COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD

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CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
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RIFPUB
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S
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569
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December 19, 2016
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April 12, 2006
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1
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Publication Date: 
January 1, 1953
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R?-P86B00269R0O 800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD IR-6165 January 1953 OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH Department of State Approved For Release 2'007/ 9_,,_ - Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.1 IR-6165.2 IR-6165.3 IR-6165.4 IR-6165.5 IR-6165.6 IR-6165.7 IR-6165.8 IR-6165.9 IR-6165.10 IR-6165.11 IR-6165.12 IR-6165.13 IR-6165.14 IR-6165.15 IR-6165.16 IR-6165.17 IR-6165.18 IR-6165.19 IR-6165.20 IR-6165.21 IR-6165.22 IR-6165.23 IR-6165.24 IR-6165.25 IR-6165.26 IR-6165.27 IR-6165.28 IR-6165.29 IR-6165.30 BURMA INDOCHINA INDONESIA MALAYA THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS THAILAND JAPAN ALGERIA EGYPT GREECE INDIA IRAN IRAQ ISRAEL MOROCCO PAKISTAN SYRIA - LEBANON TUNISIA FRANCE THE NETHERLANDS ICELAND ITALY SOUTH AFRICA SPAIN THE UNITED KINGDOM WEST GERMANY ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE GUATEMALA Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.1 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BURMA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . I ? Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 3 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 1. I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ? 5 II. Electoral Strength ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? - ? . . ? ? ? ? ? 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 9 V. Communist Influence in Labor . ... .. 9 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . 10 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . .,. . . . . 13 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 13 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . . ? 14 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 19 XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . .. . . 20 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . 21 SECRET -? SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific. "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 COMMUNISM IN BURMA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES 1. OBJECTIVES The Communists in Burma are at present pursuing a two-pronged, \and not completely consistent, policy. The illegal Communist under- ground) is continuing the insurrection which began in 1948, and seems at present to be concentrating on maintaining and consolidating its control over "base areas,' while training and strengthening guerrilla units for future action. Efforts are also being made to develop effective alliances with other insurgent groups such as the White Band element of the People's Volunteer Organization and tha Karen National Defense Organization. At the same time, the above-ground, Communist-dominated Burma Workers and Peasants Party (B`JYPP), which is recognized by the govern- ment as a legal opposition group, seems most concerned with its own internal organization and with programs designed to develop popular support for the Party. The BWPP is agitating for an end to insurgency through formation of a coalition government including opposition elements. Communist efforts to recruit support within the Overseas Chinese Community are spearheaded by the China Democratic League (CDL). Vithin the framework of these general objectives, the Communist parties seek a number of immediate goals. Domestically, current efforts are concentrated on: 1, combating the growth of anti-Communist sentiment among the over- seas Chinese; 2. penetrating Buddhist organizations; 3. increasing the membership of "mass organizations," which have thus far been relatively small in Burma; and 4. undermining the political position of the government and the Socialist Party which is its dominant element. Internationally, the chief immediate goal is to prevent a shift in official Burmese foreign policy toward the West and the US in particular. . References in this section to insurgent activity refer principally to action by the Burma Communist Party (BCP). Other Communist underground groups include: (1) the Communist Party (Burma) -- CP(B) -- which is a relatively small splinter group, and (2) a band of China-trained guerrillas under leadership of the Kachin renegade Naw Seng, which does not appear to be in contact with the BCP. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 There is, to some extent, a conflict between the policy of preparation for eventual overthrow'of the government and "legal" efforts to establish a broad popular base and to create pressures leading to a coalition government. The GUB is unlikely to be respon- sive to demands for a coalition as long as armed insurrection continues to threaten the political and economic stability of the nation, despite its apparent acquiescence in a rather artificial distinction between BCP insurgency and BWPP legal action. At the present time, overall Communist strategy seems to favor the "legal" efforts of the UWPP. II. TACTICS Current tactics include attempts to establish collaborative arrangements with other political groups and attempts to win direct following, for the party or its fronts, from diverse elements within the Burman and minority populations. The strength of the Communist appeal rests in the coincidence of certain aspects of current Communist policy with general Burmese fears and aspirations -- neutralist, anti- colonialist, and "peace" sentiments. The basically Marxist orientation of most present-day Burmese leaders, and the lingering sense of attach- ment to the homeland among the Chinese community also favor Communist efforts. Special appeals are.directed to identifiable groups within the population -- particularly youth and students and, most recently, the Buddhist leaders. There are some reports that Communist propagandists, perhaps aided by Chinese specialists, are attempting to subvert the minority peoples along the Sino-Burma border. The BWPP's small delegation in the Chamber of Deputies is important primarily as a focal point for expression of what are basically extra-parliamentary political pressures. Popular organiza- tions controlled by the BVPP or its labor wing, the Burma Trade Union Congress, are utilized to create the impression of popular demand for policies favored by the Party. In addition to opposing the specific actions or presumed intentions of the Government, political pressures. have been used in an attempt to destroy public confidence in the competence of the present Government. In planning its program, the E PP seems to be responsive to direction from the Chinese Embassy, through which it apparently receives some financial support. At the same time, guerrilla activity is continuing among under- ground groups. Although the BCP forces have increasingly been broken up into small. groups by Government military pressure, marauding bands still render large areas of the country insecure. Present insurgent military operations seem designed primarily to secure supplies and manpower, and to keep government forces off balance. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET .. SECURITY INFORMATION The BCP is capable of continuing its present level of guerrilla- type insurgency, thereby preventing the consolidation of government control over all Burma and retarding economic recovery and development. The BiVPP appears to have sufficient leadership, and an adequately dis- ciplined organization, to continue its agitational and penetration tactics, designed to maintain political pressure on the government and retard its slowly emerging trend toward a closer relationship with the West. The prospects for future Communist action will be determined largely by developments outside Burma, particularly decisions concerning broader Asian strategy. In the event of direct invasion or a greatly magnified program of direct aid to insurgent groups, the stability of the GUB would be seriously threatened. The Government might, in the absence of immediate and effective help from the West, seek accommoda- tion with Asian Communism, and it is relatively certain that the prestige and power of local Communist elements would be rapidly magnified. In the absence of external intervention, however, the Government will probably continue to make progress in its efforts to suppress the insurgents and may, as larger areas of the' country are secured, be emboldened to take more restrictive measures against "legal" Communist elements. In that event, the BNPP, which now appears to be the chief instrument of international Communist policy in Burma, might find its access to propaganda outlets circumscribed and its ability to manipulate front groups curtailed before its present organizational efforts have born fruit. In the absence of actual or imminently threatened invasion, or of unforeseen internal economic disorders, it seems unlikely that the parliamentary position of the BWPP will improve significantly or that its mass base will grow materially. The capacity of Burmese Communist groups to support Soviet policy will, therefore, depend directly on Soviet (or Chinese) action. The 1948 insurrection by the BCP has thus far failed in its primary aim of overthrowing the government and, balanced against an improving government position, its future is even less promising. Were it not for the ever-present threat that the Burmese future will be over- whelmed by events beyond its borders, it might be predicted that the Communist conspiracy would continue to wither, although at an agonizingly slow rate. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 4 - COMMUNISM-IN BURMA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH An assessment of Communist strength in Burma must include both the illegal insurgent movement and above-ground Communist elements. Available data are insufficient to permit a definitive statement of total numerical strength. The Burma Communist Party (BCP) is the most important element of the underground movement. Its membership is estimated to be about 5,000. A small splinter group, the Communist Party (Burma) -- CP(B) -- was estimated in 1951 to have about 300 members and candi- dates. The CP(B) split from the BCP in 1946 as a result of personal differences within the Communist leadership. The two groups, however, reportedly concluded an agreement for at least limited military cooperation in August 1952. The principal above-ground group now appears to be the Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BVPP), which was formed in December 1950 by a group of dissident Socialists.. The party membership is unknown, but it has become increasingly well disciplined and energetic, taking effective leadership of Communist-dominated "front groups." The most significant of the latter are: (1) the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC) with a present estimated membership of about 2,000; (2) the All- Burma Peasants Organization (ABPO), which claims a membership of 100,000, probably with considerable exaggeration; (3) the World Peace Congress (Burma) with a small but vocal membership; and (4) the People's Youth Organization (PYO), which was founded only in December 1952 but which has considerable potential importance. Communist organizations within the Overseas Chinese community are dominated by the China Democratio League (CDL), the nearest equivalent of a Chinese Communist Party. The League's membership is unknown. Although the membership of Communist organizations therefore seems relatively small, the number of individuals who are subject to Communist influence and pressure is probably significantly higher, partly because of widespread receptivity in Burma to a number of aspects of current Communist propaganda efforts. The number who are "strongly influenced" by Communist elements should probably include most of the membership of the non-Communist Trade Union Congress (Burma), and the membership of the People's Peace Front (PPF) and Mahabama parties, which collaborate with the BXPP. The Chinese population as a whole remains vulnerable to Communist pressure, but since 1950 vigorous efforts by non-Communist Chinese elements have probably reduced the number who are strongly influenced. Rural populations are exposed to Communist propaganda and organizational effort for short periods in the course of guerrilla operations. Although no adequate figures are SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 5 - available, it seems likely that 5 percent of the total Burmese population may be controlled or strongly influenced by Communist elements. Geographically, Communist strength is heavily concentrated in Rangoon and the southern towns of Burma (the BWPP and CDL groups) and in insurgent pockets in central and northern Burma (BCP). The main sources of Burmese Communist recruits appear to have been students and youth, intellectuals, and peasants; urban labor has thus far been less significant. Among the resident Chinese, the leadership is predominantly middle class in origin; laboring classes provide the bulk of membership; and a number of businessmen appear to be passive sympathizers. Comparatively little is known concerning the quality and reliability of the Communist membership or of its leaders. Although the guerrilla groups undoubtedly include some elements whose principal motivation is organized banditry, the leadership appears to possess firm political resolve and to be in effective control of its following. The surrender rate among insurgent groups has remained relatively low despite mounting government military pressure. Most of the leadership has belonged to Marxist, if not Communist, organizations for a period of five to ten years. The above-ground BWPP has recently been reorganized and "puri- fied" in a move which has apparently strengthened its internal homogeneity and removed elements of doubtful reliability. Although it is probable that the total membership has declined somewhat since mid-1951, it seems likely that the strength and dependability of the party has increased, and that it will continue to exercise effective leadership of above-ground pro-Communist groups. The leadership of the China Democratic League is relatively more experienced and many of its important leaders have been trained in China. The membership of the League inoreased"markedly between 1946 and 1950; in the last two years, however, its total strength has remained relatively stable and may have declined somewhat. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Since the underground Communist parties are outlawed, Communist voting power is reflected only in the votes received by candidates of the B41PP and the parties which support it -- chiefly the People's Peace Front and the Mahabama. The parliamentary strength of these groups in the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1951, related to the representation of other parties, is as follows, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 6 - Party Number of seats BiIPP 9 PPF 3 Mahabama 1 Other opposition groups 27 The Government Coalition# including the Socialist Party 196 The moat recent test of Communist electoral strength occurred in the Rangoon municipal. elections of February 20, 1952. The three opposition parties listed above ran joint candidates, under the banner of the Triple Alliance. The coalition won only one seat out of 35, in contrast with a representation of 15 seats for comparable parties in the Council elected in 1949. However, these figures do not reflect BXPP strength adequately, for Triple Alliance candidates are reported to have received almost half the total vote given to candidates of the governing coalition (the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League). Nevertheless, the drastic decline in Council seats is significant because of the predominant role of Rangoon in national life. Although the B1RPP and its affiliated groups are currently agitating for a coalition government including the Communists, there is no evidence of specific planning for future. elections. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Communist insurrection in Burma, coupled with Karen insurgency and the depredations of non-political bandit gangs, has effectively and seriously retarded Burmese recovery from wartime devastation. It is a continuing, though somewhat diminishing? threat to the integrity of the state. The insurgency is exploited by above- ground Communist elements in their attacks on the government. Of the various insurgent elements, the Burma Communist Party (BCP) has been and remains the most significant. The party controls as many as 8,000 guerrillas, which are now organized in small bands. There have been no recent report of concentrations of more than 300 in a single group. The BCP is reported to have succeeded recently in establishing a coalition with two other underground elements: (1) the Communist Party (Burma), with an estimated strength of 1,000; and (2) some elements of the White Band People's Volunteer Organization -- total PVO strength is estimated at 3,000, but the effective strength of collaborating groups is unknown. A potentially important group, which is now apparently independent of the BCP, is a force of Kachin-Burman-Chinese guerrillas, estimated at 1,500, under the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 7 - leadership of the renegade Naw geng. Naw Seng's two battalions have been trained in China, and may represent the beat disciplined and most thoroughly indoctrinated insurgent group. All insurgent groups appear to be currently concentrating on strengthening their control of limited, relatively inaccessible "base areas." BCP groups have been pushed back within the past year by government military operations; their current strength is located chiefly in central Burma south of Mandalay, in northern Burma, and in the western region stretching toward the Chin Hills. CP(B) groups are located primarily in the Irrawaddy delta and westward toward the Arakan. Naw Seng's force is reported to be in the Bhamo area in northern Burma. No significant military operations have been undertaken recently by-the insurgent groups except the BCP, and these have been confined to hit-and-run raids against government outposts, attacks on trans- portation and communications lines, and harassment of villages which are inadequately protected. Troops not so engaged are concerned primarily with protecting Communist-held areas from government forces, but in case of attack, the Communists prefer to withdraw rather than fight as long as it is possible to remove supplies and equipment. Little has been learned concerning the administrative apparatus established by BCP groups in areas which they control. Although the party claims to govern local areas -- appointing officials, directing education, and controlling marketing -- it is doubtful whether any permanent administrative apparatus has been established.. Above- ground Communist groups are primarily responsible for propaganda activity, but the BCP has undoubtedly carried on some propaganda work in connection with local recruiting efforts. The degree of popular support which Communist guerrillas have received seems to be a function of the military force which they can apply in any area. For the most part, the rural population appears to be passive, reacting to preponderant military pressure and aiding guerrillas only when coercion is present or threatened. The guerrilla groups live off the country, and no central supply organization is known to exist. Even though the several groups are relatively independent, there is some intercommunication (including radio), and Communist intelligence concerning government operations appears to have been generally good. The BCP leadership has made persistent efforts to secure effective working arrangements with other insurgent groups. In August 1952, an agreement was reportedly reached with representatives Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - s - of the Communist Party (Burma) and some White Band elements of the People's Volunteer Organization, providing for collaboration and demarcation of respective areas of activity. Because of past personal antagonisms among leaders of the various groups, the realization of a working arrangement would appear to reflect desperation born of declining strength, or perhaps a BCP effort to qualify for more extensive Chinese assistance by providing evidence of effective leader- ship of all guerrilla elements. External assistance (from China) to the Communist guerrillas has. thus far been sporadic and at a relatively low level. Some BCP cadres are reported to have received training in Yunnan. Naw Seng's guerrilla units have been trained in China, and may pose a more significant long-term threat to the government by establishing a protected base area in a remote region of northern Burma. There are no reliable reports of significant amounts of arms being furnished to Burmese guerrillas from China. In its efforts to suppress the Communist insurgency, the Burma Government has been handicapped by the necessity of simultaneously containing Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, attempting to subdue Karen rebels, and suppressing'Moslem dissidents in the Arakan. Total government strength of about 60,000, including the Union Military Police, is heavily taxed by its varied responsibilities, and the forces available for anti-Communist efforts fluctuates from time to time, in accordance with demands created by the actions of other dissident groups. Key posts are manned; mobile reserves are maintained at central locations; and from time to time offensive actions are taken against isolated pockets of resistance. In the absence of stepped-up external assistance, the future capabilities of the Communist insurgents are not likely to improve. Although the guerrilla forces have been able to maintain their strength for some time, no significant expansion has taken place. It is not clear whether manpower or arms shortages represent the chief limitation. On balance, the government position has improved within the past year; perhaps the most significant development has been the increasing fragmentation of guerrilla forces and the restoration of agricultural production in some areas of the Irrawaddy delta which have been cleared on insurgents. In addition to weakening the resource base of the Communists, this development will, in the long run, contribute to the strength and stability of the government. So far as is known, the above-ground BWPP has organized no paramilitary units, and has no plans for participation in violent action. In order to keep its present legal status, the party must at least preserve the appearance of being no more than an opposition political party. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 9 - IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM Present government policy draws a somewhat artificial distinction between political pressure and insurgency which, in turn, has led to the development of the two arms of the Communist movement in Burma. The insurrectionary Communist parties -- BCP and CP(B) -- have been outlawed by the Government, and exist only as underground movements. The BWPP, however, is a legal, political party, has a small parlia- mentary representation (9 seats out of 232) and is relatively unob- structed in its manipulation of front groups. (Exception: the government has occasionally denied passports to proposed delegates to international Communist meetings.) Because of official reluctance to prevent distribution of literature which is not openly seditious, Communist propagandists havesecured important outlets for dissemination of printed propa- ganda, taking advantage of an existing market for any literature which is interpreted as shedding light on "experiments in socialism." Recently, however the Home Minister issued a strong warning to publicists who spread false information, advocate armed uprising, or undermine the security of the state. Within the Chinese community, the CDL and other Communist fronts have been permitted considerable political freedom of action in Burma, owing to the Burma Government's neutralist foreignpolicy, its desire not to antagonize Communist China, and to the fact that Peiping has not encouraged the Burma Chinese to indulge in overt agitation against the Burma Government. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist political activity is limited by the Burmese constitutional provisions that only Burmese nationals may vote and by the exclusion of a large proportion of the Chinese from Burmese citizenship. During 1951-52, the increasingly vitriolic anti-Western tone of local Chinese Communist propaganda, which the Burma government deemed injurious to Burma's neutral position, and the affiliation of pro- Communist Chinese with Burmese extreme leftist opposition elements, led to the government's tacit encouragement of anti-Communist elements in the Chinese community. It is expected that the government will continue its present policy of sharply scrutinizing, though not severely restricting, local Chinese Communist political activities, and of tacitly encouraging the anti-Communist Chinese. There is. relatively little organized labor in Burma; total union membership is probably less than 70,000. The Socialist- controlled Trade Union Congress (Burma) -- TUC(B) -- split in Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION December 1950 when the BWPP,wah organized; the dissident union leaders formed the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC), which is now Communist- controlled. The most important affiliates of the BTUC are the All-Burma Ministerial Services Union (ABMSU), which is small but vital because its members staff government offices, and the Chauk Oilfields Workers Front. Total BTUC membership was estimated in mid-1952 at less than 2,000. The percentage of Communists to non-Communists within the BTUC unions is unknown; the leadership is Communist, however, and .appears to be in effective control. In addition to the BTUC, there are at least a dozen Chinese labor unions, most of them small and concentrated in Rangoon; all except the Carpenters Union are Communist-controlled. The Most important are those which deal with food marketing and handling,. the Teachers Union, and the Stevedores Union. Apart from Communist-controlled unions, there is probably some surviving Communist influence in most of the unions affiliated with the Socialist-led TUC(B). Since the 1950 split, the struggle for control between BTUC and TUC(B) leaders has been particularly strong in the Inland Water Transport Workers Union and its five subsidiary groups. Although the leadership now supports the'TUC'(B), Communist influence may still be prevalent in some locals. The Communist-controlled BTUC has been affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) since July 1951. The status of the TUC(B) in relation to WFTU is at present unclear. Prior to the 1950 split which led to formation of the BTUC, the parent organization had been affiliated.: A 1951 May Day resolution expressed interest in continued membership, but TUC(B) leaders have since stated that the group is not presently affiliated. It is certain that the TUC(B) has not been active in WFTU affairs. VI. CONQUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, A T ONS The most active Communist front organizations are in the fields of youth and student activities, international "friendship" societies and the Communist "peace movement," and among the Overseas Chinese. The following groups merit special mention: 1. Youth: There are two underground youth organizations, the Communist Youth League and the Democratic Peopls's Youth League, which are probably small but under effective BCP. control. The B4i'PP sponsored no distinct youth organization until December 1952, when the People's SECRET - SECURITY.INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Youth Organization (PYO) was founded. Although at present, in the formative stage, the PYO may become the focal point for Communist activity among youth and students. The only non-Communist youth organization, the Burma Youth League, is non-political and relatively insignificant. 2. Students: The All-Burma Students Federation (ABSF) and the All-Rangoon Students Union are believed to be Communist-controlled. The ABSF is probably affiliated with the International Union of Students. The only competing organization is the Rangoon University Students Union (RUSU) which has experienced a continual struggle for control between Communist and non-Communist elements. The most recent elections for union officers reflect some persisting. Communist influence. 3. The World Peace Council: The Burma Branch of the World Peace Council -- WFC(B) -- Is probably one of the most significant "front" groups although its active membership is believed to be relatively small. Branches of the parent organization have been established in a number of towns, and the group may be the most effective instrument for dissemination of Communist propaganda outside of Rangoon. The Council is controlled by the BWPP; its Secretary General, Ba Nyein, is a member of the BoIPP.Executive Committee and is considered the party's "leading thinker." 4. Chinese Organizations: A number of organizations within the Overseas Chinese commun are ommunist-controlled or at least pro- Peiping. Next to the China Democratic League, the most important Chinese group is the Chamber of Commerce. Its leadership is pre- dominantly pro-Peiping, although control is being vigorously contested by anti-Communist elements within the Chamber. The Hui-an Young Men's Association, the Chinese Youth Society, and the Chinese Students Union attempt to spread Communist influence among youth and students; the first two are outstanding among all Chinese youth organizations. Of the several regional Chinese societies, the Fukienese Association is the only one which is considered to be Communist-dominated. Other Communist-controlled Chinese organizations include: the Chinese Women's Association, the Women's Welfare Workers Society, the Burma Chinese Relief Association, and the Burma Chinese Cultural Union. 5. Women: The All-Burma Women's Freedom League, formed by the BWPP in January 1951, is the most active of three legal women's organizations in Burma. A smaller group, the All-Burma Women's Union, is controlled by the BCP and has been underground since 1947. 6. Friendship Societies: The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society.. and the Burma-Soviet Cultural Association are small but significant SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION groups, because membership is drawn largely from educated and therefore relatively influential classes. The former is now composed exclusively of Burmese, and is devoted to promoting interest in China and preserving "traditional ties of friendship." The latter was formed with tacit approval of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, but appears to be operated by Burmese, including some non-Communists, who are. interested in Soviet culture. 7. Minorities= Apart from the numerous Chinese organizations, the principal m nority groups controlled by Communists or Communist- sympathizers are the All-Burma Indian Youth League and the All-Burma Indian Congress. Communist penetration of the Indian minority has been largely limited to laborers, some of whom are also represented in Communist-dominated unions. Organizational efforts appear to be directed at present toward enlarging Communist-controlled units within important organizations and securing mass support for the propaganda appeals of above-ground Communist groups. Most politically conscious Burmese support some policies which are currently advocated by local communists: eg., resolution of the problem posed by the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, some aspects of the "peace" campaign, and anti-colonialism. It has not been possible to determine the extent to which advocacy of such programs by non-Communist Burmese represents oonsoious support of particular Communist policies. Quite clearly, however, Communist influence extends beyond those organizations which are controlled. or strongly influenced by Communists. SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 13 - VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Direct Communist infiltration of the Burma Government appears to have been slight. So far as is known, no Communists are represented in policy-making bodies or in top levels of the military and police organ- izations. Although there are probably some Communists or Communist- sympathizers on the staffs of the several government departments, there is no evidence that they have had a direct impact on policies and pro- grams of the government. Nevertheless, it may be well to point out that, indirectly at least, Communist "influence" is present within the government'at almost all levels. The most important Communist asset is the strength of Com- munist China; fear of antagonizing the powerful neighbor to the north has been directly responsible for the government's rigid verbal adherence to a neutral foreign policy. Secondly, most government officials subscribe to Marxist views in fields such as economic organization, and their background has stimulated an interest in "socialist experiments" in other parts of the world. Many are known to read Soviet and Chinese. literature. This indirect influence is stronger with some individuals than others. The present Minister of Land Nationalization, Thakin Tin, for example, holds extreme leftist views on nationalization and collectivization, although he is not known to be a Communist. In general, there is far more interest in the Chinese "experiment" than in the Soviet Union, and it is doubtful whether such interest is attributable, at the top levels of government, to direct Communist infiltration.. VIII. COMMU IST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Just as there is some indirect Communist influence at official levels, so interest in China and to a limited degree a curiosity about the USSR have opened the way to. some Communist influence on the public opinion-forming process. This is attributable as such to the predispo- sitions-of non-Communist Burmese as to direct efforts by Communist elements. There is some Communist influence in educational circles, partic- ularlythe Chinese schools and in higher Burmese educational: institutions. Of the more than 200 Chinese schools in Burma, a majority appear to be using Peiping-approved textbooks, although there has been some recession .in Communist penetration since 1950. There is also continuing Communist penetration of student groups at Rangoon University . Penetration of Buddhist, circles has thus far been slight, although efforts to secure Buddhist support for international Communist "causes" SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 are currently being intensified, apparently with some success. The government has shown genuine concern over these developments, and is endeavoring to counteract Communist influence by stimulating Buddhist revival programs, denying passports to Buddhist priests recruited for international Communist conferences, etc. The Communist press is relatively small, but non-Communist publications, on their own initiative, support some current Communist propaganda themes (most notably, the "menace" of Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, and evidences of "colonialism" in all parts of the world.) The Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has recently secured an outlet for Chinese and Russian films, by renting the King Theater on a monthly basis. During 1951 over 100 Chinese films were exhibited in Rangoon, and although the contents are not known, it seems safe to assume that many contained Communist propaganda themes. No noteworthy infiltration of right-wing political organizations and parties has come to light. Among left-wing, non-Communist politi- cal groups, there has been considerable indirect influence; some ele- ments of Communist dogma (anti-colonialism, collectivism) have wide appeal in most political circles in.Burma, due to historical experience and Marxist training of most national leaders. Direct Communist in- fluence, however, appears to be declining. There is an increasing tendency, particularly at the top levels, to distinguish between cur rent Soviet behavior and the theoretical Marxist formulations to which many Burmese leaders still adhere. Collaboration with Communist elements by some Karen leaders and Dr. Ba Maw's Mahabama party appears to be based on expediency, rather than on ideological-compatibility. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800080001-4 The nearest approach to a "party organ," except possi- bly for clandestine newsheets circulated in guerrilla areas. Generally pro-Communist. Sometimes prints Communist propaganda materials. Generally follows interna- tional "line." Pro-Communist Pro-Peiping, but does not follow Soviet "line." Life:tieekly (Chinese) Unknown A weekly "scandal sheet." SECRET - SECURITY INFOR4kTI0N SECRET - SECURITY IJ?~FORYATION _15_. X. C0'WIAUNIST PROPAGANDA "AEDIA For practical purposes, the Rangoon press is synonymous with the Burmese press. Very little publishing activity is carried on out- side the capital city, and for that reason, human-carrier techniques are probably more important in the dissemination of Communist propa- ganda than formal media of communication. In addition to the periodicals listed below, there is a considerable amount of pamphlet literature circulated within Burma, a good deal of it prepared or controlled by Communist organizations. A. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals Name Circulation Ludu 2,000 Zin Min Pao 2,000 (1950 est.) Organ of CDL Pyi..:Thu Ne Zin Unknown Said to be financed by TPeople'sily) Chinese Embassy. Has ap- peared spasmodically since 1951. B. Pro-Communist-Publications Guide Daily 3,000 Tainglonekyaw 3,000 Red Star 1,500 New Rangoon Evening 2,500 (1950 est.) Post ("Chinese New China Pao 4,000 (1950) Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 16 - C. Printing Establishments The following information is incomplete, but probably covers the most important local sources of Communist publications, excluding newspapers: 1. Kyaw Linn Booksellers and Publishers, /180, 51st Street, Rangoon -- Kyaw Linn has translated and printed books on China and the USSR, in addition to distributing literature reportedly sup- plied through Soviet and Chinese Embassy channels in Delhi. Kyaw Linn reportedly has been aided by the Rangoon Chinese Embassy with an initial capital investment. The firm manages at least four bookstalls on Bogyoke Street. The US Embassy has estimated that sales at each average more than 1,000 books per week. 2. Myint Swe Publishing House, Rangoon -- This firm is reported to have translated and published some of the works of Mao Tse-tung. It is not a prosperous concern. 3. Central Publishing House, Bogyoke Market, Rangoon -- This firm publishes and sells Burmese translations of popular Communist literature. Do Imported Publications The following periodicals have been available, at various times, at the People's Literature House, 546 Merchant Street, Rangoon: 1. Weekly New Times Soviet Weekly Cross Roads Cominform Journal 2. Fortnightly Peoples China World Trade Union Movement. World Student Movement Soviet Land 3. Monthly Russia Today Soviet Literature Soviet Union SECRET - SEC'?JRITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Masses and Main Street Political Affairs Indo Soviet Czechoslovak Life China Monthly Review 4. Bi-Monthly Soviet Woman In addition, pamphlet literature seems to be distributed in fairly large quantities. E. Publications of Soviet-Satellite Diplomatic Establishments Viet Minh representatives in Rangoon publish a weekly bulletin entitled "Vietnam Information." Its total circulation is unknown. Distribution to many parts of the world is handled in Rangoon. The Chinese Embassy apparently subsidizes one or more papers in Rangoon, but is not known to publish any periodicals itself. Local radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, and no direct Communist influence has been discernible. There is no known Communist broadcasting activity in Burma, except 'possibly for some radio communi- cation among guerrilla units. The military network, if it exists, is probably used primarily for operational liaison and not for public propaganda activity. There is a limited audience for both Soviet and Chinese broad- casts. Soviet broadcasting appears to be confined to daily trans- missions in English directed to Southeast Asia, plus the Soviet Chinese-language service which can perhaps be heard in Burma. The audience for Chinese Communist broadcasts is probably limited to the Chinese community. Approximately 30 hours per week on international beams can be picked up in Burma. Although no figures are available, the number of radio receivers is sufficiently low so that radio is a much less significant medium for external propaganda than publications and personal contact. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 XI. FINANCIAL C?NDITION No quantitative data on Communist finances are available. It is doubtful whether the dues-paying membership of Communist organiza- tions, particularly in the labor unions, is very large, and direct receipts of this kind can be only a minor element in total party finances. The underground guerrilla groups appear to be heavily de- pendent on local requisitioning and foraging in the areas of current military operations. Above-ground Communist groups are known to receive contributions from businessmen and other groups which are vulnerable to persuasion or pressure. The China Democratic League, in particular, probably derives part of its financial support from merchants engaged in trade with China. It is not known, however, whether any of these firms exist primarily for purposes of financing Communist activity. Leaders of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party apparently re- ceive some financial assistance through the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon. The money spent on local rallies (where, frequently, no collections are taken) suggests outside financial help. In addition, supplies of Chinese Communist publications are a direct contribution to local Communist propaganda activity. It is not known whether the Soviet Embassy has contributed directly to local party finances. In general, the financial condition of the Burmese Communists appears to be poor, with the exception of activities connected with the increasingly virulent propaganda campaign. The guerrilla groups have been able to sustain their present level of activity, but do not appear to have financial resources adequate to attract wider support or to procure additional arms. Chinese Communist elements, by virtue of their ability to exact donations from local businessmen, are in much better financial condi- tion than the Burmese groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 19 - XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS A. Communist China The first Chinese Communist Ambassador to Burma presented his credentials in September 1950. By August 1952, the Embassy staff was reported to. include 15 principal officers and 26 other members. Many of these individuals are described as "active outside," implying that considerable efforts are made to keep in contact with local Chinese organizations of various types. Supplies of printed propaganda are apparently funneled through the Embassy for distribution throughout the Chinese community, utilizing schools, commercial, labor, and cul- tural organizations as outlets and as centers for displays. It is probable that propaganda activity, in the broadest sense, is an impor- tant responsibility of most members of the Embassy staff. The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society also functions with support from the Chinese Embassy. Its membership (total unknown but apparently relatively small) includes non-Communists interested in cultural re- lations with China as well as pro-Communist elements. The Soviet Embassy was established in Rangoon in April 1951, with an original staff of eight. In late 1951, the total staff was reported to number 31, including housekeeping and administrative personnel. The Embassy has a Press Attache, and it seems probable that other staff members are engaged in essentially propaganda and contact work, since the size of the Embassy is greater than regular Embassy activities would justify. The Burma-Soviet Cultural Association, headed by a respected member of the Rangoon University faculty, was founded early in 1952. The Soviet Embassy appears to have left the initiative primarily to Burmese intellectuals interested in the USSR, with quiet encouragement for the society's activities. The first open meeting was attended by about 200 persons, but active membership is not known. Co European Satellites A Czechoslovak Consulate General was opened July 10, 1952, but no information on its staff is available. A Hungarian trade delegation is reported to be in Rangoon, but its size also is unknown. The activities of both the Czech Consul General and the Hungarian trade delegation members, although ostensibly directed toward increasing trade, probably include activities which should be labeled as propaganda. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 20 - XI II. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although no international Communist organizations maintain permanent bureaus or offices in Burma, the activities of some of these groups have been an important part of the total Communist propaganda effort in Burma. Local propaganda organs play up Burmese participation in international conferences both before and after Burmese delegations Delegations have been sent to the following recent . one abroad have g conferences: Meeting World Youth Festival - Berlin Moscow Economic Conference Asian and Pacific Peace Conference - Peiping International Cultural Conference - Moscow WFTU General Council - Berlin World Peace Council - Vienna Date Size of Delegation Aug. 1951 5 April 1952 7 Sept. 1952 26 Oct. 1952 10 Nov. 1952 3 Dec. 1952 20 Although the delegations have usually included Communists, they have not been composed exclusively of known party members. Burmese participation in the work of international "front" organizations seems to have been largely limited to-attendance at these conferences. Although no reliable data*are available, it seems un- likely that financial contributions have been received from Burmese groups. On the contrary, the international organizations appear to. subsidize the participation of. Burmese groups, at least to the extent of underwriting expenses while travelers are in orbit countries. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 21 - XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK A. International Party Channels All Communist elements in Burma emphasize the country's ties to China, because of a general Burmese sense of nearness to China and an interest in Chinese developments. Outwardly, therefore, the closest international links appear to be with Communist China. Ties with the Indian Communist Party have not been close, although one finds occasional references to liaison with representatives of the East Bengal Communist Party. There is ample, although circumstantial, evidence that above- ground Communist elements follow international Communist directives concerning propaganda drives, although local implementation of specific campaigns is frequently tardy. Under the'direction of local "front" groups, the world-wide "signature campaigns" are carried on in Burma, and particular propaganda themes related to Far Eastern affairs are generally carried in local organs. It is not known, however, whether the Chinese or the Soviet Embassy is the original source of directives to local groups. Although there are frequent reports of directives from Chinese or Soviet officials concerning party strategy in Burma, it is impossible to determine whether specific moves, particularly with reference to guerrilla activity, are the direct result of Chinese or Soviet direction. Since early in 1952, there seems to have been a shift in emphasis, from direct military action to above-ground agitation for a "united front" government and an end to insurgency. It is not clear whether the mili- tary weakness of the insurgent groups is responsible for the shift, or whether it was made in response to a directive concerning general Asian Communist strategy. 1. International courier system. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon is known to have a regular courier service, and it is probable that the Soviet Embassy provides similar facilities. In addition, commercial channels are readily available within the Chinese community. There are reports that crew members of ships calling at Rangoon serve as contacts with both Chinese and-Soviet Embassies, but details are unavailable. There is also direct overland communication with China, but it is not possible to state whether these routes are more important than sea con- tacts. Available evidence suggests, without definite proof, that the above-ground BWPP has direct access to the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon, and that the underground BCP maintains overland contact with China. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION It is probable that arrangements for guerrilla training in China are made by direct liaison with Chinese officials in Yunnan. 2. Domestic communications. The nature of current Communist operations reduces the need for close integration among the several elements. Above-ground activities are concentrated in Rangoon and in major towns, and personal travel is limited only by deficiencies in local transportation. Underground activity is apparently linked by courier and radio facilities between guerrilla areas, but details are unavailable. Radio equipment is frequently moved to avoid capture, and the location of present installations is unknown. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.2 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: ' CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDOCHINA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 01 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Tactics . .. .. 1 III. Capabilities . 3 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . ~+ I. Numerical Strength . ? II. Electoral Strength . .. . . . . . . . 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 10 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . 12 VI. Communist. Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional organizations . .. + 13 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . 14 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 14 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . ? . .. . . . . . . . . . . 15 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . + . . . . 15 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 17 XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . . . . . 18 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . 19 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party;.and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMATICN C OMMUN IBM IN IND CCHINA s OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES All of the immediate objectives of the Communists in Indochina are related to their effort to win the bitter civil war which they are waging against the forces of the French Union. Within the area which they have conquered, the Communist objective is to improve their control over popu- lation and resources in order to maximize their total military effort. Within the areas controlled by the legitimate Governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Communist objectives area 1. To subvert the loyalty of the population. 2. To improve the party's covert organization. II. TACTICS Communism's objectives in Indochina are furthered by the Soviet and satellite-recognized "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," its Chinese-supported and equipped army, its administrative and control organizations (police, secret and security services, propaganda organizations, administrative. cadres), and by its popular front movement, the "Lien Viet" or "National Unity Front." The entire insurrectionary structure is held together and controlled by the Laodong (Communist) Party. It is the Laodong.Party which, in the final resort, operates the complex mechanism of war, propaganda, and compul- sion which appears to the people of Vietnam and to the outside world as the "Viet Minh" movement. And the Laodong Party, in turn, is managed by a group of highly trained and thoroughly experienced revolutionary leaders. The Communist Party in Indochina uses.both military tactics and political warfare tactics to further its over-all objectives. Its military tactics are designed: (1) to inflict maximum disrup- tion and destruction on enemy forces and enemy war potential in the rear zones, with the minimum expenditure of Viet Minh forces; (2) to infiltrate, occupy, and consolidate territory with a view to securing a continuing reservoir of potential manpower recruitment for the army and to finding the necessary economic mans (mainly food) to support intensification of the war. These tactics have been highly successful. For over six years the Viet Minh has inflicted heavy casualties on the Franoo-Vietnamese forces, while paralyzing Indochinese. economic life and preventing the country's recovery. The Viet Minh is now strongly established in North and Northwest Tonkin, in the lightly industrialized and food-producing regions SECRET - SECURITY IN+CRMATION A ---A C- ')fl171 t11lon Id_PnPRAPnn9RARfltl(1Rflt1(18fltlfl'I-4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION of North Central Vietnam, and in the coastal plains of South Central Vietnam. Most of China's long common boundary with Indochina is now in Viet Minh hands, permitting continued Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh armed forces. Communist political warfare tactics are designed: (1) to ex- tend Communist influence among all social and economic groups in the populations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and (2) to consolidate Communist control over conquered areas and populations.. Communist propaganda attempts to exploit sentiment "for independ- ence" and "against French colonialism." To some extent, but only within carefully-drawn limits, the attempt to make the Viet Minh effort appear one of genuine national resistance to a foreign colonizing power con- tinues to displace certain other considerations in Communist tactics. Thus, Catholics in the Viet Minh zones have not.been persecuted,. nor, until very recently, attacked ideologically, so that the pretense of continued Catholic support for the "war of resistance" could be main- tained. Similarly, although agrarian reform has been strongly stressed,. landlords have been dispossessed only where it was essential to secure fuller cooperation on the part of the landless peasantry. Orthodox Communist doctrine has generally taken second place to "anti-imperialist" themes in Viet Minh propaganda. However, whenever the priority needs of intensifying the armed struggle have demanded that themes of "national unity" and nationalistic propaganda be soft-pedalled, this has been done, particularly since 1951. Efforts to consolidate Communist control over areas and popula- tions already under Communist influence center upon the peasantry. Basic Viet Minh policies and the major part of its propaganda output are calculated to increase the peasantry's contribution to the military effort. Both within and outside the zones under direct Viet Minh control, the Communists rely heavily upon conspiratorial methods and upon a large and widespread system of terror and compulsion. Such a system has been essential not only in providing the necessary vehicle for Communist control of the vast masses of people (some 12 million) and the variegated leader- ship which the Viet Minh movement has brought under its banners,. but also in order to gather the necessary intelligence for military operations and political warfare. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 3 - III. CAPABILITIES If Franco-Vietnamese military strength in Indochina does not increase, the Viet Minh may become strong enough within the next few years to be able, without identifiable Chinese Communist interven- tion, to break the current stalemate. While the Viet Minh's military capabilities are at present limited by its exclusion from the more . productive regions of Vietnam, this might be overcome by significantly increased Chinese Communist materiel and technical assistance and by conquest of further territory. At the same time, although the regime continues to be based largely on compulsion and terror and to depend mainly for the achievement of its objectives upon increasingly harsh exploitation of a war-weary peasantry, the Viet Minh's administrative and control capabilities seem adequate to counteract any growth of discontent among the populations and armies under its control. The Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial portions of the populations outside its own zones, based partly on military prestige, partly on continued nationalist appeal, and partly on a widespread mechanism of compulsion and terror, is likely to be increased or decreased in. proportion to the military power and ideological dynamism which the free world, and above all the free states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos may be able to bring to bear against it. SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMATICIK Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY I'ORMATION Communist Party membership, following and strength are heavily concentrated in the areas of Indochina controlled by the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." In the "DRY", the official Communist party, the LAO DONG (Workers) Party,has a membership variously estimated at be- een 56,000 and 715,000. Although reliable data on the number of people under Communist Party discipline is lacking, the all-enoompassing coverage of the constituent organizations of the Communist-controlled National Unity Front (LIEN VIET), suggests that a majority of the 12.7 million inhabitants of the "DRY" may be oonsidered under effective Communist control. In the areas under the control of the Associated States govern- ments of Vietnam$ Cambodia, and Laos, the Communist party is proscribed. However, there are obviously Communists in all of these areas, due to the ease With which the non-Communist regions can be infiltrated. In Vietnam particularly, but also in Cambodia and Laos, a number of clandestine Viet Minh or Chinese-Communist-controlled organizations are believed to be operating. How many of the 9.9 million population of free Vietnam are under Communist discipline cannot be estimated. Clandestine Communist opera- tions are, however, relatively successful. In part, this is due to a widespread Communist system of compulsion; on the other hand, the Viet Minh cause continues to exert considerable national appeal in the free zones of Vietnam. It is possible that a substantial portion of the Vietnamese population and of the 800,000 Chinese in Vietnam are sympathetic to the objectives of the Viet Minh and therefore susceptible to Communist influence. In Cambodia, it is unlikely that more than 10 percent of the population of 3 million (including the Chinese) are strongly influenced by Communism. However, some 5000-10,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, mainly concentrated in the Southern provinces, are reported fighting in units of about company size against Franoo-K aer forces. In early 1952, the Chinese Communist regime claimed the loyalty of 60 percent of the 300,000 Chinese in Cambodia. While this claim is undoubtedly exaggerated, a sub- stantial percentage of the Chinese in Cambodia are believed to be under Communist influence. In Laos, the number of people under Communist influence is believed to be extremely small - perhaps one percent of the one million population. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The number of Viet Minh guerrillas in Laos is estimated at about 5,000. Communist strength is believed heaviest in the DRV-oontrolled provinces of North Tonkin and North Central Annam; less numerous in "DRV" areas in Central Annam and Cochinohina. Communist influence in free Vietnam is probably strongest in the urban areas of Saigon-Cholon, Hanoi, and Haiphong. In Cambodia, Viet Minh influence is strongest in the southern provinces where guerrilla units are concentrated. Chinese Communist influence in Cambodia is strongest in Phnom..Penh where the Chinese population is heavily concentrated. In Laws, Communist influence is strongest in the Bolovens Plateau region where the Viet Minh guerrillas are mainly based. Communist Party membership in Indochina is believed to be composed principally of professionals and government employees. In the "DRV", industrial workers probably constitute an additional important membership group, Communist leadership in Indochina is believed to be well-educated (Western Europe, China and the USSR), thoroughly experienced, completely dedicated, and competent to fulfill not only its present responsibilities but those it would inherit as a consequence of total victory in Indochina. The average age of the sixteen current top-level Communist leaders is 47. Many top leaders have been active since 1930. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH On January 6, 1946, the Viet Minh Government held elections for a "Vietnam National Assembly" in an effort to legitimize its rule. In addition to the polling in-areas of North and Central Vietnam under DRV control, clandestine votes were taken in parts of South Vietnam. There is considerable doubt as to the extent to which these elections re- flected the popular will; an implausibly large vote was claimed for a country where the parliamentary system is all but unknown. Among the 300-odd members of the "elected Assembly," the Viet Minh (then ostensibly a coalition of left-wing and nationalist parties under Communist domina- tion) emerged as the largest party with 80 delegates. The 90 independents probably also included a significant number of Communists and another group of 15 Communists was elected under the label of the "Marxist Party." No further elections have been held in the Communist-held areas of Indochina. Elections have, however, taken place in Laos and Cambodia and are now about to take place in free Vietnam, although, of course, without Communist participation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION A. Total Strength and Character of Communist Forces The Viet Minh disposes of a total armed strength of about 315,000 men, distributed as follows, Regular Army, 130,000 Regional Forces, 15,000 People's Militia, 110,0000 The Regular Army is a well-trained, well-equipped, highly mobile, modern fighting force capable of waging effective positional warfare against France-Vietnamese forces. The Regional Forces are less well equipped and generally recruited regionally for static support of the Regular Army. The People's Militia is locally recruited for village defense and small-scale guerrilla action. Be Security of Controlled Areas The Viet Minh armed forces of 315,000 men, which are employed both for the defense and security of controlled areas and for offensive opera- tions based on these areas, are distributed within the "DRV"-controlled areas as follows, 174,000 men in Tonkin; 80,000 men in Central Vietnam; 46,000 in South Vietnam; 10,000 in Cambodia; and 5,000 in Laos. The population in Communist-controlled areas has generally been stable and tightly-controlled. Disturbances and riots have, however, occasionally been reported, particularly in the strongly Catholic Vinh and Thanh Hoa regions of North Central Vietnam. Civil administration in "DRV"-oontrolled zones is in the hands of administrative cadres directly responsible to the "DRV" Ministry of Interior. It is logical to suppose, although no information is available on the subject, that the Viet Minh armed forces have at least temporary control of civil administration in regions only recently conquered. This control is presumably exercised by political and administrative cadres of the Army. C. Military Support Organizations "DRV" supply, cgmmunioations, and intelligence organizations are highly developed units operating at all levels of the military administra- tion. Their authority is derived from Directorates attached to the General Staff of the army. Information concerning the strength of the various support organizations is not available although these organiza- tions may be assumed to be quite large. Their networks are known to embrace all of Vietnam, including Franco-Vietnamese areas. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 In view of the fact that North Vietnam is not only the theater of the most active military operations but also the seat of the "DRV" govern- ment, supply, communications, and liaison functions are presumably con- oentrated in that area. Intelligence activities are probably concentrated in urban centers (chiefly Hanoi and Saigon) as strongly as in strategic military areas. Available reports indicate that "DRV" support organizations have achieved a high degree of efficiency. D. External Military Support Reports from a variety of sources, in most cases neither evaluated nor confirmed, suggest that while certain supplies may originate else- where in the Soviet bloc, Communist China is the main source of military support to the Viet Minh. The following types of supplies have been reported:l 1. Arms and ammunitions Mountain guns; anti-aircraft guns; light machine guns; heavy mac ine guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars; rifles, including Browning automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers; spare parts; ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators; projectiles; grenades and grenade throwers; and land mines, 2. Commissary: a. Food: Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and soy beans, flour. be Clothin : Uniforms; cotton material; army blankets; cloth shoes; rubber shoes; steel helmets. 3. Transportation and communication equipment: Trucks; tires; spare parts; gasoline; oil; kerosene; radio sets and field transmitters, . 4. Others Medical and clinical supplies; X-ray metal testing equip- ment; baTanoes; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives; saw Reports often include quantity figures, frequently between. 400 and 800 tons per month. Overlapping of the time periods covered and non-comparable quantity designations (e.g. rounds, cases, or tons of. ammunition), however, make it impossible to arrive.at meaningful totals. Moreover, in a few oases where cross-checking of reported totals has been possible, resultant discrepancies have cast further doubt upon the validity of the figures reported. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION blades; iron and steel for making cables; electrical distributing machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers; oxygen-generating machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery. E. Military Operations Military operations in Indochina since 1946 have been conducted in virtually all areas of the peninsula, but have.been principally concentra- ted in North Vietnam (Tonkin). There, Communist forces have been, fighting a savage battle for over six years for control of the crucial rice- producing Red River Delta (in which the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong are located). At present about 174,000 Communist troops are pitted against an estimated 185,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces in the Tonkin region. The principal tactic of the Communist forces has been to harrass the Franco-Vietnamese Army by guerrilla warfare inside the Delta and by massive attacks against isolated French posts and cities outside the Delta.. A turning point in the battle for Tonkin was reached in the fall of 1950, when Viet Minh forces, in quick succession. seized all French posts along-the China border (Langson, Caobang, Laokay), excepting only Monoay in the extreme eastern coastal sector. In the fall of 1952, Communist forces expelled the French from all of Northwest Tonkin, ex- cept Laiohau and Nasan. At this moment, therefore, the Communist forces hold most of Tonkin outside of the key Delta region. The latter, how- ever, in which the vast bulk of Franco-Vietnamese forces is now concen- trated, has been heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh forces and is besieged at its periphery by some five Viet Minh divisions. In Central Vietnam, an estimated 75,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces hold the narrow coastal plain from Faifo to Dong Hoi against some 80,000 Communists who are in control of the remainder of the area. In South Vietnam, an estimated 162,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces control most of the region. but conduct frequent and difficult operations against some 46,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, concentrated principally in the unhealthy and almost impenetrable swamps of the Plaine des Jonas. In Laos and Cambodia, Communist military operations are aprawn limited to small- scale harrassment by guerrilla forces. F. Popular Attitudes. Toward the War The peasantry of Indochina has.borne the main brunt of the long war. The peasantry serves as a reservoir of manpower for the armies involved, performs the coolie duties of supply, engages in sabotage and informer Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 operations at the order of one side or the other, constructs public works, and -- over and above all this -- produces the food for its own subsistence and that of the non-productive hundreds of thousands in the armies. By this time, the peasantry clearly abhors the war and anxiously hopes for its and. General passivity toward either side in the conflict may in fact be said to characterize the sentiments of the vast majority of Indochina's civilian population. However, passivity is less noticeable, and the effects of political warfare and propaganda by either side are more marked, among city dwellers. The nationalist pretentious of the Viet Minh, rather than Communism itself, continue to hold much appeal for Indochina's urban population, whether inside the Viet Minh zones or in areas of Franco-Vietnamese control. G. Current Strategic and Tactical Objectives of the Communist Insurrection Current strategic and tactical objectives of the Communist insurrection are military and political consolidation over newly-won territories in northwest Tonkin, and intensified penetration by Viet Minh regular forces into the Franco-Vietnamese-held Tonkin Delta area, The "DRV" probably will intensify guerrilla warfare in the plateaux region of Central Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam and may also attempt a limited military penetration into Laos. In Central Vietnam, the Communist forces will probably continue to maintain strong pressure against the Franco-Vietnamese forces along the coast. H. Relations of Communist to Non-Communist Insurrectionary Organizations 1. Vietnam. In June 1952 Colonel Trinh Minh The, former Chief of Staff o? _t" e warmed forces of the autonomous politico-religious Caodaist movement, took to the bush with 2,500 men in South Vietnam to set up "the National Resistance Front," a "third force" opposed to both the Viet Minh and the French. Since the spring of 1952, when the French launched military operations against this group, Colonel The has not been heard from and his current whereabouts are unknown. There is no evidence that Colonel The has collaborated with the Viet Minh. 2. Cambodia. In March 1952, Son Ngoc Thanh, a leading Cambodian nationalist, organized a dissident nationalist movement. At first, the activities of this group seen to have been limited to propaganda attacks against the French and Cambodian King. In recent months, broadcasts of Son Ngoo Thanh have been increasingly favorable to the Viet Minh, but the present relationship between these two movements is not clear. 3. Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. The Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks, under the leadership respectively of Son Ngoo Minh and Prince SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Souphanouvong, have been formally allied with the Viet Minh movement since March 1951 when the "United National Front of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" was established. In the past, military efforts of the Issaraks have been for the most part limited to sporadic guerrilla warfare, banditry, and arms smuggling across the Thai border. A closer degree of cooperation seems to have been achieved during the past year between the Viet Minh and the Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. From 5,000 to 10,000 Viet Minh are reportedly with the Cambodian Issaraks and 5,000 with the Laotian Issaraks. In October and November, 1952, a Laotian delegate accompanied the Viet Minh delegation to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping. In December delegates from both "Free Cambodia" and "Free Laos". participated in the World Peace Conference in Vienna. I. Capabilities for Expansion and Action in the Near Future Despite the relatively low level of military industrial production within "DRV" areas and a reportedly increasing food shortage, the "DRV" could probably expand the present scope of its military activities to a limited extent without significantly increased support from Communist China or from other Orbit countries. If, as seems likely, the Issaraks receive greater material assistance and technical advice from the Viet Minh, they would be able to expand their numbers and extend their operations. A. Repressive Capabilities of the Associated States and France French and Associated States policy toward Communism in Indochina is the military destruction of the Viet Minh armed forces and complete eradication of Communist activities and influence throughout the peninsula. No Communist parties, groupings, or organizations are allowed to exist or operate in the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The overt circulation of Communist publications in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas is prohibited and the possibility of Communist-oriented material appearing in the controlled press is negligible due to tight censorship exercised by both the French and the Associated States. Severe repressive measures are taken against any individuals, groups, or organiza- tions believed operating under Communist. instructions or for Communist SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION purposes. Such repressive measures are expected to continue until -hostilities in Indochina have ceased and internal political stability is assured. They are carried out by civilian security services of France and the Associated States, and insofar as the security of components of the French Union Armed Forces is concerned, by the military intelligence and counter-intelligence services of these forces. At present, the scope and effectiveness of repressive action of which the French and Associated States civilian and military security agencies are capable in Indochina cannot be rated better than fair. By contrast, Communist subversive operations are believed to be, on the whole, vary effective. Possibly the greatest asset of Communist under- ground and subversive organizations of all types lies in the generally apathetic attitude of the Vietnamese population as a whole toward the conflict which is raging in its territory. B. Extent and Effectiveness of Communist Subversive Operations Communist subversive operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos fall into two major categories: those carried out by Viet Minh subversive teams and underground networks, and those carried out by clandestine Chinese Communist organizations.. Viet Minh organizations operating in the French and Associated States-controlled zones of Indochina are for the most part responsible directly to the central "DRV" government, or its regional representatives. They perform three general types of assigned taskas propaganda; litical, economic, and counter-intelligence;l and 'terrorism and sabotage.# The propaganda function is carried out by teams responsible to the Information Services of the central "DRV" government. The total number or size of such teams is unknown,S but their effectiveness seems to have been considerable. Espionage activities are carried out by organizations and units of unknown size believed to be attached to the regional Cong An (Public Security Service) of the Viet Minh, which is the latter's rnal security organization. Espionage agents reportedly are assigned specialized tasks, the most important of which is the infiltration of French and Associated States intelligence and security services. Terrorism and sabotage within the free zones is performed by the Dich Van which in- cludes Death Volunteer Brigades, apparently assigned to opera.e in specific regions. The effectiveness of the,Dich Van is reportedly great; it has seriously disrupted. highway and rail~traff o, damaged industrial and Military espionage is oarr ell out by intelligence organizations responsible to the Directorate for Military Intelligence of the "DRV" Armed Forces General Staff. 2. Certain types of sabotage activities are carried out by organized guerrilla and commando units of the Armed Forces. 5. In 1951, ten such Information teams were reported to be operating in South Vietnam. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION military installations, and organized numerous terroristic acts in major urban centers, the most important of which was the assassination of a number of highly prominent French and Vietnamese civil and military personalities. One of the most successful activities of Viet Minh sub- versive organizations has been the extortion of money from prominent French and Chinese as well as from Vietnamese business firms. Many of these firms regularly pay large sums of "protection money" to Viet Minh agents in order to avoid bombing of their premises. The "DRV" benefits considerably by the intelligence activities carried out by Chinese Communist underground organizations in the non. Communist zones. Since 1949, the Communist-direoted "Association for the Liberation of Overseas Chinese in Indochina" has organized various clandestine student, wen's and workers' organizations in Saigon-Cholon where approximately 80 percent of the total overseas Chinese population of some 800,000 is concentrated. During 1952, the creation of a clandestine "United Action Committee of Democratic Sino-Vietnamese" was reported, also in Saigon-Cholon. In North Vietnam, the "Society of New Chinese Democrats of Hanoi and Haiphong" reportedly intensified intelligence activities during 1952. The size of these organizations is unknown although it is believed they have been fairly successful in gaining the sympathy of certain of the Chinese population, particularly among students and workers. Specific underground activities which have been reported include extortions of money for the protection of relatives in China, the circula- tion of Communist tracts and publications believed to be for the most part procured in Hong gong, and the placement or pro-Communist instructors in Chinese schools. In Cambodia, the Chinese Communist Party, whose head- quarters reportedly is located in Phnom-Penh, claims the sympathy of 60 percent of the 300,000 overseas Chinese in that country. No information is available concerning its activities or effectiveness. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR In "DRV" controlled areas, all workers in key industries are con- trolled by Communist elements, although the number of Party members in specific enterprises is unknown. In the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the number of Communists in key industries, if any, is unknown. In "DRV" areas of Vietnam, the General Confederation of Labor, which is controlled by the communist Party, claimed "300,000 members" in 1952. The Confederation is composed of numerous affiliated trade unions organized at provincial levels throughout Vietnam. It has been reported that although not all of its directors are Party members, those exercising any real authority are. The Confederation has been affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (wFTU) since the former's organization in 1946'and has been represented at VPFTU Conferences since 1948. In addition to the General Confederation of Labor, the Viet Minh reportedly organized a Trade Union Council in 1950 to embrace "intellectuals and civil servants." SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 13 - No further information is available concerning this Council. In the free areas of Vietnam, labor organizations were prohibited until the promulgation of the Labor Code on November 16, 1952. The principal Vietnamese labor union, which until last November operated as an association, is the Christian Confederation Vietnamienne du Travail Chretien, reported to have 5,000 members. num er of civil servants in both the French and Vietnamese administrations, belong to Force Ouvriere which has its headquarters in France. Although pro sions of Me ew Labor Code in Vietnam do not extend to the overseas Chinese population, Chinese labor groups have for some time been loosely associated in a Federation of Chinese Mutual Aid Societies. The 19 organizations comprising this Federation claim an aggregate membership of some 11,000. No information is available on Communist infiltration of, or in- fluence in, these labor unions in Franco-Vietnamese areas of Vietnam. However, the Chinese organizations are the most likely to have been infiltrated or influenced by Communists, VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL O G IZ TIONS In both the free and the Communist zones, the Lien Viet (National Unity) Front has developed an extensive and intricate netwozk of front organizations to enlist the support of the peasants and special interest groups for the "resistance against French aggression.' The leaders of the front organizations are believed to be mostly well-indoctrinated and capable party cadres, many of whom work in more than one organization. What appear to be the most important front organizations are listed belows 1. The Union of Vietnamese Youth claims a membership of 2,500,000 and has been affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth since 1947. 2. The Union of Vietnamese Students and Pupils has been affiliated with the International Students Union since 1948. 3. The Union of Vietnamese Women claimed 3,000,000 members as of 1950. It has been affiliated with the Woman's Inter- national Democratic Federation since 1945. 4. The Catholic Association for National Salvation. 5. The Association of Vietnamese Journalists has been affiliated with the World Federation of Journalists since 1950. 6. The Vietnam World Peace Committee is affiliated with the World Peace Council. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 14 - 7. The Vietnamese Peasants Association for National Salvation. 8. The Sino-Vietnamese friendship Association. 9. The Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Association? In addition to Viet Minh front organizations, the Chinese Communist Party has organized various youth, workers', women's and cultural under- ground front organizations. These organizations are believed to be strongest in the Saigon-Cholon area of South Vietnam and in the Phnom- Penh region of Cambodia, where the majority of the overseas Chinese residents in Vietnam and Cambodia are located. Many, if not all, of the "Lien Viet front groups have effective underground organizations within -We areas under Franoo-Vietnamese con- trol. Little information is available concerning non-Communist social, cultural, or professional organizations which may have been infiltrated by Communists. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Such infiltration is unquestionably a serious problem for the anti-Communist goverimmentsof the Associated States. Although policy- making bodies of these states are believed to be to a large extent free from subversive Communist personnel and influences, the same can probably not be said with regard to the Armed Services, police and security services, and administrative cadres of the States. Communist subversion is believed to have reached particularly serious proportions within Vietnam's National Army. The Army Officer's Training School at Dalat has been reported strongly infiltrated by Communist elements, and certain Vietnamese troop companies in action in North Vietnam have proved of marked unreliability. The Vietnamese, and even French, security services in North Vietnam are also believed penetrated to some extent by Communist elements. No reports of Communist penetration of government agencies and services in Cambodia and Laos have been received, although it is likely that a limited degree of infiltration may be considered to have occurred. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION In the "DRV"-controlled zones of Vietnam, leaders of public pro- paganda organizations are usually Party cadres. Communist propaganda has undoubtedly reached nearly the entire population in these zones, chiefly through the effective organization of mass front organizations and compulsory study groups at provincial and village levels. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION In free Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, no known Communists are in a position to influence public opinion. There are probably a considerable number of concealed Viet Minh sympathizers or agents, however, in schools, journalistic, and literary groups. The prohibition of Communist publica- tions, tight press censorship,and the extremely limited number of radio sets among the population in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas have tended to insulate the population from Communist publications and broad- casts. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist influence has been spread fairly successfully through clandestine operations and through direct contact of many individuals with underground Viet Minh agents. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICIE S The most important non-Communist nationalist organizations and parties in Indochina are the Dai Viet Party, the Cao Dai politico- religious group, the Vietnam a ona iat Party (VN9DD). and the Catholics in Vietnam, and the Democratic Party in Cambodia. Although information is generally lacking on their membership, these parties and groups are thought to embrace several hundred thousand members. The extent of Communist influence in these organizations is unknown, but is not be- lieved to be large due to the strongly anti-Communist, although clearly pro-nationalist, sentiments of most of their leadership. Branches of the above-mentioned organizations are still in some instances allowed to operate in "DRV"-controlled zones, where the Catholics and some Caodaiats, for example, maintain social organizations. However, the Communists have undoubtedly strongly infiltrated these branches and probably control them completely. The same would be true for nominally non-Communist parties and organizations existing only in the "DRV$G Zones, such as the Vietnam Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, which the Communists continue to tolerate in order to bolster their nationalist pretensions. A. Newspapers and Periodicals Listed below are the newspapers and periodicals known to have been published by the Viet Minh in 1951 or 1952. Where known, the frequency of publication and the principal area of circulation are in- dicated. These publications are also clandestinely distributed in Franco-Vietnamese-controlled areas by Viet Minh underground organize. tions. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Rele SECRET - ase 2007/0 /201TY "ZNF Rq$g269ROO0800080001-4 Name(Translation) organ of Circulated When,pub- in lished 1. Major Papers ccasion- ( ki o n Ton Cuu Quoc (National Salvation) Lien Viet ally thioughout Vietnam ! Daily Nhan Dan (The People) Laodong North Vietnam Weekly (Worker's Party) (distributed in 27,000 copies) Nhan Dan (The People) Laodong South Vietnam Monthly (Worker's Party) (distributed in 24,000 copies) Lao Doug (The Worker) Vietnam Federa- Unknown Unknown tion of Labor Specialized and Provincial Publications Gia Dinh Administrative Unknown Two or th Committee of ree People's Army times Weekly QQuuan Viet Bac People's Army and North Unknown Militia Vietnam China-Vietnam Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association Doc Lap (Independence) Democratic Party Tonkin Unknown Tien Lien (Forward) Socialist Party Unknown Unknown To Quoo Tran Het (The People's National Saigon-Cholon 3 or 4 =&o n TWv_6Ml7 Union times Weekly Dung Tien (To Go Forward "Organ of young men South Vietnam Unknown Bravely and children" Sang Danh Chua Catholic Patriots Hanoi Sector Unknown Dan Cay Association Nambo of Unknown Unknown Peasants for National Salvation uan Doi (New Strength) Unknown Phuyen Province Unknown South Trungbo Economic Front Unknown Unknown Educational Review Ministry of Education Unknown Unknown SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 17 - E. Radio The "DRV" controls the following broadcasting stations which have regularly scheduled programs beamed to Indochina and to Southeast Asiat 1. Voice of Vietnam is regarded as the official government station. It is reportedly located in the Vinh area. News is broadcast daily to Indochina and Southeast Asia in French, English, Tonkinese, Thai, Mandarin, and Cantonese. 2. Voice of South Vietnam has tentatively been located north o gon, roe caste three programs daily of news and commentary in Cochinohinese and one in Mandarin. 3. Voice of Nambo is reputedly located in the Mekong Delta area. carries four programs of news and commentary daily, one each in Cochinchinese, French, Cantonese, and Cambodian. In Cambodia, the Voice of Issarak Cambodia is operated by the Issarak leader Son Ngoc Minh. One-half hour of news and comment is broadcast daily in Cambodian. Radio Moscow broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese and occasionally in Coo no nese. Radio Peking broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese, and twice daily for 5 to 35 minutes in Thai. Reception of the Thai language program is reported to be poor. Considering the small number of radio receiving sets in the Associated States, it is likely that Communist radio broadcasts reach only a very limited audience and achieve only limited propaganda effects outside the Communist zones. Within these zones, however, they are used as an extremely important,and probably effective, means of disseminating propaganda and official orders to the population. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The "DRV" authorities collect both direct and indirect taxes, many of them in kind, impose "duties" on goods entering Conmumist zones from the Franco-Vietnamese zones, and exact "voluntary"donations through various "emulation campaigns." The amount of revenue thus collected is unknown, as is the size of any subsidies from international Communist organizations, donations or credits by Soviet or Satellite governments, or dues from party-controlled labor unions and fronts. Nor is any information available on the amount of revenue collected through extortion of Vietnamese, French, and Chinese business firms in the non-Communist zones. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet bloc diplomatic establishments, trade, or cultural missions in free Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 - 18 - Although the USSR, Communist China, and other satellite countries have recognized the "DRV", they have not established diplomatic missions there. However, Communist China has sent various temporary military and economic missions to the Viet Minh. During 1952 a 50-man Chinese cultural mission was reportedly sent to Thai Nguyen in North Vietnam for the purpose of establishing political liaison with the "DRV" govern- ment, and an economic mission is said to have been-not up also in North Vietnam to study economic resources. Current estimates place the number of more or less permanent Chinese Communist personnel-- technicians, instructors, military and political advisors -- with the Viet Minh at approximately 5,000. All Chinese Communist Missions are surrounded by seoreoy. It is believed that contact between Chinese personnel and natives is held to a minimum. A Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association and a Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Association were organised inside the "DRV" in early 1950. Both organizations are associated with the "Lien Viet Front" and have established branches throughout "DRV"-oontrolled areas of Vietnam. These organizations are reported to have clandestine branches in the free areas, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon district. Propaganda committees areireported to have been established at the branch levels of both Associations. In addition to carrying out regular propaganda activities, these associations are responsible for sponsoring celebrations of major Chinese Communist and Soviet holidays. The Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association has published a journal, China-Vietnam, since May 1950. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS While it is not known to what extent, if any, the Viet Minh move- ment may have been aided materially by international Communist organiza- tions, it has been granted a significant extent of moral support by such organizations through invitations to participate, often in a glorified role, in Communist international conferences. In the past two years, delegates from the "DRV" and in two instances from "Free Cambodia" and "Free Laos" have attended the following international Communist meetingss Meeting Date Size of representation from Indochina Vienna Peace Congress December 1952 11 (including 2 from Cambodia and 1 from Laos) Asian and Pacific Peace October- 14 (including 2 Conference, Peiping November 1952 from Laos) Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Meeting Preparatory Meeting for,Peace Conference of Asia and Pacific Regions, Peiping International Conference for Defense of the Rights of Young People Chinese May Day Celebration, Peiping International Conference for the Defense of Children, Vienna International Economic Conference, Moscow World Peace Council, Vienna June 1952 June 1952 April-May 1952 April 1952 3 March-April 4 1952 August 1951 16 XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Communists in Indochina maintain closest international ties with Communist China, which recognized the "DRV" on January 18, 1950 and received the credentials of the first "DRV" Minister in April, 1951 (his status has now been raised to that of Ambassador), and with the USSR, which recognized the "DRV" on January 30, 1950, and received the credentials of a "DRV" ambassador in April 1952. Close ties are_ .also maintained, although much less prominently and for the most part covertly, with leaders of the French Communist Party. Relations have also developed between the Viet Minh leadership and leaders of the Eastern European and Korean Communist regimes. The clear harmony between Viet Minh and international Communist policies leaves no doubt that close coordination with the international Communist movement prevails. Proof that Communist China supplies high- level guidance to the Viet Minh leadership was recently received in the form of a Chinese Communist broadcast supplying the "DRV" government with the draft of a proposed address by Ho Chi Minh, written in China by the "DRV" Ambassador to that country. It is likely that frequent consultations between China and the "DRV" take place, and that a certain amount of day-to-day guidance is provided by the temporary technical and military missions now present in the "DRV" areas. It is also probable that the Viet Minh representative in Moscow sends home frequent guidances and reports. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Size of representation rom In oo na Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 20 - Efficiency of "DRV" contacts with the main Communist centers in Pei-p'ing and Moscow is presumably very good, since the French now control only one of the customary routes across the Chinese-Vietnamese border. Radio contact between Communist China and the "DRV" is main- tained through stations BAL 6 and GMH in China, which relay broadcasts between the "DRV", China, and other Communist countries. It is be- lieved that contacts maintained by the Indochinese Communists with France and with other Southeast Asian or Pacific countries are probably less efficient. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.3 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDONESIA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword ? ? ? ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 Objectives . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 He Tactics .. . 1 III. Capabilities . 4 ASSETS . . . ? . . . ? . . . 6 I. Numerical Strength . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 II. Electoral Strength ....... ..... 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action. 7 IV. Goverment Policy Toward Communism . . ... ? 7 V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . .. . ? 8 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . .. . . . 9 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . . S . . _ . . . . . . . . . .. . . ? 12 X. Communist Propaganda Media . 12 XI. Financial Condition . 13 XII? Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . ? . . . 13 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . 14+ XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . ... 15 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDONESIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES The major current goals of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) are to gain general acceptance as a genuine nationalist party in Indonesia, to perfect the party organization and to consolidate control over a variety of front groups, including the largest of the labor federations in Indonesia. In pursuing these aims the PKI has attempted to recoup such prestige as it lost, first, in the course of the Madiun uprising in September 1948 and, second, as a result of a series of arrests of Communist leaders by the Indonesian government in August 1951. Secondarily, the PKI attempts, especially through the activities of its front organizations, to cause Indonesia's "independent foreign policy' to be directed in such a way that ties with the Soviet bloc are strengthened at the expense of relations with the West. Thus, the PKI advocates the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR, non-cooperation with the UN embargo on shipments of strategic items to Communist China, increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and rejection of US economic. and military aid. The political climate in Indonesia, characterized by a lack of cohesive policy on the part of the major political parties and a general uncertainty as to the direction Indonesia will take in the immediate future both domestically and internationally, enhances the PKI's capability to pursue these several objectives concurrently. While present emphasis is on furthering the domestic political fortunes of the party,'particularly with the prospect of general elections in the next year, past experience suggests that should the requirements of international Communism demand it, a quick reversal might be effected, and international considerations be given precedence. At this stage it is not clear whether the PKI hopes to achieve its ultimate goal of direction of the Indonesian state through peace- ful constitutional means, involving subversion of non-Communist groups, or through eventual armed insurrection. It is likely that the party's internal consolidation is pursued with both possibilities in view. In its attempt to gain popular acceptance, the PKI has been able to capitalize on existing anti-colonial sentiment and has taken a strong stand on a number of issues which also form a part of the programs of other political parties. Thus, the PKI advocates abroga- tion of the Round Table Conference agreements with the Netherlands, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION termination of the activity of the Netherlands Military Mission, "restoration" of Western New Guinea (Irian) to Indonesian control, and nationalization of such foreign enterprises as the North Sumatra oil fields and the Bangka and Billiton tin mines. These pronounced aims of the PKI,,shared as they are with other political groups, appear to be only means to enhance the national standing of the party. More general tactics directed toward this same end are the publicly announced support of the-present Wilopo government by the PKI and efforts apparently undertaken in various localities to form a series of "Representative Councils" under PKI leadership. These united front tactics were justified in a party statement issued in explanation of the first Communist support rendered an Indonesian government since Madiun: The formation of.the Wilopo cabinet opened rather extensive possibilities to the PKI and the other people's organi- zations to work publicly; they need no longer perform under- ground activities as they did during the Sukiman...cabinet receding government7...This is the conclusion; in the present condition, tie PSI and the people have to choose one of these two; a democratic bourgeois government or a fascist bourgeois one.... On several occasions since the end of the war, the PKI has stressed the desirability of a united front. The PKI has also attempted in'the past year to seize the initiative in organizing celebrations of national holidays. At the same time that the PKI has endeavored to reestablish a patriotic reputation by positive action, it has refrained from outspoken opposition to the government's programs, thus trying to overcome a reputation for negativism. In conformance with this policy, the PKl.was relatively restrained in recent Parliamentary debates critical of the leadership of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense, and took care to deny complicity in the resulting anti- Parliament demonstrations. In paying lip service to respect for democratic institutions the PKI has probably also been concerned for its political future should anti-Communist military leaders seize a larger measure of control. The PKI- has attempted to appeal to all social groups, and has had its greatest success in the organization of labor. SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the PKI-contfolled trade union-n a e~ion, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and is an affiliate of WFTU. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activity was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION strikes in vital industries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were brought to a virtual standstill. Since that time, the Indonesian government has restricted labor activity through a series of committees to which labor disputes are to be referred for compulsory settlement. Although SOBSI organizations have refrained from disruptive activity in the past several months in conformity to the PKI program of cooperation with the government, a potential for renewed agitation exists. Among the more important other PKI front organizations in Indonesia are women's, youth, students, and peasants organizations, the People's Cultural League and the Indonesian Committee for World Peace. These groups echo the PKI program and propaganda in parlia- ment, communicate Communist propaganda to mass groups, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist causes, and participate in national conferences and international meetings of Communist front organizations. SOBSI and two peasant organizations are represented in the Indonesian parliament. Although there is no separate Chinese Communist Party organization in Indonesia, many of the same purposes are accomplished within the Chinese community by a separate series of front organizations. In addition to controlling completely the activities of the above organizations, clearly recognizable as Communist front groups, PKI members attempt to infiltrate other mass organizations. An article published in the official PKI organ in February 1951 on "The Role of the PKI and Mass Organizations" statess "Communists who are assigned to join organizations, such as labor unions which are under the leadership of Trotskyites or Social Democrats, are not to leave such organizations, for-that would mean that we were allowing these masses to continue under the leadership of those who are really enemies of the people.... Therefore, we Communists may not refuse to work in a mass organization, no matter how reactionary it is." Communist efforts are also made to infiltrate ministries of the government, the police and military forces. Apart from the known presence of Communists in the Ministries of Labor and Information, there is little evidence to indicate the degree of success enjoyed by the PKI to date in attaining this objective. Since the abortive Madiun rebellion in 1948, the PKI has, in general, refrained from violent activity. Nevertheless, the party controls several small armed bands and is believed to continue attempts to infiltrate other dissident organizations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -4- The PKI in the course of its past history was often divided in its leadership and evidenced the same lack of cohesion and direction that characterized most other Indonesian political groups. Today, fol- lowing the injection of considerable new blood into the party, there is every evidence that the PKI adheres closely to policy as transmitted through international Communist channels. Liaison is believed to be effected through the Chinese Communist Embassy and at international Communist meetings. Should the dictates of international Comnmmism so demand, the PKI today would probably not hesitate to reverse its tactics, even at the risk of weakening seriously its domestic position. III. CAPABILITIES The PHI today. is better organized and better led than at amy time in its past history. The party appears to be enjoying a considerable degree of success as a result of its policy of cooperation with the Indonesian government and its espousal of generally popular causes. As long as it adheres to this policy of united.front tactics its potential for expanding membership and enhancing its following would appear great. At the same time, the fact that the other major political parties advocate much the same program and are not faced with the PKI's constant problem of establishing' its identity as an indigenous party,. militates against the party's becoming so strong that it might participate in an Indonesian government, One major purpose of the party's united front tactics has been to assure that it will not lose its present parliamentary representation when general elections are held. It is not possible to forecast election results at this time, but judging from the Indian experience in conduct- ing elections with a largely illiterate electorate, the organization of the PHI, particularly among front organizations, will probably assure it representation disproportionate to its real popular support. As a vehicle for gaining sympathy for international Commnmist causes, the PKI is limited in its success among politically articulate Indonesians by a general awareness of the nature of.Cism and the role played by front organizations, and by suspicion of the motives of advocates of either side in the cold war. The party's appeal among the masses, in turn, suffers from a lack of awareness on.the part of most Indonesians of all but immediately pressing local problems. Nevertheless, PKI propaganda as delivered through the several front organizations capitalizes on the strongly nationalist sentiment of the people. Thus it is probable that the people as a whole are more susceptible to Communist propaganda influence than the more politically sophisticated leadership groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORu.TION It-is unlikely that the PEI-will in the foreseeable future be able to wage organized warfare against the Indonesian state, but it may be expected that all opportunities will be developed to subvert dissident groups with an eye toward future eventualities. The party does continue to possess the capability of disrupting economic life through the activities of the labor unions it controls, but such activity would run counter to the law and might jeopardize the reputation for Cooperation and concern for the natioial iriterOst that the party has been nurturing so Carefully. SECRET - SECURITY INF'OR)(ATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATIOK CCHMUNISM IN INDONESIA: ASSETS I. NU)IERICAL STRENGTH Estimates of Indonesia Commnmist Party (PKI) strength vary from 30,000-100,000 but no details are available. No separate Chinese: Com munist Party organization. is known to exist in Indonesia, although the. Chinese oomaunity, as noted below, possesses its own mass front organi zations. The PKI is strongest in Java and Sumatra and party activity seems best organized in the major cities, but little information is available concerning regional organization. Much of the leadership and probably a large portion of party membership are middle class intellectuals, but the bulk of party sym- pathizers are unskilled agricultural and industrial laborers and farmers. A majority of the party leaders have been educated or trained abroad, and Samaun, one of the PKI'S founders, is in Moscow where he is credited with playing a major role in Soviet planning for Indonesia. Other Indonesian Comnnuiists are known to be in Prague, Pei ping and Amsterdam. Beset by undistinguished and ineffective leadership throughout most of its history of three decades, the PKI in the postwar period has experienced a new vigorous direction on the part of both the overt Central Committee and its underground directorate. Party leadership today may be divided between a small group of older prewar members and a majority group of more recent leaders -- averaging.30-35 years in age -- who have ac- knowledged adherence to the party or front organizations only in the post- war period. While the government's security action of August 1951 against the Communists increased pressure on the party and for a time restricted its freedom of action, the most prominent and important leaders of the PKI escaped capture at the time, and many lesser lights have since been re- leased. There has been no evidence of dissension within party ranks in the past two years, and the present leadership appears prepared to under- take whatever action party strategy demands. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH No general elections have been held in Indonesia to date. The PKI occupies 15 seats (7 percent) out of 220 in the provisional Parliament. If satellite parties and fellow travellers are included, a total of 40 seats (19 percent) are controlled by the PKI. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Current PKI policy is to refrain from violent activity and to enhance its popular support through ostensible cooperation with the government and other political parties. Past experience in the post- war period, however, indicates that the party will not hesitate to en- gage in violent action when strategy so demands. In September 190 during negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands, the PKI undertook an armed uprising at Madiun in Republican held territory. Party strategy at that time was apparently aimed at precipitating a renewal of Dutch military action against the Republic in the course of which the PKI hoped to seize leadership of the Indonesian resistance. Premature action on the part of some of the rebelling units and prompt counteraction on the part of the Republic resulted in the suppression of the Communists after considerable loss of life. In August 1951, the Communists led-a raid on Tandjung.Priok, port area of Djakarta, in order to test the party's ability to execute this type of maneuver as well as the government's-capability of coping with disruptive activity. It was this action that hastened the Indonesian Govermment's decision to effect a series of security sweeps, in the course of which many prominent' Communists and fellow-travellers were arrested. The Indonesian Communists are believed to have infiltrated dis- sident organizations currently engaged in armed insurrection and may possess small armed bands of their own, but reliable information on this. subject is lacking. Judging from their conduct of and participation in non-violent demonstrations, Party members presumably would be available in major cities for conducting violent demonstrations.' Although the PKI probably has an organization for violent action and the quality of leader- ship is greatly improved over 191+8, the success of any large-scale insur- rection would probably depend on complete Conn mist subversion of existing dissident groups or units of the armed forces. PKI control of most or- ganized labor, the largest farmers' organizations and important youth groups might provide considerable backing for. whatever violent action the Party might undertake. - IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COWUNISIK The PKI enjoys the same freedom as other Indonesian political parties, but the Indonesian Goverment limits the extent to-which the PKI and its allied organizations can engage in propaganda attacks on friendly states and the degree to which it may express its international ties. Thus, pictures of international Communist leaders are occasionally prohibited at Communist rallies, and propaganda films of a flagrant- nature are banned. In August 1951 the Government, fearing another attempted coup, arrested mmaerous outstanding Commmists and fellow travellers. SECRET - SECURITY fl FORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Party's past experience with the ability of the Indonesian Government to curtail overt activity has presumably led it to form an underground organization. However, no details are known regarding the size or efficiency of such an organization. An elaborate array of front organizations and the probable existence of numerous undercover party members would seemingly enable the PKI to maintain its structural or- ganization and engage in limited activity in the face of Government re- pression of the Party proper. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The number of Commmnists in key industries is not known but is appreciable in view of the strength of PKI dominated unions. SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the trade union branch of the PKI, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and is an affiliate of the WFTU. It is represented in the Provisional Parlia- ment, where it holds four seats. SOBSI claims three million members, although its actual membership is estimated at about 800,000. Its largest affiliate is SARBUPRI, a federation of estate workers unions which cllma a membership of one million as against an estimated actual membership of 350,000. Other important SOBSI affiliates exist among ship, dock, rail- road, transport, sugar, and oil workers. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activities was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread strikes in vital in- dustries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were all brought to a virtual standstill. Because of the threat to security, strikes were banned by local military commanders in several provinces in late 1950, followed by a nationwide ban in February 1951. In October of the same year the ban was replaced by a comprehensive decree calling for a three-week cooling-off period and es- tablishing committees of government officials for the compulsory settlement of disputes where voluntary mediation failed. A series of disruptive har- bor strikes in March and April 1952 were settled by committee action. A strike of sugar estate workers in mid-1952 was called off only after the government threatened.to arrest strike leaders. For the last several months there have been no strikes by SOBSI organizations, apparently in response to the PKI's avowed policy of cooperation with the government. Attempts by leaders of various non-Communist parties, particularly the Socialist, Labor and Masiumi parties, to organize non-Communist unions capable of challenging SOBSI's domination of labor have been largely unr- successful. The lack of capable union organizers and funds and the desire of various party leaders to bolster their own political strength have thus far prevented the formation of a lasting united non-Communist federation embracing all non-Communist labor groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VI. CCH4UNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL. AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A. Front Organisations The most important Communist front organizations are described briefly below: 1. Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia (IPPI), Indonesian Youth and Students Union. This group claims a membership of 50,000 to 75,000, and is second in its field only to the Moslem youth organization. It is especially influential in the secondary schools and is affiliated with the international Students Union. 2. Pemuda Rakiat, People's Youth. With an estimated membership of 30#000 this is the most active politically of the numerous Indonesian youth groups. Pew.7da Rakjat is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Gerakan Wanita Indonesia'Sedar (GERWIS), Enlightened Indonesian Women's Movement. CERWIS does not possess nearly as extensive an organization as the older. women's organizations, although it is the most active politically. To date it has been unable to influence the national Congress of Indonesian Women to affiliate with Women's International Democratic Federation, of which GEIMIS is a member. ~. Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), Indonesian Farmers Corps. This group is strongest in Central Java and is represented in Parliament. Rukun Tani Indonesia (RTI), Indonesian Farmers Union. RTI, active in West Java and South Sumatra, and BTI are the two most powerful Indonesian farmers organizations. Plans are in the offing for merger of the two groups. Indonesian Committee for World Peace. This organization has branches in major cities and appeals to many non-Communist in- tellectuals. 7. Lembaga Kebudaiaan Rakiat (IEKRA), People's Cultural League. Apparently the successor to the Chinese-Indonesian Cultural league,. this group also has branches in major cities. The above groups all serve as instruments for ooammmicating Communist propaganda to mass groups, lend their names to the support of Communist causes, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION causes, and participate on behalf of Indonesian women, youth, etc., as the case may be, at international 'Communist conferences. Within the Chinese community the most important Communist organiza- tion appears to be the Min h She (People's Life Society), incorporating a great many women's, youth, educational, professional and sports associa- tions. Little detailed information is available concerning its activities, but it appears to be the most active organization today among the overseas Chinese community. When the Chinese Communist Ambassador arrived in Indonesia he was greeted by representatives of 180 Chinese associations, which may serve as an indication of the complexity of the organization of the Chinese community in Indonesia. In addition to the above group, perhaps a majority of the Overseas Chinese Associations ( Lug Hui), which have existed since the prewar period organized on a regional basis, have declared their support for the Communist cause. Many of these have been brought together in a series of Communist-dominated United Overseas Chinese General Associations. The Chinese schools are a further vehicle for transmitting Communist propaganda,, and a large number of these are known to be Communist-dominated. A majority of Chinese labor unions are believed to be affiliated with SOBSI, the overall Indonesian Communist labor organization. In North Sumatra, at least, the Chinese Communist Farmers Association is a member of the broad farmers front dominated by the Indonesian Communists. Few details are available concerning the operations, leadership or membership of this array of organizations. Chinese Communist leadership has been active in seizing control of a good many associations whose members were apathetic to the political implications of Commmist efforts. In some cases comparable non-Communist organizations exist, generally organized by the K[f, but in general, the Comumanist-dominated organizations are predominant in the overseas Chinese community. B. Infiltration of Non-Communist Organizations The fact.that many of the non-Communist mass organizations in Indonesia are inclined to the left and have programs that bear a striking similarity to those under Communist discipline makes it difficult to dis- tinguish all organizations that might properly be included in this category. It seems probable that the PKI attempts to infiltrate all such organizations. An article in the official organ of the PKI states, "It is the fundamental duty of the Communists to give gradual training to all mass organizations and to supply them with progressive leadership." This publication also declares, "Every Communist must work hard to unite all kinds of mass or- ganizations into one mass organization." It appears to be the PKI'ob jective gradually to merge infiltrated organizations into larger Communist- dominated front groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION It is doubtful whether any of the non-Communist mass organizations consciously support Communist programs, but there is often considerable agreement between the Communist and non-Communist groups. The distinction between the two groups is often only in the degree of eagerness to take sides in international issues and willingness to affiliate with inter- national Commiunist front organizations. VII. Ct7WUNIST INFILTRATION INTO COVERNMFNT A number of Commmnists are known to hold positions in the Ministry of Labor and Information and in their regional offices. The total number of Communists and Communist sympathizers in these offices is not known, but the ratio to total personnel is believed to be small. The arrests of August 1951 ferreted out a number of Communists and Communist sympathizers in the Ministry of Labor. Dialan Baru (The New Road), often cited as a guide for PEI members, declares, "The armed forces must receive special attention as the most im- portant instrument of national power. Armed forces cadres and personnel must be given special attention in line with their role as the most important instrument for the defense of the National Revolution." Although it.is.as- sumed that the PKI has attempted to infiltrate units of the armed forces, little evidence exists to indicate success to date. There are no known Communists or Communist sympathizers at the top levels of the armed forces. The same publication further states, "The police and associated personnel must learn the meaning of the National Revolution.... The police must be led by progressive cadres." Nevertheless, the mobile brigade,-national police force, is regarded as the most reliable of the Indonesian government security forces and there is no evidence of Communist success at subversion, VIII. COM1J ST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION ALtar , the national news agency is believed to be influenced by either Partai Murba, a so-called "nationalist Communist" party, or by the PKI,1 and a number of newspapers, avowedly independent, are believed to be operated by PKI members or sympathizers. Nevertheless, the fact that the Communists advocate many of the same issues that form part of the programs of major non-Communist parties and Con mmist publications share many opinions with the non-Communist majority of the press makes it difficult to assess Communist influence on public opinion formation. It would seem that the influence exerted by the Communists on public opinion media is limited and of much less importance than the impact on public opinion of the activities of Communist-dominated front organizations. 1. Adam Malik, head of Antares is thought to be a member of Partai Murba, but the possibility exists that Murba itself is today a PKI front. In any case, attitudes of the two parties on most issues are similar,. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IX. CC UNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Past experience indicates that attempts at infiltrating all political parties are probably made by the PKI. In.1948, several leading members of the Socialist and Labor parties joined the PKI in the Madiun rebellion pro- claiming themselves to have been Communists for a number of years. Little concrete information is available, however, to support the above assumption. Partai Mur_gb , which describes itself as "nationalist-Communist," has a program that differs from that of the PKI only in refusing to subscribe to a world Communist order. P~ Murba cannot be described as Titoist or Trotskyist, since it acknowledges a position of world leadership for the USSR. has four seats in Parliament, and has its own series of labor unions and front organizations. Failure of the PKI strongly to attack Murrba suggests the possibility that since the death of its founder, Tan Ma]aka., who strongly opposed the PKI, the party may have been infiltrated by PKI members. X. C 4IUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Newspapers and Periodicals B Herah (.Red Star) is the official publication of the PKI. Formerly restricted to Party members B_t nn Herah is now available to the general public, but its circulation is not Down. The- most important of the other Communist newspapers is Sin Po, with a Chinese edition of about 20,000 circulation and an Indonesian edition of about 15,000 cir- culation. There are seven other known communist dailies, none of which is believed to have a large circulation. In addition, a large number of Communist or pri.st books and pamphlets are sold at virtually all bookstores in Indonesia. B. Publishing Houses B Merah and all important PKI propaganda publications, in.- cluding translations of foreign Communist writings, now are published by the. Jaiasan Pembaruan (Modern Institute) in Djakarta, a corporation in which the PKI is reported to have a financial interest. Jaiasan Pembaruan may have replaced the translating committee Komisi Penterdjemah) formed. in March 1951 by members of the Politburo. This committee was charged with translating books and essays on Communist theory such as Lenin's State. and Revolution, and Liu Shao-ch'i'c On the Party. Three other known Communist publishing houses are the "Widjaja" publishing house and the Life Press Publishing Company, both in Djakarta, and the.Hwang... Lung (Yellow Dragon) Publishing Company in Makassar. C. Ccumunist Propaganda from Abroad The Soviet magazine Nej Times and the Soviet novel Star, both in English, have been seen on sale in Medan, Sumatra. Other specific foreign SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 33 - Communist publications available in Indonesia are not known., but trans].a- tion of Soviet writings is a constant part of PKI propaganda efforts, and a great number of Chinese Communist publications, including textbooks, are distributed among both the Chinese and Indonesian comumities. The Soviet radio devotes one hour a day and Pei ping radio a half hour. daily to broadcasts in Indonesian. The effectiveness of these programs, which is difficult to judge, is limited by the fact that only-about 230,000 radio sets are registered in Indonesia. -- II. FINANCIAL CONDITI Party dues are collected monthly on a sliding scale in proportion to income, but do not exceed 1- percent of gross income. Details concern- ing other sources of Party revenues, including possible subsidies from abroad are not known. The PKI has had some difficulty in the past in financing its publications, but organizational capabilities of the party do not seem to have been hampered by want of funds. Demonstrations or- ganized by the PSI and its affiliates appear well-supplied with posters, etc. It does not appear that the party will suffer in the foreseeable; future from financial difficulties. XII. SOVIET_SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the USSR nor the East European satellites maintain diplo matic missions in Indonesia. There is a Taos representative and a Czech consul-general in Djakarta, however, both of whom are reported to be en- gaged in political activity. Commmist China has an embassy in Djakarta and consulates at Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, Banjermasin, and Djogjakarta. The.embassy staff is reported limited to fifteen persons, and in July 1951 the Indonesian government refused the entry of sixteen additional members. No details are available concerning the consulate staffs. In 1951 the Chinese Communist representatives were active in or- ganizing demonstrations on the part of the Chinese community. The poor reception accorded this activity by many Indonesians has caused greater restraint to be exercised so that the band of the Chinese Communist embassy in such affairs in the past year has not been obvious. There is no Soviet-Indonesian Friendship Association, and the Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association appears to have been superseded by the People's Cultural League, the size of which is not known. SECRET --SECURITY INFORMATION. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11,... XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No meetings of Communist international organizations have been held in Indonesia.' The following is a list of meetings of Communist international or- ganizations held abroad, which are )mown to have been attended by Indonesian Communists during the past two years: Meeting International Students Union Executive meeting, Peiping World Federation of Democratic Youth Executive meeting, Budapest lste Known Size Indonesian Representation April 1951 1 May 1951 1 World Federation of Trade Unions Conference,. Vienna Berlin Youth Festival World Federation of Democratic Youth Annual Council Meeting, Berlin Moscow Economic Conference International Student Conference, Bucharest World Peace Council, Berlin Peiping Peace Conference Netherlands Communist Party Congress Vienna Peace Congress Czech Communist Party Cbngress, Prague July 1951 2 August 1951 53 August 1951 April 1952 July-August 1952 unknown July 1952 unknown September 1952 about 10 November 1952 2 December 1952 16 December 1952 2 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -15- XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NE MORK Close relations are maintained by the PKI with the Communist parties in the USSRR, the Netherlands, and Commnuiiat China. Leaders of the PKI have received training in these three countries, and, as noted above, Samaun, one of the founders of the PKI is in Moscow. Perhaps the most striking example of compliance with international Communist directives took place in 1948. Indonesian delegates to the Congress of the Communist Party of India and the Calcutta Youth Congress held early that year reported home the adoption of a policy of armed in- surrection. In September, following also the return of Muso, Samaun'a lieutenant, from Moscow, the PKI instigated the Madiun rebellion. A more recent example of direction from abroad was the criticism of SOBSI by WFTU representatives at the 1952 SOBSI national congress for not maintaining proper liaison with WFTU international headquarters and il t a . for failing to report SOBSI activities in sufficient de Representatives of WFTU and foreign Commuunist trade unions have ng from attended past congresses of SOBSI, and a sixteen man delegation held Peiping is known to have been present at the national you in Djakarta in November 1952. Apart from liaison that is assumed to take place at such meetings, it is believed that the Chinese Communist embassy is used as a channel of communication for the PKI. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-665.! COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MALAYA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . 1 'I. Objectives ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASSETS ... . . . . . . ... . . 5 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 5 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action . 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 7 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . .. . 9 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . . 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . 10 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION CCUMUNISM IN MALAYA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES Communist guerrillas, 95 percent of whom are Malayan Chinese, have been carrying out hit-and-run warfare against the British and their supporters in the Federation of Malaya since mid-1948, when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its fronts and labor organiza- tions were banned. Documents captured near the beginning of the guerrilla campaign'indicated that the objective of the MCP was to drive the British out of Malaya. This was to be accomplished in three successive phases by: 1) disrupting the economy 2) setting up governments in "liberated" areas 3) joining up liberated areas. The inability-of the party to achieve its first goal -- disruption of the economy -- in the first three years of the campaign has according to other, more recent, captured documents, brought about a revision of party policy from one of indiscriminate and un- bridled terrorist activity to an attempt to guide guerrilla warfare away from activities harmful to the interests of workers and peasants and toward military targets. This move, combined with others, is calculated to broaden the base of party support. MCP recognition of the necessity for this changed course of action has aroused some speculation, unsupported by any evidence, that the party, in admitting this initial failure, may also have reached the conclusion that it is incapable of achieving its ultimate objective through its-own efforts, but must preserve itself as a guerrilla force until an outside power can undertake the "liberation" of Malaya. During the past six months it has become increasingly apparent from the lessened number and changed character of terrorist incidents that the MCP, probably in response to progressively more effective pressure by British Security Forces, has put into effect its new strategic policies. The MCP's aim -- to gain the support of laborers and peasants -- has required modification, rather than abandonment, of guerrilla warfare tactics. A party directive indicates that military and police targets may be attacked, but that the destruction of dwellings and public utilities, and the seizure of food without compensation is to be discontinued. The destruction of mine and estate property is also prohibited, since it affects the livelihood of laborers. Urban organizations, particularly labor unions, are to be infiltrated or, if necessary, secret unions formed. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 The MCP's chief guerrilla organization, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) is estimated to have from 3,000 to 5,000 members. Grouped into twelve regiments, the MRLA.usually utilizes the company or the platoon as its operating unit. The MRLA is supported by the MIN YUEN, or Peoples Movement, which is responsible for furnishing supplies, intelligence, and recruits to the MRLA. Rather than a single organization, the MIN YUEN is a collection of organizations controlled by party executives for work among the masses. Among the MIN YUEN organizations are groups of armed men-numbering about 4,000, cooperating closely with the MRLA. It is through MIN YUEN organizations that intelligence is secured, men recruited, and funds obtained. While some financial support comes from regular contributions by members'of MIN YUEN organizations., the bulk of the funds collected apparently comes from the "protection" money paid by Chinese businessmen, estate owners, and tin mine operators. The MIN YUEN probably numbers upwards of 10,000 members. MCP activity capitalizes on anti-British sentiment and, to some extent, the economic rivalry between the Malayan Chinese and the paramount British economic group. Since 1949 the nationalist character of the party has been stressed in propaganda., but there is little indication that this line has been effective. Despite the receipt of one small shipment of arms from Thailand, there is no evidence that the MCP regularly receives material aid from outside Malaya. There is reason to believe, however, that some trained leaders have been infiltrated from China. Propaganda circulated covertly by the party'follows the lead of Peiping and Moscow broadcasts for the most part and it is likely that these broadcasts serve as one of the chief means of liaison between the MCP and both these Communist centers. Malaya is not characterized by the existence of either a strong unified nationalist movement or depressed economic condi- tions that could be exploited by the Communists. The guerrillas do not have widespread public sympathy, and the movement appears to be inspired by a hard core of Communists acting in response to the policies of international Communism. The party has sustained itself largely by intimidation of the Malayan Chinese community. The recent change in-the MCP's strategic policy away from wide- spread terroristic activity and the intimidation of peasants and laborers is in part at least an admission of the failure of this course of action. The effectiveness of new emphasis on gaining Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the support of peasants and. laborers, conducting a more selective terrorist campaign, and infiltrating labor unions and other organizations, cannot yet be evaluated. Over the past four years the British, utilizing military political, psychological, and socio-economic measures, have 'successfully contained but have failed to suppress the Communists. In addition-to the difficulties of guerrilla warfare in the jungle, the failure of the Malayan Chinese to cooperate in the anti-guerrilla campaign, political apathy, and the lack of a Malayan national consciousness have contributed to the inability of the British to eradicate the guerrillas. The diversity of Malaya's population has prevented the development of a national consciousness and hampered British attempts to arouse an anti-Coimnunist spirit based on nationalism. The largest elements of the population, the Malays (49 percent) and the Chinese (38 percent) form separate, mutually antagonistic communi- ties. Major causes of the friction are the Malay fear of eventual domination by the energetic Chinese whom they regard as alien, and the Chinese resentment of the favored position traditionally accord- ed the Malays by the British. In contrast with the non-committal attitude of the Chinese toward the present struggle, the Malays support the British, forming the bulk of the police and staffing most of the lower echelon administrative posts. Traditionally oriented toward China as the Motherland, the Malayan Chinese have sought to preserve Chinese culture through their schools and their family life. Loyalty to the Motherland is basically cultural rather than political, however, and the majority of Malayan Chinese are committed neither to the Communist regime in Peiping nor to the Nationalists in Taipei. Apart from a few leaders, political apathy has extended to Malayan affairs, the primary Malayan Chinese interest in Malaya being .commercial. The Malayan Chinese attitude is also due to the emergence of a strong government in China to which the overseas Chinese feel that they may eventually be able to look for protection of their interests; to the fact that the majority of the Communist guerrillas are Chinese; and to the British failure to demonstrate clearly the ability to eradicate the guerrillas. Moreover, the Chinese fear local reprisals should they aid the British, or the punishment of their relatives or the confiscation of their property in China should they openly support an anti-Communist drive. The new Communist course of action is likely to pose new problems to the British, particularly since the infiltration of labor unions is to be attempted. Nevertheless, it is likely that Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY.INFORLATION the British, now organized more effectively and imbued with better morale under the leadership of Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, will continue as during the past year to make slow progress against the guerrillas. It is unlikely, however, that the British will be able to wipe out the guerrillas completely; at the same time it is improbable that the guerrillas, without outside aid, can make the British position untenable. The eventual outcome of Malaya's Communist problem is probably to a large extent dependent upon events outside Malaya. SECRET - SECURITY INFOM TION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Although more than l5,000 persons, or about 0.3 percent of Malaya's population, are controlled or strongly influenced by Communism, the MCP itself is estimated to have only 3,000 to 6,000 members drawn almost wholly from the'peasant and laborer class of the Malayan Chinese community. Some 600 to 800 members are estimated to constitute the "hard core" of the party and to have been active in the MCP for more than ten years. During World War II, these hard core members took part in the British-aided guerrilla organization known as the Malayan People's Anti- Japanese Army. Probably not more than 1,000 members have been associated with the party for more than five years. The actual leaders of the MCP are virtually unknown, but from the fact of continued guerrilla resistance over the past four years and from the statements of surrendered guerrillas it would appear that these leaders are determined.,-aggressive., well-trained men. Despite the strong leadership of the party, however, some of the rank and file members have become discouraged at the continual hardships of life in the jungle and have surrendered to British Security Forces. Nevertheless, few of those surrendering have been associated with the movement for a long period, and it is probable that the hard core of the party has remained virtually intact for the past four years. -5- COMMUNISM IN MALAYA: ASSETS II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH No general elections have been held in the Federation of Malaya. The MCP, banned in mid-1948, has, of course, entered no candidates in the few municipal elections. that have been held. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Communist forces are estimated to consist of 3,000 to 5,000 members of the Malayan Races Liberation Party (MRLA) and approximately 4,000 armed members of MIN YUEN organizations. Despite guerrilla casualties in surrendered, captured and killed, amounting to half the estimated Communist force over the past four years, total guerrilla strength continues to be set at a constant level by British sources because of steady recruitment by the guerrillas. Lack of arms apparently prevents any expansion of guerrilla forces. All Communist support organizations, necessarily covert, are blanketed into the MIN YUEN or People's Movement. It is from these organizations that the MRLA receives recruits, funds, food, and SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6- information. The MIN YUEN has a strength estimated at 10,000 or more. MIN YUEN organizations and their functions are: . 1. Self Protection Units -- to supply food 2. Protection Corps -- to sabotage and ambush 3. Armed Work Force -- to propagandize and organize 4. District Unit -- to propagandize and organize 5. Suicide Squad --- to assassinate reactionary leaders 6. Labor Protection Corps -- to lead strikes, to sabotage, to propagandize 7. Reserve Corps -- to train executives 8. Executive Committee of the Masses -- to gather information and food 9. Sympathizers Cells -- to train prospective party members, to gather funds and food, and to act as couriers. The guerrillas have employed hit-and-run tactics against police stations and villages, ambushed patrols, sabotaged transportation and public utilities, and attacked rubber estates and mines. Newly adopted tactics will, according to a captured directive, confine such attacks to military and police targets, or to the property of "reactionary capitalists." In the past, the guerrillas have received support because of their ability to intimidate the rural and to some extent the urban populations. However, the recent resettlement of some 400,000 Chinese "squatters," who were living on the fringe of the jungle, into controlled and protected "new villages" has removed one major source of guerrilla support. Henceforth, the guerrillas must rely more upon Malay villagers, estate labor, and urban dwellers. Whether the newly adopted policy of paying for, rather than simply requisitioning food, and of safeguarding the interests of peasants and laborers will prove effective in winning voluntary support remains to be seen. The guerrillas have been unsuccessful in achieving the economic disruption of Malaya, but their tactics have nevertheless affected adversely the economies of both Malaya and the United Kingdom. Prospecting, on which the future of the tin industry in part depends, has been prevented for the past four years.. Rubber trees have been slashed, and a large- scale program of replanting made impossible. Nevertheless, current production has not been seriously affected, and it will probably be a number of years before Malayan production feels the full affect of the present situation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The expense of the anti-guerrilla campaign to the Federation has prevented the undertaking of needed economic development projects, while the expense of maintaining troops in Malaya and of contributing to extraordinary expenses of local government has constituted a financial drain on the United Kingdom. Guerrilla warfare has hampered the rapid achievement of political innovations desired by the populace and sponsored by the government as a means of encouraging Malayan nationalism as an anti-Communist force. Thus, while political progress toward autonomy has been slowed by guerrilla warfare, it is the opinion of high-ranking officials that political advance is nevertheless imperative if Malaya is to remain non-Communist. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Government banned the MCP, its fronts,-and its labor organiza- tion in mid-1918, when it also adopted Emergency Regulations placing extraordinary powers in the hands of the administration. British Security Forces consist of about 10,000 soldiers and 60,000 regular and special police. In addition, a part-time Home Guard of 140,000 has been recruited. The Home Guard and most of the special police are employed on static guard duty. In addition to the military campaign, the Government has undertaken special measures under the Emergency Regulations, as well as broader social, political, and economic steps designed to create a climate unfavorable to the growth of. Communism. By the end of 1952, more than 100,000 Chinese "squatters" living on the edges of the jungle and beyond administrative control had been moved to protected "new villages" beyond the easy reach of Communist forces that had been intimidating them as a means of getting food, funds, and information. During 1952, as in previous years, several thousand Malayan Chinese and a lesser number of Indians were deported from Malaya, and additional thousands were detained. Moreover, in several instances entire villages were punished for refusing information to Security Forces or ignoring warnings to cease sheltering or feeding guerrillas. Under the Emergency Regulations all inhabitants have been required to carry identity cards; carrying arms without a license has been made a capital offense; the movement of food has been restricted; pro-Communist newspapers have been banned; and the solicitation of money or food for the guerrillas has been made a capital offense. An additional important regulation has placed in the hands of a comptroller the power to direct any person into the police or military forces or to. perform any other duty. The announced British aim has been to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth and, as a means to that end, to do everything possible to establish the required economic and social conditions. The Federation Government's SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION efforts in this direction has been given a sense of urgency by the belief of high-ranking Federation officials that such measures will provide a long term solution to the problem of Communism. Inter- racial harmony is seen as a prerequisite to the development of Malayan nationalism, and organizations, including political parties, embracing all communities in Malaya have been encouraged. Local elections have been held in several municipalities, while some public members (as opposed to government officials) of the Legislative Council have been given respon3ibility for government departments as a first step toward cabinet government. Citizenship provisions have been relaxed to allow a much larger number of Malayan Chinese to qualify, and agreement has been reached that a certain proportion of Malayan Chinese will be allowed in the Malayan Civil Service. In the field of education, regarded as a critical element in "Malayanizing" the Chinese, the decision has been taken to establish national schools based on the Malay and English languages. Economic development, although slowed by the present guerrilla prcblem, has aimed at expanding the national income by improving and diversifying agricultural production, encouraging light industry, and improving power supply and communication. Propaganda measures, both with the guerrillas and with the civilian population, have been intensified recently. Leaflets, posters, radio, and mobile public address systems are used. One of the most effective measures has been the use of surrendered guerrillas to recite their unfortunate experiences with the Communists to a group of villagers. The recent change in tactics by the MCP would seen to indicate that measures taken by the Government have,.at a minimum, been effective in containing the guerrillas. The party's new tactics, however, will force the Government to adopt new methods, particularly since the in- filtration of labor unions is to be attempted. Since police training has been directed toward the conduct of operations rather than the collection of intelligence it is possible that the new Communist methods may achieve some success before being checked by the Security Forces.. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR A policy of encouraging responsible trade unionism was inaugurated shortly after World War II in Malaya. In the early stages, the Malayan Communist Party gained control of the labor movement, organized general labor unions on a regional basis and finally established a top-level executive body known as the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), which claimed affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The P1FTU was declared illegal in June 1948. Subsequently, many unions rapidly disintegrated. and many labor leaders went underground. Despite the fact that organized labor remains a Communist target, the Federation Government continues to encourage trade unionism as a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -9- means of developing social responsibility and combatting Communism. Under government guidance, trade unions have been rebuilt and a modest nucleus of non-Communist unions now exists as a basis for further expansion. A Malayan Trade Union Council, which was formed in March 1950, subsequently affiliated with the International Confederation of Trade Unions. . No labor unions in Malaya are known to be Communist infiltrated at the present time and no Communist influence on the leadership has been observed. While Communists have forced strikes among rubber tappers in certain areas of Malaya, Communist pressure was exerted from outside the unions rather than from within. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL. CULTURAL. AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There have been no indications of Communist influence in social, cultural, or professional organizations. It is highly probable, however, that there has been some Communist infiltration of Chinese secret societies. .VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known Communist infiltration into the Government of the Federation of Malaya. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is some evidence pointing to the infiltration of the faculties of Chinese schools by operatives of the Chinese Communist Party. The placement of'pro-,Communist teachers in Chinese schools appears to have been accomplished at times with the connivance of school trustees. Such infiltration appears to be designed not only to spread Communist doctrine but to recruit students to go to China for completion of their education. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES There is no known Communist infiltration of any of the Malayan political parties. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Publications of the MCP, usually attributed to various of the District Committees, are mimeographed news sheets circulated clandestinely or covertly posted in a public place. Publications which have appeared with some regularity include Freedom NNeews, Workers' ress, and Workerst and Students' News. The numbers copies c rrccuu ated i s own. At one time, large numbers of Communist or pro-Communist Chinese publications were imported from Hong Kong. The police, however, have SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 10 - now undertaken to prevent such trade, and overt importation has ceased. There is presumably some clandestine circulation of such publications. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No information concerning the financial condition of the MCP is available. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the USSR and its European satellites, nor the Pei-p'ing regime, maintain diplcmatic, trade, or cultural missions in the Federation of Malaya. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No Communist international organizations maintain installations within Malaya, and no conferences of such organizations have been held in Malaya.. Communist sources have reported the presence of.Malayan representatives at meetings of various Communist international organiza- tions. Since 19148, however, these representatives have been Chinese who at one time lived in Malaya. No representatives have left Malaya specifically to attend a particular meeting, or could be said to represent any particular Malayan organization. Many have been deportees. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The MCP is thought to maintain its closest ties with Communist organizations in Thailand, and in Sumatra, Indonesia, and with the Chinese Communist Party. It is assumed that at the present time instructions to the MCP are relayed through Pei-p'ing and Moscow radios, which have not only given propaganda support to.the MCP but have, prior to the adoption of a new propaganda line by the MCP, indicated what that line should be. The beginning of a campaign of violence in 19148, already favored by some MCP leaders, was given impetus by the decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India, held concurrently with the Calcutta Youth Festival sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students in early 19148. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.5 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 1 Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 IV. Supplementary Data. on the Chinese Communists in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action . 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . ... . 7 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . 7 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . . 8 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9 X. Communist Propaganda Media 9 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . 10 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . 10 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . 10 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The leadership of the Philippine Communist Party apparently does not believe that the situation will favor a drive for immediate power for some years to come. They regard the present period as a preparatory one and place main emphasis on organizational and propaganda work. Their principal immediate objectives in rough order of priority, appear to be: 1. To win over the masses to the Commmmist cause. 2. To discredit anti-Communist parties and leaders. 3. To weaken the close ties existing between the Philippines and the US. 4. To prevent further dissipation of the party's military arm. Although the Philippine Communists consider the workers and the landless peasants as the backbone of their movement and plan to concentrate their organizational propaganda efforts on them, they are also striving to enlist the support of bourgeois groups with a popular front program. In order to facilitate its work of laying a basis for a seizure of power, the Philippine Communist Party has outlined a program calling for the intensifica- tion of what it calls "legal" and "illegal" activities among the masses. (Although all Communist activities are illegal in the Philippines and have been driven underground, the Communists consider as illegal only their military activities and activities directly relating to the support of their military arm.) Their program consists of (1) revival of popular front political parties; (2) infiltration of cadres into Government agencies.,- i.e.... schools, military forces, into strategic industries, and into or- ganizations and groups, i.e., labor unions, peasant organizations, women's and youth organizations, etc.; (3) increased indoctrination of the rank and file of the movement; and (4) intensification of propaganda activities. Party planning apparently envisages the possible negotiation of an amnesty settlement with the Goverment which would enable it to expand its non- military activities. Tactics for the 1953 Presidential and Congressional elections seem to call for support to candidates allegedly sympathetic to Communism. Communist propaganda planning calls for an intensification of the "peace" and "national independence" themes. "Peace" appears designed to bring about a weakening of public support for the Government's anti-Communist policies in both the domestic and foreign fields. "National independence" SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOFOIATION will attempt to place blame for all the ills of the Philippines on US policies and US influence on its "puppets" -- the major Philippine political parties. The Communists are charging that US military and economic aid programs are disadvantageous to the Philippine masses. Both themes are to be infused into all party activities and, with suitable adaptations, directed to all classes of the populace. Communists are using their military arm, the People's Liberation Army (HMB), for disrupting Government operations, e.g. assassinations of prominent anti-Communists, sabotaging the economy, procuring supplies, and as an agency for recruiting the more violent malcontents among the masses. At present, however, a policy of conserving HIS strength and limiting its operations appears to be in effect. It may be that in the face of continued Government pressures and in order to gain from the Government freedom of operation for their organizational and propaganda programs, Philippine Communists might further reduce their military activities. III. CAPABILITIES The Philippine Communist Party, which in 1950 was strong enough to carry on widespread and well-coordinated armed rebellion, had by 1953 reached a low point in revolutionary potential and no longer constituted a serious threat to the Philippine Government. The party's once formidable military arm, the 11MB, now has capabilities for only small-scale raids and ambuscades, while the party is reduced to attempts to infiltrate and organize front groups in the face of very severe government repressive measures. Moreover, the party is suffering from a serious shortage of capable executives and theoreticians, its organizational apparatus is scattered and harassed by increasingly effective Government intelligence operations, its propaganda output is small and distributed with difficulty, and its finances are in a precarious state. Whether the PKP can again develop sufficient strength to threaten the stability of the Philippine Government depends mostly on factors outside the control of the PKP. For the future strength or weakness of the PKP hinges on (1) whether or not the Philippine Government continues its strong anti- Communist programs; (2) whether or not the US can maintain effective eoo- nomic and military aid to the Philippines; and (3) whether or not the Philippine Government increases its efforts to alleviate social and economic ills. In the event of fraudulent elections in 1953 with accompanying civil disorders and a loss of popular support for the Government, or the accom- modation of one or the other major political parties to amnesty negotiations, a situation probably would be created in which short term Commumist objec- tives and planning could operate with a fair degree of success. However, Communist tactics and planning appear to envisage a lengthy period of time as necessary before they will be in a position to effectively challenge the Philippine Government with a resurgence of their military arm and SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFO) ATION widespread mass support. With the uncertainties at present threatening the continuance of a strong anti-Communist policy on the part of some Government leaders, and in the absence of an effective Government reform program, it appears that the defensive strategy of the pKF is well suited to Philippine conditions through 1953. IV. SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE CHINESE CCBIIUNISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES Because of excellent security practices, very little information re available concerning the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the Chinese Communists in the Philippines. Nevertheless, to judge by their known ac- tivities, their objectives include the following: 1. To gain the loyalty and financial support of the Chinese community -- numbering about 200,000 -- for the Chinese Communist cause, and, conversely, to subvert and discredit Kuomintang forces in the Philippines; 2. To construct an effective espionage network; 3. In general, to establish a firm mass base for more violent revolutionary action in the future, and; 4. To support the Philippine Communist movement in any manner which does not jeopardize fulfillment of the first three objectives. Available evidence indicates that the Chinese Coinmmnists in the Philippines place highest priority on the objectives involving the Chinese community. In order to attain these goals, Chinese Communists employ a variety of tactics, including infiltration, some terrorism, and propaganda. Up to now, Chinese Communists have concentrated on infiltration of Chinese or- ganizations, particularly secret societies, chambers of commerce, and schools. However, some Chinese Communist infiltration of intelligence agencies of the Philippine Government has been reported. Chinese Communists extort contributions from rich Chinese merchants by threats of violence to them or their relatives in China. Some propaganda materials, most of which apparently are smuggled into the country, are distributed among the Chinese oommmity. Apparently, the Chinese C,om~munists in the Philippines still have fairly considerable capacity for future espionage, infiltration, and propaganda activities. The Philippine Government round-up of Chinese Communist suspects in December 1952 evidently did not cause material damage to the Chinese Communist apparatus in the Philippines. Nevertheless, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the Philippine Government and the Kuomintang organization in the Philippines are united in opposition to Chinese Communist activity there. The great majority of the Chinese in the Philippines apparently are either anti- Communist or politically neutral. The ability of Chinese Communists in the Philippines for forming front groups or labor unions is, very limited. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 COMMUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: ASSETS 1. NUMERICAL STRFaTGTH The membership of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) probably numbers about 3,000 to 5,000. There are about 8,000 to 10,000 Huks, the Peoples' Liberation Army or military arm of the PKP, who are not PKP members and an estimated 40,000 members of Communist-dominated mass organizations. The number of people influenced by partial, but significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organizations is unknown.. Altogether, Communists and those strongly influenced by Communism are estimated to account for 0.2 percent to one percent of the total population. Chinese Communists are estimated to number 2,000-3,000 but there are no data on the number of members of organizations controlled or influenced by them. PKP membership increased from 1946 to 1950 but declined during 1951 and 1952; there has been a great increase in Chinese Communist strength since 1946. Approximately 90 percent of PKP members and following are located in Central and Southern Luzon with the balance in Northern Luzon and scattered localities in the Visayas and Mindanao. The leadership has come primarily from Manila, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan in Central Luzon. Chinese Communists are primarily in Manila and the towns and cities of Southern Luzon, Cebu, and Iloilo. The bulk of the PKP membership and sympathizers are peasants while Chinese Communists are primarily merchants, school teachers, and administrators. Party members are for the most part poorly indoctrinated in Communist theory,. have little education, but as a result of continuing governmental suppressive action, are probably reduced now to a loyal and hard working core. Morale and discipline among ordinary party members is generally good, although some instances of financial dis- honesty and sexual profligacy have occurred. The fanatical well- indoctrinated "hard core" probably amounts to 20 percent in the case of the PKP and 30 percent for the Chinese Communists. In the case of the PKP, few have been members more than ten years. The top leaders of the PKP apparently are not of high caliber but the Chinese are of generally good quality. According to William Pomeroy, the.American Communist who served with the Huks for two years, the various leaders displayed poor executive ability, poor ideological training, or lack of flexibility. Taken as a group, the PKP leadership has suffered from shortages of good executives,and theoreticians since at least 1948. On the other hand, most top PKP leaders are hard working, resourceful, and hardened by the conditions of harassment under which they live. They-have close connections with the common people and are responsive to their motivations. For the most part they Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 are fairly young men in their late thirties or forties, and many have had only military experience during World War II and afterward as an occupational background. The Communist Party is not a legal political party in the Philippines and cannot run candidates on a ticket of its own. During the last general elections the PKP called for a boycott of the elections. Chinese Communists in the Philippines apparently do not vote and do not have an electoral strategy. All political parties in the Philippines receiving votes in the, last elections are avowedly anti-Communist. The military arm of the PKP, the Peoples" Liberation Army (HMB) or Huks, numbers between 8,000-10,000. Not all of these are active at any one time. Approximately half are farmers who only occasionally participate in Bilk raids, ambuscades, etc. BMB units operate as guerrillas with the strength of individual bands varying between five and 100. They have no heavy weapons but an ample supply of small arms in fair to poor condition. So far as is known, the HUB receives no military support from outside the Philippines but may receive military advice from China. However, there is no definite information on the number or duties of Chinese Communists operating with the HUB.. Opposed by approximately 23,000 government troops, the HMB retains capabilities for small scale raids, ambuscades, kidnappings, assassinations, and the dissemination of Communist propaganda. As a result of their depredations, nearly one-third of total government expenditures goes to the armed services. While the HMB does not threaten the stability of the government, they nevertheless are a drain on its financial resources, hinder economic development, and tend to disrupt the food supply situation. HMB strength and activity is concentrated in Central and Southern Luzon; their plans for expanding operations in the central and southern islands apparently have been abandoned for the present. In the face of the increased effectiveness of government military action against them, it is doubtful whether the HMB can expand its activities in the near future unless in the event of a fraudulent national election in 1953. HMB operations are hindered also by the improved discipline of the Philippine Army which has had the result of gaining the cooperation of many townspeople and peasants. While a sizeable number of local residents in Central Luzon remain sympathetic with the HMB or are SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 fearful of HMB reprisals, large numbers are now supporting the Army's efforts to eliminate HMB activities. Still, approximately 40,000 members of PKP mass organizations and Communist sympathizers aid the HMB in the collection of intelligence, procure food and recruits, work at HMB "production bases" in the Sierra Madres where root crops are grown, or act as couriers. They enable the HMB to sustain its present rather low level of activity. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TGNARD COMMUNISM The Philippine Government and both major political parties are anti-Communist and no overt Communist activities are permitted. Although the PKP has not been outlawed by Congress, in 1951 a Philippine Court ruled that the PKP was a seditious and illegal association. Although this decision has been appealed, the Supreme Court probably will uphold the lower court's ruling. In any event, all PKP members and members of auxiliary organizations are subject to arrest. All front organizations are underground and severely hampered by government agencies. In areas of the Philippines where Communists are most active, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail is denied to them. All Chinese Communist activities are also forbidden and individual Chinese Communists are subject to deportation to Taiwan on the sole grounds of Communist membership. Very little is known of the "underground" activities of Filipino or Chinese Communists. PKP organizations apparently are poorly trained and organized and with the exceptions of aiding Huks, collecting intelligence, and passing on word of mouth propaganda, do not appear to be very active. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR During 1951, Communist influence in the Philippine Labor move- ment was reduced drastically, and at present there are no Communist unions or known significant infiltration of labor unions or key industries: The possibility of Communist infiltration exists. Party members have been ordered to make lists including all factories, the organizational status of laborers and leaders therein, and the problems of the laborers. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Communist front organizations apparently have been identified by the government and driven deeply underground in the Philippines. There appears to be no known significant infiltration of non-Communist organizations by Philippine Communists. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Since the suppression by the government of the large front labor organizations in 1951, the largest mass organization probably has been the National Peasants Union. It has an estimated 4,000-10,000 members located mostly in Central Luzon and was formerly the largest peasants' organization. For the type of organization it is, it appears to have had good leadership, and were the present severe restrictive measures of the government to be relaxed, it probably could be considerably expanded. Two other known Communist mass organizations are the National Women's League and the National Youth League. In 1951, the former had a reported membership of 1,500 and the latter 2,200, but again, these organizations are underground and very little is known of their present activities. All known Chinese Communist organizations have gone underground. These include the Hwa Chi Comrades Association, the Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaborators League, and the K'ang Fan. There appears to have been a significant infiltration of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in several cities and reports indicate a possible infiltration of the leading Chinese anti-Communist association -- the Anti-Communist Anti-Soviet Salvation Association. Present Communist planning calls for the organization and infil- tration of various mass organizations -- youth, women, intellectuals, etc., but to date there is no indication that they have made significant progress with these plans. From Cavite Province comes a report that a '"peace" organization (Katahimikan ng Mahirap - Peace for the Poor) was being organized. Party theory conceives of two main types of infiltration activities: "legal" and "illegal." "Legal" infiltration activities consist of working toward a policy-making position within an organiza- tion, subtly exerting influence on its policies, and standing-by to replace an "illegal" cadre if the latter.is arrested. "Illegal" activities include industrial sabotage and recruitment of new members for the HUB. A party member sometimes engages in both types of activities simultaneously. There is no known significant infiltration of the government by Communists. That some infiltration has occurred was evidenced by the court conviction in May 1951 of an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs for participation in the Communist rebellion, and in 1952, of a Nacionalista Congressman on a similar charge. There are reports of suspected Communist sympathies on the part of fairly prominent SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Administration officials, but these have not been confirmed. In the past there has also been some Chinese Communist infiltration of the Military Intelligence Service. There is no known Philippine Communist influence in Philippine public-opinion-forming circles, although a few journalists are reported to hold views sympathetic to Communism. There is some Chinese Communist. penetration of Chinese schools and possibly one radio station. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES There is no known Communist infiltration of the non-Communist Philippine political parties. Current Communist periodicals are the Mapagpalaya (The Liberator), Titis (the Spark), and Freedom. They appear at uncertain intervals and none probably has a circulation exceeding 10,000. They are clandestinely mimeographed in several or perhaps all-Party Regions at HMB camps. Information on Chinese Communist publications is not available. Two publications, Hungary, and The Working Youth in the Rumanian People's Republic, have been received unsolicited by individuals in Manila and Dumaguete and by the Philippine Education Company. There is no regular importing of Communist publications from abroad, but occasionally US Communist Party publications and Chinese Communist newspapers are smuggled in, the latter from Hongkong. There are no Communist radio stations in the Philippines, with the possible exception of one station in Manila (the Kuo Tai Station) which in October 1952 was organized by an alleged Chinese Communist. Further information on this station is unavailable. There are no foreign Communist broadcasts directed specifically at the Philippines. The reception and size of audience of Peiping's daily 30-minute broadcast in English to Southeast Asia or its programs in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Amoy dialects to overseas Chinese are unknown. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION In recent years PKP theoreticians have emphasized the significance of finance and supply operations, both of which are called finance in PKP terminology. Data about the actual financial status of the PKP as of January 1953 are not available. Although foreign sources, notably Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the US Communist Party and Communist-dominated American labor unions, furnished fairly considerable financial aid to the PKP in the prewar period, the PKP apparently has received very little material assistance from abroad since world War II. In 1951, the party leadership promulgated a "one year program" for the PKP during fiscal year 1952, and expected party revenues for this period were budgeted at the fantasti- cally high figure of US $4,621,000. The captured American Communist, William Pomeroy, testified in mid-1952 that only "a tiny fraction" of this sum was collected. Party finances in 1952 probably were below those during 1950, for example. The PKP "Statement of Income" for the first six months of calendar year 1950 lists total party income for that period as US $10,750. Apparently, the greatest source-of income is from raids and extortion practices. (In contrast, according to the PKP "Statement of Income," only $28.50 was realized from the sale of Titis in the period April-June 1950.) Data on the income of the Chinese Communists are unknown. Several business. firms are controlled by the Chinese Communists, but revenue figures from these sources are not available. Probably the over-all health of the Chinese Communists is better than that of the PKP, in view of the generally good financial standing of the Chinese community. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet or'satellite establishments diplomatic or otherwise in the Philippines. XIII. COMMUWIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Since the suppression of the various Communist front organiza- tions in the Philippines, there has been no evidence of any affiliation of Philippine groups with Communist International Organizations. There are no installations or meetings of these latter within the Philippines and no known receipt or transmission of funds to or from them. Philippine Communists, however, have attended several Congresses or Conferences held abroad. One Filipino reportedly attended the meeting of the International Union of Students in Peiping in 1951, and Teodosio Lansang (alias Manuel Cruz) attended the Berlin and Vienna Peace Council meetings in 1951 and 1952 respectively, and the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping in 1952. There was no known attendance at such meetings by Chinese Communists in the Philippines. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The internal communication network of the PKP is a primitive one consisting primarily of the use of women couriers. The Philippine Army is supposed to have located the main north-south courier route on Luzon Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800080001=4 which ran down through the Sierra Madres. Inter-island communication is by boat, and here there are infinite possibilities for'the Communists to choose. There are reports that important leaders have radio . receivers and that the Chinese Communists had established a transmitter in the Batanes Islands. Chinese Communists apparently have excellent covert communication and courier systems. Contacts with the outside, of which China is most important and US next, must be clandestinely arranged. The many islands and the long coastline of the Philippines offer many places for-couriers.to land. There are reports of couriers landing in Manila, Albay Province, and various places in the Sulu Archipelago. landings from unidentified submarines off the east coast of Luzon are frequently reported but are to date unconfirmed. Most couriers apparently are Chinese who, after their arrival in the Philippines, manage to move about from place to place with no great trouble. The correlation of some PKP activities with general Communist strategy in the Far East possibly is effected at international Communist conventions and through couriers, but detailed proof of this is lacking. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-665.6 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THAILAND OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . i i OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . ... . 1 II. Tactics .. .. .. 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? ? 2 ASSETS ... . . ? 4 I. Numerical Strength . ? . .. . 4 He Electoral Strength . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? . . III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . .. .. .?. 6 V. Communist Influence in Labor . ? ? . ? . . . ? . . ? ? 7 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . 8. VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? ? . . . . . . 10 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 10 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 10 Z. Communist Propaganda Media .. .. ? . . . 10 XI. Financial Condition .. .. .. .. . ... 13 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . .. . . . ? 14 XIII. Communist International Organizations . .. . . . . ? 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network ? ? . ? . ? ? . . .. 16 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 COWUNISM IN THAILAND: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES The immediate goals of the Communists in Thailand are not easily discernible at the present moment, since the current vigorous anti- Communist drive of the Thai-authorities has presumably forced Communist leaders to reconsider their past strategy. Before November 10, 1952, the date when the Thai Government began its most recent attempt to suppress Communist activity, the imme- diate Communist objectives in Thailand appear to have been: 1. To expand and improve their own organizations, in preparation for the time when domestic events or external assistance might make a direct drive for power possible. 2. To mobilize all varieties of domestic sentiment against the present ruling group. 3. To undermine popular support for US policy in Asia and for Thailand's pro-American international orientation. 4. To render material and propaganda assistance to Communist-led rebels in Indochina and Malaya. In the current crisis, these objectives have probably been sub- ordinated to the overriding need to ensure the survival of key personnel. If the Thai police persevere in?:their suppression of overt Communist activity, Communist strategy will probably be altered to give greater attention to underground organizational work and less attention to propaganda activity. Two distinct Communist organizations have developed in Thailand: the Thai Commmnist Party (TCP) and the Chinese Communist Party in Thailand (CCP(.T)). The TCP is small and appears to be dominated by the larger and better organized CCP(T). Two distinct parties are maintained, however, because of the long-standing antipathy with which many Thai regard the Chinese and the desire to create the appearance of an indigenous Communist movement. The CCP(T) has attempted to gain strength by recruiting personnel for training, both in Thailand and in China- by soliciting funds for local expenses and for transmission to the mainland; by penetrating Chinese schools, labor unions, business organizations, and regional associations; and by utilizing newspapers, some of which are subsidized, to carry propaganda. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 The Thai Communist Party remains small and relatively ineffectual. Its efforts have been confined largely to propaganda work. Because the Party, as such, is illegal, its overt activity has been carried on in the face of official tolerance or apathy. Although the TOP has met with some success in creating "front" organizations to carry its message -- most notably the National Peace Committee of Thailand -- agitation has had an impact only among certain groups of people. Teachers and students, writers and newsmen, some lower grade govern- ment officials, political opposition elements; and recently some Buddhist groups have been the major targets. Both Thai and Chinese elements have used a variety of appeals in a "broadside" propaganda barrage designed to contain themes attractive to diverse groups. The principal themes-have been: 1.' Denunciation of US "imperialism" -- responsible for the "sufferings" of the Thai people -- which is leading Thailand toward war. 2. Denunciation of the Thai Government -- for allowing itself to become the "puppet" of the US; for failure to provide for the people's welfare while exploiting labor and taxing the popula- tion heavily; for suppression of political rights and for unequal treatment of minorities; and for its internal corruption. 3. Emphasis on the strength of Communist China. 4. "Demonstration" of the compatibility of Buddhism and Communism. In recent months there seems to have been an intensified effort to expand activity into the provinces, both to infiltrate administrative services and to build a mass base among the peasantry which has thus far been unresponsive to the Communist message. This change may be partly attributable to more effective police control in Bangkok, but it indicates the essentially long-range nature of Communist activity. Two other Communist groups are concerned chiefly with creating conditions in bordering countries which might, eventually, promote local Communist objectives. Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist groups in northeast Thailand are supporting the rebellions in their own countries, securing money, arms, and supplies. These elements, however, appear to be operationally distinct from both the TOP and the CCP(T). Communist groups in the southern provinces, largely an adjunct of the COP(T), are aiding Mayalan Communist guerrillas who occasionally enter Thailand.for rest and resupply. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Local Communist groups appear to receive guidance, and probably some financial support, from Chinese Communist liaison groups and through the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, but the precise pattern of external direction is unclear. Prior to the initiation of repressive measures by the Thai Government in November 1952, the CCP(T) had gained control of most Chinese labor unions, but never utilized its capability of instigating minor violence through strikes and sabotage. The TCP had, during the preceding year, increased the range, quantity, and quality of its propaganda activities. The future capabilities and prospects of the Communist movement will be directly determined by policies of the Thai Government. As long as the present governing military coup group remains cohesive, its control of the country will be firm. Police and military units are believed capable of controlling any overt action initiated by local Communists. Although it will probably not be possible to suppress the covert dissemination of Communist ideas or to eliminate underground organizations, there is no prospect for a successful overthrow of the government as a result of local Communist activity. The policies which the Thai Government will pursue will, in turn, be heavily conditioned by external developments. Its performance in the past has been somewhat ambivalent. Official adherence to an anti- Communist policy at home and support of the West internationally con- trast with apparent toleration of any Communist activity which was not judged adirect threat to the present regime. Disclosures of Communist plotting uncovered in the course of recent police actions seem to have alarmed some top government leaders, and the present repressive policies may be continued. On the other hand, an extension of Communist control in adjacent areas in Indochina, Burma, or Malaya would be apt to produce sudden retrenchment. The Thai Government has historically sought to ride the balance between contending forces in Asia,. accommodating its policies to the dominant foreign power. Its future actions might well be governed by similar expediential calculations. If the Thai Government considered Chinese invasion imminent, it is probable that only direct and force- ful intervention by the US to protect the integrity of Thailand would prevent a swift reorientation. At such a time, indigenous Communist elements. would find renewed opportunity to exploit existing Thai discontent with the Government and general Chinese resentment over the repressive measures previously imppsed on that large and strategic minority. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -4- CCHMUNISM IN THAILAND: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Several Communist parties operate in Thailand and total membership figures cannot be determined.. The Thai Communist Party (TCP) is quite small, with an estimated 50-100 members; the overwhelms majority of Communists in Thailand belong to minority groups. The Chinese Communist Party in Thsilm3 (COP(T)) is the largest organization, with an estimated 2,000 members. Viet Minh and Cambodian Communist cadres have been active in the northeastern and eastern provinces, but the. number of Party members is unknown. The Overseas Chinese in Thailand have been subject to strong pressures for adherence to Communism and as many as 100,000 may be controlled or strongly influenced by Communists. If 25,000 (one-half the estimated Indo- chinese refugees) is added to this total to allow for -the possible incidence of Communists or sympathizers among the Indochinese minority, the percentage of the total population of Thailand under Communist discipline or strongly influenced by Communists would reach a probable maid. mm: of 0.7 percent. TCP members have been recruited primarily from professionals, with lawyers and writers predominating. The TCP also exerts some influence among a s:oa11 group of students at Bangkok universities. The CCP(T) is largely composed of businessmen and merchants; laborers comprise the bulk of the Chinese population controlled or influenced by the COP(T). Most of the Indochinese refugees were originally farmers and laborers but most are now merchants and artisans due to the Thai government's restrictions on entering some occupations. Communist agents have been able to control and organize many Indochinese by infiltrating and dominating village and welfare. organizations. The center of known Communist strength is in the Bangkok metropolitan area where the TCP and the CCP(T) are believed to have covert headquarters. Two other areas of concentrated activity are the southern border region and the northeastern section of Thailan : Ban Phai, Hhon Kaen, and Nong Nhai are reported to be centers of the Communist apparatus in the northeast; Songkhla and Hat Yai are principal centers in the south with much activity along the Sadao-Betong frontier region. Much of the membership of the TCP appears to be opportunistic. In contrast, probably the entire membership of the CCP(T) is "hard-core." The Communnist organizers among the Indochinese minority are presumably well-indoctrinated Viet Minh agents of the "hard-core" category. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The leadership of the CCP(T) is vested in a central executive com- mittee of, according to one report, 36 members. A special characteristic of this central group is that many of its members are businessmen of long residence in Thailand; very few are believed to be professional revolu- tionaries with a long history of Communist activity. It is believed that membership in the CCP(T) increased as a result of the Communist conquest of China to the present estimated figure of 2,000. Insufficient evidence precludes analysis of the quality of TCP leadership or the stability of party membership. There probably has been little change, however, in the total strength of the TCP since 19166. The number of Communists in the Indochinese minority grew enormously during the 19166-1950 period as a vast number of refugees. entered Thailand. Membership figures among this group have probably been fairy stable for the past two years (1951-1952). II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Even though political parties have been prohibited in Thailand, a recent Thai law specifically outlaws the Communist Party as well as member- ship in any type of Communist organization. This restriction plus complete goverment control over. electoral procedures virtually eliminates Communist participation in elections. As a further handicap, the great majority of Communists in Thailand are found in minority groups and are largely without voting privileges. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Communists have not adopted violent action as a means of further- ing Communist objectives in Thailand. Violent action, however, has occurred in the southern Thai provinces where raids, murders, and kidnappings are- used in intimidating the local Chinese populace to supply and finance the Malayan guerrilla forces operating' along the Thai-Malay border, Cammniaist activities in Thailand have so far been largely limited to fields of organization, propaganda, and espionage. There have been no strikes or sabotage, and, except in the, southern provinces, no murders or violence of any kind that can be definitely attributed to Communist elements. Nor do the.Conmunists appear to be in a position to carry on this type of \direct action in the near future. Although during World War II some Communists were probab involved in' the Free Thai resistance movement, no indigenous Communist military resi>l,tanoe organization developed in Thailand, and no Communist insur- rectionary attempts have-ever occurred in Thailand. Rumors of'CommrUnist involvement in various cope d!etat have never been confirmed. If any SECRET - SECURITY. INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 MCUT - SECURITY INFORMATION -6- Coiivmmi.sts were involved, it was probably on an individual basis and not as the result of a concentrated Ccmmmist effort to overthrow the govern, Mont, In fact, it has apparently been Communist policy to avoid involve- ment in the periodic political oou that are attempted in Bangkok. In view of the apparent lack of preparation for military action, no armed Communist insurrection seems to be contemplated in the immediate future. Various unconfirmed reports, however, describe the organizing of a Conamist underground armed force designed to accomplish sabotage or guerrilla operations. Probably some tentative plans have been drawn up and perhaps a small number of weapons have been cached, but there. is no evidence of the existence of a Communist para-military organization in Thailand. Government restrictions and police surveillance seriously limit Communist ability to arm and train a pare-military force in Thailand. No reliable information is available regarding Commmnist plans for a military resistance organization in case of war. The estimated maximmm number that could be organized for this type of activity is per- haps 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese. Although a few CCP(T) leaders are reported to have had guerrilla experience in China, most of the leadership for guerrilla operations would have to be imported. Arms which were acctmYUlated immediately after World War II are reported to have been shipped to Indo- china to supply the Viet Minh between 1948 and 1950, and perhaps others have been sent to Malaya. Present stores of weapons and equipment for guerrilla action are believed to be negligible. IV. GOVERNM T POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The military group heading the government since 1948 has always been avowedly anti-Communist. Implementation of governmental repressive measures, however, has been sporadic and largely ineffectual and Communist propaganda efforts (the major activity) multiplied. In November 1952, the government's anti-Communist efforts were in- tensified, a law was passed outlawing Communism, and the police began a series of mass arrests of Communists and fellow-travelers. Three major Communist-sponsored newspapers were closed in December, In January 1953 arrests were continuing. The government has announced intentions to round up all Ca uxunists and sympathizers in TE+ai land. As of January 1953, no front organization was operating in Thailand since many Communist or fellow traveler leaders were in jail or hiding from the police. Communist propaganda output had dwindled to a trickle as police censorship over newspapers was strictly enforced, a number of editors were arrested, and several leading Communist dailies were suppressed. Communists still dominated the large Central Labor Union, but- government sponsorship-of a rival trade union presented a serious challenge to continued Communist control of the major portion of organized labor in Thailand. SECANT - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Strict warnings by security police accompanied by' an increase in patrol activity have usually sufficed to prevent the formation of anti- government or protest demonstrations by Communists or any other group. Only in the southern provinces on the Malayan frontier has Thai authority been seriously endangered by extensive Communist activity. A gradual in- crease in police efficiency in this area, however, has been discernible recently, and continued cooperation with Malayan authorities could probably reduce this threat. Although the Thai government did not outlaw membership in Conmmnist organizations until November 1952, the Communist organizations in Thailand have in effect been "underground" for at least five years. The Communists have been fairly efficient in covert party activities such as arranging illegal entries into Thailand, sending students to China for training, and smuggling of limited amounts of goods and arms to Indochina and Malaya. Espionage is probably well developed. V COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The numerical strength of Communists in various occupations is-not known. The Conmuunist-controlled Central Labor Union (CLII), however, repre- sents a majority of the workers in the important rice milling and rice ex- porting industries and the majority of all stevedore workers. Other oc- cupational areas in which the CLU has organized unions include tugboats, merchant marine, streetcars, oil companies, saw mills, match factories, textiles, the tea trade, the Bangkok vegetable growers,,the Makkasan rail- road shopworkers, tobacco factories, ice factories, bakeries, watchmaking and goldsmithing, wood and metal processing, various service industries, hotels, restaurants, coffee shops, and laundries. Only about 2 percent of the labor force Thailand is organized. Of this amount somewhere between 50-75 percent is organized in the CLU which had about 50,,000-m re in 1952. Approximately three-quarters of the strength of the CLU is in the Bangkok-Thou Buri area and 95 percent of its members and leaders are believed to be Chinese. Since February 7, 1949, the CLU has been a member of the WFTU. The WFTU does not maintain an office in Thailand and contact between CLU and WFTU is often concealed. The Executive Committee of the CLU is believed to control four geographic trade union federations with approximately 50 local branches: (1) the Bangkok Federation of Trade Unions, (2) the Chachoengsao Federa- tion of Trade Unions, (3) the Ubon Federation of Trade Unions, and (4) the Songkhla Federation'of Trade Unions. The Executive Committee of the CUT reportedly also has immediate control over some local unions in areas where no federation has been established. In addition, a number of local unions are not members but are affiliated with the CLU. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 The Thai Government's continued antagonism to the CLU, expressed through its active sponsorship of the rival Thai National Trade Union Congress, is serving to reduce the preponderant position of the CLU. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A. Front Organizations Since the end of World War II a number of Communist-front organi- zations have been reported in Thailand. The great majority of these failed to develop beyond the initial planning stage, and claims of ex- tensive membership have not been substantiated. No Thai front organizations are known to be active at present. On the other hand,.a few Chinese associations of long standing are now Communist-dominated; these remain active and are likely to survive the current anti-Communist drive of the government. 1. Communist-sponsored fronts. A student organization called the Union of Thai Students (UTS) with a claimed membership of 3,000 affiliated with the world-front International Union of Students (IUS) in September 1951. In January l953'the strength of this organization was estimated to be a maximum of.80-100. The Thai government discourages political activity among. students and no student movement not sponsored by the government is likely to gain much strength or importance. The UTS has been of little consequence; if it still exists it is probably located in Bangkok. The National Peace Committee of Thailand (NPCT) was organized in 1951 to support the Communist-sponsored peace petition. The Communists have used the NPCT to organize and foment opposition to the policies of the Thai government and as apropaganda outlet. A number of prominent journalists, opposition politicians, students, writers, and other in- tellectuals dominate the organization. It is affiliated with the World Peace Council and delegates were sent to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping in October-1952. Thai representatives have also attended other "peace" meetings. Until recently, membership was re- ported to be from 70-100. As of January 1953, however, most members of the NPCT were in jail awaiting trial. Police repressive measures will probably limit the usefulness of this organization in the future. Several women's organizations have been organized in the past by both Thai and Chinese Communists; they failed to gain popular sup- port, however, and no women's "front" organization is known to exist at present. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 2. Organizations captured by Communists. The Chao Chou Hui Kuan (Swatow Association with 7,000 members is the largest of seven-Chinese regional or dialect associations in Thailand. The leaders of this organization are Communists or sympathizers and the association has strong contacts with individuals and groups in China. The majority of the members are in the Bangkok metropolitan area and the-leadership has considerable influence in the Chinese community. It publishes a monthly magazine, operates several schools, sponsors a small clinic which provides cheap medical care for the poor,.sponsors athletic' events, and performs countless welfare tasks. The Pao Te Shan Ttang (Philanthropio Association) with head- quarters in Bangkok is the most important and most influential organi- zation of its kind among the Chinese. Its board of directors contains some prominent Communists and sympathizers.. Nearly all of its philan- thropic work is carried on in Bangkok but it is nation-wide in so far as contributions come from Chinese throughout the country. More than any Chinese association, this welfare association has the means and the opportunity to contact most of the Chinese in Thailand. Its prestige and charitable work make it an effective medium for the spread of Communist influence. Be ':Non-Communist Organizations Infiltrated by Communists The only significant non-Communist Thai organization penetrated by the Communists and fellow-travelers is the Press Association of Thailand (PAT) composed of newspapermen and journalists from non- government publications. Since the PAT strongly opposes the govern- ment's press censorship policy (which policy directly affects the effeotiveness..of Communist propaganda), this organization has been utilized by Communists to denounce the government. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Bangkok), with a membership of 5,000 individuals and firms, includes both pro-Kuomintang and pro- Communist cliques. It. is the most influential Chinese organization in Thailand and often assumes the role of spokesman for the Chinese community. Despite strenuous efforts Chinese Communists have been unable to dominate this organization, though they still remain a significant minority within it. .Penetration and domination of the _ Chinese Chamber of Commerce would enable Communists to exercise a strong influence among the Chinese minority in Thailand. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known Communist influence at policy levels of the Thai government or any of its agencies. Frequent rumors of contacts between certain government officials and Communist agents are without substantiation. .VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Communists have been able to achieve only limited success in penetrating or controlling public opinion forming circles in Thailand. The only appreciable influence of Communists on. education is through the CCP(T) which controls a few Chinese schools. Apparently efforts have been made by Communists to infiltrate Buddhist organizations,.but so far these attempts have been unsuccessful. Soviet bloc films are shown occasionally in a limited number of theaters in Bangkok and the. provinces. Careful government control of the local broadcasting system has prevented any use of this medium by Communists, The prevalent custom in Thailand of permitting considerable leeway to individual newsmen makes it possible for-fellow-traveler writers (often.subsidised by the Communists) employed by neutralist and uncommitted newspapers to inject Communist propaganda into the non-Communist press. However., it should be noted that it is often difficult to distinguish between non-Communist criticism of the government and Communist propaganda. Ix. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON;-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Political parties as such are prohibited in Thailand and the only legal political organization is the pro-government bloc in the National Assembly. Communist influence in that body is either totally absent :or negligible. The government has alleged that the Free Thai followers of ex- premier Pridi Phanazrong are influenced by Communism and that these individuals represent.a cohesive political opposition movement: Although it is true that several former Pridi-ites are prominent fellow- travelers, it is believed that the majority are not pro-Communist. Inasmuch as there is no longer a formal Free Thai organization, Communist tendencies have become largely a matter of individual predilection. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Communist propaganda content in-Thailand follows the current party line quite closely with special adaptations for the local situation. Daily items for Chinese and Thai publications usually are furnished by the New China News Agency (NCNA)'and Radio Peiping. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11 - Several daily newspapers regarded as party organs are supported by the Communists. In addition, a number of fellow traveler publications and newsmen apparently receive subsidies from the CCP(T) or the Soviet Legation. A few Communist films have been imported into Thailand; the principal theater exhibiting this type of film is the Sri Ayuthia in Bangkok. A. Newspapers and Periodicals Name Circulation Publisher - Remarks 1. Communist Ch'uan Min Pao 6 000 Ordered t , o cease publi- cation by Thai government December 1952. Nan Chen Pao 1,000 Puangohon Ordered to c ease publi- cation by Thai government. December 1952. 2, Pro-Communist Daily Mail 10 000 Prae Kha C , o o., Ltd. Khao Phap 4,000 Phim Thai 15 000 Thai Pha itk , n an Co., Ltd. (reportedly CCP(T) controlled) Chung Yuan Pao 10-12,000 Chung Yuan Wan Pao 12,000 Kuang Hua Tsao Pao 3,500 Kuang Hua Pao 3,500 Lok Mai (weekly) Thai Kan Phi m Press Phim Thai Wan Chan (weekly) Thai Ph itk an an Co., Ltd. SSCR$T - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Siam Samai (weekly) Thai. Phanitkan Co., Ltd. Siang Thai (weekly) Ordered to cease publication by Thai government in December 1952. Yuk Mai (fortnightly) Thai Sathit Press Akson San (monthly) B. Imported Publications Most imported propaganda material is in Chinese, printed in Peiping, Shanghai, or Hongkong. Smaller shipments of Communist publications are received in Thai and English, and a relatively insignificant proportion of imported propaganda material is in Russian. The major Communist publication outlet for Thailand is the "Overseas Chinese Book Store" in Bangkok, which carries about 600 assorted titles of books, magazines, and other publications. At various times the government has banned the importation of specific Communist publications but a large variety continued to be shipped in without restriction and sold openly by the Communist book- store. In December 1952, however, the bookstore was raided by the police and many items were confiscated. Government restrictions may limit the usefulness of this outlet in''the future. The Soviet Legation distributes a semi-weekly Thai-language information bulletin which includes articles on Communist ideology, life in the Soviet Union, verbatim accounts of speeches by Russian delegates in the tflJ, and official propaganda. The Viet Minh organization in Bangkok disseminated propaganda until suppressed by the Thai government in 1950. However, a few Viet Minh pamphlets published in Rangoon have circulated in Thailand. All domestic broadcasting stations are government controlled, thus precluding any Communist influence. Several programs from Communist stations abroad can be heard. in Thailand. Moscow Radio broadcasts two half-hour programs daily in English and Radio Peiping has two daily programs in Thai, each of one-fourth to one-half hour duration. Programs in Chinese and English SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 13 - can also be heard on this Chinese station. The size of the listening audience is unknown. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The TCP and the CCP(T) apparently have adequate financial re- sources for their present limited programs, although no information is income* available on Communist elements neThailandaalsonistiunkn~? Vietnamese Some Within Thailand, funds are obtained from numerous sources. revenue is undoubtedly derived from membership fees, labor union revenues, and private donations. Also profits presumably accrue from trading transactions of party-controlled business firms and from the sale of party publications. Several Chinese business firms have apparently been established specifically to.provide financial support. These include the Fah Dan Thai Co., Ltd, and the Andar Company which market Soviet, Chinese Communist,.and satellite goods. The Andar Company's branch in Hongkong is reported to have handled gold shipments to Bangkok for use in defraying party expenses. The "Overseas Chinese Book Store" in Bangkok was established to sell party publications. Although informa- tion.is lacking on the amount of financial support given by these business undertakings, it is known that at least in part they subsi- dize Communist information services in Thailand. Supplies and funds extorted from Chinese rubber growers, in the southern provinces are used locally to support the Communist guerrilla bands operating along the Thai-Malay border. Reports indicate that this region probably is being well organized in support of Communist activi- ties. The parties derive funds from external Communist sources as well as from their activities within Thailand. The Soviet Legation reportedly imports currency in the diplomatic pouch for the financial support of Communist activities. Also Chinese Communist officials are believed to have brought funds to Bangkok for CCP(T) operations. It is not clear, however, whether, on balance, the Communist movement in Thailand is the beneficiary of outside financial assistance or a source of revenue for other elements in the. world Communist con- spiracy. The funds regularly solicited or extorted from Chinese residents in Thailand for transmission to Communist China could conceivably much larger than any funds received by the TCP and the CCP(T) from other parties. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 14 XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS No Communist regime maintains a diplomatic establishment in Thailand except the Soviet Union. The USSR is represented in Thailand by a Minister and Legation in Bangkok. The Legation occupies 108 Sathon Road, Bangkok, which formerly was a hotel building. In addi- tion, 6 Krung Kasem Road houses the Eksporthleb Office and provides accommodations for the. business staff of Eksporthleb. The offices of Sovexport Film and TASS are at 21 Tung Mahamek, Bangkok; each has a Russian representative in charge. The ECAFE office in Bangkok usually has two Russian employees; in the past they had contacts with the Soviet Legation. The total number of Russians at the Legation, including families,. remains about 30 to 40, only five of whom claim diplomatic rank: the- minister, three secretaries, and a.commercial attache.. The remainder of the Soviet Legation personnel are called "officials" on.their appli- cations for police identity cards, but it is assumed-that some of then have duties at least as important as the diplomats. The business staff of Eksporthleb remains about two although the wives and older children of these officials occasionally work in the office. Since the Legation's overt activities, with the exception of official functions, are confined almost wholly to propaganda, it.is- believed most if not all of the personnel are engaged in propaganda activities. The Soviet Legation issues a Thai-language semi-weekly bulletin on a rather irregular basis. It is believed that certain books- containing basic Communist doctrine, which have appeared during the past several years, were subsidized by the Legation. In addition, it is be- lieved that certain ideological instructions and special feature arti- cles are provided Thai fellow-traveler and Communist publications.- According to various reports, translations of such works have been done on a contract basis by Thai, several of whom are minor government offi cials.. It is likely that the Soviet Legation subsidizes certain Thai fellow-traveler publications since they obviously could not exist on receipts from their limited circulation and advertisement, and the Thai Communist Party is not believed to be able financially to support the large number of such publications being printed. The Eksporthleb office keeps close contact with the Legation and it is possible that income from Eksporthleb is utilized for subsidizing propaganda activity. Certainly Eksporthleb's existence could not be justified by the extent of its business. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION- - 15 XIII. COIAMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No Communist international organization maintains a branch office or other installation in Thailand, and no meetings of these organizations have been held within the country. Local Communists and fellow-travelers, however, have attended meetings abroad to an increas- ingextent during the past two years. Few if any of these delegates have returned to Thailand. Recently, when members of the largest and the most publicized delegation to an international front meeting evaded police restrictions and departed for Peiping, the government announced that legal steps would be taken upon their return. No funds are known to have been received by local Communists from international organiza- tions, but it seems probable that at least part of the, travel expenses of the representatives abroad is paid by international organizations. It is not known whether Thai organizations have contributed to the sup- port of Communist international organizations. Attendance of local Communists at meetings of international organizations held abroad is summarized below: Meeting Date Size of Local Representation Berlin Peace Conference Feb. 1951 2 delegates International Union of Students Conference, Peiping Apr. 1951 1 observer Berlin Youth Festival Aug. 1951 4 delegates International Union of Students Council Meeting, Warsaw Sept. 1951 1 delegate Youth League Meeting, Moscow Sept. 1951 1 delegate World Peace Council, Vienna Nov. 1951 3 delegates Preparatory Conference for Asian and Pacific Peace Conference, Peiping June 1952 2 delegates SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Size of Local Meeting Date Representation Extraordinary Session, World Peace Council, Berlin July 1952 1 delegate Asian and Pacific Peace Conference, Peiping Oct. 1952 11 delegates XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NET-WORK Bangkok is probably the center of the Communist communication. network in Thailand and may be the center for Southeast Asia. Because use of regular mail is considered unsafe, the Communists rely on courier facilities and radio communication. The Chinese Overseas Bookstore is reported to be the center of. communications between Bangkok and "under- ground" Communists in the provinces, and a CCP(T) courier system appears to be operating efficiently and regularly between Bangkok and Songkhla in southern Thailand. A clandestine radio network has reportedly been established by the Communists in Thailand, for both internal and external communication. Although non-government transmitters are illegal, a number are in operation, many of them owned and operated by Chinese commercial firms to transact' business outside the country. Some of these Chinese-operated transmitters are. probably used by the CCP(T).Communists in Bangkok and .Hat Yai are reported to have radio communication with Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore. Assertions that the Soviet Embassy operates a radio transmitter seem plausible but are thus far unconfirmed. The Chinese Communist Party in Thailand (CCP(T)), as a branch of the CCP in China, maintains close relations with the parent body. Without.. exception, the leaders of the CCP(T) have received training in China. High-level Chinese Communist intelligence and propaganda offi- cials from a liaison office in China are frequently reported on covert visits to the CCP(T) organization in Bangkok and in the southern Thai provinces. Although the precise pattern of external direction cannot be determined, rumors of reorganization of' the CCP(T), intensification of its propaganda and espionage activities, and fund-raising efforts frequently coincide with these reported visits. The Thai Communist Party (TCP), on the other hand, apparently has the most direct contact with the Soviet Legation in Bangkok of any Commu- nist group in-Thailand. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269.R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Vietnamese Communist cells in eastern Thailand have closer ties with Viet Minh groups across the border than with China or the TCP. In the southern provinces, the Communist organization (predominantly Chinese) seems to coordinate its efforts with the guerrilla activities of the Malayan Communists, indicating direct cooperation between what are, in effect, two branches of the.CCP. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.7 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, JAPAN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CON TENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 III Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . *.D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ASSETS . . 6 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . 6 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 13 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism 21 Ve Communist Influence in Labor 23 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and 24 Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . 28 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. . . 29 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 33 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . , . . ? . . ? . . . . , 37 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . .. . . . 40 XIII. Communist International Organizations . .. .. .. . 42 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . 1 43 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS,AND CAPABILITIES In compliance with the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) currently seeks as its principal short-term objective to undermine the alliance between the United States and Japan. In pursuit of this general objective, it seeks in particular to discredit the Japanese peace treaty, the agreements under which US forces are stationed'in Japan, and all efforts to improve Japan's capacity for self-defense. Simultaneously, the party seeks to develop attitudes favorable to an orientation toward the USSR and Communist China or at least to promote and strengthen neutralist attitudes. The JCP does not ignore domestic objectives; rather it seeks as far as possible to link them to the-anti-US campaign. Where the achieve- ment of a domestic goal conflicts with the policy dictated by the inter- national interests of the .USSR, it is the domestic goal that is sacrificed. Barring a change in the international policy of the USSR, there appears to be no immediate liklihood that the JCP will alter its objectives or their relative priority rating. Simultaneously with the pursuit of its general objective, the party is embarked on the covert preparation of a para-military organiza- tion to be employed when and as required in the international interests of the USSR. The current program of the JCP is a dual operation in which a new policy involving extensive underground activity is being pursued side by side with an overt popular front policy. The party is, thus: 1. Attempting to secure the widest possible popular following, and 2. Creating an underground apparatus, including a para-military organization, in preparation for the ultimate implementation of a program of violent action. A. Popular Front Tactics The groups to which the Communist Party directs its appeals are so numerous as to include almost all Japanese except the large scale industrial and financial interests, the national leadership of the Liberal Party which controls the government, and to a lesser extent the leadership of the conservative-opposition Progressive Party. The Communists have devoted particular attention to workers, farmers, youth, and intellectuals. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Elements in the Japanese situation which the Communists seek to exploit in the effort to secure members and sympathizers and to cultivate attitudes favorable to the achievement of their objectives include: 1. Fear of war and, specifically, fear that Japan may become involved in war not in pursuit of its own interests but as an involuntary participant in the conflict between the US and the USSR. 2. Resentment of the US position in Japan including the presence of US troops, military activities involving interference with normal activities, and what may be regarded as US control of Japanese policy. 3. Fear of the economic burden imposed by defense measures and by curtailment of trade with Soviet bloc countries especially China. 4. Fear of retrogression toward reactionary government policies, repression of civil liberties, withdrawal of trade union rights, etc. 5. Desire to normalize diplomatic relations with countries still technically at war with Japan. The Japanese Party follows the familiar Communist tactics of: establishing front organizations, national and local, to cover the interests, aspirations, and activities of most of the major elements of society; linking such fronts in federations and congresses of various kinds; and utilizing the fronts to support the partyrs position on national and international issues. In the schematic terms of the JCP program, the front groups would become components of the "National Liberation Democratic United Front" whose envisaged role is that of a popular base for the overthrow of the existing government and establish- ment of a people's revolutionary government. At present probably the most active and effective front groups are those operating in the functional areas of promoting "peace" and relations with Communist China, especially those of trade. At present, of Japan's total union membership of approximately 6 million, only 7% are believed to be Communist Party members or sympathizers. The present capacity of the JCP to manipulate or benefit from the activities of the trade unions is therefore not a consequence of numerical strength or control of positions of leadership. It arises rather from the fact that an important segment of labor's leadership, politically aligned with the left Socialist Party, supports policies closely parallel to many of the positions assumed by the JCP, particularly in the area of foreign policy. In the face of this situation and in view of the JCP*s continuing incapacity to reassert SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOI3 ATION itself as an independent force in the Japanese trade union movement, the party appears to have dissolved what little remains of its own once-powerful trade union federation. It now appears to be seeking to infiltrate Sohyo, the Left Socialist controlled federation which, with .a claimed membership of approximately 3 million, is the largest in Japan. The JCP has been active in national and local elections seeking to utilize the campaigns to: seat Communists and sympathizers; promote propaganda objectives; and form alliances with other groups. In they October 1952 election for the lower house, JCP overtures to other left- wing groups for a united front campaign were rebuffed; the party polled only 2.5% of the total popular vote; and it failed to seat a single candidate. B. Underground Tactics The JCP program for underground para-military action apparently envisages a three-stage development: 1. Establishment of an organization to plan and carry out violent action, subversion, and sabotage, training of cadres for these purposes and their organization into a national network, and indoctrination of the masses with the.necessity of armed action; 2. Formation of armed "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations among workers and farmers and conduct of local partisan activities involving initially sabotage and harassment and ultimately attacks on military facilities and equipment; 3. Conversion of these "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations into a revolutionary "people's army" to carry out a general armed uprising. The party is now engaged in the first of these phases and has probably made only limited progress toward its objectives. Nevertheless in the first half of 1952, the party carried on a campaign of violent action which demonstrated the existence of well-organized and trained action squads. Since mid-1952 however, in accordance with party directions to avoid actions that would alienate the masses, there has been no significant mass violence although continued espionage and sabotage efforts have been reported. So long as the party is able to continue on a legal entity, its overt organization, its "front groups," its limited penetration of Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 non-Communist organizations and parties, and its participation in orthodox political activities enables the party to continue its efforts to encourage popular discontents and divide the Japanese from their govern- ment and its policies. The party's efforts in this regard are facili- tated by its ability to exploit the frequent parallels existing between its own position and that of groups and organizations, particularly of the Socialist left, not subject to direct Communist influence and control. Also, despite the widespread popular support presently accorded to Japan's present policy of close alignment with the US, the Party is able to exploit dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the peace and security treaties and with present restraints on mainland trade. Present evidence indicates that the JCP including its under- ground organization now has a significant potential for espionage,. 'sabotage, and propaganda, as well as for promoting at least limited and sporadic incidents of mass violence. The party is not believed capable of undertaking armed insurrection without external military assistance. The covert Communist para-military organization could, however, provide valuable assistance to an external attack upon Japan. A number of factors appear to work against any great increase in the overt or covert capabilities of the JCP. Official restraints on party activities may be expected to become more effective as Japanese police and intelligence services are strengthened and further suppressive measures maybe undertaken, particularly if the party again resorts to violence or other forceful activities that disturb the public peace. The party's open identification with and virtual subordination to the interests and policies of the Soviet Union and its doctrinaire insistance upon certain manifestly unpopular policies -- notably the demand for overthrow of the Emperor system -- limit the party's general popular appeal and make unlikely possibilities of fruitful, if transient cooperation, with extreme rightist elements. Finally, even the present limited continuance of illegal and violent activities, in the light of popular revulsion against the party's militant program during the first half of 1952, serves to undercut its efforts of exploiting and developing Japanese discontent under conditions of close alignment with and dependence upon the United States. These limitations upon JCP capabilities extend to its efforts to recoup electoral support for the party and to infiltrate and gain control over the trade union movement and non-Communist left wing organizations and parties. In sum the JCP has the capacity to exploit, intensify, or keep alive friction between the US and Japan. It does not, however, have the capacity seriously to undermine the US-Japanese alliance. While the creation of an underground structure including a para-military organiza- tion has given the JCP a greater capacity to resist suppression and to Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOrLATION resort to violent action when and as required by the tactics of inter- national Communism, the party should not within the foreseeable future become capable of sustained armed insurrection without external military assistance. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH A. JCP Membership and Following As of July 1952, the officially registered membership of the JCP was 48,596.1 This represented-a decline of approximately 60,000 (or more than 53 percent) since February 1950, when the partyts registered membership had reached its postwar peak of 108,593; this membership continued to drop through mid-1952, although the downward trend appeared to have slowed down during the first half of 1952 (the decline during that period was 2,500) as compared with that in 1950 (43,500) and 1951 (18,000).2 In addition to registered members, it is estimated that there are 30,000-$5,000 unregistered or secret JCP members. Most of these probably are former registered party members whose resignations or explusions were actually faked. These unregistered members are probably equally subject to party direction and discipline. The total 1. Registered membership. refers. to figures filed periodically with the Japanese Government, a procedure required until July 1952 of all Japanese political parties. 2. Post-war party registered membership: Date Registered Membership Increase or Decrease May 1946 4,500 -- May 1947 13,378 / 8,878 May 1948 18,088 / 4,710 May 1949 57,000 / 38,912 (February 1950 108,593 / 51,593) May 1950 99,317 - 9,276 May 1951 58,035 / 41,282 July 1952 48,596 - 9,437 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 7 - of registered and unregistered or secret members thus is probably between 80-85,000 persons. The JCP is believed to have imposed stricter admission qualifications and security precautions on prospective members than in the past. Thus, the apparent decline in the overt membership would not, from the party's viewpoint, necessarily indicate a loss but, rather, may suggest a strengthening of effective control and discipline over its membership. The JCP following includes: 1) An estimated 100,000 to 250,000 non-member sympathizers who actively participate in Communist-sponsored movements. 2) An estimated 500,000 to 650,000 "leftists" who may be classed as "passive" sympathizers through their occasional participation in pro-Communist movements. Altogether, it is estimated that one million persons are strongly influenced or under Communist Party control. This total is slightly over two percent of the total adult population and corresponds roughly with the number of votes cast for Communist and fellow travelers in the recent election. B. Geographic Distribution and Class Composition Party membership and sympathizers are concentrated in the major metropolitan areas, notably the two-primary industrial centers of Tokyo-Yokohama and Osaka-Kobe. (Tokyo alone has 16,000 known party members.) The northern island of Hokkaido, three prefectures in central and northern Japan (Nagano, Gumma; and Niigata, and northern Kyushu) are other leading areas of concentration. In general, the party's centers of strength are urban and its areas of weakness rural. The classes from which the bulk of party membership and following is drawn has been estimated recently as follows -- an estimate generally in alignment with class breakdowns applicable to. party membership as of December 1951: 1. These figures apply to Japanese. In addition there are an estimated 80,000 active and 350,000 passive supporters. among the Korean minority. (See III C, p. 8.) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INF0R1IATI0N - 8 - 50 percent from Japanese intellectual, professional and white collar groups; 30 percent from industrial workers; 10 percent from rural workers; 10 percent others (e.g., national minorities, unemployed, eta -- outcaste class --, etc.) The age breakdown of party membership has been estimated recently as follows: under 20 years, 18 percent; 20-29 years, 37 percent; 30-39 years, 24 percent; 40-49 years, 12 percent; 50-59 years, 6.5 percent; above 60 years, 2.5 percent. The average length of party membership is estimated to be three to four years. C. Quality of Party Membership The improvement of the quality of membership is currently one of the party's major internal problems. From 1945 through early 1950, the party, is keeping with its posture as a bona fide political party, operated on a mass membership policy. -Since Cominform criticism of its policies in January 1950, and especially since the revision of party. rules and regulations in early 1951, the party has sought to weed out unreliables, indoctrin- ate the remainder more thoroughly, and in general convert itself into a hard-core organization. The extent of this task is suggested by the fact that the great bulk of its membership has. joined the party since the surrender. Even allowing for additional secret members in the period 1945-1950, it is apparent that the vast majority of the membership is comparatively young in age and in experience in party organizations and activities. The quality of the membership in terms of its capacity for following abrupt changes in the party line has not been put to test recently. However, the Cominform criticism resulted in internal dissension of such bitterness as to support a supposition that the party, despite the overt. reconciliation of differences in the new program announced in late 1951, might again show internal fractures in the event of a change of line. The new program, with its dualism of "legal," overt activity and of underground preparation for violence, has provided other tests of the quality of.the membership. That the party has an efficient underground apparatus, that it has mounted violent demonstrations, that it is organizing pare-military units bespeak a significant degree of readiness to risk or incur hardships in the course of illegal action. At the same time, the overt warning carried in the Cominform journal in mid-1952 against excessive violence of the sort perpetrated that spring, and the circumstances Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 surrounding that warning suggest that significant elements of the party, perhaps including its top leadership, lack the sophistication and discipline demanded by the program. D. Quality of Party Leadership The top leadership of the party, generally confined to prewar Communists, is considered to be of fairly high quality. It includes persons trained in Moscow and comprises those hardened through years of repression and adversity. Nearly all of this level of leadership is now underground, where, despite deficiencies of the sort previously mentioned, the development of an efficient organization gives testi- mony to their administrative capability. Opportunists and dilettantes are believed to have been generally weeded out. However, the leader- ship may be evaluated as relatively weak in its capacity to comprehend and handle ideological matters. The leadership failed to adjust its policies despite clear tokens of Moscow's displeasure before the publication of the Cominform criticism; it failed to resolve the theoretical differences in which the party schism thereafter focussed for more than a year; and its level of ideological discussion has invariably been low. The leadership of the overt organization consists of thIrd- rate figureheads. The core of the party -_ those party members at all levels who carry the principal burden of leadership and crganizational activity and who may be expected to continue party activities under most adverse conditions and abrupt changes in line -- may be estimated at approximately 25,000. SECRET - SECURITY INFOPMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 10 - II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH In the October 1952 House of Representatives general election, the JCP nominated one candidate each in all but 10 of the 117 election districts. These candidates polled 897,000 votes, or approximately 2.5 percent of the total valid ballots as compared with 2,985.,000 votes (9.7%) for JCP candidates in January 1949. None of the JCP candidates was successful in 1952, while 35 had been returned in 1949. The JCP officially recommended 9 non-communist candidates, one each in 9 of the 10 districts in which no JCP candidates were entered. These recommended candidates, (four running under their party labels; five as independents) received a total of 200,000 votes and only one was successful. The portion of this vote attributable to Communist support cannot be isolated. However, the JCP added this total to the 897,000 won by its own candidates to attain its claim of 1.1 million pro-Communist votes. The JCP also identified a list of 12 candidates (four Progressive, five Left Socialists, and one Right Socialist, one Labor-Farmer, and one independent) as "Patriotic candidates," signifying their general acceptability, although all but one of these twelve competed with the Party's own candidates. These twelve received a total of 475,000 votes. Ten of these twelve were success- ful. Beyond this it is difficult to identify candidates who may be labeled fellow-travelers in some degree. Only-Labor-Farmer candidates who received an aggregate of 261,000 votes may be regarded collectively as pro-Communist oriented. Two Labor-Farmer candidates had JCP support or approval. The Left Socialist Party whose policy toward relations with the U.S. security arrangements, rearmament, etc., is very similar to that-of the JCP, officially spurned the JCP' s "united front" platform. In any event, close cooperation between the two parties would probably have been unlikely in most of the some 80 election districts where they both nominated candidates. Only in four districts are Conununits known to have obtained more votes than their Left Socialist rivals. (Six Left Socialist candidates had JCP support or approval). On the other hand, it is conceivable that Communist and Left Socialist votes were "pooled" in the 30 districts where the Left Socialists had no candidates but the Communists did. In the Third District of Hokkaido, neither the Left Socialists nor the Communists nominated a candidate and it is probable that at least some of their support went to the Labor-Farmer candidate. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11 - Alth.ough the JCP has claimed partial credit for the electoral advance of the Left Socialist Party as a group (3,494-,000 votes, 54 seats), the degree to which this claim might be justified cannot be judged. The following table presents a comparison of communist electoral strength with the strength of other major parties: October 1952 House of Representatives Election Party Votes Percent Seats JCP 897,000 2.5 0 Liberal (conservative govt party) 16,928,000 48.0 238 Progressive (conservative- opposition) 6,421,000 18.2 85 Right Socialists (opposition) 4,024,000 11.4 57 Left Socialists ..(opposition) 3,494,000 10.0 54 Independents (mostly conserva- tive) 2,364,000 6.7 21 Other 1,159,000 3.2 11 Total 35,287,000 100.0 466 Slightly less than one-third (31%) of the Communist vote in October 1952 came from urban areas (comprising the entire prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka plus the districts in which are located the larger cities, namely, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, Kyoto, Sendai and Fukuoka), and over two-thirds, from the rural districts. The ratio of urban vote was exceeded only by that of the Right Socialists (36%); the Liberal Party drew 15% of its vote from the urban districts, the Progressives, 14%, and the Left Socialists 21%. Numerically, the heaviest Communist vote was found in Tokyo Metropolis and Osaka Prefecture. In Tokyo where the total valid ballots numbered 2,480,000, the Communists polled more than 93,000 (3.7%), as compared with 1,025,000 votes (41.30) for the Liberals, 562,000 (22.7%) for the Right Socialists, 312,000 (12.60) for the Progressives, and 303,000 (12.2%) for the Left Socialists. In Osaka Prefecture, Communist candidates obtained 91,500 votes (6.00) out of 1,503,000 valid ballots; in the same prefecture, the Liberals again received a plurality of 690,000 votes (45.9%), followed by the Right Socialists (288,000 -- 19.1%), the. Progressives (248,000 -- 16.5%), and the Left Socialists (149,000 -- 9.9%). In the four major cities other than Osaka and Tokyo, Communist returns were as follows: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Kyoto 26,000 Nagoya 24,000 Yokohama 13,400 Kobe 11,600 7.9 6.3 3.4 3.9 Of the rural prefectures, where conservative parties without exception returned large majorities, Nagano had numerically the largest Communist vote (46,700 -- 4.97). In Hokkaido, Communist candidates polled 42,500 votes (2.9%), while the Labor-Farmer Party obtained nearly 110,000. votes (6.77). The vote for Communist and Labor-Farmer candidates was significant in two other prefectures: Okayama (Communist -- 21,000 or 2.8% and Labor Farmer -- 82,500 or 11.3%) and Ibaraki (Communist -- 20,000, or 2.4% and Labor Farmer -- 54,000 or 6.0). The JCP's very poor showing as compared with previous performances cannot be attributed to diminution of Communist interest in election activities except in the indirect sense that: 1) abandonment of the Nozaka line altered the position of parliamentary tactics in the hierarchy of Japanese Communist values; 2) the campaign of violence that for a time appeared to be the most conspicious expression of the new line, although terminated well before the election, alienated a large number of former party supporters. In the self-criticism in which it has engaged since the election, the JCP has not disavowed its basic campaign strategy -- the attempt to secure a united front, primarily with the Left Socialists but also with other groups, on the basis of neutralism, antiAmericanism, and opposition to rearmament. Self-criticism has instead focused on tactics and has indicated that the Communists find themselves guilty of: attempting to impose revolutionary activity on the people prematurely; failing to clarify to the people the party's role as the protector of their daily interests; and failing to integrate the struggle to achieve current popular objectives of various classes and interest groups with the struggle for an "anti-imperialist" popular front. In a recent enunciation of the party's campaign policies to be followed in the forthcoming election for half the members of the upper house, scheduled for May, 1953, it is emphasized that the party "must support, encourage, and endeavor to join hands with each and every political force that is opposed to the Yoshida Administration." SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 13 - III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Violent action has become an important policy and organizational question for the JCP only relatively recently. The Cominform criticism in January 1950 of the party's theory of peaceful revolution, and more particularly the new party program of late 1951 and accompanying covert policy statements, made it clear that underground preparation for vio- lent action was to be undertaken concurrently with implementation of the above-ground united front program. The fact that the party is now . partly underground and that its program demands a continuation of legal and illegal, overt and covert operations makes it difficult to isolate the party's organization for violent action from its total organization, although the policy concerning violent action has become relatively clear. A. Current Party Policy on Use of Violence By contrast with policy on preparation for violence, policy on use of violence was not explicitly indicated in Cominform criticism, the new party program, or accompanying covert statements. However, organized violence soon became a prominent feature of Communist-led demonstrations. This militancy began with an attack on US military personnel during a Communist demonstration in Tokyo on May 30, 1950, and reached its peak during the first half of 1952 when a series of armed clashes with the Japanese police occurred in many parts of the country. Episodes of mass violence on February 21, May 1, and May 30, 1952 gave evidence of participation by well-organized and trained Communist action squads. During the same period and previously there were also numerous episodes involving organized civil violence on a smaller scale, such as police harrassment and demonstrations against tax and grain collection. In July, however, an article in the Cominform journal attributed to TOKUDA Kyuichi, secretary-general who has been underground since mid-1950, in effect criticized resort to violence of a character that would alienate the party from the masses. Since then, there has been no significant mass violence, although continued efforts in. the line of espionage and sabotage' have been reported. Labor disputes, even in those unions subject to Communist direction or strong influence, have not been marked by violence. Party statements on the matter imply that resort to mass violence has not been repudiated in principle, but de- clared premature and inexpedient under present circumstances. Armed insurrection is the ultimate goal of the JCP's "Military Policy," but the achievement of this goal is placed in the distant future and is declared attainable only after the populace has been thoroughly won over to the popular front and been made ready for a general uprising under the leadership of the party. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 14 - B. Party Organization for Planning and Execution of Violent Activities 1. Organization. The party's organization for violent action is a part of its underground organization which, since 1950, by all evidence has become the central machinery of the party, including its overt organization and operations. The JCP Central Committee, whose members were purged in 1950, has never been restaffed in the overt structure of the party. Instead a covert "Political Bureau," staffed by purged members of the former Central Committee and other selected leaders, is secretly directing the legal Central Guidance Department and coordinating the overt and covert activities of the party from the underground. Under these covert executive bodies the party has evidently developed a nation-wide underground structure parallel to, and closely coordinated with, the existing legal organization. Most recent information on the structure of the covert organization reveals that while the regional, p efectural, district, and cell chain of command of the overt organiza- ti% n is retained, regional boundaries have been revised and six region- al subdivisions (as compared to nine in the overt structure) are now .controlled by organs designated as "bureaus" to distinguish them from the regional committees of the overt structure. The number of members in each of the new regional bureaus is set at five, as compared with some twenty members in each of the regional committees. A similar reduction in the number of members in the covert prefectural committees has been reported. In general, the organs of the underground apparatus are considerably smaller and more efficiently organized in order to insure security. In the evolution of a covert structure, the JCP has given special emphasis to the development of a para-military organization which would be capable of planning and executing a program of violence under the over-all direction of the underground "Political Bureau." Information. to date indicates that the para-military organization is composed of: 1) The "Military Affairs Committee" (also called the "Y Organization"). This committee, apparently established in mid-1951 directly under the covert Political Bureau, constitutes a covert central ad- ministration to plan and operate a program for para-military organization and action, espionage, and subversion. It is believed to include specia- lized units designated Yl, Y2, Y3, Y4, and Y5 for operations directed, respectively, against Japanese security forces, civil police and investigative agencies, US forces, industrial targets, and military bases. Y4 is also reportedly charged with direction of the nuclear self'-defense corps. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 2) Local counterparts of Military Affairs Committee. Agencies planned, though not yet reported as in being, to direct and coordinate actual operations at local levels, and responsible to the central Military Affairs Committee. 3) Nuclear Self-Defense Corps (Chukaku jiei tai). Action groups composed of up to 10 militant, able- bodied, disciplined party members, organized in factories, villages, towns, schools, to conduct agitation, sabotage, and harrassment; also to develop larger bodies of militants from among populace. Available evidence indicates that the JCP covert organization for the execution of its violent action programs is still in the pro- cess of establishment, although the party has made significant advances in this direction since 1950. In the case of the nuclear self defense corps -- the basic units of the organization for militant action -- estimates as of May 1952, on the basis of data obtained in a few pre- fectures, placed the total membership at between two and three thousand. Later estimates range up to 16 thousand for those who have received some form of para-military training. On the whole, it seems probable that establishment of the corps and of the lower echelons of the "Y organization" has taken place only in limited areas and that a nation- wide network of such units does not yet exist. Similarly, gradual progress appears to.have characterized the development of a cadre to direct the activities of the various military units. On the basis of scattered reports, centers of strength appear to be the major industrial areas of Tokyo-Yokohama, Osaka-Kobe, and northern Kyushu, and in Hokkaido. 2. Quality of leadership, mobility, available arms and equipment. High quality leadership is believed to be scarce, and limited for the most part to the top echelons of party pars-military structure. A number of factors indicate that leadership on the lower, operating levels is at a premium: the party's military program has been in effect for only a little more than a year; it demands a structure of scope and character which the party has never had in the past; implementation of the program has been accompanied by frequent indications that the devel- opment of competent cadre is a prime problem; and present JCP policy, which envisages an interweaving of its military-action and political- action programs, demands a high level of sophistication and discipline of its personnel. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Mobility is not believed to be a prime objective of present JCP military planning, which envisages rather a network of small local units mobile only within a limited area. Arms and equipment presently available consist of relatively few firearms and of crude though effective weapons of harrassment, sabotage, and street fighting, such as gasoline-filled bottles, teargas, time- bombs, hand grenades, and tire-punching tools. 3. Plans and capabilities. Present indications are that the current stage of JCP organization for violent action is such as to restrict its use to more limited programs of sabotage and the instigation and leader- ship of relatively sporadic incidents of mass violence. It is believed that the principal task of such para-military organizations as are in being include training, organization, and self-development, espionage, and non-violent agitation. Undoubtedly, members of the para-military organizations also serve as integral parts of the underground security system protecting the missing top-level leaders. In part, the limited nature of the JCP organization for violent action when compared with the eventual-goal of "armed revolution" is reflected in the militant action program as envisaged by the party itself; without setting any precise time-table for the fulfillment of its plans, the party apparently envisages three stages of development: 1) The establishment of the Military Affairs Committee and its local counterparts and creation of the nuclear self-defense corps and their organization into a national network. Simultaneously, the masses are to be prepared psychologically to accept the necessity of armed action. Only this stage appears to be regarded as current. 2) Formation of armed "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations among the workers and farmers; con- duct of partisan activities in localized sectors, initially involving sabotage and harrassment and ultimately attacks on military facilities and equipment. 3) Conversion of these "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations into a revolutionary "people's army" to carry out a general armed uprising. Whatever its expectations, the capabilities of the JCP for ex- panding the organization for violent action and for advancing the pace of its plans in this regard appear relatively limited under conditions currently prevailing. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 17 - Apart from the increasing effectiveness of Japanese government countermeasures, the present level of economic activity and living standards, the prevailing Japanese support for Western alignment and suspicion of the Communist bloc, the current disrepute of the JCP, and the greater attraction and greater feasibility of alternative methods of seeking personal, group, and national objectives all. militate against conclusion of the first phase let alone transition to the second. Nevertheless, the JCP undoubtedly has the capability further to expand, organize, and consolidate small action units composed of present members of the party, and to enhance their capacities for terrorism and other more or less limited subversive activities. At present, however, Communist policy appears to recognize that progress in the pare-military program to embrace significant elements of the population not now Communist-inclined necessitates a wider and more profound popular disaffection with the Japanese government and its policies and, indeed, the structure of Japanese society itself. Moreover, such progress neoess_itates avoidance of actions bringing severe and widespread popular censure on the party. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 18 C. JCP Ability to Rally Elements of the Population to Violent Action Despite the party's preparation for violent action, its capacities for such actions have not been tested since mid-1952. The Communist-led episodes of mass violence in the spring of 1952 demon- strated a high quality of leadership insofar as the organizing and directing of demonstrations involving the use of force is concerned. They also demonstrated that the party apparatus possessed a store of crude though effective weapons for street fighting. Finally,. they indicated that the party had a sizeable force available for mass violence. That the party since mid-1952 has improved its organizational and leadership for violent action seems altogether likely in view of policy emphasis on such preparation. It also seems likely that the party has made progress in equipping itself for violent action, es- pecially in view of repeated reports of secret party pamphlets and instructions dealing with the tactics of and the manufacture of wea- pons for street fighting. (There is, however, no reason to believe that the party has any significant stock of firearms.) On the other hand, such advances have probably been at least offset, if not out- weighed, by advances in the over-all efficiency of the civil police and in at least the size and equipment of the National Safety Force, a nuclear army trained among other things to cope with civil insur- rection. Accordingly, the Communist capacity for mass violence would seem to rest largely with the quality and numbers of the human resources at the party's command and on the character and circumstances of the action. In general, the Japanese body politic at present includes few elements sufficiently disaffected to be led into violence without previous training and/or incorporation into.the party's apparatus. Thus, the party cannot count on converting mass demonstrations sponsored by non-Communist groups into violent demonstrations. The 7,000 parti- cipants in the Tokyo May 1 riot of 1952 represented roughly two percent of the estimated three or four hundred thousand persons participating; throughout the nation some 35,000 took part in violence out of the total of 1,000,000 leftists and labor union members assembled. The most volatile elements are found in the Korean minority, the radical wing of the student group, and to some extent the day-labor ("free" labor) group. These elements have been drawn into Communist-inspired violence either by prearrangement or because their smaller-scale demonstrations have proved susceptible to Communist exploitation. Where the party itself has. sought to generate mass demonstra- tions including violence, as opposed to exploiting occasions sponsored by other groups, the results have been far less impressive. The Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION In these terms, the JCP has the following assets; 1) An estimated several thousand, at a minimum, organized in nuclear self-defense or similar corps. Estimates of numbers trained in some form of para-military exercise range to 16,000. 2) An estimated 80-85,000 party members, of whom perhaps a half might be considered to be of superior quality in terms of loyalty and disoi- pline. (The size of the party's underground is estimated at around 30,000.) 4) An estimated 500-650,000 passive supporters, comprising those who occasionally or in varying degrees support the JCP or JCP front activities. An estimated 100-250,000 active supporters, comprising those who consistently play an active role in supporting JCP programs and activities, to whom an estimated 80,000 members of the Korean minority may be added. observance of the "Third Anti-Colonialization Struggle Day" on February 21, 1952, brought out a total of some 6,000 leftists in rallies and demonstrations in 26 different localities throughout the country. Disturbances occurred chiefly in Tokyo, where about 900 out of an esti- mated total of 3,000 demonstrators were involved in rioting. In a pre- May Day rally in Tokyo on April 26, 1952 approximately 1,000 laborers, students and Korean clashed with the police. On May 30, 1952, the JCP attempted under the guise of an anniversary celebration for Japan's "labor martyrs" to stage a repetition of the May 1 display of mass violence. JCP directives reportedly called for a "nation-wide armed struggle" and ordered "action corps" to execute raids against police stations and tax offices. Demonstrations took place in various parts of the country but large numbers were not mobilized and nothing approach- ing the party's professed goal materialized. Again the most serious in- cidents took place in Tokyo where roughly 1,000 demonstrators fought with police. Assuming continued economic and political stability in Japan, the JCP in the foreseeable future is likely to prove no better able than in the past to rally significant, non-Communist elements of the population to mass violence -- especially as the public and the police have now been alerted by the violence of last spring. Accordingly, its future capacities for mass violence will depend largely on the human resources it is able to marshall under its own standard. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION To these may be added perhaps 350,000 comprising the adult portion of those registered as north Koreans (400,000) plus those believed to be north- Koreans among the unregistered (estimated 200,000). While the foregoing elements to some extent would overlap, they provide a rough idea of the pattern of present party support. This pattern has developed under circumstances in which the party has re- mained legal, its activities have been preponderantly non-violent, and the chief pressures against it have been those of public opprobrium as contrasted with the pervasive police repression of the prewar period. Thus it is believed that only a minor portion of the million or more listed as party supporters or sympathizers constitutes the party's man- power for violent action. Accordingly it is estimated that. at present, under optimum oondi- tions, the party could order out between 20,000 and 50,000 to execute acts of violence in connection with mass demonstrations, although con- siderably more might be brought out to participate non-violently. Where Korean issues are prominent these totals might be augmented by elements from among the north Korean active supporters of the JCP. This is based in part on the participation in violence on May 1, 1952, and in part on the estimates of the party's hard core which is assumed to include.its para-military forces. It is believed that for violent action of guerrilla or insurrec- tionary nature, the party's potential might range initially between 16,000 and 20,000. This is based on estimates of para-military forces with some allowance for progress and also for party elements not re- gularly engaged in para-military training which might readily be assimilated into such action. If this action were called for in con- nection with external attack, the figure might multiply in, the event, that a Communist takeover seemed assured of success. The increments would be drawn from the membership of the party and its active sup- porters who might render effective services in the form of sabotage and harrassment. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 21 - The post-treaty Japanese Government has made clear its hostility to Communism and its intention at least to maintain the restrictive policies it previously had followed under occupation direction. These policies, although neither as comprehensive nor as effective as the pre-surrender government's program of repression, nevertheless have limited the party's capabilities and have forced it to seek greater protection underground and to rely more heavily on front organizations. The legal basis of such political freedom of action as the party and its fronts possess rests on broad constitutional and statutory protections introduced during the occupation and designed, like similar protections in the US, to foster and safeguard political rights. Particularly during the latter half of the- occupation, however, activities of the party and its fronts were severely circum- scribed by the operation of supra-constitutional regulations laid down by the occupying authorities under powers stemming legally from the terms of surrender. The top leadership of the party was driven underground, the publication and distribution of major party organs banned, and other disabilities imposed under these regulations. Despite such disabilities, the JCP remained a legal political party, represented in the Diet, and continued to carry on a variety of both legal and illegal political activities. Since the end of the occupation on April 28, 1952, the party's freedom of action has continued to be limited. Laws passed during the occupation including provisions designed to bar Communit s from governmental employment remain in force. Some-of the occupation restrictions have been carried on in newly enacted legislation. Almost all local governments have passed laws for the maintenance of public peace which have acted to curb Communist demonstrations. The question of whether those charged with offenses against occupa- tion regulations -- notably including the party's top leadership underground for two and a half years -- still remain liable to criminal prosecution in post-treaty Japan is now under judicial review. The most important new law has been the Anti-Subversive Activities Law, Passed in July 1952. This law, an adjunct to the Criminal Code.and designed to suppress organized threats to the government,' permits the government to prohibit the publication and distribution of subversive literature, to suspend or dissolve subversive groups posing a clear threat of violence, and to take action against officers and members of .such groups. The law, however, contains provisions which aim to inhibit arbitrary exercise of these powers. Perhaps in part for this reason, the government has moved very cautiously in implementing the law; only two persons have been reported indicted under the law, and no convictions have been reported to date. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Rel 07i 02 - Mqq In more general terms, the Communists have derived some advantage from the difficulties besetting law enforcement and judicial agencies now operating within a social and political' structure less amenable than.in pre-surrender days to tight control. Comprehensive anti-Communist measures have been opposed by a variety of groups, not confined to those of leftist persuasion, for such reasons as fear CC governmental abuses, reluctance to antagonize the Soviet bloc, and belief that the Communists would be less controllable if driven under- ground completely. On the other hand, new law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been added to the existing surveillance and control network, and the police organization has been trained specifically to meet Communist-inspired disturbances. The government is also sponsor- ing, officially and unofficially, counter-propaganda campaigns. The party's loss of official representation in the Diet's Lower House as a result of the October elections deprived it of an advantageous national forum. In addition to this evidence of a dropping-off in the party's popular support, opposition to official restrictive measures now may be less effective because of popular reaction to Communist-inspired violence during the first half of 1952. The threat posed by governmental restrictions has caused the JCP to concentrate on developing an efficient underground organiza- tion and to emphasize front activities. The capability of the under- ground for circumventing governmental control measures is indicated by the fact that out of nine well-known, top echelon leaders of the JCP wanted by the police, only one has been apprehended after over two and a half years of intensive investigation. Another indication is the ability of the underground party press to publish illegal newspapers and pamphlets despite repeated efforts of the police to suppress its operation. The party's increased emphasis on fronts has also complicated the problems of governmental control agencies. The effectiveness of front activities, however, has been reduced by greater public alertness and by counter-propaganda. The freedom of action of the party and its fronts seems likely to be circumscribed more narrowly in the near future, although the party will probably not be outlawed. It seems probable that the government will: 1) introduce new restrictive legislation, perhaps including a bill regulating mass demonstrations that would standard- ize local regulations; 2) apply less cautiously existing legisla- tion such as the Anti-Subversive Activities Law; 3) emphasize "preventive" action in the operation of its control network; and 4) step up its counter-propaganda activities, possibly by stronger appeals to nationalist sentiment. The government at present has the power to maintain surveillance and control over overt activities. Its capacities for dealing with covert activities are less complete, due in part to inadequacies in its intelligence system. Its police and military forces are capable of coping effectively with mass violence and armed insurrection, although the party could undoubtedly launch, and for sometime sustain, a program of limited and sporadic sabotage and small-scale violence. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 23 V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR No estimates are available for the number of Communists or sympathizers employed in specific key industries, Roughly ten percent (153,000) of the workers in heavy industries and in coal and metal mining are believed to be Communists. The major trade unions in these industries, however are not Communist controlled. Since, apart from heavy industries and coal and metal mining, the major focus of Communist influence is among government office workers union, the overall proportion of Communists in all key industries (mining, chemicals, primary metals, transportation, communications, and other public utilities) probably is not significantly greater than 7 percent. Only three unions in key industries may be considered to be nationally controlled by the JCP: 1) the All Communications Workers Union (600); 2) the All Japan Metal Workers Union (27,000); and 3) the Council of Greater Chemical Industry Workers Union (5,000). In addition to the three unions above comprising a member- ship of 32,600, there are five unions with a total membership of 115,000 that are not controlled but are strongly influenced by the JCP on the national level. The ratio of C oamunists to non-Communists in these unions is unknown. There are four major unions in key industries with a total. membership of 850,000 whose policies have paralleled those advocated by the JCP. The leadership of these unions is almost exclusively in the hands of trade unionists closely supporting Left Socialist Party programs. There is no conclusive evidence as to whether the close parallel between the policies and actions of these unions and that of the JCP is a consequence of a positive pro-Communist orienta- tion on the part of nominally non-Communist leaders, or of their strong Left Socialist bias. The JCP has consistently attempted to exploit this parallelism, whatever its origins, and through it to advance its tactic of- infiltration into non.. -Communist unions. Since the period 1948-50 when overt Communist membership and influence was virtually extinguished by the anti-Communist drive in Japanese trade unions, the JCP has been unable to regain the degree of leadership and control exercised before that date. Despite indications that left-wing trade unions are aware of the threat of Communist exploitation and infiltration and despite a resurgent anti-Communist movement among Right Socialist trade unionists, the parallel between Communist policies and programs and those of non- C omnunist, left wing trade unionists does render a major segment of organized labor vulnerable to Communist tactics of propagandistic exploitation and of infiltration of membership and leadership. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 24 - VI. COIAMSNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The same threat to its legal existence that caused the JCP to develop and strengthen its underground organization has led the party to emphasize front activities in an attempt to circumvent repression. While front organizations have always played an important role in the Communist program of propaganda and agitation among the populace, they have recently been given more attention by the JCP. Party directives issued late in 1952 have called upon party members to exert tighter control over leading front organiza tions at the policy level. The usefulness of these organizations to the Communists, however, has been reduced by the fact that their status as fronts in most cases is well known. Moreover, their operations in the future may be further limited by tighter govern- mental controls, by official and unofficial counter-propaganda efforts, and by the activities of some competitive groups with an anti-Communist orientation. In any case, the significance of the role played by front groups remains an open question. Some Japanese, tncluding a large segment of the intelligentsia, have had a proclivity for positions similar to those advocated by front groups, such as "neutralism," but this proclivity may not have been induced by the front groups, and might not be removed even if the front groups disappeared entirely. National and local front organizations in Japan often center their activities around either a general theme (such as "peace" ,or promotion of trade relations with Communist China) intended to appeal to broad segments of the population or a specific theme (such as opposition to increases in university tuition rates) intended to appeal to local or special interests. Cultural and professional front groups have tended to concentrate in the Tokyo area; a number of front organizations have their headquarters in a single building in Tokyo sometimes referred to as a "Communist nest.!" Increased attention, however, has been paid recently to the development of local cultural fronts in non-metropolitan areas. One of the principal activities of many front groups is the publica- tion of propaganda organs designed to reach persons outside as well as within the areas of concentrated population. In addition, following familiar practices, the Communists have attempted persistently to infiltrate various types of non- Communist social, cultural, and professional organizations. The Communists reportedly exert varying degrees of influence, ranging from very slight to moderate, within a number of non-Communist organizations, such as: the Japanese Science Council (an organiza- tion including some of Japan's top scientists), the Japan Cultural Cooperative Union, the Japan Peace Promotion Peoples Congress (which was originally Socialist-sponsored), the New Japan Women's League SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 25 - (a non-partisan-league of women voters), the Pacific Problems Research Society (the Japan branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations), the Democratic Nurture League (which provides advice to parents on the "democratic" upbringing of children), and the Japan Organ Publications Association ?which was designed to coordinate and improve leftist publications). Among the most active front organizations are the usual "peace" and Soviet bloc "friendship" groups. The two major peace fronts are the Japan Peace Protection Committee and the Overall- Peace Patriotic Movement Council, which may merge in the near future. They are affiliated with the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. Presumably these organizations will continue to be used for general propaganda operations, signature campaigns, and the like, and may derive some benefit from the current JCP de-emphasis on violent activities. Exact membership figures are not available, but the. membership at large is believed to include non-Communists holding a variety of political views. Among the "friendship" groups are the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, with a registered membership of 8,000; the Japan-Korea Friendship Society, whose exact member- ship figures are not available; and the Japan China Friendship Society, which in December 1951 had a membership of 700. Promotion of trade with Communist China is fostered not only by the Japan-China Friendship Society, but also by two other active groups specifically devoted to this theme. The Japan-China Trade Promotion Council and the Japan-China Trade Promotion Associa- tion reportedly receive some support from non-Communist commercial firms and individuals interested in trade prospects with the Chinese mainland. Membership data .is unavailable, but the strength of these groups apparently is concentrated in.the Tokyo and Kansai regions. The largest and most active minority group fronts are among Koreans in Japan. It has been estimated that a substantial majority of the approximately 600,000 registered and 200,000 unregistered Koreans in Japan are sympathetic to the North Korean regime. Some 20 Korean organizations in Japan have been reported either Communist- controlled or dominated. Durrently among the most active groups are the Korean Democratic Racial Front, which apparently includes a majority of the Communist and pro-Communist Koreans in Japan in its membership, and the Fatherland Defense Committee, which reportedly includes the more militant and extremist elements among the Korean minority. The former is affiliated with the North Korean Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland. There are reports of an. effort to revive the Korean League, which under the name of the League of Koreans Resident in Japan was once the dominant Korean front in Japan. Before its dissolution by occupation authorities in 1949, its membership was reportedly about 400,000. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -- SECURITY INFORMATION 26 - The principal student front organization is the National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (Zengakuren), which is affiliated with the International Student Congress. The only nationwide university student organization, it reportedly has some 200 chapters throughout Japan. About 20 percent of its total membership of approximately 150,000 are estimated to be active Communists or sympathizers, who have tended to overshadow and dominate non-Communist student participation. Currently the organiza- tion reportedly is attempting to recoup its lose of membership during the past two years, as well as. to organize and penetrate the few existing high school youth groups. The two principal fronts, among high school and other non-university youth are the Japan Democratic Youth Association, with an estimated membership of 20,000, and the Japan Youth Fatherland Front, with an estimated membership. of 50,000. Both are reportedly affiliated with the Soviet-inspired Federation of Democratic Youth. There is no evidence indicating that these groups will undergo extensive expansion or increase their activities significantly in the near future. A number of cultural front organizations in the fields of music, art, literature, entertainment, and general cultural promotion have been identified . Most are relatively small but active propa- ganda organizations, reportedly including in their membership some notable names in Japanese cultural circles. The major general cultural promotion group apparently is the Japan Cultural Peoples Congress. In the entertainment field, the People's Theatrical Group and the Progressive Troupe are the most publicized and most active. The former includes 363 Communist or pro-.Communist repre- sentatives of some 60 theatrical organizations. The latter, which reportedly includes 26 known JCP members, has recently sent out small groups on a "road-show" basis in an effort to reach more people. Local Communist units are encouraged to exploit for propaganda purposes audiences attracted to such performances as these. Several literary groups operate as front organizations, although specific data is lacking. Apparently the most active is the New Japan Literary Society, which has 1,700 members and publishes a monthly periodical. There are a few front organizations for professional groups, most of which have a small membership. Two of the most useful from the Communist viewpoint are the Liberal Lawyers Group and the Tokyo Joint Law Office, which-supply legal counsel for Communists. The latter includes in its membership the more radical wing of the Liberal Lawyers Group, and the most able Communist lawyers in Japan. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - - 27 The New Japan Physicians' League, the chief medical front, consists of about 50 doctors and several operating clinics concen- trated in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. One of the most influential academic front groups is the Democratic Scientists' Association. In the field of research, there are several small, but relatively influential, front groups devoted to disseminating propaganda in the form of selected data and "analysis" relating to Communist doctrine and conditions in Communist-controlled countries. Among these groups, whose name are indicative of their interests, are: the China Research Institute, the Soviet Research Association, the Marx-Lenin Research Institute, the World Policy Research Institute, and the Soviet Data Correspondence Company. However, several competitive anti-Communist research organizations have been established in Japan recently, in addition to the research and information activities of several government agencies. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET --SECURITY INFORMATION - 28 VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Although there are indications that the JCP has attempted per- sistently to infiltrate the government at all levels, and particularly such key agencies as the National Safety Force, National Rural Police and other security organs; there is no evidence that the party has penetrated the top policy echelons. The Japanese government has been fully conscious of the potential threat posed by the JCP in this re- spect, and consistent efforts have been made to discover and discharge party members and sympathizers from agencies responsible for public safety and national security. JCP efforts in this direction are certain to continue, however, and it is possible that party members and sympathizers are present in limited numbers at lower echelons of the government and security agencies. Recent police counter-espionage has revealed that the JCP has obtained detailed knowledge of police plans through "Y-31" operations, otherwise known as the"Anti-Police Action Guidance. Department" of the covert organization. There is no indication, however, that such. infiltration ag has occurred is suffi- cient to subvert the administration of government or to impede the effective use of security agencies in coping with a serious threat to public order and safety. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 29 - VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The extent of direct Communist influence upon public-opinion leadership groups is believed to be slight. "Purges" carried out in 1949 and 1950 further reduced the number of Communists employed in educational, press, radio and entertainment enterprises. The majority of public-opinion leaders, whose prestige is usually based on social and family background, financial strength, and political connections, and whose influence is quietly but persuasively exerted, is politically conservative. The extent of indirect Communist influence, while no doubt larger, is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy. One of the difficulties involved in any assessment is the fact that the out- look of some non-Communist groups may in certain particulars coincide with that of the Communists. Such a situation permits the Communists to claim or be credited with a greater influence than perhaps is de- served. A large segment of Japants intelligentsia is inclined to be sympathetic politically with the left-wing, and many such Japanese have been attracted for some years by Marxist theories and terminology. However, the number of actual Communists or fellow-travellers among this group is believed to be relatively small compared to those who adhere to Socialist principles or programs. There are indications of some Communist youth activities in the secondary schools and suggestions that individual teachers and admin- istrators may be either Communists or pro-Communist, but there is no evidence indicating that any significant Communist influence has been exerted on youth or the local communities from these sources. The Japan Teachers Union, the most important organized group among Japanese school teachers, apparently supports the left-wing Socialists, so that on certain specific issues the view of the Teachers Union has paral- leled that of the Communists. At the University and College level the percentage of active Communist or pro-Communist professors or administrators is believed to be relatively small. A few professors were dismissed during 1949 in connection with the "purge". Many professors alleged or known to be Communists or sympathizers apparently focus their attention upon the theoretical aspects of Communism. In a few universities, particularly Osaka Municipal University, a number of faculty members have been identified as party members or fellow travellers. The extent of direct influence exerted by Communist and fellow-travelling faculty members cannot be isolated from the totality of Communist influence operating on the student body. In the entertainment field, individuals, who are either active Communists or pro-Communist, are known to be in the employ of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -30- non-Communist enterprises, but their influence apparently is very limited. Some known Communists or sympathizers were purged from the entertainment industries in 1949 and formed active front organiza- tions devoted to propagandizing through entertainment media. These small groups are very active and are considered important by the JCP. Evidence pertaining to the size of their audiences and their influence is otherwise only fragmentary. Radio enterprises and the non-Communist press carried out a purge of known Communists and sympathizers in 1950. As a result, more than 600 persons were dismissed from various metropolitan and local newspapers and from the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan. Although a few individuals may have escaped the purge and others have infil-' trated these organizations, there is no evidence that they either hold key positions or exert any significant degree of influence. However, a few individual publishing houses which publish and promote the dis- tribution of Communist literature, such as the San Ichi Book Company of Osaka and Kyoto, may be controlled by either Communist or pro- Communist. It is highly doubtful that either Communists or sympathizers have acquired any positions of influence within Buddhist and Shinto institutions in Japan. There is no evidence suggesting that the few Buddhist groups which recently have publicly advocated a program for world peace have been under any direct Communist influence. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The extent of direct influence by Communist party members or sympathizers upon the policies and activities of moderate and ultra- right wing parties and organizations is negligible. Neither major con- servative party is in any sense responsive to direct Communist influ- ence and both have adopted uncompromising anti-Communist positions. Scattered and unconfirmed evidence suggests the presence of a very limited number of Communist party members or sympathizers in a few of the ultra-rightist, nationalistic organizations. Particularly in the field of foreign policy, the radically nationalistic cast of the policies advanced by many of these organizations is of benefit to Com- munist Party propagandistic efforts and conceivably is susceptible to limited Communist exploitation. Despite the similarity of certain of their objectives, there is no reliable evidence of even limited co- operation between the Communist Party and ultra-rightist organizations. Non-Communist, left-wing parties and organizations are more vulnerable to Communist exploitation and infiltration. It is diffi- cult, however, to estimate with precision the extent of Communist Party influence in Japanese political, economic, and cultural organizations that generally exhibit either a radical or moderate socialist orienta- tion. For a minor segment of Japan's non-Communist left, the presence of Communist party members or sympathizers in positions of leadership undoubtedly has enabled the party to exert a positive, although not necessarily determining, influence on policy and activities. Such appears to be the case in certain non-Communist trade unions, both at the national and local levels, in certain segments of the Japan Farmers, Union (Nichino), in the Labor-Farmer Party, and among the extremist faction of the Left Socialist Party. A major segment of the non-Communist left - including the bulk of the Left Socialist Party and those trade unions and farmer organi- zations_closely allied with it at the leadership level -- currently supports policies and programs frequently paralleling positions assumed by the JCP. Despite the probable presence at the leadership levels of these groups of a limited number of Communist sympathizers, if not actual party members, this parallelism of policies and even of action programs does not appear to be the result of positive Communist influence. A more adequate explanation of the parallelism may be found in a tendency toward a doctrinaire, Marxist view of Japan's domestic and foreign problems, a radical socialist response to particular domestic political and economic circumstances, a political opportunism or, at most, a tolerance toward the Communist Party itself. While such circumstances render this segment of the non-Communist left potentially vulnerable to JCP exploitation or infiltration, present evidence does not indicate that the Communist Party SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 32 is able to exercise a positive and continuing influence on the formu- lation of policy and action programs. Moreover, despite the frequently close similarity of their policies, these groups consistently, since 1919, have rejected JCP "United front" overtures. Any estimate of the significance either of direct Communist in- fluence in non-Communist left-:ring organizations and groups or of their potential exploitability by the Communists must be weighted by con- sideration of the actively anti-Communist segment of Japan's left-wing. Generally affiliated with the Right-Wing Socialist Party, this segment includes the so-called "right-wing" trade unions, farmers organizations, and quasi-political groups which increasingly have adopted positions of categorical, opposition to the JCP and have sought to avoid policies closely identified with the Communist Party. Even within organizations whose leadership is closely allied to the Left Socialist Party, opposi- tion right-wing socialist factions frequently act to moderate extremist leadership and serve as a counter to Communist Party efforts to influ- ence significantly policy and action programs. Finally, it is signi- ficant that despite the apparent numerical superiority of the socialist left-wing, based principally upon the membership of trade unions whose leadership supports the Left Socialist Party, the Right Socialist Party polled a greater proportion of the total vote in the recent general elections. Assuming that Communist influence increases significantly within the socialist left, there is reason to believe that the moderate, socialist right-wing will form the core around which a majority of those now supporting more radical leadership will reorganize. In sum, it is believed that only in the minority, extremist seg. ment of the socialist left is Communist influence sufficient to exert a positive influence on action programs and policies, although even here such influence is not necessarily constant or determinant. Nevertheless, the parallel between the policies and action programs of the major portion of the Socialist left and many of the positions taken by the JCP, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, is of considerable advantage to the Communists. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORM TTION - 33 - Communist propaganda is disseminated in large quantities through a large variety of mass media. Published materials include newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, leaflets, and posters produced and distributed both overtly and covertly. Certain party publications, including Akahata (the official JCP newspaper), were forced underground as a re- sult of suppressive action initiated in the summer of 1950 under authority of an occupation ordinance. Although this ban is no longer in force, the publications affected (some of which have reemerged as overt publications) have not been able to recover their former influ- ence. Most of the available data on Communist publications pertains primarily to those official or quasi-official organs controlled directly by JCP headquarters. Overt publications currently are published by the JCP Publications Bureau. The principal overt newspaper, Akahata ("Red Flag") is regularly published every third day plus frequen elemental "extras." Its present circulation is estimated at 85,000. Zenei ("Vanguard") and Atarashii-'3ekai ("New World") are the two lea ng monthly periodica s controlled y party headquarters, each has a cir.. culation of approximately 20,000. The weekly paper To Katsudo Shishin ("Party Activity Guide") apparently is an important publication w h n the party, although no circulation statistics are available. Several party organs continue to be clandestinely produced and distributed. Heiwa to Dokuritsu ("Peace and Independence"), presently the principal clandestine paper, was last reported to be a daily with an estimated circulation of 100,000. Naigai Hyoron ("Foreign and Domestic News"), apparently a daily, has actual`appeared irregularly under a variety of disguised titles. It is estimated that the 5,000 copies printed reach 100,000 persons. To Kensetsu Sha ("Party Con- structor") apparently is an important p- l c3 alion, athough specific data on its circulation is not available. The party presumably sponsors the Japanese edition of the Cominform Journal, Kokyo Heiwa no tame ni, Jimmin Minshu Shugi no tame ni ("For a Lasting Peace, for a Peo ie's emocracy . K -weekTy paper; it reportedly is a translation of the European version and has appeared under a variety of disguised titles. Party propaganda organs are supplemented by the extensive propa- ganda activities of the numerous front organizations. The various Soviet bloc "friendship" fronts sponsor several publications dedicated to promoting "friendly relations," as well as to encouraging the es- tablishment of regular political and economic relations between Japan and Communist--controlled countries. The Japan-Soviet Friendship Society sponsors two publications, the monthly periodicals Sovietto Nyusu ("Soviet News") and Soviet Shiryo ("Soviet Data"). I is es i- ad that s 0,000 copies of the~ormer are printed, but no specific data is available regarding the latter publication. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -34- The Japan-China Friendship Society sponsors two bi-monthlies, Nippon to Chugoku ("Japan and China") and Chugoku Jijo ("China Digest"). rcu aUonWata is not available. At least three publications are devoted to promoting the Soviet- inspired "peace campaigns" in Japan. The Japan Peace Protection Com- mittee sponsors the publication of Sekai Heiwa ("World Peace") and Heiwa no tame ni Kokusai Shiryo ("Int`rna ona. Research Materials in the Cause of 1 ceWj,bothibi-monthlies; an estimated 3,000 copies of the former, and 5,000 of t'he latter are printed. Kowa Shimbun ("Peace Newspaper"), a weekly sponsored by the Over-all Peace Patriotic Move- ment Council, is the largest of its type and has an estimated circu- lation of 60,000. The Japan Peoples Relief Society, which is dedicated to the pro- tection of civil rights against "'oppressive police action" sponsors Jinken Mimpo ("Peoples Human Rights News"'). Some 8,000 copies of this paper are published every ten days. The Japan Repatriates League publishes 4,000 copies of the Shinboku Shimbun ("Friendship Newspaper") for its members. Various publications cater to special population groups. Fujin Sengen ("Women's Manifesto"), sponsored by the Japan Women's Democratic oune 1, is published every ten days and has an estimated printing of 2,000 copies. The Women's Democratic-Club sponsors the Fujin Minshu Shimbun ("Women's Democratic Newspaper"), a weekly with an est ma circulation of.70,000. The monthly periodical Kagaku-sha ("Scientist") sponsored by the Democratic Scientists Association has an estimated cir- culation of -30,000. The New Japan Literary Society sponsors the Shin Nippon Bungaku ("New Japan Literature"), a monthly periodical which has an es 1im_af072,000 circulation. The educators front,. the Japan Demo- cratic Education Association, sponsors Akarui Kyoiku ("Bright Education"), a monthly periodical reportedly reaching ,00Oreaders. Miscellaneous publications which apparently are published by private firms and which are considered important propaganda organs in- clude Jiyu Nippon Hoso (Radio Free Japan Broadcasts), a weekly containing transcripts off"-ad3o Free Japan (RFJ) broadcasts which is published by Sekai News and Kaiho no Koe ("Voice of Liberation") a semi-weekly paper published by the same company. Party and front organization propaganda organs apparently are supplemented to some extent by the importation of publications from Commuiist-controlled countries. It is impossible to ascertain the impact of such imported publi- cations because precise data is not available. Since April 28, however, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 35 - there has been no prohibition on the import of publications from these areas. Apparently all types of Communist publications are available on the open market in Japan, including Isvestia and Pravda from the Soviet Union and People's China from Co s na. is presumed from newstand 0-bookstore advertising that other major publications from these areas are readily available. There are no Communist-controlled broadcasting facilities in Japan and the extent of Communist or pro-Communist infiltration of existing broadcasting firms apparently is negligible. Propaganda broadcasts, however, are beamed to Japan from Moscow, Peiping, and Pyongyang as well as from Radio Free Japan, a Communist-controlled station located in Peiping. With the exception of the medium wave broadcasts of Radio Free Japan, all the programs apparently are broad- cast on shortwave. Although Japan has approximately 9,000,000 radio receiving sets, only about 5 percent are capable of receiving shortwave broadcasts. In an attempt to cope with this problem, the JCP has en- couraged the development of "listening clubs," and also has published transcripts or selected portions of important broadcasts. Broadcasting schedules and the names of sets capable of receiving various foreign programs are also publicized. In at least one instance, names of firms where radios could be converted to shortwave have. been published. Radio Free Japan now makes four one-hour broadcasts daily and uses two medium and two shortwave frequencies. Monitor reports indi- cate that its shortwave broadcasts are very difficult to tune and fre- quently the medium wave broadcasts are very faint. There are five broadcasts daily from Moscow in Japanese, two of 45 minutes each and three of 30 minutes each, while Radio Peiping broadcasts two programs daily of approximately a half-hour each. Ac- curate data on Pyongyang broadcasts is unavailable at the present time. Reliable data pertaining to the listening audiences of these various overseas broadcasts is unavailable. However, because of the poor quality of reception and the limited number of receiving sets capable of tuning these broadcasts, it is presumed that the audiences are relatively small and generally limited to those Communists or sympathizers who would go to considerable effort to listen. Although the importation of foreign propaganda films is under control, the JCP and front. organizations have either produced movies or encouraged the showing of those domestic and imported films which they believe have propaganda value because they present the "proletariat" viewpoint. Films of this type produced in Japan include "The Stormy History of Hakone" by Zenshir,za in collaboration with the North Star SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 36- Motion Picture Company, "Being a Mother and Woman" by Kinuta Pro- ductions, "Mountain Echo School"' sponsored by the Japan Teachers Union, "Foghorn" by Toho, and "Oh We're Still Alive" produced by Zenshinza. Attendance at the showings of such foreign films as "Bitter Rice," produced in Italy, is also encouraged. Special propaganda media include mass demonstrations and rallies, sound trucks, and other facilities used in connection with election campaigns, special lectures, and study groups. Local "struggle" cam- paigns arising from local grievances are also exploited topromote Communist propaganda. In the past house-to-.house signature drives have also provided a highly personal means for spreading the party line. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 37 XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Statistics on the financial status of the JCP are only frag- mentary. Information on the party's financial status not only is a closely guarded party secret but, since the development of an under- ground structure, party finances apparently are handled separately for the covert and overt organizations. Available statistical evidence is so inadequate that it permits no quantification of the JCP's financial health. What statistical evidence is available, however, together with other evidence drawn from party activities seems to indicate that at least since 1951 the party has been faced with persistent but not crippling difficulties in financing both its overt and covert organizations and operations. Regular sources of income, such as party dues and the sale of party publications, do not appear to be providing a significant portion of total revenues, and the burden now appears to be carried by donations from wealthy party supporters, special contributions, front organiza.. Lions, illegal activities, and Communist sources outside Japan. Evi- dence of continued financial difficulties. is to be found in the fre- quent reports of party drives for improved collection of dues and more thorough party accounting systems, of the suspension of subsidies to certain organizations, and of reductions in the number and salaries of paid party workers. The impact of straitened financial circumstances appears to have fallen principally upon the JCP's overt organization and operations. Despite these indications, however, it is believed that the party as a whole continues to have access to sufficiently large funds from one source or another to continue active operations in all fields of effort and there is no indication that it will be forced to suspend any of its major operations in the near future. Indicative of the extent of the party's resources is the fact that, despite its slight chances of success, the party expended at least 4 11,220,570 in the 1952 election campaign. Be Revenues The JCP derives its revenue from party dues, sales of party pub- lications, illegal covert activities, private donations, contributions of business firms interested in trade with the Chinese mainland, Com.. munist-controlled labor and front organizations, and international Com- munist organizations and the Soviet or.Soviet satellite governments. Very little detailed information is available on any of these sources. A possible indication of declining revenue during the past two years has been the increasing reliance on special fund-raising campaigns. In the most recent major campaign, during September 1952, a goal of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -38- 4 100 million was set. Despite several extensions, it is believed that the party failed to raise as much as 50 percent of its goal. 1. Dues and Party Publications. No recent figures are available on the total revenue collected from party dues. During 1949, when party membership was at its peak (approximately 110,000 registered members), income from dues is believed to have been only about two million yen monthly. All recent evidence, however, indicates a decline in revenue from this source, and the party frequently has admitted difficulty in the collection of party dues. A similar decline in revenue appears to have been experienced in the sale of party publications, once one of most lucrative sources of revenue. Circulation of these publications appears not to have re- covered from the suppressive measures carried out by the government from June 1950 to April 1952. 2. Donations. Although the party apparently continues to receive substantial donations from wealthy party members and from certain busi- ness interests, there is evidence that donations to party election cam- paign funds no longer provide an important source of extra income. Total contributions, as reported by the party, for the 1947 and 1952 Lower House general elections were 1- 5,155,543 and * 520,570 respectively. No figures are available regarding income from party.,.controlled business firms and from commissions in east-west trade. Such business enterprises as have been identified as controlled by party members are small (many of them being book stores or small merchandising enterprises) and it is not likely that these make a significant contribution to the party coffers. Nor is it likely that the party has received any sub- stantial income in the form of commissions from east west trade deals. There is evidence, however, that the party has received substantial dona- tions from non-Communist firms interested in supporting party efforts to promote trade with the Chinese mainland. No significant estimate is possible of the amounts received from Communist-controlled labor unions and front organizations. In view of the relatively limited membership of Communist-controlled unions, their frequently loose organization, and the low state of union finances in general, it is unlikely that these unions provide an important source of income to the party. (A possible exception here is the All-.Japan Auto- mobile Workers Union which contributed It 25,000 to the party's 1952 election campaign.) Incomplete information, however, suggests that front organizations provide a major source of party funds, both to the overt and covert structures, and are an important means by which funds are channeled to the party from sources within and outside Japan. Thus, the Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -39- party reportedly anticipated that front organizations would provide al- most X 2 million to its election campaign fund in September 1952. In addition, these front organizations frequently are the agency through which a variety of fund-raising drives -- such as the "peace" fund cam- paigns - are undertaken. A sizeable portion of such contributions probably is forwarded to the party. The fronts often are able to obtain funds from sources which would not normally contribute to the party directly. 3. International Support. No figures are available on the total of funds forwaRed to the from international Communist organizations or. from Communist governments, although incomplete reports suggest that these sources provide an important supplement to the party's total rev- enue. On at least two occasions, the transfer of funds to JCP front or- ganizations from the Chinese mainland has been confirmed: 1) a donation .of $114,000 from the Chinese Communist Peoples Relief Association to the Japan Peoples Relief Society, a JCP front; 2) of a total of It 3 million remitted during early 1952 by Japanese residents on the mainland to their families in Japan, over * 1 million is believed to have gone to the party itself or front organizations. In September 1952, the party reportedly expected "Chinese sources" to provide * 1 million toward its election campaign fund. Although there is no confirmation of reports that the Soviet mission in Japan has supplied the party with funds, it is possible that such contributions have been made. lt. Other Revenue. In addition to the sources of income noted above, unevaluated reports allege that a substantial portion of the party's revenue is derived from covert, illegal operation. Black-marketeering, smuggling, trade in narcotics, extortion rackets, and other illegal operations frequently have been reported as sources of party funds. The JCP has never released publicly any complete and accurate statement of its total assets and liabilities. As of March 1951, how- ever, the party's. finance department reportedly-listed the following as party assets: Land * 20,000,000 Buildings Y. 27,000,000 Equipment Y 13,000,000 Others Y 2,000,000 62,000,000 As of the beginning of the fiscal year 195152, the party's total lia- bilities reportedly were ; 77,000,000. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -1j0- XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Among the factors contributing to Communist strength must be in- cluded the diplomatic establishment of the Soviet Union in Japan and its political activities. A Soviet mission -- the remainder of the office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council for Japan which constituted the official Soviet representation during the occupation -- continues to exist in Japan although without official acceptance by the Japanese Government. The mission occupies a building in central Tokyo that has been closed to the public for over six months and that has been reported kept under surveillance by Japanese authorities. The number of persons attached to the mission has steadily dwindled, 24 official members departed in September, 7 "unofficial" members left in November. Available informa- tion places the total official personnel still remaining at 39, plus 14 dependents. According to Japanese Government sources, the group of 39 Sovief nationals reported still officially attached to the mission can be broken down by function as follows: Officers Others Political Section 5 3 Economic Section 4 6 Consular Section 1 1 Press Section 1 - Military 3 1 Administrative Section 2 12 16 23 This breakdown should probably be regarded with suspicion, in view of the Soviet practice of masking functions and particularly in. view of the abnormal position of the mission. There is no information available as to how many of these officials may be engaged in propaganda activities. At present the mission conducts no known propaganda acti- vities of an overt, orthodox character. The only activities along these lines reported in recent months have been an occasional newspaper story based on a press interview or on a private conversation between a Soviet official and Japanese. Even these activities may be construed as propaganda only in the sense that any Soviet moves have propaganda significance. On the other hand, it must be assumed that a major func- tion of the mission is the clandestine operation of covert propaganda SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 41 - activities, in which a large part of the personnel may be engaged. Pre- sumably the Soviet Mission still extends some assistance and guidance to the JCP and front groups. An ng the front groups worthy of mention in connection with political activities of the Soviet Mission are= The Japan-Soviet Friendship Association with a registered membership in December 1951 of 8,000; the Japan-China Friendship Association reported to have a membership of 700; and the Japan.-Korea Friendship Association, the membership of which is unknown. Although the mission previously had sought informally to include Japanese government personnel in its propaganda functions, it was only on November 7, 1951, for the first time since the surrender, that high Japanese government officials were formally invited to a mission re- ception. Since April 1952, there have been no official functions; how- ever, the mission has evidently maintained informal and personal contact with some Japanese businessmen. There are no other Soviet or satellite establishments or missions in Japan. No diplomatic or other official relations between Japan and the Communist bloc have been established. None of the Communist bloc countries that had declared war on Japan have signed a peace treaty. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -42- XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although international Communist organizations apparently have no official installations in Japan, a number of Communist-controlled or dominated front groups are either affiliated with or maintain close liaison with various international Communist organizations. In the fall of 1949 pro-Communist labor organizations in Japan sponsored the establishment of the World Federations of Trade Unions Japan Liaison Office to maintain relations with the Communist-dominated World Fed- eration of Trade Unions. Two Japanese youth organizations, the Japan Democratic Youth League and the Japan Youth Fatherland Front are af- filiated with the Soviet-inspired World Federation of Democratic Youth. The National Federation of Student Self-Government Associa- tion, the only nationwide student organization in Japan, is affiliated with the International Students Union. The small but active Womens Democratic Club in Japan is affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation. No meetings of Communist International Organizations are known to have been held within Japan. Local Communists, however, have attended the following meetings of international Communist organiza- tions held abroad: Meeting Date Known Representatives World Peace Council Berlin February 1951 1 World Peace Council Vienna November 1951 1 Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 3 Peking Asian-Pacific Peace Conference October 1952 i1 Vienna Peace Conference December 1952 3 It is not improbable that Japanese Communist groups have received some funds from international Communist organizations. It appears less likely that funds have been transmitted from Japan to such international organizations. However, no concrete evidence of such transmissions is available. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -43- XIV.. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Information regarding the JCP communications network is scattered and incomplete. The party's underground structure reportedly includes a specific liaison organization (designated by the code symbol "T") directly responsible either to the covert politburo or to one of its two immediate subdivisions. Within the "T" organization, special groups re- portedly are responsible for the distribution of covert organ papers, the maintenance of liaison with the various specialized covert depart- ments, the transmission of directives and notifications to regional units, and the maintenance of communications network between the covert central organs and lower echelons. Although no detailed information is available on the extent of the communications network at lower echelons, there have been indications that the party on several occasions has had to undertake a reorganization of its system of internal communications in the interest of greater efficiency and security against the danger of compromise. Substantial evidence indicates that since 1950 the JCP has de- veloped several code and cipher systems for communication between central, regional, and prefectural headquarters. In addition, the party reportedly maintains an emergency warning system involving commercial telegraphic communications according to prearranged texts. While comparatively simple, this system appears to be a very important part of the JCP com- munications net. The bulk of the party's foreign liaison apparently is undertaken through the commercial mails, with various front organizations serving as the principal channels. There is evidence, however, that a covert international courier system is maintained by the party. Scattered re- ports indicated that courier bases are maintained on small islands off the west coasts of Hokkaido and Kyushu. During 1950>51, one such courier net for agents commuting between North Korea and Japan was uncovered by US intelligence agencies. The principal covert JCP international courier and communications system for which relatively detailed information is available is "Maritime Organizations". Comprised of party members em- ployed in shipping, this organization receives directives and ccmmunica.> tions from, and transmits communications to, Communist China and the Soviet Union and assists members and couriers illegally entering and leaving Japan. It is believed that the 14 Japanese delegates who il- legally left Japan to attend the Pei-piing Asian and Pacific Peace Con- ference, October 1952, traveled by means of the network. There is no indication that the JCP maintains any substantial system of radio communication, either for internal or external use. Unverified reports indicated only limited use of radio communication. One such report which described the transmitter as part of the JCP "international communications division" indicated transmission between northern Hokkaido and Vladivastok. During a recent investigation, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 44 Japanese security agencies arrested a Japanese radio operator who al- legedly had transmitted periodic communications from the JCP to the Soviet Union. Radio Free Japan broadcasts, while apparently not used to transmit detailed instructions and guidance to the JCP, does serve to supplement the distribution of propaganda material within Japan and to provide local guidance to party members and units in the more remote areas of rural Japan. Despite the limitations of this international communications net- work, recent reports indicate that the JCP is making increasingly fre- quent contact with Communist Parties in other countries. The bulk of the party's foreign liaison appears to be with the Chinese Communist Party and is generally carried on by such front organizations as the China Research Institute and the Japan.-China Friendship Association. Although apparently less extensive, the party's connections with the USSR are believed to be at least as important as those with Communist China. The degree to which the JCP has been the object of specific in- structions and criticism from the Soviet Union or Communist China is not fully known, although, since 1950, known instances of such in.. structions and criticism have been of decisive importance for party policy. The first known instance of Cominform intervention in JCP affairs occurred in January 1950. Taking the form of a bitter criticism of the Nozaka theory of peaceful revolution, this attack, published in the Cominform Journal, ultimately resulted in the theoretical reorientation of the JCP to accommodate the concept of violent revolution and in the initiation of efforts to create a covert organization capable of support- ing paramilitary action. This criticism was supported, although in a more conciliatory tone, by the Pei ping Jen Min Jih Pao which also called on the party to correct its past errors. -Me same organ, on September 1950, intervened in the internal struggle which accompanied the JCP=s response to the original Cominform struggle and although Pei ping supported the dominant JCP faction it urged a more conciliatory treat- ment of party dissidents. Such an attitude subsequently was adopted by the JCP leaders. The most recent instance of international. Communist intervention occurred in July 1952, this time in a signed article of TOKUDA Kyuichi, Secretary General, appearing in the Cominform Journal. This criticism of the party for its excessive concentration on strikes and demonstrations at the expense of parliamentary activities was followed by a marked dimunition of JCR-inspired acts of violence. SECRET ?? SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.8 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ALGERIA SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 11 OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . ? I. Objectives . ? . II* Tactics . . . ? III. Capabilities . . . ? . ? ? ? . .. . r ASSETS . . . ? . . . . . . . I. Numerical Strength . . .... . . .. . . . . . ? ? ? 4 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . ? 4 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 4 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. . . . V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? .. . ... . 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political . . 6 Parties . . . . . . . e ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 X. Communist Propaganda Media ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 6 XI. Financial Condition . . . . ? . . . . . . . 7 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . .. 7 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . .. . . . . 8 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . .. ... 8 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ALGERIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The over-riding immediate goal of the Algerian Communist Party since August 1946 has been to persuade the local independence movements to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation ultimately for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control and American imperialism. In the meantime, the Communists are seeking through propaganda, to destroy sympathy for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans, and to increase local hostility toward the French administration. The serious economic grievances of the population -- both native and French -- receive particular attention from the Communists, who have a strong influence in the country's largest labor union. However, the Algerian Communist Party, in common with all other Communist groups in North Africa is faced above all with the task of recovering its own strength. II. TACTICS Having failed thus far to achieve a common front with the nationalists, except for the limited and now dormant front established in mid-1951, the Communists have attempted instead to participate, uninvited, in nationalist demonstrations, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly, Communist propaganda pamphlets and news- paper articles have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the popular mind the need and desirability of reviving and extending the common front of 1951. Occasionally, coincidentally with such tactics, they berate the nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a new popu- lar front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating with the French even in a minor way. III. CAPABILITIES To date, the small Algerian Communist Party has had only limited influence on the Algerian nationalist movements, largely because (1) the nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in non-Communist areas; (2) the local Communist party is largely French in membership, and (3) the present nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would dislike as much as that of the French. As an autonomous unit, the Algerian Communist Party is weak. While it dominates Algeria's largest labor federation, the Algerian SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION CGT, the latter is no more able to maintain a general strike without support from non-Communist labor unions than is its counterpart in France. Moreover, while the Communist-dominated CGT includes possibly 50 percent of organized labor in Algeria, it is estimated that only about one-fifth of the Algerian labor force (estimated at. 400,000) is organized at all. French officials continue to hamper Communist party activities of all kinds in Algeria. The present capabilities of the Algerian Communist Party re- main minimal either for achieving its own current local objectives or for furthering Soviet policy. Its own membership is small and believed declining although it has lost only slightly in percentage of total votes received in elections during recent years. The leaders of the two nationalist parties seem to be unwilling.to resume the former cooperation, even on the limited scale provided by the Algerian Front for the Defense and Respect of Liberty -- which was organized in mid-1951 primarily in.protest against administrative interference in the June 1951 elections. This limited victory was achieved when the leading figures of the extreme nationalist movement led by Messali Hadj, the moderate nationalists led by Ferhat Abbas, and the Association of Ulema which comprises the leading teachers and scholars of the Islamic tradition, united with the Communists in July 1951 in the Algerian Front. How- ever, each nationalist party to the alliance joined for the furtherance of its own ends and not through any basic sympathy with the objectives of international Communism. The Communist victory was based upon their initiative in taking advantage of local grievances, and the Front's program centered upon the issues of civil liberties and civil rights and French administrative control over Moslem religious affairs. The Moslem parties remained unwilling to let the Communists jointly appeal with them to the Moslem masses on the broader issues of nationalism and "neutralism." All three Moslem groups may also have hoped, by their association with the Communists, to frighten the US into bringing pressure to bear on France to make more political concessions. The disparate aims of the four groups prevented the Front from achieving either importance or permanence. Although the Front has given Communist speakers the prestige of appearing on the same plat- forms as the Moslem parties and enabled them to take such occasions to propagate the Communist line in international affairs, it is doubt- ful, unless conditions in the Arab world further deteriorate, that the Communists will be able to convert the particular "neutralism" of the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3- Arab nationalist parties in Algeria into a pro-Soviet view of World affairs. Nonetheless, the Communists meanwhile have had an excellent opportunity to acquaint most of the educated Moslem leaders of Algeria with Communist tactics and perspectives. The Communists will doubtless continue their efforts to join forces with the nationalists, and there is some danger that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives,. they would accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it is doubtful that the Communists will capture control of are- Algerian nationalist movement, Communist influence might lead to the adoption of more anti-Western policies and to increasing resort to direct action on the part of the nationalist groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 4- COOUNISM IN ATGEM: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH No information is available concerning the numerical strength of the Algerian Communist Party, the membership of Communist controlled organizations, or the number of persons controlled through Communist infiltration of non-Caamwnist organizations. The usual estimate for the Algerian Party for several years has been 15,000 persons. However, recent developments point to a decline of membership and hence this figure appears too high. Indications are that the bulk of the members are found among Frenchmen especially workers, artisans, and lower bracket civil servants. The number of Moslem members and number of general sympathizers apparently varies with economic conditions. The hard core is primarily composed of Europeans. Strongholds of the move- ment are Algiers and Oran, which elected the only two Communist members from Algeria to the National Assembly. There are also regional head- quarters at Constantine, Bone, Sidi-Bel-Abbes and Blida. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Even allowing-for the fact that Algerian elections are not entirely free, the Communist Party's electoral strength is small. In the elections to the National Assembly, cantonal and by-elections, the Communists have polled an average of 20 percent of the votes. In the Algerian Assembly, they have captured only one seat out of 75. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Because of lack of both funds and members, the Communist Party is unable to employ violence at present. It is conceivable, however, that Communist agitators will try to use the discontent among the native population to stir up riots, or to exacerbate disturbances created by others. The Communist Party has tried to impart a political complexion to the strikes and work stoppages which have occurred during the last years, although their causes have been economic. The degree to which Communist plans for violent action in Algeria can be made effective will depend primarily on the degree of cooperation which can be achieved with the nationalist movement, which has most popular support in Algeria. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Algerian Communist Party is a legally recognized organiza- tion which is permitted to operate openly and, on the whole, without any disabling restriction in Algeria. Members of the party are permitted to compete with candidates of other indigenous political parties for SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION election to public office, to publish and circulate newspapers, and to convene "mess"meetings. Repression of local Communist groups or the Communist press by the French Administration has generally been sporadic. To date, repressive measures employed by the French authorities have served as irritating and discomforting restrictions on the Algerian Communist Party but have not been sufficiently extensive and crippling to drive it underground. V. CG?fTNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR No information is currently available concerning the number of Communists in Algerian defense plants and other key industries. Communist influence in the Algerian labor union movement is enhanced by the refusal of the French Administration to allow the native population to establish its own labor organizations. Official recognition is restricted to the Communist-dominated CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail), the Force Ouvriere, and the CFTC (Christian Trade Confederation). It is estimated., for example, that out of a total labor force of approxi- mately 400,000 workers (of which some 80,000 are in commerce, industry, and government unions), the Communist-controlled CGT has maintained some 45-50 percent of union membership. Among some of the more important strategic labor organizations with which the CGT has affiliations are the General Confederation of Agriculture, the Inter-Union Central Committee of Government Employees, the Railroad Workers' Union, Electricity Workers Union, and the Union Algerienne des Travailleurs des Ports et Docks. Moreover, the Algerian Communist Party, either independently or through the CGT, has been quick to throw its support to striking groups throughout Algeria, no matter whether members of the CGT or independent elements. While the Communists do not possess numerical superiority in the CGT, their dominant position permits them to disrupt the transport, stevedoring, telecommunications, and mining activities of Algeria if sufficiently popular causes can be found. The Algerian CGT, as an affiliate and subordinate of the French CGT, is a member of the Communist-front WFTu. VI. COM4JNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Algerian Communist Party has organized and subsidized a number of specialized social, cultural, and professional organizations. Generally, these groups are established either on a temporary basis to acquire French and Algerian support for short-term Communist-inspired programs (such as soliciting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Petition), or are organized on a long-range basis with yearly allocations of funds. Normally, the latter groups formulate programs seeking (1) the re-estab.. lishment of Algerian independence and sovereignty; (2) the awakening SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION of feminist political and social self-consciousness; and (3) the indoc- trination of Algerian youths with Communist ideology. Among the more important of these front organizations are the Communist Youth Federation, France-USSR, Les Amis de la Democratie, Secours.Populaire d'Aledrie, Uni Al n g$ enne d Or ions a Je s e C , Union des Femmes d'Algdrie, As= ration des tudiants Musulmans and Section EtudiantEe du Comite d'Action des Intellectuels Algdriens pour la naix. While no information is available concerning the overall strength of these organizations, their number is estimated to be extremely small. In the case of the last two groups, for example, it is reliably reported that their combined membership does not exceed 300 youths. Moreover, they are generally concentrated in the cities of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Philippeville. No information is available concerning the infiltration of non- Communist organizations in Algeria. Occasionally individual members of certain Moslem groups, such as the Association of Ulema, are noted as having attended certain People's Peace Congresses. but these individual deviations do not mean that these groups as a whole are Communist oriented or dominated. VII. COMMJNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is little concrete information available concerning the infiltration of Communists into the Algerian administration. Unconfirmed reports indicate that there has been some Communist infiltration in the lower governmental echelons. However, the number, influence, and areas of concentration of these elements, though unknown, is small at this time. VIII. COM?4JNIST INFLUENCE ON. PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Some journalists working for conservative journals and a small number of primary and secondary school teachers are thought to be Communist. No reliable information is available. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NOK-CONMNIST POLITICAL PARTIES (For connections with nationalist parties, see Part I under Capabilities.) X. COr 1UNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The Algerian Communist movement publishes and circulates one Arabic-language and three French-language newspapers. These include the Alger Republicain and Le Courier Algdrien, which are published daily; Libertd, which is a weekly newssheet, and the Arabic-language New Algeria, a monthly. Alger Retiublicain, which is perhaps the most SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -7- important Communist newspaper in Algeria, utilizes the presses of the Societe Nationale des Edition de Presse, is estimated to have a total circulation of approximately 20,000, and is published by Pierre Laffont under the directorship of Henri Alleg (member of Central Committee of Algerian Communist Party). Libert is also estimated to have a total circulation of 20,000 and is also printed by SNEP. Alger Republicak is not a member of the local newspaper syndicate because it does not pay its employees the official minimum wage. The paper claims to do so, and has noted that its employees turn back part of their wages voluntarily in their desire to keep the paper solvent. Alger Republicain is the only newspaper in Algeria to print schedules of the broadcasts of the Soviet and satellite radios. It is assumed that all Communist newspapers in Algeria, because they have considerable difficulty in making ends meet, are subsidized in part from France. The French Communist Party is also active in providing supple- mentary reading material for native consumption in Algeria. Recent reports indicate, for example, that The Principles of Leninism by Joseph Stalin,has been published in Arabic by the Colonial Section of the French Communist Party and is currently being circulated in Algeria. The Algerian Communist Party has established a small book store in Algiers to further the circulation of each propaganda material. There is a paucity of material coming directly from the Soviet Union and its satellites. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Little is known of the financial situation of the Algerian Communist Party. Recent reports indicate that the party finds itself in a rather difficult position financially and is being subsidized, at least in part, by the French Communist Party. In the quarter beginning July 1, 1949, the Algerian Communist Party is reported to have distributed party funds as follows: (a) 5,400,000 francs (approximately $15,500) for assistance and relief; and (b) 3,200,000 francs (approximately $9,000) for, propaganda -- 700,000 francs for the department of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, and 2,500,000 francs for Arab villages and the territories of the south. XII. SOVIET SATEILITEOFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Consulate General at Algiers ceased to function on October 15,.1951. Its affairs were subsequently transferred to the consular section of the Soviet Embassy in Paris. It was reported that this action was taken by the USSR on its own initiative and without any intervention on the part of the French Government. The closing of the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -8- Soviet Consulate General currently leaves the USSR and its satellites without any official representatives in Algeria, or in French North Africa. XIII. COMMMIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATI( S The Algerian Communist Party has been a continuous supporter of international peace conferences. Most recently, representatives attended the Vienna World Congress for Peace. Members of the Algerian Communist Party also attended the Berlin Peace Conference which was held in the summer of 1952. During 1951, the party claimed to have acquired 100,000 signatures in its campaign to gain Algerian support of a Communist- inspired resolution calling for the conclusion of a peace pact among the five major world powers. XIV. CG M JNIST COWNICATION NETWORK No information is available concerning the channels by which confidential information is transmitted among members of the party. The Algerian Communist Party maintains its closest ties with the French Communist Party, which appears to serve as the parent, or guiding, organization. The French Communist Party's hierarchy has been critical of the inability of the Algerian Party to remain. solvent, strengthen its current ties with the nationalist parties, formulate a program of action capable of attracting a larger number of native Algerians, and provide sufficient discipline within the party. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.9 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, EGYPT OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives .. ? .. .. 1 II. Tactics ? . .. .. ? . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . .. 3 ASSETS . ? .. ? !~ I. Numerical Strength ? .. . . . . . . ... ? .. .. ? 4 II. Electoral Strength . . ? . . . . . . ? . * ? . . ? . ? . 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . .. 5 Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . ? .. ? . . .. 5 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . 6 VIII.. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 7 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . .. . . ? 7 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . 7 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? 7 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets ... . . . . 7 XIII. Communist International Organizations .. . . . . . . XIV. Communist Communication Network .. . . . .. ? . . SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN EGYPT: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The goals of Communist activity in Egypt cannot be stated in terms of the pronouncements and major activities of a specific Communist Party. There does not appear to be any single organized Communist Party in Egypt nor do any of the groups engaged in Communist propaganda and activities appear to be capable of giving central direction to the actions of the others. The goal of what Communist activity exists in Egypt is to discredit the West and weaken Western influence. In particular, Communists attempt to stimulate local efforts to oust the British., to prevent the establish- ment of a broad defense scheme which could act as a substitute for the present British military establishment, and to agitate against the acceptance of Western assistance, such as the Point Four program. Since the intent of these goals is to achieve a political vacuum in the Middle East, their success would fulfill the major policy requirements of the USSR. The party is far from possessing power to secure these aims, however; thus,. its principal immediate objective is the creation of a stronger and more effective party organization. II. TACTICS Communist activity in Egypt is small and fractionalized, partly because a large part of its work is carried on among certain minority elements, such as Copts, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Italians, operating within the framework of separate minority organizations often connected. with similar groups abroad. In part also, Communist work. is the work of separate individuals operating within existing parties or organizations, particularly among youth groups. At present the tactical aim of such activity apparently is to form, surreptitiously, a united national front of these splinter groups and leftist elements in the Socialist and Wafd Parties and in the Moslem Brethren. An attempt will undoubtedly be made; to reach the membership of other parties, such as the New Nationalist and new labor and peasants' parties. Certain women's organi- zations such as the Bint al-Nil (the Moslem Ladies' Society) and the Feminist Union, have become interested in the possibility of attracting local attention and getting some international recognition by cooperating with the Communist movement, and have espoused Communist aims and sent delegations abroad to Comma~nist-sponsored conferences. For example, the Wafdist Vanguard, a leftist group in the Wafdist Youth, is now headed by 'Abd al-IAihazin Hamuda, formerly Egyptian press attache in Washington, who was deported from the US in April 1952 as a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Communist. Ahmad Husayn, president of Egypt's Socialist Party, is an opportunist who was pro-Fascist prior to World War_II and since 1945 has made numerous pro-Communist statements and has reportedly received financial subsidies from the Communists. Ahmad Taha, pro- Communist brother of the murdered Lt. 'Abd al-Qadir Taha (who is regarded as a martyr to their cause by the Liberal Officers), is prominent in Egypt's embryonic labor movement. He plays upon his fraternal connection to enhance his prestige and to ingratiate himself with the Liberal Officers, who hesitate to snub him because of his brother's memory. He is seeking to oust the present anti-Communist leader of the Egyptian labor federation movement in order to secure that key position for himself. Several efforts have been made under the Parties Law of September 8, 1952 to secure recognition of a number of pro-Communist political parties, but all have been turned down by the government. Until the recent out- lawing of all Egyptian political parties, Muhammad al-Bindari, former Egyptian Minister to the USSR and leader of the Egyptian Partisans of Peace, was bending every effort to secure recognition of a Communist front party under the guise of a "national liberation" group, with members drawn from among Partisans of Peace and other left-wingers. In the days immediately after the military coup of July 23, 1952, the Communists, who were apparently. taken by surprise, supported the army officers against King Farouk and his entourage and pursued a policy of "wait and see," on the domestic reform program of the military group. By September 1952, the Communist movement had decided that the Nagib regime was its enemy. Since that time, the Communists have engaged in a campaign. of vilification directed particularly against Nagib and 'Ali Mahir, who was Prime Minister during the first month after the coup. Pamphlets have been distributed among army personnel characterizing the coup as an "Anglo-American imperialistic plot," and General Nagib as a "stooge of the imperialists" and as another tyrant, exactly like Farouk, who must therefore be liquidated. It is said that the Communists inspired the violent strike of textile workers at Kafr al Dawwar in August 1952 and that they organized an anti_Nagib conspiracy among non-commissioned army officers in August or September 1952, which proved abortive. The Communists seize every opportunity to sow dissatisfaction in Egypt. When a member of a prominent landowning family who also heads an important Bedouin tribe was imprisoned for attacking the police in protest against the application of the land reform law to the family landholdings, local Communist propaganda took the line that Nagib was persecuting the tribesmen. When it became apparent that the military regime intended to purge party leaders, including Mustafa al-Nahas and other prominent members of the Wafd Party, the Communists took the line that Nahas was a national leader who should be retained as the president of the Wafd. The Communists have taken advantage of anti-British feeling in Egypt to urge the use of force in ousting United Kingdom troops. Since the economic and political measures cr the Nagib regime have led to some decline in SECRET - SECURITY INFO MATICK Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION T3T business and industrial activity and resulted in rising unemployment, Communists are almost certain to exploit the dissatisfaction among urban labor which will follow any reduction of the already low standard of living. Another possible field for the expansion of Cammmniat influence in the near future would seem to lie among the fellahin. The Nagib regime has removed the legal prohibition against agricultural labor unions, and has established agricultural cooperative societies as part of its program. of land reform. The Communists can be expected to infiltrate and attempt to gain control of both. Still another fertile field for CommdLnist activities has been among students, both in universities and secondary schools, and particularly in youth movements. This group is especially vulnerable to Cammunist propaganda, since many Egyptian students apparently feel that a Communist econcey and form of government could be adopted without the abandonment of Islam. )hny student riots, organized to protest against the British, against martial law, and against "imperialism" generally, have no doubt been sparked or stimulated by Communist agitators, working within the youth groups. Guerrilla warfare against the British in the Canal Zone, carried on mainly by youth groups in para-military organizations or student groups in late 1951 and early 1952, was partly Comiminist-inspired. III. CAPABILITIES The ultimate objective of the few disciplined and thoroughly Moscow-oriented Communists in Egypt -- the establishment of a Communist state subservient in foreign policy to the USSR -- is far beyond the capabilities of the present Communist movement. As for the more immediate goals outlined above, the Communist movement may be able surreptitiously to keep up its propaganda against the UK and the West and against Western-sponsored regional defense organizations or programs such as Point 4. Some of the influence and capabilities of the Communist movement in Egypt before the July 1952 military coup have been reduced at least temporarily by (1) the counter: attraction of the new regime's direct attack on economic and social maladjustments, and (2) the adherence of certain previously left-wing and opportunist writers and leaders such as Fhthi Radwan and Rashad al-Barawi to the now military regime, in which their basic desire for power and their bent toward nationalism find greater satisfaction than in their previous fellow-travelling role. In mid-January 1953, moreover, the new regime also arrested a considerable proportion of the known Communists in Egypt, and banned the publication of all newspapers whichL have fairly consistently supported the Communist line on international and domestic questions. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH There is no Communist Party as such in Egypt. Communist activity in the country is carried on among a number of splinter groups, whose total membership is probably not over 4,000. It was reported in September 1952 that an organization called "The Nucleus of the Egyptian Communist Party" had recently been founded, with units in both Cairo and Alexandria. Most of its leaders were reported to be drawn from among technicians and industrial plant employees; its main source of funds reportedly was an Egyptian engineer named Satd Muhammad Hasan. Most Communist sympathizers are centered in Cairo and Alexandria, and a rather high proportion are members of minority groups -- Copts, Armenians, Greeks, and Italians. Several Egyptian feminist organiza- tions appear to be involved in front activity, having sent representa- tives to the Vienna Peace Congress of December 12, 1952. Madame Siza Nabarawi, head of both the Egyptian Feminist Union and the Women's Movement for the Popular Struggle, Madame Ragiyah Hamzah of the Bint-al-Nil (Daughters of the Nile), and Madame Haja Zaynab al-Ghazali, president of the Moslem Women's Society, attended the Vienna meeting. Students are another segment of the population where Communist sympathies appear to exist. A number of members of the Wafdist Vanguard, a part of the Wafdist Youth, are connected with the Communist-front Partisans of Peace. Student demonstrations against the British and against martial law have on occasion been exacerbated by Communist agitators. There is no reliable information available on the quality of the party membership in terms of its willingness to incur hardships or cling to the party line. Fourteen "hard-core" Communists were imprisoned after the "Black Saturday" rioting (January 26, 1952), and have not been released. There are no outstandingly effective leaders among the various Communist groups. Kamil al-Bindari (The Red Pasha) has attempted on several occasions to form a Communist political party, as has Fathi al-Rawli, the editor of al-Mu'arda (The Opposition). Their attempts have been unsuccessful, which may be attributed partly to the firm attitude of successive Egyptian Governments towards the Communists as well as to the opportunistic and.dilettantist character of the latter's activities. The feminist groups which have taken on a pro-Communist coloration have definite dilettantist overtones in this aspect of their SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET.- SECURITY INFORMATION activity, and are more likely to be using it as a lever' to secure politi- cal recognition of womenta rights than from any sincere conviction re- garding Communist tenets. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communists have never appeared on the Egyptian ballot, and no clearly identifiable fellow-traveller candidates are known to have participated in any election. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Egyptian Communists apparently have no'military organization for violent action. However, some student disorders and nationalist demonstrations were undoubtedly supported and exacerbated by Communist agitators. Communists have participated in anti-UK guerrilla activity in the Canal Zone. The number of guerrillas with military equipment might.be a few hundred. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM As a result of an attempted counter coup in mid-January 1953, the Nagib government has-banned all political parties. The coup was attributed to army-Wald-Communist collaboration, and as a result all existing Communist publications were banned and a number of Communist leaders, including Fathi al-Rawli, editor of al-14u'arda, and Yusuf Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Partisans of Peace, were jailed. There is no definite information available on.a Communist underground, but it may be safely assumed that there is such a movement, although it is probably-quite weak at this time. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Egypt is not extensively industrialized and imports practically all of its armaments. The pro-Communist elements have had some success in infiltrating the labor unions and have been attempting to gain control of Egypt's labor federation movement. Under normal conditions they could be expected to try to gain control of agricultural unions and the agricultural cooperatives set up under the Land Reform Law. However, since the Nagib government is apparently taking strong measures to repress pro-Communist activity, such efforts can be expected to fail. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The partisans of Peace is the only significant fellow-travelling Communist-controlled organization. It draws support from such groups as urban youth, particularly students; women; and cultural and professional circles. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION pproved Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATIIII Probably several thousand Egyptians are sufficiently sympathetic to Communism to attend occasional mass meetings or read the organiza- tion's paper, Al-Katib, when it was published. Centers of strength are Cairo, Alexandria, and in the provinces of Miniah in Upper Egypt, and Mansurah in Lower Egypt. The Partisans of Peace, though stronger than insignificant are any other known Communist organizations a ptin EgYPt, organizations. influence compared with The leaders, such as Kamil al-Bindari, Yusuf Hilmi, and Said al Din Kamil, seem to be mainly professional men and intellectuals; they are neither Moscow-trained Communists nor skilled professional revolutionaries. However, they have read the Communist classics, are informed about affairs, and are capable of carrying on propaganda epparticularly ties which are fairly successful with the Egyptian public, when they parallel the slogans of nationalism and anti-imp The Egyptian Partisans of Peace have often sent delegations to Communist-inspired"peace" conferences. The most recent was held in December 1952 in Vienna at which Rashad, pthelpresident of the ilmi, the secretary-general, and delegation, represented the Egyptian organization. The Partisans of Peace reportedly plan to expand by establishing committees in the armed forces, particularly among the NCOts. Social committees are to be formed in towns and villages where they do not already exist. Their objectives are to (1) exploit the popularity in Egypt of the idea of neutralism and non-involvement in the East-West conflict, and (2) make the Partisans of Peace the leading exponent of this idea. The Partisans of Peace probably are capable of a considerable expansion of their organization and an increase in the range and effective- ness of their activities if they are permitted to operate in relative freedom. It seems unlikely, however, that the authorities, a grow to specifically the present military regime, will permit formidable size. The Partisans of Peace do not seem capable of seriously challenging the policies of the military, but might become much more dangerous if (1) there is a breakdown of orderdueerto2factiional disputes t among the members of the present military j, suffer a series of foreign policy setbacks which are widely ascribed to its having been too subservient to the Western powers. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT of There is no reliable information available of on the eexxaac armed Communist and Communist-sympathizer penetration go SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION services, police, and national industries. A situation which bears watching is the reliance of the military junta on civilian advisers who have manifested pro-Communist tendencies in the past, notably Fathi Ridwan and Rashad Barawi. However, as noted above under "Tactics," most such men were determined opportunists who joined the Communists under the previous regime because they were frustrated in their desire for high office. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION As indicated in "Tactics" above, there is considerable attention to Communism as a system in public opinion forming circles. Even in the non-Communist press, there are individual reporters who are quite sympathetic to certain aspects of Communism. However, such people -are often unclear as to the extent to which they are supporting Communism or simply taking up a Communist cudgel against the West. Those'Egyptian newspapers which at least occasionally print a pro-Communist article have a combined circulation of over 100,000. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Since political parties were banned in Egypt effective January 16, 1953 (for a three year period), this question is no longer relevant. However, before this action, pro-Communist elements apparently had some success in infiltrating the Wafd youth groups, the Ikhwan, and the Egyptian Socialist Party (formerly Young Egypt). X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA There are some consistently and by local standards sensationally pro-Communist newspapers such as al-Mur'ardah, edited by Fathi al-Ramli; al-Katib, edited by Yusuf Hilmi, and'a1- alayin, but it is not known whether they are currently being published since such papers are frequently banned or temporarily suspended. No well-established paper is pro-Communist. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The financial position of the Egyptian Communist Party has always been precarious. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Soviet and satellite countries having Legations in Cairo are manned by the following staffs: USSR, 11;Poland,1; Bulgaria, 1; Hungary, 4; SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Rumania, 1; Czechoslovakia, 6. None of these states have trade or cultural missions in Egypt. USSR and satellite Legations are reported to have personnel engaged in propaganda activities. Probably all personnel make some attempt to Osel1M Egyptians whom they meet on the advantages of the Commminist system. The Soviet Legation and probably some of the satellite Legations have receptions on their national holidays. Egyptian Government officials are invited and. many attend. The effect of these activities appears to be insignificant. XIII. CO4MUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Egyptian Student Union, which may be a member of the Internation- al Student Union, is reportedly organized under Partisan of Peace leader- ship. It urges students in various parties, particularly the Wafd and the Socialist, to join its organization. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK No reliable information available. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.10 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, GREECE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . ? 0 ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . ... . . 1 II. Tactics . . . . . . ? ? 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASSETS . . . . . . . . .. 4 I. Numerical Strength . . ? . . . . 4 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . 5 III. , Military Strength and Crganization for Violent Action 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . ? . . . . . . 9. V. Communist Influence in Labor .. .. . ? . . VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural., and Professional Organizations . . . . ? ? ? ? VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . ? . ? X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . 12 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . ? . . . . . . 14 XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . . . . . 14 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . ? ? . . ? ? . . 14 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented. in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20?: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN GREECE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Communist revolt in Greece at the time when the country was liberated from Nazi occupation (December 1944), and the guerrilla war which the Greek Communist Party (KKE) undertoo1 in the fall of 1946 demonstrated that the major and ultimate objective of the Communists is to bring Greece within the Soviet orbit. Since the defeat of the Communist guerrillas in the summer of 1949, the outlawed KKE has confined itself to political action designed to reorganize their underground apparatus in Greece and, in addition, to establish a front which can operate legally and openly. The immediate objective of the KEE seems to be to promote its domestic political fortunes by reestablishing prestige among the left wing elements. of the population. Its propaganda hammers away at the alleged connection between poverty, "repression," and the increasing power of Greek "reactionaries" and Greece's participation in Western defense activities. The burden of the Greek defense budget and Greece's need to withdraw from the "war camp" are particularly stressed. II. TACTICS The principal taotical objective of the Communist Party appears to be to broaden the membership of its front organization, the "United Democratic Left" (EDA), which in the 1952 elections gained about 12 percent of the popular vote, by seeking to win another 20 percent of the electorate now constituting the left wing of the Progressive Democratic Party (EPEK). Thus, the Communists hope to make EDA Greece's principal opposition party. The KKE has on several occasions told voters that they could find "reliable" candidates in "all the parties" who could be supported. This would suggest that the Communists have infiltrated even into the more conservative political circles. Surer evidence indicates that they have recovered much lost ground among labor. Through the ESKE (United Trade Union Movement), which is the labor arm of EDA, the Communists have infiltrated labor unions to an extent that may make them capable of wielding considerable influence at the next Panhellenic Congress of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE). This situation, however, is causing the present labor executive of the GSEE to take steps to block ESKE fron gaining control of locals and attaining a position of influence in the Confederation. The success which the Communists have had in recovering their operational position within labor is principally due to their ability to establish a united front with the union membership itself. Their attempt, however, to carry out SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION broad front tactics by formal alliance with the leadership of labor unions and political parties has met with little success. EPEK rebuffed the latest such attempt just prior to the elections. Although EDA, despite its constitutional conduct, has steadily become less a front group and more the KISS itself under a different name, the new Greek Government controlled by the Greek Rally has shown so far no inclination to take action against it. It is possible that, while EDA hopes to attract additional members under the new right-wing regime, the Greek Rally Government may let EDA continue in its present legal status in order to splinter its center opposition. III. CAPABILITIES The political capabilities of the KKE appear to have been blocked for the time being with the rise of a strong ,government. As a result of the elections of November 16, 1952, the present Greek Government, headed by Marshal Alexander Papagos, gained about 49 percent of the popular vote and, under a revised electoral system, about 80 percent of the seats in Parliament. This governmental strength, which the Communists probably did not expect to develop, could serve as an effective deterrent for the next four years against Communist subversive activity and infiltration in the institutional life of the country. Nonetheless, the Communists, despite the fact that they failed to elect any deputies, enjoy an electoral base for political consolidation and maneuver. The prospect of the KKEts gaining a position of significant influence is contingent on the capability of the Greek Rally to hold, or increase its popular support, and to the ability of the center coalition, composed of the Liberal Party and EPEK, to cooperate in carrying out a constructive opposition policy. The Communists probably anticipate that both pro-Western groups, the Greek Rally as well as the Liberal-EPEK coalition, will disintegrate, since both political groups are made up of heterogeneous political elements. Since the Greek Rally is held together by the prestige of Marshal Papagos and the opposition by the patriotism of General Plastiras, the political life of the country thus centers on two personalities who are at their career's and. This fact gives hope to the Communists, who are also encouraged by the economic situation, which imposes a low standard of living on the population. Unless overall Soviet strategy requires them to sacrifice EDA and go completely underground to resume their tactic of terroristic. activity, the Greek Communists will seek to increase their strength SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 with time through a program of relatively moderate political action and propaganda. While the Communists for the time being apparently are not planning to resume large-scale sabotage inside Greece, there are about 20,000 Greek Communists in the satellite countries who are kept in training for possible reinfiltration into Greece. The Greek Government, however, is acutely aware of this threat, and continues accordingly to budget for strong and vigilant police and gendarme forces. The KKE has a reservoir of about 200,000 male voters and as many women to servo as an echelon of supply and support for any underground organization. The returns of the last three elections have shown that the KKE has a constant popular support of about 10 percent of the voters. It is therefore significant that, with this small percentage of popular support, the KKE was capable of disrupting the country for almost three years (1946-49). It is also noteworthy that the Communists were able to preserve their electoral strength after the liquidation of the guerrilla war. The election returns make two points clear: (1) the absence of defection among the rank and file of the Greek Communists; and (2) the capability of the KKE, whose top leaders operate from within the Soviet orbit, to exercise remote control over its organization in Greece. While the Communists are presently aiming at strengthening and enlarging the legal status and political base of EDA, they may also have made progress in building up their underground by their partially successful campaign for the release of the Communist internees in concentration camps and prisons. The ultimate influence of the Communists, however, will depend on the degree to which the anti- Communist parties can cooperate in solving domestic problems, especially improving Greece's economic situation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH No reliable figures are available on the membership of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). In 1949 Soviet sources claimed as many as 75,000 members. The Greek elections of 1952 revealed about 180,000 Communist sympathizers. Of these, the number of card-carrying members is probably not more than 100,000, of which 30,000 might constitute the hard-core. There are probably 150,000 individuals in organizations controlled by the communists, and an additional 300,000 persons are influenced by partial, but significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organ- izations. In all 12 to 15 percent of the total population is subject to direct Communist influence or control, or some 900,000 to 1,000,000. These figures are not documentary; they are merely the best estimate that can be made. The regional distribution of KKE strength is indicated in the following table, which shows areas in which the Communist-front party EDA is strongest as reflected in the November 16, 1952 elections: Voters (male) Percent of Total Voters Athens 30,000 15.5 Corfu 6,000 25.0 Drama 4,000 16.3 Canea (Crete) 7,000 25.0 Heraklion .(Crete) 6,000 16.2 Kavalla 9,000 29.0 Lesvos (Mitilini) 15,000 39.5 Patras 4,000 12.5 Piraeus 17,000 24.3 Rethymnon 2,000 11.1 Salonica 24,000 25.3 Serres 6,000 13.6 Veria 4,000 14.3 Volos 6,000 21.4 The bulk of party membership and sympathizers are drawn from industrial and agricultural workers, and secondarily, and to a,decreasing extent, from the intellectual-professional stratum. Additional pertinent data on the KKE membership are reflected in the following statistics of the Seventh Conference of the M. held October 1-6, 1945: (a) Total representatives 228, of whom 26 were women. (b) Social composition of the representatives: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SECR T - SECUiiITY INF'ORM~TION Workers 119 52.2% 5% 3 Artisans 8 . 9.6% Agrarians 26 11.4% Employees 12.7% Professionals 29 8 8 3.5% Intellectuals 11 4.8% Students 5 2.3% Unspecified (c) Of these representatives, 105 had prison, exile, or concentration camp experience. (d) Length of membership in the KKE: 63 representatives joined before 1930 75 representatives joined before 1940 85 representatives joined after 1940 (e) Age of the representatives: 73 between 20-30 years of age 100 between 31-40 years of age 46 between 41-50 years of age 3 between 51-60 years of age 1 between 61-70 years of age (f) The average age of the Central Committee membership was 41 in 1945-46. No data are readily available on the length or annualntt goveer of the membership, the number of members of over years lation any relation the decline in membership since 1946. If.membership has o re10 to the voting strength, the M has had a consistent average ofp1lar percent of the popular vote in the last four elections. vote has not declined since the elections of 1946, but its card-carrying membership must have declined since the party is illegal. Probably more than 20,000 Greek Communists are outside the country. The KKE leadership can be characterized as youthful, enthusiastic, individualistic, and immature; despite the limitations imposed by these qualities, they have developed a high sense of party discipline and a tightly-knit organization. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The official returns for the Actually, 9elections won more than 164,848 votes for the Communist-front EDA. SECRET SECURITY INFORt4ATI0" Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 180,000 votes -- about 12 percent of the total. The following tabulations compare the EDA vote with that of opposing parties and show its regional distribution: Comparison with other parties: EDA popular vote 12.0% Vote for the government party 49.3% Vote for the center opposition 36.5% 97.8% Independent vote 2 2% 100.0 Centers of largest FDA vote: Area Communist ED1 Government 0oposition independent Athens 29,572 91,262 72,330 725 Corfu 5,629 11,199 7,005 0 Drama 3,694 12,069 10,946 0 Kavalla 8,650- 11,617 10,512 7 Larissa 3,466 6,530 5,569 50 Lesvos (Mitilini) 14,831 15,567 7,414 0 Lefkas 2,429 2,490 a/ 2,899 Salonica 23,227 36,555 32,397 0 Samos 1,702 6,735 6,662 24 Trikkala 1,588 8,141 7,369 695 Veria 3,553 12,330 11,429 0 Volos 6,143 11,991 9,129 0 Xanthis 0 8,183 2,689 (7,677) (agrarian) a. The center opposition supported an independent candidate. b. In the January 1953 by-elections, EDS made substantial gains: it received 43,037 votes as against 47,232 for the government party and 23,946 for the center opposition. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION A. World War II and 1944 Insurrection During World War II, the Communists controlled the principal resistance movement, the National Liberation Front (EAM). The principal centers of EAM strength were in Attika, Central Greece, Macedonia, Crete, and in the major Aegean Islands. Although no reliable estimate is available of the number of people who participated in the resistance, there were probably more than 500,000 men and women active in EAM, who probably had the sympathy and support of more than 50 percent of the Greek population. Most of those who supported EAM before the December 1944 uprising were not Communist sympathizers and few were aware of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Communist control of EAM or of Communist tactical and political ob- jectives. EAM's military arm, ELAS, could have resisted the Axis more effectively if it had not been primarily concerned with achieving political domination. It is doubtful if EAM-ELAS contributed much to the liberation of Greece or to the success of the Allied military effort. During the war. ELAS claimed as many as 65,000 armed members and it is with this force that it launched the December 1944 revolt. The revolt was probably supported by 35 percent of the Greek population and was terminated by British intervention. SECRET - SECURITY INFORm4kTION B. The Guerrilla War, 1946-49 In the fall of 1946, the Communists began another armed insurrection, using guerrilla tactics. The principal objective was to bring Greece within the Soviet orbit and, secondarily, to prevent the West from:, creating a situation of strength in a strategic area. The uprising had the support of about 10 percent of the population and approximately 40,000 persons participated in guerrilla activity. Of these, a maximum of 25,000 were actively engaged in operations; probably another 10,000 were in reserve outside of Greece. The government forces, including the police-gendarmerie and the civil guard, totaled some 250,000. The overwhelming sentiment of the Greek people was anti-guerrilla, but morale fluctuated and was affected by international conditions and domestic issues. In areas controlled by the Communists, the guerrillas had some local support, but on the whole it was forced rather than voluntary. Since the guerrillas failed to hold populated areas for any length of time, their effectiveness in propaganda and espionage was spasmodic. There were no non-Communist insurrectionary groups which the KKE could exploit. The principal areas controlled by the guerrillas were along the frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. By the middle of 1948, guerrillas had appeared throughout the mountainous regions of Greece and in the islands of the Aegean, Lesvos (Mitilini),.and Samos. The main operations took place at Grammos Vitsi and at the juncture of the Greek, Albanian, and Yugoslav borders; tactical operations were conducted in Peloponnessos and Central Greece. Beginning with hit-and-run operations by bands of 10 to 50, guerrilla tactics had developed by 1948 to attacks on toxin by forces of from 100 to 2,000 men. In 1949, the guerrillas tried to employ orthodcx military tactics involving holding operations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Logistic support of the guerrillas came primarily from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The volume of this support has not been estimated satisfactorily. The guerrilla war seriously affected Greek economic and political stability and it was primarily US aid and advice which saved the country from a complete collapse. The insurrection postponed the economic and social reconstruction of Greece for three years and divided Greek political circles on both domestic and foreign policy. C. The Present Situation Current KKE policy is to refrain from any activity which will provoke drastic measures against its underground apparatus or against its front organization, EDA. KKE does not now appear to have the strength and popular support to resort to violence, and there is no prospect for a Communist armed uprising in Greece at present. Although no violent demonstrations have taken place since the defeat of the guerrillas in the summer of 1949, the Communists are capable of limited acts of violence for diversionary purposes. The Communists could organize orderly demon- strations through EDA but will probably refrain from doing so for the time being in order to avoid jeopardizing their front organization. No information is available on Communist plans for creating or activating military resistance organizations in the event of war. It is reasonable to assume, however, that such plans exist or are being formulated by the top KKE leadership. In an East-Vest war, the Greek Communist apparatus would be capable of sabotage. In a localized war between Greece and an orbit country (Albania or Bulgaria), Greek Communists would split on the national issue and the KKE would find it difficult to carry out sabotage to any appreciable extent. On the outbreak of conflict, the present EDA leadership would either withdraw or be liquidated and KKE underground operatives would try to take over, although many Communist cells would probably break up in the event of a localized Balkan war. Circumstantial evidence indicates that the KKE has stocks of hidden weapons and equipment in Greece, and more can be infiltrated from Albania and Bulgaria and from across the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. A maximum of some 20,000 to 25,000 combat-trained Greek Communists, both men and women, are readily available to the KKE from within the Soviet orbit; this figure could be increased to about 30,000 to 40,000 by drawing upon other Greeks living in the orbit. Underground recruiting in Greece could yield about 5,000 persons in the initial stages. In some respects, the Communist underground apparatus in Greece is a paramilitary organization. Vestiges of the wartime OPLA (Organ- ization for the Protection of Popular Security) still exist. It was re- organized in 1947 as CDA (Democratic Security Organization), the terroristic and assassination unit of the M. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORWTION ODA -- or its current equivalent -- is presently inactive, but it is probably kept in a state of readiness. Its strength is not known but. it is reasonable to assume that it is centered in Athens-Piraeus and Salonica. ODA is a mobile organization and its members probably possess enough weapons -- pistols for the most part, and hand grenades and sub- machine guns in some cases. The quality of its leadership is difficult to determine on the basis of available information, but usually the most fanatic and capable KKE members, many of whom have a criminal record, are recruited for this branch of Communist activity. A variety of interlocking "self-defense" units have been reported, but little is-known of their present status. For example, the OA (Self-Defense Organization) was subordinated in January 1951 to KOSSA (Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps). QA is also known as the "People's Avengers" (Laikoi Ekdikitai). Units of the OA are organized in three groups of three men each, under the command of a tenth man who is also responsible for the weapons. These "vigilance" officers are kept ready, under pseudonyms, for any assignments calling for violence. It is not known whether the MIA (Wide Popular Self-Defense), created in 1945, is still in existence. This was the first para-military organization formed by the Comtmmnists after the collapse of the December 1944 revolt. The Narrow Self-Defense and the Democratic Army (the Communist guerrillas) were able to draw upon MIA for well-disciplined re- inforcements. Sufficient data are not available to evaluate the current status of these paramilitary branches of the KKE. However, their capacity for expansion and action is contingent upon the success of the Greek security organs in uncovering "vigilance" operators. To date, the record of the Greek police in this respect has been good. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Greek Communist Party (EKE) and its affiliated organizations were outlawed in 1947. A leftist party appeared in the elections of 1950, which developed as the legal front of the NIC; under the name United Democratic Left (EDA). There is enough evidence of its ties with the EKE to warrant suppression, but neither the recent government of the center, nor the present right-wing government of the Greek Rally have taken action against it. Under the center government, EDA's weekly party organ and youth organization were suppressed. Under the Rally government, however, the party enjoys the freedom accorded to the opposition parties and its daily newspaper continues to be published. The. government has the capa- bility and popular support to repress any Communist-front group. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION While the effectiveness of the underground organization of the 8M cannot be estimated, some idea as to its efficiency can be gleaned from the effective support it gave EDA in the elections of 1952. The MM was able to resolve the divided opinion in EDA on electoral tactics, ordering the front group to run its own ticket and preventing cooperation with the center parties. V. C04MUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR' There are no data available on the number of Commmmists in defense plants and other key industries, such as railways, ccmmnunicatione, shipping, and chemical industries. In Athens Piraeus and Salonica, probably 30-50 percent of the industrial workers are EDA sympathizers. The percentage of Communist sympathizers in the communications system is smeller, since it is mostly under indirect government supervision. The General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) has managed to prevent Communists from holding crucial posts in its organization, and has been countering Communist infiltration. ?EDA su ports the labor organization known as ESKE (United Trade Union Movement), which was organized in June 1950. Its membership is not Down. There are, in addition, several unions strongly influenced by ESKE on the national level,.such as the Tobacco Workers' Union in Salonica, which has about 5,300 members, . but' the total number of-Communist members is difficult to. determine. None of the labor organizations operating within Greek law are affiliated with international Communist confederations, such as WF"1V. What" the KKE calla the "elected" GSEE (which exists now only in Com unist propew. ganda) belongs to the WFTU. The present GSEE is regarded by the K as "appointed," and is affiliated with the pro-Western ICFTV. VI. C0 E4UNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL. AND PRO FESSIONAL T Organizations which were known to be Communist-controlled are out- lawed, but the KKE continues to use their names in its propaganda. Some of them went underground and many were absorbed by )A. Little is knawsa of EDA activity in these fields. The extent of Communist infiltration into non-Communist organi. zations cannot be estimated, either in general or in connection.v th particular organizations. Available reports on Communist infiltration are inconclusive. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERZ~'. A. National and Mianicipal Legislatures There are no known or declared Communists in the national legis- lature. The Parliament elected in 1951 had 10. A. deputies, who voiced SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 the Communist line in domestic and international affairs, out of a total of 258 members. The .present Parliament, elected on November 16, 1952, has no EDA representation. On the local level, the Communists. through the "Democratic Front" (now EDA), attained a majority in 13(665%) municipal councils of a total of 218 which were elected April 15,.1951. Of the total municipal council- men elected (1,840), about 10 percent (187) belong to the "Democratic Front." Ectreme leftist mayors of the "Democratic Front" were elected in 11 municipalities: Egaleo in Attika - A. Stingos Vyron in Attika - A. Kostantileris Elefsis in Attika - Geo. Rigos Kaisariani in Attika - D. Manolidis Keratsini in Attika - A. Patsilinakos Kifissia a in Attika - J. Varouxakis Nikea in Attika - D. Karakoulouxis Haidari in Attika - M. Koutsokos Patras in Attika.. - V. Roufos Kavalla in Kavalla: - Emm. Melissakis Larissa in Larissa - D. Karathanos a. A resort community for wealthy Athenians. B. Armed Forces While the influence of.the Communists and their sympathizers in top levels of the armed forces is nil, the lower ranks contain a leftist element of about 2-5 percent. Two percent of the army vote in 1951, was for EDA, as compared with its civilian vote of about 10 percent. (In the 1952 elections, the army did not take part. as, a separate entity.) The underground organization of the KKE for the armed forces,.known as KOSSA (Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps) s pre- sumably has agents in military circles. Little evidence has been reported of its effectiveness. C. Police No data are available on Communist infiltration in the police and security services. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION D. Administration The number of Communists in the national and municipal administration SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION cannot be ascertained. No estimate exists of the percentage of civil servants who voted for EDA. The total number of civil servants in the national government is about 80,000. It is probable that about 20-30 percent are EDA sympathizers. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Data inadequate to draw reliable conclusions. IX. CONW?UNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-CONMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Communist influence in right wing organizations and parties is difficult to ascertain inthe case of Greece. It is reasonable to assume that the Communists have planted their agents in conservative circles, whose object is probably to affect the top levels rather than influence the rank and file. It is probable that some of the 31 deputies of the left-of-center party EPEK have Communist connections. There is enough evidence for at least one to be suspected as a crypto-Communist, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A. News-papers and Periodicals Communist newspapers and periodicals are illegal in Greece. Nevertheless, the Communist underground prints and circulates clandestinely the principal long-standing organ of the KKE,'Rzosnastis, and other old or new titles, which appear at varying intervals and in various parts of Greece. Another publication of the' EKE appearing irregularly is Neos Cosmos (New World), which reproduces texts of Central Committee pronouncements. Youth publications are: Flow. (Flame), organ of the Communist underground student organization which shows Athens as its place of publication; and Leventia (Youthful Manhood) and Neos Agonistis (New Fighter), organs of the KKE youth organization, EPON. Publication of the clandestine Communist papers is irregular and the number of copies circulated unknown. EDA puts out a number of publications, which are not as openly Communist as those published clandestinely by the M. Its first official organ, Dimokratiki, which began publication in August 1951, was suppressed by the center government on January 19, 1952. No circulation figures of EDAts publications are available. During the election period (October- November 1952), the caretaker government allowed EDA to publish Av i (Dawn) as a daily organ, and its publication has continued under the right wing Greek Rally government. It started as a weekly, claiming 50,000 circulation. Its circulation figures as a daily are not available. EDA published a weekly called Isonolitia (Civil Rights Equality), but infor- mation on its present status is not available. It also published SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frouri tis Irinis (Guardians of Peace), which was suppressed, together with Dimokratiki, on January 19, 1952. This was intended to disseminate the youth organization EDNE's propaganda on the Communist peace campaign. It is not known if another publication took its place. 1. Printing Establishments. Underground Communist printing establish- ments exist. Indicative of how well the underground press operates is the fact that Rizospastis has had a continuous (although irregular) publication since the M. was outlawed in 1947. 2. Import of Publications from Abroad. Communist publications can only be smuggled into Greece, and consequently, few are imported from abroad. No data are available on this traffic in Communist literature. There is some ground for suspicion that certain issues of R'z~ ospastis are printed abroad. Soviet-satellite diplomatic establishments in Athens issue frequent press releases. The Soviet Embassy is not known to release publications of any significance. B. Radio There are no domestic broadcasting stations in Greece controlled or influenced by Communists. Communist broadcasts, however,, are beamed to Greece from Moscow and all satellite capitals. The main station broadcasting in Greek is radio "Free Greece," operating probably from Rumania as the KKE's principal medium of communication. Radio "Free Greece" has proved effective in communicating with the KKEts underground organization. It can be heard in most parts of Greece and reaches the Greek communities in the Near East. No attempt has been made so far to estimate its audience. Greek broadcasts from Radio Moscow and satellite countries are secondary to radio "Free Greece. They frequently quote KNE broadcasts. The size of their audience in Greece is also unknown, but is certainly less than that of radio "Free Greece." XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The financial condition of the KKE is unknown. The underground in Greece counts on collections and contributions from party members and sympathizers. It is unable, however, to extract sizable funds by ex- tortion as it used to do before it was outlawed, although it still uses this method on a very limited scale. Evidence indicates that for oper- ations and specific activities in Greece funds have been imported from abroad. On the basis of available data no estimate can readily be made of the total financial assets of the KKE. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - l4 - XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS A. -M tic Establishments The only Soviet bloc countries with which Greece has diplomatic relations are the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Embassy in Athens .is small, consisting (as of October 1952) of about 5 individuals, headed by a charge d'affaires, all of whom are listed as living in the chancellery. The Czechoslovak Legation in Athens is small. There is practically no political activity on the part of orbit diplomatic. representatives in Greece. Reports in 1946 and 1947*indicated that bloc undercover agents have operated in Greece, but there has been no information of their existence since then. If the bloc diplomats in Greece are now engaged in political activity of any significant nature, it must be covert. The only Soviet reception reported was held on November 7, 1950. It was well attended by the foreign diplomatic corps in Athens. The USSR and Poland had representatives on the UN Balkan Commission in 1947, but subsequently withdrew their delegates. Since then, no Soviet bloc representatives have participated in UN observation groups in the Balkans. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The KKE participates in Communist international organizations and conferences, but since the party is illegal there is no opportunity for participation-from within Greece. EDA conducts no observable relations with international Communist bodies. This is left to the KKE, which operates from within the Soviet orbit and through its agents in Western capitals. XIV. 001?MUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK A. Courier System An underground courier system of the KKE exists. This has been established by the arrest of Communist agents by the Greek police, but information on the efficiency of the system and points of contact is not readily available. B. W/T System The clandestine W/T station in Kallithea (near Athens), which the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMTION Greek police discovered and raided on November 34, 1951, was in operation for several years. This suggests, and there is evidence, that more W/T stations are in operation. About the same time another clandestine W/T station at Glyfada (outside Athens) was uncovered. Bucharest (Rumania) was the focal point of traffic from and to these stations.. It was rumored in May 1952 that another secret transmitter had been discovered in the Kilkis area of Northern Greece. Nothing farther was reported of this, bat indications are that the Communists have enough transmitters in Greece to carry on their espionage uninterruptedly. It has been established from the messages captured from the W/T transmitters in Kallithea and Glyfada that EDA receives instructions from KBE leaders in the Soviet orbit. This was also seen clearly from the radio "Free Greece" broadcasts in connection with the recent elections in Greece. KKE ordered EDA to run on its own ticket, and this was carried out without deviation. EDA was also in consultation with the KKE on the selection of candidates. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.11 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDIA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. . . ? 1 I. Objectives . .. . 1 II. Tactics . . . . . . 3 III. Capabilities .. ? 3 ASSETS . . . . . . 5 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ... . . . . . .. . .. 5 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 8 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 9 V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . . ? . . . . . . . ? 9 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . 14+ VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . ? ? 15 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . ... . . . . 16 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Xi. Financial Condition . . . . .. .. . . .. . . 24 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets .. . . . . . . . . . 25 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . .. . . . 26 XIV. Communist Communication Network ? 28 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES The objectives of the Indian Communist Party, as set forth in an article by its General Secretary, A. K. Ghosh, in the December 1952 issue of For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, are defined as the "liquidation of all vestiges of British rule, defense of the National independence and sovereignty threatened by the American aggressors," the "preservation of Peace," and. the "promotion of a life of happiness for the people." Yrhile current developments do not pro- vide many striking opportunities for the party to work towards the fulfillment of the first objective set forth above, the party does attack India's membership in the Commonwealth and British vested interests in India on every.possible occasion. Frith regard to the second objective, the US Technical Assistance program and activities provides a major target and it is clear that an immediate objective of the CPI is to hinder so far as possible the community development projects undertaken with US financial and technical aid, and to dis- courage public cooperation with these projects. An additional set of objectives in the general field of foreign affairs is given in a list of the basic tasks facing the party drawn up by the General Secretary in the spring of 1952 following the general elections. These include a five-power peace pact; "solidarity with colonial peoples fighting for freedom"; friendship and closer economic ties between India and the USSR and China; withdrawal of the Kashmir issue from the-UN; and the development of a peace pact between India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. In the main these objectives primarily fulfill tho foreign policy requirements of the USSR rather than promote the party's domestic political fortunes. However, as indicated in many party. documents, Indian Communists are most actively concerned with building the party's organizational strength, particularly among labor and peasant groups, and some of the party's most prominent immediate objectives are designed to further this end. Among the basic tasks facing the party today, as outlined in the General Secretary's post-election report, are the follcwing: the development of a broad-based mass movement for civil liberties, including repeal of the Preventive Detention Act; intensification of the movement for linguistic provinces; the building of a, "united move- ment for help to the people in the famine-stricken areas" to force government to increase relief measures, and "to mobilize people for adequate rations and against rise in prices of food-stuffs." Barring the dictation of a new line by Moscow, it now appears improbable that the party will in tiic immediate future revise its objectives or shift the relative emphasis among those it now pursues. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 2 - II. TACTICS Present tactics of the CPI are characterized by attempts (1) to form, where possible, working alliances with left-wing or other anti- Congress political organizations with a view to building a united front; (2) to win a direct following and popular support among all social segments, particularly peasants, workers, students, and intellectuals; (3) to utilize constitutional procedures; and (4) to exploit its mem- bership in the central and a number of the state legislative assemblies. Insofar as the party abides by constitutional procedures a principal method of propaganda consists in its legislative activities which enable party leaders in both the central and state legislatures to put forward the party line and to express their opposition to the Congress government program. In recent months there have been numerals and recurring opportunities for the party legislators to press their demands for civil liberties and for the formation of linguistic provinces. A principal motif of the party's propaganda appeals outside the legis- latures is its use of "peace" movements to win support. To a certain extent the Communists specialize their appeals to various groups, and the "peace" propaganda is largely directed towards intellectuals, students, and other urban groups, whereas among peasants the emphasis is on agrarian problems. The Communist Party does not hesitate to form alliances with left-wing or even, sub-rosa, with anti-Congress right-wing political parties in the legislative assemblies and for election purposes, when some advantage is to be gained. Such inter-party arrangements are not always for the purpose of augmenting the party's voting strength, but are sometimes designed to reduce the strength of the Congress-dominated faction and if possible to keep that party out of office. On occasion, and to a limited extent, sacrifices have been made by the. party to preserve such alliances and, where they have broken down, as in Madras, it has so far been due to. the action of the allies rather than the Communist Party. There is little evidence that the Communists at present, in spite of their emphasis on the development of a united front, are making concessions in their program to win the adherence of groups usually considered beyond their reach. The party's extra-territorial loyalties, for example, are a definite liability as far as all non- Communist groups are concerned, yet the party does little to play them down. On the other hand, the Communists are able to capitalize on the anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism which is universal in India, and on the definitely pro-Chinese sentiments of the literate population. Dissatisfaction with prevailing domestic policies of the Congress government is played upon with considerable success. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Although the party is now work-''g along constitutional lines, the leaders have not hesitated to state from time to time that the Communists would resort to violence to attain their ends should this become necessary. In fact, along with legitimate activities the party or those directly under its influence has continued to engage in armed violence in certain areas, notably South India and PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union). There are indications that party leaders, foreseeing the possibility of a ban on Communist activities in certain States, or even in the country as a whole, are preparing for increased underground activity. At the present time, the party uses trade unions and "pease" movements as vehicles of propaganda, and to a lesser extent, as pressure groups. In rural areas where direct action has been resorted to, peasant organizations are used to stir up the agrarian population and to enlist support for subversive activities. The recent general elections revealed a marked weakness in Communist influence among the working classes. Probably partly because of this lack of strength and capability, the party in recent months has seldom resorted to strike tactics in the trade unions which they control. Communist labor leaders, however, frequently join in or support strikes which they have not instigated, and claim credit for any concessions secured. With regard to the methods used by the Communist Party to recruit and retain members, it is believed that active proselytising is carried out among student groups and labor organizations, and that a certain selection is exercised through a period of indoctrination and probation. Discipline appears to be strict, and to work fairly effectively to retain members in the party. There is growing evidence that the CPI receives both instructions and financial help from agencies and organs of the USSR in India. An important source of financial aid is the large number of books and printed materials brought into the country as part of the Soviet informa- tion program and sold at low cost for the benefit of the Indian Communist Party. It is possible that party leaders are now under the direct influence and guidance of the Soviet Embassy officials. Insofar as a major current objective of the Indian Communist Party is to build up its organizational strength, the party is probably in a stronger position than ever before to achieve a degree of success. The party's victories in the 1951-52 elections have enhanced its capa- bilities for political action in the sense of providing a platform for party propaganda and for attacks on the government policy and program. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Hitherto, the party has suffered from dissension within its ranks and has periodically been greatly handicapped by a lack of unity among the leaders and a confusion based on conflicting views regarding policy and tactics. The establishment, during the past few years, of increasingly direct contacts with Soviet Union officials should go far towards reducing this factionalism and confusion, and so increase the party's organizational strength. How far the party will succeed in its efforts to increase its influence and widen its control over the trade unions is doubtful. The results of the general elections revealed that the party had little strength in this sector, and it may not even with increased efforts be able to make such headway against its rivals, the labor organizations dominated by the Congress and the Socialists. Conditions seem somewhat more favorable for success in enlisting peasant support and building up effective peasant organizations. Agrarian unrest is widespread, and prospects for substantial improve- ment in rural standards of living in the near future are not bright. The Communists do not appear to be making much headway with the movement for a United Front of leftist parties, and it is probable that an alignment of non-Communist leftist groups will have the effect of isolating the Communist Party. To a considerable extent,party capabilities in respect to organization depend upon the attitude of the Indian Government and the various state governments towards the party. Present indications are that the governments' attitudes are gradually crystalizing and that the dangers inherent in the Indian Communist movement are receiving more and more recognition. It is possible therefore that the Indian Communist Party, at least in certain areas, may be driven underground. The party's capacities in regard to building. organizational strength, and to achieving its other objectives, would be, thereby, greatly impaired. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -5- COMI4JNISM IN INDIA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The Communist Party of India has an estimated membership of about 50,000. This figure reflects the probable increase since October 1951 when the party claimed.30,000 members. The size of the party's following is roughly indicated by the more than 4,700,000 votes received by Communist Party or front candidates for the national legislature in the 1951-52 general elections. While the geographic distribution and class composition of the Communist membership is not definitely known, analysis of recent election returns indicates a concentration of Communist strength in south India (Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, and Madras) and West Bengal, and greater Communist support in rural areas than in the major industrial centers of the country. The larger segment of its urban support consists of middle-class intellectuals and white collar workers rather than members of the industrial working classes. The quality of the party membership has seldom been tested, and no useful conclusions can yet be drawn. During the Telengana disturbances in 1948-50, numerous small bands of Communist-affected "hostiles" ravaged the countryside and eluded several thousand government troops for an extended period. In the general elections of 1951-52, the party line of constitutional opposition was generally adhered to, but Communist strength grew more from general anti-government sentiment than from the popular appeal of Communist 'doctrine. Stability in point of total membership is not a characteristic of the Indian Communist Party. In February 1948, the party claimed 100,000 members; in October 1951, only 30,000. This decrease was caused by internal dissension and a policy of repression on the part of the central and state governments. Since the election campaign of late 1951, member- ship has increased to an estimated 50,000. In its fluctuations since 1946, Communist Party membership has probably never fallen below 20,000. This would appear to represent the "hard core," almost one-half of the present party. This "hard. core" seems to be strongest in those areas of greatest electoral strength and is drawn from practically every social classy with probably a majority from the urban middle and working classes. Members of the "hard core" as a whole are estimated to average 30 years of age, with 8 years of membership in the party; leaders of the "hard core" average 45 years of age with 20 years of membership. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Communist leadership is in general well-educated and able, but the party has lacked leaders with the qualities necessary to attract the Indian masses. The effectiveness of the leadership has also been lessened by personal rivalries and disputes over policy and tactics. From 1948 until 1951 there was serious dissension within the party with several strong local leaders unable to establish clear title to national leadership. The most serious internal differences were, however, resolved by mid-1951 and since that time the leadership has functioned. more harmoniously. Since the 1951-52 elections, the several provincial segments of the party have found a focus in the national Parliament, .where the Communist delegation effectively directs party activity throughout the country, ably assisted by Communist representatives in provincial legislatures. II. EIECTORAL STRENGTH The Communist Party, together with front or fellow-traveller affiliates, polled 4,712,009 votes in India's first national elections,. held between October 1951 and March 1952. These votes represent 4.45 percent of the valid total cast and won the party 23 seats in the House of the People, the lower house of Parliament. Other Marxist, far left splinter parties received approximately 1,500,000 votes (about 1.4 percent of the total) and four seats. The over-all Communist and near- Communist vote, including an, approximation for independents on whom specific data are not available, was between six and seven percent of the total vote. In elections to the state assemblies, the total Communist vote was somewhat larger, approximately 6,100,000 or 6 percent of the total. Other far left parties gained approximately 1,200,000 votes or one percent of the total. Independent candidates with Communist sympathies would probably increase the far left vote by about another one percent. By-elections since M rch 1952 do not indicate any trend in Communist Party strength. A comparison of Communist electoral strength with the strength of other major parties in the national Parliament (489 seats) follows: Party - Votes Percent of Total Seats Won Congress (government) 47,528,911 44.85 362 Communist and fronts. 