LETTER TO MR. MATHIAS F. CORREA FROM ROBERT BLUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050062-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: January 13, 1949
• Content Type: LETTER

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13 January 1949
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Cahill, Gordon, Zachary and Reindel
63 Wall Street
New York, New York
Dear Mat:
Enclosed is a copy of the Services Chapter in
the form in which I sent it to the printers. I would
appreciate your looking it over and telling me
whether you wish any changes made so that I may
make the necessary corrections on the proof, which
I will have on Friday.
Sincerely yours,
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0EAPT AI
TEE SZRTICE ISIGENCR AGZCISS
The Survey Group has been primarily concerned with examining the
structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships
of the Central Intelligence Agency. in the examination of the Service
intelligence agencies, emphasis has been placed on their contribution
to national intelligence and their relation to the Central Intelligence
Agency. On the basis of this study, the Survey Group does not consider
self qualified to submit recommendations regarding either the details
of the internal administration of the Services or of their methods of
collecting information and producing intelligence.
s on Resuonsibilitiss
The National Security Act, in providing for the systematic coordina-
tion of intelligence, also safeguarded the role of the Services in Intel-
ligence by providing in Section 102 (d) (3) that the departments and
other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, ,evaluate,
correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence." Subsequently.
The Nationarl Security Council in Intelligence Directive No. 3 (See Annex
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No. 9) defined departmental intelligence as "that intelligence needed
by a Department or independent Agency of the Federal Government, and
the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and to discharge
its lawful responsibilities."
The mission of the military services involves the enormous respon-
sibility of maintaining the security of the United States. It is incum-
bent upon them to produce or obtain from other agencies the intelligence
necessary to assist them in fulfilling this mission. In the past this
used for intelligence has been not to a large extent by the Services
acting Independently and without the benefit of systematic coordination.
Although it is now generally recognised that such coordination is
urgently needed, there is. still a tendency on the part of the Services
to strive to cfieate their own self-contained systems of intelligence.
This tendency stems in part from the military doctrine that "intel-
ligence is .-function of command," a doctrine which has been interpreted
to require the control of the collection and production of all necessary
intelligence by the staff of the commander requiring it. The doctrine
so construed can only result in an obviously unsatisfactory and
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impractical attempt at self-sufficiency. As a matter of fact, at all
staff levels intelligence must be supplemented by contributions of both
raw information and finished intelligence from other departments and
agencies*
general definition of departmental intelligence must therefore
be qualified by practical limitations and subject to the overriding
necessity for coordination of the intelligence activities of all Govern-
ment agencies, pursuant to the National Security Act. The need for
limiting the tendency toward self-sufficiency, while acknowledging the
broad interests of the departments, is formally recognised in National
Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos 2 and.3. These directives
assign to the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively,
dominant interest in the collection and production of military, naval
and air intelligence. The directives also recognize that the concern of
the Services in intelligence is broader than their specific areas of
dominant interest. Directive No. 2, concerning intelligence collection
provides;
"No interpretation of these established over-all policies and
objectives shall negate the basic principle that all Departmental
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representatives abroad are individually responsible for the
collection and for the appropriate transmission to the"rDepart-
ments of all intelligence information pertinent to their
Departmental missions."
Similar safeguards are included in Directive No. 3 concerning intelligence
production which provides than
'fil?:ach intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for
the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own Department
shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of
each of the Departments must be broader in scope than any alloca-
tion of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant
interest might indicate. In fact. the full foreign intelligence
picture is of interest in varying degrees at different times to
each of tha Departments."
In practice, the Service departments, while concentrating on their
respective areas of dominant interest, collect and produce substantial
quantities of information in fields with which they are not primarily
concerned. As a result, there is considerable duplication in the material
collected and produced by them and by other agencies.
St row dinat on of Service Intelliaenae Activities
Intelligence collsotion'by the Services is an important part of our
intelligence system. There are for example the intelligence components
of overseas commands in Europe and the Far East, and attaches stationed
with United States diplomatic poets throughout the world who are in a
position through observations and official liaison to collect valuable
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information.' There are also military missions in various countries and
specialized representatives such as the Air Technical Liaison Officers
abroad and the London office of the Office of Naval Research. The Ser-
vices are also the exclusive collectors of communications intelligence.
All of these channels are used to meet the collection requirements of
the Services as broadly interpreted by them, as well as some of the
collection requirements of other departments an& agencies rich make use
of Servicemllection facilities.
