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May 11, 1949
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Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 NEW BODY FORMED TO GUIDE SECURITY Interdepartmental Committee Will Chart Policy Against Subversive Activity SneeI- i to Tar, New Yonx rinses WASHINGTON, May 10-The National Security Council, it was learned today, has created the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) to de- velop a policy against subversive activity within the United States. The new agency, which will function at the highest level above Federal investigating and intelli- gence agencies, was formed on March 23 with the approval of President Truman, who is chair- man of the National Security Council. The directive putting it into effect was recently taken off the secret list. The ICIS received co=equal status with the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), which consists of the heads of Federal investigating departments. Thus, while the new committee ,vill have no authority over the old .IC, its policies and decisions on nethods of coping with particular >ecurity problems will govern the nvestigating agencies. Any dis- igrecnent between the two would >e settled by the National Security 'ouncil, parent of both groups. my fundamental; division that ould not be settled by the council vould be submitted to the Presi- lent for decision. Officials said this was the pre- erred solution of the problem of oordinating anti-subversive activ- dies and developing a policy re- nting to it. It was recalled that ames Forrestal, former Secretary f Defense, had proposed that ome eminent civilian be chosen o survey the adequacy of internal ecurity and to take on the task f correlating the efforts of all the gencies involved in maintain- Ig it. The wisdom of placing such a Yale Professor Chosen s Drew Seminary Dea Yale U as dea serve tamen cc tment, Dr. Craig will succe-kd Newton Davies, who is retiring next Monday afte ulty_ role in the hands of one person was questioned, however. The council thereupon settled on the ICIS. Mr. Forrestal, a member of the council, readily joined in ac- THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY,' MAY 11, 1949. cepting it as the preferred machin- ery, it was reported. As now conceived, the two agen- cies, having great responsibilities relating to inquisitional powers and safety of the nation, would act as a check and balance on each other. The members of the ICIS are: Raymond P. Whearty, special as- sistant to the Attorney General; Samuel D. Boykin, director of the Office of Controls, State Depart- Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence, and Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, director of the Officq of Special Investiga- tion, Air Force. Between them the two agencies, apart from maintaining estab- lished security safeguards, would consider new problems as, they arose. These might include such cases as that of Mme. Irene Joliot-Curie, daughter of the discoverer of radi- ment; ? James J. Maloney, former head of the Secret Service, and now chief coordinator of the (Treasury Department's enforce- ment agencies, and Major Gen. Charles L. Bolte, director of the Special Planning Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. J. Patrick Coyne, former Direc- tor of Internal Security in the Federal Bureau of investigation, has been retained as coordinator of the Activities of the IIC and the ICIS. He is a member of the staff of Sidney W. Souers, execu- tive secretary of the National Se- ,curity Council. The members of the IIC are J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI; Major Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin, Di- rector of Intq ligence, Army De- partment General Staff; Rear um and wife of Frederic Joliot- Curie, Communist head of the French Atomic Energy Commis- sion. She received a visa to visit this country in March 1948 But , . when she arrived in New York the i ' mmigration authorities detained her. She was finally released and went ahead with a lecture tour on behalf of Co the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee mmittee. It was said that under the new system her case would be Ccnsidered before a visa was grartted. Also mentioned was the problem raised by the admission of com- munists and fellow travelers to the so-called Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace in New York in March. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 They Fight the Cold War Under (:over i)OI'L i .L ; ~' BIl\.SO.1 I ter(' ' the turv uI NN hat our neii eaL -iI I il-)Iit g(er outfit. t114 (,t'ntril III14 genre _-enev, i- doing to Iceel- unr -i f rots-au(I learn the -ecret- of other uatiut):. It tint'- fruni thine who serve in the IitIle-LnoAAit ur,!anizatiun. Ai'l' 1 ,1st spring, Lt (of. J. 1). Tassoyev, Soviet Guards Officer, was the central figure tit a melodrama of internal ional intrigue that rocketed onto the front page of almost every news- l';ifier from Moscow to Sun Francisco. At the i ime, there were two versions to the incident. 'l'ass, tIre official U. S. S. R. news agency, charged t hat Tassoyev was kidnaped from Bremen to Lon- don. imprisoned and tortured by the British Secret Si'rvice in an effort to make him abandon his couu- v's service. I lily because "a scandal was brewing," 'l'ass attn. did t he British Government ultimately release I tip' o.'olonel to Soviet authorities. The gent torah was here in England of his own tree will," countered the British Foreign Office... He left because he was asked to leave." The American intelligence officers could fill in I he missing chunks of both stories. They could tell :i tale ,,t spy arrd counterspy that would sound lil.e a movie thriller. It. would he a valuable account, too, for it would prove that, despite blundering of high levels Lard abrasive frictions between agencies of our own ( lovernruent, the. United States at last has the rnak- ings of in ell`ective intelligence system. Here is the story the United States intelligence of- ficers could tell. It comes from otlicial United Stales Government sources. ('olonel'Tassoyev approaclied American agents ill Bremen last April wit h an otter to desert the Soviet Arniy. According io the report sent Washington, the colonel spoke at lengt It about his hatred of cornmu- nisnr, his yearning for democracy. He hinted t hat lie had a large stock of secrets to divulge. Such tut otter was nothing new to the United States intelligence men. Scores of lied Army mien, including at least one Russian lieutenant general, have recently run out on Stalin. Many have given valuable infortnat.ion. But the American agents told Washington 1 hat t hey were not impressed with Tas- sovev. "There was something phony about hits. Ill their radioed report to Washington, the Americans said point -blank that Tassoyev was a plant. Wash- ington directed that they have nothing to do with hint. The American agents didn't, but the British Secret Service dill! 'I'assoyev went to the British after tit(- Americans strut the door in his face. The British took him at his word and flew hint to Eng- fand in Field Marshal Montgomery's own plane. 11heu our siipersleutits flopped. Iilood, N rioting in the streets of' BogoIJI, Colombia. opening of flit- Pan-American Confirt-114c there last %pril. Our operatiNes' inecpcriencv marked the as blamed. Director ,,t' Iii nem. oritl'it. Hear Admiral It. If. IIiIIt- iihOCtIcr itioi41, hiring _+nniIiiii? arIisty. - . In I ou,;on, he British lodged I he colonel iii a coud'ortahie six-room apart uieni turd set to work ex- amining hint. They even had one of I heir young woman opera, ves, a blonde maned Betty Wiggin, on hand IW26W0Q QQW01-9 THEY FIGHT THE COLD WAR UNDER COVER (Continued from Page 30) picture of what is going on above and underground throughout the world. On the basis of a probing investiga- tion into CIA's record, the results of which were checked with a wide num- ber of important Government officials, this writer can say: Months in advance, CIA ascertained that the Russians were projecting a drive to oust the Western democracies from Berlin. As far back as last Decem- ber, it provided Washington with de- tails of the Russian plans for blockad- ing the German capital by disrupting its rail, river and air transportation. CIA obtained full facts on the activ- ities of the 100,000 slave laborers min- ing uranium for the Russians in Ger- many, Czechoslovakia and Poland. More than three months' notice was given the United States Government of the Russian communist plot to take over Czechoslovakia. The massing of Red troops on the Czech border was completely reported to Washington. After the debacle, CIA engineered the escape to the United States Zone of Germany of dozens of outstanding Czech democrats. CIA agents turned up the proof that Russia was supplying arms and ammu- nition to its adherents in Italy and France. Continuous inside information has been furnished Washington on future Arab moves in the Palestine situation. On the other hand, the record also discloses that CIA has stumbled badly at times. It shows that: CIA made a mess of its work in con- nection with the outbreak of violence that swept Bogota, Colombia, during the Pan-American Conference there last April. Efforts by CIA to learn and properly evaluate what other nations are doing in the field of atomic energy have been a fizzle. CIA permitted subversives to pene- trate its own staff. This occurred when it was given responsibility for the mon- itoring of foreign broadcasts, a job formerly held by.the Federal Communi- cations Commission. A number of fel- low travelers, or worse, who had been working for the FCC were taken on the CIA pay roll too. It took months be- fore CIA awakened to their presence and cleaned them out. "Quitting, Matthew?" Experts like Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, ascribe these bungles largely to CIA's youth and inexperi- ence. They say that the organization has shown real improvement in recent months. The Central Intelligence Agency is not the only Government agency in the foreign-intelligence field. The State De- partment's Foreign Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Intelli- gence and Air Force Intelligence also have their fingers in the pie. Each is au- thorized to collect any information "of interest to itself " that is available through "open channels," such as the press, radio and official government re- ports. However, under a formula laid down by the National Security Coun- cil, CIA is the pivotal group. It handles all undercover operations and, in addi- tion, is charged with correlating all ma- terial gathered by the others. Unfortunately, there is evidence of bitter jurisdictional rivalry and feuding among these various organizations. Overlapping functions and unnecessary duplication of work are widespread. And in the opinion of many Washington experts, these factors are seriously im- peding the nation's intelligence pro- gram. On the bright side of the ledger, though, is this: CIA has built up a staff of some thousands of people and is now striving diligently to give America eyes and ears in every country on earth. Its agents abroad are under strict orders to keep Washington posted on everything from a mayoralty election to the name of a prime minister's mistress and the extent of her influence over him. Government officials familiar with CIA operations say that its men are closely scanning every facet of the eco- nomic life in the countries they're in. Key factories, railroad lines, oil refin- eries--all these are being ferreted out and reported back to Washington. Not long ago, a high Air Force gen- eral wanted to see just how much prog- ress CIA had made in this sphere. He arranged a confidential meeting with CIA chiefs. At this session, he asked the CIA people to assume that war with Country X was going to break out the following day. How much help, he in- quired, could CIA give in the determi- nation of bombing targets. Inside of five minutes, complete de- tails were handed him on the location, description and importance of every significant industrial target in Country X, several thousand in all. In many cases, photographs were shown him. The general was deeply impressed. He told me so. By orders of the National Security Council, CIA men are sent into action whenever the Army, Navy or Air Force is unable to get data through open channels on the new weapons produced abroad. Right now, CIA agents are said to be working overtime to get specifica- tions on certain foreign bombers, sub- marines and germ-warfare develop- ments. Though little is being said about it, CIA is known to be making wide use of the same spectacular techniques which OSS employed to rally resistance move- ments against Hitler. Both in front of and behind the Iron Curtain, CIA men are assisting d'emocratic forces to resist Red excesses. Anticommunist political leaders, editors, labor-union chiefs, clergymen and others are getting CIA support in their struggles to retain or regain democracy. CIA men call this "building first columns." In view of today's international ten- sions, the biggest assignment CIA has, of course, is the evaluation of other na- tions' intentions toward the United States. It is CIA's duty to tell the Na- tional Security Council if and when an- other country plans to start a war against America. The biggest test CIA has had to face in this line came during the "war crisis," last spring. It was a tough one. A top-secret cable from Gen. Lucius D. Clay, United States Military Gov- ernor in Germany, set off the furor. It arrived at the Pentagon on a Friday morning shortly after the communists had seized control in Prague. Cabinet officials who read the cable quote Clay as saying, in effect, that he was ready to modify his long-standing belief that the 'Russians did not intend to. start a shooting war soon. The man sitting on the hottest spot in the world, in other words, had shifted his position from "they won't" to "they might." Clay explained very carefully, however, that he had no new evidence to support his belief; he merely had a hunch and wanted Washington to know about it. When a man as responsible as Gen- eral Clay makes such a statement, Washington sits up and takes notice. The CIA was asked to check up-im- mediately. For three days and three nights the CIA staff got no sleep as it got in touch with its agents in all parts of the world and assembled all the information on Russia at its disposal. It had its opera- tives check to see if any Red Army units had been shifted, if new supply dumps had been established, if Euro- pean fifth columns had been alerted. On the following Monday morning, CIA sent a note to President Truman, stating: "The Russians are definitely not going to start a war for the next sixty days, and in all probability not for a year." The President's Cabinet accepted this estimate and tension eased in the capital The men and women overseas for CIA today are operating under a score and more of different covers. As a rule, they do no spying themselves. No one wants the men to crack safes or the women to vamp generals. The risks would be too great. The main job of these agents is to make contact with elements in each country who are will- ing to support the fight for democracy. This is not to say that CIA representa- tives don't also buy a good deal of in- formation. They do. Most of the CIA agents are veterans of wartime intelli- Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Afll 4 q41f~x ~%, t94 45/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R0005000501( mher 20.1048 gene. Each is required to speak and read the language of the country in which he is stationed. In fact, CIA in- sists that an agent must have traveled extensively in that area before it sends him there. A top Government official who knows the organization inside out says that CIA has deliberately steered clear of gumshoe artists in selecting its agents. He says it much prefers " keen analysts, with imagination and a flair for win- nowing the important matter out of a mass of confused detail." Training men like that is a tricky business and a very secretive one, he declares. As he puts it, "A new CIA agent has to be taught the techniques peculiar to covert operations. He has to be briefed in the area he is going to from a clandestine intelligence point of view. He has to be tutored on personali- ties to know, use or avoid. A secure sys- tem of communications, with alter- nates, has to be devised for him and he .has to learn how to use it." And, he .states, this all has to be done in com- plete secrecy. At no time during his training can the new agent have any direct contact, or be in any way identi- fied, with CIA. CIA personnel are paid up to $9900 a year. The total amount of funds avail- able to CIA, incidentally, is a carefully concealed secret. All that is known is that it runs into the tens of millions. In spite of the missteps CIA has made, reports have it that even the British Secret Service has been favor- ably impressed by its early record. Ac- cording to an unimpeachable authority, the British recently urged a virtual merger of both services. The British suggested that the two agencies split the world between them, with some areas assigned to CIA for coverage and others to the British. In particular, the British proposed that CIA handle all intelligence work for both nations in Rio de Janeiro, while it would handle every- thing in Cairo. CIA refused. Under such an arrange- ment, it fears the United States might be left half-blind should war come and Great Britain be knocked out. In an uncertain world, the CIA men hold that America must have its own eyes ev- erywhere, depending upon no one but its own organization to keep it informed. The closest liaison is maintained, how- ever, between the top echelons of CIA and the British Secret Service. How did CIA come into being? Tra- ditionally,.the United States has always ignored the value of intelligence. It had no real organization of any kind before the war, depending upon its military and naval attaches to pick up any scraps of information they could. Pearl Harbor disclosed the tragic results of this attitude. Nor was our military in- telligence much improved during the war. While OSS sometimes performed Herculean feats, Army G-2 was fre- quently ineffective. The massing. of German panzer divisions prior to the Battle of