EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION TEHRAN, APRIL 28-30, 1960 U.S. VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 20, 1960
• Content Type: PAPER

_ DD/P0 0/41
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EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL sEssqy
sition Paper
U.S. Viem2.112fzhajaistan
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
TEH D-11/4
ave
April 20, 1960
thtici Ated Positions of Forsign Governments
le Pakistan has indicated that it intends to bring up the
aubjeat of Afghanistan during the session. Pakistan may express its
belief that the situation in Afghanistan, particularly as it affects
Pakistan, has deteriorated sharply since the last session (See sepa-
rate paper on han-Pakistan Relations), and contend that Afghanistan
is now, for all practical purPiiiel,-Wer Soviet domination, Pakistan
will probably express its concern about the threat of direct or indi-
rect aggression by Soviet-equipped and inspired Afghan forces. Paki-
stan may also express fears of Soviet-instigated tribal uprisings
along the Pak-Afghan border, and complain about the continued virulence
of Pushtunistan propaganda. Pakistan may propose a CENIO public
statement supporting Pakistan an the Pushtunistan question and con-
demning the Soviet Union for interfering in a local dispute. Pakistan
may also be expected to propose contingency military planning against
Afghanistan (See separate paper on CEN) Military Contingency plamilloc.
2. Iran may also be expected to show considerable concern over
Soviet efforts in Afghanistan and may claim that Soviet military aid
to Afghanistan poses a threat to Iran's security, thus justifying
larer Iranian forces for northeastern Iran. Iraa nay raise the
Jubect of the Helmand waters (See separate pap aa on Iran-Afghan
'a.elations), although not as a threat to Iran's sacrity. Iran may
-ulaiort Pakistan's proposal for a CENTO public stateaont and also
apeart contiaeency military planning against A.rgbanistan.
3, Turkay probably nil continue to be more yapathetic towards
aelantatarTs oaposed position and may reiterate is belief that the
ifgl an ruling group is determined to maintain the independence and
'earality of the country. Turkey may not wholehaeatedly support the
a:aipaaed p*,:fioq of '),T.1.istan and Iran for otate-
it or contingency planning
Recommended
STATE review(s) completed.
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Recommended United State& Position
1. The United States shares the concern of the member governments
regarding Soviet efforts in Afghanistan and the possible adverse con-
sequences thereof0 We continue to believe, however, that the Afghan
leaders and people still preserve the will to maintain their indepen-
dence and neutrality. We do not believe that Afghanistan is yet under
Soviet domination, although we are in no way attempting to minimize
Soviet gains,
2. We believe that the royal family in Afghanistan, although
its rule leaves much to be desired, provides stability in the country
and is the only alternative to chaos which would benefit only the
Soviets? Ve, therefore, believe the present Afghan Government should
be supported and won over rather than harassed and threatened.
3. We are particularly concerned about Soviet influence in the
Afghan armed forces, but this concern is based on the potential for
subversion rather than on any fear that the Afghan military establish-
ment presents an aggressive threat to other CENTO members. It is our
view that the Afghan Government his no intention of committing aggres-
sion against its neighbors and that in any case it will take consi-
derable time for the Afghans to absorb the training and required skills
for the effective use of Soviet equipment. We have noted with pleasure
that Afghanistan recently has turned to the United States for the
training of a substantial number of pilots and mechanics. It is our
hope in this same connection, that Turkey may be able to increase and
strengthen its military mission in Afghanistan and train more Afghan
officers in Turkey in order to counter Soviet influence.
4. It continues to be our view that one of the principal require-
ments for countering Soviet penetration of Afghanistan is the easing of
tensions between Afghanistan and its two Moslem neighbors - Pakistan and
Iran (See separate papers on Afghan-Pakistan Relations and Iran-Afghan
Relations).
5. As a fall back position the U.S., if seriously pressed, would
acquiesce in a CENT) public statement (without judging the merits of
Pushtunistan issue) which condemns Soviets for interfering in a local
dispute. This is as far as the U.S. can go without adversely affecting
its own capability to influence favorably the Afghan Government in
matters affecting the security of the CENTO area and the free world as
a whole. (See separate paper on Afghan-Pakistan Relations for fuller
discussion of Pushtunistan questionJ
Discussion
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Discussion
Soviet-Af han Relations: Since 1953, Afghanistan's relations
with the USSR have become increasingly close. Afghan leaders have
been largely motivated by (a) their desire to modernize Afghanistan
and (b) their fears of and quarrels with Pakistan and, to a lesser
extent? Iran.
The Soviets have capitalized on these Afghan motivations and have
made a massive bid to penetrate the country economically, militarily,
and culturally. Since 1954 they have committed approximately $300
million in economic and military aid, of which approximately $75 mil-
lion is military aid. With this aid has come a large number of tech-
nicians and military advisors now estimated at well over 1,000. Since
the last ministerial session, Soviet Premier Khrushcher has visited
Kabul and: (1) signed a cultural aareement) (2) given the Afghans
50,000 tons of wheat as well as assurances of continued economic assis-
tancel (3) publicly supported Afghanistan's position on the Pushtn-
nistan question.
U.S.-Afghan Relations: The Afghans have maintained friendly
relairons with Cfie United States and have sought our aid in an appa-
rent effort to balance Soviet influence. The U.S. economic program
since 1953 has totaled about $150 million, mostly in grants, The
major components of this program have been:
Millions of dollars
Export Import Bank Loans (Helmand)
50
Helmand Valley-Development
11
Air Transportation
27
Af-Pak Regional Transit
19
Road Improvement
4
Education
8
Surplus Agricultural Commodities
15
The balance of U.S. aid has consisted mainly of technical assis-
tance in agriculture, public administration, etc.
The U.S. does not intend to compete with Soviet aid to Afghani-
stan on a dollar for dollar basis. We are trying to concentrate on
key fields of economic and political significance. We hope to main-
tain our influence and presence in Afghanistan in order to convince
the Afghans of the benevolence of free world intentions and to keep
before them a reasonable alternative to complete reliance on Soviet
assistance.
Turkish-
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Turkish-Afghan Relations: The Turks have enjoyed a position of
great prestige in Afigeligli in the past. A high percentage of Afghan
army officers have been trained in Turkey. The Turks have maintained
a "military mission" in Afghanistan for some years but lately it has
been poorly staffed and largely ineffectual and there have been uncon-
firmed rumors that it is to be discontinued. Turkish diplomatic rep-
resentation in Kabul has been weak in recent years. The Turks have,
in the past few months, expressed their intention of refurbishing their
relations with the Afghans. They have shown interest in strengthening
their military mission and diplomatic representation in Kabul, in train-
ing larger numbers of Afghan officers in Turkey and in operating a
Military Staff College for the Afghan army. One of Turkey's top dip-
lomats, Mr. Benler, has recently arrived in Afghanistan as Ambassador.
The U.S. is gratified at these Turkish efforts to recapture their posi-
tion of prestige, particularly as a counter to Soviet influence in the
Afghan military establishment.
Afghan-Iranian Relations (See separate paper).
Afghan-Pakistan Relations (See separate paper).
Internal Conditions
1. Political: The royal family rules Afghanistan with a firm
and, at traiii-rO-Firessive hand. It has consistently avoided splits
within itself. Prime Minister Daud is without doubt the strongest
member of the family and, in general, his policies receive family sup-
port. He has shown himself a shrewd and competent leader. The regime
is not popular with the masses, however, and active discontent has been
manifested against Daud's policies of: (1) accelerating the pace of
social reform in connection with the emancipation of women; and (2)
more actively collecting taxes. The present regime has nonetheless
increased the plover and authority of the central government throughout
ta,e enentrv and has gradually eliminated elements of rntential oppo-
sition. The only threats on the horizon to the stability of the present
regime are: (1) the opposition from the conservative religious element
te tee rtp.V. zhnngc; (2) the ldoteatitil subversive efi'ect of Soviet in.-
finance on the growing paver of the military establishment; (3) the
possibility of large-scale tribal uprisings.
