EBERSTADT COMMITTEE REPORT INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2003
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• Content Type: REPORT

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EBERSTADT cottarrm REPORT
INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTYILICENCE
Central: Intellilenoe Agency
Director
Appointment of competent civilian as Director
is preferable but military man should not
be disqualified soeirolloosilloyes*Areippoogise???????se, 11 43
Director must have continuity of tenure 0411**40411041104 ? II 380 II 43
Inclusion of Director in membership of
Joint Intelligence Committee of Joint
Chiefs of Staff should be considered,.s..,le...,... II 52
Evaluation Beard should be established by CIA
at high level, consisting of small group
of highly capable people, freed from .
administrzitive respensibilities o oo eitsoires? 16, II 149
Feasibility of shifting large part of State
Department's intelligence section to
Central Intelligence Agency should be
studied 1110?001P90110 oo 411 oo 0011 OOOOO OeillOVOIP0411011#0,00.00 /I 50
Internal structure and external relations of
CIA must be improved osire4tilosiolvoevoteeesise?? OOOO **ow 36,11 Ws 11 53
Participation by CIA in planning and operations
of Chiefs of Staff is ricommended OOOOO moose // 52
RIlationship of CIA to other agencies
Closer working relationships should be
established between the sections of CIA
responsible for the preparation of estimates
and the National Security Council staff
and the Joint Intelligence Group of the
Joint Staff fol000sioefiwpoo0?0000rno4??????serio4elP
National Security Council should give more
attention to relationships of CIA to
other intelliis-eince agencies 111,114111110110 11 60
*---/Yinposod revision Of espionEem laws should be
carefully examined by Gangrene ????
Improvement of other intelligence agencies should
receive attention of National Security Council ....? II 60
Joint ,Ote,Xlieence Committee of Joint Chiefs of
Inclusionaf
of Director of Central Intelligence
Agency in membership of Joint Intelligence
Committee is desirable illesmeemoillioloornse toss*. It 52
II 53
II 59, III 249
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Militarv Service*
- .Intelligence dorps or attractive intelligence'
careers should be provided by the services ',is. 4 *mom** 132, 144 40
Intelligence estimates of services must be
. improved 041,01,91,040110M41041M00011004P04110414141 ** *IP * ***Olt.** OitOS,
-- ation of intelligence systems should be
uniartaIcel two or three years hence les******Ao******** *****0 II 40
Scientific intelli,gence including medical intelligenee
should be evaluaag centrally ***************Ar********** .* Ii3,. I/ 56-57
Facilities for evaluation and collection
should be improved ********** * vose*******************.******* /I 56
Research and Development Board and CIA should give
Consideration to establishing a scientific and
medical intelligence. unit ..:(4,41.,,,,..e.womilli?????10.4.40 iv*. 134
Ti 140
mama SECURITY
Ono central aGeng should formulate policies for
Illation' internal security ? 00000 eseue?????****??*** *my**, 21, 46, III 247,
III 248
sed revisionthe Ez.ionare Act now in
01
be given a thorough study by all interested
agencies and by Congrese before enactment to
avoid endangering fundamental liberties III 248
Lwow' attention should be given to Internal
Security by Aational Security Council 21, 166
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Report by the Commission on
Tint NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION NS/P-7
(Volume I)-6s
SUMMARY OF MAJOR REOOMMENDATIoNs
III. TEAMWORK AND COOBDINATION THROUGHOUT THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE IMPROVED
(d) that vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal
structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and the quality of its
product, especially in the fields of scientific and medical intelli-
gence; that there be established within the agency at the top echelon
an evaluation board or section comyosed of competent and experienced
personnel who would have no administrative responsibilities and Whose
duties would be confined solely to intelligence evaluation; and that
positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the several departments
and agencies that it serves;
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Report by the Commission on
TUN NATIONAL SNCURITI ORGANIZATION NS/F-7
(Volume I) -S*666041
FINDINGS rap CONCLUSIONS
TR N NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION AJTORDS A MEANS
FOR MIGRATED PLANNING AND PUTORNANCE
7. Reliable Intelligence is a Vital Need
The second requitite to sound security measures is complete and
dependable intelligence. The Act properly placed the Central Intelli-
gence Agency* directly under the National Security Council. Obviously,
the correctness of the Councills conclusions will be directly related
to the quality of the information at its disposal. If the intentions
of foreign nations are incorrectly reported or their military strength
and potentials are either underestimated or exaggerated, this will
affect the Council's decisions and recommendations to the President
and, in turn, the sise and cost of the armed forces. To reach valid
conclusions, the National Security Council needs, above all, full
and accurate intelligence, developed to meet the needs of national
policy rather than in support of the views of a particular service
or department. So that the Council might receive composite, balanced,
and evaluated intelligence, the Act provided that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency should draw on all available sources and thus avoid in-
complete or "slanted* views.
*See Vol. II, hapter II, Central Intelligence Agency
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Report by the Commission on
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION IS/P-7
(Volume I)oatuttma
yi1DI110$ MW ONOLUSIOIS
TES NATIONAL STCURITY ORGANIZATION AFFORDS A MEANS
FOR INTEGRATRD PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE
SO. Intellinence is the First Line of Defense
Intelligence is the first line of defense in the atomic age. Recog-
nition of its preeminent role in defense planning was given in the
ational Security kat by creation of the Central intelligence Agency di-
rectly under the National Security Council to coordinate intelligence
activities of the Government and to collect, correlate* and evaluate
intelligence. The relationships of this agency to some of the other
Intelligence agencies of Government?notably to 0-2 of the Army, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
State Department have been and still are unsatisfactory. But even more
important, the Committee is convinced that too many disparate intelligence
estimates have been made by the individual departmental intelligence
servicee; that these separate estimates have often been subjective and
biased, that the capabilities of potential enemies have frequently been
interpreted as their intentions, and that a more comprehensive collec-
tion system, better coordination and more mature and experienced
evaluation are imperative.
The Central Intelligence Agency is sound in principle, but im-
provement is needed in practice. It is not AOW properly organised.
A serious deficiency is the lack of an adequate top-level evaluation
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board or section, whose duties are confined solely to the evaluation
of intelligence, with no responsibilities for general policy or
administrative matters.
Co-equal improvement in G-2, FBI, ON!, State Department and other
Government intelligence services is also essential. Above all, a
spirit of teamwork must govern interagency intelligence relationships.
The Central Intelligence Agency deserves and must have a greater
degree of acceptance and support from old-line intelligence services
than it has,had in the past.
The Committee is concerned by the someWhat haphazard method employed
by the services in the selection of officers for important intelligence
posts. 0-2 in the Army has had seven chiefs in seven years, some of
them with no prior intelligence experience Whatsoever.
The Committee believes that intelligence careers within the
tervices must be encouraged, either by the establishment of a
separate intelligence corps or by other means.' A prime problem
within the Central Intelligence Agency itself is the recruitment of
qualified personnel. In the last analysis good intelligence depends
on good personnel.
The Committee is particularly concerned over the Nation's
inadequacies in the fields of scientific and medieel intelligence.
There are difficulties peculiar to this situation which the Com,.
ittee has not overlooked. Tot the vital importance of reliable
and up-to-date scientific and medical information is such as to
I.
The Committee has been informed that the Armed Services Personnel
Board has undertaken a study of ways and means to improve quali-
fications of intelligence officers and to provide attractive
careers for officer specialists in this field.
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call for far greater efforts than appear to have been devoted
to this essential need in the oast.
uggestions were made to the Committee that the primary
responsibility for the generation of scientific and medioal-
intelligence should lie with theResearch and Development Board.
This conclusion was based upon the history of frustration of the
one scientist (who has now resigned) charged with these duties
In the Central Intelligence Agency.* An intelligence service,
which must put a premium upon anonymity, is unattractive to a
scientist Whose professional reputation is OD dependent upon
open contacts with other scientists and upon palls expression
Of hie own scientific views. Other elements of the National Mili-
tary Zstabliehment engage in specialized intelligence activities--
the Navy collecting naval data, the Air Force data peculiarly
important to air power, the Army data about land armies?and,
therefore, it would be logical to equip the Research and Develop-
ment Board with its own service, the fruits of which could be
garnered and utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency as in
the case of all the other agencies. This suggestion has con-
siderable attractiveness, and perhaps in the future, if the
scientific intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence'
Agency do not materially improve, it may have to be adopted.
But it has two major disadvantages. The Research and Development
Board, unlike the services is not an operating agency; intelligence
"The Committee has been advised that a replacement has been outdo.
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collection would put it into the operating field. Moreover, the
establiehment of still another intelligence activity would render
More difficult the taek of the Central Intelligence Agency's
authority?Which needs strengthening rather than weakening.
Accordingly, rather than reoommending this course, the Committee
felt that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Research and
Development Board should in cooperation decide on the form and
placement of scientific and medical intelligence and, above, all
Should proceed energetically to obtain a staff with competent
And experienced personnel. This task, in the Committee's judg-
mento.is an urgent one, demanding high priority in energy,
resourcefulness and attention.
In reaching its conclusions, the Committee and its staff had
the benefit of consultation with a group, appointed by the Presi-
dent, who are making an examination of the Central Intelligence
Agency under the supervision of the National Security Council.
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Report y the Commission on
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION NS/P-7
(Volume II)
CHAPTER II
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
il'arra-masw'eegencore
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The firat effort toward a central intelllgence system was
taken in July 1941, When the Office of Coordinator of Information
(sometimes called
I) was established by Executive Order and
auVorized to collect, analyze, and make available to the
appropriate officials all information relating to national
security. The 'I included propaganda functions. The organization
was large and unwieldy. In June of 1942, the propaganda aspects
of =ix responsibilitiee were transferred to the Office of War
Information (OWI). The Office of Strategic Services (OBS) was
established during the same month to dontinue the function of
evaluating and correlating-intellT.gence informations It was also
to be the agency responsible for secret intelligence and the
conduct of guerrilla warfare.
OSS ocetinued to perform these functions throughout the war.
Coiaiderible thought was given in the summer' of 1945 to the way
in which the central evaluation and collection of intelligence
could best be accomplished in peacetime. Papers on the subject
were prepared for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Secretaries of War and Navy and other officials concerned.
In September 1945, by,Emscutive Order the research and analysis
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functions of OBS were transArred to the State Department, From
this tranafer hs resulted the present Office of Intelligence
and Research in the State Department which now reports to an
Assistant Secretary of State, Simultaneously with the transfer
of research and analysis to the State Department, tha Strategic
Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department was established to
liquidate the rather substantial quantities of operational material
accumulated by OSS during, the war. SSU was also charged with
carrying on, on a more or less caretaker basis, the secret
intelligence functions formerly performed by 0554 In other words,
the two most -important units in OSS were alit between two
departments,
By Executive Order dated January 22, 1946, the National In.
telligence Authority, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War
and Navy, was established by the President. Under the National
Intelligence Authority was constituted an organisation
known as the Central Intellimnce Group (CIO) under the direction
of a Director of Central Intelligence, The CI; MU8 charged with
correlation and evaluation of intelligence, the c-)ordinvtion of
departmental intelligence activities, and the performance of .
intelligence services of comnon concern,
The Nati(nal Security Act of 1947 abolished the National
Intelligence Authority and transferr-d the functions of the Central
Intelli-lence Group to the present Central Intelligence Agency
(generally referred to as CIA),
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The new a.,,ency was superimposed as a top-level national
security organisation, ;,:bove the older-established service
agencies. Those older services, 04 of the Arm.
Office of Naval Intelligence, A-2 of the Air Force, and the
Federal 3ureau of Investigation (FHI) (with counterespionage
functions), all had long histories behind them' CIA with preat powers
great authority, and great hopes was, in point of time, a_nouveau
ziabib, In addition to its lierk with that's agencies' CIA had to
establish close working relationships with a new and ambitious
State Department intclligence branch. Its mirk, therefore, cat
squarely across and through the National NilitaryEetablishment
(though it was not, itself, a part of that establishment) and
extended beyond the military establishment to other departments
of ,,,overnment. CIA was given a mission new to our hietor, and
obviously occupi9s a position of peculiar diffiad1W.