the Bulge was fully noted by J' OSS, but G-2 disregarded its reports. Hence the paralyzing surprise the Nazis were able to effect in the Ar- dennes. It was a lack of accurate intel- ligence on the Pacific war, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, OSS head, says, that led President Roosevelt, at Yalta, to make such extensive concessions to Stalin. F. D. R. was informed by G-2, states Donovan, that the Japs had an additional army of 750,000 men in Manchuria. Anxious to offset this force, Roosevelt went all out to get the Rus- sians in the Pacific war on our side. "That report was untrue. The Jap- anese had no such army," General Donovan informed this writer. "It is tragic that poor intelligence so misled the President." With the end of World War II, Don- ovan and others urged President Tru- man to take immediate steps to estab- lish a permanent peacetime intelligence organization. Groundwork for such an outfit was even laid by the OSS. Before its various units around the world closed up shop, they drafted plans and made arrangements for such a group to take over. The OSS plans were largely discarded, however. Luckily, a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a temporary in- telligence setup was accepted by the President. On January 22, 1946, he es- tablished a National Intelligence Au- thority, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and the Presi- dent's Chief of Staff. It was not until the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, though, that a permanent intelligence organization was set up by law. This was the CIA. It came into official being on September 26, 1947, as a separate agency reporting only to the National Security Council, a group com- posed of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air, and the chairman of the National Se- curity Resources Board. The law specifically decrees that CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law- enforcement powers or internal-secu- rity functions." Congress was taking no chances on propagating a Gestapo. On the recommendation of Admiral Leahy, President Truman appointed Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter as CIA's first director. The post pays $14,000 a year. A snub-nosed man of fifty-one, with closely cropped dark hair, Admiral Hillenkoetter is a Mis- souri-born Annapolis graduate who has had a distinguished naval career. He was wounded aboard the battleship West Virginia while fighting off the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor. Later, he com- manded the U.S.S. Dixie during the Solomon Islands campaign. He has spent many of his twenty-nine Navy years in intelligence, putting in three different stretches as a full or assistant naval attache in Paris. It was he who set up Admiral Nimitz's intelligence net- work in the Pacific. Hillenkoetter is married to the daugh- ter of a Navy doctor. They have one ten-year-old little girl. His friends say that he spends twelve to fourteen hours TAIL SATURDAY EVENING POST "Heh-hch-er-thai.'s the end of the joke . . ." a day at his desk, taking an afternoon hour off only once a month for a game of golf. He generally shoots about ninety-two. His chief recreation is the reading of history, and he is said to be an expert on the writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, quoting at length from them to prove a point. Admiral Leahy says that no man in the country has a better grasp of the mechanics of foreign intelligence than Hillenkoetter. He gives him personal credit for virtually all of CIA's accom- plishments. However, other Govern- ment officials do criticize Hillenkoetter for certain missteps. They say that he badly erred in filling some forty of CIA's most important posts with Army and Navy personnel. They claim that this was unwise, on the ground that the services lend orly their less able officers for duty with outside agencies. These same officials heatedly censure Hillen- koetter, for example, for placing one of his key branches under Brig. Gen. Ed- ward L. Sibert, who, as intelligence chief for the 12th Army Group in Europe, was blamed for the Ardennes surprise. Hillenkoetter apparently saw some validity in these charges, because he recently had General Sibert trans- ferred back to the Army. Over in the Pentagon, Hillenkoetter is particularly assailed for talking too freely before Congress on the rioting that punctuated the Bogota Confer- ence, He did this when asked to ex- plain CIA's failure to warn Secretary of State George C. Marshall of the likelihood of broad-scale trouble during the Pan-American parley. At an open hearing of a House com- mittee, the admiral read a number of the actual messages CIA had received from its agents in Bogota. They pur- ported to outline communist plans to break up the conference. "We did know of unrest in Colom- bia," he testified. "We did know that there was a possibility of violence and outbreaks aimed primarily at embar- rassing the American delegation and its leaders, and this information was transmitted to officials of the State Department." He implied that General Marshall had disregarded the CIA warnings. Nothing in Hillenkoetter'stestimony, though, demonstrated any inkling on CIA's part that such widespread dis- orders were in the wind. Furthermore, (Conr;in.u.ed on Page 194) Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27: CIA-RD P8N6Q0~~9 (2000500050101-9 `J l I`IIE S VI, It 1) kY ti Noce rnltcr 20, 191-8 1a,,1 /)Dirt Page 192) the Pentagon believes that Hillen- koetter did CIA a great. disservice in giving this evidence. He compromised his Colombian agents and their sources, it feels. Actually, Hillenkoetter begged the congressmen not to make him testify in public. He was told, though, that if he refused to testify at an open hearing, he would be punished for contempt of Congress. Even so, one prominent Defense De- nrtment official sternly commented, He should have gone to jail first." The Bogota incident brought some- thing else to light. It showed how squab- bling between CIA and other Govern- ment agencies has critically impaired America's intelligence effort. Hillen- koetter's evidence disclosed that one vital CIA dispatch was withheld from the State Department because Willard L. Beaulac, United States Ambassador to Colombia, and Orion J. Libert, the department's advance representative in Bogota, insisted upon it. The mes- sage said that "Communist-inspired along. It, is known that, Army Intelli- gence took eleven months before it carried out. orders to turn over all its undercover operations to CIA. Washington is still talking about the catastrophic boner Army Intelligence pulled in connection with a clandestine project to take aerial photographs of Poland. In June, 1947, the Army or- dered S/Sgt. James Hoagland, an Air Force photographer, to join the United States Military Mission in Warsaw for this purpose. Ile was to make use of the mission plane for his surreptitious photographing job. One set of Ser- geant Hoagland's orders was sent by diplomatic pouch to Col. Thomas Betts, the head of the mission. An- other set of these top-secret papers was sent through the ordinary mail in an envelope addressed simply to "The agitators will attempt to humiliate the Secretary of State and other members of the U. S. delegation ... by manifes- tations and possible personal molest.a- tion." What happened was this: Under cur- rent regulations, CIA agents in foreign countries must submit all their dis- patches to t:he ambassador or ranking diplomatic official present. They there- fore read this message to Ambassador Beaulac before radioing it to CIA head- quarters. Beaulac demanded that, the dispatch be shown to Libert, before it went to Washington. This was done. According to the CIA men, Libert stated that, he did "not consider it ad- visable to notify the State Department of this situation." He was afraid it might unduly alarm the delegates. Libert's stand put. Admiral Hillen- koetter in a quandary. He got the re- port, all right. The ambassador could not prevent its transmission to CIA. But Hillenkoetter knew that if he for- warded it to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Beaulac would learn of it and might make the CIA men's posi- tion in Colombia untenable. Reluc- tantly, he decided not to pass this mes- sage along. Bogota is not the only place where CIA has been tangling with State De- partment people and regulations. It, is common knowl-Age in Washington that a similar situation prevails in Italy. The chief British Secret Service man in Rome is said to have more au- thority even than the British ambassa- dor. In the American Embassy, how- ever, the head CIA agent reportedly complains of being treated like an office boy. There have also been differences be- tween CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission. One cause for this has been CIA's inability to learn what prog- ress Russia has made with the atomic bomb. The other big reason has been CIA's refusal-on the ground of se- curity -to tell the AEC the sources for such atomic-energy information as it has been able to secure. The AEC main- tains that it must know these sources if it is to evaluate the information with scientific accuracy. Recently, the situ- ation was somewhat eased when CIA designated a reliable scientist as a liai- son officer with the AEC. The AEC has agreed to accept his judgment as to the worth of CIA scientific reports. Rela- tions between the two groups, however, are still far from amicable. Evidence is also on hand that CIA and Army Intelligence do not get Commanding Officer, Warsaw, Po- land." Quite naturally, the Polish au- thorities opened the envelope and read its contents. They permanently grounded the Military-Mission plane. Another move that amazed Washing- ton was a statement by Army Intelli- gence people in Germany giving details of the alleged manner in which they had spirited former Vice Premier Stan- islaw Mikolajczyk out of Poland. Cap- ital officials cannot understand why Army Intelligence bragged about such an ultraconfidential topic, especially since Army Intelligence, they say, had nothing whatsoever to do with Miko- lajczyk's escape. It is true, as Lt. Gen. Albert, C. Wedemeyer, of the Army General Staff, pointed out, to the writer, that "the caliber of American military attaches abroad has been vastly im- proved. We are no longer sending over teacup pushers with rich wives. Now we are using military experts who are thoroughly conversant with the people, the language and the conditions of the nations t.o which they are a,4signed." But the Army has not been so care- ful in its choice of enlisted personnel for the offices of these military attaches. Last. May, Army Intelligence was severely embarrassed when a Russian spy named Mrs. Galina Dunaeva Bi- conish was able to seduce twenty-one- year-old Sgt. James M. McMillin, de- coding clerk in the Moscow Embassy. The sergeant fell wildly in love with this beautiful brunette and publicly re- nounced his American citizenship in favor of Russia. Unlike CIA, where opportunities are being offered for a lifetime career in intelligence, the Army has almost al- ways refused to let its officers special- ize in intelligence work. It assigns men with little or no intelligence background to the various G-2 sections. Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, for example, who, until his transfer recently, was Director of Intelligence, Army General Navy John L. Sullivan's statement about the presence of "unidentified submarines" off the California coast. During congressional hearings on the draft, Sullivan got headlines by inti- mating that Russian submarines were reconnoitering American waters. He noted that similar reconnaissance by Nazi and Jap submarines prefaced Pearl Harbor. A news report of the secretary's re- marks was the first indication ONI had of the presence of those submarines. An immediate investigation was or- dered. According to a Navy Depart- ment spokesman, ONI found that there was nothing to Mr. Sullivan's state- ment. No Russian submarine was then closer to the United States than 3000 miles. The Air Force's intelligence service is reputedly doing a good job, although it is occasionally attacked for alleged wild-eyed exaggerations in its esti- mates of Russia's combat air strength. In as much as General Vandenberg, the Air Force commander, is an old intelli- gence man himself, Air Force Intelli- gence has been receiving consistent support in terms of funds and per- sonnel. At, the State Department, it is said that Secretary Marshall has made sev- eral attempts to better its foreign- intelligence reporting. The same pal - tern is still followed, though, with all dispatches channeling through the various ambassadors and ministers. This, it is stated, has frequently re- sulted in only that information reach- ing Washington which has shown the particular envoy in a good light or which has reflected his personal politi- cal views. Whether this be the reason or not, members of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee are bitter about the de- partment's forecasts of the results in the last French municipal elections. The department told the committee that General DeGaulle's new party did not have a chance, that the com- munists would sweep the polls. In- stead, the Reds were decisively trounced and the Gaullists won an outstanding victory. The FBI has not been in the for- eign-intelligence field since early in 1947, when it was directed to trans- fer its wartime Latin-American net- work to the Central Intelligence Group. It is now responsible solely for counterespionage activities within the United States and its possessions. There is antagonism between it and CIA. Official Washington is aware of this feud and the other internecine strife in the intelligence family. In behalf of the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal has ap- pointed a three-man board to look into it, as part of a broad survey it is to make of all American intelligence op- erations. On the board are Allen W. Dulles, who headed the OSS mission to Switzerland, William H. Jackson, New York lawyer and wartime intelli- gence ace, and Mathias F. Correa, former United States attorney for the Southern District of New York. While the full findings of this board will probably never be made public, it is expected to demand that the inter- agency squabbling stop and that all groups co-operate in the drive to give the United States the best possible eyes and ears around the world. The board is said to believe that a fair start has been made in this direction, but, that much remains to be done if another Pearl Harbor is to be avoided. rur,ENll Staff, is an officer with G-3 (Plans and Operations) experience. So is Maj. Gen. A. R. Bolling, who was his deputy. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, recently recognized this pecul- iar state of affairs and made a move that to Army men is 100 per cent revo- lutionary. He said to this writer, "I am recommending to the General Staff that the Army establish an intelligence corps in which personnel can specialize in intelligence just as artillery men con- centrate on guns, and armored-corps men on tanks." The Office of Naval Intelligence is already veering in this direction. It has instituted a separate section just for intelligence experts and other special- ists. This will allow them to focus ex- clusively on their specialties without the old-time necessity for regular tours of sea duty. The stress that ONI is now placing on intelligence can be seen in its training program. Where the Army gives its military attaches and other intelligence men four months' school- ing, the Navy puts its men through a fifteen months' course. ONI men, by the way, are quick to deny responsibility for Secretary of the Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1948. Intelligence I Approv One of Weakest Links in Our Security, Survey Shows-Omissions, Duplications By HANSON America's first line of defense in the atomic age-a world-wide in- telligence service-is today one of the weakest links in our national security. This is the conclusion of this correspondent after a careful sur- vey, of our intelligence activities, and it is a conclusion with which most of our informed authorities emphatically agree. The evidences are legion. Fric- tion has been pronounced between various intelligence agencies of Government-notably between the new post-war Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department; between the CIA (Central Intelli- gence Agency) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and be- tween the CIA and the Atomic En- ergy Commission. There is unnecessary duplication and overlapping; at the same time, there are serious omissions of in- telligence, and there is consider- able expensive "empire-building." Worst of all, many of the person- nel being utilized to evaluate intel- ligence reports are definitely sec- ond-rate, able to earn more money in Washington in Federal employ- ment than they could earn on col- lege campuses or in other civiilan occupations. Know Little of Soviet Strength The result today is a marked depreciation in the quantity and quality of our intelligence as compared to the war years. Our knowledge of Russian strength is admittedly fragmentary, and many of the estimates by different Gov- ernment agencies are conflicting- so widely divergent in some cases that they are impossible to recon- cile. Our information about Rus- sian atomic energy activities is notable for its scarcity. These facts, a growing sense of frustration and discouragement among some intelligence personnel, which has led to the resignations from CIA and Army G-2 of some of the best civilian personnel, and several intelligence fiascos since the war, climaxed by Bogota, have brought about an investigative survey of the whole intelligence structure of Government, it was learned. Allen W. Dulles, who occupied a prominent role in Switzerland with the Office of Strategic Services during the war; William H. Jack- son, New York lawyer and wartime intelligence officer, and Mathias F', Correa, former OSS official, have been surveying our intelli- gence organization and its opera- ,*fc Rn4eassi003 15)2 t House, Secretary of Defense For- W. BALDWIN restal and the National Security Council. The survey, a continuing one which will end with a report by next January, is studying not only the Central Intelligence Agency, but also the inter-relationship of this agency with the intelligence activities of the State, Army, Air Force, and Navy Departments and the FBI. As a result of the study some changes already have been made, and others-perhaps of a sweeping nature-are predicted. Considerable shifts of personnel, particularly in the Central Intelli- gence Agency, have occurred, or are occurring, although some of them pre-dated the Dulles commis- sion's appointment. Changes Going On in CIA Apparently as a direct result of the Dulles inquiry some strange "finaglings" have been going on in the Central Intelligence Agency. Last year, coincident with the transfer of its director, the office of collection and dissemination, one of six principal offices in the agency, was abolished. Today it has been restored under another head and is bigger than ever. After the Dulles survey started a considerable section of the office of administration and manage- ment, a lopsidedly large and over- staffed office which was supposed to shuffle paper work for the bene- fit of the operating forces but had become in some ways the tail that wagged the dog, was seemingly "eliminated." But the elimination, it has now developed, merely in- volved the paper shift of a large number of personnel to the newly reconstituted office of collection and dissemination, with no net re- duction in employes. At the same time some of those in the intelligence picture-partic- ularly a few "empire builders" in the CIA, who were being studied with particular interest by the Dulles commission-have appar- ently started an attempted "back- fire" against the Dulles group in an attempt to discredit it. Mr. Dulles' survey, in other words, already has struck sparks, but if it is to achieve its purpose it must inevitably lead-in the opinion of those who have studied our intelligence agencies closely- to major personnel changes in our intelligence agencies, to some re- organizational and perhaps func- tional modifications, and to insist- ence upon better cooperation be- tween all intelligence agoncies. IATRDP88B 68 0 50101-9 articles.] Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Older Agencies Resent a Successor And Try to Restrict Scope of Action In telligence-II _Jul v 2,-1c4FA - Approved tained in some of them was accu- rate and of considerable impor- tance. The full scope of the up- rising, and particularly the exten- sive participation of the Bogota police in it, were not anticipated, however. The incident clearly re- vealed some weaknesses in collec- tion of intelligence, greater weak-1 nesses in evaluation and the creaky nature of the mechanism for exchange and transmission of information between the State De- partment and the CIA overseas and in this country. Improvements in the latter weakness have been made, due in large measure to the Dulles in- quiry, but the State Department is still hostile, not to the concept; of the CIA, but to the present or-, ganization staffed as it is, and feels that many of its reports and evaluations merely duplicate its own. 3. Friction between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion really began fourteen months ago when, under a Presidential di- rective, the CIA took over the in- telligence functions that the FBI their powers and prerogatives and to restrict and confine and reduce CIA's scope of action. Catalogue of Friction Friction between Government Intelligence agencies is in a major :degree responsible for the current study, headed by Allen W. Dulles, of the Government's intelligence organizations. Friction is not new to Washing- ton, but the newly-established Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, succes- sor to the Central Intelligence IGroup and to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, has had more than its share. A new agency always has trouble in establishing itself in politically-jealous and power-conscious Washington, and this has been especially true in the case of CIA, which "inherited" some of the Office of Strategic i Services' wartime feuds, and which found itself a "nouveau riche" in the field of intelligence amongst old established agencies. Some gross mistakes of its own and a much too rapid expansion by CIA which led to "empire-build- ing" and retention of some incom- petent personnel fed the flames of controversy, but major friction has resulted because of the attempts of the older agencies to -retain all had expressed in Latin' America during the war. The turnover of responsibility in various offices that had been established in Latin America followed no common pat- tern but generally was a good ex- ample of lack of teamwork. In some Latin-American offices FBI agents offered full coopera- tion to their 'CIA successors and delayed their departure to permit a period of overlap and a gradual and orderly turnover. But in a number of instances the CIA agents arrived in the morning to find the FBI files burned and the FBI agents booked for departure that afternoon. The excuse given was that some of the CIA agents assigned to Latin America were not sufficiently "security-consci- ous." Shift on Loyalty Checks More recently, the FBI, which conducts loyalty and security checks for personnel of all Gov- ernment departments, stopped per- forming that function, in so far as the CIA was concerned. The CIA was forced, because of this FBI action, to set up its own security check department---now a part of the office of inspection and secu- rity---to check records of prospec- tive employes. The FBI recently rescinded its action and is again undertaking CIA checks, but the expense to the, CIA and to the Government in personnel and money was large. 4. Considerable difficulties be- tween the Atomic Energy Com- mission and the CIA were evident until recently. The CIA, criticized by older intelligence agencies be- cause of its alleged lack of secu- rity, refused to divulge to the AEC on the grounds of security the sources of its atomic energy in- formation. The AEC insisted that it required these sources for prop- er evaluation of scientific informa- tion. This difficulty seems to have been at least temporarily straight- ened out by the appointment of a liaision officer within the CIA-a young scientist, whose word as to the reliability of scientific reports is satisfactory to the Atomic En- ergy Commission. Neither the lat- ter commission, nor for that mat- ter the CIA itself, are satisfied, oR?~R8@B60 9RO1DO5O ligence, and we now very itt e The full intelligence story of the Bogat& conference never'has been told, and probably never can be. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillen- koetter, director of the Central In- elligence Agency, produced-at the quickly dropped Congressional in- vestigation-messages which were A brief catalogue of this friction reveals its seriousness: 1. CIA and G-2 were locked in a bitter feud until some months ago; today relations are more cor- rect but not cordial. The issue, in part, was whether or not CIA should take over collection of se- cret intelligence as well as its evaluation. CIA won out and the- oretically, at least, controls all espionage agents operating for this country overseas, but there is still reason to believe that G-2 continues to operate its own agents, although it denies this. 2. Prime antagonists today are the State Department and CIA, or at least personalities in both agen- cies. CIA representatives overseas have been in virtually all cases at- tached to American Embassies land have usually used State De- partment communications facili- ties. Differences of opinion as to the exact power of the Ambassa- dor over the CIA representative and other issues finally crystal- lized into open "name-calling" aft- er the unexpected rebellion flared at the Bogota conference in April. hailed in some quarters as proof of our foreknowledge of the revolt. A careful reading of these mes- sages, however, indicated that they were virtually unevaluated and un- digested intelligence; most of them read like clippings from The Daily Worker and were so generalized that they could scarcely be inter- preted as accurate forecasts of the revolt. It was learned, however, that the messages produced for Con- gress and published were not, by any means, the only indications gleaned of the Colombian situa- tion. Other messages-at least one of them forecasting the par- ticipation of some of the Bogota mobile sound trucks to Incite re- volt t--were received, and the fac- tual advance information con- about Russian atomic energy progress. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 In tellig en ce-III --sLlt1y_ .-._l948. Errors, in Collecting Data Held Exceeded by Evaluation Weakness By HANSON W. BALDWIN Several intelligence fiascos sinceservice loyalties and service inter- the war, major service differences in our estimates of Russian strength and intelligence evalu- ations too much influenced by prejudice have hampered and are still hampering a sound intelligence analysis of the world situation. The fiascos-they might be called intelligence "catastrophies -have occurred in Rumania, Hungary, Finland and elsewhere. The Rumanian case of last fall offered an almost opera bouffe ex- ample of how intelligence should not be gathered; the episode might well have been "graustarkian" had it not resulted in tragedy and in considerable embarrassment to the United States Government. Two young and exuberant army officers attached to the Central In- telligence Agency as carry-overs from the old Office of Strategic Services organization made con- tacts almost openly with anti-Com- munist and opposition leaders in Rumania, urged the formation of an anti-Communist group in that country and recorded their efforts, the names of the conspirators and even the minutes of the "secret" meetings held-apparently in order to impress their superiors with their industry. "Duck Soup" for Soviet MVD Naturally such naive attempts were "duck soup" for the Russian MVD; the officers left Rumania hastily, but their native associates ;soon landed in jail. The Russians utilized the information, including !the seized documents, with consid- erable embarrassment to this Gov- ernment at the trial of Dr. Juliu Maniu and his associates which subsequently resulted in Dr. Maniu's imprisonment for life. The details of the Hungarian and (Finnish fiascos have understand- ably been guarded with consider- able secrecy, but apparently "rings" of agents established in the old OSS days and inherited willy- nilly by the Central Intelligence Agency were responsible for much loose work which resulted in easy detection and ultimate elimination of the "rings." Perhaps more dangerous today than the heritage of the mistakes of the past, and even more glar- ingly weak than our system of collection of intelligence, is our evaluation of it. That evaluation is too often subjective and preju- diced, and is too often made by men without adequate background for the task. Each service-Army G-2, Air Force A-2, Navy-ONI-is making subjective estimates of Russian strength, each of which varies in important particulars from the other estimates. The Navy empha- sizes Russian submarine strength; 'the Air Force, Russian air ipower; the Army, numbers of Russian di- visions. Approve Fbr eleas'e 2O03Mk27 b[ course, affected, if only subcon- sciously, by the inter-service strug- gle for funds and by their own ests. The men who are making these estimates are thinking first as naval officers, air officers or Army officers, not as intelligence officers. 6 The result is a distorted picture of Russian strength. The Navy probably exaggerates the numbers of modern Russian submarines; the Air Force's estimates of Rus- sian combat planes are not'wholly accepted by G-2, and at least one well informed British air officer believes the A-2 estimate of Rus- sian long-range bombers is far too high. CIA Tries to Reconcile Data The CIA is attempting to recon- cile these divergent estimates with the aid of service information and its own sources, and the resultant compromise estimate is, in this writer's opinion, more accurate- - or at least, less in error-than that of any one of the services. Yet the CIA estimate cannot yet com- mand the respect it must have, if it is to mean much, partly because' of past CIA mistakes, partly be- cause of some inferior CIA per- sonnel, partly because of the new- ness of the CIA and its history of frictions and duplications. Another mistake now currently being made-exemplified in the February and March crisis when the CIA was right but General Clay and the Army were wrong- was a mistake constantly made during wartime, the confusion of enemy "capabilities" with enemy "intentions." The Russians, for instance, may have the physical "capability" of overrunning west- ern Europe in forty-five days- though though this seems a dubious esti- mate--and the military services may be perfectly correct in so es- timating, for this involves a mili- tary judgment. But a Russian "in- tention" to overrun western Eu- rope must imply political as well as military judgment, and the services are not particularly com- petent to make such judgments. This is the function of the CIA, to couple the political judgments of the State Department with the military judgments of the services and to supplement them with data gathered by itself and other Gov- ernment agencies and to evaluate all this and present a definitive whole view. Too often it has not done this, ,.at least not comprehen- I sively; too often it has simply re- peated the political views of state and the military views of the serv- ices. Occasionally it has produced a careful synthesis, and it has cer- tainly produced many detailed re- ports of great value. Its judg- ment in the so-called "spring crisis," for instance, was far closer to being correct than the Army's was. But the CIA does not yet have' sufficient stature to command the full confidence f the o - IAaRDb8&BO&269RQOe v050101-9 gence services--subjective in their approach-fulfill alone the func- tions which CIA is supposed to fill. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Intelligence-IV J111 Y 24, l 94Fs __ Competent Personnel Held Key To Success-Reforms Suggested By HANSON W. BALDWIN The current survey of the na- I must provide a greater continuit',' lion's intelligenc i e agenc es, which have been beset by factionalism anad friction can had only to one major conclusion: that adequate personnel is the key to adequate intelligence. The study now being conducted under the chairmanship of Allen W. Dulles must undoubtedly rec- ognize this fact, even though it may make suggestions for im- provements in organization and perhaps a redefinition of func- tional activities by the various ,agencies. Personnel weaknesses undoubt- edly are the clue to the history of frustration and disappointment, of friction and fiasco which have been, too largely, the story of our intelligence services since the war. Present personnel, including many of those in the office of research and estimates of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, suffer from inexperience and inadequacy of background, Some of them do not possess the "global," objective mind needed to evaluate intelli- . ence, coldly, logically and defini- tively. Others, in offices of opera- tions or special operations in the CIA are chair warmers. Some---in CIA. and service agencies---are "empire builders," anxious for prestige and rank. Civilian Executive Urged The first requirement is to in- duce into government service ci- vilians of high capacity and will- ing anonymity. The CIA should be headed by a civilian, not by a military or naval man as its first three directors have been. Its senior executives and office chiefs should be largely civilian. The concept that CIA could be staffed in large measure by service personnel and that the services would then owe greater loyalty and support to this agency be- n cause of their personnel stake in it has failed. The officers sent to CIA are not always the best and most of them have a psychological aversion to the duty; they con- sider themselves, in a professional sense, "lost." Civilians, therefore, must be in- duced into CIA and into other government intelligence agencies, but they probably cannot be per- suaded unless son le of the re- strictions of Civil Service are re- laxed and more security and sense of accomplishment is provided. A corps of junior civilian intelligence experts might be established gradually by enlisting picked men from the colleges or graduate schools to serve four or five years in government intelligence work. The best 10 per cent might, if they wished, make intelligence a career; the rest would return to civilian life--available, if neces- sary, for a later tour of duty or for ser I"-In r~ o Appr,tr, k7rn'~F~ilstravey9nprr5 size intelligence even more greatly han they have yet done and they tion to officers who make intelli- gence their specialty. ,Some Reforms Suggested A solution of the personnel problem is of prime impottance, but these additional reforms ought to be considered carefully: 1-A thorough house-cleaning of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to rid the services of drones, incom- petents and "empire-builders.- 2-Re organization of the CIA on a more efficient basis. The otfice of collection and dissemina- tion probably ought to be eliminat- ed or greatly reduced and the of- fice of administration and man- agement ought to be cut down; these two offices have become Loo much the tail that wags the dog. Friction between the vital offices of operations and special opera- tions must be eliminated; these two offices probably ought to be combined under one head and re-' duced in size. Neither one needs an evaluation section as at pies-, ent; these sections somewhat I duplicate the work of the office of research and estimates. The lat- ter office is a key to sound in- telligence; it must be strengthened. One means of doing so and of l eliminating duplication with the State Department is to transfer the State Department's intelli- gence analysts to CIA. The residue of the Office of Strategic Services was split up after the war be- tween the Central Intelligence Agency (then the Central Intelli- gence Group) and the State De- partment. This, it is now clear, was a major mistake; the two ought to be rejoined. Functions Need Redefining 3 --The functional purposes of each of the governuncnt's intelli- gence agencies ought to be rede- fined clearly and unmistakably, but the CIA must be clearly estab- lished as the top-echelon agencyi with powers to coordinate the a(!