STATEMENT OF DCI TO USIB ON ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 129
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: STATEMENT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
A. Statement of DCI to USIB on Establishment of W67rlcmg Group.
. B.
CIA Organization.
(Reorganization charts. )
1.
Memo to Mr. McCone from L. B. Kirkpatrick, dated
7 November 1961, subj: Organization of CIA.
2.
Memorandum for the Record from L. B. Kirkpatrick,
dated 22 January 1962, subj: Discussion by the Working
Group with Mr. McCone, Tuesday evening, 16 Jan 62.
3.
Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from
dated
13 February 1962, subj: Views Regarding-the Organization
of the CIA and its Relation to the Intelligence Community.
Plus four unsigned memos to dates and
subjects as follows: 30 Jan 6Z, Organization of CIA in
relation to Intelligence Community; 27 Dec 61, Suggestions
for Reorganization of CIA Clandestine Services; 30 Jan 62,
Thoughts on Reorganization of the Intelligence Community
and CIA; 5 Feb 62, Organization and Functioning of CIA.
4. Memo for the Record from L. B. Kirkpatrick, dated 26
February 1962, subj: Meeting with Bureau of the Budget
on Agency Reorganization Plans.
5. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from DCI, dated 14 February 62,
subj: Requesting copy of present organization chart, revised
chart and record of existing key executives.
6. Memo to DCI from L. B. Kirkpatrick, dated 22 March 1962,
subj: Allocation of Responsibilities in the DCI's Office, (2).
7. Operation of the Office of the DCI, Staffing Complement of
Office of DCI, plus chart of Office of DCI organization.
8. Summary of Working Group Comments on DCI's Office.
it it if " " on Offices Reporting
to the DCI. Army, Navy, USAF, DOE and DOS
D. Coordination.
review(s) completed.
10. Memorandum to DD/R from dated 16 March 62, 25X1
subj: External Research. -a s 6k. (. S
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
11. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from John Bross, dated 8 February
1962, subj: Org ization of the Office of the DDP, plus chart.
e `~- 5 w ct
12. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from DCI, dated 14 February 1962,
announcing DCI's intention to appoint Mr. Helms as DD/P.
13. Memo to DD/P, DD/I, DD/S & IG from DCI, dated 16 February
1962, subject: Reappointment of Mr. Bissell as Acting Chief
of DPD for two weeks.
14. Memo to General Schuyler and Mr. Coyne from L. B. Kirk-
patrick
subj: DD/P or
anization:
dated 26 Februar
1962
,
,
g
y
Suggestions by Lloyd George, plus chart. !a ~- } ~~ bs
16. Summary of Working Group Comments on Deputy Director/Plans.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
40 Q, B ?
L. Deputy Director (Intelligence) -- Summary of Working Group
Comments on DD/I Area.
Z3. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from Chester Cooper, dated
9 January 1962, subj: Estimate Programming.
24. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from Abbot Smith and Chester
Cooper, dated 9 January 1962, subj: The Relationship of
O/NE to the DCI.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
'16 41 !1 -0
1
25. Memo to Mr. Kirkpatrick's Committee from Sherman Kent,
dated 29 January 1962, subj: ONE and the Preparation of
Military Estimates.
26. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from Chester Cooper, dated
8 February 1962, subj: Responding to your Query on
Merging OCI and ONE; plus attachment of three suggested
versions on organization.
27. Memo for L. B. Kirkpatrick from Sherman Kent, dated
9 March 1962, subj: Exchange of Personnel Between O/CI
and O/NE.
28. List of officers in ONE, plus organization and recommenda-
tions, undated. - 'a- s ~ -
29. Memo to the DCI from L. B. Kirkpatrick, dated 27 Jan 62
subj: Special Organization Scientific and Technical Intelligence.
30. Memo to DCI from Mr. Amory, dated 19 March 1962, subj:
The Proper Location of OSI.
31. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from Richard Helms, dated
21 February 62, subj: Organizations Used in Agency S & T
Effort, plus attachments: list of organization, Current
DPD contracts. - (L~ ` D a (~ aw.~-~ ~S~
R. Deputy 'Director (Research)
32. Memo to DCI thru DD/I from Dr. Scoville, dated 10 Jan 62,
subj: Missile and Space Intelligence Management. -
33. Memo to DCI from Mr. Amory, dated 17 January 62, subj:
Missile and Space Intelligence Management; w/cy of
Dr. Scoville's memo dated 10 Jan 621 same subj, addressed
to DCI thru DD/I.
34. Summary of Working Group Comments on DD/R.
35. Memo to DCI from DD/R, undated, subj: Activities of DD/R.
- 4 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
S. Deputy Director (SUpport)
36. Memo to
from dated 26 Feb 62,
re- C)ff;ra of Para-nn1 support to andestine Services
p
37. Memo to Chairman of Reorganization Committee from L. K.
White, dated 1 March 62, subj: Organization of Support to
the Clandestine Services.
38. Summary of Working Group Comments on Deputy Director/
Support.
T. Comptroller
39. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from Col. White, dtd 15 Jan 62,
subj: Budgetary Procedure and Accounting Controls, plus
attachment of original copy of memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from
E. Saunders, dtd 13 Jan 62, subj: Budgetary Procedure and
Accounting Controls.
40. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from I Idtd 14 Feb 62,
subj: Agency Planning Policy & Financial Review, plus attach-
ments (a) Policy Review Committee, and (b) Budget and
Financial Advisory Committee.
U. Security -- Memo for the Record from D/Security, dtd 12 March 62,.
subj: Proposed Plan for "Special Security Control Center".
V. e: Establishment of Working Group. a Sb 114 N
re: Mr. Bissell as DD/P.
re: Creation of DD/R & appt. of Dr. Scoville.
re: IG as separate component, OGC to O/DCI.
re: DDCI delegation of authority.
re: appointment of Bross as Comptroller.
e: appointment of Gen. Carter as DDCI.
re: Mr. Sheldon designed as A/DDI.
W. Bureau of the Budget
41. Memo for the record, dtd 20 Feb 62, from re. 25X1
DCI luncheon with Bell and Staats of BoB discussing reorganization
of Agency.
42. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from DCI, dated 14 Feb 62, re: LBK
or Coyne requested to comment to Mr. Macy of BoB on re-
organization of Agency.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
X. State Department
?
43. Memo for L. B. Kirkpatrick from dated
2 March 62; subj: Administration of the Foreign Service.
44. Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick from Roger Hilsman, State
Dept., dated 16 February 62, subj: INR Proposal for Cold
War Survey, plus attachment copy of memo to USIB from
Dept. of State, dated 25 July 61, subj: Early Warning of
"Cold War" Crisis Situations.
Z. SAC -- Memo for the Record from L. B. Kirkpatrick, dated
30 January 62, subj: Briefing at SAC, Tuesday, January 23.
Working Group Briefing Notes.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
6
S1-AT
14
P WO. ::INC GROU
With the a~roval of the President I ha-we estabiishecx a grooms to work
o the # C
l
+i ix4M x. e
atiVnahL to o ante1IAgence
craxs: xmunitY, the organization Of the intelligence t:omai d.xecuti -e secretary of the President's ~"orei ,n Inteaili.gence Auvisory Board,
has been .made available to work on this matter on a part-tine basis.
This group will wish to discuss matters will: representative of the
varlou,4 deiart xkctits and agencies. Further, .ii any of you have any a-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
~:r:;eSri. O a/CI 'J.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
care. to ca'.il to their attention that woaid serve to l x- prw a the ca
intelligence effort, I wish you wou t+ get in tQUel+ with h r. '`f-irltpatrick.
Z would appreciate your giving thern your ZAIl cooperation.:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The IG's office has asked that this
paper be held strictly to Mr. McCone,
to you, and to me.
mfb
11/13/61
(DATE)
FORM Io ' WHICH MAY BE ED.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
7 November 1961
Memorandum For Mr. Mc Cone
Subject: Organization of CIA
1. This memorandum is on the subject which we discussed
October Z7 regarding the relative emphasis placed by the clandestine
services on covert action versus espionage and counterespionage. You
will recall that I suggested that the overemphasis on covert action, or
lack of emphasis on clandestine intelligence, whichever it may e, could
be corrected-by executive action rather than an organizational change
such as placing the responsibility for covert action in a separate component
such as we once had. The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend
to you an organizational realignment by which the appropriate executive
direction can be established to achieve the proper emphasis on clandestine
intelligence and on covert action. Because this subject bears directly on
the entire organization of the Agency, I have presumed to present a plan
to reorganize the Agency to achieve objectives which I consider vital to
good management.
2. The present organization of CIA divides the Agency into three
Deputies areas with each Deputy reporting directly to the Director. This
illustration shows the organization indicating the number of major units
under each Deputy and the percentage of employees in the Deputies areas
assigned to each.
Director Executive
Inspector Officer
General Deputy Director
ssistant for
Coordination
25X1
F
Deputy Director Deputy Director Deputy Director
for for for
Intelligence Plans Support
Personnel-
Components
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
This organization, in my opinion, has the following major deficiencies:
a. It has reduced the span of the command of the DCI to too
narrow a base -- actually three units inasmuch as the Inspector General,
Executive Officer and Coordinator are staff officers.
b. It has decentralized the organization and delegated authority
to a dangerous degree with the resultant loss of control by the Director.
c. It has resulted in the creation of what are practically three
independent organizations within CIA, which while bound together by a
common set of rules and regulations, nevertheless follow differing policies
on such fundamental matters as promotions, overtime, housing and enter-
tainment al owance pu -~`icaions, etc.
d. It has resulted in internal staffs in each Deputy's area many
of which are duplicative and excessive echelons. It has also resulted in
an excessive number of support personnel throughout the Agency.
e. It has resulted in the creation of loyalties to individual
components and Directorates rather than to the Agency. Our present
Career Service system is administered on the basis of a series of asso-
ciated career services and not as a CIA service.
3. The CIA three-deputy system possibly could be made effective.
As you know, the President's Board of Consultants on two occasions recom-
mended the creation of an Executive Director or Chief of Staff in the Agency.
These recommendations were directed at freeing the DCI and DDC~? for
greater effort in the field of inter-agency coordination, and also at improving
management in the Agency. You are familiar with the work of such an office
which would be comparable to the General Manager in the AEC. Such an
officer could contribute greatly to the management of CIA either under the
three-deputy system or the organization I prepose below.
4. The suggested organization of the Agency would abolish the
present three-deputy system and in its place establish nine assistant
directorates each reporting directly to the Director. As arranged on the
chart below, this organization would in effect have three Assistant Directors
over the components now assigned to each of the Deputy Directors.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Inspector
General
Asst. Director
Personnel
Affair s
Personnel
Training
Security
Medical
Asst. Director
Support
General Counsel
Legislative Relations
Historical Staff
Logistics
Communications
Asst. Dir. Asst. Dir.
Espionage Counter -
e spionage
Asst. Dir.
L overt Action
Coordinator
Comptroller
Budget & Finance
Audit Staff
Management Staff
Asst. Dir.
National
stimate s
ONE
OCI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Asst. Director
Research
ORR
O5I
OBI
NPIC
Asst. Dir. for
Intelligence
Support
OCR
FDD
FBID
 :- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
a. The Assistant Director for Personnel Affairs would take
over the responsibility for the present Personnel, Training, Security
and Medical Offices. This would raise the level of the management of
personnel affairs in the Agency and would group in one organization all
of those offices directly concerned with personnel matters. It would
allow a single voice to speak for personnel matters, something that is
not true in the present organization. This Assistant Director should be
given considerable authority over all personnel actions.
b. The Assistant Director for Support would be concerned
primarily with the management of the Logistics and Communications
Offices. In addition, this Assistant Director would have the General
Counsel, Legislative Relations and the Historical Staff. While it could
be argued that the General Counsel should be put on a higher echelon,
the simple facts are that the General Counsel of this Agency has no
activities comparable to those of the general counsels of other depart-
ments and agencies.
c. Comptroller. This individual would be the Comptroller
in the true sense of the word and would have .the financial responsibilities
of the Agency under his jurisdiction just as the comptroller of a major
corporation would have. The office in the Agency which today is called
Comptroller is misnamed. This is simply a budget and finance office
j+~ and has none of the traditional authorities associated with a comptroller.
Under the new organization, the Comptroller would have the
present office
known as Comptroller which should be renamed Budget and Finance, the
Audit Staff and a new and revitalized Management Staff.
d. The fourth major component would be the Assistant Director
for Research who would have under him the Office of Research and Reports,
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Basic Intelligence and the
National Photographic Intelligence Center. All of these are research organi-
zations and have considerable in common.
e. The Assistant Director for National Estimates would have
under him the Office of National Estimates and the Office of Current
Intelligence as presently constituted. These offices should be merged
as presently the Office of Current Intelligence is engaged in making spot
estimates and should be under the direct control of the Assistant Director
for National Estimates. It is possible that such a merger could effect
j manpower savings.
- 3 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
f. Assistant Director for Intelligence Support would encompass
the present Office of Central Reference, Foreign Documents Division and
Foreign Broadcast Information Division. This results in the elimination
of the present Office of Operations which would lose its third division --
the Contact Division, which should become the Domestic Division in what
is presently known as the Clandestine Services.
g. In place of the present DD/P, three Assistant Directors
would be created. One each for Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert
Action. The Assistant Director for Espionage would have his immediate
staff, the present Foreign Intelligence Staff
The
Assistant Director for Counterespionage would have in his immediate
staff the present Counter Intelligence Staff. The Assistant Director for
Covert Action would have the current Covert Action Staff in his immediate
office. These three Assistant Directors would have under them the present
area divisions of the DD/P. The allocation of relative responsibilities to
the area divisions would be done by these three Assistant Directors working
together and under the direct guidance of the DCI and the Executive Director.
h. Above all of the Assistant Directors and in the chain of com-
mand to the Director would be an Executive Director whose primary responsi-
bility would be the internal management of the Agency on behalf of the
Director.
them.
5. The proposed organization, in my opinion, has several major
advantages over the present one to commend it. By creating three Assistant
Directors over the Clandestine Services a better system of checks and
balances is established to insure the proper emphasis of espionage, counter-
espionage and covert action. This will also provide a more objective measure-
ment of covert action by having an Assistant Director for Espionage who will
not be directly involved in mounting operations in the covert action field and
who thus would be more likely to issue warnings when he was concerned that
the intelligence did not indicate the desirability of a proposed action. But
in addition to this check and balance, I would also propose that an examina-
tion be made for more realistic appraisal of clandestine intelligence possibly
under the Assistant Director for National Estimates.
6. The above has been presented for your consideration. If you wish
more detail, additional or different proposals, I will be pleased to nr -n-- e
yman r pa ric
Inspector General
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
IS.
