardening of the Soviet stand. (This is so only within limits as will be discussed below.) But is it no less true that a too rapid surrender to Soviet blandishments may give the USSR all the advantages of course (a) and still retain for the USSR the capabilities of course (b), i. e., it will still give the Soviets the option of executing an about-face when it serves their purpose. Everything therefore depends on projecting to the Soviet leaders a correct picture of U. S. determination: if they are sincere, in order not to mislead them into believing that a real accommodation can be purchased by a change of tone alone; and if they are playing for time, in order not to allow them to buy it cheaply. In short, it is to the U. S. interest to strengthen those forces in the USSR not willing to risk everything for the sake of expansion but to do so in a manner which neither disintegrates domestic U. S. support for a firm policy nor undermines allied relationships. The real difficulty with the above observa- tions arises from applying them to concrete. situations, particularly if one inquires into the psychological potential available to achieve American objectives. There is no doubt that the desire for peace is the predominant trend in the public opinion of all the countries of the world including the Soviet Bloc. It is the attitude which must be used to legitimize any U. S. policy. The USSR has so far been most skillful in utilizing it in two ways: (a) By talking about peace, in general, it has given the impression that the outstanding disputes are minor and that the achievement of peace depends largely on a change of tone; (b) By focusing on security problems, such as German rearmament, the USSR has placed itself in the position of being threatened and has put the onus for reassuring it on the West. Both tactics are eminently to the Soviet advantage. While the concept of peace is identified with the ease of international inter- course it will be relatively simple for the USSR to play for time and to prolong negotiations as long as it suits its purpose to negotiate. The more the Soviet Bloc is permitted to capitalize on gestures which cost it nothing, such as visits of Soviet farm delegations or releasing illegally imprisoned U. S. citizens, the more difficult it will prove to get popular support for the level of armament expenditure which brought the USSR to the conference table in the first place. The more prolonged the discussions aboub threats to Soviet security, the more difficult will it prove to return to the real security prob- lem: the disproportion in conventional military strength and the presence of Soviet troops in the center of the European continent. In the process unless the U. S. is vigilant it may be forgotten that no peace is permanent which does not take into account the nature of power relationships. Stability is not achieved only by conciliatory words-at least no statesman Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET NEGOTIATION WITH USSR 171 can gamble the survival of his charge on words alone particularly under conditions of modern nuclear capabilities. This is all the more true when confronted by a power priding itself on its assessment of "objective" factors to which professions of good faith unrelated to power factors will seem caused either by hypocrisy or stupidity. If this is true, the U. S. has the following tasks in the present negotiations: (a) to main- tain within the U. S. the domestic support for a continuation of a firm policy; (b) to reduce the Soviet peace offensive to concrete terms as quickly as possible; (c) to announce a program which captures the universal desire for peace while leaving no doubt that peace can only be achieved through a series of concrete adjust- monts; (d) to announce a program which ap- peals to the general desire for economic ad- vancement in the, underdeveloped countries; (e) not to permit the present negotiations to be conducted solely on a plane where the U. S. will be placed in the position of reassuring the USSR. In other words, the presence of Soviet troops in the center of the continent and the Soviet satellite orbit must be stressed as one of the causes of the present tension; (f) to generate symbols which will create pressures which the Soviets must include in their calculus of risks. II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT CONFERENCE Against the background it may prove useful to reassess the Geneva conference. There is no doubt that it yielded some gains for the U. S.: a. It demonstrated that U. S. relationships with its allies can be conducted only as an aspect of U. S.-Soviet relationships. No amount of patient discussion with our allies had the electrifying effect of the U. S. dis- armament proposal to the USSR. b. In limited fields and for the time being the U. S. has gained the diplomatic initiative. e. For the time being the wind has been taken out of the sails of the neutralists. d. If the USSR is really interested in an accommodation, Geneva has supplied the atmosphere in which it may occur. e. It may have launched the USSR on a process it may find difficult to reverse. In the present atmosphere ft return to a "hard" line may have deleterious effects on the USSR both domestically and abroad. Many of the above gains are problematical, however; others are useful only for a limited time. It is not at all clear for example whether the USSR cannot reverse its present course at a moment's notice as it has so often in the past. On the contrary it may well be that if the USSR should decide to adopt a more in- transigeant policy it would derive considerable benefit from its present line since the Soviet people at least would probably be convinced that only provocation on the part of the out- side world could have led to the new reversal. Nor is our new-found popularity in the neutralist press likely to outlast our first attempt to implement our alliances for something else than generalities. Above all Geneva has con- fronted us with the following dangers: a. Domestically, the "spirit of Geneva" may make it more difficult to obtain appro- priations for defense or to continue a firm policy. The same problem may be faced by most of our allies. b. Within NATO, we may have played into the hand of all the forces making for inaction. Public support for coalition policy concerned with anything but a direct threat to the survival of our European allies may be reduced. c. To the extent that tension has been lowered in Europe we may have isolated ourselves in Asia for the only incentive for the support of our European allies in Asia is their fear of being left alone in Europe. d. We may have given the USSR an atmosphere in which to gain time to catch up in its development of nuclear weapons and thereby shift the strategic balance against us. e. We have strengthened all the forces who advocate a third course both in Europe and in Asia. f. The policy of the Bonn government has become more vulnerable domestically. (See Paper 16.) III. OUTLINE OF A FUTURE STRATEGY Whether Geneva was a success or failure therefore depends on the use we make of it. We have gained a measure of freedom of action but it will be of little avail if we do not exploit it. But what is meant by the term "action" in the context of a detente or at least a series of negotiations leading to a detente? What measures can utilize the psychological potential of a peace offensive while at the same time bringing pressure on the USSR? How can we keep the USSR from gaining time and dis- rupting our system of alliances without appear- ing bellicose? What pressures, in short, are available to the U. S. to bring the negotiations which started at Geneva to an issue favorable to us? The answer to these questions depends on an analysis of what brought the USSR to the conference table in the first place. As already noted two interpretations are possible: (a) that the USSR is simply playing for time until the constellation of forces in the outside world is more nearly favorable to it and until it develops its nuclear capability more fully, (b) that the USSR has found its previous course too risky and that it sincerely desires an accommodation with the U. S. It must be stressed at the outset that these motivations are not mutually exclusive. In the short term, they can coincide or at least it is in the U. S. interest to make them coincide: i. e., the U. S. should not permit the USSR to gain time except on terms which the U. S. considers the basis for a real accommodation. Conversely, even if the USSR sincerely desires a settlement it will undoubtedly seek to buy it as cheaply as possible. Thus a period of relaxation of tension which is permitted to remain largely formal may have the paradoxical result of tempting the Soviets, whatever their present intentions, into a more intransigeant attitude later on if they get through this period with their power unimpaired. To be sure, the U. S. should do everything in its power to strengthen the peaceful elements within the USSR by giving demonstratons of limited objectives and by meeting