_! tivities of all the others. Organi zationally, the present structure seems sound; certainly it is better than any prior system. The CIA probably should continue to col- lect information by both overt and covert means as well as to analyze it. If, however, official approval should be given to the collection of secret information by spy rings operated by other agencies the "master mind" control of all such rings must be in the hands of the CIA. 4 -Secret intelligence operations must be conducted on a broader and far more secure base than heretofore. The State Depart- ment's embassies and missions have offered "cover" up until now for nearly all overseas CIA activi- ties largely because 11-J& cover"I RDI 86B Z4kV0500050101-9 can and must be provided. Ingenuity and secrecy are the keys Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 In tells en ce-V Ju- . Broader Control Set-Up Is Held Need, With a `Watch-Dog' Unit for Congress The enlargement of present in- telligence activities of the Govern- ment and the establishment of a Congressional "watch-dog" com- mittee to study and inspect those activities continuously are two of major reforms required in the reorganization and modernization of our intelligence procedures. first suggestion enlarge- ment of our intelligence activities already has received some atten- Lion from Allen Dulles, chairman a three-man group which has surveying our intelligence of John Foster Dulles, who is gen- era.ily regarded as the next Secre- of State if Governor Dewey should be elected to the Presidency. need for enlargement or some of. our post-war concepts of ligence was stressed by John Fos- Dulles recently in a speech to the Bond Club of New York. Mr. Dulles, in his address, rec- ommended "an organization dedi- defense." Such an organization, he held, should expose Communist other subversive. plottings, "tell adequately through radio and press the story of what is happen- cated to the task of nonmilitary terrorism," and help leaders-in- protect "the free press" of other countries by opportunity to "get print paper"; provide "asylum for those menaced by Communist exile of foreign countries overrun by communism "to go on working for freedom." Joint Organizations Mooted out the details of his proposal, but seemed to lump together the func- .John Foster Dulles did not spell Department's "Voice of America," the FBI and the Central Intelli- tions now conducted by the State gence Agency. Such an organi tion as he described would pre- activities carried on by the Office of. Strategic Services during the psycholog'ical warfare, including the utilization of "black radio" or sumably conduct some of the same war, plus political warfare and sabotage, would be included in its No single organization of gov- clandestine stations operating per- lisps behind the "iron curtain." In wartime other activities, including cope. ernment now has any such all-em- bracing' charter as this, but the CIA could conduct some of the activities suggested, particularly "black radio" and the encourage- merit of anti-Communist minors- emphasis of these "secret opera- tions," but it seems likely that most of these will be conducted by the CIA. No such inclusive overall organization as that app rentlyi suggested by John Foster Dulles is , at least in the immediate probable, futu future. Early Wartime Merger Failed A merger and intelligence activities was tried in the early days of the war, but did not work out, and there was a resultant nt split into the Of- e of War Information and the fice Office of Strategic Services. Th%,, State Department must also have' a major voice in "political war-i fare" " and in dealings with leaders- in -exile. It does not seem possible, refore, to centralize all such therefore, intel- operations agency, nor is it desirable. From the Congressional ressional and public point of view such an organization would represent a greater emphasis on "secret opera- tiona I " as well as on "secret intel- " is now obvious, and someI ligence" agencies of government must per- form all the functions mentioned by John Foster Dulles as well as other functions to which he did not . The CIA is the place for allude. many of them but not for all. "Watch-Dog" Group Suggested Because of the importance to national security of secret intelli- gence and secret operations, be- cause of our past errors in intelli- gence and , particularly because the grants of power given to intelli- gence agencies ,,secret , a Congressional committee to act as a discreet "watch-dog" over za- of men of great discretion reliability, close-i and thorough men able to keep secrets. mouthed It should be composed of repre- sentatives of both parties; such a committee must be nonpartisan, for above all, intelligence must be out of politics. It should kept have the same relationship to the and other intelligence agen- CIA the Senate'House Atomic cies that Energy Committee has to the United States Atomic Energy Com- Such a group, to act as a mission. advocate for our in- sympathetic telligence agencies and at the same time as a gadfly to those agencies and a check-rein upon undue Approved FAhPuifl 1-9 enough viewpoint. Allen Dulles' Intelligence system -the first line survey already has resulted in a re of defense, Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 '1'114- shake that failed. In Manila to Bice up, general hawahe got thrrrnbe(I on Iii. %cav when he tried lo-clasp hands wi I h I he ant hor. I Was an American Spy I. I SII13IR. as tnh( to ,111 . >7 IVELL )IIe of' %Iae rtlitir"s key airlr~~ [("is lilt' almost uuI-elie%al-le store t-I' his life as a +?Iira1. and dagger" operati'e. Peril, intrigue, sl.ultlu erg' were his llaik distr. Ills first chief told hire: "Re It Ienlbe I., i f yotr" re (If F ww e ney er heard of you."" HAVE been in military-intelligence work, di- rectly and indirectly, for twenty-nine years. it hick up a book or drop into a movie for a a'oupfe of hours. So I'm pretty familiar, too, with he Cloud-Cuckooland version of intelligence. Your American intelligence agent of fiction and screen is a man of parts. He's part Dick Tracy, part. liar Galahad, plus dashes of Lanny Budd and Casa- aaova, double-distilled with the Boy Standing on the Burning Deck and Vesuvius in eruption. All this is rapped in a package resembling Alan Ladd. Usually the agent is an amateur, a sort, of Intelligence Minute Man. He has been called to ,nrvice from soda fountain, law practice or garage. A few weeks of training turns hint into such a master of disguise, dirty infighting, secret inks, codes and lethal gadgets that he'll make monkeys out of the hest career operatives the enemy can muster. `['he list tonal agent, for variety's sake, soni l imes runs into such a riot of mayhem that he goes down, bloody but unbowed. In that case, a faithful Corn- Either way, the agent or his hallowed memory gets the un- dying gratitude of his government. On the screen Ihis is 1uielly expressed by a distinguished, white- haired official in a map-hung office whose windows frame a view of the Capitol dome. There is a modicum of truth to this popular no- tion of intelligence work. For that matter, there are recognizable objects in a Dali painting. But, Colonel .A1ashhin, who today breaksal9-scar silence on his wuiclue mulercon'er i~ork. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 taken by and large, it's flapdoodle-entertaining enough, but still flapdoodle. I know this because my career has covered every phase of this complicated work. If a few of my ex- periences will serve to bring the vital subject of military intelligence into better focus and to alert our people to its importance, I shall be satisfied. If any toes are stepped on, I apologize in advance, but, the public must know the facts in order to plan intelligently for the future-something we have never done before. My first detail took me into Mexico before we declared war on the Kaiser's Germany. Later I helped run German spies to earth. Between wars, I had assignments in Japan and Siberia for Army In- telligence, and in Japan again for Naval Intelli- gence. During World War II, I served first with the Intelligence Branch of the Signal Corps, and later in the G-2 Section of General MacArthur's quarters. I have riot been a typical intelligence officer, for t he very good reason that, there is no such animal. The only constant in intelligence is infinite variety. So this has to be an intensely personal nar- rative. And being personal, let me dispose of glamour right now. Sadly enough, no movie-type female spies endowed with slinky grace ever tried to suborn me. I've an idea, too, that most movie-goers wouldn't find the rough stuff sometimes involved quite as attractive as the vicarious thrills of the screen. For one thing, when a bullet rips into you, you don't bleed tomato catsup, as I learned on my first intelligence mission, which was as a spy. In the summer of 1916, I was a captain in the 1st, Arizona Infantry. We were stationed on the Mexican border, where Pancho Villa and his hen.- didos were kicking up a lot of dust. after their raid on Columbus. Although the headlines in Mexico read: "Our brave General Villa has captured Columbus, is marching on Washington, and President Wilson and family have fled to Canada for safety," the fact is that "Black Jack" Pershing and his cavalry were running him ragged. Suddenly our advance was halted on inexplicable orders from Washington. Arizona's Sen. Marcus Aurelius Smith told several of us in the old Pueblo Club in Tucson that President Wilson had privately advised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that % here are grave reasons wLy we cannot be- come involved in a war with Mexico, and those rea- sons have not hing to do with any country on this coniinenC." Apparently that was why Gen. Frederick Funst.on sent, me below the border to investigate reports from Papago Indian scouts that, groups of Japanese had been landing in Sonora and infiltrating northwest into Baja California. From the Indians' descrip- tion, they were clearly military personnel, armed and specially trained. General Funston's parting words were, "Remem- ber, Mashbir, if they or the Mexicans catch you, we never heard of you." A Ilot Time in It Jai)-lnlested Desert. IN prospector's clothes with every identification removed, and traveling light, I went across the border. Northwestern Sonora is one of the most desolate spots on earth. Even cactus doesn't, thrive, and rattlesnakes and Gila monsters are few and far between. The Indians themselves shunned this suburb of hell. When the sky was like a sheet of dull fire and the heat, devils shimmered over the dead sand, I was thankful for the hardening I'd had in Arizona. I had been reared there, had spent, years in the desert surveying for railroads, and as a kid had even worked in the copper mines. No one had mapped the region I was entering. I did discover that. one white man had preceded me, at, least as far as the Pinto Range. I found his bleached bones. He'd been a prospector. Inside an iron utensil which stood beside what, time had left of ]rim, the dying man had scratched with his knife: "eny body wail cum this fur lookin fur gold is a darn fool. John Gilson 18b I ." There was no t irne to bury bones. I kept pushing on to Tinajas Allas, a water hole where I had my first glimpse of Japanese ideographs. They were traced in charcoal against cliffs overhanging small puddles of greenish-brown soup. Later I spent years studying the complicated Japanese writing. in 1916, 1 hadn't the faintest notion what, it meant. I made laborious copies in my notebook. As it developed, they were route mark- ings. i collected scraps of paper printed in Japanese. Whet her they were military messages or wrappings of canned goods, I couldn't tell. TO get information, vou associate with those who have it. So Colonel \lashhir Mows Jap big-wigs c,-ill a speech at a Pan-Pacific inneheon in Tokyo in I937. The reran f ingering his chin is Baron Togo. At any rite, I was three weeks on the trail, from one scummy water hole to another. Subsequently, we est imated that no fewer than 10,000 Japs had taken the trek across those terrible shifting sand dunes as =advance training for possible operations in American desert areas. The Jalr; were guided between water holes by mounted Mexicans and half-breed Indians. Once I came upon them just before sundown. I hid among the rocks until dark. Then I crawled closer to watch and listen. In the glow of the firelight, the Jap leader was poring over a map. He gave orders in broken Spanish to a swarthy guide whom he called " Fosut.achari." Subsequently, when I learned Japa- nese, this name resolved itself into "Charlie Foster." The party turned in without posting sentries. As soon as they were asleep, I crept forward, scared silly, but. determined to get. the map and what other papers I could lay hands on. I almost made it.. In fact, I was just. reachirig for the leader's knapsack when I knocked over a canteen, whose rattle roused them all. I got. the damnedest. beating I've ever had. A thousand years later, I heard my voice croaking for water. Direly Iwas aware of the renegade hall-breed, Foster, looming over me. He spat in my face and told me in foul Spanish that. that was water. He thought I was too badly injured to move, much less attempt to escape. 1 lay still for a while, gathering my strength. Again I groaned for water, and again Foster came over and leaned down to spit in my face. I caught, him on the point of his chin. I eased line silently to the ground, without disturbing the sleep- ing Japs. I had been too weak to do more than stun hire. I couldn't al'l'ord to take chances, so I made use of the knife he had af his belt. Still gripping the knife, I stumbled to Foster's horse. I cut the rope hobbles and, pulled myself astride. Foster must have made some dying commotion. The Jap camp sprang to life. There was scattered rifle fire. Id just about got out of range when a Mauser shag; caught me in the right hip. An even unluckier shot. dropped the horse. I crawled oft over a led of shale where tracks wouldn't, show. Squeezing into a jumble of boulders, I flattened out and waited. The Japs combed the area. They found the dead horse. Somehow they missed me, though one of them came so close I could hear him muttering; to himself. At daybreak they gave it, up, apparently de- ciding I was so far gone from the beating that I he desert, would get, ere. What finally happened to them and to the other Japs who had gone before them I don'a know. I sit pposeeventuaflyt[ley seeped out of Mexico as they had come in. At, any rite, I lay low for twenty-four hours. I dug the Mauuser bullet out of my hip with my knife, cauterizing t he wound by packing it with gunpowder arid tom'hu'g a match to it.. After recovering my haversack from its hiding= place, I hobbled ollfor the border, mind 'r an umbrella of tow-circling buzzards whose right iul menace drove inc on every time I was about i n give in and unit. The sheer horror ul Thai I'll never forget. I did trot over the border with the first Javanese papers ever captured by an American. I had lost thiriv-five of my 160 nounds. T had gained an in- eradicatale tinIred o! Ow .tapa.nese !uil,rat,y_ My, papers and notes were sent to Washington. Now a simple definition of intelligence is "ev al- uated informat.ion." The most detailed inforniatioti is worthless if the higher-ups misinterpret it. I was bitterly disappointed when Washington reported: "'t'hese papers and writings have no military value." Somebody had completely missed the point, the obvious military significance of any Japanese writ- ing's be=ing discovered at. that, time and along that route. The Japanese were then at war with Ger- many, but on a jackal footing, to nick up what spoils t hey could in the Far Fast,. They seized, but refused to send troops to Europe uaa- less permitted to colonize Australia. The Allies ill France seemed to be crumbling before the massive German drives. In later days, when I studied the Japanese at, firsthand, I learned that. they seldom gamble in the Western sense of the word. When they do bet, it's en what they believe is a sure thing. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 L1. Gen. Kawabe,''akashiro, sninh for sill-render. ;gels the word from 1lashbir and (at left) General \ltu?lrtluu's G-:', Nlaj. If ;vu. C. 1. A%illoughbv. r So, in 1916 they were preparing to switch sides if and when Germany forced the United States into the war and there were diversionary attacks on us by the Mexicans. Afterward, when I was an intelli- gence officer at Governors Island, I learned that. (;ermany had not, only offered Mexico the states of Arizona, New Mexico and Texas but, had guaran- teed the participation of Japanese troops. For practical purposes of applied intelligence, my mission into Mexico had been time wasted. I might, ,is well have spent those weeks playing ticktacktoe. Later Pershing was withdrawn from Mexico. Iloweve.r, I was rewarded by my immediate su- periors. Within less than a year a lot of regulations were waived, and I had been commissioned in the Regular Army and put in charge of counterespio- :.age and counterintelligence for the Eastern De- partment of the United States Army. I owed the assignment to Gen. F. D. (" Handsome Dan") Webster, who had been with General Fun_ :~ton on the Mexican border. He told the Eastern Department commander, Gen. Eli D. Hoyle, that I was the man for the counterespionage job, on the premise that it takes a thief to catch a thief. And hadn't T been a spy for a few weeks? That, ought, easily to qualify me to discover and upset. the com- plicated spy system which the Imperial German General Staffhad spent many years perfecting. I confess I was in a hand-painted Peruvian tizzy. I didn't know how to begin. Almost, I was tempted to dig into F. Phillips Oppenheim for guidance. Then I recalled the old Arizona story about: the cow- puncher with a gift for finding strayed horses. When asked how he did it, he said, "I just figger where I'd want to go if I was a hoss, and I go there, and there the boss is." In amateur fashion, I'd hit upon one of the fundamentals not only of counterespionage but. also of all intelligence. Knowing the enemy's int.entin is, you must, deduce the courses of action open to him, and then anticipate him. Conversely, if' you do not. know his intent ions, you must, deduce the iii from his strength, dispositions and possible courses of action. Very well, I thought, if I were doing it,, I'd plant, spies and saboteurs in positions where they could do the most damage while attracting the least notice. 