II. ORGANTTATION CF CENTRAL INTr:LLT0ENCE VIM!
The National Security Act of 19117 (Sec. 102 (d)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5))
provides in substance that "for the purpose of coordinating the
intellimnce activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interost of national security* the Central
Intelligence Agency, "under the direction of the National security
Council" shall:
"(1) advise the haticnal Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the
Government departments and agencies as relate to
national security'
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"(2) make recommendations to the National Security Council
for the coordination of such intelligence activities
of the departments and agencies of the Government as
relate to the national security'
"(3) ...correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security, and provide for the appropriate die
semination of such intelligence within the Government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities
"(4) ...perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
vencies, such additional services of common concern as
the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally'
...perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time direct.
The statute further provides (Sec. 102 (a) and OW, that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be appointed by the ,
President,, by and with the consent of the Senate, from among
commiasioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals
incivilian life. His tenure is indefinite. Hia annual compenarAion
is $14000. If a uomaisaianed officer, he is expressly removed
from the chainof command of any of the three services sin the
performance of his duties as Director," His tenure of office shall
not affect hie service rank or status. The differenCe between his
service pay and $14,000 is made up.
At present there is one Deputy Director, The Deputy Director
acts for, and in the absence- of, the Director. Ho is the principal
link between the Director and the operational and administrative
functions of the Agency.
CIA is divided into five major offices, each headed by' an
Assistant Director. In adeition there is a division concerned with
"(5
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admiAistration and housekeeping, and a division charged with the
enforcement of security.
The five major offices are the Office of Reports and Estimates
(ORE), the Office of 'Collection and Diseemination (00D), and three
other Offices charged withthe collection of information by
monitoring foreign broadcasts, examining foreign documents,
collecting information by clandestine means, conducting counter?
espionage abroad, and other work.
The Office of Collection and Dissemination performs services
not only for CIA but for 4 number of other Government agencies as
well, It mainstainsithrough the use of machine records, central
indexes indicating the substance and showing the location of
information relating to foreign personalities, scientists, etc.
and graphic material suoh as photographs of foreign intelligence
value and foreign industrial information, OCD also includes a
so?called liaison branch which endoavore to insure that routine
reciprocal channels between CIA and other agencies (Statep.Commerce,
Agriculture, the Armed Services., etc') are maintained so that
information secured by these other agenoiee is available to CIA
and that reports prepared by CIA are properly distributed. OCD
also tries to eliminate duplication in the field of collection by
seeingt (1) that a request for information by a CIA division is
routed to the appropriate collecting agency (State, 4.2, the
clandestine service, etc.); (2) that collection machinery is not
put into operation at all if the information required is already
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available (this is accomplished by reference to the machine
records); and (3) that two or more requests are not made by
different individuals, branches, or agencies for collection of the
same information. It disseminates CIA's reports to other
Government agencies.
The principle function of the Office of Research and Estimates
is the evalention.of intelligence and the preparation of intelligence
estimates; For this purpose ORE is divided into six regional
branches representing geographical areas. Those branches are
charged with the examination of "raw" information concerning their
respective or aa which comes in the form of thousands of cables
and reports from State Department missions abroad, from military
and naval attache', from clandestine sources, etc. Estimates made
by branches form the basis of reports from CIA to the
National Security Council or other "customers". In additi.on to
the regional branches ther are four groups concerned with
economice, science, transportation, end international organizations.
Those groups act as expert consultants to the regional branches in
the preparation of their estimates. The Aaaistant Dtreetor in
charge of ORE is assisted by-a planning, reviewing, and editorial
staff,
ORE also performs a service of cannon concern to many
Government departments through the medium of a Map Branch where
central indexes of foreign maps are kept and facilities for map
making are available.
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OTHER INTELLIGENCE ,CENCIES
CIA is the apex of a pyramidal intelligence structure, Other
Oovernment intelligence agencies, without which no inteililmoo
service could be complete, are numerous- and important. This study
is primarily concerned with CIA since the Committee's work schedule
did not permit detailed examination of the structures of the
separate service departments, The State Department and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Governmental departments
with intelligence activities lie beyond the scope of the week of the
Committee. Nevertheless, it would be misleading and inaccurate
to focus attention solely upon CIA without meaningful reference
to the other intelligence agencies.
The service agencies are three?the Army G-2, the Offibe of
Naval Intelligence, and A.2 of the Air Force, The Federal Bureau
of Investigation is Charged with counterespionage in this Country,
although the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps carries out inventiga.
tions within army ranks:, The Navy and the Air Force also investigate
their own personnel, calling in the FBI from time to time. The
State Department maintains its own intelligence branch. Each of
these services maintain sizeable organizations for the collection
of intelligence (through military, naval, and air attaches and by
other means), for its classification, and fbr its.svaluation and,
analysis. Foch maintains certain expert advisors and specialists,
each eons researchers, Each must cooperate with and dovetail into
the other; each must support and maintain CIA if there is to be
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effective intelligence. Neither these agencies nor CIA can operate
with success independently; they are all interdependent
IV. RELATIONSHIP VIT1 OTHER AOENC
Contact between the National Security Council and CIA is
maintained through the Director of CIA who attends Council meetinge?
Three joint committees contribute to the relationship between
CIA and other Government agencies:
.(a) By National Security Council directive there exists
an organizationknomn as IAC (Intelligence Advisory Committee)
consiting ef the principal intelligence officers of State,
Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy
Commission. The Director of CIA acts as chairman, although
CIA technically is not a member of the oommittee, In the
past it has dealt largely :with procedural matters, although
on occasions it has mot to ?m older matters of substantive
intelligence.: The Intelligence Advisory Committee was probably
originally eatablished.by the National Security Council as a
for to deal with problems arising in the course of C/Ale
discharge of ita statutory duty "of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments grn"
(b) Within CIA is a group known an ICATS (Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff) which oonsiets of a number of
individuals assigned to CIA by the State Department and the
military services.. Its activities to data have largely
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consisted of handling papers of procedural concern to
Intelligence ArIvisory Committee a2;encie8. The chairman of
ICAPS is the official CIA reprlsentative at meetings of the
National Security Council staff. A representative of CIA
Office of Research end Estimatoa attends meetings of the
Council's staff when invited, and is thus develop ng an
informal working relationship between CIA and the Council's
staff.
(o) A tIlird Committee is the so.called "Standing
Committee" which consiets of representatives of State and
the military services on the "Colonel" level who are not
assigned to CIA but are charged within their respective
agencies with cogni_ance of CIA matters.
? The Director of CIA has no direct, formal contact with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Intelligence Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff does not include him in its memberehip
although the lower-echelon Joint Intelligence Croup of the Joint
Staff includes a CIA representetivei, Representatives 'of both the
Joint Staff and of CIA participate in IntAligence Advisory Com-
mittee meetings, which does provide a certain contact?though a
tenuous one.-between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA.,
4orking relations with outside agencies are maintained through
the liaison sections of the Office of Collection and Dissemination
of CIA. ?hada maintain channels for routine reciprocal interchange
of information needed by CIA or other Government agencies and for ?
the distribution of reports, Working relationships also are being
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built up with varying degrees of success between the regional branches
of the Office Of Reports and Estimtes and their opposite 1i-umbers in
State, 0.2, etc.
Another tT?pe of relationship is the ad hoc comrittee, of which
a number have been constituted. An example is the committee formed
under the chairmanship of a representative of ORE, to allocate amongst
Golernment.agencies responsibility for compiling appropriate sections
of basic regional studies (political sections to State, sections on
road communications to Army, etc,) and to determine the priorities
to be accorded to studies of various areas*
A working relationship exists between BI and CIA* I
:Liaison is accomplished by representatives of CIA and FBI, designated
for the purpose, Liaison is also maintained by interchange of reports
between the counterespionage officials of CIA and appropriate re.
presentatives of FBI,
The FBI formerly investigated all prospective CIA employees for
security, but due to the pressure of these and other commitments,
FBI has felt obliged to discontinue this service* The FBI, however,
cooperated with CIA, on the latter' request, in special security
checks.
A type of relationship of considerable importance is exemplified
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by the Chief of the Map Section of CIA, who is also a special
assistant to one of the divisions of the State Department's'
V. PEISONNEL
(a)Genera'.
There has ben some newspaper and muchofficial and unofficial
criticism of the parsonnel of CIA, During the course of a much too
rap'.d expansion of the organization which took place under a previ 41
Director, mistakes in ly-Irsonnel procurement were made* There is
evidencl, however, of improvament in the recruiting of men and wamen
with appropriate education, exp-rience, and pea'nslity, although
additional improvement is needed* Many of the individuals on the
"desk" or staff level appear to be intraligence, enthusiastic, and
competent* Time, experience, and training are necessary, probably
requiring years, to build up a fully competent staff for all offices
and echelons of CIA* This can only be accomplished as a matter of
internal administrative development with continuity of competent
leadership
(b) Size or Operating Staff
A number of the services that CIA performs as a matter of common
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concern to other alencies of the Government require substantial
staffs, Those include the staffs necessary to; (1)
Intain a
reference library and central indexes of all intellgenco materials;
(2) oerform certain essential liaison fUnctitinsj1
\(4) maintain
antral map eervice feral Uovernment agencies, and s(5) examine
quantitites of foreign documents measured in tons* The number of
individuals em7loyed in the conduct of CIA's clandestine activities
is probably not excessive when the peculiar services required for
such operations are ecnsidered. A considerable staff will inevitably
be necessary to enable CIA to perform its evaluating function.
Although there is duplication In the economic and political research
done by. Various Government -departments and agencies including CIA,
the total number of persons employed by the Government for research
purposes cannot, in all probability, be very substantially reduced.
(n) Adtinistrative and Security Personnel
The size of the Security Division of CIA is probably reasonable*
The present size of the Administrative Division seems excessive,
particularly in light, of requirements for an administrative staff in,
each of the offices in some of which security requires a large degree
of independence. On the other hand, an organization as Dirge as CIA
requires a substantial amount of housekeeping, telephone service,
?
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maintenance of personnel records, eta. The problem is complicated
by the fact that accommodations to house CIA centrally are not
milable and could only be constructed at a substantial ?est and
with considercbae publicity, A certain amount of decentralization
f CIA nay be desirable for security reasons. CIA is spread
separate
amongst twenty-two/buildings, including warchoweamall of wAch
must be mainc,ained and serviced eopart.tely, Moreover, CIA
maintains a large number of field stations of one sort or another
in various psrta of the United States and eroad which are supplied
b, the Administrative Division. Reduction of the administrative
overhead is poseible and desirable. There is some evidence of
interference le, administrative functionaries in matters of primarily
operational concern. A certain amount of such interference is
inevitable due to the fact that a Director will tend to entrust the
? enforcement of budgetary controls to his immediate administrative
representatives, Too much interference of this pert Is undesirable,
but this is an administrative problem that must be solved internally.
? VI, EVALUATION
?
Intended as the major soiree of coordinated and evaluated
intellii;ence, on w-ich broad national policy could be soundly based,
the Central ,Intelligence Agoncy has as yet fallen sort of the
objective. while it has made prozreas in organising and equipping
itself, product, howev,T valid, does not presently enjoy the full
confidence of the National Security Organization or of the other
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agencies it serves and has not yet--with certain encouraging
exceptions--played an important role in the determinations of the
National Security Council,
CIL raises some difficult problem. which for reasons of
security, are not easy to discuss. The Committee feels that CIA
is properly located under the National Security Council; that its
organization needs continuing careful attention and that better
working relationships with other agencies must be established. In
this respect it suffers from a familiar fault, recurrent throughout
the whole National Security Organisation. Its main problem, as is
likewise true of most of the other agencies, is one of personnel.
The Committee emphasises a truism, that good intelligence depends
upon, good personnel. CIA must have imaginative and vigorous
supervision. The Committee is certain that the director of the Cl).
must have continuity of tenure and should be selected primarily on
the basis of competence, but that, other things being equal, it
would be preferable that he be a civilian.
The Committee was particularly concerned over the Nation's
inadequacies in the field of scientific, including medical
intelligence. The vital importance of reliable and up-to-date
scientific information is such as to call for far greater efforts
than appear to have been devoted to this need in the past. Scientists'
in general have expressed considerable distress at the paucity of
information available and the relationship between science and CIA
does not seem to be of the best.
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The intelligence agencies of the services, the State Department,
and the FBI must do their proper share, and the whole mast pull in
harness if our intelligence services are to be adequate to the
difficult requirements of the atomic age. The very problems that
have beset CIA have troubled, to more or less degree, the other
intelligence agencies. Of all these problems, one looms largest--
personnel. The skilled and experienced personnel of wartime have in
most cases severed their connections with the services; selection
and replacement of new personnel have been extremely haphazard. In
one of the service's intelligence systems at headquarters, Washington,
no Russian linguist is now permanently employed. In Germany, the
conduct of the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, a highly important
part of intelligence work, became notorious, yet inherently this was
not the fault of the Corps; the personnel assigned to it had no
qualifications or training for the work and was often of inadequate
caliber, The Army's remedy for this situation was not to improve
personnel selection and training, but to order all CIO personnel to
wear uniforms, live in barracks, and report for regular Army meals.
