BACKGROUND MEMO ON SENATOR PELL'S THOUGHTS REGARDING CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050060-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 60
• Content Type: MEMO

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BACKGROUND A,F-MO ()I, SENATOR PLLL'SS TEt7UCHTS
rtu,C=A 1RInnr o CUBA
I strongly urge that we should not step up overt or convert action
in Cuba at, this time. Above all, I believe it would be a calamity if
American troops e'ould be involved in any way iu the near future.
My reasons are:
,No revolution can be sparked unless the populace Is ready. In this
case, my own personal observ*ti s in Cuba and the reports of those
newsmen and unbiased observers which I have seen, lead me to believe
that the majority of Cubans have not yet become sufficiently disillusioned
with Castro and, hence, are not ready to rise.
We are all aware that the reaction of our Latim American neighbors to
further United Stater intervention would, in general, be bad, as it would be
throughout the world. Perhaps the best evidence of the seriousness of roc ant
Latim American reaction was the demonstration irk Uruguay, the most
Democratic Latin American country and a traditional friend of ours.
I understand it was once of the largest demonstrations that has occurred
there since the War - and It was directed entirely against our action in.
Cuba.
I. believe that the impact in the United Rations of further American
intervention would be particularly harwi.Ad. Moreover, If we should directly
intervetur in Cuba to depose a still popularly supported government, it would,
of course, make it Inconsistent and llbgical for our representatives in New
York to protest similar Soviet attempts in other countries.
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2.
VI* r untsr arimm nt to the effect that we are ' patat+rt is because we
are not taking more action is usually aclw ,td by people from the
relatively small profcessional and entrepreneurial segtiente of Latin
American society. slut, these are the very groups toward which, berauae
of their sbality to speak English and ttwtr persorAl attractiveness, our own
representatives from the State Department, the CIA, and other Government
Agencte* tend to gravitate.
Fiscally, when tt coam-eD to the views of, Cu a refugees t"nemselvem.
Iona personal e> rlenee in d4al.tng with r efugets and emigre political
figures bast made zz .eXtrermely leery of evaluations made by such groups.
I sin fizUy awars that regimes like Centro'R do not simply wither away
and dies Liko a boil, they sometimnes chose to-be surgically removed. But.
the boil must first come to a head and this means, as you suggest, a
period of waiting, Cuban people will do the operation themselves.
If they dca . tbxten, when the boil has reached its load, when the Cubans
are dis ncbantod, and when public opinion in Latin 1.merica is galvanized,
more direct Action might appropriately be takes. Under such conditions it
mia'ttR be pod,rlblt to dal this through the Urgacti~tivn of Amt rice n lstatta- -
a condition that does not exist today.
In the.meantime, I believe there are usatay positive measures we can
take, of which the Alliance for Progress proarara is the most important. If
we can %aske this truly a long-term measure acrd make sure that it is imple.
menteE so that the fruits of progress will roach all segments of the various
populations. I believe it w11 be successful beyond all hope and will deynon-
sstratae tbrp~mio~~aaolsetiavo3l~~ll6~ltbt3ersoo6o-5
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I also believe that our policy of i aa1cing dear our di'clike of a1I
dictators .is most correct. In my opinion, we shothld never yladld to the
temptation to relax this policy on the fallacious grounds that we must
be friends with anyone who opposes Castro.
long range
We have already 'had indications that positive/programs designed to
alleviate conditions under which Castroism can flourish may find increas-
ingly, sympathetic climate in Latin America. Brazil has indicated that they
are nowt becoming worried. This is quite an admission from the Quad rom
regime. There have Chao been anti- Castro demonstrations in Costa Rica.
Thai' Is good! reason to believe that Brazil and Costa Rica are not alone
in their voiicer.
if tht.Communists do build up missile banes or participate in some
other torn of overt aggressive actfvitr toward the United States from
the Cuban beachhead, we may eventually beforced to take action. But,
it we do, we must do so, being aware of the inconsistency of saying that
it is all right for us to have missile sites in Turkey, near the boundary
of our enemy, while at the same time it is wrong for our enemy to have
missile sites near us,
My hope would be that, If the time ariseit we must take action against
missile altos in Cuba, our ICBM program will be advanced to such
an extent that we would take the position that we no longer need missile
sites in'Turkey and could dispense with theme; while at the earn* time
b"rtng-dawn 90 the Cuban mistkile sites. .
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