'Chat finally boiled down to just one thing-non- commissioned officers. They are the backbone of any army. You'd as soon have suspected General Pershing of traffic with the enemy as American noncoms, who, t.radit.ionally, are rough diamonds with hearts of gold. Precision \\ ork F,xposes it Noncom I DU(: into the records. 1 discovered that the rolls bore thousands of Teutonic names. The pre- ponderance were undoubtedly loyal. But the con- centration of Germans in noncom ranks was particu- larly heavy. I felt. I was near pay dirt:. I tested my theory at. Governors Island, where I was stationed. There was a good possibility handy near by at. Fort Hamilton---Master Gunner Paul Otto Kuno. Kuno had served ten years in the Coast. Artillery. He was efficient, his conduct had been exemplary. I felt hangdog about it, but I had him sent. on a detail to Fort, Wadsworth for a day on which I arranged with Frank Burke, operative in charge of the Secret Service in New York, to lend me his best lock expert. This expert., who not only looked but, dressed like President Wilson, was G. E. Adams, known as "Camera Eye Adams." After we had got into Kuno's quarters, Adarns removed his frock coat. to reveal, fastened all around his belt, dozens of bunches of keys of all sizes. None of Kuno's lug- gage gave difficulty, and none revealed anything, except for one small trunk. The odd thing about, this trunk was t.haf it had two different, locks and that everything had been packed in a peculiarly syst.ernat.ic and complicated manner. Camera Rye Adams photographed in his mind the exact angle and order of each piece as he removed it._ Adams felt, over the entptfeel trunk, inch by inch. Finally, he grunted, "Here's something." He had found a key under the bottom lining in :r place exactly hollowed out to fit it. I'd have missed it entirely, so cunningly was the job done. Adams discovered the mi,roscopic seam, carefully cut. and peeled it hack, removed the key, made a wax impression and replaced it. After a delicate gluing job, he repacked the trunk so that Kuno was never able to detect any tampering. Several days later Adams reported that he had checked the key maple from the wax impression with all the key companies. Kuno's was of a type fur- nished for safe-deposit boxes to a bank not far from Fort. Monroe, Virginia. The rest was routine. We located the box, taken under an assumed name. It contained Kuno's credentials as a reserve officer of the Prussian Imperial Guard Artillery on special foreign ;ervice. Among other incriminating evidence was a notebook giving most. minute details of our Eastern coast defenses. From then on it was like unraveling a piece of knitting when you've snatched the right tag of yarn. We discovered that the Germans had at least, one man in every ((nnrrnr 1-111 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 "I\ i4.4? jig 14\i11'- .ai4I aIIia11I,-, . J4)-An11t? I4)r114Y1 On IIiIII. "Il III4)1I 4?CrIaiI I Ic i, 114 )1! I.1'~ a I44 r!'4?i?IIN 14119"V nig111! 1)111 I4)u 114.111. 111 aI Juauila -ing?" DP86B00269R000500050101-9 -Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 EVENING POST I WAS AN AMERICAN SPY troop, battery and company in the pre- war Regular Army. They didn't need infernal machines and other favorite devices of fictional secret agents. Pliers to cut a control cable or a hand- ful of sand thrown into the mechanism of a big gun could immobilize it as effec- tively as a direct hit by a shell. Often as not, the Kaiser's boys turned out to be company cooks. Imagine what a cook, armed with nothing more deadly than a bar of soap, could do to an out- fit on the eve of battle. Even careless failure to rinse all the soap from the soup kettle can knock out an entire company with dysentery. I might mention in passing, as an- other example of our naive unprepared- ness for World War I, that inspection revealed that, due to recalibration, not one single big gun in the coast defenses of New York harbor could have been accurately fired at an enemy fleet for the first nine weeks. In one way or another, we got rid of all the German agents we uncovered. If, as in the case of Kuno, they were not naturalized and we caught them with incriminating documents, they were dishonorably discharged and in- terned for the duration at Ellis Island. After the war they were deported. But no German spy was hanged in the United States during World War I. Under the laws then in force, we would have had to nab them actually smash- ing a breechlock or handing secret pa- pers to someone in German uniform. A -number we knew to be enemy agents were so clever that we either couldn't even get enough admissible evidence to intern them or get it be- fore it was outlawed by the two-year statute of limitations. The Articles of War provide: "Except for desertion committed in time of war, or for mutiny or murder, no person subject to military law shall be liable to be tried or. pun- ished by a court-martial for any crime or offense committed more than two, years before the arraignment of such person. . . ... Treason, after two years, is exempt under military law. We had to shunt them to routine Army jobs where they couldn't pos- sibly cause harm. I regret to say that several have "honorably" completed their active service. They are now drawing retirement pay "equal to three quarters of the pay of their highest grade." All this because of the law- makers who failed to provide us with adequate safeguards against espionage before and during World War I, or with an adequate intelligence service staffed by trained officers, instead of leaving it in fumbling amateur hands like mine. Counterintelligence work kept me in this country throughout the war, in spite of every effort to get overseas. I was finally detailed as. G-2: of the 12th Division just before the war ended, but wound up in Washington instead, and was sent to Camp Dix as Camp Intel- ligence Officer. Then in June, 1920, I got confiden- tial orders from the War Department to proceed to Tokyo as assistant to the military attache. Officially, I had a four-year assignment to study the Japa- nese language. Shirttailed to the orders, however, was this significant passage: . . and to perform such other duties as may be assigned to you.,, I arrived in Tokyo in August with my running mate and lifelong friend, Maj. Edward: F. Witsell, now the Ad- jutant General, reporting to Lt. Col. Charles E. Burnett, our military attache. Another officer who was on the same transport with a similar detail to China was Maj. Joseph W. Stilwell, afterward the famous General "Vinegar Joe" of China and Burma fame. The morning after I moved into my Japanese-style house, a stocky Jap, enveloped in a suit of clothes straight out of vaudeville and with a dinky derby riding prim and high on his shaved pate, bowed and hissed on my doorstep. "Captain Mash-i-ba San," he said, "I are detective from Aoyama Poreece Station. I are come to welcoming you to new home. Japanese soldier are very foolish. Japanese soldier think must be loyal to Emperor. Japanese soldier think must fight for Emperor. Japa- nese soldier are very ignorant." (Continued on Page 126) Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Ap EVENING POST March 27,1948 (Continu.ed front Page 124) Speaking for myself, I know that I If I had fallen into this so-subtle trap wound up my first period of service in and had agreed with him or had made Japan penniless and in debt. But that's any remark which the witnesses shut- running too far ahead. tling with elaborate casualness back It was my habit to take daily walks and forth before my door could have through Tokyo. One day I stopped at twisted, the Imperial Government a bookseller's stall. My eye had been would have demanded my withdrawal attracted by a red book cover which on the. ground that I had insulted the showed an American flag being attacked Emperor. by dragonflies. Its title was Nichi Bei I shut the door and the incident in Moshi Tatakawaba-"If Japan and his face. It was not to be my last ex- America Fight." The author was Lieu- perience with Japanese police. Their tenant General Sato, of the Imperial military intelligence wasn't always that General Staff. I took it home and muttonheaded. For example, Colonel worked on it, turning the translation Burnett told me that the day my or- over to Colonel Burnett to forward to ders to report to him were mailed from the War Department. The virulence of Washington, and before they had the book was beyond the wildest invec- reached me, Maj. Hisao Watari, of tive of that part of the American press Japanese Intelligence, walked into his which relied on the "Yellow Peril" office and demanded, " Who is Captain for sensational stories. When I later Sidney Forrester Mashbir? Who is reported the existence of this ultra- Major Edward Fuller Witsell? Why nationalist group after the assassina- they are coming to Japan?" Beyond a tion of Premier Hara on November 12, doubt, whether by blackmail or cash, 1921, one indorsement on my official they had, to our peril, made some of report read, "This young officer has our own people their creatures. The been reading E. Phillips Oppenheim." Germans used Germans; the Japs, per- Another comment: "This young offi- force, used mercenaries. Here was the cer apparently fancies himself as an tip-off on an even more acute peril than international spy ! " the prewar German spy system. Alerted by Sato's book, I searched My primary duty was to learn Japa- further and discovered several vol- nese. More than once I've heard it umes written by other high Japanese said that no sane man can learn Japa- officials, including Lt. Gen. Baron Ta- nese and that no man can learn Japa- naka, Minister of War and reputed nese and remain sane. Somehow I author of the notorious Tanaka Me- passed my examinations in the spoken morial. I'll admit that I was shaken to idiom as well as the three types of bedrock. Here were blueprints for ideographic writing. The reader is wel- aggression drawn by the powers behind come to draw his own conclusions. the Japanese throne and implemented As I got the knack of conversational by the notorious Black Dragon Society. Japanese, I kept my ears open. On the Prominent among their schemes were streets, in trams, at the markets-. plans for air attack on the United everywhere I heard hatred of the States, outlines of what was later to be United States voiced. My superior, known as the Greater East Asia Co- Colonel Burnett, took my reports seri- Prosperity Sphere and dozens of other ously. Not so, the diplomatic gentle- harbingers of the Nipponese will to men of the embassy. They stayed in conquest. character. To hash a few metaphors, It was all succinctly epitomized in they preferred to see everything rosy, the doctrine of Hakko I-Chiu-"The as through a dark glass eye. We intel- eight corners of the world under one ligence attaches-crude fellows-must roof." Expanded, this meant that all have been subjects of superciliously Japanese, being gods, are superior to all amused chitchat over cocktails and other mortals, that the emperor is the teacups. greatest living god, and that all nations These "tea-drinking crystal gazers" must be brought under his benevolent by rights should have had the field to and enlightened rule. That was a clear- themselves. Congress allowed such nig- cut statement of enemy intentions. gardly appropriations for military and The day I gave my translation of naval intelligence that an officer either Baron Tanaka's book to Colonel Bur- had to have a private income or use up nett to be sent home in the diplomatic his savings to supplement his trifling pouch, I put in an appearance at one pay. The wonder is that there were of the regular Wednesday Afternoons at always officers and their wives willing the embassy. Our ambassador, Mr. to scrape down to the last cent in order Charles Beecher Warren, had no high pPov ' P k6IeU''266Nb8' 'T'~' CIA-RDF(?98 Yd2$91 0&b050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 THE SATURDAY (Continued from Page 126) opinion of intelligence activities, but he was a stickler for those Wednesday Afternoons. On entering the embassy, I found Mr. Warren standing before the great fireplace in conversation with Sir Charles Eliot and Monsieur Bassom- pierre, the British and Belgian ambas- sadors. Mr. Warren motioned to me and said, "Mashbir, I was just telling their excellencies here that no Japanese in a position of authority has ever made the statement that Japan desires a foothold on the mainland of Asia. Isn't that'so?" "I'd better go pay my respects to Mrs. Warren," I said. "Answer my question. Is that not so?" "No, sir, it isn't," I said. He flared up, " What do you mean by that, Mashbir?" "Mr. Warren," I said, "I have just translated a book called Sotei Tokuhon written by the Minister of War. It is required reading for every male Japa- nese inducted into the armed force. The opening sentence of the opening paragraph of the preface states, `In the event that we do not gain a foothold on the mainland of Asia and hold it at all costs, we shall die like a miniature garden deprived of moisture."' The ambassador was speechless as I excused myself to give my respects to his very gracious wife. In January, 1922, I had one of my finest breaks in the way of an intelli- gence mission. The Armament Limita- tion Conference, then in session at Wash- ington, was also taking up the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia, where they had formed part of the allied expedition against the Bol- sheviks. American, French and British contingents had pulled out almost two years before. The Japanese gave as their excuse for staying the massacre of their garrison at Nikolaevsk. They claimed that the deed had been done by Chinese bandits who were in the pay of the Reds. Our military intelligence smelled a large rat behind the wall of so-right- eous indignation which the Japanese had thrown up about the incident. Furthermore, Merkuleff, president of the pink Far Eastern Republic-a ram- shackle moderate-socialist affair, bol- stered by the Japanese, but by this time secretly leaning toward the So- viets-had got in a vodka-flavored mood of confidence with Macgowan, our consul in Vladivostok. He had hinted that he had documents proving the Nikolaevsk slaughter had actually been something special in the way of a hand- crocheted double cross. Then he had shut up tight and refused to say more. I was sent to Vladivostok to get to the bottom of the thing and, if possible, to obtain at least one of the documents. As the first Army officer to get a visa for Siberia since our forces had with- drawn, I expected-and got-a full share of secret-police surveillance. All the way from Tokyo I had the com- pany of a staring Japanese. He sat op- posite me in the railway coach, from which other passengers vanished as soon as they saw him. On the deck of the steamer he practically walked in lockstep with me. However, he couldn't have been shad- owing me. Said so himself. Several times he volunteered out of a clear sky, "I are not secret poreece. I are not following U. S. captain. I are simple Japanese business person." I had to paralyze his arm with a loaded riding crop when I caught the simple-business person trying to rifle my luggage. Otherwise the trip to Vladivostok was comparatively un- eventful. NEXT WEEK-Nimble footwork brings Colonel Mashbir through a succession of Jap traps. He undertakes a mission in Japan so secret that even G-2 doesn't know about it-and it puts him under surveillance as a suspected Japanese agent. Second of three articles from a book titled What is Intel- ligence, Anyway?, which Colonel Mashbir has writ. ten on his unique career as an intelligence officer. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 I Was an American Spy The ,Jays arraugc(I a sure-lire trap for tltc ' ants( scut to ferret ollt their sc(rcls iii Sih('I'ia. 1n(I Ihell he (liscoycre(I Ihat OIlt own (:-2 strongly sitsl-v('1('(I hint of beIifi, it Jal- agent! NTELLIGENCE work can he an unrelent- ing grind. But every once in a while you get, a dividend of high amusement to top off the accomplishment, of your mission. Not that you have any forewarning. I know that I expected :tuything but amusement when I left, Tokyo in Jan- uary, 1922, for Siberia, where the Japanese expe- dii,ionary force was sitting tight long after the other Allied units sent. there to check the Bolsheviks had withdrawn. I had been ordered to discover the truth about the massacre of the Japanese garrison at. Niko- laevsk, allegedly the deed of Red-inspired bandits. We had sensed that this Jap claim was spurious. I braced myself to face a very rough time from their intelligence agents. A three-ring circus was the farthest. Ching from my mind. At. Vladivostok, I was met. by Capt.. Louis C. Richardson, of the U.S.S. Albany, which was anchored in the harbor. He introduced me to Marine Capt. now Col.) James F. Moriarty, in- ielligence officer of Lhe Albany. "Mo" and I not. Only worked on t his mission together, we have re- mained the closest friends ever since. Meanwhile, the Japanese authorities in Vladivos- tok had put, their heads together and had cooked up a sure-tire recipe to get, rid of me, but, good. First, r;tep was a flowery but, urgent invitation to pay :t call on General Isamura, chief of staff of the Japanese expedit ionary force. This 1 dill immediately, but. not as they had ex- pected alone. To their chagrin, Moriarty ac- companied me. We were met by a Major Isobe, who ushered us into an anteroom and promptly disap- peared. The roe in was bare of furniture except for a table in I he corner. The table was heaped to a height of about two feet with rolled maps, all of which were stamped in Japanese characters, GoJ;cu Ilirnitzu, or what would correspond to our "Top Secret" classi- fication. The red stamping was arranged so that I could not fail to see it. In an undertone, I said to Moriarty, "Straight to the window." The window was on the opposite side of t he room. We stood there forty-five minutes, looking out, talk- ing went her and other trivialities, until Isobe, ill concealing his disappointment with politely hissed phrases, came to fetch its to the general. The watchers at various thin slots in the walls had expected us to grab up a few secret maps and conceal them on our persons. Thus, on leaving, we would have been arrested, dealt wit It as spies, and would have contributed a i'aiise rrtli,bre to thicken the Japanese smoke screen over Siberia. list cad we strolled in to see the general with all the anienit ies intact. The general was, to say the least, somewhat upset by the Failure of his plan. 