Under such a regimen they were expected to keep in contact with the
local population and to catch spies!
ahoice intelligence berths in the services have too often been
assigned to officers not particularly wanted by other arms or branches.
The capable, experienced, and thoroughly devoted personnel Who have
specialized in intelligence have too often seen their organizations
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and their systems ruined by superior officers with no experience*
little capacity* and no imagination. In the Committee's opinion,
it is highly iaportant that an intelligence corps--or at least an
intelligence career?be provided by the services and that adequate
selection and training systems be inaugurated.
The services must also try to rid their intelligence estimates
of subjective bias. Partly because of their natural service interests
partly because of inter-service budgetary competition, our estimates
of potential enemy strengths vary widely, depending upon the service
thal makes them. The Army will stress the potential enemy's ground
divitions, the Navy his submarines, the Air Force his planes, and
each estimate differs somewhat from the others. In one specific
instance, an estimate of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the
Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oonteined so many
inconsistencies within a single paper that it was considered value-
less for planning purposes. Out of this mass of jumbled material
and herassed often by the open and covert opposition of the older
agencies, CIA has tried to make sense. That it has not always
eucceeded ham not been entirely the fault of CIA.
Intelligence can best flourish In the shade of silence. But if
It is not subjected to scrutiny it could easily stagnate. Another
examination, two or three years from now, of our intelligence system
should be undertaken, either by a Congressional watchdog committee*
or preferably by a committee akin to the Dulles group (described
below). .The basic framework for a sound intelligence organization
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now exists; yet the material so far produced is by no means adequate
to our national safety in this age of cold war? and the atomic
bomb. That framework must be fleshed out by proper personnel and
sound administrative measures. Intelligence is the first line of
defense.
21111-1-1"--ISS?VjAin
A detailed study of the organization and activities of the
intelligence divisions of the government, including CIA, is being
made by a committee consisting of Mr. Allen Dulles,
Mr. William H. Jackson, and Mr. Mathias Correa, Who are assisted by
a staff of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum, of the Office of the
Secfetary of Defense. The Committee was appointed by the President
on the recommendation of the National Security Council. It will make
its report with specific recommendations by January 1, 1949. All
problems here considered will also be reviewed by the Dulles Committee.
Ipalifications of Director
k moot question is whether the Director should be a civilian or
a professional military man. The argument in favor of a service man
is that he will command more confidence from the armed services who
talk his language and will respect his position and security. With a
military men, the present pay scale will not prove a deterrent. The
job could be developed into one of the top staff assignments available
to members of the three services.
Against this, it is said that the position requires a broader,
background and greater versatility and diplomatic experience than is
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usually found in service personnel; that the best qualified and
most competent officers would not accept the position if to do
so meant permanent retirement and an end of the road to important
commie or operational responsibility. If a military man is
assigned to the position as a tour of duty, he will, it is said,
inevitably be influenced to some degree, in the execution of his
duties, by his rank and status as compared with that of other
officers with whom he deals. Be may also be influenced by concern
for his next billet.
The principal argument against a civilian is the difficulty of
getting a good one. It will be difficult to attract a man of force,
reputation, integrity, and proven administrative ability Who has an
adequate knowledge of foreign history and politics and is familiar
with intelligence technique and the working machinery of the
Government and the military establishment. Not only is the pay low
in comparison to industry and the professions, but the reward of
access is anonymity. The wisdom of putting an individual who lacks
intelligence experience in charge simply because he is a competent
administrator is dubious. A civilian would have the advantage of
being free from taint of service ambitions or rivalries. On the
other hand a civilian may be more subject to political pressure than
a military.man. In certain foreign countries this has occurred.
In any event a civilian would have to be a man of commanding
reoltation and personality in order to secure the respect and
cooperation of the services. CIA's relations with the State
D partment would uadoubtedly benefit from the preseace of a civilian
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director, known and respected by the Secretary of State and his
assistants.
The intrinsic interest of the work, its potential influence on
policy, and recognition of public service to be performed might
combine to persuade a competent civilian to accept the poeition.
If so, his appointment would seem desirable. A change in the statute
that would disqualify a military man is not, however, recommended.
Moreover it would not be wise, at this time at least, to amend
the statute to include a mandatory requirement that a military man,
appointed as Director, must retire from the service. A. competent.
officer Could be persuaded to retire from his service and abandon
hie career to become Director of CIA only if he felt some assurance
of a reasonable tenure of office. That no such assurance exists today
appears from the fact that three different Directors have been
appointed since January of 1946. A provision requiring the retirement
from service of any commissioned officer appointed Director might
appropriately be included in the statute--if coupled with provision
for adequate retirement pay in case he is removed as Director.
itocation
(1) CIA's Location under the 16C
CIA must necessarily be centrally located both as a
"coordinator" and as an "evaluator". It must work with service
intelligence agencies and with agencies outside the National Military
-4stablithment. It must accomplish the allocation of responsibility
for collection and research among Government agencies and fulfill
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its responsibility for central evaluation of intelligence free
from departmental prejudice, control or bias, whether real or imagined.
It must exercise authority through directives issued centrally and
must at the same time maintain smooth and constant working relation-
ships with the other departments and services.
It has been suggested that CIA should report directly to the
?resident. One alleged advantage of such an arrangement is that
'CIA's authority as a coordinator would thus be eehanoed, as its
directives could be issued as executive orders. Another is that
CIA would then report to an individual rather than a committee.
Apart from the question of burdening the President with
additional personal responsibility, it is doubtful whether, as a
practical matter, he has the time to pay much attention to it.
Internal administration will always remain the personal responsibility
of the Director of CIA Who can be held accountable by the National
Security Council, at the instance of any one of its members, as
effectively as by the President. It is unlikely that the Director's
effectiveness either as a "coordinator" or an "evaluator" would
be Increased by putting him on a White House level. His -estimates
would, in all probability, receive neither more nor less attention
from the departments if they emanated from the executive office of
the President or an appendage thereto. The exercise of CIA's
coordination function to allocate responsibilities must, initially
at least, be performed on a more or less negotiated basis. Morts
to impose directives concerning the internal workings of a department
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upon officials of the level of the Secretary of State or Eecretary
of Defense are not likely to meet with success.
tAiggestions have also been made that CIA should be in the
State Department or in the National Military Establishment. But
CIA.'s functions and interests transcend both the military establiih?
went and thn State Department. The Army has suggested that the
National Security Act be amended to provide "that the Secretary of
Defense shall be responsible for coordinstina the intelligence
aotivities of the departments and agencies of the National Military
Establithment*, and that CIA "ellen deal only with the Secretary of
Defense, or such other agency or agencies as he may designate". But
inclusion of such a provision would tend to break down the necessarily
comolicated but established working relationships between CIA and
individual agencies, and in any case seems redundant. The Secretary
of Defense must be. per se, the coordinator of intelligence and all
other activities within the military establithment, and CIA practically
must deal with him?as it actually' does through the National Security
c;ouncili A better. mechanism than now exists for coordinating the
servioe intelligence agencies in the Secretary's office 0ould be
established, but there Should be no artificial restriction of the
flexibility and authority needed by CIA. CIA is properly placed
uttaer the National Security Council.
(2) 'bociat;.ot ofibommo4 eel-vices" under' CIA
Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance of such
oervices of common Imam as the National Security Council shall
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determine. At present these include, apart from Scientific
Intelligence, Which is discussed separately; (a) maintenance of
central indexes of report, records and documents having intelligence
value; (b) *lamination of foreign documents from which intelligence
material is extracted and disseminated; (c) maintenance of central
map facilities; (d) monitoring of foreign broadcasts; and (0) collection
of information by clandestine means and counterespionage abroad.
There is little real dispute that the first four of these
functions should be located centrally. The question of wherethe
clandestine operational activities should be located has long been
the subject of debate. Wherever located, there is little doubt that
they should all be treated together as a single unit.
Proponents of the theory that the clandestine service Should
be under the State Department\
secret intelligence is closely related to the
formulation of diplomatic decisions, Others maintain that espionage
is essentially valuable for defense and in wartime would inevitably
pass to military control and become a function of commend. They argue
that this service Should be under the Secretary of Defense or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
An objection, sometimes mad* to continuing espionage under the
Jt., is that it creates so complex an administrative burden for the
Director as to render it difficult for his to function as an ?level tor";
also that as an *evaluator" he will be prejudiced in favor of
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information procured by his own service. This objection has 11024
slight validity but must be weighed against serious objection to
olacing the service elsewhere.
The arguments in favor of control by the Secretary of Defense
or the Secretary of State are in large degree mutually exclusive,
and this fact suggests retention of the service in its present !pot
under a body where both are represented. 1
25X1
Oonsiderable thought must be given, however, to the desirability
of splitting CIA in time of war and transferring two or three of its
five major divisions--certainly the operational services the open
and 'overt collection of information--to the National Xilitary
Lstabliehment, Where they could function under the Joint Chiefs of
staff (preferably) or under the Secretary of Defense. If inclusion
of these services in the wartime chain of command is deemed desirable
the objective could be facilitated by a slight, and at the same time
a desirable, change in CiAls present organisation--the grouping of
all operations under a Deputy Director Who should have considerable,'
through not unlimited independence. in time of peace, the Deputy
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Director in charge of operations would function under the Director
CIA; in time of war he might if necessary report directly to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Continued experience may suggest other changes, but change is
disruptive in itself, and one great present need of the intelligence
services is a relatively reorganisation-free period. in which to work
out their problems. If at some future time it appears desirable to
tOansfer CIA's operational functions to another agency, the transfer
might be accomplished with the approval of the rational Security
Council, the Director CIA, and the President.
Internal Reorganisation
Some changes .in the internal structure of CIA, in addition to
the groupaent of the operating offices under a deputy director, may
be needed. The very large number, of people employed by CIA in itself
suggests that a careful survey Should be made of its administrative
procedures with a view to greater economy. The administrative
division seems too large with danger that the tail may be wagging the
dog. The Office of Collection and Dissemination sometimes in the past
has acted as a bottleneck but under its new head it appears to be
performing an efficient job. Sone though Should be given to merging
the map ;services, now under the Office of Research and lstimates, with
the other reference facilities under the Office of Collection and
Dissemination. The name of this latter office is a misnomer; it
probably should becosie purely a reference service with its full energies
devoted to this important work. Its liaison functions might be split
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off to form a separate small section. The Dulles study will
undoubtedly make more detailed recommendations for internal reform.
intelUSIAce Pral2MUUHLIttal
The greatest need in CIA is the establishment at a high level of
a small group of highly oapable people, freed from administrative
detail, to concentrate upon intelligence *valuation. The Director
and his assistants have had to devote so large a portion of their
time to administration that they have been unable to give sufficient
time to analysis and evaluation. A small group of mature men of the
highest talents, having full access to all information, might well
re released completely from routine and est to thinking about
intelligence only. Many of the greatest failures in intelligence have
not been failures in collection, but failures in analysing and
evaluating correctly the information available.
Duplication
There is SIMI duplication in the work done by the Office of
Lesser& and Mstimates and the work in other governmental intelligence
agencies. This duplication is caused in pArt,by the fact that ORM
and other agencies, notably the intelligence division of the State
Department, but also sections of 0-2, On, A.-2 and even the Department
of Commerce, examine the sake basic material for the purpose of making
intelligence estimates. To some degree this may be inevitable and
even desirable as CIA must be in a position to verify the intelligence
that it evaluates. ftamination of basic material for this purpose
might be acoomplithed with fewer people by placing CIA analysts in
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the message centers and secretariats of the departments and services
to sift out really important material for routing to CIA.
The present size of ORL is in oonsiderable measure due to
dependence on its own facilities forresearch. Research
divisions of other agencies are preoccupied with their immediate
departmental requirements and are Unable to meet or are otherwise
aaresponsias to CIA's priorities. CIA accordingly tends to do its
own basic research. Duplication in the field of economic research can
probably be reduced over aperiod of time by intelligent use of
"coordinating" power exercised over many Government agencies.