legitimate Soviet concerns for their security. But the U. S. cannot gamble its existence on the assumption of continued Soviet good faith. A "better atmosphere" is not an end in itself but only a condition in which U. S. objectives can be realized. In short, the U. S. while keeping the door open to a real accommodation must frame its policy on the assumption of the worst contingency, that is, that the Soviets are really playing for time. The most signal achieve. ment of Geneva has been the emergence of the President as the most dominant figure on the world scene and the explosion of the myth of U. S. intransigeance. This is the platform from which the U. S. must move in charting its future strategy. How then can pressure be brought on the USSR in the form of a peace offensive? If the USSR is interested in gaining time, then "time" itself is negotiable, then the U. S. must sell time as dearly as possible. This means that we must overcome the static concept of negotia- tions which looks at a conference as an isolated phenomenon the failure of which merely defines the subject for a future negotiation. Such an attitude is tailor-made for the Soviets to confuse the issues while prolonging the semblance of harmony. If on the other hand we realize that the failure of negotiation can be used as the basis for increasing the pressures on the Soviet Bloc and if no doubt is left that this will be the result of a failure, we will have created a motive for Soviet conciliation. For even if the Soviets are willing to make concessions, they will find it impossible for domestic reasons except insofar as the U. S. poses a calculus of risks that will make yielding appear as the lesser of two evils. But how can time be negotiable? It can be used as a means of pressure if the U. S. an- nounces objectives whose very existence will generate pressure on the USSR (i. e., the dis- armament proposal). Although our tone should always be conciliatory, it should be made clear that unless negotiations show some progress toward these objectives the U. S. will see no further point in conferences and will await the time when discussions promise to be more fruitful. The announcement of these objec- tives would in itself force the Soviet hand in case they should wish a long-range settlement and it will make clear that peace is not equiva- lent to general statements of good will. By relating these objectives to definite timetable, we shall make clear that negotiations cannot be an end in themselves. The U. S. therefore faces a threefold task: (a) to become clear about its own objectives: specifically, to clarify the extent to which the Soviet sphere is compatible with U. S. security and determine what U. S. policy can prevent further Soviet gains in the uncommitted areas. It is all the more necessary that the U. S. be clear about its objectives lest the USSR score psychological gains by means of concessions which do not affect the strategic balance (it will therefore be necessary to develop policies on the colonial issue, Southeast Asia and the Formosa Straits); (b) to make these objectives clear to the American people so that there will exist public support for a long-range program; (c) to make clear to the Soviet leadership that the failure of negotiation entails a penalty, at a minimum the refusal to continue to negotiate, at a maximum a stepped-up defense effort. These goals can be achieved by the following steps: (a) A fireside chat by the, President explain- ing that while Geneva has created a better at- mosphere it will still be necessary to test Soviet intentions by concrete measures; that while the U. S. is willing to negotiate as long as there exists a hope for concrete results, it will not be a party to misleading the people of the world if the negotiations should merely mask continued Soviet intransigeance. As a first test of the new atmosphere the President should propose that the Soviet leaders associate themselves with him in a declaration that the Big Four oppose the settlement of disputes by force and that they will refuse to support materially or other- wise any effort to settle disputes by force. As far as the U. S. is concerned such a declaration would merely formalize what has long been an- nounced U. S. policy (i. e., the U. S. attitude toward South Korean threats to advance north) and it would further strengthen the image of the President as a man of peace. As for the USSR, such a declaration is fraught with the danger of a split with China and it would in any case make more difficult the strategy of using the detente in Europe to obtain freedom of ac- tion in Asia. If the USSR refuses this proposal we would have an unassailable basis to refuse further negotiations. (b) The U. S. should announce a dynamic program for the underdeveloped areas to con- vince the USSR that time is not on its side and to demonstrate the superior viability of the Free World. This may involve an interna- tional point IV agency or similar cooperative ventures and the measures outlined in Paper 16 and others. (c) The U. S. must maintain its present force levels and if possible increase them, for, to the degree that the strategic balance shifts in favor of the Soviets, their readiness to make conces- sions will diminish. (d) The U. S, should continue to push the Geneva inspection plan but announce at least partial realization of it as the condition for fur- ther negotiation. (e) The U. S. should propose a conference to discuss concrete measures to lift the Iron Cur- tain, perhaps beginning with a proposal for free travel within Germany (See Paper 17). All these proposals should be designed (a) to create by their very existence pressure on the USSR (b) to make Soviet concessions accept- able domestically within the USSR; they should not be calls for surrender but at the same time they should make clear the penalties of rejection (c) to attempt to restore fluidity to the diplo- matic situation by starting a process the Soviets may find it difficult to control (d) to make clear to the U. S. public and the rest of the Free World its dangers as well as its oppor- tunities (e) above all conciliation should stand at the end not at the beginning of this process; it is the price we can. pay the Soviets for concrete concessions, We can learn from Tito in this respect: he replied to every Soviet blandish- ment with a demand for deeds and not words, until Khrushchev appeared in Belgrade. SECRET IV. NOTES ON THE ARMS RACE A special word must be said in conclusion about the arms race. There can be little doubt that the existence of the arms race can in itself furnish a pressure on the Soviet Bloc. To be sure, the Soviets can hold their own in some fields but to the extent that they do so, they may impose a measure of stagnation on the Soviet economy and retard Soviet efforts to industrialize China. On the other hand, Soviet resources freed by disarmament may well emerge in a competitive effort in the under- developed areas. Finally in stressing disarma- ment plans based largely on the number of troops under arms, the USSR is seeking to shift the strategic balance in its favor: (a) because of its superiority in conventional weapons (b) because even if it should accept a limitation on the production of new weapons its stockpile of conventional weapons is presumably far superior to that of the Free World. All these considerations will be dealt with in detail in other papers. It may be useful, how- ever, to stress here the psychological aspect of the arms race which has two facets: (a) its impact on the USSR (b) its impact on our allies. Looking at the world through Soviet eyes, the continuation of a high level of U. S. defense expenditures, however conciliatory our profes- sions, will be a source of concern and therefore SECRET an effective means of pressure. The U. S. defense effort can therefore under no circum- stances be relaxed until we have obtained a transformation of the strategic situation. It may be argued that a continued high level of defense expenditure coupled with a refusal to negotiate unless the USSR makes concessions may lure the Soviets into an anticipatory strike. But it is more than doubtful that the USSR will launch a "preventive war" unless it considers its chances better than even, a situation which our force levels should always be adequate to prevent. In any case reassuring the USSR is the task of our diplomacy, not of our military policy. The impact of the armaments race on our allies is more subtle: no matter how disquieted they may profess to be by American military preparation, they will be made infinitely more nervous by a relaxation of this effort. Their leaders have no illusions, even if their public has, that U. S. strength is the only obstacle to the immediate occupation of their country by Soviet troops. But while the size of the U. S. military establishment represents the basis for our diplomacy, the distribution of its force levels and the strategic concept behind them supply the basis for its flexibility. The stra- tegic concept must be adequate to deal with any form of Soviet aggression for our ability to act will be largely determined by our planning before action becomes necessary; and our force levels must be able to implement this strategic concept. (It is significant that there has been increasing debate in the German press about the meaningfulness of German rearmament.) The real significance of thermonuclear weapons may well be that they place a premium on a strategy which shifts the risk of their use to the other side by means of an alternative weapons system. If we stake everything on an all-or- nothing military policy one of two consequences becomes inevitable: either our allies will feel that peace is preferable to wax almost at any price; or they reduce their military expenditures on the assumption that events cannot be affected by their action. In short in order to obtain indigenous support for local defense, we opportunities for the U. S. but they will be no must make local defense meaningful. greater than our strength and if we fail to Thus even the armaments race has a psycho- grasp them they will merely define the dangers logical component and one we can ignore only which are inevitable if the USSR gets through at our peril. The period ahead holds many this period without a major adjustment. Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 SECRET The German Problem One of the most serious problems facing the United States is the increasing rigidity of the diplomatic situation in areas whore the Soviet position is weakest. While on the surface this rigidity may seem to work in both ways and off or a measure of assurance for the maintenance of the status quo, actually the reverse is true: for the longer the Soviet bloc can freeze existing lines of division between it and the Free World, the more it will give rise to the idea that the fate of the nations now under Soviet rule and even more the fate of the nations now divided depends entirely on the good will of the USSR. To the extent that this notion gains ground the U. S. position automatically deteriorates: if the status quo conies to be generally accepted, the satellite orbit will require a smaller control apparatus and, more important, some of the nations now divided, Germany in particular, may find a direct deal with the USSR increas- ingly attractive. The issue of German unity is ideally suited to restore a measure of fluidity to the diplomatic situation. For Germany is the area where we are diplomatically strongest; there our power and our moral position are in harmony. By contrast the USSR can only lose on the issue of German unity for in almost any form that will be acceptable to world public opinion German unity must lead to the collapse of a satellite regime; it will involve a withdrawal of the Soviet armies from the center of the continent; it almost necessarily will raise the issue of the Oder-Neisse line even if security guarantees against German aggression are given. One might add that oven a neutral Germany, as long Paper 16 as it is rearmed, would be to the Soviet dis- advantage; it would. still constitute a barrier to a Soviet advance; it would still exercise considerable pressure on the satellites. Thus, on every issue, except the maintenance of the status quo, the USSR finds itself at a distinct disadvantage. It is for this reason that the USSR took its stand at the November foreign ministers' con- ference on the security issue. For this is the one ground on which they can gain public sup- port both in Western Germany and in Western Europe: in Western Germany because of the Socialist argument that only rearmament stands in the way of German unity, in Western Europe because of the fear of resurgent militarism in Germany. But while the Soviet strategy is understandable we cannot afford to let ourselves be lured into negotiating only on their ground and at their pace. European security is the most disadvantageous negotiating point for us, because it can be transformed into a technical problem which deprives it of any symbolic value, and because of the emotions aroused by the memories of German aggression. To be sure, we must be prepared to demonstrate the hollowness of even this Soviet tactic. But we need not rest on it; we must be prepared to show not only that the USSR is not willing to accept unity on our terms, but that it is unwilling to accept it on any terms. And this is equally important in order to maintain Adenauer's domestic position. For already there are growing doubts in Germany about the efficacy of a rearmament in the face of new weapons' development and a protracted diplomatic stalemate may completely erode the psychological framework which alone can make German rearmament meaningful. It is no accident that however the Summit meeting was received elsewhere, in Germany it was considered a setback for Adenauer's policy. The longer negotiations between the USSR and the U. S. continue without any tangible progress or at least without a concrete U. S. proposal which demonstrates bow unity may be approximated if not achieved, the weaker will Adenauer's position become. Until November the German opposition was restrained by the forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers at Geneva. Since this passed without result we can expect the pressures against the implement- ing legislation for rearmament to multiply. Color will then be lent to the Socialist argument that only rearmament stands in the way of German unity. Moreover not only may it prove difficult to obtain passage of the necessary implementing legislation, but pressures for direct Soviet-German negotiations will increase. Indeed Soviet strategy may well be designed to deal on German unity, if at all, directly with the West Germans, perhaps coupling it with offers for increased East-West trade. For all these reasons we must develop an integrated program for German unity, any one of the proposals of which we can afford to have accepted while the acceptance in turn can only weaken the Soviet position in Eastern Germany. In drafting such a program we should focus on the most blatant weakness of the East German regime, that it cannot afford a free election. It should, therefore, be our aim to induce the Soviets to accept or to shoul- der the onus for refusing free elections for some all-German organ however circumscribed its powers. The very fact that there exist two electoral mechanisms, one for an all-German body and one for the East German government coupled with the certainty that free elections in the Soviet zone would show results totally different from the controlled elections for the East German regime would shake the hold of the Pankov government. The U. S. strategy on Germany might then take the form of pro- posals phased in several stages and designed to shift the onus for the failure of negotiations on the USSR: 1. In Stage 1, we began by asking for political unity and all-German elections coupled with a number of security plans. 2. Now that the Soviets have refused these proposals, we should announce that since the USSR did not agree on political unity and since it would not accept our security proposal we should move the discussion on a plane which is divorced either from the issue of political unity or of rearmament. It should be stated that the German people should not be deprived of an approximation to its rightful aspirations by the inability of the Big Four to agree on the issue of over-all unity; instead we should realize German unity in the fields where it is attainable. With this general statement the U. S. should then propose an Economic Parliament for all of Germany elected by free universal suffrage under international control. This parliament should have competence in specific fields such as finance, customs, or whatever other spheres may be agreed to by the Big Four. The U. S. should further propose that the central sector of Berlin be neutralized by the withdrawal of all four occupation forces on the model of Vienna, and be declared the seat of the all-German Economic Parliament. The U. S. should further invite the USSR to join in establishing a fund to assist in the economic equalization of the two zones. Such a series of proposals would have the following advantages: (a) If the Soviets refuse it will take. the wind out of the sails of the German opposi- tion which claims that only rearmament stands in the way of German unity. In short, it would divorce the issue of German unity from that of German rearmament. (b) If the Soviets accept we will have established the principle of all-German free elections. The disparity in results between the controlled and the free elections would weaken the moral authority of the East German regime. (c) The Economic Parliament can in any case be only temporary and will by its very existence add another weight for the achieve- ment of political unity. Any educated German will remember that once before, in the nineteenth century, economic union pre- ceded political union. (d) It will be easier for the Soviets to accept an Economic Parliament than a pro- posal which is tantamount to a demand to dismantle the Pankov regime. By the same token, it will be more difficult for the USSR to refuse and will shift the onus for failure clearly on the USSR. (e) By establishing a free zone in the center of Berlin we will have added to the attraction of Berlin as a center of a unified Germany. It may be argued that by making such a pro- posal the U. S. admits the legal existence of the East German regime and its willingness to settle for something less than full political unity. But we can avoid this danger by making it clear that what is involved is not a parliament composed of delegations from the existing parliaments but growing out of free all-German elections. Moreover we would not be proposing the Economic Parliament as our last word on German unity but as the only attainable step in that direction. 