22 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion by the Working Group with Mr. McCone,
Tuesday evening, 16 January 1962
1. We advised the DCI that these were some of the tentative con-
clusions which we had reached, but that we had not quite concluded our
work on the DD/I and thought it important to see some other agencies
before we definitely made recommendations particularly on the subject
of estimates and current intelligence. (The following is the approximate
order in which we presented these conclusions to the DCI. )
a. We are seriously concerned about the caliber of personnel
in key positions in the DD/I and the obvious lack of leadership in key spots.
General Schuyler emphasized that he was "shocked" at finding how little
impact the DD/I made on his offices, stressing the fact that this was not
in any way a reflection on Mr. Amory personally. He noted that each of
the offices seemed to be particularly a self-contained entity.
b. We said we felt quite strongly that the Board of Estimates
should be strengthened and that it needed a strong economist, a good
scientist, better military men and perhaps individuals from business.
c. We said that until we looked at the whole organization we
would hesitate to move ONE or any other part of the DD/I's office to the
DCI.
d. We urged a better system for controlling the production of
national estimates particularly as to scheduling and limiting the number.
We said that we felt the effort of the Board of Estimates had been dissi-
pated. We noted that the weekly Cold War Crisis Survey was probably a
good vehicle for doing some of the work that was currently being done
with memoranda and with SNIE's.
e. We stated that we were seriously concerned about raw
intelligence going to the White House. This evoked a rather lengthy
discussion on where intelligence originated that currently goes to the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
White House and on how we could effectively channelize this in order
to give the DCI control.
f. We urged that the White House briefing officer be in the
DCI's office and that the DCI should be kept informed of everything going
to the White House, everything said in briefings, and every question
raised by the White House on which CIA was asked to reply.
g. We expressed grave concern as to whether the Watch
Committee and NIC could do the job that it was expected to do. We
said we had not yet finished our look at this but thought that some very
important measures should be taken.
h. We expressed some reservation about the
with General Schuyler and myself saying it had beneficial public
relations aspects but probably not much in the way of substance. Mr. Coyne
was very negative, feeling that people who were not entitled to receive
intelligence would obtain it in this fashion.
i. We said that we thought there should be separated out from
the DD/I all activities that are not intelligence correlation or evaluation.
1. We urged that senior Agency officials stay out of the policy
making field. The DCI asked what we had in mind and I explained that
we had particularly in mind the Tuesday luncheon meeting attended by
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Amory and Bis sell and noted the tendency for them to volunteer policy
information. The DCI was apparently unaware of this meeting but made
the comment that it might be valuable for them to attend provided they
kept their mouths shut.
m. We urged the DCI to have a regular weekly meeting with
the President to keep him informed of Agency activities.
n. We urged a regular briefing at each NSC meeting noting
that this had been dropped after Cuba but stressing that it was important
for the policy makers to hear from the DCI.
o. In conclusion we said that we were gravely concerned about
the extent to which the DCI could turn over the running of the Agency to a
deputy. We felt that this had inherently so many problems that any dele-
gation of authority would have to proceed most cautiously. The DCI said
he agreed and that this was one of the matters which he hoped we would
study most carefully.
2. The DCI then asked when we planned to get to the DD/S area, and
I told him it would be last. He said he was very dissatisfied with what he
had seen of the DD/S area. He particularly was unhappy about Personnel
to whom he had referred about a dozen people, none of whom were ac-
ceptable. We discussed the DD/S area briefly and I noted that I thought
Personnel was poor; that there was a wholesale housecleaning necessary,
and that we had a great deal of duplicative support.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
LBK/jrc
Orig - LBK Notebook
1 - CVRS Notebook
1 - JPC Notebook
- 3 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Direceerr' of Central Intell;ar-nr.I
LBKirkfa trick
28 Feb 62
(DATE)
D N REPLACES FORM 10-101
54 lvI WHICH MAY BE
1 AUG USED.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 r Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
26 February 1962
SUBJECT: Meeting with Bureau of the Budget on Agency Reorganization
Plans, Friday, 23 February 1962, 11 a. m. -- 12:30 p.m.
1. At the DCI's instructions I called Robert Macy to advise him
that Mr. McCone had mentioned some of the reorganization plans to
Mr. David Bell and had asked me to brief him on them. Mr. Macy
advised that he had already left BOB for AID and suggested that I call
and brief Irving Lewis. The briefing was set up for Friday, the 23rd.
In addition to Mr. Lewis, who is Acting Chief of the International Divi-
sion, Mr. Kenneth Hansen, Assistant to the Director of the Budget,
was present as well as Frank Ecker and Don Swan from the Inter-
national Division. Mr. Coyne sat in on the briefing and on a few
occasions made some comments.
2. In the approximately one and one-half hours that I was there,
I went from the top of the organization through all of the presently con-
templated changes which have been discussed with the DCI and com-
mented briefly on each and the reasons why we believe the changes to
be in order. In summary these included in the DD/I area the possible
combination of ONE and OCI into one office; the breaking up of 00 to
use the Contact Division as a nucleus for a Domestic Division in the
DD/P with the Foreign Documents Division and the Foreign Broadcast
Division remaining in the DD/I area. In the DD/P I mentioned that
we proposed the combination of the staffs into a central staff system
of rather decreased strength under the present numbers; the creation
of a paramilitary office; the drop-
ping of the third man in the DD /P front office; and the possible com-
bination of some of the area divisions. I advised of the establishment
of a Deputy Director for Research and Development who would take
over portions of the DPD and TSD units from the DD/P plus other
R&D activities as yet not firmly decided upon. I noted that the
in the DD/P and that perhaps some TSD elements would remain in
the DD/P although I likened their operation support work and its
introduction into the DD/P to aircraft delivery in which company test
pilots take the vehicles to the users and train the user pilots. In the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 r~rf-nn i- ?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
DD/S area I noted that the Comptroller would become independent
and report directly to the DCI; the Audit Staff would become part
of the Inspector General Staff, although maintaining a separate and
independent function in the audit and management analysis field; that
the General Counsel would become an independent staff; and that we
were still studying very carefully the whole interrelationship between
the support offices and the support elements in the DD/P inasmuch as
we thought a better organization could result in some considerable man-
power savings. Finally, I mentioned the Coordination role and the fact
that we thought the present system, which was in effect an inter-agency
committee, was not effective and that what we needed was a small group
of top professionals who could identify the coordination areas, could
get the heads of the components together and urge them to coordinate,
would keep the DCI apprised and when needed would get the DCI to take
the action to achieve the required coordination.
3. The representatives of BOB were particularly interested in
where the "evaluation functions" would reside and were advised that
this would be in the Inspector General--Audit Staff, as part of the
Comptroller function, in the DD/P's immediate office and in his senior'
staff system, and that we had not yet gotten to but were thinking about
a senior planning and policy staff reporting to the Director. There was
also interest in the Automatic Data Processing Staff and where this
would fit into the Agency as well as the fact that the Agency should
move into this field aggressively and straighten out its own house before
the other agencies created their own systems which might be incom-
patible with ours. There was also discussion as to whether these changes
would result in a decrease in the number of personnel and also whether
there would be a weeding out of some high level personnel who are no
longer as effective as they should be, and what could be done about
more senior CIA officers being transferred to agencies like State and
AID. Kenneth Hansen was particularly outspoken on this subject and
mentioned that he had put forward the name of n at least
three occasions for ambassadorial posts. I note that CIA was not
in a very good position to tell other agencies that we had good men
who could perform top jobs, and that if BOB felt strongly on this sub-
ject they should take the initiative.
4. It was my general impression that the BOB representatives
looked favorably upon our plans and felt that we were making some
very definite moves for improvement.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
cc: DCI _fLyman B. Kirkpatrick
DD/S
Comptroller 11: ~'~
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
February 14, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick
(a) Copy of our present organization chart in reasonable
size, and including thereon the names. of all Division and Section
Chiefs, and the employees in the home office and foreign, in each
Division or Section.
(b) Copy of the revised chart which we discussed the
other evening, modified to incorporate subsequent developments.
(c) Separate record in the form already in existence of
20 or 25 key executives.
John A. McCone
Director
cc: General Schuyler
Mr. Coyne
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0400010002-4
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI' J
Attached are the DCI's and your copies of a
memorandum on allocation of responsibilities
between the DCI, I DCI and the Executive Director.
I am sure the DCI will want your views on this.
which you may prefer to give orally rather than
forwarding the attached.
LBKirk-patrick
2( March 1.962
(DATE)
FORM 54 NO. 101 WHICH REPLACES MAY FORM 10.101
BE USED.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
r C' . Aft A&
MEMORANDUI1 FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
3U EJECT
Allocation of Responsibilities in DCI's
Office
1. Attached are three listings in which I have attempted to
lay down the division of labor in the DCI's office between the 1XI,
the DDCI and his Executive Director. In preparing these I have
endeavored to insure that the DDCI would be in a position to back-
stop the DCI on. those matters of national or interdepartmental con-
cern, and that the Executive Director would be in a position to back-
stop the DDCI in his role as chief executive and general manager of
the CIA. .Further, I have attempted to insure that there be a clear
delineation of responsibility so that officers in the Agency will be
able to approach one of the top officers of the Agency in order to
obtain a decision. The purpose of this memorandum is to spell
out the reasoning behind certain of these items which were not
already established in the DCI's office.
Z. The Agency Financial policy Committee will be spelled
out in the notice under preparation on the responsibilities of the
Comptroller. As indicatea by the DCI this will become a primary
management tool for governing the Agency's financial activities.
3. The professional personnel of the Agency constitutes its
single, most valuable asset. Yet one of the areas in which the Agency
has been weakest over the years has been in the field of personnel
management. As noted later in this memora.ndim our present per-
sonnel policy is implemented in many fashions. Today the Agency
has a 3uper Grade Board, chaired by the DDCI, a Career Council
chaired. by the Director of t'ersonnel and supposedly a Career
Development Board, although the latter has never functioned. In
order to establish a single personnel policy and see that it is imple-
mented, I believe most strongly there should an Agency personnel
'board chaired by the DDCI combining all of the functions of the above
and seeing that the proper -policy is created and executed. In our
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
4 March 1962
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
peculiar system, with four deputies directing activities in broadly
diverse fields, a director of person el under one of the deputies
camaet perform much more than processing activities. Consequertlyr,
anagement needs top level attention.
3. Senior assignments throughout the Agency are geeneerally
approved by the DDCI or TCI.
S. The Agency produces approximately 191 serial publications.
tip to the present the Inspector General has been chairing the Agency
Publications ward with responsibifitles to insure that no unnecessary
publications are issued, that they adhere to correct format. and that
they are properly coordinated. This should be brought to the DCl's
office.
. 'here is important need for an operational review board to
meet regularly. I would suggest weekly, at which a systematised Pre-
sentaetion on current activities. in sensitive fields should be made for
the information of the DDCI. This is not dome today and the )Cl and
DL CI are kept informed only by informal briefings and notations
7. Other Items listed under the Executive Director such as
review of Agency regulations, middle aeaanagam ent assignn
external contracts and travel plans aro all in the area of housokeop-
ing. The periodic review of security pr; ublereas is a continuation of
an activity. conducted previously by the #DCI and the Inspector General
jointly who met with the heads of the Security office at least semi-
annually and reviewed all border4ine security cases. I strongly
believe this should be continued as we have several rather important
matters in this field.
8. Finally, the daily staff meetings of the Executive Director
with the Assistants to the DCI and DI CI a nd the Chief of the Secre-
tariat are vital in keeping the propaetr flow of papers in the DM's
office and properly coordinating its activities, in order not to place
an undue burden on the Agency.
9. In addition to all of the above, there are so=* areas where
I don't believe office chiefs. or even line deputies, will be able to
solve problems of considerable consequence to CIA -- and in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
are geeneraixy Of :gency?wide or oven govern!nent.widee interest, on
which strong and often directly o aixasite views are held, both hater-
sally and externally, and and which have began , allowed to drift along un-
solved for years while the differing views beecaarue noire and more
solidly entrenched and develop supporting constituencies. In all
of these areas 1 submit that the CA should have taken aggressive
irx leadership. Example* arw
ltequireeneents: In simplest terms, a requirement is a dernand
for colitdction of infoM&tioa on a specific subject. The 3oint Study
Croup report highlighted the fact that requirements acs.-a uncoordinated
(even in CIA 40 per cent of them short-circuit the established systemx
and that the many volumes of requirements represent great expendi-
tures in manpow,r for limited reterus. If we range Agency procure-
ment of supplies and equipment the same way, we would be bankrupt
In
yeas. Strong leadership from the DDJI's office is needed.
Auto ati_aal: In the Agency we have three differing programs
for automation in the three areas. areas. There are many more in other
agencies, some incompatible with CIA's. The Automatic Data
:Vrocossing Staff is a catalyst, but has to negotiate, rather than
ct. Direction Is needed from the DCI's office.
.i eerssoaneel: There are basically three different sots of peer-
sonuel policies in the Agency, e. g., OCI pays overtime to prafees.
sionaals to grade CS-15, 1)1)/P pays no overtime to professionals
and expects thwn to work even longer hours that these in OCI; 1)1) I
and DD/: assign good officers to all-Agency activities such as the
Office of Training and the .10 Staff, while the DL)} trios to send
weak ones or cast-offs; there are are variations in nearly every phase
of personnel management. The Director of Personnel is merely a
support officer. Personnel maaanaaagerrseent needs the strongest guidance
f'rorr the 1XI's office.
Training: CIA's success or failure will depend on the profs. .
signalie of people. The Doolittle Study Croup in 1955 recommended
CIA have to per cent of its people at all times taking training courses.
CIA issued a regulation saying that 5 per cent would be In training
courses. The result was a large cadre of professional trainees ->
people the units didn't want. The best training effort we have is
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
our JOT Program (Junior Officer Training) which has been publicly
stated to be one, of the best in the United States and classed with
Proctor & Gamble's (one of the beat in industry). This succeeds
becaas, it is required. The DCI's ofOc. must see that it is re-.
q:zired up through the ranks.
Txavel: . lot *
-.~..~.. 7ary in this business. CIA
25X1 does too much ..., We overburden our fief
stations with unnecessary visitors. There should be centralized
control in the .CI'a office.
i0- I would appreciate any guidance you can give me on these
subjects.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Attachments
LBK/jrc
Orig &
1
Addressee (w/att. )
1
- DDCI (w/att. )
1
- chrono
1
subject
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
erctor of Central Intelligent
ideat's principal inteUfgez ce officer.
Responsible for coordination and effective guidance of the
intefigenc, community.
3. U.sponsjble for polity guidance to titer Central lntUUiXence
Agency.