'clue from Lhe crowning operation of Nlashbir's career. 1 fresh-eaurht ,lap prisoner is being put 1111?ough Lhe Hringer on Ilollandia. Painstaking iulelligeme crork sairvI eouulless knlel'lean tiles. The aulhor. ~shosi' duel of kits, Scotch, sake and secrets lath the .lap had a surprise finale. But, taken within his own frame, he was no fool. He could be shifty on his mental feet. After an involved lead-up, he announced that, as the Washington Con- ference would make us allies, we would surely want Lo know :uid report, to our Government the dis- position of Japanese divisions in Siberia. Therefore, he would sket ch us a little map, with details and designations on it. This he did, and handed the map to me, not bothering to veil the gleam of triumph in his eyes. He knew i htit Lhe stupid Americans were hemmed in. They couldn't refuse the map without, giving grave offense. " Mo" and I would have to take it, thank him, ,and then walk out to search and certain arrest. We ;issii meet ;in air of awe-st ruck diffidence, and I began saving, "Your excellency, we do not feel worthy. But HOW that you hive seen fit to bestow such confidence upon two lowly American officers, we humbly ask another small favor from the boun- teous store of your graciousness. We desire a me- inenlo which our children and our children's children can proudly display. In a word, Captain Moriarty and 1 shrill be grateful evermore when your ex- cellency and the renowned Major Isobe, who sits be- side you, favor its with your autographs upon the map, sett ing down in your own distinguished hands the date of this not-to-be-forgotten occasion." It. was in the purest, formal Japanese corn. As a samurai, (teneral Isamura had to abide by the code of his owra gaire. Possibly, he was secretly amused. In any event, i rapped by his own ground rules, the general shot his stale eyes at Isobe, picked up the brush again, flicking his signature and the (late on the map as did Major [sobe. " Mo" Moriarty and I solemnly Ii) lowed suit- We shook hands with Isamura and the gaping Isobe. and politely bowed ourselves out. We returned to Lhe Albany unmo- lested. But, as I was soon to learn, the assiduous Major Isohe had by no means tossed in the sponge. Presi- dent Mer' iletl of the Fair l';astern Republic. re- gretting his indiscreet hinting at, the machinations of the Japanese accupalion forces in Siberia, made himself about as easy to get, hold of in Vladivostok as soap in a Iuhful of hot; water. Major Isobe took the opposite tack. Wherever I went, he thrust. himself upon me. A droshky jaunt':' Major Isobe would draw up beside me in another droshky, ducking his head and pop- ping a mouthful of teeth at me. A cal'e? Isobe would table-hon to mine, teeth gleaming. If I took a stroll, guess who happened accidentally to be taking a const it.uI Tonal along the same avenue'.' The upshot of it was that. I accepted an invitation to dine at his billet. I had become so interested in the good aajor's devious ubiquity Ihat I agreed to appear alone, at six ((far, ii,, 1'd an Page 1_25) Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 ,~ 11. N N hat goes on o11'sta9e in our relations kith Russia is so paiit I'll IIN difl'eren I front is hit I happen,. on stage. 1a1-shall and Molotov are Ioasline each other a'* ? I I. - London debacle. near the Nnl'I tutu Ica nariau hordt'1' is ^ I:ut--bin" utttllet' !e -Not S 1 16 C C/ _1'i t Rtj ks F, cr 1Iv II 1 /\ O,'V 11XI1;1)IU'I- T We should nut wag' a ltreventIN( \val? a ;must the SOv iels, nor enlbral e the world state of the visionary if] lernatiunalists, the author stales. Father, he believes, we should snl-l-ort a IU'.w kind of Ainerit'ari balanr?e-of-jtom('r role. MERICANS are a materialistic people with a A washing-machine culture. We are fond of escape mechanisms, wishful 1 thinking and ivory towers. Some of us are cynics, but we often cloud our national aspirations with a wistful ro- manticism, and we always have possessed what Percy Bidwell has called "an underlying vein of idealism." No other nation, a British editor has written, is "more firmly on the side of the angels in the long run." This conflict. has produced n contradictorv and unstable political mind. The gyrations of 111N5 Atnet-- ican mind are plainly influencing the present de- bates in Congress on the Marshall Plan and are scaring the daylights out of our friends in Europe and Asia. The plain truth is these friends of ours don't know whether they can depend upon America. Let it, be said at once that we are more realistic than we used to be-most Americans now under- stand that we cannot change the horrid facts of international politics by turning inward upon our- selves. We are committed to the role of world power. Some of us welcome this, some of us are resigned to it., few of us understand it. A world role for the United States-yes, but what world role? Communism's appeal to the multitudes is as a blood-red banner streaming from the battlements of heaven. It promises the brotherhood of man. False though its promises are, we cannot counter t.hern beneath a simple standard of the status quo. Politics is the "art of the possible." This is a definition Hint ought to be emblazoned on every American's political consciousness. For in our thinking ahout international affairs we fend to leap too easily over the chasm of the impossible into the millennium. We fashion nice political theories which have nothing to do with reality. What. in the modern world does the "art of the possible" permit,? There are four principal courses, any one of which we might, in theory, follow. These are: (1) iso- lationism; (2) a world order by agreement, with international atomic and ether controls: (:3) a world order by conquest that is, imperialism and the waging of a deliberate preventive war against. Russia before she manufactures atonic bombs-- and '4) the middle road: I he maintenance and ut.i- lizat ion of our national power for international rehabilitation and world stability. The objective: A balance of power- 1. Isolationism. Isolationism cannot be titled into the "art of the possible." Isolationism is im- possible in the guided atomic-missile age. 'T'rans- oceanic planes and supersonic, stratospheric missiles with atomic warheads, biological agents, radioactive dusts and lethal new gases have destroyed our strategic insularity. Oceans, polar ice masses and other barriers are no longer ramparts of defense. Today the United States has "live" frontierst.he frontiers of the air. Isolationism today is simply re- tirement, into n fool's paradise and never-never land. redo get along--sontel inae,. "1'Iti. li usso- 1nu riean parley This n al ion, standing alone or with the rest of the Western Hemisphere ;at, its side, has such tremen- dous st.rengt h today that it could face with some assurance for a few years a Europe-and even an Asia :aligned beneath the standard of a single power. Hut it. in time, anticommunist. forces were scattered :nut broken; if, in lime, the potential of Europe and Asia was harnessed and developed to the Kremlin's ends, we should be threatened as never before in our history. Even if t his danger did not exist, it is certain t hat we cannot. serve the cause of Western civilization by shutting o,trselves tap in ear hemisphere. L` c :ire not sell'-sufficient ttraniutn, Inanganese and many of her essential raw materials come from foreign sources. Our prosperity depends upon the world; we need the world as the world needs us. Isolationism is not the answer. 2. A world order by agreement. The type of world order contempInted by many blueprint int.ernation- alists is not corrapatihle with the "art, of the pos- sible." Man's n-ind and man's emotions :tre riot yet adjusted to the elimination of national boundaries, to a cornnuan citizenship. Such a development seems to me to he psychologically impossible today. The deliberate reduction of national military strength to a position inferior to the strength possessed by some overruling world order has been shown to he politically impossible by our posh it experiences. This solution hogs the question of practical means Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 I WAS AN AMERICAN SPY o'clock sharp, one evening. I'd come to be rather fond of him in a back- handed sort of way. He meant so ill and worked so hard at it. I arrived ten minutes early. Through- out my career I've found that nothing is so disconcerting as to keep an ap- pointment before you are expected. So I rang the bell, whereupon there were sounds within as of rats scurrying in a wall. Finally, the worthy major him- self trotted to the door and ceremo- niously ushered me in. Obviously flus- tered he led me to the dining room. We took chairs on opposite sides of a mahogany table. It was covered with linen and had candles throwing blobs of snuff-colored shadow on a beautiful Japanese screen where ancient heroes stomped and grimaced, gods squatted, and female deities were stylized wraiths. No dishes had appeared or did appear. However, on the table were bottles of old Scotch whisky, Tan San water, and sake. Major Isobe's opening gambit was a rhapsody on the friendship between Japan and the United States, a friend- ship welded as steel by the Washington Conference, then closing. He proposed toasts to the illustrious leaders of our two peoples. It would be appropriate, he declared, for each of us to imbibe his own national drink. He would sip the relatively mild sake, I whisky. "No, major," I said. "I think, as allies, it would be more appropriate for us to alternate our national drinks-I drinking sake and you whisky, then swapping back and forth. That would be a real hands-across-the-Pacific eve- ning! " I poured him a generous four fingers of Scotch, and extended my glass, into which he automatically slopped sake. As he opened his mouth to make some belated objection, I quickly arose, say- ing, "His Imperial Majesty! Kampai!" (Bottoms up.) Of course, Isobe shot to his feet. Strangling manfully, he managed to view the ceiling through the bottom of his glass. As duty-bound, he proposed the health of President Harding. This time I drank Scotch, he sake. Instantly I proposed Her Imperial Majesty, we refilled, and his Scotch and my sake went bottoms up. Now, sake itself is a mild rice wine. But sake-and-Scotch sandwiches, rap- idly taken, have all the subtlety of an elephant on roller skates. Like the vast majority of the Japanese, Isobe had never learned to handle hard liquor. However, he was a soldier on a mis- sion. He remained on his feet through four quick pairs, but he was obviously slipping. He clutched at the table with both hands while an expresson of cun- ning idiocy puddled his now cherry-red face. We seated ourselves. He said, "Washington Conference have make us allies. We will have very entertain evening now." He gulped and leaned forward confidentially, blurting in what he conceived to be a whisper, "You know secrets?" "Oh, yes," I replied. "I know secrets," he said. "You will telling me American secret and I will telling you Japanese secret." "Fine," I said. "Go ahead and tell me one." "Oh, no, you telling me first." I became quite reluctant, asking for his word of honor as a samurai never to repeat to a living soul the hushed in- Approved For Releal?QQ(A~3TtFPP,8600269R000500050101-9 125 formation I was about to divulge, be- the odd wellspring from which Rus- ration, I adopted one of the best tech- cause it would most assuredly embar- sian logic flows like glue. niques-the "sneer technique." Seem- rass a highly placed personage. Captain Richardson, of the Albany, ingly I lost my red-headed temper. "I promise on honor of warrior an- was with me. Merkuleff produced a file "Very well," I said. "I don't want cestors," said Major Isobe. of documents from which he read in to discuss these so-called documents In a low tone, I said slowly, "I hear, excellent English at great length, with- further." major-I hear that your commanding out letting us inspect them. In general, Merkuleff bridled, "Why not?" general has been living with a Russian these purported to be translated state- "Because, your excellency, I'd have woman for six months." ments by Chinese bandits that they to say something that would offend Isobe gasped, then pitifully wailed, had been paid by the mikado's forces you. Let's drop the subject." "Oh, but I do not mean that kind of to massacre the Japanese Nikolaevsk "I demand " he shouted. secrets!" garrison. Merkuleff did not say how "No," I said acidly. "Your excel- "Hell, major," I said, "that's the the papers had been obtained. Obvi- lency has undoubtedly been acting in only kind of secrets I know." ously either bribery or torture-prob- good faith. Temporarily, I was also He didn't answer. His head had ably both-had been resorted to by his deceived. But I soon realized that dropped forward on the table. He was Cossack strong-arm men, you have been imposed upon and that snoring in a moist, whimpering sort of In my inexperience, I revealed my in- the documents you hold in your hand way, passed out cold. I looked at him terest and asked Merkuleff to let me are unquestionably forged. I would for a moment. Then I got up and take the documents with me. He re- not consider offering such fakes to walked around the corner of the hand- fused. I begged him to let Captain my Government. I believe you under- some Japanese screen and politely said Richardson and me at least look over stand me!" good night to the two astonished gentle- the file. He declined abruptly and He exploded. He raved and ranted men behind it, whose chagrin was be- loudly. He said that his word as a Rus- all over the place in Russian, English, yond description. Although I frequently sian ought to be sufficient guaranty of French, and-I think-longshoreman's saw Major Isobe later in Tokyo, the the authenticity of the documents. Turkish. To cut a long story, he wound word "Vladivostok" was never even Furiously he charged that I was im- up by offering first one, then several, mentioned. Oriental "face saving." pugning his honor. I did not know at and, as Captain Richardson and I in- At long last we got devious word that time that such is the Russian way differently declined them, the entire that President Merkuleff would see us of getting concessions they want. The batch of documents. If he'd had any secretly at a late hour one night. Why guy who yells the loudest wins. idea of remuneration for his evidence of his sudden change of heart, I'll never How long the thing might have Japanese duplicity in Siberia, he forgot know. I don't profess to understand lasted, I can't say. On a sudden inspi- it in his passion to prove that he was 0 MARRIAGE lC ENSES E "Something?" neither a dupe nor a liar. With a great show of reluctance, Captain Richardson and I permitted ourselves to be persuaded to examine and select key documents, no more than 1. could carry back to Tokyo con- cealed on my person. We maintained a bored attitude as we took our depar- ture, but there was nothing languid about our beeline to the Albany. We didn't relax until we were safe on good American deck plates. Then we must have laughed a good ten minutes. Some days later, after more fencing with Japanese intelligence agents on shipboard and along the rail route to Tokyo, I reported to the embassy and gave the documents and full details of the mission to Ambassador Warren and to his extremely able counselor of embassy, Hugh R. Wilson, afterward ambassador to Germany. A long cablegram was drafted to go to the State Department. Mr. Warren added: "I am not prepared to state that these facts are not correct." I mention this gobbledygook, not to reflect upon the memory of Mr. Warren, but to point out that his re- action was only typical of the non- career diplomat's attitude at that time. For that attitude tens of thousands of young Americans have paid with their life's blood, and in suffering, maimed bodies and nightmare memories. I am grieved to say that some persons in lofty positions and even in the armed services still do not seem to be con- vinced that intelligence is a profes- sion-is, in fact, an art, requiring a life- time of study, application and devo- tion over and above the call of cocktail parties and intimate little luncheons. It's beyond human understanding. To return to the Siberian affair- Hugh Wilson was upset over the am- bassador's footnote to the cablegram. He said to Colonel Burnett, "Charlie, send a cable to your people on the third floor"-the Intelligence Division was then on the third floor of the old State, War and Navy Building in Washington-" and tell them to walk around the corner and tell our people to disregard that last sentence." This was done, and it worked. After my return to the United States, I was told by Maj. Karl F. Baldwin-now a retired colonel-who had been detailed by the War Department as liaison offi- c n the Ja anese d 1 t' Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050T0' -9 p e ega on at the Approved For Release,, 0,~`(95J A ~j I PPG"@#P269R000500050101-9 Arai 3,19.1.8 126 Washington ference: pleased to have it turn out that way, for the time being. After I'd got my plan working, I could present a fait accompli to the top-drawer boys in Washington. The story would be dif- ferent then, or so I believed. However, one hurdle I balked at taking. I could get a leave of absence from the service, but knew it wouldn't do; the Japanese would suspect my real designs. Or I could resign out- right from the Army. Week after week I hesitated to do that. One day I was discussing it with Colonel Burnett. He pulled out of his desk drawer a copy of the National Defense Act of 1920, saying, "Here's your answer, Mash- bir." One section stated: "Former officers of the Regular Army and retired offi- cers may be reappointed to the active list, if found competent for active duty." It was the most cataclysmic earthquake of modern times. My firm was wiped out. And what was worse, from the