3. For these reasons we should not accept a Soviet refusal of the Economic Parliament as final. Instead we should move to Stage 3 of our strategy and offer variations of the above plan, keeping the principle of free all-German elections in the forefront. One possible varia- tion on the proposal would be the assembly of an Advisory Parliament based on the same election modus as the Economic Parliament to deliberate on certain areas where laws can be equalized between East and West Germany. 4. If the USSR refuses to accept the prin- ciple of free elections for anlJ all-German body we should in Stage 4, upon consultation with the Bonn government, propose certain areas where laws between East and West Germany can be equalized. Specifically we should pro- pose an immediate end to all restrictions on the movement of persons between the two zones. This should be coordinated with the Bonn government so that the Bonn government will be able to time its announcement of its readi- ness to abolish these restrictions with the pro- posal made at the foreign ministers' meeting or before. It must be stressed that every stage of the above program should be advocated not as an end in itself but as a stop toward full political unity. If we fail to emerge with an intermedi- ary program we will surrender the pace of future negotiations to the USSR. They will not be satisfied with maintaining the status quo but dangle the carrot of German unity and East- West trade before the Federal Republic in return for leaving NATO. If on the other hand we announce a concrete program, Soviet con- cessions will appear as a result of U. S. pressure and any progress on the issue of German unity will strengthen the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 CONFIDENTIAL 1. THE PROBLEM What would be the character of a Soviet community which at some time in the future might play the role of a normal partner in a permanently peaceful world, without having had World Wax III? Soviet Evolution Originator: George Pettee Critics: Philip E. Mosely Stefan Possony Paper 17 prescribe courses of action for the U. S. con- sequent of rather than causative of Soviet developments. The choice of approach taken in this paper is not meant to imply rejection or exclusion of the other approach from consideration. What would be the nature political system? What is the present condition of the Soviet political system: a. As a state among states? b. As a parlei-staat? c. What factors favor development in the right direction? d. What factors favor the wrong direction? o. What can the U. S. do about it? The problem has been stated above so as to relate it to the issue of possible peace or prob- able war, rather than to formulate it as a purely predictive problem as to the actual evolution of Russia, It is assumed that only by defining a goal or a range of alternative goals, by considering the street of all factors except U, S. actions, and by further considering the degree to which U. S. actions by all means available may affect the outcome, can the question be formulated as an action problem. The alternative would be to con- eider the Soviet community as a closed system, predict its probable course of evolution and III. FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS The Soviet Union is politically organized as a sovereign state. Although dominated by the Russian com- munity, it is a very large state geographically and in population, and multilingual and multi- national in origin rather than a typical nation- state type. It is one of the two great powers which now possess the independent capability to wage major wars; whose interests are affected by developments in all parts of the world, and around which most other sovereign or quasi- sovereign states have coagulated in various forms of alliances. The Soviet system has a general culture which does not share many of the most significant ingredients of western culture (including re- spect for the individual, humanitarianism, and the tradition of law) for the simple reason that the historical development of western culture was not shared to any significant degree by the people concerned. The Soviet system is now politically organ- ized as a doctrinaire or partei-staat of police and totalitarian type, but in the fourth decade of its existence, a state of this type may be Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 182 SOVIET EVOLUTION subject to developments which do not occur in a shorter period. It may be assumed that the United States can influence the course of social and political evolution in the USSR through the presenta- tion of ideas and through the establishment of facts having meaning to the Soviet mind, as well as through actions presenting problems which the enemy cannot ignore. IV. DISCUSSION This discussion will be under the following heads: a. The USSR in the present world political system. b. The primary characteristics of the USSR as a community. c. Factors tending toward a favorable development. d. Factors tending toward an unfavorable development. c. Alternative forms of struggle. f. Possible U. S. courses of action. The USSR in the Present World Political System The present world political situation has evolved from that which existed before World War I. While world politics before World War I were in a constant state of dynamic evolution, the situation from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the opening of World War I in 1914 may be characterized as the nation-state system. As implied by books on the nature of nations and nationalism written in the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, the typical nation-state was a community having common language, a large degree of common traditions, a govern- ment enjoying full legal powers within definite territorial boundaries, and the capacity to conduct wars and to survive as an independent entity. The typical nation-state was France or Britain, taken in each case without their colonies or empires. Tendencies to rationalize and systematize the nation-state system had led to the unification of Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century and to the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands and Norway from Sweden. The predominance of European technology and power in comparison with the, rest of the world had led to the growth of the colonial empires of the major European powers, The tendency to identify nations on such "natural" characteristics as language and tradition and the tendency to build larger and larger economic commonwealths with the growth of technology carne into explosive con- flict in World War I. Imperialism has rapidly declined in the west since that time with the liberation of Ireland, the establishment of free Arab states, and the division of India into two independent states. At the same time, how- ever, it has continued as a major development on the Communist side with the elimination of several independent small states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) and the extension of Russian hegemony over many others, The relatively small nation-state was militarily, and therefore politically, viable as an inde- pendent entity in the period when military technique was dominated by the long bow or the musket. Serbia and Greece became in- dependent of Turkey when the political con- sciousness of their populations together with the military technique of the time and con- ditions made it too costly for the Turks to maintain their predominance. Other small states survived because of tacit agreement by large states that it was more convenient to keep the small ones independent as in the case of the Low Countries, but the critical fact setting the viability of a nation-state was its military viability under the prevailing con- ditions of military and logistic technology. In general, each such state had demonstrated its capacity to conduct war and to survive war with its neighbors, and the number of sovereign states in the world and their size and dis- tribution reflected these general conditions. World War II brought, or demonstrated, radical changes in the economic and teehno. logical basis of war, Only a very few states were able to participate in a fully self-governing sense because only a very few had