4. Advisor to NSC.
S. Chairnxan of USIB.
6. Member of Serial Group.
7. Me nber of Counter Iusurgeacy Group.
Member of NSC Stang Croup,
9. Represents Agency with Chairmen of Congressional Committees.
W. . Receive* dim
?lligence briefing.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
? De Director of Central lntee3liswncee
0!!x
MOM
Acts as DCI in the latteree absence.
Responsible for general management of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
s the production of inteiltgence.
7.
Chairs the Watch Committee.
Insures inter-agency ?coo:dinatieaan.
CIA member of USIB.
Assists DCI in preparation of intelligence briefings.
3.
Supports DCI in preparation of national estimates and in
9.
production of national current intelligence.
Lx officio member of Agency Financial Policy Committee.
C.
Chairman, Agency Personnel ,Board.
11.
Reviews and approves subject to i3CI concurrence Agency
1Z.
or Assignments.
Reviews Inspector General-Audit reports.
L.3.
Chairman, Agency P-sbli aations Board.
11.
Arranges periodic staff .meetings of senior officers.
15.
Attends DCles daily intelligence briefing.
16.
Chairman, Operational Review Board.
`In this capacity personally approves all Agency activities or projector
which 'must be approved by or coordinated with other departments,
those activities which affect U. S. relations with other countries, and
any activities which might require advice to +Go -itteees of the Congress
or the White House.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
C. Executive Director
. Acts for DDCI in latter's absence.
A"10 iember Agency Financial Policy Cormr$ittee.
officio fliembe r Agency
ersonnel Board.
Aix officio member Agency publications Board.
Reviews and approved for DDCI Agency regulations.
.views and approves for DDCI Agency middle management
7.
iteviews and approves for DJ;Q1 externaa contracts.
6.
Approves for DDCI ixgency travel plans .
9.
Conducts periodic review of security problems on behalf of
DI:iCI and DCI.
iO.
Reviews Congressional matters with Legislative Counsel.
. Conde
A sail
daily staff meetings with Chief.of retariat and
the DCI and DDCI.
tZ, Serves as focal point for lisiao with President's
Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
I:. x officio member, Operational Review Board.
pt as member of USIB, which UD/I will asst rue.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DCI:
(1) The control point within the DCI's immediate office is the Executive
Officer, O/DCI. The Executive Officer performs the duties devolving
upon a staff executive. He is responsible for coordinating all staff
actions and assuring that all correspondence, memoranda and documents
originating in the various components of the Agency and requiring DCI
action are properly staffed, coordinated and concurred in by the
appropriate responsible officials. He attends the Director's
regular morning staff meetings with the Deputy Directors, and per-
forms such other functions and duties as the Director may direct.
He directs the activities of the Executive Secretariat, the Cable
Secretariat, the Historical Staff, and the O/DCI Security Staff.
(2) Within the Executive Secretariat supervised by the Executive Officer
are three assistants to the Director, one of whom, is primarily assigned
to supporting and assisting the D/DCI; an Administrative Officer who
is responsible for administrative support to the O/DCI, encompassing
personnel, budget and finance, and logistical matters; and the
Executive Registry. The Executive Registry receives, controls,
distributes, maintains files, and makes appropriate disposition as
directed of all correspondence and intelligence, operational and/or
administrative documents flowing through the O/DCI.
(3) The Cable Secretariat, operating under the direction of the Executive
Officer, is charged with coordinating policies governing the prepar-
ation, release, and distribution of CIA cables and is charged with
the review, processing (exclusive of the encrypting, decrypting,
and transmitting processes), distribution, and delivery within CIA
headquarters of all classified incoming and outgoing CIA cables;
ensuring that the originating office has secured the personal approval
of the Director on all outgoing cables involving questions of
national policy; and ensuring that all intelligence items contained
in cables are transmitted to the Office of the Deputy Director
(Intelligence). The Cable Secretary is also charged with the
responsibility for the control and dissemination within the Agency
of non-CIA produced cables and telegrams.
(1i) The Historical Staff, under the immediate supervision of an
Assistant to the Director, serves as a focal point for the DCI
and the Agency in all contacts with representatives of the press
and public relations matters in general. It provides the Director
with items of general and intelligence information from. the daily
press and other media, prepares a daily clipping book containing
press item.s of particular interest for the Director, provides
reviews of current literature pertaining to the field of intelligence
and r'elatedabtivities, and is engaged in writing the history of
the CIA from its inception.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4 v
(5) The Security Staff affords physical protection to the DCI and to
classified documents he is carrying to and from, various meetings
in Government buildings or elsewhere, between his office and
residence, and at his residence. The staff maintains up-to-date
records on all known cranks and mentally disturbed-persons who
write to or seek personal appointments with the DCI at the office
or residence and personally interviews such persons as the occasion
requires. It provides technical support and transcription services
in all instances wherein the DCI, D/DCI or IG desire to record
conversations or conferences. The staff maintains liaison with
the local police forces in the Metropolitan area and with the
National Park Police, and supplies such other support in making
,or assisting in travel arrangements, hotel reservations and
services of a general "aide" nature as the DCI or Executive Officer
may direct.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
' ~.?. `~' J 1, W Y .`J a tl d '~ L S l C
STAFFING COMPLEMENT - OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
25X1
Immediate Offices of DCI and D/DCI ..................
Executive Registry ............. ..................
Cable Secretariat ...................................
Historical Staff ...................................
Security Staff .....................................
TOTAL ...................
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INSPECTOR
GENERAL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Exec Secretariat
Cable Secretariat
Historical Staff
Security Staff
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
a. There should be created a Committee to be chaired by
the [Deputy Director: Management consisting of the four Deputies
and the Comptroller to review periodically and report to the DCI
on major projects and operations of the Agency.
b. There should be created a Financial Management Committee
under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director: Management and
consisting of the Comptroller, the four Deputies or their assistants.
This committee should review and make recommendations on the
allocation of Agency reserves, and Agency budgetary and accounting
procedures.
c. The Automatic Data Processing, Staff might function in
three locations: under the DD/R & D, under the DD/S as at present,
or under the DCI's immediate office. We have not been able to
reach full agreement as to which of these locations would be
preferable.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4 r/
Offices Reporting to the DCI
a. The Comptroller's office should be brought out from under the
DD/S, report directly to the DCI's office, and receive full authority to
control the flow of all funds in the Agency. Assign to the Comptroller
responsibility for total fiscal control of the Agency. New leadership
is needed in the present office in order to exercise the Comptroller
functions as you envisage them.
b. Assign to an appropriate element of the Office of the DCI
all functions involving policy support of the DCI in the SIGINT
(COMINT, ELINT, RADINT, etc.) field.
c. Combine the Audit Staff with the staff of the Inspector
General and direct the merged staff to report to the DCI's office.
d. General Counsel should also report directly to the DCI's
office. The Legislative Counsel should be a part of the General
Counsel and report directly to the General Counsel.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
February 14, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick
On February 15, at a DD/P Staff Meeting, Mr. Bissell is
oin to announce his resignation
and immediately thereafter I will announce the
appointment of Mr. Helms as DD/P.
Concurrently, the scope of DD/P is to be modified in
accordance with our recent discussions by the elimination from
the cognizance of DD/P certain areas requiring scientific skills,
as particularly NRO and Special Projects.
However, there should be prepared memoranda covering
(a) the appointment of Mr. Helms as DD/P; (b) establishment of
DD/R (Research) and the assignment to it of NRO and Special Projects;
the appointment of Dr. Scoville as Acting DD/R;
With respect to the location of TSD, study should be made as
to whether this could be appropriately placed under DD/R, with suitable
administrative arrangements with the Division Chiefs so that their needs
will be fully met from the standpoint of both research and development
and application. This is a classical argument we meet both in govern-
ment and in industry and is answered in various ways. It has been my
personal experience that an operation such as TSD can function under
a. research director and properly serve all operating divisions. Never-
theless this question must be fully explored.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
moves -are made to implement the plan. However,
there is no urgency in this matter.
With respect to the actual transfer of responsibilities from
Bissell to Helms, this will take place as of close of business on
Friday, February 16.
John A. McCone
Director
cc: General Schuyler
Mr. Coyne
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
16 February 1962
MI:340RANLIUM POR: Deputy Lirector (Plans
Deputy r lrector (Support)
Inspector General
)spaty t ireector (lnteelligeacee)
L- To effect the orderly trausfeer of activities of the
Development -jects Division (Deputy Director/ Plans),
Mr. Richard M. Dissell is appointed Acting Chief of that
Division for the period 1? February 1962 through 28 February
1962. During this period Mr. Bissell will continue to exercise
the delegation of authority over funds granted to DD/P for the
DPD projects.
Z. During this temporary assignment, Mr. Bissell
will draft for my consideration a proposed order which will
assign to Deputy r4rector (Plans):
s. Those elements of the Development Projects
Division to remain with the Deputy Director (Plans),
and
b. Those elements of 1'evelopment Projects Division
which will be transferred to the IP eputy Director (Research
and Development).
obn A. Mccone
Director
cc: Dr. Scoville
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Summary of Comments on the DD/I Area
Our views as previously expressed to the DCI at the meeting at
his house (see attached summary) are still basically the same. In
addition we would make the following comments and recommendations.
a. Merger ONE and OCI into one office to handle .national
estimates and current intelligence.
b. Strengthen the Board of National Estimates by the
addition of personnel with requisite backgrounds in the economic,
scientific and foreign service fields.
c. Establish procedures through USIB to better regulate
the screening of requests for national and special estimates.
d. Designate DD/I as the focal point for clearance of
all Agency originated intelligence that is sent to the White House.
e. Reject the proposal that OSI be transferred to the
DDR&D.
f. Dissolve the Office of Operations. Transfer the
Contact Division to the DD/P. Assign FDD to OCR. And for the
present assign FBID as an independent unit reporting to the DD/I.
g. Restrict DD/IPs Comint and Elint functions to that of
consumer, transferring the policy support functions to the Office of
the DCI and the security functions to the Security office.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
9 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
SUBJECT: The Relationship of O/NE to the DCI
1. On the question of transferring O/NE from the DDI to
Mr. McCone's office: as you know, the NIE's are "submitted
by the Director of Central Intelligence" as part of his statutory
function to produce national intelligence. They represent a
community-wide effort in every stage of their production. O/NE
is the Director's agent in preparing and coordinating these papers
for the Director's approval, with the concurrence (or dissent) of
other members of USIB. Thus National Intelligence Estimates
have always been prepared for the Director in his capacity as
coordinator of the entire community's intelligence efforts, rather
than in his capacity as head of CIA. This distinction has made
little practical difference in the past, but if Mr. McCone should
organize things so that he personally is concentrating primarily
on his function as coordinator, there is no logical function for
O/NE unless it is attached directly to him.
2. In the last analysis, of course, the question should be
resolved on the basis of Mr. McCone's own conception of how
he wishes to use the Board and staff of O/NE. It is worth
noting that, while the production of NIEs and SNIEs is the prin-
cipal business of O/NE, the Director has in the past requested
O/NE to deliver considered judgments to him on. a host of im-
portant substantive problems. This has largely been done through
the vehicle of the Board's Memoranda to the Director (105 were
forwarded during 1961). If Mr. McCone feels that O/NE should
continue to be the Director's senior substantive staff, we would,
of course, welcome any arrangement that would result in a
closer organizational relationship to the office of the Director.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
3. As a practical matter, you realize that O/NE has operated
with a comparatively small staff and has relied extensively for
support on other elements of the intelligence community, both inside
and outside CIA. Of these, the most important are OCI and ORR.
We would like to be sure that these relationships continue in future
and urge that O/NE, wherever it may be placed on the organization
chart, should be kept in close physical proximity to the rest of CIA,
with whose components we should continue to work closely in pre-
paring material for Mr. McCone.
STAT
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman,
Board of National Estimates
STAT
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
29 January 1962
MEMORANDUM TO MR. KIRKPATRICK'S COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: ONE and the Preparation of Military Estimates
1. For ten years or more ONE has drafted the text and
presided at the coordination of National Intelligence Estimates
respecting the military strengths and capabilities of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. The drafts are prepared on the basis of written
contributions from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, from certain
committees of USIB (GMAIC, JAEIC, and SIC), and from the
economists in ORR. A great deal of assistance also comes from
OSI and OCI. During recent years the work of ORR has become
increasingly important, especially in connection with Soviet
aircraft production and Soviet ballistic missiles. In addition,
the substantive contribution of ONE itself has been considerable,
particularly in connection with Soviet strategy and Soviet
military programs. ?
2. With the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency
a question arises as to how far this system should continue. We
understand that written contributions from the military will
CON:J`4D N i eAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86BOO269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
henceforth come from DIA. Should not the coordination of
military estimates now be left to DIA? There is no question,
of course, that the vast bulk of military analysis and estimating
will remain in the hands of the military; detailed Order of
Battle, analysis of weapons and weapons systems, campaign and
logistical studies, and the like are almost purely military
problems. We believe, however, that for the small but extremely
important portion of military intelligence which appears in
National Intelligence Estimates the process ought to stay pretty
1 ;.~y`}t? 9tw eoo-vtd~N~tra~ Gw t~ {tatiuL~ ~ GN#~, '
much as it is nowt The reasons for this belief are set forth below.
The Board of National Estimates
3. That the Army, Navy, and Air Force tend to approach the
most important estimates with conflicting views and interests
hardly requires demonstration. This conflict is frequently
denounced as bad and wasteful, but it is by no means always so.
In such a matter as the number and deployment of Soviet ICBM's,
for instance, it is worth while to have two or three more or less
independent analyses in progress. It is even valuable to have two
or three groups appraoch the problem each with a lively desire to
prove some preconceived hypothesis. We do not say that the services
always approach estimates in this fashion, nor do we mean to charge
any lack of good faith. We do know, from experience, that the
estimates have profited from a vigorous conflict of views, backed
up by adequate research and analysis.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
4+. The Board of National Estimates has long sat as a kind
of umpire and overseer of these disputes. After listening to
the evidence and argument, it has recommended to the Director of
Central Intelligence what it thought his position should be. It
possesses three main qualifications for this job: (l) a consider-
able degree of experience and expertise among its members; (2) the
services of a highly competent staff in ONE and elsewhere in CIA;
and (3) no vested interest in any particular answer to the problems
presented. The latter in particular would be difficult to achieve
1
in an n~mi itary organization dealing with the problems arising in
military estimates.
Political and Economic Aspects of Military Estimates
5. Estimates of Bloc military strengths and capabilities,
and of Bloc military and strategic policies, do not rest exclusively
upon military evidence. They are based also upon a great deal of
economic analysis of production capabilities in the Bloc, of
budgets, of the cost of alternative weapons programs, and in
general of the allocation of resources within the Bloc economies.