Some duplication and overlap is inherent in the existence of several
independent Service collection agencies operating in all parts of the
world. As pointl out in Chapter IV, there has been no continuing coordi-
nation of their efforts. ' only formal limitations which have been
imposed by directives generally prohibit certain methods of intelligence
collection, such as espionage and the monitoring of foreign broadcasts,
which have been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as services
of commoIconoera. More effective coordination of collection is a
recognised necessity and should be performed in accordance with the
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recommendations outlined in Chapter IV. In addition, coordination can
be.improved within the Services either upon their own initiative or
upon that of the Secretary of Defense.
The production of intelligence by the Service agencies generally
falls into the three categories of current# basic and staff intelligence
(including estimates).
Current intelligence is prepared by,each of the Services in the
form of daily, weekly or monthly summaries, briefings and digests derived
from varied sources. Much of this product, particularly that dealing
with general military and political developments, is duplicative and of
such common interest that some consolidation of effort is desirable
and should be possible. We recommend that this situation be reviewed
in order to determine what effort may be properly dispensed with, what
consolidation in possible and what common services the Central Intelli-
genes Agency might render in this regard. (See Chapter VI).
In addition to basic studies in their respective fields of dominant
interest, including such tasks as determining the armament potential
and order of battle of various countries, each Service accomplishes a
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large amount of research, compilation of data and reporting in the
fields of economic, scientific and political intelligence with which
they all have some concern. In our examination of the Central Intelli-
genre Agency and the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State,
Arr. Navy and Air Force, we have found that there is overlapping o
interest and duplication of effort in intelligence research and production
in such fields as petroleum resources, communications, industrial pro-
duction, guided missiles and biological warfare. Betablished procedures
for coordination ,ip these and related subjects are lacking.
It is in order to improve this situation that we have recommended
in Chapter FI the creation within the Central Intelligence Agency of a
Rssearch and Reports Division which would perform research and production
of intelligence in fields of common concern on behalf of all of-the
interested agencies and would coordinate their efforts in these fields
when centralization was undesirable. This office, which should operate
in close relationship with the Services and be staffed in part with
Service personnel, should perform much of the work now being done in
the fields of economic, scientific and technological intelligence.
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There will, of course, be specialised matters for which the individual
Services must continue to be ultimately responsible, but there is a
vast area of common interest from which they can all draw.
Estimates, prepared to meet the requirements of the departments and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are the most important type of staff intelli-
gence produced by the Services. The present position with respect to
their production is not satisfactory. Each Service produces its esti-
mates in accordance with assumptions, standards and methods of its own
selection and gives to them the scope it desires, not necessarily limiting
them to its own field of interest. Departmental plans and policies may
be based on such independently produced estimates, regardless of the
divergent and even contradictory estimates of other departments.'
As pointed out in Chapter V. the Central Intelligence Agency has
not as yet adequately exercised its function to coordinate these and
other estimates, for example those of the State Department, for the
purpose of preparing national estimates. The Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee performs this task. to some extent in the military spheres but
arrangements are lacking for regularly insuring that assumptions are
comparable, analytical methods valid and the final estimates as so
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as possible. In our opinion, an important step toward improving this
situation would be taken if the recommendations subaitted in Chapter V
regarding the production of national estimates were adopted.
These steps, together with the creation of the Research and Reports
Division in areas of common interest, would have the offset of bolstering
the Joint Intelligence Committee in its special role and promoting the
coordination of Service estimates in both broad and limited fields.
It is important the the strictly military estimates of the Joint Intel-
ligence Committee and the national estimates produced by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, partly on
basis of the same material, should,be in harmony,
the
In/general field of counter-intelligence the'Services have usually
placed primary emphasis on protective security activities which do not
necessarily have intelligence as their primary aim and have often been
performed by non-intelligence personnel.* The more specialized counter-
spionage function, rich has as its precise objective the identification
and thwarting of the personnel, methods and aims of unfrimaly foreign
intelligence services
< The Air Force has cecognissed this emphasis bye'transferring practically
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is a true secret intelligence activity. Exclusive responsibility for
its conduct Or
d has been properly assigned to the central Intelligence
Agerncy, except for the counter-intelligence activities of the Services
necessary for their own security. (see Chapter VIII). In the areas
of United States r .litary occupation, this exception has been broadly
interpreted wadi in particular, the Counter Intelligence Corps, both.
German and Japan, has devoted considerable effort to connter-
espiorra1 including the use of intelligence networks extending beyond
the actual areas of occupation.
There has not been adequate recognition of the need for coordina-
tion of these activities with the broader responsibilities of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The dissipation of trained personnel,
failure to centralize information concerning counter intelligence targets,
the risks inherent in the uncoordinated conduct of agent operations
to weaken our prospects of succesu in counter-espionage*
This need for coordination of the counter-intelligence effort
also exists in the United States where the responsibilities of the
Services are linIted in relation to those of the Federal Bureau of
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Investigation?