the capability to produce the range and variety of weapons required for the conduct of war in the quan- tities essential for the maintenance of combat, and with the variety of trained military man- power required. The U. S. was, actually, the single power which conducted full scale war with all three types of forces: ground, sea, and air. The U. S. and the USSR are today the only communities which can play the role of pro- tagonist or antagonist in a truly major war. This is a reduction from approximately ten or a dozen states formerly regarded as "first-class powers" a generation ago. All others, including even Britian, can play a part in a major war only as the ally of one or the other of the two great powers. Other states which, like Bel- gium, could produce a complete weapons sys- tem for war as late as 1914 can independently produce only a small part of a weapons system today. The reduction in the number of states with full power to make war and to survive it from approximately sixty in 1910 or 1920 to two today has in some ways modified the nature of sovereignty. This is obvious as a limitation on the sovereignty of all states which have lost such a degree of independence. Obviously the relationship of each of the two major powers to the other and to the rest of the world of "sovereign" states is very seriously modified, and can modify both the content and the con- duct of all diplomacy, However, one major characteristic of the sovereign state remains. Both of the major powers are sociologically and politically independent decision-making entities of the old familiar type in that de- cisions on a course of action on problems which affect them both can be made only by agree- ment reached through processes of diplomacy or negotiation, or through independent actions likely to generate friction, or through war. The processes which ordinarily generate war between independent political communities are 183 fully operative in the USSR. They are ag- gravated by the intensification of all elements of interdependence in the modern world, economic and social, and by cultural and ideological disparity between the two great powers. On the basis of past political history, without taking notice of modern changes in basic condi- tions, war between the two present great powers could be predicted as inevitable. The two great powers in the world today are concerned with any minor struggle which can arise in the world. They are both capable of major war, but it is highly unlikely that both would survive another major war. They may be compared to Athens and Sparta as the two polar powers of the Hellenic world before the Peloponnesian Wars, or Rome and Carthage as polar powers in the Central Mediterranean before the Punic Wars. The Primary Characteristics of the USSR as a Community The USSR is first of all a state in the tradi- tional sense of the term. It should be noted that for a state in this sense, as for Germany, France, or Britain in the period 1648-1940, the occasional occurrence of war with its major neighbors is to be expected, The reduction of the political scale of the world until the USSR has only one major neighbor with whom to have a major war does not affect this. The polarity of the world between two great powers tends rather to aggravate it, since all minor tensions, as between the Arab States and Israel or between the Portuguese and India are of concern to the two major powers. On this ground it is important to recognize that the factors normally generative of war could be expected to operate even if Russia were not Communist. In the second place, Russia is a state of doctrinal police-partei-staat type. As such its decision-making processes are dominated by the adherents of a single doctrinal party, adherents deeply and thoroughly trained in the classics of Leninism-Stalinism, To the degree Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 184 SOVIET EVOLUTION that they think alike, they are as a group correspondingly less vulnerable to the impact of ideas foreign to their own doctrine than would be a multi-party or two-party system. Thirdly, the historical tradition of the communities which they govern is fundamen- tally non-European. The great evolution of western nationalism and of western humani- tarianism based on Christian and Hellenic origins, which occurred in Western Europe and America in the last few centuries, did not occur simultaneously or in the same form in Russia or China or most of the other Communist- dominated areas. Whether we refer to the concept of the gentle knight originated in the troubadour period in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Western Europe, the origin of the Red Cross, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, or the movements against child labor, we find historical records in the West. We find such records in Russia only in the form of superficial transplants. Many of the peoples of the world fail to recognize all "atrocity" or to share the western reaction to "cruelty" just as, if we bothered to recall it, our own pre-humanitarian ancestors would have failed to share such reactions. In simple terms, this means that the typical inhabitant of the non-western part of the world has far less acculturated feeling for the dignity of the individual, or abhorrence of cruelty, or faith in the value of justice. In more complex terms, it is reflected in the wedding of eastern ruthless- ness and philosophical doctrine analyzed by Shub as the essential characteristic in the evolution of Marxism into Leninism. In summary, we have to deal with a state which on all ordinary considerations might be expected to become involved in war rather than permanent peace, In addition, the situation is aggravated by the fact that it is a parlei- stoat, Further, the social and cultural condi- tions of the community which it governs aggra- vate the problem. It is the evolution of a community from such a starting position which we have to consider, There are some other important character- CONFIDENTIAL istics of the Soviet system. Although it does not share many elements of the western tradi- tion, in philosophy and ethics particularly, the Soviet Union is fully receptive to modern science. Technological progress, especially in weapons, threatens not only to equal but to surpass the United States. At the same tinro, the general productivity is still low, and by the same token, the standard of living is low. Because of this the burden of full scale arma- ments is felt as acutely by them, in spite of totalitarian organization and police methods, as by the West, and the high costs of rapid replacement of weapons cannot be accepted by them any more agreeably than by us. Factors Tending Toward a Favorable Development The first favorable factor lies in the age of the Soviet state. By inevitablo evolution, the for- mer type of professional revolutionary which dominated the top cadres of the Communist Party in the Soviet Government, during the first few decades of power has been rapidly re- placed by personnel of administrative-executive type. The personality structure of such indi- viduals cannot be the same as for the generation of Lenin anti Stalin. The relation of intellectual doctrine to emotional motivation is not the same. Fanaticism of a hide-bound type may remain, but it is more the fanaticism of the one-track mind than the fanaticism of otno- tional drive. This does not imply that euno- tional drives towards power for its own sake may not be present, nor that such drive may not be as dangerous as doctrinaire fanaticism. However, the type of actions that will be taken and the type of judgment exorcised may be considerably different in the one case from the other. The economic austerity which has been im- posed on the Russian people for four decades, since the Revolution promised them prosperity and plenty, is related to the second favorable factor. However low the present standard of living in Russia may be in housing, in consump- Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 CONFIDENTIAL SOVIET EVOLUTION tion goods, and in consumer's durable goods, the Russian people have had at least a taste and a smell of economic welfare. Judging by all human experience, the more they get the more they will want. Having never enjoyed the full prosperity of an economy free from heavy defense expenditures, the pressures for reduction of taxes or against increases of de- fense effort are doubtless far less vigorous than in the United States. However, many specific sectors of the Russian economy may demand a larger share in incon}e in practical ways which the state cannot deny. The gradual replace- ment of slave labor by wage labor, simply be- cause the former dies off, is a concrete case which they cannot avoid. The impact of education, including scientific education, upon all those elements in the Soviet society which enjoy such education is a third factor. We know that it is quite possible, unfortunately, to be both a scientist and a Communist. However, the police state or parlei-staai can hardly be compatible in the