They rest also on political and ideological analysis; Soviet military
programs and military strategy are inextricably linked with Soviet
politics and Communist doctrine. No military estimate of importance
-3-
`~.~ ,eC a .~ `d J Cu^~i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
CON
is made without a blending of these various aspects, and the
basic work on these is done almost entirely in the State Depart-
ment and in CIA itself.
Personnel
6. ONE, ORR and the other offices of CIA have over the
years built up what we consider to be an extremely competent body
of personnel to deal with military estimates at the national
level. Through training and long service these people have
developed great experience and skill, not only in analysis of the
problems involved, but in writing, negotiating, and coordinating
the final product. Insofar as the DIA, or any other agency, is
staffed by officers on comparatively short-time assignements it
will be at a considerable disadvantage in producing national
estimates.
Military Estimates as National Intelligence
7. Finally, the military estimates with which we are con-
cerned are designated national intelligence, and. as such are
submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. For various
reasons, including those stated in paragraph 5 above, they
probably ought to remain in this category, and not become "depart-
mental intelligence" pertaining only to the concerns of the
!. -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
CON DEN h L
Department of Defense. As long as they remain national intelli-
gence, it would appear essential that the Director, in submitting
them, should. have under his direct control a competent staff to
advise him as to what his position should be, and indeed to
prepare and coordinate the estimate for his submission. As
already pointed out, ONE has long performed this function, with
the assistance of other elements of CIA, and we think it should
continue to do so.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
-5-
CON )rE ~ 11AL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
8 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KIRKPATRICK
SUBJECT: Responding to your Query on Merging OCI and ONE
1. At your suggestion, there is set forth--below some ideas ^
on merging OCI and ONE. Since nd I have only a STAT
vague understanding of your requirements and have had but a few
hours to discuss our ideas, the following proposals should be re-
garded as preliminary. We have assumed in our discussion that
the new office would remain under the DDI and that a primary ob-
ject in such a reorganization would be to economize on personnel.
2. 1 have taken seriously your admonishment about "not
fighting the problem" and will not discuss the merits of such a
merger in this memorandum. I wish, however, to reserve
radio and TV time to state my views on this aspect of the question
before anything definite is decided. In any case, since Sherman
is away until 12 February, I certainly would not want to imply by
anything that follows that such a merger has even the tacit approval
of the AD/NE. Also since I have not had an opportunity to discuss
the question with Ting Sheldon, the same reservations presumably
apply to OCI.
3. ONE, as you know, is comprised of a Board and a staff.
I assume that you had in mind primarily a merger of STAT
the ONE staff with OCI, and our concept of a combined operation
is based on this assumption. However, before we get into the
question of how we would deal with the ONE staff, let us first
consider the Board. Five theoretical possibilities are open in
connection with the Board: (a) it could be abolished; (b) it could
report to the DCI in his role as the coordinator of the intelligence
community; (c) it could report to the DDCI in his role as operating
head of the agency; (d) it could report to the DDT; or (e) it could
serve the AD of the combined office. On the assumption that the
BNE is not to be abolished, there appear to be no outstanding
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
advantages to having the BNE report to either the DDCI or the
DDI; rather it should be attached to either the DCI in his role
as coordinator or to the AD of the new office in order to have
close contact with the estimates process.
4. There are three theoretical ways in which the ONE staff
could be merged with OCI:
A. Under the AD of the new office there would be
a DAD for Current Intelligence primarily responsible for the
current intelligence staff pretty much as it is now organized;
there would be a DAD for Estimates in charge of an estimates
staff (more or less along the present lines) and would administer
the production of NIEs. This arrangement would result in the
least disturbance of the present organizational structures of ONE
and OCI.
B. The combined office could be organized pretty
much along the present lines of OCI except that each area division
would consist of a branch concentrating on estimates and one on
current intelligence. Because of the heavy additional burden the
estimative load would place on the AD and DAD of this office, it
might be useful to have a special assistant to the AD or DAD who
would monitor the estimates activity. This arrangement would
still preserve some aspects of the present separation of estimates
and current intelligence, but would resul in closer relationship
the area analysts in both fields.
C. The present, organization of OCI could be maintained
with the ONE staff members melded into the OCI organization;
there would be no formal distinction between current intelligence
and estimative responsibilities.
I_th__ It might be necessary in this case, as in
the one a ove o ave a Special Assistant for Estimates. (See
Chart No. 3)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
STAT
STAT
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
? 0
4. Each of the three organizational arrangements suggested
above have advantages and disadvantages -- most of them obvious
to you. If there is anything to the theory that NIEs can best be
written in a somewhat different setting and by people having
talents not necessarily transferrable to current intelligence pro-
duction (and vice versa), the first arrangement would seem the
most desirable.
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
-D-D- I ------
AD
Est Staff
Kr-ea Breakdow
Current Intell Staff
kdow
Erea Brea
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
? ?
DDCI - -
DDI
Spec Asst
for Estimates
DAD
Est Branchi I Current Branch
B NE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
f ?
(no functional breakdown)
DDCI _ ` i~
DDI
AREA STAFF5I
BNE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
3. . 0 F, a 7.
9 March 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KIRKPATRICK
SUBJECT: Exchange of Personnel Between O/CI and O/NE
1. In connection with our discussion of the other day
and your remark about the percent of O/NE bodies recruited
from O/CI and now on board, I thought you might be interested
in a brief summary of the exchange of personnel that has
taken place between the two offices during the past several
years.
2. Of our present staff of I (came to us from
O/CI. One of these has been in O/NE since 1956, 2 since 1957,
1 since 1958, 2 since 1959, and the rest have joined us during
the past 18 months.
3. The flow of personnel between O/CI and O/NE has
not been one-way. Thus, ^ staff members (Cline,
- a rather impressive array o a en
transferred from O/NE to O/CI. In addition, 2 O/NE research
assistants went to O/CI in professional capacities.
To cite a few of the more outstanding examples: Borel left us
25X1 for O/CR, for USIB, for State, for the
White House, Bundy for the Defense Department and~:'
for the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
4. 1 should also hope that O/NE has provided key per-
sonnel to other parts of the Agency and the government in general. 25X1
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 11 ) .1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Yre LG
27 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Special Organization for Scientific and Technical
Intelligence
Your message through reached us in Albany
yesterday and we debarked to Genera c uy er's residence and spent
from 10 to 12 p.m. studying the subjects which were mentioned. The
following is a statement which was drafted at that time.
1. We favor establishment of a Special Assistant at a
high level in the Agency (but not necessarily at the Deputy level) to
direct, control and monitor the major Research and Development
aspects of Scientific and Technical efforts of the Agency in the
intelligence field. When such Research and Development efforts
result in workable systems for collection, we would favor their
being turned over to operational elements for control and use.
2. Under such an official we would place such matters as:
b. The Agency's Elint and related activities.
d. Research and Development support of activities in
various other sophisticated intelligence equipment areas
(e. g., NPIC).
3. We believe that a maximum effort should be made to
bring to bear on our intelligence problems the scientific and technical
talents which exist outside of the government. Accordingly we
endorse the concept of establishing an outside organization to
accomplish this purpose. However, before proceeding we should:
a. Clarify the specific areas requiring exploration.
b. Report further on the several Agency-sponsored
organizations and projects of this type already in existence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
a, I
c. Avoid Agency involvement where the same objective
could better be achieved by military or other agencies. We
feel that considerable additional study is required before
any action is taken leading to the establishment of such an
outside organization.
We have deliberately not placed anything on the record
concerning personalities, but inasmuch as we were asked to also
consider this, I will be glad to discuss it with you orally at your
convenience.
yman B. Kirkpatrick
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
19 March 1
W2401LA f t)Idf FL's: Director of Central lutelligence
The Proper location of 061
Mom from DDR to DGI, undated, subject,
.4Activities of DDR"
I have advised you oral13 Ian strongly of the
opinion that it 'would be undesirable and against the beat
interests of the Agency to move 081 f`resz the DDI area to the
have reached mmorandm setts/ forth principal reasona 'lay I
have reached this conclussicas.
2. First, as to the purpose of a?tabltsh ; the DD,
it is any, uunderstanding fran you thct the principal goal 'waas
to split the Agency'tt collection ef'fox t into tvo arms, the
classical and the scientific or technical, experleuc,- having
shorn that the tuna tasks were essentially too 'big for one
individual to administer. I believe this should. still be the
primary objective and. conEider that the direction of all
advanced :methods of intelligence data collection isz a sufficiently
d ndi rg task to occupy fully the DDE end his staff. The fact
that more than one-third o'? the f ;enc:y' s budgeted resources, are
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
allocated to this t rk wild tend to support this view.
M le second point I would she night be ca.Ue4 the
essential integrity or intelligence production. Ever since it
was estx b 3ished ..CII. hPa focused in one place, initially in the
S ice of Research Estimates. an since 1952 the Deputy
Directorate for Intelligence, responsibility for the research
8na1 rsiss and production of intelligence conclusion for which
the Agency is responsible. it would seem to be clear beyond
argument that the assessnmt of a country's capabilities and
possible courses of action mast include scientific and technical
factors along with szilitaty, economic, and political axes.
Moreover, this integration must take place at all levels of
analysis and production and for all finished products tether
National Intelligence Surveys,, current intelligence publications
or National Intelligence Estimates. 6eparatton of responsibility
alto the extremely obs a line that separates Research and
Devel t data from production and teployme nt data ulud seem
to have no positive advantages and many obvious disadventaa es
including the necessity of bringing. relatively trivial disputes
as to methods and analytical conclusions to the Director's office
for resolution. Fuses of disciplines rather than their separate
ccx artments tion is a necessary pre-coud.iticn to balanced rounded
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4 0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
intelligence, It be worth, mentioning in passing, to .t most
universities mintain a single faculty of "Arts and ienceeo
s one basic serial unit.
4. The third issue to be considered Is
Of the scientific talent available in the
util nation
gree, that
should be offered the opportunity of a varied car
including assiumeuta both in intelligence research and in
devvelopmental work. This can be ace
by setting up a career designation of "scientist" to cover
those worms bo7th in 2E and 001.v and. I would not object to
such a career service board being chaired by the I. What
be kePt firmly in mind is that when, working in I on produc
intelligence appraising other nations' scientific .capabilities..
sta are first and foxes ost Intelligence officers
scientific background to assist them in a
process of reasoning that is no different from that engaged In
by the Political scientists or economists. -'1'o mist that the
;t lllgence producing scientists or scientific intelligence
officers be li ed in with the research WA develo at peop,
n kes no More sense to me thsn placing the economists of CM
under the Comptroller for the reason that both are concenied
with statistics.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
ti
Though the person selected to direct OBI has carefully
and astutely avoided taking sides ca this issue, I e convinced
he will be in a better position to represent the Agency on '
questions of scientific intelligence on foreign countries'
capabilities if he is not mintier the shade of a senior Agency
official engaged in developing and promoting particular collection
cysts i$.
6. Thou4gh this issue is 'not one to be settled by counting
noses, it is worthy of note that the Kirkpatrick-Schuyler-Coyne
Cc nittee has studied the matter intensively and has concluded that
081 should remain where it is. Moreover, my associates who share
a portion of responsibility for the integration of fianished. 25X1
elligenee such as Dr. Kent for National klstimates, Mr. Sheldon
for Current Intelligence, and for National
Intelligence Surveys agree that it would be undesirable to
break up the presently existing and long established close
association between their offices and 081.
In. sum, though whatever decision you arrive at will be
made to work, it is my belief that logical analysis of what our
enterprise is all about and application of the principle of
focusing responsibility for cognate and. closely interrelated
operations clearly lead to the conclusion that the beat interest,-
of the Agency would be served by leaving 0 I where it is.
R(lWET AWRY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Y"'
JAN 1962
ANI',D UM FCr` : Director of Central Intelligence
THI OLON:
SUBJECT:
Deputy Director/intelligence,
Missile and Space Intelligence Management
I. When we discussed 061 activities With you in late
October,, you asked that a study be made to determine if an
organizational structure comparable to the JAEIC
up could bring about required improvements in the missile and
space intelligence field. As a result omt our examination of this
problem, we recommend that:
a. A Missile and Space TecbAica l Intelligence Center
(bi1ST'IC) be established, .ttb its Director in the Defense
I teelligence Agency, to manage the technical collection
and analyses, except as limited by NSCID-6 and NSCIt-8,
of data on foreign missile and space tests. (COMINT and
ELINT functions assigned to NSA under NSCID-6 and photo
interpretation functions assigned to NPIC under NSCID-8
should not be transferred to IST.ic. )
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0
be bz+c oe4 a+ streogthen*d to be +t a
rsl
first serw.4 with the tollocO a prod ts, and
+ c-aad ti es reseuch s r.gv4r to . ~1 It*
is bip of t1w sabaocs4
***i d to as oItt iat
furred
sb+ i4Vro titaOfo to tew
00$0"W
be &
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Ask
CT t* M16890
4.
eoa a ii ab. I e vat'eato. to O wt a - ~l*s
be saetae bed itx tb*
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
s r JEC `: : is rtt: aid pace, 1a$S1ttg.i c nagerent
O ee WOWS*,
eucepass
7. NO
Agency. U this placement of t e S V4
th
;*sr iatefLgeroce operation
My b*eau-e broad coo uxa? ity resp nstbUity for tbO
operratt * have boost iomee*at IttriUmd b
6*s to recognise
toe effective guidaece and direction toy
c011ectiA,eri U ch*ntsrnV Witch Were supposed to serve It. tier ace
recemumti Is that
4io that it will IutlCt `t in. retattan to
=?Y :?:. riF?rrVa-as~.F+~iFTwwawr s~w'w A
7
a:hgays been head thin Cl
dire t co xis and link for e:
"rations be strongthome
of TV IC has
d this has pro it
retstng his toord na$i
sibtlity
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
a cowowtoml tM*1II
grasp to pre
stems auwm ter Ow dtsee t *ati e y 4 t
t +e-tfaes
t sUPPO" an the ors at A* r CC s
Praric ties.