Duplication in the field of political reporting remains an issue
between CIA and, the State Department. Some duplication may be justi-
fied on the ground that "We guesses are Vetter than one"; also because
CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department work with
different objectives and different priorities. However, it is now
clear in retrospect that it was a mistake to split up the Office of
atrategic Services after the war and to assign part of its functions
to one department (State) and part to another (Army). This mietake
now has been largely remedied by creation of CIA, but its effects
linger on in the research and analysis duplicationm?particularly marked
in the economic and political field-between CIA and State. The
Sensibility of shifting a large part of the State Department's
intelligence section to CIA should be studied. If this should prove
to. be impractical or undesirable, unnecessary duplication should be
eliminated by progressive coordination, interchange of personnel, and
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The allocation of specific responsibilities to various agencies by
National Security Council directives.
Evaluation and Correlation
: This function is currently performed by daily intelligence
sutmaries containing Nipot" intelligence items which go to the
President, members of the NSC, and others. 4eekly and monthly
estimates of the world idtelligence situation are also prepared as
'11 as estimates of opaline situations. These are drawn up from
time to time, as occaaion arises, on CIA sa own initiative or in
response to requests from the National Security Council or ?err
agencies, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerned with national
security.
CIA's estimator, and surveys are criticized principally on two
grounds. OM is that as a normal routine they receive insufficient
consideration from the policy makere, and aro not responsive to their
immediate problems and requirements', A second criticiam, which is
allied to the first, is that CIA estimates are made without access to
all relevant information including information concerning activities
and decisions of the military services, operationalln nature, such
as the extent and deployment of the fleet in the Pacific, etc Both
these criticisms have some elements of truth.: The military services
tend to withhold operational information and the details of military
plena on thf! grounds of security. In formulating plans the State
Department tends to rely on its own judgment and information without
consulting CIA. Although CIA appears to be supplied with all
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informationof a strictly "intelligence" nature, it is not clear
hat CIA has adequate 'access to information about operational
developments. Yet effective intelligence is possible only when it is
closely linked with planning and policp.making.
Plans and decisions affecting national security are presently
made at various places; by the Batienal Security Council, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the State?Army.tiavy.Air Force Coordinating Committee,
by the State Department and by the military services individually.
These various authorities rely, in formulating their plane and decisions
on the respective departmental intelligence services, on the joint
Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint
Intelligence Group, which is the working body for the JIC, as well as
on CIA. If CIA is to perform adequately its function of evaluating
and correlating intelligence relating to the national security, it must
be aware of, and participate in, the thinking at all these levels*
It is particularly desirable that the association between the
Joint Staff and the CIA be as intimate as possible. CIA is the
logical arbiter of differences between the evvices on the evaluation
of intelligence. Assumptions made by the Chiefs of Staff both for
planning and oper%tional purposes should be formulated with CIA
participation or at least reviewed by CIA.
For the purpose of fostering a closer relationship between CIA
ani: the Joint Chiefs of Staff'j, Consideration should be given to
including the Director CIA among the membership of the Joint Intelligence
Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. FUrthermoris it would seem
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desirable that the Intelligence Advisory Committee meet more fre n
to consider questions of substantive intelligence. This would
contribute to an interchange of intelligence opinion between the
principal intelligence officers of the Government and mould in itself
insure a closer relationship between CIA and the Joint Intelligence
Committee both of which participate in Intelligence Advisory Committee
meetinge,
It is also desirable that a closer working relationship be
established between the seciona in CIA responsible for the preparation
of estimates and both the National Security Council staff and the
Joint Intaligonce Group of the Joint Staff.
Scientific Intelligence
Failure properly to appraise the extent of scientific developments
in enemy countries may have mar immediate and catastrophic consequences
than failure in ami other field of intelligence. What is needed is
a central authority responsible for asaimilating all information
concerning developments in the field of science abraidand competent
to estimate the significance of these develoments. This agency
obviously must have access to all available information bearing on the
problem. It must also be able to provide intelligence direction in the
collection of items of information likely to have significance in the
scientific field*
At present, miponsibility for intelligence evaluation in such
fields as biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics,
developments in guided missiles, etc., is spread amongst various agencies,
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including the Chemical Warfare Sol-vice (CWS), 3-2, A.2, ONI, and the
Atomic Energy Commission as well as CIA, Medical intelligence is
virtually non.existent.* Estimates of foreign potentialities made by
various agencies are inadequate and contradictory, In CIA itself
respenoibility for scientific intelligence is divided between the
Scientific Branch of ORE and figroup concerned with atoric energy.
Collection of information concerning scientific developments abroad
is clearly inadequate.
On the recommendation or Dr. Vannevar Bush, then Chairman of the
R&M, a scientist of reputation has directed the work of the Scientific
Branch of ORE for the past year. Be recently resigned** and the office
iss awaiting the recommendation of a auccemor by Dr, Compton, who
has: replaced Dr. Bush. As presently constituted, the Scientific-Branch
of ORE iz,not in a position either to evaluate intelligence or to ?
stimulate the collection of neceasary information. There is no
physician and no mechanism for collecting or evaluating medical.
intelligence in CIA.
Some of the difficulties presently experienced are inevitable.
py eminent scientist will be impatient with routine resplatione4 and
sore "red tape" exists in any [worriment organization,. It is desirable,
however, that the individual responsible for scientific intelligence
* See Chapter XIII, Medical Services and Hospitalisation in the
Military Services.
**The Committee has been advised that CIA has been successful in
finding a satisfactory replacement.
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within CIA be freed, as far as possible, from subordination to
administrative officials. This might be accomplished in CIA by
raising the Scientific Branch to an office level and making its
chief an Assistant Director.
A consideration that makes it difficult to keep qualified
scientists in CIA is the undesirability of public acknowledgment of
the nature of the activite. The practical result is to creatoth,
impression that the indtvidual in question isn't employed by anybody.
This makes it difficult for him to attend conferences or write papers,
and he soon loses etandine in his profession.
IA currently
popular but baseless theory that scientifint are inherently insecure
is advanced as an argument wlw individuals responsible for scientific
intelligence should be denied opportunities for active aesociation with
other scientists at conferences, etc" on any basis. Security would
appear to be a matter of individual re,ponsibilitys No evidence
justifies the conclusion that insecurity is an occupational failing
peculiar to scientists.
The activities of scientific IntellieBnce should be directed by
amientist and not by some otherwise competent individual whose
education and experience in the scientific field is superficial. An
educated glee as to the implications of a given scientific development
can be made only if 'the guesser has a real understanding of the
potentiality of scientific development. Not only must he be fully
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competent to appreciate the significance of development himeelf,
but, if he is to be effective, he must be able to convince other
scientists that his interpretation of a given development is
reasonable. He must speak the scientific language.
Security conaiderations occasioned th- divorce betmeen the grow
in CIA concerned with atomic energy and the Scientific Branch. It
was felt that individuals concerned with developments in WI atonic
field should be strictly isolated. Fressnt arrangements for
intelligence relating to atomic energi seem to be working more
amoothly than those in other scientific fields although the collection
of foreign information is slow and difficult, and our atomic energy
intellieence is by no means adequate.
Logic suggests that at some future time responsibility for all
scientific intelligence be centralized. An immediate reorganisation
for this purpose would probably be premature and simply retard the
development of atomic intelligence without contributing to the improve-
ment of scientific intelligence generally.
Vigorous action is imperative to improve all facilities for
evaluating and stimulating the collection of scientific intelligence,
Outside the fie3d of atomic energy this must be done by increasing the
authority and support elven to the official responsible for scientific
intelligence within CIA whether he remain on a branch or be raised to
an office level. Non-technical as well as technical intelligence "
information contributes to the evaluation of foreign scientific
developments. For this reason scientific intelligence including
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medical intelligence should be evaluatod centrally where intelligence
information of all kinda is immediately available.
,Evaluation of Operations and Location of Counterespionage
For security reaaons no atteppt has been made at a detailed
analysis or appraisal of the clandestine operational activities of
CIA Senior officers of the government who testified before the
Committee on the National Security Organisation expressed themseivee
as fairly well satisfied with the necessarily slow pregress could be
more rapid. Zven this limited satisfaction is not echoed in lower
ranks.
The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear properly
integrated with CIA's other clandeetine operations. Although arguments
have been made in favor of extending CIA's authorityto include
responsibility far counterespionage in this Country, such an extension
of jurisdiction does not at present appear justified. For one thing,
concentration of power over counterespionage activities at home in
the hands of a Director of Central Intelligence responsible for
espionage and abroad, might justifiably arouse public suspicion and
opposition. Conceivably it could form the basin for a charge that
a gestapo is in process of creation even though the power to arrest
were specifically withhold. To transfer responsibility for domestic
counterespionage frost the FBI, which has an established organisation
and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped for the assignment
would probably create more prOblems than, it would solve. It is
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doubtful whether the logical benefit of having one somcy responsible
for oeunterespionage throughout the world would justify the dislocation
and confusion that such a transfer would inevitably occasion.
C/A representatives have indicated that their present working
liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee doubts that
FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate. Who Director of FBI
declined the Cormitteel_ invitation to appear before it to diecuse
the CI with the cormittee or its representatives on the ground that
he know too little of its activities,
Budget and Administration
CIA's budget is a guarded secret. Present arrangements appear to
work satisfactorily. The interlited services participate in requests
for the allocation of funds to CIA. The amounts requested are reviewed
by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget designated for the
purpose and controlled by appropriate committees of the Congress in
closed session. CIA has requested amplifying and /lamenting
leg/elation (3.2688? introdUced but not acted upon during the 2d Session
of the 80th Concaves') to define better its power and to Amplify
administration and payment of some of its employees. Most of the
provisions of this legislation would confer upon CIA that administrative
flexibility and anonymity that are essential to satisfactory intelli-
gence, but some of them seem to involve undesirab2 . broad grants of
power for the new agency. Congress should examine this proposed
legislation carefully, modify it as seems necessary, and act upon it
as soon as possible.
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NO44
Seourity Legislation*
The CIA, the IFTI? and the services have periodically su ested
revision of the Nation's espionage laws to reduce the difficult
legal burdens of securing convictions under these statutee. Detailed
eueeestions for revision of the present law, ehich would permit '
conviction irrespective of proof of intent to injure the Government,
probably will be presented to the next session of Congrese. This
Committee sympathises with CTA and other agencies of tho Government
in their desire to protect themselves agpinet dangerous dieclosures
by indiscreet and irresponsible persons, and it recognises the need
for more effective counterespionage protection. The Committee has
not examined- the proposed revision of the espionage laws nor is it
competent to judge them. The Conmittee feels strongly, however, that
better protection for essential Government secrets does not lie in
legislation alone, Counterespionage is a difficult art, and it has
not alweys been well practiced in this Country. Strengthening of the
FBI, the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Army, and CIA's own-
internal security is isportant regardless of new laws, Revision of
the espionage laws to remove the necessity of proof of intent might
broaden the Act to such an extent as to constitute a peril to our
concepts of freedom. Such proposals should be examined most carefully
by Congress.
The Committee is of the firm opinion that there must be major
ism:element in all our intelligence services. This cannot be achieved
overnight; time is required to build a good intelligenee service. A
vIEN.Oimerwommoismwslammisia.
See Chapter XIV, Civil Defense, Internal Security, etc.
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prowr selection of personnel and a well thought?out prognzm far
their assignment and training aro essential--particularly in the
Arm**
The general framework of our intelligence or ard.zakion is soundly
conceived The p,Irtinent agancies are aware of its as4,Jete and
liabilities, of its virtues and shortcomings, The National seauri
Council, which has properly concerned itself with CIA, should give
more thought aril attention to the relationships of CIA with other
intelligence agencies and working through the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of State, should encourago the improvement of
other intelligence agencies.
Such of the reform suzgested by this survey, and by the Dulles
Committee, as are accepted, should be made promptly, but when action
has been taken. CIA and other Government intelligence agencies should
to permitted a period of internal development free frau the disruption
of continual examination and as free as possible from publiatty.
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OUTLINE FOR FINAL REPORT
PREFACE (6a:
DRAFT. NO. 5 -
5 Nov. 1948
A statement of the terms of reference of the Survey Group,
haw these terms have been interpreted and the procedure followed in
conducting the Survey.
INTRODUCTION -- The Nature of the Intelligence Problem
;A brief statement of the nature of intelligence and of the issues
which need to be examined and resolved.
Chapter 1 -- Present Organization for National Intelligence
A general analysis of the position of CIA as de
in
the National Security Act, the relations between CIA and the
departments and a general description of the mechanisms for
coordinating intelligence activities.