long run with the implied philosophic values of any scientific education. In the very long run, therefore, it may be expected that the educated elements in Russia will more and more pull in favor of the elements of democratic thought present in Marxist doctrine, and make it more and more difficult for the totalitarian system to continue its perversion of such elements. It remains, of course, quite uncertain as to how fast such a process will operate, and it would be only stupid optimism to expect demonstrable results in less than several decades on this alone. Fourthly, the Soviet Union cannot be immune to knowledge of the evolution of the non-Soviet world. If the United States proves that it is no longer subject to economic crises, that it is able to maintain continuous tochuo- logical advance, and that it is able to solve its own social and economic problems, the myth of capitalist collapse must itself collapse. If the free world is able to rearrange the political position of former colonial peoples, to develop systems both within such communities and between them and the rest of the free world so that they share in dynamically stable progress of the free world, the myth that capitalism is dependent on imperialism must also collapse. And if the free world is able to maintain a position of dynamically stable military strength, such that the Soviet Union never has an oppor- tunity to attack with the expectation of success and without the threat of direct attack upon the Soviet Union, the myth of the eventual, inevitable conflict must also collapse. Finally, Communism, even at its ruthless worst, is not a doctrine of uncalculating, emotional fanaticism. Communists never at- tack without expectation of success, and Marxism, with all its errors, is no bar to a reasonably realistic calculation of the chances in an immediate situation, They will not go out for war for its own sake, or seek martyrdom for its own sake, and it is a deeply established part of Communist doctrine not to do so. Factors Tending Toward an Unfavorable Development The normal tendencies to antagonism be- tween sovereign states, where such states have substantial interrelations and, therefore, inter- fore with the conditions of calculability for each other, are not directly affected by any decline in the strength of Communism. The substitution of men of executive type for doc- trinaires will not by itself assure, that men of such typo cannot be as nationalistic, and as inclined to war for national reasons, as the pre- Communist statesmen of any nation. The most dangerous condition of all is the general complex of factors which may provide them with opportunities to gain in relative power during the coming years. All gains, whether in weapons technology, in political weakening of the free world, in colonial civil wars, in reduction of free world arms defense effort, or in economic recessions, will tend to confirm their confidence and stimulate their motives to continue their drive to win the whole world. In the course of the last eight years of inten- sive cold war they were forced by the tactics they used, and by the free world's reactions to those tactics, to abandon or foreclose against themselves many of the opportunities on which they would otherwise rely for a high and con- tinuing yield of profit. The abandonment of the intensive cold war offers them the oppor- tunity to turn loose many factors not under direct Communist control ranging from Mor- roccan nationalism to the demands for greater welfare in many other areas, and pressures for tax reduction in the leading free world powers, which can work greatly to Communist ad- vantage and against which the free world has no present well-developed safeguards. The more they are encouraged by the results, the stronger their morale will be for continuing towards their major goals and the greater the likelihood of eventual war. This is it truism. Alternative Forms of Struggle Given that the time will certainly be long in years before evolutionary processes can change Russia into a genuine participant in an orderly and peaceful world, and assuming that it may, nevertheless, be possible to maintain a situation which will deter them from choosing major war throughout this period, the likelihood during most of this period is for alternative forms of struggle. The situation will be a more or less tense armed peace with more or less violence of limited character. The violence may be of no great military importance since it may include sporadic violence such as recent events in Morrocco, in which there is no such reinforce- ment of both sides as occurred in Korea and, therefore, no formal battles. The Communists may count upon a future economic depression in the free world to create such conditions that civil wars of various scale and intensity can become possible. They can count with assur- ance upon the fact that all cases of violence in which Communist initiative is absent or not apparent will cause severe strains in the system of alliance of the free world. The elimination of formal Communist aims and the turning of Communist efforts support of movements of local or n character throughout the free world, manner of the Popular Front period of 1f is the appropriate Communist tactic greatest difficulty which it will place free world is the difficulty of maintain identification of the enemy and, there] maintaining effort along all the lines ri to maintain a position of deterrent stren A resort to a Popular Front type of t fully compatible with the opening of Ri travel in a far greater degree than in years. It may be forgotten that Russia the first Five Year Plan, and again dur Popular Front period, was again open to travel and that Russians were able to international meetings of a cultural and fie type. There might be a very great of relaxation of present barriers without way exceeding the degree of relaxation such past periods. Possible U. S. Courses of Action The permanent avoidance of World I involves a maintenance of an effective di posture from now until the firm estabJi of such a degree of federalism in the we recourse to war on any serious scale w become impossible. The principle has been established in the conduct of Woi II in charges of crimes against the pet in the charter of the United Nation resort to violence is a criminal breach c This by itself implies, but only implies the drastic abolition of sovereignty of When it has been fulfilled as an i condition in the world community, t1 no longer be substantial national forces in most nations and the idea of to war will be as remote from the consid of the governments of states in the wo is from the consideration of state gove within the American union today. T not necessarily imply a world state, no necessarily imply any particular pal federalism known to us today. It certainly does imply the acceptance of legal decision- making processes for the solution of all problems and the elimination of war as a means of decision. In order to conduct the world from its present condition to such a future condition, a very considerable degree of leadership will be involved and required. The United States has already informally, as in Korea and in connec- tion with atomic energy for military purposes, accepted an assigned role as the nation primarily responsible for the conduct of world affairs toward such a goal. Thus far, however, the U. S. has done so rather tacitly than explicitly. The concept of leadership toward such a goal is an essential one. The U. S. can accept the position of paying most of the bills and pro- viding most of the armaments, and still have no clear answers to many of the problems of policy. The conduct of psychological warfare on the most serious scale offers many questions which remain unanswerable without some con- cept of the major goal. The grounds of policy cannot be simply to doter the enemy from war or from continued profit by aggression. There has to be an everlasting affirmation in action and in words to all the principles involved in the struggle. On many specific issues, there will be matters on which a government, particularly the gov- ernment of the United States, can deal only awkwardly partly because of differences in American opinion which make it impossible for the government to take a position, partly for sheer difficulties of decision-making in the gov- ornment. There are many matters on which the government cannot speak with an affirma- tive voice in the world. A great part of the basic foundations of western civilization are involved in such matters. It is a fact that these foundations of western civilization were created by the efforts of non-governmental groups. The prevention of cruelty to animals, women's suffrage, universal education, and many other concrete illustrations of our system were founded upon the intellectual effort of private persons followed up by the promotional efforts of private organizations and persons. The great body of philosophical and ethical principles and the great body of acquired cul- tural practices which we regard as the