2. Economic: The potential for developing Afghanistan's primi-
tive economy is reasonably good. Population is relatively small and
resources in terms of agricultural production, hydro-electrie power, etc.
are adegpate
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are adequate. The principal shor es are skilled technical and
managerial personnel and local currency resources. The economy is
heavily mortgaged to repaying Soviet bloc loans and is somewhat depen-
dent on Soviet bloc trade particularly in certain key commodities
such as POL products. However, with reasonable development, the Afghan
economy can probably make reasonable progress. The present ruling
group has placed great emphaeis on economic development and some modest
progress has already taken place in building up the economic infra-
structure,particularly roads and hydro-electric power. The communist
bloc is in a position to put heavy economic pressure on Afghanistan
should it choose to do so. On the whole the Afghan economy is primi-
tive but fundamentally sound and with reasonable foreign assistance
should develop at a fast enough pace to satisfy the demands of most
Afghans.
Drafted by:
SOA - Mr. Catch
Cleared by:
SOA - Mr. POullefle NEA - Mr. Kennedy
- Mr. Adams C - Mr. Keyser
GTI - Mr. Hope
NEA/NR - Mr. Gannett
S S-RC - Raymond L. Perkins, 5274 NS, Ext.
44-4
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EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran April -30 1960
Indo-Pakis Relations
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
Anticipated Pakistan Position
TER D-11/8
April 20, 1960
55
1. Pakistan representatives may seek U.S. support for their position in
regard to continuing disputes with India, of which the most important are the
Kashmir issue and the Indus ';:aters dispute.
2. Kashmir - The Pakistan President has publicly indicated that Pakistan
is unwilling to accept partition along the present Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir
as a permanent solution to the problem, but that there is room for negotiating
a solution short of the preferred one of a U.N.-supervised plebisicite. A
solution must meet the interests of all three parties: Pakistan, India, and
the Kashmiris themselves. Pakistan representatives may request the assistance
of Pakistan's CENTO allies in persuading Nehru to renew bilateral discussions
on Kashmir; however, this is a more likely subject for bilateral talks than for
consideration in the CENTO forum.
3. Indus Waters - Representatives of Pakistan may seek support for their
position on One or more of the points still at issue with India in the Indus
Waters negotiations, as outlined in the discussion section.
Recommended U.S. Position
1. The U.S. welcomes the steps that have been taken over the past year
to resolve a number of the long-standing disputes between India and Pakistan
and hopes that the remaining issues will continue to move toward solution.
2. Katbmir -We continue to favor settlement through bilateral negoti-
ations and are gratified at Pakistan's initiative in this direction. Our
position is known to the Indian Government. In the absence of a bilateral
solution, the U.S. believes the parties should continue to be governed by the
U.N. resolutions on this subject.
3. Indus Waters -.The U.S. should avoid becoming involved in the merits
of the vinani7PET6 still at issue in the Indus negotiations. It would be
appropriate, however, to emphasize the importance of India and Pakistan reaching
an agreement on the Indus Waters Treaty at an early date in view of the possibility
that the U.S. Congress, which will probably adjourn by early July, might refuse
to enact proposed legislation for a project on which Pakistan and India are not
yet agreed.
Disaassion
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Discussion
1* Indo-Pakistan disputes stem from centuries-old Hindu-Muslim rivalry-
and from the partition of sritish India in 1947; from the sharing of 3,000
miles of unnatural and sometimes disputed frontier; from religious differences
and differing concepts of the state; and from a lingering basic suspicion on
both sides that the other intends by force or otherwise ultimately to dominate
the subcontinent. In addition there are tensions over relative prestige in Asia
and over relationships with the great powers.
2* Important steps have been taken to resolve a number of the outstanding
Indo-Pakistan disputes since President Ayubgs accession to power in October 1958.
The border problem have been resolved in two conferences and most of these
disputes are on the my to actual settlement on the ground. The dispute over
financial balances in government accounts and for reftgee property arising
from the partition of the old India into two new countries in 1947, has come
under active negotiation. This stepebyeetep improvement in relations has been
due to the initiative of President &Nub. It has been made possible in India
because President Ayubgs government, while originally deplored as undemocratic,
has been viewed by Indian leaders as more stable than its predecessors, so that
fruitful negotiation with it has appeared possible. This improvement may have
been hastened and made easier in India by Chinese Communist aggression. Such
aggressiony!and increasing Soviet activity in Afghanistan, have publicly
underlined the danger from the north to the subcontinent.
3. Within the past few weeks, however, some setbacks to improved relations
have taken place. The agreed solution to one of the border disputes, involving
the exchange of enclaves between the Indian State of West Bengal and East Pakistan,
has been declared by the Indian Supreme Court to require a constitutional amendment
for its implementation by India. Talks between the Finance Ministers of the two
countries over the financial disputes were recessed without agreement having been
reached over the exact amounts of money involved, and no date has been set for
their restwption. The status of the Indus eaters and Kashmir issues, however,
remain the most important barometers of Indo-Pakistan relations?
Kashmir
4. There has been little recent progress toward resolving the Kashmir
dispute, which has been before the U.N. Security Council since January, 1948,
and has been the subject of a number of resolutions aimed at settling the dispute
through the process of demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite. Dr.
Frank Graham, the U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, submitted his latest
report to the security Council on March 28, 1958. In his report Dr. Graham con-
cluded that the most immediate requirement of the situation was the resumption
of direct negotiations between the two governments. He made several concrete
suggestions for the resumption of bilateral negotiations under his auspices,
which were accepted in principle by Pakistan but were unacceptable to India.
50 Since
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5. Since assuming office, President Ayab has felt himself under the
same internal political pressures as his predecessors and has from time to
time publiclerexpressed his concern for a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir
problem. Until mid-1959, his statements envisaged a satisfactory solution only
by means of the holding of a plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The Pakistan
Government informed us in January, 1959, that it was considering asking for
renewed Security Council consideration of the issue, a course that we believed
would exacerbate tensions, might weaken the UNCIP resolutions which form the
mainstay of Pakistanis position, and would be unlik4y to bring the issue nearer
a solution. Pakistan did not pursue this proposal. In September, 1959, when
on his own initiative President AYub held talks with Prime Minister Nehru during
a brief stop-over in New Delhi en route to East Pakistan, the Pakistani President
publicly hinted that he would like to resume bilateral talks on Kashmir; Mr. Nehru
remained silent.
6. In February and March 1960, President Aub and Foreign Minister. Mansur
Qadir made public statements outlining the framework of the negotiations Pakistan
desires. Pakistan, they announced, cannot accept partition along the present
Cease-Fire Line as a permanent eoletion to the issue and still considers a U.N.-
supervised plebiscite the best solution; but the Pakistan government is willing
to cc:paid:0r any other ftfair o propoeals. The interests of all three parties must
be met by the Pakistani, Indian and Kashmiri people. Pakistanis interest is
related to defense and to economiciatters: under the proposed solution to the
_Indus Waters problem, Pakistan is toJlave the use of water from the Jhelum and
Chenab Rivers, which rise in KaSheireand provision mist be made to prevent India
from cutting off water to which Pakistan is entitled, as happened once in the
.peet.during a bitter period inindo.Pakistanzelations. The Indian Government
baa not responded to this Pakistani Initiative. It is believed that Mr. Nehru
considers it impossible to disoe0;:-Ahe Kashmir issue at this time, when he Is
.under greet internal political.preepure to take a strong stand against any cession
of Indian-claimed territory to...pee0enist China in Indials border dispute with
,Te4ipg. The Indian Government hap to us that they believe that Indo-
Pakistan relations can only be,i0OrOVed on a step-by-step basis, implying that
J0.0:0:ier steps must be taken on,Othererobleps before Kashmir can :00:1*ought under
eegettatien.
,7. We believe that the best:epe for solution of the Kashuilepue lies
in bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, but that atetheJeameat
India appears satisfied with thk,00,At:Atetue of the Kashmir issue and cannot
be pressured into a negotiatioe.ef:Ahe Metter. President Ayub has told us that
Pakistan will pursue a policy of tying to work out with India ipsees, ether than
'KW:sari but that he felt net much more could be done in Improving relations
ibetween the two countries if India reemins adamant in its refusal even to discuss
Keehmir. It is our hope that the:pakistanis will net become discouraged by India is
_present refusal to come to grips pith the Kashmir problem, andwill,centinue to
..work on the step-by-step approach which has proved so fruitful.