Chapter 2 -- Organization, Administration and Direction of CIA
An overall sketch of the organization of CIA with an examina-
tion and evaluation of its managerial set-up, administrative
operations, security, personnel, and direction.
Chapter 3 -- CIA's Res onsibilit for the Coordination of
Intelligence Activities
An examination of the organization and operations of IAC,
ICAPS, OCD, and other CIA activities for the coordination of
intelligence activities, an analysis of the NSC Intelligence
Directives, and an appraisal of CIA's achievements in coordinat-
ing intelligence activities.
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Chapter 4 -- 2T12.2 Re2ponsibility for Intelligpp valuation
and Estimates
A discussion of CIA's responsibility for the coordination of
national intelligence and an examination of ORE Is performance.
Chapter 3 -- CIA's Performance of Common Services: The Collection
of Overt Intelligence
This chapter would deal with 00.
Chapter 6 ? CIA Is Performance of Common Services:
Intelligence wiSecre-b0era,tions Abroad
This chapter would cover the activities of OSO and the new
Office of Policy Coordination.
Secret
Chapter 7 ? The Department of State
An examination of the organization strength and position of
the intelligence agency in the Department of State, including a
definition of its fields of' activity and an appraisal and recom-
mendations of its relationships to Department of State operations,
to the departments, ani to CIA.
Chapter 8 ? The Service Intelligence Agencies 0.-.Caerierisi ouseioa--
it statement of the intelligence responsibilities of the
service intelligence agencies in relation to each other, to the
JIC, and to CIA.
Ch ter 9 The vice Intelli encies:
A amination and praisal of th ntelligence activi es
of the servic gencies.
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Cha. t r 10 ? Pri ciples of Organization for National Intelli ence
An analysis and appraisal of the general principles which
should guide intelligence organization and activities and a
statement of the type of national intelligence organization which
is needed, the respective relations of the principal agencies
and of the major operations.
. Chgpter Conclusions and Recommendations
A recapitulation and reinterpretation of the conclusions and
recommendations developed and stated in the previ 01B chapters.
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Rblum
NOTEs FOR CONCLUIONe 13 Nov 1948
Inte lieeace Oeeanizetion -Geuerel
The National Security Act of 1947 provides an adequate
basis for a sound intelligence organizetion ana no emeadments are
recommended d (11:fr t--A-4taT'
(complete centrelieation of intelligence is undesirable.
The departmental intelligence agencies should be strong within
their respective spheres and should be supported by and in turn
ee\
themselves support the Central Intellieence Agency. ,e
,"There is no evidence that intelligence i being neglected,
e
although there is much evidence that its possibilities are not
being fully exploiti;0
(There is evidence that within Individual departments and
as between one department or agency and enother, there is not the
fullest measure of cooperation. This is sometimes due to the
over-emphasis given security consideretions as contrasted with
reeuirements for effective operations.)
Steps should be taken to strengthen the authority of
the Nationel Security Council over the CI e in order that CIA
may receive better support frem the members of the National security
Council than heretofore and so that the IL-Lionel Security Council
may assure itself that CIA is properly fulfilling its mission.
This might be done by aesignating the Secretaries of State and
Defense as a subeammittee of the NSC for this purpose.
i The relationship between CIA, the Intelligence edv sory
Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs
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of Staff needs to be readjusted in order that the National Security
Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with the principal
departments concerned with national security, may receive
consolidated national intelligence estimates from one source, arriv
at after appropriate discussion ana criticism./
\ The Survey Group has not been able to examine sufficiently
the very ilsportant question of communic,tions intelligence so that
it has not been able to formulate definite views on this subject,
except in relation to specific problems*
CENTRa4 INTELLIGENCE A q
General Appraisal,
Although CIA has in some respects ma d& good progr
in many 'respecs? it 4b comple,lely failed in its mission and
there are no signs of h? deficiencies being remedied*
CIA doe e not enjoy the confidence or support of the
other departments and agencies of the Government*
The general mend e oven to CIA
Act seems to bp 1-1 proper one ,nd s iCientl
, r
the N tic)
nedeesary adjustments can )se made within its tei;ls*
1- ecurity _
so that
The combination of responsibilities in CIA for coordinat-
ing intelligence activities and for conducting certain operations
has some drawbacks, but it is felt that these can be largely
overcome by approprt-te adjustments and that the disadvantages
of making any radical change in this respect would outweigh the
possible advantages,
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Oritanization and Mission
The leadership of CIA goes not deMbnstrate a clea
,- ,?----r-----------z/-- ??i- ,----', ,..-----,
__
'
under ,p4ng of CIA4s tission dotit iive,erfecti've a ,ct dil
1
to cA, and has failed t6-iin the f supoort o _the other - 4encies
- . ,_____,
0: he Government.
The Director- of CL should be aciviliri, appointed
on a. non-partisan basis ;And a person with - good understanding
of intelligence problems.
The internal organization of CIA is unsatisfactory.
There is insufficient flexibility of administration and inadequate
participation by the intelligence chiefs in the determination of
CIA policies.
Too much importance rests witn the administrative and
managerial staffs, which are becomin6 the principal me;Laasibr
controlling intelligence openAtions.
Rigidity of administration has led to a general condition
of insecurity, which needs to be remedied by appropriate administra-
tive-plicy arrangements.
There are too many military- personnel on tour of duty
in pos , ons of major responsibility.
a to,
ion of Intelligence Activities
CIA has not effectively promoted the coordination of
govrnment intelligence activities. The opertions of the various
intelligence agencies are largely unaffected by the existence of
CIA.
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bk.ChLT
The Intelligence Advisory Committee has been largely
ineffective as an agency to assist the Director of Central
Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence activities.
Nevertheless, the principle of the IAC is sound LAid the IAC
should be continued.
'CAPS has not been a successful staff. It should be
revitalized as a staff for the Director of Central Intelligence with
the concern of developing plans for the coordination of intelligence
activities, including those conducted under CIA and by other agencies.
That portion Of OCD which is concerned with the coordina-
tion of intelligence activities should be established us part of
the reconstituted ICAPS.
The Director of Central Intelligence should be concerned
primarily with the coordination of intelligence activities and
the coordination of intelligence opinion. Intelligence operations
conducted by CIA as a common service should have an autonomous
position Within this framework.
Correlatiell_ef #ational Intelligence
The Office of Reports and tstimates is not now effectively
performing one of- the major functions for. which CIA was created,
namely, the correlation of national intelligence.
ORE has become a producer of intelligence, whose production
is often unreluted to policy requirements and competitive with the
intelligence production of other agencies.
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There has been a failure to distinguish between Olibts
mission of coordinating intelligence aria the intelligence producing
functions which it performs as a common service for other intell-
gence agencies.
ORE should be reconstituted so that a small group of
high quality concerns itself with the coordination of iritelligen Ce
at the highest level of Government reuirements. It would base
its work largely, but not exclusively, upon the intelligence- -
products of the other intelligence agencies and would have the
responsibility of monitoring the intelligence, production of the
other agencies in order to improve its quality.
There would also be created a separate central research
and evaluating unit in CIA which would perform, on behalf of all
the intelligence agencies, including CIA., research and evaluating
services in fields of common concern, e.g. economic, industrial,
scientific, etc. and map research, document translation.. .
Common Services Performed. by_CIA
The central unit mentioned in the previous paragraph
?will be created.
The Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy
Coordination, and the Contacts Brnch of the Office of Operations
should be consolidated under 4 single head. This operJting unit
should be largely autonomous, enjoy specil security arrangements,
control its own administration, and. receive policy guldnee directly frol
the Secretary- of State and Defense. A closer relationship needs to
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be established between thse operating units and the other depart-
ments and agencies of the Government in order that there may be
more effective determination of requirements for the operating'
services and a higher degree of confidence in their work.
There needs to be a higher degree of coordinetion of
clandestine ,ctivities conducted by the various agencies of the
Government; in particular, the activities of the _Armed Services
in occupied areas and the counterespionage activities of the FBI
need to be more closely related to the, work of CIA.
More effective methods need to be developed for the
exploitation of domestic sources of intelligence, Including
refugees and foreign nationality groups, in consultation with the
FBI. -
The counterespionage activities of CLI need to be more
actively developed and the entire counterespionage ..ctivities
of the Government need to be better coordinated.
There is evidence that communictions intelligence is
not being effectively used in. rel tion to. CIA secret intelligence and
secret opemtions activities.
ThE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE .;LGENCIES
The potation of Stete Department intelligence needs to be
reexamined in light of the changes in ORE which would have the result
of placing a greater burden on the State Department for the production
of political intelligence.
The present separate intelligence orgnization in the State
Department needs to be brought in closer relationship to the policy desks
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There should be established in the State Department at
a high level a sinele point of liaison and generLd colic./ guidance
for all CIA secret operational matters.
The personnel policies for intelligence in the service depart-
ments should be re-exemined to insure that the reserve program is
being actively prosecuted and that the tour of duty principle is hot
being applied to the detriment of intelligence,. The recruitment of
professional civilian employees for the service ageac1es should be
encouraged.
The service intelligence agenciee should concentrate on
intelligence in their respective areas of dominant interest.
They should also be concerned with such current intelligence aS
is needed for staff purposes.
The Joint Intelligence Committee should be reconstituted
to include representation from CIA and the State Department In
this reconstituted form end with the assistance of the newly
created unit for high level intelligence coordination La the CIA,
it should provide the definitive Government intelligence ostimetes
on all national intelligence questions.
The Joint Intelligence Group may continue to functin as
a staff agency for the Joint Chiefs of btaff.
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CHAPTER IV
The Organization, Administration, and Direction of CIA
- Robert BluM
Organization
The National Security Act of 1947 has very little to say on the
. subject of the organization of CIA other than to provide that it shall
be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence and that he "shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or
from individuals in civilian life. The Director is free to orianize
CIA as he chooses and to appoint to positions within MA persons of
his own selection, subject to the general control of the National
Security Council, which has in fact been exercised only once in this
respect.
=affirm to any nuar
seisting the Director are a
Deputy Director and an executive Director who are his immediate sub?
ordinates in the chain of command. Attached to the Director in a staff
capacity are the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
(ICAPS compriaing persons. desiEnated by the D
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Navy and Air Force, who have the responsibility of assisting tis Director
and the Intelligence Advisory Committee with respect to plans and policies
for interdepartmental coordination (see p. below); the General
Counsel who handles all staff work of a legal and legislative nature; and
the Advisory Council, a small staff which represents the Director in
handling communications intelligence matters.
In addition to the, e small staff sections with special respond.-
bilities there are two large units called "Executives"lvth;ZA11-
tt-L. )-0.:AALcr.th
p have
in fact the major administrative responsibilities within CIA. These
are the Excutive for Administration and Management which handles finan-
cial and budgetary matters, adminiatrative services, supply and genaral
housekeeping, personnel and management advice and surveys; and the
Executive for Inspection and Security which is responsible for internal
security policies and investigations, physical security arrangemenbe
inspections and audits.
The bulk of CIA's intelligence and related activity is performed
in five Offices, each headed by an Assistant Director. These Offices
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report through the Executive Director and Deputy Director to the Director.
They are the following; Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which
prepares intelligence reports and estimates(see p. below); Office 25X1
of Operations (00)
translates foreign
documents see p. below)i Office of Special Operations (0S0),
which carries out espionage and counter?espionage abroad (aee p.
below); Office of Policy Coordination (OPO), which conducts secret
operations abroad see p. below); and the Office of Collection and
Dissemination (OCD), which arranges for CIA to receive and disseminate
intelligence information, coordinates to a limited extent intelligence
collection and houses certain reference facilities see p. ,elow
This st1ruoture does not present a very clear pattern when matched
against the three broad functions assignea to CIA by the National Secutity
Act of 1947. CIA's responsibilities for advising on the coordination
of intelligence activities are performed through the Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff which does the staff work for the Direc?
tor of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee
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on the National Security Council Intelligence Directives refe ed to
in the previous chapter. However, ICAPS also performs mtscel aneous
staff functions for the Director, primarily of a liason. natur ? The
Office of Collection and Dissemination also assista in coordi ting
intelligence activities, but does this at an administrative r ther than
a planning level. It is concerned almost entirely with : coordating,
th
to a limited extent, e collection of intelligence required CIA
and the various departments. However, OCD also performs certa
vices of common concern, primarily of an information reference
in that it compiles and maintains certain biographical and oth
n ear-
nature,
r refer-
ence indexes;4eagt=rurimeew. Finally, OCD performs certain functions
which are primarily administrative, including the reception and dissemina-
tion of documents and reports.