standpoint of the M-Plan, the milita- rists made use of the earthquake sham- bles to tighten their grip on Japan. Many of the "advanced thinkers" upon whose good will I was counting were herded into bull pens and bay- oneted. They were blandly reported as quake victims. Fear made most of the survivors docile. Those who dared to show sparks of opposition were later used as shock troops in the campaigns against China. They were among the first casualties. Others were assassi- nated by army and Black Dragon So- ciety thugs. During the war, many were imprisoned and even tortured. Along with my red hair, I'd inherited Scotch stubbornness. I returned to the United States early in 1924, hoping to get American capital to finance my you, and depend on the loyalty and patriotism you have shown to see that this does not become public until after the war." Well, it's after the war now! If ever a man smacked into a dead end, I was that man. A few pen strokes had crossed out my excuse for being. It was the all-time low of my life. But despair and defeat aren't cherished seriously or long under a red thatch. Moreover, I had a family to support. So, at the age of thirty-two, dead broke, I had to make a new start in life. Friends grubstaked me. The minutiae of my subsequent business ventures, ranging from selling cash registers and some minor dabbling in the stock market to the founding of my present engineering-research firm, are more a hiatus than a central part of this narrative. "When Secretary Hughes read the cablegram nailing down the plot against Siberia to the main. group of Nippon's delegates, he, unfortunately, hadn't enough fingers to cover up all the names of the Japanese officers instru- mental in arranging the Nikolaevsk massacre. One name could easily , be read. As you remember, that officer was reported a suicide within forty-eight hours." Shortly thereafter, the Japanese withdrew from Siberia. The military caste lost a great deal of face. Their advance into the continent of Asia was set back by many years. I do not wish to be understood as claiming that my mission alone forced their withdrawal. But it probably played a part, and if so I'm pleased. One morning in June, 1921, Capt. Edward H. Watson, our naval attache in Tokyo, came to me and said, "I've been instructed by the Navy Depart- ment to find some way to get informa- tion out of Japan in time of war. Do you think you could draw up a plan?" I'd been waiting for such a request. Before leaving Washington, I'd had oral instructions in G-2. The officer ex- plained the impossibility of using non- Japanese as spies. Japanese natives themselves were under such thorough surveillance that they would be almost as useless for our purposes. "We're completely at a loss," he said. "During your four years in Japan we want you to give as much thought to this prob- lem as possible." It was never out of my conscious or subconscious mind. By the time Cap- tain Watson talked to me, I believed I was close to a solution. Main details of this M-Plan are still on the Secret List, and likely to remain there for some time. But I can say this much: It depended on establishing in Japan a number of commercial enterprises, apparently unrelated to one another. By a carefully thought-out psycho- logical plan-too lengthy to go into here-I had been able to get closer than most foreigners to topflight Japanese. I knew many of the "advanced think- ers" who opposed the conquest schemes of the military. I was also well ac- quainted among the great financial and industrial families who believed that Japan's destiny lay in co-opera- tion with the United States. Such statesmen as Prince Tokugawa and Viscount Inouye were my friends. I became a director of the Pan Pacific Association, the surviving members of which will form the only safe nucleus of a postwar Japanese democratic government. From a Japanese engineering firm I'd had an excellent offer to go into busi- ness. It flashed through my mind, Why not take it? It ought to pay enough money to permit me, personally, to get the M-Plan started. By using personal funds, I could eliminate the greatest dan- ger of our Government's being implicated if the Japs caught up to me. I was not so naive as to believe that Washington would go shouting mad with enthusiasm when it examined the M-Plan, but I didn't expect it would roll over and play dead. As Capt.- now Rear Admiral-Ellis M. Zacharias of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and author of the recent authoritative Secret Missions, put it, "Any plan was better than a total of no plans at all." Weeks passed after I had submitted the plan to Washington. It had evoked an epic unenthusiasm and a thunderous silence. Some dusty, remote file cabinet had swallowed it up. I was just as "Hell, son," Colonel Burnett said, "when the war breaks, Congress will promote you and cover you with medals." That settled it. I could resume my intelligence career officially, once I had the M-Plan going soundly. Yet the act of writing my resignation caused me the most terrific mental turmoil. I didn't even take my wife into my con- fidence as to what lay behind the resig- nation. Only Colonel Burnett, in Tokyo, and Commander Zacharias, Naval Intelligence, in Washington, knew. In April, 1923, now a civilian, I started work for the Japanese engi- neering firm. I had charge of importing American agricultural and indus- trial machinery such as tractors, high- pressure boilers, hydroelectrical equip- ment, coal-loading apparatus, and so on. By late summer the Japanese were placing increasing confidence in me. Unless the skies fall, I thought, I'll have the M-Plan operating in good ear- nest by the end of the year. The skies remained in place, but on the hot September first of 1923, the earthheaved and spewed beneath Japan. I'll pass over the years 1924-1937, saying only that I kept plugging for reinstatement in Regular Army Intelli- gence. In 1928 I served eight months on the General Staff as a Reserve In- telligence Officer. Then, in 1937, at the request of Commander Zacharias, with whom I had been constantly co-operating, and of Capt. William D. Puleston, the direc- tor of Naval Intelligence, I went on a short mission to Japan. The Office of Naval Intelligence had disinterred my M-Plan. I was asked to make an eleventh-hour reconnaissance to see if, perhaps, it still could be put into opera- tion. I insisted on going at my own expense to prevent discovery of a Gov- ernment tie-in. I discovered that it was much too late for the M-Plan. However, I did return with such conclusive evidence of Japan's aggressive intent against China and against us that only the deaf, dumb and blind could have ig- nored it. Washington's high policy makers ignored it with frantic enthu- siasm. I heard the first Pearl Harbor bulle- tin over the radio in my Washington home. I went from the dinner table to the phone and called several intelli- gence officers, offering to take anything anywhere. I wired the Secretary of War and offered my services in any capacity without pay for the dura- tion. A puzzling silence of weeks followed. Finally, on January 23, 1942, I was as- signed as a lieutenant colonel in charge of the Intelligence Branch of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. Early in 1942, Zacharias was made Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. He knew that I was anxious to go to the - Pacific, where my knowledge of the Japanese and their language ought to be useful. But orders to that theater were strangely tardy. Then Zacharias set certain wheels in motion. One day I saw the dossier on me. The file was half a foot high. Talk about the left hand neither knowing what the right is doing nor giving a damn- G-2 had not known that my Japanese visit in 1937 had been on a Naval In- telligence mission. By avoiding con- tact, as instructed, with our military and naval people, so as not to arouse Japanese suspicion, I had, weirdly enough, incurred the suspicion of our own side. Through the five years since the mission, I had been under close surveillance. I was strongly suspected of being a Japanese agent. M-Plan. To put it mildly, the attempt was a flat failure. The particulars are too involved, too dismal for inclusion here. I applied for reinstatement in the Regular Army under the previously mentioned terms of the National De- fense Act. Colonel Burnett, Gen. Frank McCoy, Ambassador Warren and others had written to the Adjutant General and to the Secretary of War, recommending my immediate return to intelligence duty in Tokyo. My orders were already drawn up when it was discovered that some six months before my resignation the Judge Advocate General had ruled out reappointment of former officers who had resigned. Incidentally, this was not printed in the law until 1926. Any- way, the decision went against me on the grounds that unless the real reason for my resignation were given, even one exception would establish a prece- dent. " If we give the real reason," the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs said to me, "we'll have international complications overnight. This time your country must desert NEXT WEEK: In the last ofthree.articles, Colonel Mashbir reveals how Allied intelligence extracted vital information from captured Japanese docu- ments and soldiers. He tells about the sheet of car- bon paper which led to the liquidation of a Jap force, and the faux pas which endangered the surrender conference. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved For Release 2003-1 k1 llac l rlhur" hcadcluarter,. (,metal Kailabe, Colonel llashbir (cenler) and General Vi illoughbF. l Was an American Spy 4v ( OI., .'11k'S IJ) F"..11 i.'+11IIIR, a tind tap,/1 11 1,i5 'I: 1,11 H-1, of one of 1114' must N iial intclli~encr operations of World \\,11- 11, the h,)\\ Ili;. IIliil 4r1)1IIH)'tl III,, 'kip", tol- 'eerets and cnahlc(I 11ac- \rthur's forces to carrv out their islau(I-hopping a(Ivances-to "Tokyo's dismay. N intelligence agent can never tell when his work may have some jolting backlash. I learned that afterPeart Harbor. Previously, in 19:3, Nava] Intelligence had sent ire on a confidential mission to Japan. At, he beginning of World War 11, when I applied for service in the Pacific, I found lint Army Intelligence just.:rbout had ire taped as a Japanese spY- I adrnif to unbridled rage. After all, in 19l(i I'd been all but, killed by what, amounted to a Jap goon squad in the Sonora desert. of Mexico. While I was an nitelligenceofficer in Japan, I'd reported Lime and Again the ultranationalists' plans for war on the United States and for the seizure of Fast Asia. And now, because I had done what an in telligerice opera- I ive should do keep his mouth shut., except to those who have assigned him - I was under a cloud. Fortunately, Calif. Ellis Zacharias, of Naval Intelligence, having discovered the G-2 blunder, simply invited an inspection of his secret tiles. The whole I hing was cleared up in no Lime. On Septem- her 28, 1942, after spending some six weeks working wit h Zacharias at. t he request of Admiral King, pre- paring a plan fora central intelligence agency, I left for Brisbane, Australia. I had been detailed to General MacArthur's headquarters as chief of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section of GHQ, under Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, his brilliant G-2. It was a small -less than forty men lint , polyglot unit., composed of Australian, Canadian and British army, air and navy men; Chinese, White Russians, East Indies Netherlanders and a handful of Amer- icans. As the ,var progressed, ATIS was to become preponderantly American. At the outset., however, we were a potpourri, not an organization. The prize was a Greek citizen in the Australian Army who spoke Japanese with it Russian accent. Soon after my arrival, we had our first captured Japanese documents. Clotted with blood and body fat, they had been taken in New Guinea and flown to Brisbane. Australian Lt. John Shelton read them aloud. ( )ur group made notes. They dealt, chiefly with a Japanese mountain-artillery regiment in the Owen Stanley Range. Two American officers jumped into a car and raced to General MacArthur's headquarters with the informal horn, just in time to catch hell. One of the other mien, an Australian, had telephoned it to his headquarters, which had at once rung up GHQ and passed on the data before the Americans could get in with it. I called together my unit heads. "Gentlemen," I said, "right now, let's make the Japs our Number One enemy, instead of their coming fourth-after i he three allied intelligence services." Then rid here we agreed to wipe out all inter- allied and irrl.erservice distinctions and prejudices. lnformat in gleaned from documents and prisoners was thenceforth communicated to all headquarters simultaneously. It was an interallied, interservice command thtrt really worked. A'I'IS was completely secret, until the Japanese surrender. It eventually expanded from its little nucleus to more than 3000 personnel, and partici- pated in every single operation in the PacificThea- ter. In the beginning, when the Japanese were push- ing ahead in New Guinea, we had few captured doc- uments, fewer prisoners. But as the .Japanese ad- vance turned into retreat, more of both began to trickle in. "Trickle" is the correct word.. Throughout the war the number of prisoners was amazingly small, and most of 1.hern were suffering either from wounds or starvation. At Guadalcanal 40,000 Japs were killed, Tait. only about 600 taken prisoner- Forty-three thousand (lead were counted in the Buna operation, yet we captured just 625 prisoners. This ratio remained constant, until just before the close of the Philippine campaign. I doubt it' in any war so few prisoners have been captured in proportion to the number of troops engaged and killed. The United Stales, in contrast, lost 85 per cent. as many prisoners as dead. The reason for this state of affairs was Japanese indoctrination. The soldier was taught that he ceased to exist. as a Japanese and as a spiritual entity if he gave himself up. Unwounded men sought death rather than capture. Captured Japanese invariably lied on first, interro- gation. The PW often gave an assumed name---fre- rluently that of his bitterest personal enemy. He readily gave information on the chap's particular outfit, although it might be his own unit. His chief concern wash t military security, but to protect his family from reprisals. We soon came to know that, even though given under an alias, most of the information was fairly accurate Sinre the Jat aiiese fb4htint rnna1 was un- der grim order to die by his own hand in preference to capture, his superiors couldn't very well school hint to avoid divulging information when captured. A scattering of prisoners-mostly navy men, more intelligent. than the run-of-the-mine army con- scripts would say nothing at first. I remember one obdurate Japanese who sported that rarity among his people, a full beard, of which lie was very proud. I had him brought into a room where a camera was suet, up and a barber's chair prepared. The barber waited with lather cup and razor. "Do you see that barber'?" the bearded Jai.) was asked. "Well, we are going to shave you and photo- graph you and have your picture published in Allied and neutral countries as one of the. first Japanese prisoners." After a moment of thought., he said, "Haki-tai !" which means, " I must vomit !" Promptly he did, then talked q~.nte freely. (Corrlirmed on P.r., l30) Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Approved build, with broad shoulders and a swarthy face. His eyes hold little encouragement for anyone wishing to push Jerzy around. It all started in September, 1939, when Hitler in- vaded Poland, and Jerzy was hurriedly drafted for the defense of Warsaw. He was just, seventeen. He had left school two years before and was working as n bellhop in the Hotel Polonia, where his father, Samuel, had spent, the better part of his life as it doorman. He was by no means a stationary char- 'refer, old Samuel Fordonsky; having fought, bravely with the Czar's armies in the first World War, lie landed in Shanghai, where he became a man of some importance in the Chinese police. He returned Lo Lodz, via the United States, with four Chinese medals, which he kept on a silk cushion in his living room, where Jerzy eyed them with envy, and de- cided to earn his own medals someday. By 1939, Samuel had already been pensioned off and was living in a small apartment near the Lodz railroad station with his second wife-Jerzy's mother having died when Jerzy was five months old. .Jerzy had been it soldier for exactly ten days when Poland tell. He was taken prisoner. "Your father's name is S. Fordonsky?" The German looked at his pupers. "S. for Stanislav'?" .Jerzy nodded. "It. saved my life right then and there," he ex- plains. "They released me, along with the other Polish soldiers. If they'd known I was a Jew, they would have sent me along to Auschwitz." And Jerzy had other plans. Hack in Lodz things were looking grim and getting grimmer by the hour. More than half of the city's /00,000 inhabitants were Jews, and the German conquerors were beginning to herd them into it ghetto. Jerzy, having holed in with non-Jewish ac- quaintances here and there without reporting his whereabouts to the police, took one look at: the large walled-oil' Jewish section and decided it was not, for ;ninr. He preferred the freedom of the hunted. He went. just once, to see that, his old father, his step- inot,her and his brother, who had obeyed the Ger- rnans and moved in, were all right. But even while he was visiting, the Germans sealed the exits, and .Jerzy had to climb back to freedom over the high wall, He checked in with a Catholic family he knew in one of the suburbs and took stock of the situation. " I watched the German progress in France and Scandinavia," he recalls, "and t figured it, would be a long war. You can't stay on here indefinitely, n _ llow is the fighting going in Palestine? Jerzy devours all available newspapers to find nut. '1'0 !Tire the lit Is a I h r i l l . Jerz.v fret It eI I II-, N% ears some of his medal bears of Ira_edv bill,' uol ,I:ona;*ed his spiriI. IIe Ollen eheens the young I)I',s NiIII a I i 1 4 - I % Led Iime solo on Iris harrn,urira. Jerzy,' I said to myself. 