8. Indus Waters -As a result of negotiations carried out under auspices
of the IBM, the Governments of India and Pakistan in the summer of 1959. arrived
at agreement in principle an a plan of settlement of the Indus Waters dispute
proposed
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proposed by the Bank estimated to cost about a billion dollars. The two
governments have since been negotiating the details of an Indus 'eaters Treaty
which would govern the settlement. Agreement has reportedly been reached an
all but a few points. Of these the question of Indian uses of waters of the
Western rivers and the erection by India of storage dams on those rivers are
believed to be the most important.. Indian uses of waters of the Eastern rivers
during the transition period is a related point at issue. Also, Pakistan is
undetstood to wish a eforce majeure clause and a clause reservieg its legal
position in Kashmir. The IBRD hopes to obtain agreement on outstanding points
in time to permit signature of the Indus Waters Treaty at the meeting of the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in -London in early May, 1960.
9. Concurrent with these treaty negotiations the IBRD and representatives
ef certain friendly governmentee(the.e.S., the U.K., Germany, Canada, Australia
and New Zeeland) have reached agreement on the text of a multilateral ,Indus
Baeinllevelopment Fund agreement for cooperatively helping to finance that part
.of the Bank's plan relating to the Construction of works in Pakistan. Their
contribution to the Fund would total $692 million in foreign exchange and local
purreney. In addition, the IBRD-aed.the U.S. would extend $56 Million to India
in bilateral loans for developmeetmorks under the Bank's plan. It is anticipated
thWttle Indus raters Treaty and the. Fund agreement will be signed _at about the
same time.
10.- The Government of Pakistan has informally indicated its general satis-
faction with the terms of the Fend agreement. It is believed, however, that
while Pakistan may be willing to sign the Indualuaters Treaty, it would not ratify
that Treaty until adequately assured that the foreign assistance contemplated in
the Fund agreement will actually,beforthcoming. It does not wish to sign away
its present water rights until satisfied that it will have the funds necessary
to replace these waters from other sources. In view of the size of the proposed
U.S. contribution to works in Pakistie (l-lion in grants, $70 million in a
DLF loan and the equivalent of $235 million in Pakistan rupees), Pakistan is
understood to be particularly desirous of obtaining such assurances from the
United states. while no absolute guarantee can be provided by the U.S., in view
of the inability of one Congress to. commit a future Congress with respect to
appropriations, it is believed that Pakistan would be satisfied with an expression
of Congressional intent in support of the project, as contained in legislation
now before the Congress. This proposed legislation has already been favorably
reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Also, the DLF would be prepared
to sign a loan agreement for $70 million with Pakistan as seen as the Congress has
acted favorably on the pending legislation.
U. U.S. signature of the Fund agreement, if required prior to congressional
action on this legislation, would be made subject to Ccegressional approval of
the project.
[ Drafted by:
SOA - Mr. Horgan
- Mr. Adams
- Mr- SPengler
Cl
SOA - Mr. Adam
NR - Mr. Gannett
NEA - Mr. Ludlow
- Mr. Kennedy
8/3-ARarovReadYnfilateattritiff04PffiaktIZIAT61418169R000400060003-8
eared
UNP - Mr. Brown
IJ/MSC - Mr. Baxter
C - Mr. Keyser
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Tehran, April 28-30, 1960 ? TEH D-11/9
April 20, 1960
Position Paper
Menderes-Khrushchev Exchange of Visits.
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
55
The Problem
The Turkish Government has announced a Menderes-Khrudhchev exchange of visits,
with Prime Minister Menderes going to Moscow in July and Khrushchev visiting Ankara
later. According to the Turks, the visits are being arranged to indicate their
participation in the general effort to bring about some relaxation of tensions and
to promote a favorable atmosphere for calmer resolution of Turkish-USSR problems.
The Turks do not intend to discuss substantive questions, and it is generally
believed Menderes can be expected to deal with the Soviets without detriment to
the West. Some concern is felt for the ultimate effect the visits may have on
other countries, notably Iran and Pakistan, and Greece has already manifested a
reaction of embarrassment and annoyance.
Anticipated Turkish Position
Turkish leaders will characterize the visits as Turkish efforts to keep in
step with the current world-wide spirit of detente, which they maintain should
be viewed as an expression of Turkish solidarity with the West in similar efforts.
Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu has stated the GOT feels that after an exchange of
visits Turkey would be under less pressure from some of its NATO allies who have
expressed the view that the GOT has maintained a "provocative" attitude toward
the USSR. Menderes has undertaken not to discuss basic foreign and defense
policies affecting Turkey's allies in NATO and CENTO. Turkish officials have
indicated their conviction that there is no change in the position or attitude
of the USSR, and no significant developments in Turk-Soviet relations are
anticipated.
Recommended U.S. Position
In earlier discussions the U.S. informed the Turks that the question of a
Menderes-Khrushchev meeting was a matter for decision by the Turks and that we
had full confidence in their ability to conduct their relations with the USSR
in a manner advantageous to the West. The U.S. continues to be confident that
Turkish leaders in making the decision have weighed the advantages and disadvan-
tages and that their relations with the USSR will be conducted without prejudice
to Western interests. The U.S. welcomes the decision of Turkey to approach the
visits as a NATO member and to continue in close communication with its NATO
allies about any developments. If the Turkish Foreign Minister should allege
that criticism within NATO of Turkish policy towards the USSR motivated the
forthcoming Menderes-Khrushchev visits, the Secretary Should assure him that
the U.S. has never engaged in such criticisms in NAC or elsewhere.
Drafted by:
NEA:GTI - Mr.
S S-R0 - Mr. Raymond L. Perkins
Piste
Cleared by:
GTI Mr. Hope RA - Mr. Tnbin
SOY - Mr. Gleysteen
NEA Mr. Kennedy
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TEE D-11/10
April 20, 1960
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran4_6pril
The Situation ia Jordan
(To be raised only at the initiative of other delegations)
Aeticipated Position of Other Delegations
The British feel strongly that. Jordanian independence and integrity under
e Hashemite throne must be preserved. This feeling is strengthened by
historical associations, and is re-enforced by eontineing distrust of Nasser,
wham the British suspect of having long-range deal ea on Jordan. Britain
believes that, in consultation with the United States, it continues to have
an important role to play as guide and adviser to the Jordanian Government.
Turkey and Iran, with frontiers on the Arab world, strongly support
Jordan as the most outspokenly pro-Western and antieCommunist Arab country.
Both see in King Hussein a desirable counterweight to Nasser's brand of
Arab nationalism. In addition, Iran in particular lcoks to Hussein as an
aeset vorth preserving against a possible upsurge of Come/inlet strength in
Iraq,
Pakistan, though less directly concerned with Arab affairs, views
favorably the international posture of the Jordanian Goverment.
Recoemended U. S. Position
The United States has demonstrated its support of Jordan by generous
technical, financial and economic assistance. We welcome continued British
assietaace in this regard and recognize the valuable role British influence
plays in Jordan. The United States has also supported Jordan politically
against outside pressures which threatened to undermine the authority of
the Jordanian Government and to create instability within the country. Our
past performance
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past performance in this regard should be taken as evidence of our in-
tentions for the future where Jordan is concerned.
We recognize that any sudden or drastic shift in the character of
the Jordanian regime or in its relations with its neighbors carries the
threat of serious disturbance for the area as a whole. We regret the
recent deterioration in UAB-Jordanian relations, and deplore the use of
subversion against the Government of King Hussein or any other government
in the area. While finding King Hussein's distrust of Nasser under-
standable, we would stress to the Jordanians that their own interests
are best served by exercising maximum restraint and avoiding exacerbation
of their differences with the UAR. while continuing to oppose any attempts
to change the situation by violence, we feel that long-term political and
economic viability for Jordan probably lies in fruitful association with
a larger Arab community.
The United States is confident that Jordan's friends will continue,
through patience, understanding, and firmness when necessary, to do all
they can to prevent situations from developing which could upset the
delicate balance now existing within Jordan, and between Jordan and its
neighbors.
Drafted by:
NEA/NE - Mr. Atherton
Cleared by:
NE - Mr. Meyer BEA - Mr. Kennedy
GPI - Mr. Mouser BNA - Mr. Swihart
SOA - Mr. Poulleft C Mr. Keyser
NR - Mr. Gannett
S S-RO - Raymond L. Perkins, 527 NS Ext.
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EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran April 28-30,, 1
CYPRUS
att7e3Z-N PaptE
TEH B-11/4
April 20, 1960
I? SUMMARY
The issues which have impeded the establishment of the Republic of
Cyprus, and which have been the subject of protracted British-Cypriot
negotiations, appear close to settlement. Barring some unforeeeen
difficulty, Cypriot independence in June seems a reasonable assumption?
Neither the British nor the Turks have shown great concern over the post-
ponement of Cypriot independence nor asked for our intervention?
II. STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
In a series of tedious talks which have been continuing since January,
the British and Cypriots have resolved a number of problems involved in
the implementation of the Cyprus Agreements and have narrowed their
differences over the central issue, the size of the two military bases in
Cyprus to be retained under British sovereignty, to a matter of only
several square miles. At the most recent meeting, Archbishop Makarios,
on behalf of the Cypriots, said he was willing to agree to base areas
totaling 93 square miles while the British indicated their willingness to
accept 99. It seems likely that they will split the difference as part
of a package settlement including agreement on the other outstanding
issues: (a) the amount of British financial aid to Cyprus, (b) disposition
of the British bases if and when the British should no longer need them,
and (c) the form in which the agreed administrative arrangements governing
the base areas *# to be conveyed. The British seem confident of an early
solution of these remaining problems and our Consul General in Nicosia
also believes agreement will be reached within the next several meetings,
thereby making it possible for Cyprus to become independent some time in
Juno.
III, MILITARY AM ECONOMIC AID
We have told the British, Greeks and Turks but not yet Archbishop
Makarios? that we cannot justify direct military assistance to Cyprus. We
haves however, told the Greeks and Turks (and informed the British) that
we would be willing to allow the Greek and Turkish contingents which are
to be stationed in Cyprus under the terms of the Cyprus Agreements to take
MAP equipment with them for their own use and that we would consider
permitting the transfer of MAP equipment by Greece and Turkey from their
stocks to the Cypriot arm, provided such equipment is in our view excess
to Greek and Turkish needs and overall MAP requirenenta3
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The British have agreed to make available10 million pounds to
Cyliras over the next five years in the form of grants and loans. The
have told us that they believe Cyprus should be able with this
.,'stance to manage satisfactorily in its first years. We have told
the Cypriots that they could under certain criteria be eligible for
PY4,80 assistance as well as DLF and Ex-Im Hank loans for development
'yi1.--)ses While the Cypricts themselves will undoubtedly 'look to the
States for economic assistance, neither the British nor the Turks
i-m-N12 thus far urged us to provide such assistance to Cyprus('
f Drafted by:
GTI - Mr. Blood
,
Cleared by:
GTI - Mr. Hope BNA - Mr. Svihart
NR - Mr. Gannett U/MSC - Mr. Baxte
BEA - Mr. Hart C - Mr. Keyser
SLS-R0 - Raymond L. Perkins, 5274 NS, Ext. 4445
'
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MIMM?160?11.
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CONFIDENTIAL
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehsara_k_E11223-30, 1960
TER D-10/1
April 20, 1960
U. S. Views on the Annual Re ort of the Economic Committee
or 19 c7r/Er
D
Position Paper
Antici ated Position of Foreign Governments
It is expected that the Annual Re ort of the Economic Committee for
1959 will be approved by the other members.
Recommended U. S. Position
01.42.1?400.,
The United States finds the Annual ReE2EL2Lq.2 Economic Committee
for 1959 acceptable.
Discussion
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Discussion
The Annual Report of the Economic Committee to the Council in
the past as been in u
c ude n =1
der the agenda 3:-:.:overing the Report
of the Economic Committee to the Council, This y3ar, however, it is
being considered as a separate item?
The Report is a somewhat optimistic and superficial commentary
-on the economic activities of CENTO for I9590 In general, we find no
problem in accepting it as a reasonably accurate though brief descrip-,
tion of these activities. It was prepared by the Economic Division
of the CENTO Secretariat, and reflects minor changes suggested by the
United States during the recent Economic Committee meeting?
; Drafted by:
4 Cleared by:
NEA:NR - Mr. Walstrom NR - Mr. Gannett ED - Mr. Meyer
NE - Mr. Bennsky ICA - Mr. Ferris
NEA - Mr. Kennedy C - Mr. Keyser
S/S-R0 - Raymond L. Perkins, Room 5274 NS, Ext. 1ihh5
CONFIDENTIAL
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-
Cav-r
Elviropear Etmalorlo. ?Couliperairton frade ad De,J.aopmaat
aaportana nay devaaopmenta aro underwa aa
zeaaa of turopean economia integaataoa and aooperatioa beween Laaapeao
aoantries, the 'United States and Canada, and to a almated extent, aapan.
These devolopments stem from U.S. la,itialavta takaa aa taa Waateaa aammat
aaataag last December aud at apealat aacaamdr: ,taaaaaa, laaala aa aeA-
,anaeaay. Theae meetings aasaitad in a5?'T,a.Met
ta) Establiahmeut or a 17ahe coma takt, aonalatiag ot 1.8
Earopaan member6 of the Oraaaizati on for Earoptaa F4.7010 C;o0pAzra',..aaas
citi? the Commissioa of the European aommoa Maalak.,rrCaaaa aa,d
tna la S. which hava beea ea osely W1411?:lated vita Oaet; Maasaa'a
days, Tha Fxecative Secrataay of GATT attenda as av abaaraa, ahaa aralp-
t ng raaa s art no a - parti a i pa 1 i ag a oaatr e s
Purpose of the Trade Commattoe, which. atidI itat ma LU
aasIng
eaa March 29, is to seek solutioas to difficalt ecoacmia Jalaaaa
important political overtoaee) whiaca haaa aaiaan frog the fp:imaraoa of the
Beaopeaa Economic Community?the Common Market 01 "th,-t! -and
Europaan liaeae Trade Aasoalation---'tae Sevea.';1/ Vae firat maating af the
laaea committee went vela aad ail agreed to ataAy tha actaaa taade a1taa-
tioa KV a first step toward aolving these probiema,
(o) Eatablishment of a Gaoap of foua ata4y pa.,a-tbi:Atias For
reconstituting OEEC and adapting 1T to aew taaka. ',I a. maaaar of the
Groap and chairman is the 'a.3. Repreaantative to NAT!) and tha ORF.C,
Ambatalador Burgess, The ot!Aers aro Faenah, British, and Graak oftaiais.
Tbia iiroup bas aompleted its report aad drafted a paoposed ahaater for tte
new Organizatioa which Canada and tne U.S. wila 2iao fall members,
together with tae 18 European countnies. This aeaoat tas been gent to
the 20 governmenta and wil2 be made public on Aril
The parties ccncaraed will then meet taa':y lz May lc d 9't.1-86
the report and actually bagin intergovernmental nagotiatioaa
(a) As an item measare pending reaaratil-atioa of OFak
(which may recrArt 18 months for parliamentary acaia0, eight countriaai
supplying substantial bilateral mid to underdeveloped aaeaa, ave aonsula-
ing on means of improving the flow of long-term capital. Since the
ommor, Market
.4--757?Timembers are all Euaopean NATO aouatrias plua
Austria, Xrelanch Jpain, Sweden, Switterland.
V The S are: France, Germaay, Italy, Ba4las, auxamncarg,
Netherlands,
V ..4.-ae Seven are The U.K., Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland.
Yil
.J, The eight are Belgium, Canada, France, Germanyi Italy,
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eCemmon Market Commission adminis
dependent African areas, (and
developed areas), it participa
been successful in assuring Jap
special development fund for
a broader interest in under
the Group. The U.S. has also
e partieipatien. The Europeans
were reluctant, fearing this might be a first step toward eventual
Japanese membership in a reorganized OEEC. We do not contemplate
such Japanese membership, but do favor Japanese association with such
future OEEC activities as DAG. The GropPeef capital exporters, which
is an informal body, not an organization or institution, is called the
Development Assistandi Group (DAG). It is an interim body whose func-
tions will later be encompassed in the reorganized OEEC. It held its
first meeting in Washington March 9-12 and successfully began exploring
these problems.
11.2.L.24eatstlim
2. The U.S. has certain basic objectives which are worth recalling:
(a) There are first of all the political and security reasons
underlying postwar U.S. support for European integration represented by
such developments as the Common Market. Our objective includes the key
element ,of tying Germany tightly to the West. Other elements include
Franco-German reconciliation; desire for European cohesion leading to
a new power element in East-West relations; and belief that long-run
economic benefits such as increased demand for imports from the rest of
the world would offset short-term trade disadvantages.
(b) We want the new Common Market grouping to evolve in a
NATO framework so as to minimize any long-term risks of neutralist,
third-force tendencies.
(c) We want improved relations between the Common Market on
the one hand, and British and other Europeans who feel unable to
partieipate in a "supranational" institution, on the other hand. How-
ever, we do not want to see problems between the Six and Seven settled
by diseriminatory trade deals or by watering down the political potential
of. the Common Market.