Isar f OU
strieam.#e a the cb*ntsm saa watke it
car t Is 4W 40d b4 i s t AD/31 *Ad AD
ssafw4 seamy to t~s Ak /-t. i- mtsstiesce~
this r
the pt*.ea to
War
that the CIA f
in tats file as .*Paco
I4, t.c*s.se Ot the t*cb tc.i
it. sera t
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0
17 Janwrya' 11
~,T )Rx
Director of ventrbi Intelligence
and 3 pave Int ellig ce ~^ xa a j"e nt
UINNOMIdUM Same Subject -`rn Dr.-coviile
TO lou Ott ached) , o ~
J~
L
intra??agemy prz :.ls pct forward by Dr.
covi e, but 1 do not believe they- ii1Z, by any =am,, provide a cure-.
our problea5 in the missile irforma tion collection nie w '.
in > i that the collection activities related to zinsil. s
are for wore heterogeneous than thoee focused an atomic test and itni '
more Fepara co ands at cetera are involved in the former than in
the letter caneo
the i ce. icy fcr loth as=V :thening the Gul; ed :isci.ie ',C=itte saint
giving it authority ever all. aspects of missile is telligenUce tlsrou h-=
out tiv, c, :ty?
d. ;'Us problem has t :k a brought to the attention of the
Kii
potricx iask Iorce and should,, I. belicva, be considered b the &nd
to thf antra-agency proposal he saes and t t he is tal K;l w about is
or not at aa
u.. has stated to t zat t ae statesaeut does not
. 1 tic4l3y diseg with the second clause on pa.ragrapb le
ichx "'auld trasster cll. intel ence on *i aiie research and pry..
ton to a single control within M. I do :uat propose to arj a the
point here . .3y, but merely wish to record any strong view that unless
there is a ctcpleets reorga.z ti.oo; of the D-l olementes of the it-envy,
it Maul. to .ill-advised to put to technical.. wI and 1) aspects of 'Missile
inteili rer ee now in '-I wader "I':F' z4nageae of Ica equally ll acfvi ed
to do the converse. 4ow that we sR x:;1.1 in t Zamze I ui;tctL , an 3Y
i_nterc'l , ;e of materials ideas and semi--firdshed research i.- convenient.
IS should, as a practical. propoaitl,oa, be able to achieve aal r real
benefits of consolidation without, disruptix t N as amautali allocation
aarf responsibility that nar prevails.
3. '-r, $covi ie saga in hi.ac paragraph 2 that all hire reca :acndaa..
ti.o:se are inteerdepen nt and should$ therefore,, be adopted in total
'
dlecussed uetweeu them, Dr. covil,l , a d ava*It an their delit4cr
Dep"Y Director
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
a
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJE CT : Activities of DD/R
1. The DD/R has been established with the objective of
consolidating in a single Agency organization the major activities
involving science and technology. These S&T activities which
should be considered for inclusion in the DD/R include three
general types of work:
a. Research and development on technical collection
and data reduction systems;
b. The production of intelligence on scientific and
technical capabilities of other countries; and
c. The conduct of all operations using technical collection
methods and of SLIT operations using classical agent techniques.
NOTE: Since the DD/P has the responsibility for the conduct
of clandestine operations, and since the tradecraft of classical
intelligence collection is highly specialized and available only
in the DD/P, it is clear that the DD/R should not have the final
responsibility for SIT clandestine operations. However, such
operations have a major technological input. Conversely, it is
extremely important that all Agency R&D be sensitive to operational
,needs and limitations; therefore. one of the most important
problems in developing an organization for the DD/R is a delineation
of the responsibilities between the DD/R. and the DD/P which will
ensure the closest integration of the activities of the two organiza-
tions.
Z. In reviewing the various Agency activities which might be
considered for incorporation in the DD/R, the following organizations
have been considered and their relationship to the DD/R is discussed
below.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
a. Development projects Division DD/ pPt . The
special projects activities of DPD should be incorporated in,
the DD/R, but the air support operations should be split off
and assigned to the DD/P. The responsibility of .the DD/:R
for the special projects activities should, because of the
specialised nature of the activities, extend all the way from
the initial research through procurement and .suck operations
as may be deemed desirable for the Agency to conduct. using
the DD/P only for ouch liaison and supporting activities as
may be necessary at overseas stations. Past experience with
the U.Z and other developments has shown the tremendous
gains which come from this integrated effort on such highly
sophisticated projects. Stage it is Undesirable to have two
Agency air operations ceeaters, it is believed that a single
center should be established to serve both the 1)D/P and the
DD/:R. needs, probably under DD/R. control. The detailed
assignment of the present DPD functions was prepared by
Mr. Bissell. is agreed to by the DD/R. and D1)/P and is
appended as Annex A.
Technical Services Division - DD/P (TS3)I: With the
exception of certain special projects. TSD conducts the majority
of the DD/P research and development on technical collection
systems. to addition, at the present time TSf) is responsible
for the procurement, supply, installation and maintenance of
suck equipment. These generally fall into two categories:
(1) R&D not in direct support of the Dl)/P which involves
a modest amount of manpower, but a large part of the TSD
research budget. This effort is in the development o
`--
sterns deeiaseed to cello scientific fntellisence
ttc pro ects vo ve very tt er toract on t e
operational elements of DD/14. It is believed that this
type of activity of TSD should be transferred in tote to
the DD/R With the DD/P having only a miaim: ponsi-
bility for station support in the field.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
?
ine between the responsibilities of the DDIa and the DD/P
can be drawn at a number of different stages in the cycle,
but the following is proposed as appearing the best method
of achieving the objectives listed abovearnd at the same time
properly observes the basic responsibilities of the .DD/R
and DD/P.
(a) The DD/.R should have the prime responsibility
for the research and development through the laboratory
testing stage, but, even in these phases, the operational
elements should provide requirements and indicate
Operational constraints. They should also initiate
operational planning at an early time in the RECD cycle
so as to be in a position to take fullest advantage of the
developments underway.
(b) The DD/P should have prime responsibility for
operational simulation tooting, procurement, production.
supply, training, field maintenance and operation of the
equipment. In these areas, DD/R will provide technical
assistance. In order to carry out its responsibility i
this area, it is believed desirable for the DD/P to
establish a technical services unit for both overseas and
Headquarters activities, the manning of which might be
carried out by an over-all Agency scientific and techno-
logical career service (see paragraph 3).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
4. Office of Scientific Intelti eance ? DD/I 051 . The
primary responsibility of OSI is the production of intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
K
IT, nas p me a ma or function. providing assistance to both
technical and classical collection activities in the form of require-
ments, guidance and scientific support. Experience of the past
several years has shows,, the importance of a close working
relationship between the consumer and the collector if one is
to improve the quality of our intelligence in the critical techno-
logical areas. Furthermore, 051 has available both internally
and externally through its contractor-consultant relationships
a scientific manpower pool which should be extremely valuable
in the critical formative stages of the DD/R. Therefore, although
the logic of the normal CIA structure involving production elements
and collection elements in separate components might place 061
in the DD/l, it is believed that, at least Initially. OSI should be
placed in the DD/R in much the same way that the scientific
elements of Development Projects Division and Technical Services
Division are placed in the DD/R rather than in the DD/P. If this
transfer is made, it is essential, however, that t6I continue to
place its major effort in support of the DD/I needs for scientific
intelligencefm national estimates, current intelligence and more
extensive research products.
e. NAtional Photographic Intelligence Center.- PD/I NPIC).
The NPIC carries out research and development related to the
exploitation of photographic materials obtained primarily as a
result of various DPI) or related military service projects. Much
of this work is of an engineering nature directly associated with
the procurement of specific items of equipment for processing the
collected material. Such developmental, work should not be
separated from the NPIC itself. Other R&1),, however, is aimed
at developing solutions to longer range photo interpretation
problems and seat necessarily directly associated with the specific
operations underway. It is possible that this more basic research
should eventually be transferred to the DO/ft, but. no recommenda-
tion on this will be made until a later date. In any case, it is
essential that very close working relations be maintained between
IPIC and DO/R, particularly with the special projects activities
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
I& order to ensure that the exploitation capability is compatible
with the collection systems becoming available.
f. Automatic Data Processing Staff ? DD/S PS The
ADPS is responsible for staff support to the various Agency
programs utilizing automatic data processing systems. Both
the DD/P and the DD/S have or will have in procurement
systems which are beyond the R&D stage and should not incur
any responsibility of the DD/R. The primary problem in the
Agency at the moment is how to apply already existing com-
puter equipment. It is, therefore, recommended that this
activity not be assigned to the DD/.R, however, it is conceivable
that in the future it will be necessary for the DD/R to undertake
&D of a new computer technique to satisfy a specific need.
g? 17th'/P Scientific and 'Technical Collections
The DD/?
.
has a major responsibility for the co lectton of SST intelligence
by means other than technical methods. At the present time
providing requirements, technical guidance and assistance to
h. meter A enc Research Coma onents. Other Agency
components may have small R&D programs to suit their specific
needs. These activities will be studied to determine whether
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
.7_
they involve overlapping or could profit by consolidation in the
present over-all Agency research program under the DT1IR.
3. Career Mann emext of S&T Personnel
a. The Agency needs qualified Ski personnel in many of
its components and these personnel serve in a variety of ways,
including scientific intelligence production, research, applied
engineering, research and development, and scientific intelligence
collection operationns. The bulk of these personnel are presently
used in Office of Scientific i telligence, Technical Services
Division, Development Projects Division, Office of Communications.
and as UT case officers for the various area divisions and staffs
of DD/P.
b. To achieve the most effective results in this short-supply,
highly competitive field. It is recommended that some provision
be established to offset an integrated program that would include
initial selection, recruitment, placement, training and continued
development from a career standpoint. The objectives of such a
program should be getting the right talents, knowlsdges and apti-
tudes brought into the Agency. and subsequently to get these
qualities effectively developed and pieced according to the needs
of the organization.
c. Perhaps the best approach would come from placing such
a program in the hands of the largest S&T component such as the
new DD/lt, letting all SkT personnel be assigned to this career
service. This central body would perform all of the functions of
personnel management, and staff, as requested, the S&T needs
of other Agency elements not contained within the DDIR. This
would have the advantage of command authority to approach every
step from recruitment to career development, thus making it
possible to gain efficiencies in the recruitment and training
processes and the maximum opportunity for developing rounded
capabilities of the maximura number of people. including getting
the "right man for the right job. " By so placing responsibility,
expertise in all of those management aspects could be developed
to a degree higher than in any one of several smaller components.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0
0
' 8-
d. To supplement its internal scientific capabilities, it is
proposed that the Agency develop an outside contract of the
type. Such a contract can be of major assistance
in developing greater Agency capabilities in both the collection
and analysis fields. The Office of Scientific Intelliainnce et
This type assistance is particularly useful on a special project
basis where one desires to obtain highly qualified scientific
attention to a specific problem. It is not believed, however,
that this technique is a good Substitute for the development of a
strong in-house technical capability. The use of such a contract
just to circumvent Civil Service regulations would, in the long
run, drive out of the Agency its most qualified people and reduce
rather than improve its present high standards.
e. Since the recruitment of scientific manpower to fill the
wide variety of Agency needs is critical and urgent, it is rocorm-
mended that an an initial stop attempts be made to obtain on a
temporary consultant basis an individual experienced in the
recruitment of scientific pee rsonnel. This individual, whom we
might borrow from tither industry or some large university,
should survey the Agency seeds for such individuals and develop
a recruitment program designed to satisfy these needs. It is
hoped that during the period this program is being developed
that someone could be recruited to run this program on a continuing
basis and that the necessary supporting organization both in the
field and at Headquarters can be developed. while it is recognized
that successful recruiting is dependent on the individual efforts of
many persons, it is not believed that the present rather haphazard
system is satisfactory to achieve the high quality manpower which
this Agency must have.
4. In summary, it is recommended that you approve in general
the following actions. The details of the various transfers can then
be discussed with the heads of the components involved. The cases
in which resolution cannot be achieved between the DD/let and the
other components will be referred to you for resolution.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
(3) The development of a working agreement between DD/P
and DD/R on their various responsibilities for technical
collection along the lines discussed in paragraph 2. b. (2).
-9-
16
Recomme]
W" The Special Projeets components of Development iirojects
Division be formally transferred to the DD/R. as of I March.
b. Discussions be held with DD/P and Chief, Technic
Services Division relative to:
(1) The transfer of the R&D and laboratory testing
components of TSI3 to the DD/R;
(2) The establishment of a technical services organization
within the DD/P using the remainder of TSD as a nucleus
to caryy out the operational testing, procurement and field
maintenance of technical devices to assist clandestine
operations; and
.0
d. The Office of Scientific Intelligence be transferred to the
DD/R.
e. A scientific and technical career service under the chair-
manship of the DD/R be established to satisfy Agency-wide needs.
f. An expert consultant on SECT recruitment be immediately
procured.
Attachment: A2mex A.
Recommendations in para. 4 APPROVED:
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research) .
Director of Central Intelligence Date
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 .fa.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
t'JE VUU_L-.IJ -,
? ? DD/S 62-0792
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman
Reorganization Committee
SUBJECT : Organization of Support to the Clandestine Services
1. In the early stages of development of the Clandestine Services following
World War II and prior to the Korean emergency, virtually no trained Support Offi-
cers, with the exception of some Finance Officers at a few of the larger stations,
were stationed physically with the Clandestine Services either at headquarters or
abroad. Support functions were usually performed by Case Officers untrained for
support responsibilities; obligation records were not properly maintained, supply
accounting was minimal, and personnel were promoted according to the grade of
position occupied without competition. As the Agency matured and grew, it became
necessary to introduce obligation records, to improve accounting for both money
and property, to provide central procurement of supplies and equipment, to estab-
lish more formal control over the hiring and promotion of personnel, etc., and to
develop a number of other management devices and systems.
2. Until sometime after the Korean War new employees required to per-
form support functions in the Clandestine Services were usually assigned immedi-
ately to the Clandestine Services both at headquarters and abroad with little or no
training or orientation by Central Support Components in Agency policy, regula-
tions, and procedures. The requirements generated by the Korean emergency left
us little choice. The result, however, was less than satisfactory to, the manage-
ment of the Clandestine Services and the Agency. During this same period the
Central Support Offices were expanding in order to cope with their responsibilities;
the employees hired by these components were also to be relatively ineffective until
they received both formal and on-the-job training and orientation in the unique re-
quirements of the Clandestine Services. Throughout this period we were searching
for a formula which would provide timely and adequate support to the Clandestine
Services with due recognition for security and compartmentation and at the same
time best and most economically serve the Agency as a whole. There were those
who felt strongly that nothing short of a complete Support Organization within the
Clandestine Services with no outside supervision would be satisfactory. At the
other extreme were those just as confident that a Central Support Organization
could do the job.
3. The system which we have today grew out Qf certain basic decisions made
in December of 1951.. Significant excerpts from the minutes of a 10 December 1951
meeting at which these decisions were made follow:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
%K6lJt1a L U ?
"2. a. The DD/A is in charge of and directly responsible to the
DCI for all administrative support for the Agency.
"b. Present administrative support facilities will not be dupli-
cated at any level for the purpose of providing to the DD/P, or Offices
under his supervision, separate, independent or semi-independent
administrative support facilities."