treasures of our civilization have to be spread through- out the three-quarters of humanity which does not now share it before the social foundations of a fhm world order will exist. These can be done far better in many of its aspects by private money and by private effort than by govern. mental agencies. The maintenance of an effective deterrent defensive position can be rationalized only as the means to victory in war or as the means of safeguarding the world during a transition period which will not last forever. Clarity about this second condition will permit all psychological warfare to be oriented around the positive principles implied and criticism of everything in the enemy system which contra- dicts these principles and of every enemy action not in accordance with them. The immediate and concrete measures which the United States should take in relation to the evolution of the enemy society are not separate or independent of those dealt with in connection with other specific issues. It is therefore felt appropriate to omit any such concrete sugges- tions from this paper other than the following: 1. The mobilization of a large-scale effort under private auspices for the promotion of the principles of western civilization through- out the world in applied form should be made a major instrument of American operations toward the winning of the cold war. 2. The maintenance of a fully effective military deterrent position is a prerequisite for all other American actions designed to affect the evolution of the enemy system and of the world system toward this stable order. 3. We must clearly formulate, analyze, and spell' out the concept of a transition period, starting from the present situation, to create a permanently orderly and peaceful world by the close of this century. This should be most emphatically a magnificent CONFIDENTIAL work project, requiring enormous effort, and ficial one, but involves the creation of a funda- in no way to be confused with Utopian gadg- mentally new political system in the world to etry. It must be kept everlastingly clear replace the nation-state system, and that the that it will not promise relief from sacrifice means are the realistic ones, creative work, for a long time to come. It must also be not wishful thinking. emphasized that the goal is in no way a super- Investigation of NATO 1. THE PROBLEM The problem is to investigate methods by which the NATO structure would be main- tained as a going concern and be stimulated to further growth and, perhaps, ultimately, to integration. II. ASSUMPTIONS It has been said that fear was the predomi- nant motivation for the creation of NATO. This theory is only partly true: twenty years ago oven a gigantic pressure of fear would have been inadequate to bring together the NATO nations in a venture of joint military security. NATO was possible because there are many ties outside military interests which unite the member nations. These ties, consciously felt only by the "elites" in the NATO nations, are as yet dimly understood. It is true, too, that these ties are still rather weak, All the same, they are developing, and in general the trend of the socio-political development points clearly toward ever greater mutuality and cooperation. It is conceivable however, that a true and lasting "easing of tensions" would slow down this process of "confederalization." If this slowdown is to be avoided, there are only two solutions: either to stimulate new and threat- ening international crises or to stimulate numer- tusin which the NATO nations join tax ventures in which the NATO nations join Paper 18 fields. If it should prove feasible to set up "joint ventures aiming at great common goals," the NATO structure no longer could be dis- solved and should be moving in the one and only general direction of confederalization or even integration.' Naturally, it is uncertain to what extent this expectation will be fulfilled. It is equally doubtful whether fear will cease to be an inte- grating (as well as disintegrating) factor-in fact, this is entirely improbable. However, it can be assumed safely that common efforts among the NATO nations would: a. Remove some of the consequences of a cooperation based exclusively on fear. b. Create a larger area of truly common interests and therefore act as an additional means of improving cohesion. In addition to the assumption that the stimulation of common ventures would help to cement and foster the emerging NATO community, it is assumed that: a. The creation of joint ventures is useful in all fields of public interest; b. These joint ventures must be well- prepared and be launched through a system- atic, step-by-step procedure; c. They must be of direct benefit to the populations of the NATO nations; d. The joint venture program is long-range in nature and will require ten to twenty years before it is in full operation. own I Both of these terms evoke false notions. It is o of f bringing purpose of their tha abbouut t a necessary to find other words to describe the getting mmateratriaiall self-interest and double e ther of the NATO nations. t f oge o community of effort in a maximum number of1S91 100 III. DISCUSSION Security Problems Before entering into a discussion of joint peaceful ventures, it is useful to stress that the military cooperation among the NATO nations also needs to become more intimate and more "natural." It is desirable to create various types of joint military organs through which further progress will be assured. Some ideas which could be considered are as follows: 1. The more nuclear technology becomes the basis of modern armaments, the more it will be necessary to associate the continental nations with atomic efforts. At the present moment there are many restrictions against closer atomic cooperation and it is undesirable to move too fast in this domain. Among other reasons, it is necessary to habituate the European military and civilians gradually to the new facts of life, and specifically to avoid paralyzing fears. It is recommended, however, that small weapons atomic tests be held in increasing numbers for the benefit of the NATO staffs and that some of these tests be set up outside of American territory, for example, in Atlantic waters or in certain areas of the continent. In particular, it is recommended that as soon as capabilities emerge, such tests be devoted to demonstrations of ground-to-air missiles with nuclear war-heads in order to show the potentialities of a truly modern air defense. 2. It has been pointed out before that the lack of a properly integrated and effective air defense system protecting the industries and major cities of the NATO nations is one of the greatest vulnerabilities of NATO. The Soviets will not fail to exploit this vulnerability through nuclear blackmail. It must be recognized that if the Soviets were successful in psychological warfare based on nuclear threats such a "non- military" attack could produce the do facto paralysis or even the disintegration of the NATO structure. On the other hand, there is no gainsaying the fact that. an effective air SECRET defense system will require considerable in- vestments which at the present time may be beyond available resources. It is this assump- tion concerning the financial and military "impracticability" of a NATO air defense system which has motivated the relative in- action in this field. However, it is self-evident that a military structure which cannot assure the security of its base will prove ineffective both as a deterrent and as a combat force. Moreover, there is some doubt about the validity of the assumptions underlying the present policy of inaction. For the time being- with missiles and atomic warheads not yet being available to the NATO nations-there is no reason to improvise a costly and perhaps inappropriate defense system. But it is be- lieved that some progress could be made if the NATO nations were to set up a scientific body modeled after the American RAND or ORO organizations to study the air defense problem of NATO and make suitable recommendations. 