(d) Lastly, now that the Europeans are fully recovered from the
War, they should not only open up their markets to outsiders but also take
on more of the aid burden.
3. Various decisions taken in Faris in January give us organizational
and procedural machinery for pursuing the above objectives.
Other Considerations
4. Nevi.., in mind de Gaulle's opposition to overt manifestations of
sUpranationalism and his concern with French national prestige, the ques-
tion has been raised as to whether the Common Market can succeed. In
fact,
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'ict, we believe the Common Market is succeeding. Private business has
taken to it in the Six. Specific proposals for accelerating the Treaty
and substantially lowering its external tariffs are under consideration.
As the Treaty is implemented, common commercial policies among the Six
will mean closer political unity. Our chief aims must be to help it
succeed and to make it liberal. This should ease adjustment problems
for non-participants in Europe and elsewhere.
50 Just as non-Common Market countries in Europe are worried about
the Six, it is only natural that non-Europeans should be worried about
Implications of both the Six and the Seven for their interests. To some
extent these fears are unavoidable and are part of the price we have to
pay for any kind of special cooperation with, or support for, European
developments (e.g. NATO). While overall U.S. interests may make it
worthwhile to pay this political price, everything possible should be
done:
(a) To depict European economic integration and Atlantic
economic cooperation in the most favorable possible light in terms of
the mat of the world. (This means incidentally avoiding the word
"Atlantic" in favor of more neutral language - the name of the new
organization will be "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development", OECD); and
(b) To press Europeans to assist underdeveloped areas and
to mitigate possible adverse effects in the underdeveloped world of
European regional trade arrangements.
6. At the same time, we would hope that European developments
would not be used as an excuse for other areas to create loose prefer-
ential trading systems. This is not to say that if they work up sound
plans for economic integration, which are defensible on their merits,
the U.S. should not support them.
Policy Line with Non-Europeans
7. With the above in mind, the Department has been taking the
following line with non-Europeans on developments stemming from the
recent Paris meetings:
(a) In the trade field (Sixes and Sevens), sensitive political
aspects of primarily intra-European nature made it necessary to set up
a new, informal Committee of Twenty-One, rather than handle the problem
In other forums such as GATT. However, a primary U.S. aim in participating
in this work has been to guard against deals between the European groups
which would be contrary to GATT or at the expense of non-Europeans. The
GATT Executive Secretary participates in the Committee of Twenty-One and
GATT provides the secretariat.
(b) In the
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(b ), In the attfield 4AG), our primary aim has been
to increase the amount 'along-term capital available to the under-
110eveloped world, not to coordinate projects or programs affecting
recipient countries witheut the er being present.
(c ) In connection the OEEC reorganization, the
aim is not to replace or weaken world-wide bodies such as the UN
Economic Commissions, GATT, or IBRD but rather to supplement the
work of these organizations. The aim is to convert a useful,
established organization, which has heretofore unavoidably been
concerned with Europe's narrow economic interests, into an outward
looking body which will help force the industrialized nations to
face up to their responsibilities in terms of world-wide trade and
economic development.
8. We realize that no matter how worthwhile these developments
are, non-Europeans may still be sceptical. Part of the answer will
be in our willingness to keep them fully informed on what is going
on and ultimately to deliver the goods (e.g. liberal trading policies
and more money from Europeans).
9. A special problem area exists in connection with African
territories associated with the Common Market. What happens to
their Common Market links after independence? Non-associated
African areas, Latin Americans, and Asians are apprehensive that
special Common Market arrangements on coffee, cocoa and other
tropical products will injure their European markets. They also
fear that associated territories will be favored for investment.
In GATT and elsewhere the U.S. will have to use its influence
increasingly to see that this does not happen-:"
Pro osed Turkish Association with European Common Market
10. In the summer of 1959, Turkey (following a similar Greek
initiative) requested associate membership in the Common Market.
Following a series of exploratory discussions, formal negotiations
were recently opened with Greece and should begin in the near future
with Turkey. The U.S. has supported association of Greece and
Turkey in principle, in part because of the political importance
of their being linked with Western Europe. However, the U.S. has
reserved its position on details and indicated that the association
should conform with the principles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.
Draed by:
I-------ft Cleared by:
RA - Mr. Hartman U - Mr. Laddy
C - Mr. Keyser
S/S-R0 - Raymond L. Perkinb, 5274 N3, Ext, 4445
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TMD-11/3
CONFID&NTIAL
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL sEssus
Te122:0
Position PapE
Situation in Iraq
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
April 20, 1960
Anticipated Positions of Foreign Gover -lento
1. United Kingdom - The UK can be expected to take the view that, while
the long range Communist threat in Iraq remains serious and Qasim's personal
political futuq) is uncertain, recent GOI measures aimed at curbing the
Communists have produced a much more genuinely neutral stance on Iraq's part.
The free world baa no choice but to try to encourage this trend in its deal-
ings with the Iraqi regime; to this end it shoed peek to be responsive to
Iraqi requests for assistance of any kind,
20 Turkey, - The Turks continue to attach great importance to seeing
Iraq remain free of Nasser's influence, They feel that they have successfully
developed fairly close and friendly relations with the present Iraqi Govern-
ment and believe the West should continue to support and encourage Qasim.
3. Iran - The Iranians remain concerned over the degree of Communist
penetration in Iraq, and particularly over what they view as Iraq's toleration
(if not encouragement) of Tudeh Party exiles engaged in subversive activity
against the Shah's regime. Iran's attitude is also colored by its perennial
unhappiness over preponderant Iraqi control in the Shatt al-Arab waterway,
although this issue is quiescent for the present.
4. Pakistan - The Pakistanis will probably echo the Iranian position,
but do not seem to feel very strongly about the Iraqi situation,
Recommended LS. Position
We believe there is no COU261 for complacency about long range Communist
potentialities in Iraq, and feel that in many respects Qasim's leadership
leaves much to be desired. At the same time, his recent moves against the
Communisti appear to have increased Army support for the regime and to have
hastened a polarization of Iraqi public opinion in which the Communists
emerge clearly an a minority - and a minority which is for the present on the
defensive. We therefore continue very strongly to believe (as do the British
and the Turks) that the present trend in Iraq should be encouraged by all
appropriate means and that it is in CENTO's and the free world's interest to
avoid any measures which would drive Iraq closer to the Communist camp.
We are happy to see that relations between Iran and Iraq have improved
recently and that agreement has been reached for an exchange of new Ambassadors.
We hope that this will make it possible to work out problems such as the
Shatt al-Arab dispute through diplomatic negotiation and make the current
propaganda truce a permanent one.
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Discussion
Following is a summary of recent Iraqi Government moves against the
Communists and developments unfavorable to the Soviet bloc and/or favorable
to the free world.
1. Pro-Communist Minister of Agrarian Reform and Acting Minister of
Oil Affairs Ibrahim Kubba was dropped from the Cabinet on February 16.
2. License to operate as a political party was refused to the hard
core of the Iraqi Communist party on February 24, after a dissident splinter
group had received a license in the name of the Communist Party of Iraq.
3. The Communist-front Republican Party, which many had expected to
provide a vehicle for party activity by the hard core Communists, was
refused a license on March 27.
4. Also on March 27 the Government announced commutation to prison
terms of death sentences imposed by the Peoples Court in the early days of
the revolution against Fadhil Jame:II:and other Old: regime prisoners.
5. A series of Communist-inspired strikes have recently been broken by
forcible intervention on the part of police and military forces, anda
substantial number of Communist labor leaders have been arrested.
6. The first big trial of Communists accused of atrocities during the
Mo0U1 revolt of March 1959 opened in the First Martial Court on April 9, with
74 defendants accused of setting up a "Proletariat Court" and meting out death
sentences.
70 Mikoyan's visit to Iraq April 8-16 appears to have resulted in no
new Iraqi-Soviet commitments, and Iraqi handling of the whole affair MIA
decidedly restrained. The Iraqi Government was at pains to make it clear
that Mikoyan was self-invited and that the occasion was not a stet? visit.
The vi et apparently did not have the presumably desired effect of bolstering
the sagging prestige and morale of the Iraqi Communists..