"3. It shall be the responsibility of the DD/A to determine whether
the administrative support facilities can adequately support a proposed
program or project, and when necessary the DD/P or his representative
shall, in consultation with the DD/A or his representative, modify the
proposed program to the extent necessary to insure that the program can
be adequately supported.
"4. Subject to whatever conditions or limitations the DCI may see
fit to impose upon a given project or program under the DD/P, the DD/P
shall have responsibility for its successful implementation and freedom
to develop the program according to his own judgment, insuring, of
course, that it is developed in a manner which can be administratively
supported according to the agreed upon administrative support plan.
However, the DCI (through the DD/A) reserves the right to inspect and
audit all programs to insure that they are implemented properly and in
accordance with approved directives. "
4. While we might express these principles in slightly different terms today,
I believe that they have stood the ten-year test reasonably well. Adhering to them,
we have come to recognize in practice that:
a. Those services which can be performed most efficiently and
economically by the Central Support Components without jeopardizing
security should be and are so performed; (The Development Projects
Division may be an exception. It does have certain self-contained Sup-
port Components which parallel in part the Central Support Organiza-
tion.)
b. The DD/S and the Heads of the various Support Components
have staff responsibility for support at all levels and locations of the
Agency;
c. The Central Support Components are responsible for hiring,
training, and supplying Support Specialists to all components at all
levels at headquarters and in the field. This is most important;
-2-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 iik Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
OF T"ET , . ?
d. The DD/P Area Division or comparable Staff Chief is the
Executive Agent for all CIA activities in his area and, therefore,
within this area has over-all line responsibility for all activities,
including support. In order to discharge this responsibility it is
essential that he have some specialized support competence in his
organization and under his command in order to ensure adequate
and timely support from the Central Support Components in a man-
ner which will still serve the "need-to-know" principle. (This is
not unlike a military Field Commander who has on his Staff certain
specialists such as a Finance Officer, Signal Officer, Ordnance Of-
ficer, etc., while at the same time drawing a large measure of his
support from other Service units not a part of his command.)
5. I believe that our present system of support to the Clandestine Services,
which we have continued to improve through the past ten years, is now working sat-
isfactorily and that there is no reason to make radical changes at this time; specifi-
cally, I believe that it would be most unwise to charge the Central Support Compo-
nents with functions now recognized as an inherent part of the command responsibil-
ity of the Agency's Executive Agent in the Clandestine Services, i.e., the Division
Chief. Finance, Personnel, Logistics and other Support representatives within Area
Divisions of the Clandestine Services--by virtue of their proximity to,and specific
knowledge of an Area Division's projects, overseas stations and particular adminis-
trative problems--lend a special assistance which would be difficult to duplicate by
Central Support Components. The workload of the Central Support Components has
increased tremendously during the past several years without a corresponding in-
crease in personnel. They could not assume these additional duties without an in-
crease. Further, I believe that the principles of good security, compartmentation,
and need-to-know would not be as well served as they are now.
6. It is my belief that, due to cover and ceiling limitations, Field Station
Chiefs are inclined to reduce. Support Staffs to the bare minimum in order to accom-
modate the maximum number of Operations and Intelligence Officers within their
over-all complement, and that there is virtually no possibility of duplication.. To .
me, therefore, the problem resolves itself into a question of whether there is unnec-
essary duplication between the- Support Components and the Clandestine Services at
headquarters. Here the chances for duplication in support functions, except Person-
nel, Finance, and Logistics, are also very slight. I have been advised that as of
about some reduction, I do not believe that it would be very substantial.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
~ tv~
W is ""-~L ~ 10
7. In summary, I believe that the present organization, system, and pro-
cedures for support to the Clandestine Services are sound and are working satisfac-
torily, and I see no reason for change at this time. DD/S in consultation with DD/P
should, of course, continue to make every effort to improve the system and its
procedures so as to maintain the total number of personnel engaged in support func-
tions at a minimum.
L. K. White
Deputy Director
(Support)
cc: DD/P
SSA-DD/S
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Deputy Director /Support
We were generally quite favorably impressed with the caliber
of the office chiefs of the DD/S area and with the organization and
work of these offices. We have recommended elsewhere that the
Office of the Comptroller, the General Counsel, and the Audit Staff
be transferred out of the DD/S area.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 `Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
. SEC
REi
llll/5-bZ-U192
T 3T.
15 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
SUBJECT : Budgetary Procedure and Accounting Controls
REFERENCE : Memo dtd 13 Jan 62 to L.B. Kirkpatrick via DD/S fr
Compt, same subject
Pursuant to your request I am forwarding the attached
memorandum from Ed Saunders on "budgetary procedure and accounting con-
trols." I think that it can be summarized as follows:
(1) The Comptroller does not participate in the preparation
of the DD/P budget prior to its submission to the Bureau of the Budget.
(2) PRC consideration of country programs and other projects
is rather perfunctory.
(3) A substantial part of the DD/P budget, particularly DPD,
is not considered by the Project Review Committee.
(4) In many instances DD/P requests for releases from the
Reserve are not coordinated with the Comptroller prior to approval by the
Director.
(5) DD/P liaison with the Bureau of the Budget, and sometimes
other agencies, is carried on rather extensively without coordination with the
Comptroller.
(6) In some cases (Project is a good example) the Direc-
tor has, for security reasons, made the Area Division Chiefs responsible for
certifying to the expenditure of funds, and in such cases it is not uncommon to
find that expenditures are not properly documented or supported.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
SECRET
(7) With the exception of cases in which the Comptroller has
been excluded from full participation, such as 0 our controls, accounto
ings and audits are good. Our problems in connection with audit are primarily
in the field of proprietary projects. We have had considerable difficulty in the
past, but at the moment we know of only one project not being
audited on schedule. I reported to the Director on this in July of last year and
believe that we are about to obtain full agreement to start an audit of this Pro-
ject in the very. near future.
1 Att:
Referenced memorandum
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 T~,Iw / n - i 0 iI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
1 3 JAN t962 %
MGMORA1TDUM FOR: Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)
SUBJECT : Budgetary Procedure and Accounting Controls
1. It is my understanding that Mr. McCone gained an erroneous
impression that approximately of the Agency's funds are
not under good accounting control. s impression presumably was
obtained from my briefing on the activities of the Comptroller's Office,
particularly that part of the briefing which involved an explanation of
the budgetary procedure. It was pointed out that the Office of the
Comptroller does not make a detailed review of the estimates submitted
by the Deputy Director (Plans) nor are any hearings held by the Comptroller
with components of the Plans Area prior to submission of the estimates
to the Bureau of the Budget. It was stated that the estimates of the
Plans Area are included as presented by DD/P. In contrast, Mr. McCone
was informed that a detailed review is made of the estimates submitted
by the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and the Deputy Director (Support)
and that hearings are also held by the Comptroller with the Intelligence
and Support operating components where additional justification and
explanations are given in support of the estimates. Also, during the
briefing, it was pointed out that approximately of the
Agency funds were expended under the certification or the-=--and,
coincidentally, the estimates for the Plans Area on the budget chart
were in the neighborhood of of the totals shown. The
total for the Plans Area, however, prove es for both
Another factor which may have contributed
to a misunderstanding was the statement that the PRC only makes cursory
review of the over-all totals of the Agency's budget prior to approval by
the Director.
2. Due to the fact that the briefing was terminated prior to
completion, we did not get to discussing disbursing activities and
accounting controls in any detail.
3. The following information on the Agency's budgetary and accounting
controls is submitted in accordance with your request. In addition, I am
including my comments on certain items.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
el-. BUDGET REVIEW
a. In late Spring of each calendar year, the Comptroller's
Office receives Operating Budget Estimates for the succeeding
fiscal year and Preliminary Estimates for the following budget
year from all elements of the Agency. The estimates are reviewed
in considerable detail and hearings are held on all activities in
the Support and Intelligence Areas. The Plans Area estimates are
not similarly reviewed.
b. In the Plans Area an internal pro ranuni. c rcl~is carried 5,-/s v Lp
out in which the rnrm+rpl l ar! c (1f'f c~ S~nOt &x l A to This
programming exercise culminates in the submission of Operational
Programs of each Area Division of DD/P to the Projects Review
Committee. Summary information is made available to the Comptroller
whose comments are submitted to the PRC. These comments call
attention to over-all trends and related general questions. The
items contained in the programs are listed in over-all amounts and
do not contain much information as to how the amounts were determined.
The discussion in PRC is usually limited to general policies and, on
occasion, individual projects are reviewed as to operational value.
The program of the Development Projects Division is prepared and
submite tc~ i rectory f'or approval_b_y the Deputy Director (Plans)
Programs for the staff officesfof the Plans Area are approvey -
Deputy Director (Plans).
c. The estimates contained in the Operational Programs are
used by the elements of the Plans Area in preparing their Operating
Budget and Preliminary Estimates. These estimates, when received
by the Office of the Comptroller, are combined with the estimates
of the Support and Intelligence Areas into a series of three over-all
Agency papers prepared for the review of and approval by the PRC and
the Director. These three papers are: (1) Operating Budget for the
succeeding fiscal year, (2) Preliminary Estimates for the following
budget year, and (3) Personnel Estimates for the two fiscal years.
The review by PRC and the Director establishes the over-all funds
and personnel estimates limitations at the Deputy Directors' level.
Based on the decision made by the Director, the offices prepare
detailed estimates. The Agency's budget is then prepared by the
Office of the Comptroller and submitted to the Bureau of the Budget.
d. During the review of the Agency Estimates by the Bureau of
the Budget, hearings are held on the Plans Area. The Comptroller's
Office assists in defending the estimates to the best of its ability
without having the benefit of a detailed review and hearing prior to
meeting with the Bureau of the Budget.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
f
e. It is the opinion of the Comptroller that the budget
estimates of the Plans Area should be subject to the same review
as other budget estimates of the Agency with the provision that Gib
the review of certain sensitive operations will be limited to
specifically cleared officials in the Office of the Comptroller.
This is not to suggest that the Comptroller be placed in the
position of making operational determinations.
f. Further, it is the opinion of the Comptroller, that PRC
should devote more time in reviewing and providing program guidance
affecting budget and financial requirements of the Agency. I
recommend this approach because I realize that top officials of Oe
the Agency do not have time to make a detailed budget review.
It would be more appropriate for a committee headed by the
Comptroller to make the more detailed review after the Budget
Division has completed its study and compiled estimates.
IT AGENCIES
a. As I have been discussing problem areas in the budgetary and
financial field, I think it would be appropriate to discuss the area of
liaison with other Government Agencies. According to Agency Regulations,
the Comptroller has the responsibility for controlling all liaison and
contacts with the Bureau of the Budget. It is not uncommon for the
Bureau's Examiners to contact Agency officials and to address mail to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
-4-
them although the first correspondence originated in the Office
of the Comptroller. At times, the Comptroller has been informed
by Bureau Examiners of contacts made by Agency officials and
decisions reached relative to budgetary and financial matters.
b. The Comptroller also has the responsibility of supervising
all liaison with other Agencies in connection with budget and
finance matters. It is not at all uncommon to receive a call,
particularly from the Department of Defense, advising that the
Department has funds available for transfer for a given project
or purpose and the Comptroller has no knowledge of the activity
or the transfer of any funds.
c. Liaison in the budget and financial field, if not fully
coordinated and controlled, can lead to the making of conflicting
statements, confusion and embarrassment to the Agency which may
have a profound effect in obtaining the required funds for Agency
operations.
d. A notice or memorandum should be published emphasizing
the responsibility of the Comptroller in this field.
8. ACCOUNTING AND CON ROL OF AGENCY FUNDS
All funds available to the Agency are accounted for and controlled
in substantial conformance with principles prescribed by the General
Accounting Office. Such funds are identified as vouchered or confidential,
depending on the purpose for which used, as explained below:
a. Vouchered Funds
Funds used for the payment of all claims which because
of their nature can be overtly identified with the Agency
are classified as vouchered funds. Such transactions are
completely supported by documentation conforming to the
requirements of the General Accounting Office. All vouchered
fund transactions are individually approved by authorized
approving officers of the component responsible therefor,
audited for correctness before payment, and certified by
authorized certifying officers prior to being recorded as
expenditures of appropriated funds, and they are subject
to final audit by the General Accounting Office. These
transactions do not require certification by the Director.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
25X1
d. In summary, all Agency financial transactions are accounted
for either consistently with requirements applicable to normal 25X1
Government Agencies or under comprehensive procedures established
within the Agency for control of confidential funds transactions.
^lhus, accounting techniques are provided for the financial control
of all activities regardless of sensitivity.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
10. SURVEYS OF ACCOUNTING AND FUND CONTROLS
a. In 195+, of the Special Study Group
reviewed the Agent Cashier procedures and rendered the
following report:
"In my opinion the procedures which are now
being used are adequate for the handling and
safekeeping of agent cashier funds."
b. The Inspector General made a study in 1957 and rendered
a report to the Director dated 2 October 1957 on the cash controls
of this Office. In his conclusions the IG stated that "the physical
handling of cash within the Agency is on a sound basis and except
for human error and occasional lapses of supervisory judgment
represents no cause for concern."
c. The controls of cash that were reviewed in those surveys
have been maintained and improved.
d. Also, in the IG study of 1957, a review was made of the
over-all control of Agency expenditures. The conclusions contained
in that study were that eighty-four per cent of Agency expenditures
in Fiscal Year 1956 were "supported by sound financial records and
accounts, consistent with the best accepted standards of public
accounting" and that only sixteen per cent of Agency expenditures
are not as completely supported. The report states that for this
relatively small percentage "the Agency is uniquely dependent upon
the character and integrity of operating personnel to insure that
funds are, in fact, expended for the purposes intended." Since
this report, the ratio has been improved to the point that the
Agency's expenditures for Fiscal Year 1961 in the first category
have increased from eighty-four per cent to ninety-one percent
and the second category has been reduced from sixteen per cent
to only nine per cent.
E. SAUNDERS
E.
Comptroller
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
1 -10RANDUM FOR: 11r. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Chairman, 1-forking Group
SUBJECT : Agency Planning Policy and Financial Review
1. Because of the number of persons involved in the various inter-
related actions and decisions leading to Agency policy and budget prepa-
ration, coordination at the Agency level is a problem. It is the opinion
of this Office that the areas of coverage and the tasks to perform are too
large and complex for assignment to the Project Review Committee as it is
presently constituted. It is recommended, therefore, that the Project
Review Committee be relieved of its financial and detailed project review
functions and be reconstituted as a "Policy Review Committee". All of the
present financial and project review functions together with additional
ones should be assigned to a new group, the "Budget and Financial Advisory
Committee".
2. Briefly, these two committees would perform the following functions:
a. Policy Review Committee
(1) A continuing review, appraisal, and evaluation of
Agency performance.