'Too many people know your face around this town, and the Germans will pick you up in the end."' Having heard I hat. large remnants of I he Polish ;rrrny had pushed across the border into (Czechoslovakia and Hungary, fie de- cided to join theta. One rainy morning in June, 19'0, having bade farewell to Iwo or three friends of he family, Jerry quietly slipped out of town. In the ancient city of Cracow, not far from the border, he called oil an ofd pal who had once been a policeman in Lodz. "The border is closed and guarded by the SS," he t old Jerzy. " Why don't you stay here? Cracow doesn't. even have a ghetto yet. V n:r re sai't here . . . aas tong as no one' knows that you're Jewish." .Jerzy Ibought it over and decided to take his ad- vice. "All I could think of', then, was how Lo survive. The Germans had caught are once, and I didn't want. them to catch inc again. I was afraid of them. I wanted to live." Jerzy went tot he Polish Hed Cress and told I Irern the hard-luck story of it released prisoner who had no family and was out of a job. The Red Cross, without asking too many quest ions, directed him to it small furnished room in an apartment which had once belonged to it Jewish f:trnily until the Gestapo emptied it, and Jerzy moved in. Jerzy couldn't took for it lob because of the con- stant danger of being found out.. The Gestapo was combing all Poland for lows, and they were using the line-tooth comb by now. He had no proper papers. He had no alibi for being at. large. But he had to eat., and there was only one answer to his intrnedi:rte proilern the black market. On C'racow's main square, chrisitned Adolf Ilitter I'lat.z by the Germans, Polish hues would buy whatever (;r'rm:rn soldiers could spare extra hisnkets, boots and watches curd sell I hem, in turn. such luxuries is it side of bacon, n Polish barn, a few eggs. "There was a fair living in this sort of thing, if you were smart. Jerzy felt relatively +:ife in it business where rteiltier seller nor buyer cou d :rlford to he inquisilive'. He became a si.early, t bough distinctly small lime operator on the Platz; and he went on, to this pre- carious fashion, for nearly two years, never revealing himself, and wary of making enemies or friends. l 4d r l,ruds .,ere r,;tl herirrc' rrvr-r his heart. AN Jerzy had to drr ":is look out the window :ind he could see which w:rv the wind was blownri;. The streel where he live was sealed off with harhed wire no%v; Lhe' Gestupo was using it is a collecting; point for Polish Jews. /:very night a new cargo of weary, ragged, slupelierl hninimity was pushed onto frocks to he carted off'. And every night, as Jerzy looked on in horror, i few would quietly collapse, having mirnaged Lo swallow poison. When would they come for hint? Hy late summer of It.)1'?, with I lie Germans logged down before Stalingrad, the dragnet. was applied with greater care than ever. 5S men took up po- sit ions it( I he st recI corners, spot -chocking people's documents. A decree was published ordering every Pole to apply fur it new ideality card, with his Foe- ture on it. Deeming it unwise to present himself to the nuthoril ies, Jerzy let the dead line go by, unde- cided, brooding. 'I'll( ! ..,r a;,, r,..,I ,to I'n_.? I :; ) Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 - I WAS A pro F?1@1JMX7 : C111ATI`D600(~P68Idfi0065i(~1,?1-9 '?""" anguage proved a terrible problem to t~"`'`~fr?"' ~'i, 28) us at first, but in the end a boon. The Japanese had to write down everything That is as close as ATIS ever came possible of misinterpretation. They de- to applying pressure to a prisoner. Yet pended to a pitiful degree upon the every one of the 14,000 we interrogated written word in all military operations. eventually told us what we wanted to We found that they seldom used the know. simple Kaisho for anything more im- The attitude of many of them was portant than formal operations orders, expressed by one Japanese sergeant, medical and intelligence reports, whereas member of a "special intelligence unit" at least 80 per cent of the documents set which operated in Filipino garb behind down in the obscure Sosho script had our lines in the Philippines with orders immediate tactical value. Apparently to assassinate MacArthur. "Defeat for the Japs had decided that Sosho con- Japanese is death. Thus, if living in stituted an almost unbreakable code, flesh after defeat, Japanese prisoner is as far as Anglo-Saxons were concerned. reborn to new life. We prisoners, hav- Every scrap of Japanese paper we ing been reborn as Americans, must regarded as a potential nugget. A sheet serve America with utter loyalty. Amer- of carbon paper salvaged from an icans do not understand this, and I do abandoned Jap position in New Guinea not understand why I am to be hanged had been used three times. This be- tomorrow for a crime committed in a came an intelligence classic. Subjected previous existence." to ultraviolet-ray scanning and other General MacArthur is one American techniques, the carbon betrayed: (1) who does understand, incidentally. The a hitherto unknown war-craft route be- wholesale success of his administration tween the Japanese bases of Kokopo of Japan, where the armchair experts and Salamaua; (2) The exact strength expected bedlam confounded, demon- of the Jap 66th Infantry Regiment; (3) strates his profound knowledge of the The amounts of quinine dosages being nuances of Japanese psychology, issued to troops in a certain jungle area. Before Pearl Harbor, t here were prob- The intelligence value of the first ably fewer than 100 Caucasians in all two items is obvious. However, it was the Allied forces reasonably expert in the routine medical notation that both spoken and written Japanese. proved to be of most dramatic and im- Written Japanese entails use of some mediate tactical importance. We al- 6000 borrowed Chinese ideographs. As ready knew the approximate number if that weren't enough, there are three of Japanese troops in the sector, and varieties of Japanese writing. Kaisho we had learned that about 30 per cent of is a relatively simple blocklike print- them were normally out of commission ing. Gyosho corresponds roughly to with malaria. But the carbon revealed handwritten script. Sosho can be de- such a heavy increase in issues of scribed only as a species of short- quinine that it was deduced that hand, refined to almost indecipherable malaria casualties had soared to at rudiments. least 80 per cent. days Jforathe ptalk is language, morass every- of men and supplies for an attack on this homonyms-words identical in sound, area, planning to launch it in about but with meanings poles apart. There three weeks. Now they decided to is some of this in English, to be sure- strike at once. This they did the mid- "pear," "pair" and "pare," for in- night following the discovery of the stance-but nothing to compare with sheet of carbon. The malaria-ridden Japanese. Take the sound "Ki," pro- Japs were cleaned out in short order, nounced "key." Depending upon the and the Allied timetable in that part ideograph used, Ki can mean tree, of the Pacific leaped three weeks ahead. vessel, river, undiluted, yellow, a sea- Another discarded scrap of paper, son, a warning, a warrior, strangeness, picked up at Gizarum, gave away the and a baker's dozen other things. daytime hide-outs of Jap supply nd On a street corner in Japan it is a troop barges along the Neuinea common sight to see two conversa- coast. Allied aircraft promptly blasted tionalists lost in the labyrinth of their them, sinking 300, with probable Jap- own speech. One breaks off talk to anese casualties of 12,000 to 15,000 explain what he has been saying by men, and none on our side. tracing with a forefinger in the palm (Continued on Page 132) Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Apps Ved For Releiage Q o3 TYeA lJ B00269R000500050101-9 ((: ,i, /6uu(l frouI Pag(' 130) Eventually, ATIS published 20,- 000,000 pages of information derived from the interrogation of prisoners and the examination of 2,000,000 enemy documents. All of it was evaluated, painstakingly correlated and then in- dexed and cross-indexed. On very short notice almost any fact or com- bination of facts about Japanese forces anywhere could be extracted from the files. For example, before the attack on New Britain, ATIS was ordered by General Willoughby to furnish data on Japanese strength on the Gazelle Pen- insula and at Rabaul. In twelve hours we delivered to GHQ a study, complete with maps, showing every gun posi- tion, pillbox, pig track and equipment part, every billet and the number and identification of its occupants, and even the telephone numbers. If needed, it would have been possible to give - d preju ages, birth marks, hobbies, foo dices and snoring habits of scores of the thing bore historic Japanese names. At Rabaul garrison. Toward the end of Wewak, for instance, they used names the war, GHQ literally knew more like Momo Yama-tomb of the Em- about Japanese military and naval peror Meiji-Tsushima-scene of a dispositions and strength in the Pacific great naval battle of the Russo- than did the Japs themselves. Japanese War-and Chusenji-a fa- Most of our tiny original ATIS group mous shrine. Capt.-later Maj.-George were competent linguists. But as the Caiger, Australian Army, had an in- work load became heavier, I had to spiration while laboring over these requisition additional men from the maps. He said, "I don't think these anese place names have been sp- Ja l h p oo s military-intelligence language sc in the United States. A very few were plied haphazardly. I'm convinced this expert. Some, found proficient in is a far cry from the sense of humor Japanese, were only so-so in English. that G. L's show when they call some Others, rating excellent in English, steaming, muddy hole `Times Square' had mediocre grasp of Japanese. It and a jungle trail `Broadway. fi 11 oncluded that the elab- c W e nay occurred to me that individuals in the groups might serve as mutual orate names were a tip-off that the crutches. Experimentally, we paired Japs had been ordered to hold these linguists. This technique proved emi- places to the death. If so, they might nently successful. Out of every two just as well die there of starvation as d of bullet wounds or shrapnel. This de- partial Allied linguists we obtame one team nearly the equal of an educated duction was submitted at once to GHQ- Japanese. General Willoughby concurred. It was A majority of our translators were one of the factors considered in the American Nisei. Had it not been for leapfrog jumps which thereafter char- the loyalty, bravery and ability of acterized General MacArthur's tactics. these Japanese-Americans, many phases Wewak was among the first Jap of intelligence work in the Pacific would strongpoints by-passed. Among their have fallen flat. I know that their sacred place names the Wewak troops faithful service to the United States sat and starved while our timetable d f r months ahead. Their saved many thousands of American jumpe ou lives and shortened the war by months- plight became so bitter that cannibal- It must be realized that this group of ism was rampant. At final surrender, men had more to lose than any others nearly 40,000 Japanese scarecrows at participating in the war. Had any of Wewak laid down their arms. I believe them been captured, their torture that thousands of Americans are alive would have been indescribable. To today only because-in spite of lifted each Nisei outfit reporting for duty, I eyebrows-General MacArthur de- said, "I won't lie to you. You're in as cided not to storm those symbolically difficult a position as Jews in Germany. renamed Wewak strongholds. The vast majority of you are volun- Understanding the unique quirks of teers. You know what war hysteria has the Japanese make-up was just as vital done to your families in the States. to success in another phase of intel- They have been put in concentration ligence -psychological warfare. Some camps, some with good reason, others Washington officials initially felt that simply because of race. Undoubtedly, techniques which had worked bril- liantl in the European Theater of are Y some of you are bitter. But you ood Americans. You have decided to g serve your country where you will be most useful, nevertheless. I give you my promise that, if I live, I will make every effort within my power to see that your achievements are recognized by the American public." Every word was taken to heart. Throughout the war, we never had to take any disciplinary measures where our Nisei were concerned. When the Nisei got into combat zones, they often were fired on by both sides. The Japs complicated this by infiltrating our lines with men garbed in American and Australian uniforms stripped off our dead. Finally we issued orders that every Nisei going to the front had to be accompanied by an American or Australian noncom or officer. None of them ever showed the white feather, although ATIS Nisei accom- panied assault units on every landing from Papua to the Philippines. More than 150 were finally given direct com- missions. The rest were promoted several grades. An exceptionally high percentage were decorated or cited for valor. Every now and then you get results in intelligence work by playing a hunch-not the race-track, spur-of- the-moment kind, but the poker type based on knowledge of your opponent's psychology. During the New Guinea campaign, ATIS was having trouble identifying scrambled place names on Japanese military maps. Sometimes the Japs used native names. Again, they would adopt designations from British maps or from old sketches made by Dutch missionaries. At other points we found arbitrary labels such as Hill A, Hill B, Hill C. Operations ought to come off as well against the Japs. Much effort against Japanese troops in the field was ini- tially directed toward arousing nos- talgia. Leaflets were dropped describ- ing the beauties of Japanese homelife and giving surrender as the prescription for a quick reunion with loved ones. I doubt like hell if any Jap gave up for this reason. By their code, the Jap who did surrender considered his fam- ily disgraced and himself dead as a Japanese, and forevermore banished from his homeland. However, con- structive criticism by ATIS was well received in Washington. By and large, the quality of psychological warfare improved remarkably. Under Gen. Bonner F. Fellers it became a precision weapon-but that is a story in itself. App{ oved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050101-9 Ridicule was one of our beet psy- chological weapons against the Jap- anese, I do not mean juvenile insults :end narne-calling, such as the Japs' classic shouts of. "To hell with Babe Ruth!" But, skillful needling could, uncl did, goad them out of bunkers and caves into suicidal Banzai charges where grenades and trench mortars failed. For the Philippines campaign, we broadcast i.o the Japs along this line: "'Can it, be that the Imperial Japanese Navy, whose bravery has never been questioned, is carrying its historic en- anity against, the army t.o such an ex- lent, that. it, is abandoning the soldiers to die like curs on the shores of foreign lands? " (quickly the Japanese filled the ether with counter-propaganda that the Philippines were now an integral part of the empire. 'T'herefore, Japanese soldiers giving their lives there would certainly not, be (lying on foreign shores. But other Jap broadcasts con- fusedly stated that the Japanese Meet, was inactive in the Philippines because it, was being utilized for protection of -apanese home waters. This gave its the perfect cue_ Our next. broadcast said, in effect, "In view of the fact that the Philippines are now >a part of the Japanese Empire, how can file Imperial Japanese Navy reconcile its statement of guarding the Japanese Empire with its abandonment of Nip- ponese soldiers in the Philippines? As part. of' the empire, the Philippines are part of the home waters of Japan ! " We couldn't. have wished for more perfect Liming. Damned if it, didn't, 1 he Japanese fleet, chose to be damned if it did. It. sallied forth to its destruc- tion at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The climax of my intelligence career came in two parts-one before and one Approved For Rele;it 2` 03/0,4/127''CIS-RDP18'6B00269R000500050101-9 during I he surrender. Ever since I had liver] among the ,Japanese 1 had puzzled over their seemingly autornat.ic disci- pline. They a re law-a biding, whether the law is civil or military, on a scale that. Occidental individualists simply can't. grasp. I tried to att.ribut.e it. to Em- peror worship, to Shinto indocl.rina- 1ion, to the thought police, inbreeding, t.radit.ion, and so on. No single factor or meshing of factors gave nme a satis- factory answer. I was also at. a loss t.o interpret, certain vague undertones in Japanese conversations and news- papers. During the war, the same mad- dening hints kept bobbing up in cap- tured documents. Then in March, 1945, A'1'IS had a windfall. Several apparently unrelated Japanese documents reached us simul- taneously. Taken together, they spelled out for the first. Lime the missing clue to Japanese psychology a spy-hostage system called Ilol,:o, which had secretly functioned in Japan for centuries. tinder its modern name of Tonuri (;umi or "Neighborhood Associations," it, had been successfully extended Lo con- quered parts of China and Manchuria, and was now proposed for application to the Filipinos. The system originated in China about, 1100 B.('., and was first intro- duced into Japan about, 700 A.D. by the Empress Gemrnyo. Very simply, it, made every member of every family re- sponsible for any offense commil.ted by any other member. A special family representative "acceptable to the po- lice" was appointed to report. to the authorities. That was only the beginning. Every Len families formed a Ili. They, in turn, selected a responsible representative. Ten If, became a Ko, with its own rep- resentative. Every ten Ko formed a Ho, with its representative. The local Trouble-Free for n LifeTime From the day you lay ORANGEBURG PIPE, its time-defying material resists cracks, breaks, corrosion. TAPERWELne= Couplings hold fast, repel roots, prevent leaks. That's why Orangeburg non-perforated lasts a lifetime for House-to-Sewer, Septic Tank, Conductor or Irrigation Lines. For Septic Tank Beds, Foun- dation Drains, Land Drainage, use the perforated type. 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