GonOurrently there has been a discernible improvement in Iraqi official
and public attitudes towards the United States, and a growing interest in
expanding commercial relations with the West. We have also received a steady
trickle of Iraqi Government requests-for information on international CoMmunist-
front organizations, technical and scientific data, and copies of US lays and
regulations on a variety of subjects.. We are negotiating a Cultural Agreement
with Iraq as a reset of Iraqi initiative and are attempting to assist Baghdad
University in the recruitment of American professors.
Drafted by:
NEA/NE Mr. Lakeland
Cleared by:
NEA/NE - Mr. Thacher NR - Mr. Walstrom
- Mr. Eilts C - Mr. Keyser
GTI - Mr. Hope
S/S-EQ - Raymond L. Perkins, 5274 NS, Ext. 4445
QfltTiL
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CONF:IDIZTIttr:
TEH Me1,10 .31.)
April 20, 1960
EIGHTH CENTO pplISTEMAI, coulgc:a._sEsicx
Tehrant., April 28-30, 1960
Second Revised.....1211ELELEEPHE
Attached is a second revised list of papers to be prepared
for the Eighth =ITO Ministerial Council Sassion to be head in
Tehrcn, April 28-30. The responsible officer aud the df3ad3i)7p.
are indicated for each paper.
Note: Only those position, hackgvollnd eld referee pas:ex.:1
..teleted to subjects coutalw-d on the agemin, cr likely to arls
.17). connection vith itis upon the agenda for the carAmil savgism,
ex-a included in this list. See TEH KeN0 2 fa: treatment of kmn-
tngency papers on topics of lesser importaac vhich :iisy be raised
ther during the conference or in bilateral discussions taking
place at Tehran.
Raylnonal... Perkins
S/S-R0
Room 5274,, WS, EY.t. 4445
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CONFIDaVelitl,
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COU:IL SESSION
Tehran April 28-30L1222
Second Revised LifELEILEEEEE
2E211124.23ifice Date Due
0. General
Annotated Agenda NR - Mr. Gannett April 20
Scope Paper (D-0/2) Issued
Reference Pq.ers
Departure Statement
(Washington)
Arrival Statement (Tehran)
Departure Statement (Tehran)
I. Installation of Chairman
.
Opening of the Meeting
NR - Mr. Gannett
BR - Mr. Gannett
NR - Mr. Gannett
Remarks by the Secretary NR - Mr. Gannett
III. 6A215121!ILNERia
IV. Alp_422ment of a Drafti.......eaLaeF_i_nal_Comm_tuliyud
V. r..t.t...tp..12x1122..!..a._?etm_geceneral
U. S. Views on Report of the
Secretary General
April 19
April 20
April 20
April 14
BR - Ma.. Gannett April 20
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C0NFIDF2iT1AL
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Drafting Office
vr. EvemLog the Military Committee
U. S. Views on Report of the
Military Committee (D-6/1)
CENTO Command Structure and
Related Questions (D-6/2)
CENTO Military Contingency
Planning (0-6/3)
Basic Assumptions for Global
War (D-6/4)
Reference Papers
? Table of U.S. MAP for Cento
Members (R-6/1)
Current JCS (MAP) Force Objectives
for CENTO Members (R-6/2)
vii. EfrEL2L-.the Liaison Committee
U. S. Views on Report of the
Liaison Committee (D-7/1)
VIII. limEt....2fthe ounter-Subversion Committee
U. S. Views on Report of the Counter-
Subversion Committee (0-8/1)
Ix. EffaLes the Economic Committee
U. S. Views on Report of the Economic
Committee
NE -
U. S. Position on Financing of Joint
Economic Projects NR
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Gannett
Mr. Gannett
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Date Due
Issued
Issued
Issued
Issued
Issued
Issued
Issued
Issued
April 20
April 20
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U. S. Position on CENTO Tele-
communications Project
U.S. Position on the Turkish-
Iranian Railway Link
Drafting Office Date Due
moserisossavesonclamews
NR - Mr. Gannett April 21
BR - Mr. Gannett April 21
X. Annual Report of the Economic Committee for 1222
U. S. Views on Annual Report of the
Economic Committee for 1959 MR - Mr. Gannett
XI. Review of the International Situation
Position Papers
U. S. Adherence to CENTO (D-11/1)
UAR Developments (D-11/2)
Situation in Iraq
U. S. Views on Afghanistan
Iran-Afghan Relations (D-11/5)
Afghan-Pakistan Relations
Soviet Pressures on Iran (D-11/7)
Indo-Pakistan Relations
Khrushchey-Menderes Visits
The Jordanian Situation
Summit Preparations
Found Lazsa
Political-Economic Situation of
Turkey (B-11/1)
Political-Economic Situatiou of
Iran (B-11/2)
NE - Mr. Lakeland
SOA - Mr. Gatch
SOA - Mr. Spengler
SOA - Mr. Horgan
GTI - Mr. Morris
NE - Mr. Lakeland
SOV - Mr. McSweeney and
NR - Mr. Gannett
CONFIDENTIAL
April 14
Issued
Issued
April 20
April 20
Issued
April 20
Issued
April 14
April 20
April 19
April 20
Issued
Issued
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CON? IAL
21LLraftlr_a_ce Date Due
Political-Economic Situation of
Pakistan SOA - Mr. Spengler April 14
Cyprus OTI - Mr. Blood April 20,
Economic Cooperation, Trade and
Development RA - Mt. Hartman April 14
XI/. Place and Date of the Next Ministerial MePting
Places and Dates for Ensuing
Meetings (D-12/1) Issued
XIII. Approval of Final Communique
XIV. Any Other Business
U.S. and CENTO International
Budget (D-14/1) Issued
Law of the Sea U/LS - Mr. Arneson April 20
XV. ploseserits
XVI. plemse19.19.19rmation
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Apeti 13, 1960
EIGlibi CEETO Kr: Sl? ESIO7
Tehearil
U. S. A,db.crence to CIEZTO
Positienjtjtm
eted Aeeition of Pareign Governments:
1. Tha three regional states; may again urge net the United,,
efihere to CZNIO as a means of simengthening the M'avnization.
2. The United Lingdom, While aerineeiatine* cur problems ca aater -
meal wield also 11,ke the United States to adhere as a mews of etle'f.en-
ite the Mrale of the regional states?
Itece4e.Fr:eded U. So Position:
1. la the bilateral meemtive agreements signed with th.e three
eestelml states an. March 5, 1959, the United States eseweeff. a simileree
but reeraliele-obligetion to that stienlated in Article I of the Tarte-
Trenew, i.e., "to ecoperete 51.-th, the regional %1.fpator.y stateg
fee .thoie eemulty and dofenee.n Further? the oblieatioe aneemed in
the azgeercente execeds that ccafeminad in the =TO deem:mat, 117ir it
reaceeeeemee the concept of U. S. 0.es:tetra:tee env:Lee:zed in the ebint
1.1?enletlen to Promote Peace end Stebilitee in the riddle East, In cur
thrlEe P.,?sTeerients lesaen the need for fermal U. S? adherenee.
2.0 re do not ignore the psychologlenl significence foneal U. S.
a0Seeeeree, but firely believe that our present relationehip M.M.,0 is
'Kee cegaelentien'a best interests? It enables us, en the me heed,
to celve ezzong exte: effective euport to it and, on the otter, to aver-
se!,ree A noteratelLge influence on interecrea dieptttes invelvire Cirtde)
en72,?:eere: end other arca statezo
..!c) not rule out resaible future adheranvel, but, do not think
that "JO ahreeld aelkeze at thin time. The question of U. S. edhence is
em-der wettest:tug reviews
4. In sey event,U. S. memberahip ierald in no vay alter nreeent
U. S 011,7901t Dolieies for (TO, which are based, on U. Ele globel and
arseee:lele commitments Cn limited eveileble fende.
Diecuasion
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el7f: i011
Ever since the inception of C.53ETO in 1955 (then the Bogband ?act),
the regions/ Ertates have strongly urged U. S. adherence. They have
%Tented this partly for psychological ream= and partly in the hope
that U. 3. membership would be e.ccompanied by inc z1 edlitary and
economic assistance. While they still would like the United States to
there, they have recently been less insistent up= this and now aypeer
leo accept with more equanimity our non-adherence.
Ife have not felt it to be in our interests to become a fun membee'.