We have seen that within the Military Establishment there is no
general i chi r.:ry for intelligence coordination. The 3ecretary of
Defense at present has no staff for this purpose or to do more than
exercise very general supervision =xI control. He is able to initiate
particular projects for coordination and has,, it fact, done so with
respect to the production of co nunioa tions intelligence and the attacle
Voters. He can also resolve particular controversies ihich cannit
be settled at a lower level in the Military Establishment. Other
exanpies within the Military Establishment of coordination in limited
fields are ttn Joint Intelligenme Committee ;a responsibility for
estimates required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrangements for the
e Coordination in this field is carried out in accordance with the
Presidential memorandum of June 26,E 1939, which stipulated that the
War Departments Navy Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation
would be the only agencics of the Government to conduct investigations
into matters involving espionagei, counter-espionage, or sabotage.
The principal function of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
set up as a result of this memorandum has been to delimit the respeo-
tive investigative reuponsibilitie of the three agencies in the
T2ited States.
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production of ca Acations intelligence, and the existence of they 3 it
Intelligence, Division for the production of air intelligence by the
Air Force and Navy.
Although coordination has been attempted or accomplished by the
Services, either on their own initiative or at the instigation of the
aretary of Defense, in l invited areas such as those mentioned above
effective coordira tLon of the Service intelligence agencies requires
the over-gall coordination of the activities of a intelligence agencies
Goverment. This is a duty assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Comnittaoo. In
Chapter IV we have rocammended the t the Intelligence Advisory Com ittoe,
which the Ser'videe are represented, should participate mare actively
with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing ooordira tion
of intelligence activities. To a very considerable extent responeibil ty
successful operation of this 'machinery rents with the Services.
Sla.- 29 hkat-mm IA the S a
Recognition of the impdrtant role of intelligence in the determdm-
tion of national policy and of the major responsibility which the Services
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have in intelligence requires that the Servips agencies enjoy in their
departments a position comparable to the si of the task assigned to
them. In order to be able to oar;y out their responsibilities to their
departments and to make an effective contrft*ition toward a coordinated
national intelligence system the Service agoncie must work closely
with the planning and operational staffs and,; be fully informed raga
departmental plans and policies.
To meet adequa ear their vital responsibiliti+ ca to maintain
i
their proper position in the departmental struct are#`, this Service intellL
'e\was
genco a!ynciea mist be ataffA with qualified pwionz ll Th
little recognized prior to, the last warp and upon; the outbreak of hos-
tilities we found that we were serio
ly deficient 1 zt numbers and
qualitr of intelligence officers. a did attempt to ," e1eIs to.'
correct this situation in the various intelligencq~ schools' an
acquirin personrl from civilian life to be tram c1 as intelligence
officer3. Recently, the importance of intelligence, training l'ai, been'',
Uwe fully re^lizodt and the Services have taken stets to provid+
I ~.
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adequate schools. In consequence, the qualitty of both the intellilp We
officers and the attaches has improved in recent years,
The theory of rotation in the Services has been a handicap to
sound intelligence work in that it militates against experience and con-
ti faity, An assignment to intelligence will probably last not more
than four years, and usually a shorter time, This not only mans that
the individual officer has dificultiy in becoming proficient in intel-
ligence, but that the Service intelligence a1ency is in danger of
suffering from a lack of continuity of leadership trained in intelligence.
For example, the Arn' Intelligence Division has had seven chiefs in
the
seven years, and/recently formed Directorate of Intelligence, Air Force,
has already had two directors.
It is not our purpose to suggest once more the often discussed
possibility of an intelligence corps, but we do believe that, if the
corps theory is urs aceptable, some alternative method should be developed
where officers, although taking an occasional tour of duty in command,
operations or other staff positions, will feel that intelligence is their
permanent interest and concentrate in it ,over the major portion of
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In the pest, capable officers havz not been attracted tD intelli-
ence work clue to their belief that intelligence was a backwater,, might
delay prom on, and in air event would not further their careers.
This tendency must be overcome and officers male to feel that their
cpportmities for advancement will not be impaired r an assignment, to
intelligence duty. Intelligence must be given prestige, and it mast
be made saf`"iciently attractive so that an officer will seek an-intelli-
gence assignment as he would one to comrand or operations.
In addition to making a career in intelligence more attractive in
the Services, it to important to provide for the training and availability
of reserve officers. There are thousands of such officers today, rho,
during the last war, were in various intelligence agencies or at over-
uses commands, and marry proved of inestimable value, Their talents
and their willingness to serve must not be lost,
In conclusion, we wish to note that a maaauro of progress has
Mein made in that the Service intelligence ngenciea have ma ifeated
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an increased interest in intellienoe and an attitude conducive to
accomplishing its effective coordination. The Services are conscious
of ' their grave responsibility for helping to avert the