3. The present strategy of the NATO na- tions, as well as the utilization of modern technology by NATO has been, and continues to be, a matter of controversy. Continental nations are not happy with present Anglo- American thinking on two counts. They note that the territorial defense of "forward areas" (which happen to be the habitats of some of the most important member nations) is not properly assured. Moreover, these nations are expected to make the major effort in ground battle, while Britain and the United States reserve for themselves the naval and air mis- sions. Many continentals feel that the mili- tary "sacrifice" is unevenly distributed, with the Europeans expected to carry the main blood burden. The point is not that there is much choice in the present distribution of military roles. The point is rather that what- ever strategy is finally adopted, it should be the result of the best joint strategic thinking which the NATO nations can produce. NATO strategy should be made psychologically accept- able to all member nations through the device of having the best national specialists work out the most suitable solutions. a. It would be useful to increase the number of Advanced Military Study Groups and in particular to create groups which develop various alternate NATO strategies for the long-range future. Some of these study groups should operate from the United States and preoccupy themselves with the question of how continental nations can contribute to the security of the most important NATO "ar- senal," i. e. the U. S. It is necessary to de- stroy the notion that, militarily, NATO is a one-way street, with all the key strength flowing from the U. S. and none flowing back into this country. b. It furthermore would be advisable to enlarge the structure of military NATO col- logos in the double sense that additional col- logos should be created and that the number of officers attending courses should be increased. As to the addition of new colleges it is proposed that consideration be given to a NATO Indus- trial College,' to a school dealing with the problems arising from multi-national and multi-lingual forces, to a school developing knowledge and procedures about the gradual adaptation of national military organizations, and to a tactical air defense school. c. It is to be expected that these various schools will come up with new ideas. It is also to be expected that the validity of these ideas may not be determinable by merely theoretical or a priori considerations. Accord- ingly, it is suggested that there be formed several types of experimental units which, in collaboration with these schools, test the sug- 2 A NATO Technological College would be a "nat- ural'' parallel institution. It would allow the highly desirable utilization of European technical manpower, the creation of additional technicians, and the recruit- ment of qualified personnel into the military and tech- nical structure of NATO. The fun utilization of toohnioal manpower throughout NATO ultimately will be dependent upon the establishment of a NATO- wide security-clearance system. The development of such a system is recommended. gested solutions and moreover bring together in joint and future-oriented field ventures (as distinguished from joint staff planning) officers from all the member nations. d. In addition to these new NATO schools, ever greater emphasis should be given to the potentialities of exchange officers. Large num- hers of officers-including, most importantly, reserve officers-should be assigned for tours of duty with military units in other countries, partly as students and instructors in military schools, partly as liaison officers and observers, and partly (wherever practical) as integrated officers. e. Similar efforts should be made with pro- fessional NCO's, including an enlargement of exchanges between N. C. schools. f. Outside such regular duty assignments, a major effort should be made to encourage travel by military personnel and civilians in the military service throughout all NATO countries. Convenient transport and credit arrangements should be developed for this purpose, and clubs and other facilities for social intercourse should be formed. g. To the extent that additional security systems such as SEATO come to life, contacts between these organizations should be in- tensified. Peaceful Collaboration Programs should be undertaken in four broad areas: joint studies, joint ventures, gradual and mutual adaptation, and reporting organs. Joint Studies While many joint ventures could be im- provised without delay, it must be recognized that the concrete problems of the various NATO nations and more particularly of their interrelationships are as yet poorly under- stood. There is an urgent and overriding need for major efforts at fact finding and documentation as well as for joint training and SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4 education. The following suggestions should be given consideration. Research Institute on NATO Political In- stitutions. The function of this institute would be to identify and analyze pertinent facts concerning the political institutions in the various NATO countries, government pro- cedures, and political problems, with a view to determining: 1. The best methods through which de- cisions can be made collectively by all member states. 2. The legal, institutional and political obstacles delaying or precluding joint actions. 3. In a broader sense, the compatibilities and incompatibilities of the various political systems and the possibilities for the har- monization" of political institutions within the NATO area. 4. The need for the creation of new organs of joint decision making. This Institute should have nationals of all NATO states among its working members, including first-class and creative scientists able to synthesize the information in order to pro- pose novel solutions which would be beneficial everywhere. In other words, emphasis should not be placed on the mere modification of existing institutions, but on the stimulation of political and institutional progress. An Institute for the Study of NATO Legal Problems. This institute would have to survey existing legal systems and economic legislation, their similarities and dissimilarities as well as their mutual compatibilities and imcompati- bilities. It should evaluate the sufficiency of these systems, analyze the validity and per- tinence of current laws, and determine the numerous laws which have become invalid but have not been repealed. On these studies, it should base recommendations concerning the joint and mutual reforms of the NATO legal systems. A NATO Medical Institute. To survey existing health programs, health legislation, and medical education. A NATO Resources Institute. This institute would make studies in the field of natural resources within the NATO area, analyze the technology of resource exploitation, and rec- ommend the most advantageous and mutual exploitation of various types of natural wealth. Conservation within the NATO area would be one of the topics to be dealt with by this institute. There are a number of other economic institutes which could and should be created, to deal with most of the significant economic problems such as wages, taxes, finances, internal and external trade, productivity, social legis- lation, manpower training and mobility, etc. Closer economic cooperation cannot be achieved so long as there are major differences in wage levels, tax structure and systems, social legislation, etc. However, before these differences can be adjusted-and this is possible, if at all, only over the long pull-they and their causes must be identified and their effectiveness evaluated. A great deal of work needs to be done in this area. Universities. The curricula of continental universities are in many respects out of date and do not reflect either the findings of political science or, more particularly, the specific problems of NATO. An effort should be made to establish throughout the NATO university structure, additional courses on pertinent sub- jects, including international relations, NATO economics, intra-NATO cooperation, etc., and to teach the political and social sciences in all the universities in a really up-to-date fashion. Moreover, a major exchange program should be undertaken in some of the more obvious fields, such as linguistics and history. As a general rule the history and language of a particular nation should be taught in all universities by natives from that country. In addition, there should be several mandatory courses which are to be taught in one or the other of the more important NATO languages. Seminars par- SECRET INVESTIGATION OP NATO ticipated in by students and professors from other NATO countries and a growing scope of international scientific conferences would be useful. There should be an attempt to coordinate academic requirements and to out many of the bureaucratic obstacles which at present mili- tate against study in foreign countries, such as loss of credits, non-accreditation of academic titles, etc. There are many subject areas of great im- portance to the NATO problem which should be approached through systematic study and instruction. Reference has been made above to the usefulness of an Industrial College within the NATO military structure. Within the civilian context, there would be an urgent nt need for an Administrative College, to attended by public administrators from all member countries as well as by students ho seek administrative careers. One by-product of such a college would be that the clearly objective administrative practices of the various countries will be analyzed properly, permitting the expectation that sooner or later adminis- trative reforms will take place. Again, this Administrative college could be broken down into its various component parts such as municipal administration, inter-regional ad- ministration, the administration of finances, etc. NATO Consideration should be given eh colleges Teachers College, or a group of s ll eges neu~