Ittaleeleg the Iraqi carp d'etet of 19581 the United States oisee.O.
the Lon Alan Declaraticn of July 28? 1958, in which we undertook, inte.
te3..io, to conclude bilateral executive agreements with the regional
Tarerkber Mates. These were signed on March 5, 1959, aftor longtiky
nagekleetfezas. Consistent with existing legialative oxithorization,
eeirof y, the Joint Resolution and the larb.tal Security Act of 1954,
caaanils,;3.., the agreemente obligate the United States "to cooperate
Lath regimal signatorieg for their security and defenee." This
is the itieeltiaal obligation set forth in Article I of the Turk-Iraqi
Treeloe-,Inedelitien, these agreements obligate us to consider using
U. E. armed ferces? as authorized in the Joint Resolution to Promote
Pestie and Stability in the !addle Bast, in the event of overt Commeniot
ri-zpecolf.m ofnie exceeds any obligation specified in the CffiTO Treaty.
2eryl mt thee egreczents should, for the time being at least:, cen-
t:teem -to 130 a euitczble alternative to adherence.
Ces.t., toed below are tke relvantages end dieaderlteges of U. S.
,:v:Pacnqpto
e-,liezeteg:Lls
14.., it Tilould bolster the regional otatea --eta ;,..partiatatarly
crreExpel.ience has sheen, houever, that this is likely to
be: eqtff: dairel0Xera
2-, It reold give VETO s,:etewhet. greater ?twang in the int-
ee'oleeeel ma-amity than it atm enjoys.
exenteges
It wculd reeeete some advcavce political rezertion in the laddle
1/42eee:' re, .7f,..tele end in India in partiveler, where CU:20110 is 7>I.0regerded
ef..-; reeetere.-OOTZOriVOIL e.gvice dee:tuned to pm7oetelate Weatern
in the exert.
2. Parmg. atilierenee woad tea, to confirm suepiciotte by rion-eligned.
FiT1,15Ale
rates of U. S. iteroritiem taeurd the MVO re..enbez.- Ceeetes,
and thereby
MOM
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and thereby lessen U. S. capability tO e7.eret:.-ze a moderatieg influence
on existing intra-area disputes Lavolving CNETO members and non-member
states, e.g., Pushtunistan, Shatt al-Arab, Kashmir, Indus Waters: etc.
3. It could disrupt the delicate balance which currently obtains
in Afghanistan and Iraq and might drive OAS or both of these states
closer to the Soviet camp.
4. Utile adherence would probably get us through one meeting, it
would in no way solve any of the basic problems that we face in our
CENTO relationship, e.g., demands for increased military and economic
assistance. Rather, it could be expected to strengthen the "bargain-
ing position" of the regional states and thereby pave the way to
greater expectations and increased demands for aid.
5. Under present circumstances it is dodbtfal that the EXecutive
Branch could advocate successfully the CENTO document for Senate
"eonsent to ratification". An unsuccessful effort to do so veuld, of
eaarse? seriously hurt CENTO. The document is vaguely worded and could
give rise to question's as to the all-eebracing nature of the obligation
Inherent in CENTO meeberehip. Alternatively, a preliminary effort to
persuade =TO to modify the terms of the Treaty to focus on the Soviet
threat vould revive our long-standing (but presently latent) difference
of opinion with the regional eembers over the basic purpose of CEO.
6. We must continue to expect that Senate approval of U. S. ad-
herence would require a corresponding arrangement with Israel. Such a
development, especially if attributable to CTO, would fUrther seri-
may impair U. S. (as well as CENT? member) relations with the Arab
countries.
As a Tall member of CEWTO, the United States might in certain
circumstances find itself oat-voted (4 to 1) on esseatial matters
afToctftng significant U. S. political and security interests.
8. For the time being at least, our bilateral executive agreements
with the regonal mer atatea of March 5, 1959, are a satisfactory
mo aus azereedi for our CENTO relationship. They permit us to assert
Rhatfxer degree of positive leadership interested U. S. agencies may
wish and as maybe compatible with our global andaresewide interests.
%eR0 - Raymond L. Perkins Drafted by: NEA/N17:-Mr. Waistrom
Room 5005 NS, Ext 5262 Cleared by. DR - Mr. Wright
GTI - Mr. Hope
SOA - Mr. Adams
BEA - Mr. Jones
H Miss Kirlin
- Mk. Achilles
SECRET
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Ag711 149 1960
EIGHTH CENT? MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran,,sAF.11 28-30 1960
Sinnnary Table of U050 Miiitaiy Assistance
Programed or the midTle East GENTO Member Countries
(Materia4 training, spares, consumables, and construction for fiscal years)
(In millions of dollars)
(Pre-CENTO 1950/55
Fbriod)
Estimate
Cumu3,a-
tive to
Proposed
and
1958
1959
1960
6/30/60
Fr 1961
Ms 56/57
1,001...IMMONMEACIMIeNVaGSTWAcliS
IRAN 22803
11003
9405
4805
481.6
85.7
PAKISTAN
(54/57
only) 297.4
84.8
7001
3704
48907
5407
TURKEY 1,30905
203.3
141.0
100.1
1975309
204.6
s/s-R0 ymond L. Perkins
Room 5005143, Ext. 526k
'?aft.77---1 rby: - Mr. Dahl
Cleared by: NR 14essrs. Gannett and
Wright
- Mr. Jones
C - Mr. Ke ser
SECRET
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TEH Memo aa
April 13, 1960
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
283OL 1960
lityLsedEA1122E2E
Attached is a revised list of papers to be prepared for the
Eighth CENTO Ministerial Council session to be held in Tehran,
April 28-30. The responsible officer and the deadline are
indicated for each paper.
NOTE: Only those position, background and reference papers
related to subjects contained upon the agenda, or likely to arise
in connection with items upon the agenda for the Council Session,
are to be included in this list. See T141 Memo 2 for treatment of
contingency papers on topics of lesser importance which may be
raised either during the conference or in bilateral discussions
taking place at Tehran.
Raymond L. Perkins
S/S-HO
Room 5005, NS, Ext. 5262
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EIGHTH UNTO MINISITRIAL couNaL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960
Revised List of Papers,
O. General
Drafting
Office
Date Due
Annotated Agenda NR - Mr. Gannett April 20
D-0/2 Scope Paper
Reference Papers
Delegation List NR - Mr. Gannett April 14
Biographic Sketches of Principal
Delegates RFB/BI April 14
Departure Statement (ashington) NA - Mr. Gannett April 19
Arrival Statement (Tehran) NR - Mr. Gannett April 20
I. Installation of Chairman
II. Opening of tha Meetira
Remarks by the Secretary NR - Mr. Gannett April 14
III. Adoption of Agenda
IV. Auointment of a Drafting Co,,nittee for the Final Communi u6
V. Report by the Secretary General
U.S. Views on Report of the
Secretary General NR Ar. Gannett April 20
U.S. Personnel Assigned to
CENT? NE - 1r. Gannett April 19
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Drafting
Office DaLe Due
VI. Repoi:t2ELtgy.it.ar Committee
U.S. Views on Report of the Hilitary NR - Mr. Gannett April 14
CKTO Command Structure and Related
Questions NR Mr. Gannett April 19
CENTO Military Contingency Planning NR - Mr. Gannett April 19
Basic Assumptions for Global War Ma - r. Gannett April 19
Reference Papers
Table of U.S. MAP for CENTO Members NR - Mr. Gannett April 14
Current JCS (MAP) Force Objectives
for CENTO Members NR - Mr. Gannett April 14
VII. 2E9..x.:t of the Liaison Committee
U.S. Views on Report of the Liaison
Committee NR - Rr. Gannett April 11
Vat Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee
U.S. Views on Report of the Counter
-
Subversion Committee NR - Mr. Gannett April 11
Eaort of the Economic Committee
U.S. Views on Report of the Economic
Committee (Other subjects to be listed) NE - Mr. Gannett April 20
Annual Petyrt of the Economic Committee for 1959
U.S. ViaVNI on Annual Report of the
Economic Committee for 1959 NE - Mr. Gannett April 14
XI. Rev-Iew o.;! '61213 Ini.ornational Situation
Position Eaters
D-11/1 U.S. Adherence to CENTO
UAR Developments NE - Mr. Brewer April 14
Situation in Iraq NE - Mr. Lakeland April 20
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- 3 -
Arab-Israel Dispute
The Jordanian Situation
Israel's Relations with Turkey
and Iran
Indo-Pakistan Relations
U.S. View on Afghanistan
Afghanf.Pakistan Relations
Iran,-Afghan Relations
Iran's Claim to Bahrein Island
Soviet Pressures on Iran
Summit Preparations
Economic Cooperations Trade
and Development
Background Papers_
Political-Economic Situation
of Turkey
Political-Economic Situation
of Iran
Political-Economic Situation
of Pakistan
xTI.Place and Date of the :%ext iAnisterial pleeting
D-12/1 Places and Dates for Ensaing Meetings
)11Y. Approval of Final CommunisagL
Drafting
Office
NE - Mr. Thacher
NE - Mr. Lakeland
NE - Ar. Hamilton
SOA - Mr. Horgan
SOA Ar. Gatch
- Ar. jpengler
GTI - Mr. Mouser
GTI - Mr. itiouser
GTI - Mr. Mouser
Date Due
April 14
April 19
April 14
April 14
April 20
April 20
April 11
April 19
April 14
SOV - Mr. McSweeney
and
Nit - Mr. Gannett April 20
RA - Mr. Hartman April 14
GTI - Mr. Morris
GTI - Mr. Mouser
SOA - Br. Spengler
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rnmrTnuvAITAT
April 14
April 14
April 14
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IV. Any Other Business
U.S. and CENTO International Budget
Law of the Sea
XV. C1osing2yrangements
Drafting
Office
NR - Mr. Gannett
Viz - Mr. Arneson
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Date Due
April 114
April 14
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UNCLASSIFIED
TER Memo la
April 8, 1960
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTFRIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960
Distribution Pattern
revised
Attached is a/distribution list for papers to be prepared
in connection with the Central Treaty Organization Ministerial
Council Session to be held in Tehran, April 28-30, 1960.