(2) Review issuances from the President, the National
Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget, and other
Government agencies for possible effect on CIA.
(3) Review and evaluate policy recommendations from
the Deputy Directors for Plans, Intelligence, and Support
and the Inspector General.
(4+) Prepare Agency policy recommendations for the
approval of the Director.
(5) Prepare recommended Planning Guides covering Agency
objectives, policy, and assumptions. tThen approved by the
Director, the Guides would serve as the basis for the develop-
ment of programs, projects, and activities and related budgets.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
fi ? . .
- 2 -
b. Budget and Financial Advisory Committee
(1) Reviews all:
(a) Preliminary budget estimates.
(b) Operating budgets.
(c) Proposals for releases from the Reserve for
Contingencies.
(d) Proposals for major shifts of funds during the
operating year.
(e) Project proposals requiring the approval of the
Director.
(f) Any other financial matter that requires the
approval of the Director.
(2) Hold hearings as required.
(3) Prepare reports and recommendations to the Director
concerning budgets and other financial matters.
(4) Conduct any financial study (review, analysis,
evaluation, and recommendation) that the Director may
require.
Unresolved questions concerning Agency program objectives and policy appli-
cations that will be raised during the "Budget and Financial Advisory
Committee" meetings should be referred to and resolved by the "Policy Review
Committee".
3. Drafts setting forth the proposed Committees' functions, composition,
and procedure in more detail are attached. Although these drafts reflect the
present organizational structure of the Agency, they can easily be modified
to any changes that may occur.
Attachments
Tab "A" - Policy Review Committee
Tab "B" - Budget and Financial Advisory Committee
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Each Government agency is faced with making decisions that are of major
importance from program or activity, economic, and political points of view.
The first step in the conduct of activities is the determination of policy
objectives. The process culminates in the allocation of national resources to
carry out approved programs and projects. The responsibility for the development
of policy objectives for the Agency is assigned to the Policy Review Committee.
1.Iembership
The Policy Review Committee is composed of the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence as Chairman; the Deputy Directors for Plans, :intelligence, and
Support and the Inspector General as voting members; and the General Counsel
and the Comptroller as advisory members. The Committee can designate additional
advisory members as required. The Committee appoints an Agency Officer as
Secretary.
Functions
The Policy Review Committee performs a continuing appraisal and evaluation
of Agency programs and activities in the light of resources available and the
broad national security policies and objectives proposed by the National Security
Council and approved by the President. The Committee recommends to the Director
Planning Guide papers covering objectives, policy, and assumptions.
Procedure
The Committee prepares at least two Planning Guides each fiscal year. The
main purpose of the first guide issued by 1 December, is to provide objectives,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
- 2 -
policy, and assumption guidance for use in preparing Agency programs and
preliminary budget requirements for the fiscal year beginning approximately
eighteen months hence and for long-range forecasts for successive fiscal years.
The second guide is issued by 1 April to provide guidance for the preparation
of Operating Budgets for the fiscal year beginning three months hence and to
revise the preliminary estimates guide to the extent necessary. Amendments to
Planning Guides are issued as required to provide for changes in Agency objectives
and policy dictated by changes in national objectives and policy.
Issuances from the President, the National Security Council, the Bureau of
the Budget, other Government agencies, and recommendations from the Deputy
Directors for Plans, Intelligence, and Support and the Inspector General form
the basis for considerations of the Policy Review Committee. Meetings are
called by the Chairman. Materials for consideration should be in the hands of
members at least five (5) trork days before scheduled meetings. Urgent cases
requiring an emergency meeting can be provided for in a shorter period.
Although no transcript is made of meetings, the Secretary summarizes the
proceedings and prepares drafts of Planning Guide papers. Final papers recom-
mended to the Director are signed by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee.
Dissenter(s) from the recommended paper prepare and sign any minority reports.
Planning Guide Authority
Approved Planning Guides are issued to the Deputy Directors of major
components and form the basis for all Agency activities and the development of
financial requirements. The Deputy Directors develop additional detailed
objectives, policies, and assumptions that may be required to assist the offices
under their jurisdiction.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Because of the number of persons involved in preparing and executing a
budget, and the various interrelated actions and decisions, coordination at
the Agency level becomes a problem. A high level committee is required to
review and evaluate budget requests and other financial matters and to make
recommendations to the Director. This committee serves in an advisory capacity
and does not take final action. Thus, its review can be impartial and objective
and its recommendations can be directed toward securing decisions that reflect
the most effective, efficient, and economical use of Agency resources.
Membership
The Budget and Financial Advisory Committee is chaired by the Comptroller.
The Comptroller is responsible for advising on the financial implications of all
program proposals. The Comptroller also provides for the administrative and
technical needs of the Advisory Committee. These needs are such as arranging
for hearings; providing agenda, secretarial, and technical assistance; and the
preparation of reports and recommendations to the Director. Members of the
Committee are high level Operating Officials representing the major programs of
the Agency. Membership, other than the Chairman, is not fixed by position but
remains flexible to provide for shifts in program emphasis. The Committee is not
too large so as to make the conduct of meetings unnreidly, nor is it too small so
as to prevent adequate coverage. Under the present Agency organizational structure,
the best approach to membership is to have the Deputy Directors of the three major
components nominate a high level representative and the Deputy Director of the
Agency nominate one to represent general Agency management and program in the
Directorts area. All nominations must be approved by the Director.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Functions
The Budget and Financial Advisory Committee performs the following functions:
a. Reviews all:
(1) Preliminary budget estimates.
(2) Operating budgets.
(3) Proposals for releases from the Reserve for Contingencies.
(l) Proposals for major shifts of funds during the operating year.
(5) Project proposals requiring the approval of the Director.
(6) Any other financial matter that requires the approval of the
Director.
b. Holds hearings as required.
c. Submits reports and recommendations to the Director.
d. Makes any other financial study (review, analysis, evaluation, and
recommendation) as the Director may require.
Procedure
Committee meetings are arranged by the Comptroller. Jul material necessary
for a meeting should be in the hands of Committee members at least five (5) work
days before scheduled meetings. Urgent cases requiring an emergency meeting can
be provided for in a shorter period.
Materials for Committee meetings are determined by the requirements of the
Committee members. In general, analyses prepared by the Budget Division, Office
of the Comptroller, form the basis for discussion. The Committee can call on any
Office for any technical assistance deemed necessary.
Meetings are informal. Although no transcript is made of meetings and
hearings, the Comptroller provides a secretary to the Committee to summarize
proceedings and to prepare the required reports.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
-3-
The reports and recommendations reflect the majority opinion; minority
opinions can be submitted but are the responsibility of the minority. All
reports and recommendations must be submitted in irriting and signed by the
Chairman on behalf of the majority; minority opinions are signed by the
dissenter(s).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
USIB-M-193
5 January 1962
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Minutes of
One -hundred-ninety-third Meeting
United States Intelligence Board
USIB Conference Room
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1030 hours, 5 January 1962
Director of Central Intelligence
John A. McCone
Presiding
Mr.. Robert Amory, Jr. ,. acting. for. Deputy,Dir-ector of Central Intelligence
Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
Agency
Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Rear AdmiralVT`rnon L. Lowrance, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
(Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
United States Air Force
acting for Director, National Security Agency
Major General Richard,Collins, Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative to iJ SIB
Mr. Alan Belmont, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation representative
to USIB
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
USIB-M- 193
5 January 1962
1. Approval of Minutes
28 December Meeting
(USIB-M-192, including Annex
distributed. through. special
channels)
Approved as circulated, including the Special Annex.
which had been requested by the State Department. The Board concurred
in the initiation. of this. estimate.
a. Watch Committee Report
No. 596
b. Watch Committee Report
No. 595
c. Weekly Survey of Cold War
Crisis Situations (No. 1-62)
Approved as. amended.
of Working Group
Mr. McCone noted that in order. to carry out the mandate of the
President with. respect.to the questions of organization. of the intelligence
community and the: CIA he had established a small group to work with. him
in studying these problems.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
USIB-M-193
5 January 1962
He had relieved the Inspector General of.CIA, Mr. Lyman B.
Kirkpatrick, Jr. ,. of his responsibilities as Inspector General for
approximately a 90-day period in order. to work full time on this project.
To assist Mr. Kirkpatrick, he had been fortunate in obtaining the assistance
of General Cortlandt Schuyler, USA, Ret. , and Mr. J. Patrick 'Coyne,
Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
Mr. McCone noted that, in the course of their study of these problems, this
group may wish to discuss pertinent matters with representatives of the
various Board departments and agencies.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
SECRET
USIB - M-.19 3
.5 January 1962
7. Release of NIE 29. 3-61
The Outlook for Cyprus
(Memorandum for USIB, 3 January)
9. Collection of Intelligence
on Albania
Mr. Hilsman referred to messages, which had.-been sent by the
Department of State to various. diplomatic posts abroad, emphasizing the
need for additional information on Albania, and. to other steps, taken to
increase intelligence coverage of that country. However, he- indicated
his. continuing concern with this. problem, despite some improvement in
the U. S., intelligence: collection. capability with respect to that area. After
*This. Post-Mortem, as. approved by the Board,. will be circulated as
USIB-D-15.2/ 79, Final, 5- January 1962.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
SECRET
USIB-M-193
5 January 1962
a general discussion the members- concurred in the view that the relevant
Board agencies should check further, into the. present status of, and .attempt
to augment their respective intelligence collection efforts on, Albania,. as
appropriate.
Executive' Secretary
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0
CONFIDENTIAL
1. I am establishing a small working group to study the
organizational structure of the Agency, the scope of its activi-
ties, the inter-relationship of the Agency and the intelligence
community, and various aspects of the organization of the
intelligence community as a whole. I have asked the Inspector
General, Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., to chair this working
group.
2. For the duration of this working group,
is named Acting Inspector General.
3. Mr. Kirkpatrick will continue to give guidance and general
supervision to the Legislative Counsel on my behalf.
4. Mr. Kirkpatrick will continue to have the responsibility
for monitoring all liaison with the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
HN A. McCONE
r of Central Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
1. Effective 17 February 1962, Mr. Richard Helms is
appointed Deputy Director (Plans) vice Mr. Richard Bissell who
has submitted his resignation.
2. The organization of the DD/P is currently being
studied and certain changes are contemplated. There will be
created a Deputy Director for Research and Development and
certain of the Research and Development functions now
administered by the Deputy Director (Plans) will be transferred
to that Deputy.
3. Additional announcements will be made in the near
14 February 19
A. McCONE
f Central Intelligence
DISTRIBUTION: AB
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0 S V
16 February 1962
1. There is established effective 19 February 1962
the Office of Deputy Director for Research. Certain of the
activities of the Development Projects Division, DD/ P, will
also be transferred to DD/R. In the interest of strengthening
the Agency's technical and scientific capabilities by centralizing
such effort in one division, other activities in Research and
Development will be placed under DD/R as appropriate.
2. Effective 19 February 1962, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. ,
is appointed Deputy Director (Research).
3. Dr. Scoville will continue to act as Assistant Director
for Scientific Intelligence.
JpHN A. McCONE
Direct r of Central Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Vor
This Notice Expires 1 July 1962
20 March 1962
ANNOUNCEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
The following Organizational changes are effective 1 April 1962.
1. The Deputy Director (Support) is relieved of the responsibili-
ties prescribed in for directing and coordinating the activi-
ties of the General Counsel, the Audit Staff, and the Comptroller.
2. The Inspector General is established as a separate component
reporting to the Office of the Director. He will assume responsibility
for coordinating and directing the activities of the Audit Staff and is
relieved of his responsibility for providing general guidance and super-
vision to the Legislative Counsel.
3. The General Counsel will report to the Office of the Director
and will assume responsibility for general guidance and supervision
of the Legislative Counsel.
4. The Comptroller will report to the Office of the Director.
5. For purposes of this notice and related organizational matters,
the Office of the Director includes the Office of the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and other executive responsibilities assigned to
that office.
ohn A. M.c Cone
Direct r of Central Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0 ?
I hereby delegate to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
all authorities vested in me by law or by virtue of my position as
Director of Central Intelligence and head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, including, but not limited to, the certification authority
set forth in section 8(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949, as amended, except for any authorities the delegation of which
is prohibited by law.
All other delegations of authority currently in force remain
valid to the extent they are-not inconsistent with this delegation.
Director
[N A. McCONE
f Central Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
This Notice Expires 1 July 1962
20 March 1962
ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT TO KEY POSITION
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
V1
1. Last Fall Mr. Edward R. Saunders, Comptroller, made
plans to retire from the Federal Service sometime during 1962. In
early February he was involved in an automobile accident and suf-
fered serious injuries from which he is still recovering. Inasmuch
as the date on which he might be well enough to return to full duty
status is uncertain, he has applied for retirement to be effective at
an indefinite future date but not later than the expiration of his accrued
sick leave.
2. Effective 1 April 1962, Mr. Saunders is relieved of his responsi-
bilities and Mr. John A. Bross is appointed Comptroller.
3. In making this appointment you are advised that the responsi-
bilities of the Comptroller are to be substantially expanded, details of
which will be published later.
Jon A. McCone
Director If Central Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4 V
? . . V
(This notice is NOT to be filed in Agency
manuals. Please destroy after reading.)
Having been duly appointed and sworn, Lieutenant General Marshall
Sylvester Carter, USA, assumed his duties as Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence effective this date.
'OHN A. McCOI4E
3 April 1962
Director /f Central Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
20 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
1. The Director had lunch on 20 February 1962 with
Messrs. David Bell and Elmer Steats, Director and Deputy Director
of the bureau of the Budget respectively, during which a lengthy
discussion was held on the proposed organizational changes to be
made in the Central Intelligence Agency.' Both Messrs. Bell and
Staats expressed enthusiastic satisfaction with the changes to be Made.
2. The Director advised that the selection of the Deputy at the
moment is unresolved.
25X1
scut ve cer
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0
February 14, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick
I have advised Mr. Bell, Director of the Budget, that we
were rapidly crystalizing views on organization, and asked if he
wished to comment. He expressed great interest, but did not
express a desire to indicate approval before changes are made.
I therefore plan to meet with him after my return from
Europe (if I go). However, I did state as an interim measure that
you and/or Mr. Coyne discuss plans briefly with Mr. Macy, or
his successor. This I would hope could be done this week.
John A. McCone
Director
cc: General Schuyler
Mr. Coyne
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
'-% THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Office of the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: INR Proposal for Cold War Survey
I promised to send you a copy of our original proposal made last
summer to handle the cold war survey problem. This proposal, which
I raised at the USIB meeting on July 25, 1961, is attached. In es-
sence, it suggests that the CIB mechanism, with some modification, would
be the best way to handle "cold war" items.