?
CVOs responsibility to "correlate and evaluate intellige ce relate.
ing to the national security" is carried out almost entirely
Office of ,Reportis and Estimates. However, as we will point ous. later,
a clear distbina+Aon has never been made within ORE bewc the
:\
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correlating and producting national intelligence and other du:iese which
ORE performs and which are primarily the production of report as a
service of common concern for the benefit of the exiating intelligence
agencies. To some extent ORE also coordinates the intelligence activi-
ties of the other government armies to the extent of planning,
coordinating and editing their contributions to basic intelligence
handbooks.
Certain services of common concern which are primarily of informa.
tion-producing and reference character are performed by the Office of
Collection and DisseMination and the Office of Reports and Estimates,
as pointed out above. Anpther common service of this kind is carried
out by the Office of Operations which is charged with theerettelmtken?
RFintelligence/Ifound in foreign documents and publications. However,
the principal services of common concern 'Which have been forni?4,3
allocated to CIA are of an operational nature.
Foreign espionage and counter espionage
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Finally, the principal function "related to intelligence affecting
the national security" so far allocated to CIA is performed by the
Office of Policy Coordination, which conducts secret operations abnvad.
However,
? .f-thi0 kind) the securityof vital industrial
operations abroad, is being coordinated by the. Executive for Inspection
and Security.
The internal organization of CIA has not been set up with a clear
conception of CIA's distinctive yet
inter-related missions. This has
-ticttlarly with inbpect zd-e-1*-13?
dutioolaf-000rdinating
14
tenigenoc
activities and of o.riallating-inz.--
effBot-ef-eheouring
CIA14-paseper relationships with the other Government agencies concerned
with intelligence matters.
There are also certain administrative policies and practices that
make it difficult to derive the maximum effectiveness from the activities
of CIA. The most serious of these difficulties is the position of pre-
eminence which has gradually been acquired by administrative officials
and practices. Thus, administrative considerations are often given greater
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n 11 gence considerationsl and the officials primarily
responsible for intelligence matters have little contact with each other
or with the general determination of CIA plans and policies. Ts re is
no close collaboration between the Director and the heads of the various
offices. Standing between them are not only the Deputy Director and the
Executive Director but also, to a large extent, the administrative staffs
which have acquired a position that enables them not merely to serve the
intelligence offices but to exert control over them. Administrative and
command channels are rigidly adhered to, and there is little close con-
sults ion on intelligence and policy matters between the various stratified
levels. This situation does not appear to be due to any inherent organi.
zational weakness but to the policies. pursued over a period of time by
the Director or and his immediate eubordinate$who, as a result, arelmoved
from the actual intelligence operations on the success of which the strength
and effectiveness of CIA depends.
This situation is reflected in the failure of the intelligence
working-levels to receive adequate guidance from the Director, with the
result that to a large extent they are forced to determine their awn
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plans, policies and activities. Another consequence, is tint the working
levels often receive inadequate support for their activities because of
the failure of the top levels to understand their problems. Finally,
relationships with outside agencies are hindered because of various ad?
ministrative and liaison practices which, while not contributing to
bettor.security, impede the effectiveness of CIA's work and the necessary
cooperation with other agencies.
It has not been possible to judge in detail the efficiency of the
internal administrative services of CIA. Although there is no reason to
doubt that these activities have been efficiently performed, there is
little doubt that CIA is over?administered and that the role of administra?
tive officials is out of proportiorto their true imports
probable, therefore, that criticism should be directed agains A nistrative
and management policies rather than against
tive orgc1nizationm Th s is also borne out by the fact that CIAls
dif?
ficultd.es with respect to personnel and security are due largely to
policy rather than strictly administrative considerations. It is difficult
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to determine whether there is justice in the charge* frequently heard*
that there are too many administrative personnel in CIA* and that the
organization is top heavy in this respect. Although the numbers of
administrative personnel may be high as compared to other agencies* it
must be recognized that the operating problems of CIA are peculiar ones.
Although this cannot be said with certainty* the criticism of numbers may
be more a criticism of administrative policies and procedures.
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The budget figures for the fiscal years 1949?50 are the following:
1-6
?-
The great care with which CIA's budget is. handled so as to make the
entire procedure a very secure one, even though CIA is a statutory agency,
is not matched by a similar security consciousness in other matters,.
Although there is no evidence that there is any laxness in CIA's administrative
arrangements for security, there de-eppese?.15wgm a number of circumatanoes
and policies which detract from the general security of the organization.
It is very difficult to create adequate security, other than normal
physical security, around an organization like CIA which was created by
statute
and encompasses a wide variety
of activities. The fact that some of these activities are carried on
is a matter of public record) the existence of others is highly classified.
Yet by combining in a single, centralized structure a vide variety of
activities, e security of the most sensitive of these may be compromised
by the insecurity of the least sensitive. This situation is also aggra.
individuals publicly identify
vated by the fact that
themselves with CIA and that some of these are engaged in activities which
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must be kept from public notice, although there is no satisfactory way
of accomplishing this.
There are further examples of the same difficulty. In the Washington
area, CIA occupies 19 buildings, all of which can readily be identified
as CIA buildings. In various cities throughout the United States, the
regional offices of the Office of Operations conduct their business under
e public labels. "Central I telli7ence Agency. Z-2-14Pwere?persibbe
4t_seztaft,edELftayart
the-pertionni. theser,ditfioulteri-ousy-4314,41A0
Thus all personnel,
. regardless of the particular part of CIA in which they work, are known
as CIA personnel and all buildings, regardless of the activity they house,
are known as CIA buildings.
These deficiences are increased by the tendency within CIA toward
aciM nistrative uniformity and centralization. This seems highly uncle.-
sirable in an intelligence organization performing a variety of functions
in which flexibility is important not only to ensure effective operations,
but also as a security safetuard.
DE-T1
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CIA-RDF'86BONElkic. 1
Security also suffers because of poor morale. among persons within
the organization and those who have left it. An unfortunate tradition,
of which CIA is but the heir, has developed according to which intelligent*
is a subject of public discussion, at least in limited circles a
morale and discordant views as to haw intelligence should be organized
contribute to fanning the flames of this discussion. This is not to seOr
#4.;),
that there is,secpri ith respect to -pier 1
fi
but that there is a general atmosphere ofAsecurity in ntlli?te
which may endanger the security of particularly sensitive questions*
Some of the factors Which have contributed to this situation may be
unavoidable, but they can be compensated in part by proper administrative
and operational policies, the cooperation of other agencies of the
Government and rigid indoctrination.
CIA also labors under a very difficult personnel problem. A camiw.
preheneive intelligence organization such as CIA has extremely varied
personnel requirements. It needs persons with highly specialized talents
who are not easily found or trained, as well as persons with broad political
and administrative badkground. The conditions of change and uncertainty
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which have prevailed in our intelligence organisation during the past
few years have made the task even more difficult)because persons who
might otherwise be. qualified and interested have been discouraged from
entering the intelligence field. The predominance of military personnel
in so many key positions in CIA, and the
enjoyed
by CIA, have also contributed to an unsatisfactory personnel situation
and to the difficulties of recruiting suitable people.
Morale on the whole is poor. The chief reasons appear to be disaatie
faction with the leadership, uncertainty as to the future of a career in
intelligence, and an awareness that CIA's standing in the Government leaves
much to be desired.
It is difficult to make any sweeping judgment as to the qualification/
and competence of CIA personnel. It is probably accurate to say that
there are few outstanding persons but that) for the most part,thoee at
the "working levels" are loyal and. competent. However, highly qualified
individuals have not been readily attracted to the orgaAzation and same
of the most qualified persons have left it.
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One strong contributing factor to this situation is the relatively
high proportion of military service personnel in key positions in CIA.
At best, intellience as a career is not favored in the armed services
and CIA?As in Many casee, accepted officers who were either withodt agy
int igence experience whtsoever or were not desired by their own intel-
ligence services. This is not to say that there are not good intelligence
officers in the Services but that CIA has little likelihood of getting
them and that these officers would be conscious of the fact that their
oWn careers would suffer from a long association with ak. There are
the further facts that Servi4ersonnel are normally assigned for a brief
tour of duty and that the turnover is exceptionally high, preventing
continuity, and that the presence of Service personnel in many key positions
-14
is discouraging to competent civilian personnel who desire to make
intelligence a career.
In the subsequent chapters, dealing with. the various activities of
CIA, we will see how these activities have been affected by the administrative
considerations mentioned in the present chapter. To some extent, the
difficulties monikft with respect to personnel, security, administrative
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?3E.CHLT
policies and methods, and leadership affect the entire organisation,
Diffjcu1tjes on such a vide scale attributed at least in part to in-
adequacy of leadership. The position of CIA in relation to the other
Departments and agencies of the Government is unsatisfactory and there
is no substantial evidence of improvement. The functions of CIA do not
appear to be clearly defined and seem to result more from the efforts
of individual workers interpreting their responsibilities rather than
from understanding, leadership and direction. In sere, there is little
is
prospect that CIA, as it/presenqy led, organized and operated, can win
the confidence of the Government departments and agencies which it was
created to serve and make an effective contribution to the coordination
of national intelligence,
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I
es
sec
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Jackson
Chapter -33iF
Coordination of Intellience Activities
National Security Act of 1947 provides in Section 10.2 forth
blis
seve
it s
Sec
ent of a Central Intelligence Agency. Paragraph (d) of tia
on rea
s in part as foliose,
"For the
urpose of coordinating the intelWenoe ac vities of
al departme
and agencies in the interest of
11 be the duty
Council
"(1) to advise the
rning such intelligenc
agencicqa as relate
tional security,
the Agency, Under the d ection of the Natio
me
"(2) to make
the coard
tea
Nationa ecurity Council in matters ccL-
a
vities of the Government departme ts
o nation 1 security;
ecommendations t the National Security Coun
tion of such intelligenc
ac
ivitle of the depa t-
agencies for the Government as rela
to the national\
It seems clear from the declaration of policy underlying the Act and
from the import of Section 102 establishing the Central Intelligence
Agency that the coordination of te1Ligence activities of the several
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departments and alencies was intended to be the primary fun tion of CIA.74.-.)-4....,4,/
CIA is not granted unlimited authority to coordirnte intelligence
activities upon its own initiative. It is given the duty to advise the
National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities
and to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of intelligence
Jw,t44-4/?44c4.A.Tmli4..
activities relating to the national security. Final authority?toA coor-
dinat4ktellizerce activities is vested in the NSC.
The statutory limitations upon the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence dlpeettivee upon its own directive without
higher review are obviously designed to protect the autonomy and internal
arrangements of the various departments and agencies performing intelli-
gence functions. The secretaries of departments, who are members of NSC
are in a position to review recommendEitiOns of the CIA concerning their
own departments and provision is made that other departmental heads may
be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when matters pertaining to their
intelligence activities are under consideration.
The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities'"
which the CIA is to coordinate with the approval of the Security Council.
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1.1.
IIT
,
I
41 Orr /
sumably all i tellicence activities relating to the national security
v
[first instance to th are included, from collecting information or raw intellienge in t SECRET
e dissemination of finished intelligence reports as
tha final stage of ihtelligence activity.
_ ,--
__-_
,-?
rrhe
Th Act escribes for the Central Intelligence Agency functioft and
duties in ak1ition to the duty to make recommendations with rsapect to
the coordinatio of intelligence activities. It is givrifthe duty to
correlate and evaliite intelligence relating to th /national security
(See 'Chapter--infra). 'it, is also given the d)1(ty to perform, or the
7
benefit of existing intellgi e agenciep, mach additional services of
COMm0Y1 concern as the National Se ty Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centraily. ee Chapter--infra)
The National Securi Act thus imposes three major ani i5tinct duties
upon the CIAI ( duty of recommendation to the NSC inthe\interest
of proper coordi ation and greater efficiency, how
various dep rtments and agencies, intelligence activi
ere among the
/
ies relating to the
natio security should be performed, (2) The duty to pradu in
///
presumably through coordination and assembly of intelligence opinion
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withinlIta_knoWledge of particular departments and agenciee, national
intelligence transcending in scope the intelligence mission of agy
department ior agency, 13) The perfa-rbance of services of comon con?
cent2?jskiedfican be more efficiently accomplished centrall
Ltd-hese three basic duties of the CIA, although distinct in themselves,
are necessarily inter?related and the performance of one function may
involve another, For example, in pefforming its pahmery duty of coordi?
nating intelligenoe activities, CIA may recommend to the NSC the means
to be employed in the assembly of material and opinion requisite for the
perfcrmance by CIA of its second duty, the production of national intelli?
gence estimates. As another example, CIA may recommend accordance
withits primary duty of coordinating intelligence activities, that a
particular intelligence funotion be performed henceforth by the CIA
itself under its third duty of providing services of common concern more
efficiently accomplished centrally.