Raymond L. Perkins
S/S-R0
Ext. 5262
Room 5005, New State
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EIGHTH CENT? MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 283O, 1960
Distribution Pattern
.2&.!Ja
Room No,
Ext.
CC
No,
o Mr. Meloy
4133
4945
1
1
0 Mr. Stutesman
5146
4132
1
2
Mr. Keyser
5156
4371
2
3-4
S/P Mr. Savage
5110
4480
2
5-6
NEA Mr. Mak
3022
4672
6
7-1:
NR mt.? Gannett
3224
3297
6
13-:
EUR Mr.1Winship
6162
2183
2
19 -:
FE Mr01Sullivan
3153
2019
1
21
IO Mr. Jones
6325C
5248
2
22-.
Mr..Shostal
6826
5914
4
24-
Mr. Kilduff
6819
4906
3
28 -
INR Mr. Skiff
6531
2134
1
31
U/MSC Mr. Romano
4527
2564
2
32 -
Mr. Cottman
4154
3277
1
34
ICA Mr. MacDonald
Maiatico Bldg. 113x2864
3
35 -
sib Mr. Calhoun
53.33.
5381
1
38
S/S-RO Mr, Dunnigan
5274
5836
1
39
S/S-RO Mr. Perkins
5005
5262
3
4o-
Defense, OSD/ISA
3E226
11x77836
18
43-
Lt. Co].. Greene
Pentagon
CIA, Office of the Director
2
61.
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?
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conFnavriA.L TER D 12A
April 13, 1.960,
MOTH CENTC 11011,37LERIA.1, coma SESSION
Tehran A9j96O
Places and Dates for EnsuLyijitsqle
PositioaltriE
I. Ministerial Council
A, Place
Anticipated Position of FbreAms Governments:
1. Since it is Turkey's turn to act as host for the Council,
the Government of Turkey will probably extend an invitation that the
Council hold its next session in Ankara.
2. Failing this, either London or Karachi are possible sites.
Recommended U. S. Position:
1, We normally prefer that Council sessions be held in
Middle East mother capitals (a) to emphasize the regional nature of
the CO association, and 00 to keep to a minimum the costs to
CENTO's International Budget.
2. We are agreeable to an Ankara venue, or alternatively to
London or Karachi in that order.
B. Time
Anticipated Position of FOreign Government :
1. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan may be expected to favor holding
the next Council session in approximately six months' tine, i.e.,
October-November 1960.
2. The United Kingdom prefers a longer interval between
sessions, but may be expected to defer to the wishes of the regional
states on this matter.
Recommended U. S. Position:
1. We believe that longer intervals between Council sessions
than bas usually been the case would allow greater progress to be made on
CENTO affairs. Our impending elections provide an excuse for us to explore
the possibility of deferring the next meeting until early 1961.
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2. We are nevertheless willing to concur in a consensus of the
Middle East umber states on an autumn meeting if the prospect of delay
appears to worry them unduly. If an autumn meeting were held the Seers-
tamer would probably be unable to attend in person.
II. Major Committee Meetings
Aeleisleeted Position of FOreien Governments:
1. The regional members may propose that CENTO revert to the
schedule followed through the January 1959 meeting in Karachi of having
the Economic, Military, Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees meet
just before the Council and in the same city as the Council.
q. The United Kingdom prefers an interval of at least a month
between major committee meetings and the Council, and does not feel these
meetings need necessarily take place in the same capital as the Council.
Recommended U. S. Position
1. We prefer an interval of at least a month between major
committee meetings and the Council, and do not feel these meetings need
necessarily take place in the same capital as the Council.
2. We prefer that major committee meetings be held in the
Middle East member capitals as best suited (a) to emphasize the regional
nature of the CENTO association, and (b) to keep to a minimum costs to the
CENTO International Budget.
3. If pressed by the regional members, we are prepared in
principle to host major committee meetings in the ordinary course of
rotation, subject to our prior agreement on each meeting in question. We
believe, however, that Council discussion of this matter should normally
be held st the Deputies level rather than by the Ministers.
Discussion
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-3-
Discussion
I. Council
A. Place
Successive meetings of the Ministerial Council have rotated among
the capitals of the member states, with some variation in the order
occasioned by circumstances of the moment and with the last meeting being
held in Washington. The Council has thus met once in the capital of each
participating state, and twice in Karachi. The current conference in
Tehran will be the second for that city. In the ordinary course of rota-
tion the next two meetings would be in Ankara and London, in that order.
There does not appear to be any reason why Turkey would not wish to host
the next session.
B. Time
Since its inception the Council has sought to meet semi-annually.
This pattern had to be interrupted following the Suez crisis of late 1956,
when the third Council session originally scheduled for Januaey 1957 had
to be deferred until Jane of that year. The interval preceding the Wash-
ington meeting in October 1959 bad to be lengthened to eight months to
meet our convenience as regards availability of conference facilities.
Experience has shown that a six-month interval between Council
sessions allows insufficient time to permit meaningful progress to be
made on CENTO projects. This situation has usually resulted in some
discontent on the part of the Middle East member states over the allegedly
slow pace of CENTO activities. In mid-1958 we sounded our member govern-
ments views on longer intervals between Council sessions. At that time,
Pakistan alone expressed some interest in this prospect. The matter has
not been raised since.
U. Major Committee Meeting!
At the Karachi session in 1959, acting on U.S.-U.K. initiative, the
Council agreed that major committees should henceforth meet at least one
month before the Council and not necessarily at the sane place. Thus
the major committee meetings preceding the Washington Council session
were held in Ankara and in London several weeks in advance. Those pre-
ceding the current conference were all held in Tehran, also several weeks
in advance. This arrangement is eminently satisfactory to the United
States and, the United Kingdom. The regional states seem to prefer the
previous schedule whereby major committees met just before the Council
session
CONFIDENTIAL
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CIITIDENTIAL
session, and in the same city as the Council, which better enabled their
participants at committee meetings also to be present during Council
sessions. Our representative at the recent eommittee meetings report
the regi,mal representatives feel keenly that, as the Ministerial Council
has met in Washington, their committees should also visit our capital in
the course of rotation.
It as felt necessary prior to undertaking to host the Washington
Ministerial Council session to secure White House approval and to
consult with appropriate Congressional committees. This particular
action would no longer appear to be indicated In the case of major
committee meetings in view of the successful handling of the Washington
Ministerial session and to the fact the President would not be involved
in the schedules of the committee meetings. Prior approval by the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs would be required for each
committee meeting, however, in accordance with agreed U. S. policy that
all decisions for the U. S. Government to host international conferences
reqpire policy clearance at &high level.
Raymond L. Perkins- 4 S-B0 liraftr4 by; NEA NR - dr. Gannet
hoo,. 5005 N39 Ext. 526k Glearnd by: NEA Ar. Jones
- Mies Kirlin
A/BF -Mr0 3rockett
GIG ar. founl.
- Mr. Achilles
M - Mr erchant
CONP'IDEN'XIAL
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