Our proposal opposed the idea for meeting the requirement for
early warning of cold war crisis situations by setting up a new
mechanism. Our view did not prevail and, as you know, CIA/ONE ac-
quired responsibility for production of the "Weekly Survey of Cold War
Crisis Situations".
We still believe that our proposal has much to be said for it.
We still feel that a special mechanism to keep an eye on critical
situations is unnecessary and that the CIB procedure with some neces-
sary modifications could more effectively accomplish the same thing.
We still believe, as we did last summer, that this proposition is true
only if the CIB mechanism is modified to provide both for a wider range
of speculation by the USIB member agency responsible for the type of
information in question and for an uninhibited opportunity for dissent
by the other USIB agencies. Given these adjustments, the CIB mechanism
is more likely to provide meaningful early warning of critical changes
in situations. In this connection the desirability of improved com-
munications between the widely dispersed intelligence agencies remains
self-evident.
o?gwwql s m LaEnclosure:
As noted.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
SECRET
July 25, 1,061
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
SUE=T: Early Warning of "Cold War" Crisis Situations
N
The Department of State believes that a committee mechanism in
the usual sense would be inappropriate for meeting the requirement for
early warning of cold war crisis situations set forth in
Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum of July 24 for the Director of Central
Intelligence (USIB-D-28-I/1). The requirement would best be met, in
the Department's opinion, through a mechanism which would bring the
existing resources of the Intelligence Community-to bear directly, and
not through a committee, on the problem.
In this the Department is guided by the following considerations:
1. At any given moment there may be several situations in. the
world'of a critical nature or of a nature which makes their development
into critical situations on short notice possible;
2. In recognizing such situations and assessing their significance
a wide range of specialized knowledge is often necessary;
.3. To some degree early warning of the type required of necessity
involves speculative opinion and an effort to develop a unanimous
community view would tend to inhibit such speculation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
SECRET
The Department believes that an answer to the problem posed might
lie in:
1. Speeding up the flow of current intelligence items of community
or national interest among USIB member agencies and from TJSIB member
agencies to the White House; and
2. Changing the mechanism of the Central Intelligence Bulletin
(CIB) to provide for (a) a wider range of speculation by the USIB
member. agency responsible for the type of information in question and
(b) an uninhibited opportunity for dissent, if desired, by other USIB
agencies.
Specifically, the Department suggests that the Intelligence Board
consider establishing a secure teletype circuit among USIB member agencies
to be used exclusively for current intelligence reporting and Watch
Committee business. The White House and the National Indications Center
(NIC) would also be on this circuit. The USIB agencies would put onto
this circuit any current intelligence items lying within the field of
their responsibility or competence which they believed would be of
interest to others. This process would furnish a timely written record
of such items and would permit distribution to interested officials
within the recipient agencies. The circuit would also furnish a forum
for further discussion and dissent.
The Department further suggests that the present CIB procedure
be modified to make it a vehicle for the views of the responsible agencies
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
-3?
with opportunities for dissent and contrary interpretation by other
agencies. Toward the end of the day a panel of this new "CIB" -- perhaps
renamed the "National Intelligence Bulletin" -- would meet under Central
Intelligence Agency chairmanship to select the items that had been on
the round robin current intelligence circuit and to resolve differences
of view if possible. The U SIB agency having primacy responsibility for
the type of information in question, however, should have the last word.
on the drafting of the basic items to go into the Bulletin while other
agencies would be able to express in their own language dissent or
differing interpretations of the item in question if they so desired.
The secure teletype circuit described above could also be used to
disseminate the conclusions of an emergency Watch Committee session and,,
when appropriate, to formulate such conclusions without a formal session
of the Watch Committee.
A system of message indicators should be worked out to identify
items of critical significance. This system could be used both for
messages on the current intelligence circuit'and for items included in
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4 ,
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
C, C A
30 January 1962
SUBJECT: Briefing at SAC, Tuesday, January 23
1. The general review of SAC's intelligence effort raised only a
few problems for further study. First, there seemed to be some con-
flicting views between what we heard at NPIC and what we heard at SAC.
For example, NPIC had stated that there were definitely confirmed SA 3
sites in the Baltic area and that SAC had agreed to this. SAC classed
these as "suspect". Further, Lundahl claimed that he had the best
equipment while SAC claimed they had better equipment which Lundahl
did not have.
2. The principal area for improvement seems to lie in the field of
estimates. As a result of a lengthy discussion on this subject, it is my
view that ONE is too wed to certain indicators; e. g., rail limes, SAM
sites, etc. The Germans in World War II started the V-2 with a com-
plicated launch system and ended with a very simple truck launch system.
Further, since the U-2, and with probable knowledge of our satellite
program, it would appear logical for the Russians to try and make their
launch sites innocuous. Further, there is 25X1
too great a dependence on photography. Great efforts -- and risks should
be expended to get more collateral. The espionage effort should be greatly
accelerated and more emphasis should be put on trying to read all Comint.
Finally, SAC'.s views should be solicited on estimates in their field of
interest prior to DIA completing their draft of the estimate.
Lyman 13. r patrick
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
Briefing Notes for Thursday, 1 February
1. The first briefing is by Chief of the Audit Staff.
He is appearing at this time because a is leaving next week on a three
week trip and we would not get him until after we had been completely
through the Agency. The Audit Staff is under the Deputy Director for
Support and is responsible for auditing Agency expenditures and sub-
mitting copies of the audit report to the DD/S and the IG as well as the
unit audited.
2. The second briefing is by Roger Hilsman, Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. We previously heard
from Hilsman's deputy, Thomas Hughes. Hilsman has some definite
views on certain intelligence matters such as the preparation of esti-
mates, the handling of current intelligence and control over clandestine
intelligence and covert action. Hilsman was formerly with the Library
of Congress, once wrote a book on intelligence, and during the war served
with the OSS 101 Detachment which operated behind Japanese lines in
Burma. I suggest that the bulk of our time be devoted to his views on
national estimates, and if there is any time left over, we discuss..the role
of the intelligence staff in the Department of State.
3. Sherman Kent, Assistant Director for National Estimates of CIA,
is scheduled for 2:00 and may consume all afternoon. He has been in the
hospital and so we have not had a chance to talk to him until now and he
will be leaving for Florida at the end of the week. Kent has been with the
Board of Estimates practically since its founding, is a former Yale pro-
fessor of history who spent a year on the faculty of the National War
College during which time he wrote the book "Strategic Intelligence".
More than any one other single individual he is responsible for the esti-
mative process as it has presently evolved. He is an ardent supporter
of the estimates being those of the DCI with others dissenting. I would
suggest that we cover particularly the following:
a. The feasibility of the military and/or State drafting the
basic estimate when it lies within their particular field of competence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
b. The quality of the contributions by the various departments
including the offices of CIA.
c. The system whereby JAEIC drafts the basic Atomic Energy
estimates and differs from the method by which all other estimates are
prepared.
d. Why so little of the original contributions ever appear in the
final versions.
e. The quality of the personnel on the Board of Estimates.
f. The advantage of having retired military vs. active military
on the Board of Estimates.
g.
The desirability of having a Foreign Service officer on the
h.
The preciseness of language of estimates.
i.
Whether the Board of Estimates sh
ould be dire
ctly under
j.
Whether the current intelligence fu
nction shoul
d be tied in
more closely or made a part of the estimating function.
Lyman B Kirkpatrick
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4 c~
i a f
Briefing Notes for Friday, 2 February
1. Mr. Richard Helms is the Chief of Operations of the DD/P
and as such should be the No. 2 man in the Clandestine Services.
However, in recent years there has been confusion created by the
fact that an "Assistant DD/P for Covert Operations" was named and
his responsibilities never clearly defined. Helms is the most ex-
perienced senior officer in the Clandestine Services at present --
his work in clandestine intelligence operations dates back to OSS days.
His only previous working experience before that was as a foreign
correspondent for the United Press in Germany. I believe that I know
his work capabilities quite well as he was my deputy when I was Asst.
Director for Special Operations in 1951 and 1952 and that office ran
all espionage and counter espionage operations. In my opinion he
deserves great credit for holding the Clandestine Services together
during a long period in which the two DD/Ps were poor managers.
The more that we can draw him out on some of the problems in the
Clandestine Services, the better picture we will. get of the organization's
capabilities.
2. Mr. Lloyd George (no relation to the British Prime Minister)
is Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. His experience
also dates back to OSS. He has served primarily in the Far East in-
cluding during World War II and also Chief of the Far Eastern Division
of OSO. His Foreign Intelligence Staff is charged with developing doc-
trine and guiding espionage and counter espionage operations. He is a
careful, cautious, experienced officer.
,,,..ice..
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Notes on Working Group Activities -- 28 February - 2 March 1962
1. Inasmuch as I will have to be absent from approximately
11 a. m. Wednesday until noon Thursday in order to go to Princeton
to participate in a panel on careers, I am noting some suggestions
for discussion on the briefings for this week.
Z. We open with Mr. Sheldon who wants to discuss with us the
merger of ONE and OCI which he favors, as well as where all of the
Comint and Elint activities in the Agency should be centralized. Our
second meeting is with Messrs. Bissell, Cunningham, Helms and
Scoville and is at the Director's specific request and concerns whether
DDR&D should operate as well as develop. You will recall that we
have made some rather specific comments in this regard to Mr. McCone.
3. At 11:30 we meet with Tracy Barnes to go into greater detail
Mr. McCone asked that we examine
in some depth Barnes' proposals and this will afford that opportunity.
4. Inasmuch as Dr. Scoville will be away Thursday and Friday,
he is scheduled for two hours starting at one o'clock for a wrap up
discussion of what should go under the Deputy for Research and Develop-
ment. I understand that there has been some further discussion about
putting OSI and NPIC under the DDR&D and I strongly recommend that
we hold the line toward leaving these two offices under the DD/I.
r,rhlilliff( t rAnPral Schuvler
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
S _N ?
5. The last session of the day starts at three o'clock with
on War Plans. You will recall that we saw him very
briefly in company with This time he is returning
with his deputy, and will describe in detail how the
Agency makes its war plans and how these are meshed with the require-
ments of the JCS. I believe that it is particularly important to probe
25X1 with both how practical are the JCS requirements and how
realistic are the CIA replies.
6. On Thursday, 1 March, the opening session for one hour is
with Col. Stanley Grogan, whose official title is Special Assistant to
the DCI, but who actually is the public relations officer of the Agency.
I am in considerable disagreement with the way the Agency's public
relations is presently being conducted. We are at this time providing
background briefings by our area experts to certain newspapermen on
various foreign areas and foreign subjects. I think it is wrong for
CIA to do this and that if it is done, it should be done by the Department
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Li (ri:tilir` r
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0 0
of State. Further, there are far too many newspapermen still seeing
senior CIA executives. CIA senior executives in my opinion should
have a passion for anonymity. Further, I believe you would find it
interesting to examine the genesis of the0 book, with particular
relation to the fact that he was provided with a folder of clippings by
CIA and had access to Mr. Dulles and perhaps other CIA officials. I
believe you both know that the President's Board and the White House
are very much opposed to publicity on the CIA.
7. The second session of the morning is with
who at present holds the title Executive Officer of the Agency, but who
in effect runs the secretariat of the DCI's office. Over the last several
xecu ive Registry which is supposed to handle all of the materia for
the DCI's office. I wish you would examine this organization of the DCI's
office most carefully because I have been so close to it for so many
years that I may be overly prejudiced about what I feel is a very in-
efficient organization and operation. It is not at all unusual for my
office to get five or six calls about one appointment or trying to trace
carbon copies of one letter, or trying to find some paper which should
be filed in the Executive Registry. The Executive Registry has never
been used properly and in fact General Cabell's office used to make a
joke of the fact that they refused to use it. I neglected to mention at
the start that in addition to the above there is the DCI's personal security
staff which goes well beyond security functions and gets into all types of
administrative arrangements and in my mind only serves to duplicate
and confuse the above issue. Several years ago the deputies and my-
self on the Super Grade Board felt so strop 1 about this that we refused
to go along with the promotion of one of assistants until it
was simply made an issue that Mr. Dulles wanted it and therefore the
promotion was given. It was our opinion that it was not deserved and
that the DCI's office places a very great burden on the rest of the
Agency due to its inefficiency. I would suggest examining particularly
the allocation of responsibilities, the methods of handling corres-
pondence, the methods of handling memoranda and documents inter-
nally, and the general knowledgeability about what goes on in the Agency.
of the DDIP, is coming to lunch and talk about the
work of his staff. It is my understanding that his staff has recently
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
?
At 1:30 Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel
SSA/DDS,
are coming to continue
their discussion of the support mechanism in the clandestine services.
10. From 2:30 to 4:00 Col. White will meet with us for a wrap
up of the DD/S.
11. From 4 to 5:001 I Acting Director of
Training, will go over some matters in the training area that we have
not previously covered, in particular the work of the Assessment and
Evaluation Staff.
12. On Friday, 2 March, we open with a session with Lawrence
Houston, the General Counsel. This is followed by our second ses-
sion with Angleton, Chief of CI Staff, to discuss counter espionage,
and finally our wrap up session with Dick Helms on the DD/P. I
suggest that we then devote the last part of Friday to formulating
our conclusions and recommendations on CIA for Mr. McCone and
if possible meeting with him on this subject. Then, except for some
odds and ends we will have completed with the Agency and will be ready
to move into the intelligence community.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
.6
A. Director of Central Intelligence
1. President's personal representative on intelligence.
2. Member of NSC.
3. Briefs President and NSC.
4. Chairman of USIB.
5. Member of Special Group.
6. Member of Counter Insurgency Group.
7. Member of NSC Planning Board.
8. Briefs Congressional Committees.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
0 0 40
B. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1. Acts as DCI in the latter's absence.
2. Coordinates and directs the production of intelligence.
3. Chairs the Watch Committee.
4. Insures inter-agency coordination.
5. CIA member of USIB.
6. Assists DCI in preparation of intelligence briefings.
7. Supports DCI in preparation of national estimates and in
production of national current intelligence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
CiuV~Ul :U
C. Deputy Director: Management
1. Acts for DDCI in latter Is absence.
2. Chairs Agency Financial Policy Committee.
3. Chairs Agency Career Council.
4. Chairs Agency Supergrade Board.
5. Chairs Agency Publications Board.
6. Reviews and approves Agency regulations.
7. Reviews and approves senior Agency assignments.
8. Reviews and approves external contracts.
9. Approves Agency travel plans.
10. Reviews audit and Inspector General reports.
11. Conducts periodic review of security problems.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
This was prepared by John A. Mc Cone (DCI)
(probably about December 1961) and was given to
Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick (Chairman of the Kirkpatrick-
Schuyler-Coyne Working Group) and represents his
ideas on the organization of CIA.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4
ILLEGIB
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400010002-4