Before considering in this chapter the performance by the CIA of
its primary duty to coordina i Wait 280 bto *FLAW veRmther ClitimWarY
observations are relevaht.
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three distinct if inter-related duties, has had the consequence of
confusing Directorate of CIA in arranging the internal organization
of the agency and the performance of any of these duties. Intelligence
produced independently by the CIA as a service of common concern n per-
formance of its third function has been confused with the coordination and
assembly of national intelligence in pursuance of its second function.
Coordinat on of intelligence opinion as a second function has in turn
led to emphasis upon CIA relationship with the intelligence staffs of
State, Army, Navy and Air Force departments to the neglect of It primary
duty to coordinate the intelligence activities of all federal agsncies
and n proper relation ipto bring them to bear pon the ame 1
intelligence problems of the government. Confusion in the internal
organization of CIA has been in part e8MBe and in part effect of con-
fusion in its directorate of its three basic functions.
The AdminietratiWYeghanism for
Coordination of intelligence Activities by CIA
Three organizations assist the Director of CIA in discharging his
responsibilities in the coordination of intelligence activitiest The
10
71
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Intelligence Advisory Ccemittee (IAC); the Interdepartmental Coordinating
.and Planning Staff (ICAPS) of CIA; and the Office of Collection and
(colDisaemination lso in CIA.
(a) The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The membership of this committee includes the heads of the inteiligewe
staffs of State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments, the head of the
Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff and the chief intelligence
officer of the Atomic Energy Commission. Its predecessor, the Intelligence
Advisory Board occupied a position approximately coordinte with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Group. The National Security Act
in establishing the Central Intelligence Agency to supersede the Central
Intelligence Group made no mention of the Intelligence Advisory Board
or of an Intelligence Advisory Committee. .74.-pueArl-the Central_IntiaLi--
v_encekna.1---Security___CDuncil,-A-144-01e Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee was established by the first Intelligence
Directive approved by the NSC on the recommendation of the Director of
CIA, it was given power merely "to advise the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Its coordinate status thus no longer existed.
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The members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, by directive of
the NSC are authorized to pass upon recommendations of the Director to
NSC and upon measures proposed by the Director in implementation of NSC
directives. Although it is inconhent upon, the Director to transmit to.
NSC dissents of. members of the IAC to hie recommendations, the IAC may
not prevent the Director from making his own recczamendations to NBC
regardless of dissents an:1 be may accept the advice tendered him by the
lAG only as he sees fit. Cta-_tha_zma_oa.oas.ton-,_hcuewr, when (Assents
-4._!,.plifers of the IAC to a proposal by the DirectorINSCID #9) were
_
forwarded to the NSC,th-Thrde-ci-sionActs given in favor of the IAC view
and agaixtth.s-
? ;tile 1, ?
--Central-ingeneett
Whether becauee of its limited function of rarely advising the
Director or because of the Director's failure to make more active we
of this administrative machinsry for achieving coordination of intelli-
gence activities, the Intelligence Advisory Committee has in fact made but
con
button to the solution of problems affecting the intelligence
structure as a whole. There have been only infrequent meetings aria there
is little evidence of thorough discussion at these meetingsoof such funds-
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mental problems. In fact, the Committee has met less than six times
since its eetablishment late- in 1947 and'does ;Low have any regular
schedule of llasitare meeting although meetings can be called by the
Director or upon the initiation of any member by application to the
Director. So far, the activities of the IAC have been largely confined
to passing formal judgmenti usually only by voting slips, upon recommenda-
tions of the Director to the NBC or upon CIA implementing directives.
Same of this work is conducted through the IAC Standing Committee consist-
ing of representatived designated by each of the members.
On one occasion the IAC has made an important contribution to the
coordination of intelligence activities apart from its formal procedure
in granting concurrence to CIA recommendations and directives. The
Committee took the initiative in establishing in interdepartmental ad
hoc committee to consider Soviet military capabilities and intentions
during 1948. The reports by this committee were of high quality. The
special importance of the incident for the purposes of this chapter of
this report lies in the fact that the IAC proved itself capable of
action of importances invplving intelligence coordination. It also
c RE!
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demonstrated that the technique of producing national intelligence by
assembly of departmental contribution and interdepartmental discussion under
CIA chairmanship is effective.
(b) Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS)
This is the chief staff agency within CIA for the coordination of
Intelligence activities in accordance with the duties and responsibilities
of the Director. Its chairman is a representative of the Department of
State of the grade of first secretary serving with CIA. Its members
inclxIe representatives of the intelligence organizations of the Stets,
Army, Wavy, and Air Force Departments of the grade of captain, colonel,
and comparable civil service rank. It is significant that no Member of
ICAPS had prior experience in intelligence organization and only one mem-
ber served at length with an intelligence agency. The Joint Intelligence
Group and the Atomic Energy' Commission, although represented on the Intel-
ligenceAdvisory Committee, do not supply members to ICAPS. An adJitional
me-Mbar of IGAhPS acts as the official liaison officer bet/teen the CIA and
JIG.
The assigned task of ICAPS is to review the intelligence activities
of the ittpisonserhEp aft tbaseadBNOSS7D12110211bEIP8.8132112111RODS?
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E t
coordination for recommendation to NSC. In order to perform effectively,
IGAPS should have intimate knowledge of the organizations, responsibilitiea,
activities and priorities of the various intelligence agencies which its
meirber reproaent and should give constant consideration to the intelligence
relating to the national security available in other federal departments
anL agencies. Actually, its achievements reflect inadequate knowledge of
these Subjects andlitilure to appreciate the breadth of the CIA's responsi-
bility for coordination.
During the first year of C
conc mod with the coord-nationiactivities
r\ rine intelligence
existence, ICAPS has been largely
directives of the NSC and four implementing directives of the Director
of Central Intelligence. It has supervised the drafting of these papers,
secured more or less complete acceptance of them by the intelligence-
producing branches of CIA, and submitted them to the IAC Standing
Committee and the IAC prior to their submission to the NSC or their publi.
cation as CIA directives. It was originally expected to act as a secre-
tariat or working staff for IAC, but oming to the infrequent meetings of
IAC this has never occurred. As a manse forcing IAC and its standing
WE'
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Committee to assume more responsibility (and bccause of the evident de-
fects of ICAPS itself), it has often been suggested that ICAPS be
eliminated entirely. Such a step, however, would leave the Director
without a unit within his own agency to carry out his coordination re-
.spensibilitieso and would not of itself cause IAC to become more effective.
As a planning and coordinating staffs ICAPS suffers from conflicting
organizational loyalties. It might be expected that the members of 'CAN
. acting as a staff in CIA, would owe their primary allegiance to its Direc-
tor and would uSe their departmental experience and status merely as an
appropriute background for the performance of their duties, The contrary
appears to be true. The members of ICAPS tend to regard themselves
primarily as representatives of their awn departments assigned temporarily
to CIA, and only secondarily as agents of CIA charged with implementing
it responsibilities. Hence they offer departmental points of view at
discussions of matters affecting their awn agenc so ey regard themselves
as in some measure obligated to protect the interests of these agenciesp_
and to reflect their policies rather than assume the pbligations of the
Director of CIA. To some extent they substitute themselves for the IAC,
but withtiaibrdreitif asTRaftladEMOIN15/2faxeltik-R11010.269E101105 mew
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with any such responsibility. They look in two directions* towird CIA and
toward their departmental agencies; but chiefly toward the latter.
They are* in addition* largely out of touch with the internal arrange?
ment8 of CIk*.pkrticularly in its intelligence?producing offices. Because
of this aloofness* numerous complaints are heard in intelligence producing
sions of CIA that the members of ICAPS keep almost entirely apart* knee
little of their problems, and consult them only cursorily upon gennral
problems of coordination. There are exceptions to this generalization;
bu
liAPS to relyupon its own
judgment and to forego intensive study of the activities of CIA and their
relation to these of the departmental agencies. The consequences are a
minimum of interdepartmental coordination and only a hazy recognition
or entiredisregard of fundamental and critical problems of intelli7ence
organization.
The member of ICAPS charged with responsibility for CIA liaison with
JIG acts as a oannel of transmission for JIG papers upen the conclusions
of which CIA comment is requested. This officer aim, keeps
he Director
of Central Intelligence personally informed of intelligence problems of
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JIG. His duties relate to the availability of intelligence information and
the conclusions to be drawn from it. These duties have not been assumed
to involve, like the duties of ether members of ICAP, the formulation of
administrative plans for coordination of intelligence activities. As a
consequence, tekparticular ia1sqn officer has only infrequent contacts
with other members of ICAPS, and reports only rarely to its chairman, thus
emphasizing the distinction between his functions and those performed by
the other members of the staff.
A similar problem arises with respect to The chairman of ICAPS. As
a part of his duties, he attends meethings of t e working staff of the
National Security Council, and is supposed to make available to the Council
intelligense resources of CIA, while keeping the intelligence?producing
divisions of CIA inferred of tits problems of the NS C staff. This relation?
ship involves the discussion of intelligerme requirements, tl-e furnishing
by CIA of intelligence reports and The oral presentation of the conclusions
which may be drawn therefrom. The Chairman is not qualified by training
or experience to participate in such discussions. This problem has been
at least partially solves( on the inttiative of The NSC. The Chairman of
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ICAPS has been prevailed upon to bring with him representatives of CIA quali-
fied by knowledge of the applicable intelligence to take part in the dis cus-
sion of particular sitamtions or general policies. This has provided a
mare efficient means of supplying the NSC staff with the beat thinking in
CIA, but designation of The CIA representative wh will provide intelligence
&race remains with the chairman of IMPS. He is at least potentially a
buffer, who by his mere presence can influence the flow of intelligence to
one of the twat significant of the intelligence sonsumers served by CIA.
In general, we have Sound that ICAPS, staffed by individuals whose
experience with problems of intelligence organisation is not extensive,
ha e failed to undertake a broad and effective program of coordination of
intelligence activities. It has little contact with the intelligence pro-
ducing units of CIA, and on the contrary has tended to place itself between
them and other agencies outside CIA with which they should properly be in
touch. It h as even served to prevent working contokacts between units
within CIA, although as an administrative planning staff it should advo-
cate and assist such contacts where they serve a useful purpose. Nowhere
baa ICAPS recommended or itself undertaken an extensive program of study
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within CIA and the various agencies of the goverment legking toward co-
ordination of duplicating activities. It has not sought systematically to
arrange for th,1 tapping of the resources of intelligence agencies not
represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee except as some of these
have been approached in connection with the national Intelligence Sir vpsr.
In it.e preparation of recommendations for the Director to the NSC it las
"AiNg as an organization in a desultory manner, which ha v not given the im-
pression within CIA or outside that its members or C/A. itself grasp the
tremendous responsibility for coordination of intelligence activities which
are imposed upon CIA unier the NSC by the National Security Act.
iVe are, of course, aware that CIA. (and CIO) has been in existence for
less than three years, ani that ICAPS itself has operated under its exist-
ing charter for considerably less than this time. Ore are also aware that
it is exceedingly difficult to obtain the assignment of competent personnel
acquainted with intelligence organization. The several direc ors of GIG
and CIA have been burdened with a multitude of problems affecting a raw
organization, which nay explain the general lack of direction which ICAPS
has received from the heads of its own agency. Finally, it must be recog-
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nized thit any group having the responsibility of =PS must proceed slowly
and tactfully. We are convinced, however, that even within the limits
imposed by these circumstances, the present ICAPS hir/Pced or in many instances
everIconsidered the intricate problems involved in the coordination of "
intelligence activities within the Government,
(c) The Office of Conection and Dissemination (0CD1
This is the third of the organizations having an important role to
play in the coordination of intelligence activities. Like IC/U'S, it is
located in CIA but unlike 'CAPS, its members have no positive allegiance
to any intelligence organisation outside CIA.
It combines three functions, only two of which bear directly upon
its task of coordination. In the first place, it acts as a service organi?
zation for the operating offices of 01K in procuring intelligence materials
from other agencies, maintaining a central file service in its Reference
Center, and disseminating intelligence collected by CIA in its field
operations. These are essentially internal responsibilities, and although
related to OCD's coordinating tasks, are not a part of them.
The second function, which does involve coordination, is the furnishing
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of certain "services of common concern" on behalf of fedeoll r ioce
?16.
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as a whole. One of these is the maintenance of a central biographic file
for seientLfic and technological personalities; another is a cen
tz
index, not yet complete, of all biographical information in the hands of
the several departmantal intelligence agencies as well as of CIA.. These
functions involve coordination to the extent that they make it unnecessary
for other agencies to undertake the save tasks," or to make inquiries for
the same informStion of several agencies-.
The third and most important activity of OCD in the field of ii?i
genoe coordination is its responsibility for coordinating intelligence
collection and dissemination within CIA and among the agencies of the
government having national intelligence resources. In order to discharge
this reaponeibility, it is to maintain "continual surveys and contacts"
among the federal agencies in order to learn What intelligence they have
available Which can be shared with other interested agencies, and what
information needs they may have which can properly be satisfied by other
agencies. It is charged with being familiar with the collection ospabili-
ties of all agencies as well as CIA, and to recommend procedures and
polt-
aLes throughout the collection and dissemination field. The activities
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of OCD were intended not only to serve the intelligence needs of ClAsnd
of the departmental agencies, but also to comprehend the Whole problem of
intelligence collection and dissemination within the entire intelligence
structure, and to initiate measures and conduct surveys designed to achieve
and maintain its greatest efficiency.
In fact, 00D has devoted most of its energies to satisfying the needs
of the operating units of CIA for collection and dissemination. It coordi-
nates the intelligence requirements issued to it from other offices of CIA
but it does not take and has not sought responsibility for coOrdi
the intelligence requirements of all agencies throughout the governmenU
of
Thus COD will secure information for the Office of Reports end listimates
(ORB) of CIA from, for example he Intelligence Division of the Army; bit
it is not consulted and has no role in satisfying requirements of the 14
telligence Division from the Department of State. In the same way, it con-
ducts no surveys of the information resources or the collection potentiali-
ties of other agencies except as these affect the present or anticipated
requirements of CIA. It does not attempt to learn, for example, whether he
economic information collected throughout the several agencies is sufficient
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to satisfy the recognized need of the Office of Naval Intelligence for in-
fo
on world Shipbuilding capacities. Such a request may be addressed
to OCD by ONI, in Which case 00D will determine the intelligence resources of
CIA in satisfying ONI's request; but it will not undertake to consider this
requirement in the light of the overall availability information throughoul
the entire governments Any such action must be taken by ONI, without further
assistance from 00D except that which may be specifically asked.
In line with its function of surveyingintelligence resources, it may
be a proper function of 00D to recommend to ICAPS that steps be taken by the
Director to secure authority for the inspection of intelligence in federal
agencies, such as the Treasury. ICAPS may take the initiative in such a pro-
ject itself, but in either case the inspection may well be Conducted by OCD.
So far as we have been able to determine, COD has not yet made any such pro-
to
posal of inspection to ICAPS or/the Director, and has not conducted
veys on its own part which go beyond the normal activities of inter-depart-
mental liaison.
It may be observed in general that the responsibilities assigned to
OCD in regard to the coordination of collection and dissemination are
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appropriate. They have been interpreted narrowly, however, in terms of the
needs of the producing offices of CIA rather than of intelligence production
throughout the governaent. It is evident that OCD has overlooked important
areas Where it should sponsor formal measures of coordination in the form
of recommendations by the Director to the BSC-Departmental inspections is a
case in point. The failure of OCD in performance of its coordinating func-
tion is also apparent in connection with the absense of implementing direc-
tives designed to strengthen the position of CIA in preventing duplication
under existing directives such as SSC Intelligenee Directive # 2. As with
ICAPS. we are aware of the difficulties besetting coordination. of intelligence
activities by OCD. It is true, nevertheless that in OCD as in other branches.
CIA has emphasized its own role as producer of intelligence reports and. esti-
mates at the expense of its responsibility to coordinate.
Ceerdination as AgAieTed bz CIA
Coordination of intelligence activities as achieved by the Director,
the Intelligence Advisory Committee. the Interdepartmental Coordinating and
Planning Staff and the Office of Collection and Dissemination through oficier
'
action is represented by nine NS0 intelligence directives and four Ia
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The NSC Intelligence Directivell:the coordination of intelligence
A
activities in various ways. Your of them, NBC 5,6,7 and 8, assign certain
"services of common concern" to CIA under the authority granted in the National
Security Act (102 d 4). These are coordinative in the sense that they des g-
nate more or less precisely the roles to be played by CIA and the depart-
mental agencies respectively in conducting certain intelligence operations.
Thus NSC #5 provides that OIL alone will conduct covert espionage and counter-
espionage operations abroad except for certain agreed activities by other
departments and agencies, including the use of casual agents on covert opera-
tions. It also provides that CIA will coordinate covert and overt collection
activit
s among the several agencies and CU. NSC #6 similarlyAlves CIA
authority to conduot all monitoring of foreign press and propaganda broad-
casts, and directs CIA to disseminate the information thus received to in-
terested departmental agencies. NS? # 7 defines the duties of CIA in exploiting
domestic sources of foreign intelligence, and provides for the participation
of departmental agencies in this activity. The directive is comprehensive and
detailed, both as to CIA's functions and those of the departmental and other
agencies. A fourth "service of common concern" is provided in NSC # 8, in
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which CIA is assigned responsibility for the central file of biographical
data on foreigh scientific and technological personalities which was mentioned
as a function of 00D. Rare again the participation of departmental and other
agencies is specified.
Generally speaking, this series of NBC Intelligence Directives allocates
responsibilities to CIA in fields which have been conceded to be those of
common concern where work can beet be done centrally by CIA. The directives
have not aroused particular controversy once the principle behind them was
accepted and their terms have been generally approved.
The most important NW Intelligence Directives are Nos. 1,2,3,4, and 91
which represent CIA's approach to the basic problem of intelligence coordina-
tion by allocation of responsibility. They constitute an effort to sort out
departmental and CIA responsibilities.
NSC Intelligence Directive #1 establishes the basic mechanism for such
coordination. It sets up the IAC ?to advises the Director, siecifies, the
procedures for the issuance of NSO Intelligence Directives and those of the
Director of CIA; and defines the duty of CIA with respect to the production of
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"national intelligence.* It provides for exchange of information between
CIA and the departmental agencies, and authorises the assignment of officers
to CIA by the departmental organisations. It includes provi
or CIA to
request 'authority to inspect intelligence material in agencies of the govern-
meat, and provides that in producing national intelligence, the CIA "than not
duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Departments
and agencies, but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities.*
Intelligence Directive: f2 determines the allocation of intelligence
collection responsibility abrasd among the State, Army, Navy and. Air Toros
departments. It establishes rather vague fields of primary interest (certain
broad Categories of agency responsibility") so far as political, cultural and
sociological, and military, naval and air intelligence are concerned. But it
merely allocates economic' scientific and technological intelligence collection
to each agency "in accordance with its respective needs.* It provides for
coordination of normal collection activities in the field tit the senior US
representative within the spirit of the directive.
NSC Intelligence Directive 0 is an elaborate definition of the forms
of intelligence production, i.e., basic, current and staff intelligence; and
of kinds Afpriikkentellierea4+1003AMSTIOSIAtRIDAMSNANORMOSINt
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lligince.
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In defining these terms the directive specifies the roles to be played by the
departmental agencies end CIA respectively in intelligence production .
The direotie does not establish the National Intelligence Survey pro-.
gram except to define broadly the general terms under which basic intelligence
studies of this kind should be produced by cooperative inter-departmental
activity. There has since been no CIA implementing directive on this subject
although the program is now well startedon the basis of certainaku arrange-
meats.
With respect to Staff Intelligence, the directive recognises that "the
staff intelligence of each of the departments mu.at.be broader than any allo-
cation of collection responsibilityluand specifies that as part 9f the co-
ordination program, the Director of Central Intelligence will seek the assis-
tance the lAG intelligence agencies in minimizing the necessity for any
agency o develop intelligence in fislds outside its dominant interest.'
indirection, this provision points up the vagueness of the original alloca-
tions of dominant interest, made in NSC Intelligence Directive #2. CIA has
sought no positive /AC assistance which would reduce duplication in collec-
tion ander NSC Intelligence Directive #2, and would coordinate the production
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of departmental intelligence.
A further provision of RSC Intelligence Directive #3 commits CIA to a
program f Aanning and developing the productionof national intelligence in
order to obtain departmental intelligence for this use within the capabilities
of the departmental agencies to produce it. In an ilementing directive
(DCID #3/1) a standard operating prooedure for the production and coordination
of national intelligence is established Which is designed to regularise the
relations of CIA and the departmental agencies in this field. Another imple-
menting directive (DCID #3/2) specifies procedures to le followed in coordi-
nating intelligence reports by CIA with the intelligence branches of thi
State, Army, Navy and Air Pores departments. Neither implementing directive
has been in force long enough for its effectiveness to be proved.
Neither the NSC directive nor the CIA implementing directiges attempt.to
establish anr control over the production of "national intelligence" by CIA'.
The term is defined as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers broad
aspects o national policy and national security, is of concern to more than
one Department or Agency, and transcends the swans-lye competence of a single
department or agency. . ." It is left to CIA to decide what is national
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intelligence in specific cases, as well as to produce it on the basis of this
decision..
NSC Intelligence Directive 44 provides that the CIA Shall take the lead
in preparing a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objectives, and
from time to time shall- indicate the priorities attaching to the items so
listed. The directive has been implemented by DCID 44, which gives a rather
general list of objeCtives and provides that approved priority listings Shall
be disseminated by CIA from time to time.
The most recent BSC Intelligence Directive is f9, which establishes
U.S,
icatione Intelligence Board (USCIB), specifies its working mechan-
ism, and makes it the authoritative agency for the coordination of communica-
tions intelligence activities of the Government. It places members from CIA.
State, Army, Navy and Air Force on the Board, and provides that their unanimous
decision is necessary for approval of particular matters. The directive is
partly signiftoant because of its history. In its earliest form it provided
for an independent, departmental board to control communications tnteiligenD
Which was not to be under the NSO and was not to include C/A as a member. How-
ever, CIA proposed to the NSC that the Director of Central Intelligence take
are
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full control of communications intelligence activities and direct and coordi-
na e them himself with the advice of the departmental agencies involved. The
militaryagencies of LAC took exception to this proposal, and their dissents
were upheld by the NSC as reported earlier. In the final directive CIA was
included among the members of the Board, but was not given authority to direet
or coordinate activities in this field.
taw Following this disoussion of the Directives there should be a
disous144gLof the actual practide of coordination, and its successes
and failures in various fields, such as scientific intelligence intel-
ligence collection, counter intelligence, intelligence production.
00n0 ons
1. CIA has neglectedite primary responsibility of promoting the co-
ordination of the intelligence activities of the Government. That coordi-
nation which has been achieved consists mainly of the assignment to CIA of
certain common service functions; the mere allocation by directive of respon-
sibilities for the collection and production of intelligence has not been
effective.
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2. In general, each department and agency continues to conduct its
operations as it chooses without the benefit of coordinationby CIA. There
is no attempt at systematic coordination in some of the major fields of in-
telligence activity.
3. An agency such as the Intelligence Advisory Committee is sound and
should also have responsibilities for the cooreination of intelligence opinion
is a point which will be considered later. It is essential that the Director
of CIA and the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee take more
responsibility n ensuring that it becomes an active agency for advising on
the continuous coordination of intelligence activities.
4. The IAC Standing Committee Should be eliminated, as it detracts from
the authority of the LAC and prevents the proper functioning of 'CAPS.
5. ICAPS Should be reconstituted so that it is more clearly a staff
agency responsible So the Director of CIA although it should remain in close
touch with the service departments and State. The members of this staff
Should be responsible only for developing plans for the coordination of in-
telligence activities and Should not have any liaison duties relating to cur-
rent operations.
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6i The Office of Collection and Dissemination should, be broken up and
its, various responsibilities re-allocated. The dissemination of CIA intelli-
gence should be done by the offices producing it and not by a separate office,
as discussed in later chapters. Reference and related services should be
Po
o med by a reconstituted Office of Reports and Estimates, as discussed
later. The limited responsibilities of OOD for coordinating the collection
requirements of the various government agencies shouldbe carried out as a
subordinate activity under the reconstituted ICAP6.
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