4,712,009 4.45 23 Socialista 11,126,344 10.50 12 Kisan } zdoor Prajaa 6,158,782 5.81 9 a. These two parties recently united to form the Socialist-Praja Party, with a total of 21 seats. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There are no major parties supporting the Congress Party in the House of the People. The Communist Party vote is concentrated in the southern states of Hyderabad, Travancore-Cochin, and Madras and in the northeastern states of West Bengal and Tripura. The tables below indicate the comparative strength of the Communist. Party in those states as shown in the 1951-52 elections. Hyderabad Assembly (175 seats) Percent of votes Seats won congress 41.84 93 Communist 20.88 42 Socialist 11.37 11 Independents 14.46 14 Travancore-lCochin Assembly (108 seats) Congress 85.4 43 Communist (United Front of Leftists) 21.4 32 Socialist 15.0 11 Independents 17.5 11 Madras Assembly (375 seats) Congress 35.05 152 Communist 12.90, 62 Kisan Mazdoor Praja 8.82 35 Socialist 6.58 13 Other parties 21.76 34 West Bengal Assembly (238 seats) Congress 38.94 150 Communist 10,76 28 Kisan Mazdoor Praja 8.97 15 Jan Sangh 5.65 9 Independents 21.61 16 Tripura Electoral College (30 seats) a Communist 43.10 12 Congress 18,17 9 Independents 21.72 6 This state is without a--legislature but selects an electoral college which elects the state's representatives to the upper house of Parliament, the Council of States. SECRET , SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The present policy of the Indian Communist Party is to refrain from violent demonstrations, except perhaps to a limited degree under special circumstances, but at the same time to maintain close contact with dissident groups and to join demonstrations when they occur. Most recent demonstrations cannot be attributed to the Communists alone, although they have contributed significantly to some of those which have occurred. In December 1952, a series of demonstrations were staged to protest a state sales tax in Saurashtra, and two Communists were on the committee of 10 which directed the action. Communists were conspicuously present in the Hyderabad City riots over the employment of non-Hyderabadis and in the massed demonstrations demanding the formation of a separate state of Andhra. Over the past year, there has been continuing but sporadic violence against landowners in PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union) in which it is thought the Communists have had a leading part. It is known that the Communists are attempting to strengthen their underground apparatus but details are not available and nothing is known concerning any plans that the party may have for engaging in violence in the future. There have been reports of armed Communist groups in Tripura and considerable numbers of Communists in Hyderabad are believed to have arms. There may also be small armed groups elsewhere. Several thousand members of the party have had past experience in riots and other violent tactics, but any precise estimate of their number is impossible. It is impossible to estimate the maximum number that the Communist Party could mobilize for violent demonstrations at present, but where an issue of importance to a specific group was involved, particularly a problem concerning regional susceptibilities, several thousand people could certainly be rallied. In March 1948 the party inaugurated a policy of violence and terror on the assumption that India was ripe for a proletarian revolution. Strikes; sabotage of railways, munition plants, and public utilities; mutiny in infiltrated armed services; arson; bomb-throwing; and murder were the weapons used in this civil warfare, and there was a consequent alienation of public sympathy from the Communist cause. In South India, the Andhra branch of the party, although opposed by the Communist high command, followed the Chinese path of agrarian revolt and of building rural bases of armed strength, and succeeded in bringing a large area on both sides of the Madras-Hyderabad border under Communist control. There is no reliable estimate of the total number of people involved in the 1948-50 period of violence but over 5,000 Communists were jailed. There were probably 2,000 to 3,000 involved in the Telengana area of Hyderabad and Madras. Other centers of violence where possibly several SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY 1NIFORMATION _9 - hundreds were engaged were in the states of Assam, Tripura and Manipur, and Calcutta in northeast India, and in the Tanjore and Kerala parts of Madras state and in the state of Travancore-Cochin in south India. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TCWARD CO*dJNISM The Communist Party, although outlawed in several states during the 1948-50 period of violence, is now legal throughout India and with its front organizations has full freedom in parliamentary and other legal activities. Under the constitution, the national and state governments have the powers of preventive detention in cases involving the security of a state, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of essential supplies or services. Ordinarily, detention without trial beyond three months must be authorized by an Advisory Board composed of persons who have the qualifications of High Court Judges but the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, renewed and amended by the House of the People, permits detention for periods up to a year without reference to an Advisory Board in cases involving India's security, defense, or foreign relations; the security of a state; or the maintenance of public order. The Advisory Board may authorize a continuance of imprisonment so that in effect the government may detain a person indefinitely. During the period of Communist violence in.1948-50, the government made extensive use of the power of preventive detention. Since independence, the size of the Indian police forces has been appreciably increased. The central Intelligence Bureau and the state Criminal Investigation Departments are believed to have an extensive network of informers in the Communist Party and its fronts. The higher levels of army and police forces, and most of the lower ranks, are loyal to the government and at present the government appears capable of repressing the party to a great extent, although undoubtedly some Communist leaders would escape detection and some underground activity could continue. V. COM41JNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Most of the 3,000 primary unions in the country belong to one of the four major federations of unions. Since the federations are closely identified with political parties, affiliation is largely a matter of political rather than economic considerations. The largest federation in the country, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (IITUC) has a total membership of 1,435,258, and is affiliated with the Congress Party. The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) was the only central labor organization in India prior to World War II and was non-partisan in character; it came,under Communist control during the war, and remains today an organ of the Indian Communist Party. It has 606,194 members organized in 729 unions. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) is the labor SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION organ of the Socialist Party, representing 464 unions with 704,987 workers. The United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), established in 1949 as a reaction against the policy of violence imposed.by the Commmists on member unions of the AITUC, represents about 300,000 workers. Indian labor unions do not exert the same control and discipline over members that US unions do. Frequently, the unions are nothing more than very loose associations of workers who have little organization, pay no dues, and do not operate as a united force. Thus, figures as to total strength, which all unions greatly exaggerate, may be very misleading. Information available does not permit a comparative analysis of union strengths within industries. There is no industry which can be said to be unionized by any particular federation; all groups have influence in various industries. Geographically, Communist trade union strength is greatest in Calcutta, the Andhra area of Madras, and Bombay city. Of the total unionized labor force in India, the Communist unions may have very roughly 10-.25 percent. Some of the locals in the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) may be influenced by Communists but no specific evidence is available. At the end of 1950, AITUC claimed 729 unions but a complete listing of them including the plants involved, is not available. Some specific information for Bombay, which is evaluated by the collector as probably true, is given in the three tables below: Industry Communist Union Approximate --strength Textile Mill Mazdoor Union 20 000 Silk Reshern Mazdoor Union , 800 Railways Central Railways Labor Union 4 000 Indian Navy Dock Yards Armari Godi Kamgar Union j, 2 000 Seamen Bombay Seamen's Union .9 000 4 Oil industry Petroleum Workers' Union , 3 500 Air India Air India Employee's Union , 500 Ordnance Depots Il a 400 Bombay Gas Co. a 900 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11 - In the textile industry the following plants are affected: Jain Manufacturing Company Mill Number 1 Digvi jay Mills Bombay Dyeing (Textile Mills) Elphinstone Mills India United Mill Number 1 New China Mills Western India Finlay Mills Madhusudan Mills Shriniwas Mills Gold Mohur New City of Bombay Tata Mills In addition, the Communists have considerable (approximately 70 percent) influence among the workers of the following enterprises: Crompton Parkinson (Works) Ltd. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company Britannia Biscuit Company Acme Manufacturing Company Mukund Iron and Steel Company Tate. Oil Mills Lever Brothers Ltd.. Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company (Dalda) Glaxo laboratories Mazagaon Docks Ltd. Metal Box Company of India Automobile Products of India VI. COMMJNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The All India Youth Federation is a Communist-controlled organiza- tion affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Its numerical strength and its strength relative to that of other youth organizations are unknown, but all youth organizations in India are known to be weak. The Federation's leadership is mediocre. The organiza- tion has as its objective the establishment of a united front with other youth groups. Its capabilities are probably very moderate. The All India Students Federation (AISF) is Communist-controlled and is affiliated with the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Its membership probably does not exceed a few hundred and its leadership is ineffective. The AISF convention in June 1951 stated that the organization's first aim was the unity of the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 student movement, which was to be achieved not by an insistance on the acceptance of a particular philosophy or ideology but only by promoting the day-to-day interests of the students. The Mahila Atma Raksha Samita (MARS) is a Communist-controlled women's organization. Its membership probably does not exceed 200 and the organization is relatively unimportant as compared with the All India Women's Conference, a non-party but predominantly Congress organization. The leadership of MARS is inferior to that of the All India Women's Conference. A member of MARS attended the November 1949 meeting of the Women's International Democratic Federation, but it is not known whether MARS is an affiliate. The All India Progressive Writers Association (AIPWA) is a Communist-controlled professional organization. The size of its member- ship is unknown, but there are provincial branches in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Bombay and local ones in Bhopal, Hyderabad City, Bangalore, and Gauhati. Although weaker than similar non-Communist groups, the AIPWA is nonetheless very active and some of its members have substantial literary reputations. Its main objective is to contribute to the over- all Communist propaganda effort. The membership of the Communist-controlled Indian People's Theater Association (IPTA) is unknown but there are branches throughout India. In comparison with other similar groups it ranks fairly high and the quality of its leadership is good. It contributes to the Communist propaganda effort through such media as plays and dances. Its capabilities are fairly good.. The All India Friends of the Soviet Union (AIFSU) has branches in Bombay, Calcutta, Lashkai, Jamshedpur, Muzaffarpur, Madanpalle, Nellore, Ahmedabad, and Wardha. Its numerical strength is unknown. AIFSU's primary function is to conduct propaganda through cultural exchanges. The Indo-China Friendship Association has branches in Calcutta, Bombay, Patiala, Debra Dun, and probably elsewhere. No information is available on the number of members or the quality of its leadership. Like AIFSU, it is primarily concerned with cultural exchange as a propaganda weapon. The All India Peace Council (AIPC) has over a score of provincial and sub-provincial branches. Its main centers are in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The AIPC is associated with the World Peace Congress and sends delegates to major Communist-sponsored international "peace" meetings. Its primary purpose is to serve as a vehicle for Communist "peace" propaganda. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There are no known Communist front organizations based on racial, religious, or nationality distinctions, although the Communist Party directs special appeals to the minority communities. The Chinese consulate has made strenuous efforts to organize and control the roughly 10,000 Chinese -- about half of India's Chinese population -- resident in Calcutta. At present the community is split with the Communists controlling perhaps 30 percent of it. There is also fragmentary information which indicates that efforts have been made by agencies of the Czechoslovak Government to win over the tiny Czech communities centered in Batanagar in West Bengal. In addition to the above organizations, which represent the most important groups created or captured by the Communist Party, there are a number of others of lesser importance controlled by or infiltrated by Communists. Information concerning these is almost entirely absent. A list of some of these organizations is presented below: Playback Singers Association India Cultural League Kerala Tyojalali Sava Sangh Vichar Vikas Mandal Tyagaraj Gyan Sabha Teachers' Association The Progressive Group Kerala Kala Mandalam City (Bombay) Yuvak Mandal C. Ward City (Bombay) Vidyarthi Mandal Deddhar School of Music People's Academy The Madanpura Youth Trichi Scheduled Cast Federation Trichi Press Worker's Association Scientific Workers Association Progathisil Yuvak Sangh Vile Parle Youth League Progathi Mahila Sangh Lawyers' Association The organizations appearing in the above list are almost all . located in Bombay city. Comparable Communist-infiltrated or -controlled organizations can probably be found in all the major cities and large towns in India. The listed organizations represent fronts in which the Communists are active, such as youth, labor, women's, students', untouchables', professional, and cultural groups. The Communists are also active in sports associations and in refugee organizations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There is evidence of Communist infiltration into the Indian' Institute of Science and the Association of Scientific Workers of India. It is probable that other non-Communist organizations of this nature have also been infiltrated. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT As far as is known, there are no Communist Party members in the executive policy-making bodies of the central government or, with the possible exception of the State of Kashmir, of the states of the Indian Union. The Congress Party controls the national government and all state governments except in the state of Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) where a United Front of right-wing parties controls the government. This United Front has recently made an opportunistic deal with the three Communist members of the state's legislative assembly but this does not give the Communist Party much influence in the state government. There have been conflicting reports of Communists or fellow- travelers in the Kashmir government but the extent of Communist influence is unknown. A few high officials of the Indian Government, such as V.K. Krishna :Tenon and K.M. Panikkar have approximated certain parts of the Communist line in their utterances but the amount of influence they exert within the government is uncertain. The number of Communists or sympathizers in the armed services is unknown but believed to be small, as strenuous efforts have been made to uncover and dismiss them. Reports indicate that Communists are attempting to infiltrate the police forces. In general, there has been only limited success, although in West Bengal, Travancore-Cochin, and Madras infiltration has been more extensive than elsewhere. In early January 1953, there was a fairly serious revolt by the civil police in Madras which the military helped to it down. It was reported. that the Communists controlled the executive or negotiating body of the Madras constabulary association. There is no evidence of Communist influence at the top levels of the Indian police. India's Atomic Energy program is very small and is limited to mineral surveys and research. It is not known whether Communists have any influence within the three man Atomic Energy Commission which directs the program. There may be some Communist influence among other research scientists. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 15 - VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION It is evident that the extent of Communist influence in public- opinion-forming circles is considerable, although an estimate in numbers cannot be given. This is particularly the case in entertainment media. A number of films produced in India in recent years may contain Communist propaganda. Films imported into India from the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary represent a very small percentage of total film imports, but they add to the Communist propaganda effort; non-commercial showings of imported Communist films are said to be extensive. The consensus among the motion picture industry and the movie-going public is, however, that Soviet films are boring and valueless as entertainment. The Communists appear to have made a considerable study of the forms of communication and entertainment in rural India, and some of the more important folk forms have been adapted by them for use in dissemination of propaganda. Dances,, plays, and dance-dramas are also used by the Communists for propaganda purposes in the urban areas. The Indian Communists encourage the composition of propaganda songs by staging competitions. Communist propaganda from time to time finds its way into the non-Communist press. There is some Communist infiltration of the reportorial staff of certain papers. The vernacular langauge press uses Soviet news agency handouts rather frequently, largely because limited financial resources make them appreciative of any kind of matter which is already translated for them and which can be passed on to their printers with a minimum of editorial work. A number of non-Communist newspapers which have large circulations relative to other Indian newspapers and which use TASS material (including reprints from the Soviet press) are listed below: Name Place of publication Language Circulation National Herald Lucknow English 1+0,000 Indian News Chronicle Delhi English 15,000 Nation Calcutta English 10,000 Sansar Benares Hindu 15,000 Pratap New Delhi Urdu 25,000 Tej Delhi Urdu 20,000 Milap New Delhi Urdu 20,000 Vir Bharat Delhi Urdu 12,500 No information is readily available on the presence of party members or sympathizers in All-India Radio. Radio Moscow and Radio Tashkent make daily transmissions to listeners in Southeast Asia and English-language programs emanating from Radio Peiping can be heard in India. SECRET - SECURITY-INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 16 - Communist influence in Indian educational institutions is ' significant. A considerable number of professors and instructors have been and are associated with Communist front organizations and Communists have infiltrated both the leadership and general membership of student federations. The number of people subject to Communist influences through these non-Communist channels is unknown. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES There is some Communist influence, not believed to be extensive as yet, in the Akali Dal, a Sikh communal party. The size of the Dal's membership is not known but in the 1951-52 elections it received slightly over 1,000,000 votes. Several small leftist parties which are fairly strongly influenced by the Communist Party are listed below: United Socialist Organization Socialist Republican Party of India All-India Forward Bloc (Marxist) Revolutionary Socialist party of India Socialist Unity Center Revolutionary Communist Party of India (Das Gupta Group) Bolshevik party of India Indian National Army peasants' and Workers' Party The Dravidian Federation All but the last two of these have their principal strength in Bengal. The peasants' and Workers' party has most of its following in Bombay and Hyderabad and the Dravidian Federation is primarily a Madras party. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A list of Indian Communist newspapers and periodicals is given below. It is probably not exhaustive. Frequency of place of publication publication Publisher Circulation Communist monthly Bombay M.B. Rao n a Crossroads weekly Madras G. Alavandar, 25,000 Janasakthi Printing Press SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 17 - Name Frequency of publication Place of publication Publisher Circulation Desabhimani daily Calicut n a n a Jai Gujarat weekly Ahmedabad n a n a Janashakti do Patna n a n a Peop e s - -- -- Strength) Janashakti do Quilon A.V. Vasavan n a Janashakti daily Madras n a 5,000 Janashakti weekly do n a 1,000 Janayugam monthly do n a n a (People's - -- Age) Jan jug weekly n a n a people's Age) Janvadi monthly Bombay V.M. Kaul n a Voice of the people) Jugantar n a n a n a n a New Age) Kamalan weekly Ernakulam n a (Travancore- Cochin) Lokyug do n a n a n a people's Age) Mashal daily Calcutta n a Torch Light) - - Nai Zindagi n a Bombay United Fine Arts n a (New Life Lithographies SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of Name publication - 18 - Place of publication Publisher Circulation Nevalokan daily n a n a 12,500 (New World) Navayugam weekly Trichur n an 5,000 (New Age Naya Daur (New Age Naya Dabera Hyderabad Hyderabad n a Lakshman Shastri n a (New Dawn) Naya Zamana Lucknow n a 1,500 (New Age_ Prajashakti bi-weekly Vijayawada n a 20,000 (people's Strength) Swadhinata Calcutta n a In ependence) Soviet Land monthly New Delhi TASS representative n a n a = not available Indian communist-front organization list is probably not complete. organs are listed below. The Frequency of place of publication publication Abhidaya monthly Vijayavada Progressive Writers Association Indo-Soviet Bombay All-India Friends of Journal the Soviet Union Naya Adab do Progressive Writers Association Naya Sahitya do Allahabad All-India progressive Writers' Association Parichaya do Calcutta Progressive Writers TIER cator) Association, Bengal Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 19 - Frequency of Place of Name publication Publication Publisher Student bi-weekly Bombay All-India Federation of Students Trade Union monthly do All-India Trade Record Union Congress Unity do Calcutta Indian Peoples Theatre Association The following is a list of pro-Communist, disguised publications; Name Frequency of publication Place of publication Agrani n a Kanpur neer) - - Agramani weekly Calcutta Bombay Blitz do Chaya patha do n a China Review daily Calcutta Dainadin n a Bengal State Etathupaksham daily Ernakulam Hans Swan) monthly Allahabad Ilm-o-danish do Bombay Knowledge) Indian Struggle n a India Today monthly Allahabad Janata people) bi-weekly Bezwada, publisher Circulation n a n a n a Blitz publica- 25,000 tions, Ltd. do 1+5,000 n a n a n a n a n a n a n a n a n a. n a n a n a O.P. Sangal n a Kavitilaka press n a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Janavani Janvadi (Voice of the people) Kerala Bhoomi (Kerala Land SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of publication 20 Place of publication Publisher Circulation weekly Madras n a 1,500 monthly Bombay People's Book n a weekly n a Vallathol Printing and Publishing House n a Manjil n a Mannuni monthly Madras Vanguard) Marxist weekly Trichur Calcutta Nai Chetna n a n a Nav Yug n a Bombay Naya Duar weekly, New Delhi Naya Zamana do Lucknow (New Age Oolaga Anasiyal (World Po itics) do Madras Pravaham (The Current) monthly n a 7 Days) n a New Delhi n a Senguntha Mitha Press Marxist Publishing House n a n a n a n a n a n a n a n a n a n a n a S.R. Sundara Rajan 15,000 Vijaya printing n a and Publishing Hot e - - n a n a n a n a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of Name publication - 21 - Place of publication Publisher Sada jug n a Calcutta n a Our Age) Sapthik Adhikar weekly Lucknow Lakshmi Das Public Opinion do n a Sanj Vartaman press Satyajug daily n a n a Age of Truth) The Behar n a patan n a Herald Viddi Velli monthly Madras V. Vijaya (Morning Star) Baskaran Visal Andhra do Madras n a (Greater Andhra) n a = not available Circulation n a n a n a n a n a 2,000 n a A considerable volume of Communist non-periodical literature is published in India, including books, leaflets, and pamphlets. These publications include works written in India as well as translations and reprints of material written abroad. Translations are made into all of the important literary languages of India. houses: The following is a list of Communist-controlled publishing Peoples Publishing House, Ltd. Bombay (main office; branches in 6 other cities) New Age Printing Press Soviet Writer Publishing House Marxist Publishing House Bombay n a n a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -22- No information regarding the quality of their equipment is available. The following Communist publications are imported from-the countries indicated: Soviet Literature World Student News (organ of t e International Union of Soviet Woman Students) Soviet Union Czechoslovak Life New Times CHINA News China Pictorial RUMANIA People's China For a Lasting Peace, For China Monthly Review a Peoples Democracy (organ of the Comi orm Chinese Medical Journal World Youth (organ of China Reconstructs the World Federation of Democratic Youth) FRANCE Labour Monthly World Trade Union Movement organ of the World Fedir-ation of Trade Unions) In addition to the periodicals listed, a considerable quantity of books and pamphlets are imported into India from the USSR and Communist China. Some titles are; Advancing to Communism, Two Collective Farms, Public Education in the USSR, Mother and Chid Care in the USSR, The Truth About American Diplomats, Conspiracy Against Peace, The C inese People's Liberation Army, China Fights for Peace, and China's Youth March Forward. TASS news agency publishes a bulletin entitled News and Views from the Soviet Union and a periodical entitled Soviet Land, in English, Hindi, Bengali, and Telegu. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION No broadcasting stations are controlled by Communists. The extent of Communist penetration into the government-controlled broad- casting service is unknown but probably slight. The following programs are received from stations in the USSR: Radio Moscow Radio Tashkent GMT 1400-1445 - English GMT 1500-1530 - English 1445-1500 - Hindustani 1600-1615 - Bengali 1500-1530 - Bengali 1615-1630 - English Although Radio Peiping has no special service directed to India, its signal is audible in India beginning at 0900 GMT, 1330 GMT, and 2200 GMT. These programs are in English. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY IIF0RD'ATION XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Party membership fees are fixed by the Central Committee and are paid monthly, or, in the case of peasants, less frequently; no information is available on the size of the fees. Income from them goes to the district committee. The district, provincial, and central committees are also empowered to fix and collect levies on the income of party members. Individuals occasicnally donate sums of money to the party. The publication, distribution, and sale of party pamphlets, leaflets, and books, mainly by the Peoples' Publishing House, Ltd. of Bombay, is an economic enterprise of the central organization of the Communist Party. The sale of publications from abroad is also a source of party income. The maintenance of a party press is believed to be a considerable drain on the party's finances. It has been reliably reported that the World Federation of Trade Unions sent about $2,800 to the Secretary-General of the Communist-front All-India Trade Union Congress in 1951. It is not un- likely that grants from parties in other countries as well as from international front organizations augment the Indian party's income. There have been occasional reports that Soviet and satellite govern- ments are directly subsidizing the Indian Communist movement but there is no conclusive evidence to this effect. There have been reports recently that the Chinese Embassy in India has extended financial aid to local Indo-China Friendship Associations. No information regarding revenue received from party-controlled labor unions or front organizations is available, but receipts from such sources are probably small if not non-existent. No estimate of the party's total assets is possible. It is believed that the disruption of the party organization as a result of government repression and the inner-party factionalism which arose in early 1948 out the party off from financial resources which it had previously commanded. The central organization was apparently having a difficult time meeting expenses during the first half of 1951 and by the middle of the year it had hardly a month's reserve of funds. This same situation seems to have obtained in all the provincial and district organizations. In mid-1951 the expenses of the central organization amounted to about $1,400 a month; this was increased to about $2,000 monthly by the additional work of organizing a campaign in connection with the general elections, reviving and intensifying the work of all front organizations, and preparing for the holding of an All-India Party Congress. The provincial and district committees also participated in this additional work and their limited finances also were heavily strained. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATICN - 25 - It is believed that a significant percentage of the income of the Indian Communist Party goes for the maintenance of party organs, very few of which are self-supporting. For example, one Communist periodical which began publication in May 1951 reportedly had incurred an indebtedness of approximately $2,400 by October of that year. From time to time Communist publications such as Crossroads, Swadhinata, and the Indo-Soviet Journal have had to make special appeals to their readers and to the general public for contributions to help the publications meet their obligations. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi has the following staff: Ambassador Secretary Counselor Commercial Counselor 3 First Secretaries Commercial Attache 4 Second Secretaries 3 TASS representatives 2 Attaches Pravda representative Third Secretary Film distributor At least 7 clerical employees The TASS News Agency's main office is located at Travancore House, Curzon Road, New Delhi. It also has a branch in Calcutta. More than 100 Indian nationals are employed by TASS. The Soviet Trade Agency's main office is located at 4 Camac Street, Calcutta. The Czech Embassy in New. Delhi is staffed by a Charge d'Affaires, a Second Secretary, two Third Secretaries, and a Commercial Attache. No information on the clerical staff is available. There is a Czech Consulate in Bombay, but no information is available on its staff. The Czech Trade Commission in Bombay is headed by a Trade Commissioner. No data are available on the staff. The Hungarian Legation is staffed by a Charge d'Affaires, a Commerical Counselor, and two Attaches. No information on the clerical staff is available. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY IN DRMATION -26- The Chinese Embassy at New Delhi has the following personnel: Ambassador 2 Counselors Counselor for Consular Affairs Counselor for Commercial Affairs Military Attache 2 Assistant Military Attaches First Secretary 2 Second Secretaries 2 Third Secretaries Attache No information is available regarding'the clerical staff. The Chinese Consulate General in Calcutta is headed by a Consul General assisted by two Consuls and a Vice Consul. No informa- tion is available regarding the clerical staff. A Czechoslovak Oultural Festival which was held in Calcutta from Febru.Fry 23 to March 2, 1951, showed puppet films in English and a full-length Czechoslovak feature film in English, Lost Frontiers; a lecture on planned economy in Czechoslovakia was also given. Czech and Russian pamphlets, books, and magazines in both Bengali and English were displayed on the sidewalk for public perusal and purchase. The University Institute Hall, where the festival was held, contained an exhibition of photographs of Czech industry, peasant life, and architecture. Samples of Czech textile work were draped about various stands. An estimated 15,000 people attended the exhibition. The Chinese Consulate at Calcutta held an exhibition of photo- graphs of alleged atrocities by American troops and of life in Communist China. This exhibit drew large crowds. The Soviet Embassy sponsors film shows and exhibits and gives entertainments; its officials participate in front organization activities. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No international Communist organizations maintain offices in India. The only meeting of a Communist international organization held in India in recent years was the Southeast Asian Youth Conference, held in Calcutta in February 1948; it was sponsored jointly by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). The IUS executive committee is scheduled to meet in India in January 1953. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Indian Communists have attended the following meetings of international organizations held abroad: Meeting Third World Festival of Youth and Students (co- sponsored by WFDY and IUS WFDY Council Meeting (7th Annual) WFDY Executive Comrit- tee Meeting, 1952 WFDY Executive Commit- tee Meeting, 1951 IUS Council Meeting (5th Annual) IUS Council Meeting (6th Annual) IUS Executive Commit- tee Meeting, 1952 IUS Executive Commit- tee Meeting, 1951 IUS Executive Commit- tee Meeting, 1950-51 Date and Place Number of Indian Representativ August 5-19, 1951 (East Berlin) August 23-28,1951 (East Berlin) January 20-24, 1952 (Copenhagan May 24-27, 1951 (Budapest) August 31-S tember 7, 1951 (Warsaw) September 6-10, 1952 (Bucharest) March 14-18, 1952 (Budapest) April 24-28, 1951 (Peiping) January 13-18, 1951 (East Berlin) World Federation of October 1-4, 1952 Trade Unions(W1FTU) Inter- national Conference (Textile and Clothing Workerst Trade Depart- ment) WFTU Administrative Committee Meeting (Land and Air Transport Work- ers' Trade Department) (Berlin) July 16-19, 1951 (Vienna) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 1 known 1 known 1 known 1 known A few Indians attended 1 known Undetermined number 1 known 6, reportedly Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Meeting SECRET - SECURITY Il'CF.MATION 28 Date and Place Number of Indian Representatives Women's International February 1-6, 1951 2 known Democratic Federation(WIDF%East Berlin) Council 'fleeting WIDF Executive June 20-24, 1951 1 known Committee Meeting (Sofia) 1st International Con- April 12-16, 1952 19 known ference in Defense of (Vienna) Children (sponsored by WIDF) WIDF Executive July 18-22, 1952 1 known Committee Meeting (Bucharest) World Peace Council February 21-26, 1951 2, reportedly Plenary Session (East Berlin) World Peace Council May 5-7, 1951 1 known (Executive Meeting) (Copenhagen) World Peace Council November 1-7, 1951 8 known Plenary Session (Vienna) Moscow Economic Con- April 3-12, 1952 28 known ference (Moscow) World Peace Council July 1-6, 1952 2 known Plenary Session (East Berlin) Asian-Pacific Peace October 2-12, 1952 52, reportedly Conference (Peiping) World Congress of December 12-20, 1952 30, reportedly Peoples for Peace (Vienna) XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Indian Communist Party is believed to have an extensive courier system within the country, but little reliable information regarding it is available. It has been.reported that the TASS employees sometimes serve as couriers, and that motion picture film shipments are used to convey party messages. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFDRMATION Charges that the party operates an extensive wireless system throughout India were made in June 1952 in the Indian Parliament. Confirmatory evidence of the truth of these charges is lacking, however. The closest foreign tie of the Indian Communist Party is believed to be with the Communist Party of Great Britain. The Indian party for many years has maintained correspondence with the British party and in particular with R. Palme Butt. The Communist Party of India follows gs best it can the general policy laid down by the Cominform. It has been definitoly established that the Indian Communist Party directs the activities of the Communist Party of Pakistan in East Pakistan, and there is ample evidence that the Indian party and the Communist Party of Nepal maintain close liaison. In addition, there have been a number of reports of contacts between Indian and Chinese Communists. It has also been well established that the Indian Communists are in contact with the Communist Party of Burma. There is strong evidence that on two occasions criticisms and guidance from the Communist Party of Great Britain have exerted a dominant influence on the policies of the Indian Communist Party. In 1942, the Indian party was tardily brought to adopt the new line regarding World War II as the result of strong pressure from the British Communist Party. The Indian Party had continued to condemn the war long after world Communism had dubbed it a "people's war." Intervention from the British Communists appears again to have been a decisive factor in the Indian Communists' shift to a united front policy in 1951, which is probably attributable to a letter received by the Indians from R. Palme Dutt in the fall of the preceding year. Numerous active Communists from abroad have visited India in recent years. Among these are: Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet, in October 1950; D.N. Pritt, a British lawyer, in the autumn of 1950; Mrs. Jessie Street, in July 1950; Malcolm Nixon, the Secretary of the WFDY, in May 1952; and M. Joliot-Curie. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-665.12 COh9MUNISM IN TEE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPART}}NT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CON SITS Page Foreword . . . . . . ? . . . . ? . . ? . . : . ? ? ? ? ? ? . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . ? . 1 II. Tactics ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 2 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 6 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 8 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . ? 8 II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 9 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 10 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . ? . . ? . . ? . 11 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional organizations . . . . . . . ? . . . . ? 12 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . ? ? ? 17 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 18 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties ? . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . 18 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . ? ? . . . ?,? 18 XI. Financial Condition . ? ? ? ? . ? . . ? ? . ? . . . ? 19 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . ? . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? 19 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . ? ? . . 20 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . ? . ? . .. ? . . 20 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries-of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out;.and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN IRAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The major Communist objective in Iran appears to be to get control of the Iranian Government by constitutional means. Communism is repre. sented organizationally in Iran by the Tudeh (Masses) Party, which emerged into public life in 1943 as a coalition of Iranian Liberals and Communists. The Tudeh Party was declared illegal in February 1949 but has been main.. tained since then clandestinely and has operated overtly through a variety of front organizations, of which the "Peace Partisans" and "The Society to Combat Imperialism" are the most prominent. In moving toward its primary objective of getting control of the government through constitutional means, the Tudeh Party appears to have the following concurrent high priority intermediate goals: (1) legaliza- tion of the Tudeh Party; (2) replacement of Mosadeq as Prime Minister; (3) control of the key Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice; (4) control of the M%jlis (lower house of Parliament), if necessary by a coalition group; (5) neutralization or elimination of the Shah; (6) neutralization or elimination of the traditional governing groups; (7) transfer of the management of factories and services to union organizations; (S) confiscation of large landholdings for distribution to peasants, thereby neutralizing or eliminating large landlords; (9) neutralization or conversion of intellectuals ; (10) elimination of all Western political influence; especially that of the US; (11) neutralization of UN influence; and (12) establishment of closer cooperation, especially in the economic field, with the Soviet Union. These objectives are set primarily to increase the capability of the Tudeh Party to exercise political power both through the ballot and the mechanisms of mass demonstrations, riots, and intimidation, employed to undermine public confidence in the authorities. Although the elimina- tion of all Western, especially US influence, in Iran would fulfill a Soviet foreign policy requirement, the alleged threat to Iran arising from that source provides the Tudeh Party currently with one of its most valuable tools in seeking non-Communist cooperation. The current top priority short-term Tudeh goal appears to be to utilize its Communist-educated, disciplined, devoted, and effective organization to expand its influence in non-Communist circles. The degree of concentration on other objectives is opportunistic. For instance, the government's decree increasing the peasants' share of agricultural production was utilized by the Tudeh Party to arouse support for its goal of confiscation of large landholdings; similarly, the ineptitude and ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Labor in protecting workers has been repeatedly used by the Tudeh Party to destroy non-Tudeh SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION unions and strengthen its own. Tudeh leadership has shown great flexibility and alertness in exploiting opportunities for advancing its objectives as they arise. There are no significant incompatabilities among these short-term Communist objectives, which are designed to destroy the capacity of the present governing groups to prevent ultimate Communist control of the entire bureaucracy and the army. Incompatabilities are likely to become apparent only after these short-term objectives have been achieved and the ultimate Tudeh objectives are exposeds (1) the complete Sovietization of Iran, including (a) neutraliza- tion of the middle class, (b) establishment of a single political party, (c) imposition of police rule, and (d) replacement of the current curriculum in schools, colleges, etc., by the curriculum used in the USSR; and (2) transformation of Iran into a Soviet Satellite state. If the Tudeh believes it can muster an overwhelming prepon- derance of force, it might rapidly shift its strategy of achieving control through constitutional means to achieving it through a coup d'etat. Failure of such an attempt would result in the destruction of the organization and. the indefinite postponement of success by legal means. We have no evidence to indicate that this shift in tactics is likely in the immediate future, although serious dis- affection in the armed forces or simultaneous tribal and urban dis- turbances throughout the country could present an opportunity. The obstacles to movement which winter snows and spring floods present in the mountainous tribal areas make disturbances there unlikely in any case before May. II. TACT ICS The underlying strategic policy of the Tudeh Party is threefold: (1) it is designed to build up a direct following among all social groups; (2) it attempts to enter working arrangements with or gain covert control of non-Communist political groups; and (3) it attempts to weaken by subversion and intimidation non-Communist political and social groups. Since the Tudeh Party is illegal, its efforts to build up a hard-core following are largely covert, although its activities through front organizations and its-newspapers are, in effect, overt. The Tudeh Party carries on its propaganda wherever there is an opportunity and in the manner best suited to the recep- tive capacity of the target. Emphasis is placed upon factors and grievances which affect the immediate personal lives of the particu- lar audience and therefore varies in accordance with their background, prejudices, and aspirations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3- The bulk of the membership appears to be in urban centers, where the industrial and educational life of the country and governmental machinery are concentrated and where ease of communi- cation and association facilitate organization. The Tudeh Party is apparently also attempting through sports clubs to establish a body of young men highly trained in the technique of street fight- ing to supplement the unorganized bands of thugs who have partici- pated prominently in past Tudeh demonstrations. There is no evidence that an effective pare-military organization as yet exists. Given the economic and social conditions in Iran'since 1945, it is probable that the Tudeh Party would have made more progress in the postwar period if non-Communist National Front groups had not emerged with objectives which in many respects duplicated those of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh propaganda promises a higher standard of living for 90 percent of the Iranian population, "social justice," "national independence," and cultural autonomy. All of these objec- tives have very broad popular appeal in Iran. Furthermore, the experiences of Iranian students abroad, as well as both Western and Soviet propaganda during and since World War II, encouraged Iranians, especially in urban centers, to expect and demand improvements in their economic and social conditions, but did not make clear alter- native methods for achieving these. Primarily through its newspapers and pamphlets and through discussion at cell meetings, the Tudeh Party, aided by radio propa- ganda from the USSR, has kept up a continuous barrage of criticism designed to destroy public confidence in the ability and good in- tentions of the governing groups in Iran. The members of the party are engaged actively in collecting damaging information.' There is a sufficient basis of truth in the Tudeh accusations of official injustice, disloyalty, and incompetence to provide confidence among hearers in the exaggerations and untruths disseminated. Furthermore, by claiming credit for improvements in the working conditions of various groups of laborers, and by providing financial aid for Tudeh demonstrators injured or under arrest, the party has established sufficiently convincing evidence of its claims that it constitutes the only effective defense against "exploitation." In a country where official promises have remained traditionally unfulfilled, these small positive Tudeh actions have been effective, especially in urban areas. Tudeh activity in Iran has been greatly aided since.March 1951 by the controversy over oil nationalization, which led to a concentra- tion of resentment against the UK. Under the guise of patriotic support for the national struggle to free Iran from alleged British SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 -4- control, the Tudeh has been able to gain experience in the use of mass demonstration and has provided some of its members with practical experience in street fighting and the use of slogans. The party has also been aided by the activities of ultra-conser- vative Moslem leaders, such as the Majlis President, Mullah Kashani, whose agitation for the return to Islamic principles arouses misgiv- ings in the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minority groups. Further- more, sections of these minority groups were among the most active collaborators with Soviet officials during the Allied occupation of Iran. Their inability to emigrate and their fear of Soviet perse- cution in the event of another Soviet invasion of Iran encourage especially the younger people among them to join in Tudeh activities in the hope of ultimate personal gain or safety. The Tudeh Party has also been aided by the revolutionary policies and propaganda of the National Front group which, though less extreme, has seriously weakened the power of the traditional governing groups in Iran. Conditions governing foreign trade have also aided the Tudeh Party. The limited and.costly transportation system in Iran makes exporters in the northern regions particularly vulnerable to attractive commercial offers from the Soviet Union. The proximity of those areas to the USSR and the fear of another Soviet invasion also incline merchants in the north to cooperate with the Soviet Trade Delegation and, indirectly, the Tudeh Party. The major propaganda line which the Tudeh Party employs to build up local support is that the present governing groups are.un- willing and unable to establish and carry out policies which will improve the lot of the Iranian masses. It therefore argues that only through the united action of the people under the guidance of the party can a program of reform be executed which will provide the people with necessities and assure them social justice, health, education, and-opportunity for self-advancement. In moving toward its major current objective of replacing the government, the party utilizes its front organizations, such as the Peace Partisans, to discredit the West, especially the US, in the hope of forcing the government to weaken its position by rejecting aid from the US. It uses its trade unions to discredit the Ministry of Labor and to frustrate by strikes and repeated complaints official attempts to maintain some degree of stability in industrial enterprises. In the same way, the great variety of front organizations which relate to practically every phase of activity in Iran are used to hamper whatever steps the government may take toward orderly reform and to spread and increase popular distrust and dissatisfaction with officials and government organizations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 5 New members of the Tudeh Party are recruited by personal solicitation of old members after a thorough period of investigation. The new recruit's interest is usually based upon some personal grievance which Tudeh promises to remove. The recruit's active interest is maintained by a sense of purpose, of comradeship, of membership in a secret, exclusive organization, and of conviction that in the end he will be on top and his enemies destroyed. any' ttthe he financing have littled detailed information about some cingiof the par beyond the fact that members pay d , rived from the sale of newspapers and publications, and that some is derived from Communists abroad and indirectly from foreign com- mercial transactions. Before the Tudeh Party was declared illegal, the composition of its directing committee was well known. It was composed of Iranians with various degrees of Soviet training. They are now dispersed, some in Europe, some in the USSR, but is. is probable that some are in hiding in Iran and that they continue to direct policies there. The extent of direction from Soviet or satellite sources is not known, but it is probably significant. Control or influence in non-Communist organizations (excluding fronts) is achieved by infil- tration or bribery. The characteristic Iranian emphasis on individualism promotes disunity in organizations and so facilitates the acquisition. of key posts by any determined minority acting as a unit. As a matter of policy, the Tudeh Party appears to prefer that the most prominent posts be filled by non-Communists, so long as the voting power and ideological direction remain in Tudeh hands. The Tudeh Party has been greatly handicapped in its efforts to obtain control by constitutional means by the fact that it is illegal and that the elections have never been free. It therefore ,resorted in the 1952 elections to the following devices: (1) support- ing candidates proposed by front organizations; (2) bribing or making deals with candidates supported by either Mosadeq or Kashani. Support for front candidates was not only urged by Tudeh newspapers, but was promoted by instructions delivered in Tudeh cell meetings. In order to obtain Majlis representation, the Tudeh is now expressing its willingness to join with any political group. So far, however, the disadvantages to non-Communists of. such association appear to have prevented the success of this tactic. It is possible, should the National Front group leaders come into conflict over, say, the succession to Mosadeq, that some leader might accept the collabora- tion of the Tudeh Party. But at the present time the prospects are that any resort to such collaboration would unite the remaining non- Communist opposition and assure them the victory. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6- III. CAPABILITIES In the absence of muoh more serious disaffection in the army, simultaneous uprisings by various elements throughout the country, or some unexpected Soviet action, it is not believed that the Tudeh Party has the ability to get control of the Iranian Government by force. The ability of the Tudeh Party to achieve its major current objective of gaining control through legal methods will be in inverse pro- portion to the effectiveness of the.present government in relieving traditional economic and social pressures on the bulk of the popula- tion and meeting the aspirations of the younger educated groups who provide an important element of National Front 'support. Tudeh leaders at present probably feel that they have no'alternative than to bide their time while consolidating their strength, knowing that .any non-Communist government will be forced by continued financial and political difficulties to adopt strong regulatory measures which will increase strife between the "haves" and the "have nots." If the National Front government is unable to meet the mounting pressures, it is probable that Tudeh will receive added strength and, will obtain effective representation in the Majiis through elections and pressure on deputies. The ability of the Tudeh Party to.exploit opportunities favor- able to its current goal of gaining control of the Iranian Government stems primarily from four factors: (1) it is the only united and disciplined political party; (2) it has developed the techniques of the controlled use of mass demonstrations, strikes, riots, and inti- midation for political purposes; (3) its policy of opposition to or evasion of established authority strikes a sympathetic chord with most Iranians who are acquainted from personal experience with social, political, and economic injustices; and (4) the centralization in Tehran of control over governmental machinery provides Tudeh with a compact, crucial target. Because of these factors the Tudeh Party is likely to increase in power, unless it represents a clear political threat to a non-Communist government which would then try to destroy it. At the present time, the existence of an active Tudeh Party is politically advantageous to Mosadeq in conducting both his internal and foreign policies. Under those circumstances, it is probable that the Tudeh Party will be permitted to continue to operate through -front organizations. It will attempt to further Soviet policy by discrediting and, if possible, forcing the rejection of US aid to Iran. The party may be expected to pursue its efforts to hamper the government's attempts at reform by complaining that actions taken are too slow or too limited and by publicizing instances of dishonesty or incompetence. It will also persist in using Tudeh unions to disrupt industrial and trans- portation operations. .SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The disunity of the non-Communist forces in Iran and their internal jealousies and conflicts will facilitate the expansion of Tudeh power and influence, despite the relatively small membership in the Tudeh Party. However, with patience and persistence, a non- Communist government can, with outside assistance, gradually improve the conditions which now provide the Tudeh Party with its major sources of support. Barring some unexpected development such as a political disintegration of the National Front, a serious crop failure, an unfavorable export market, or an abrupt change in Soviet tactics, the probability is that Tudeh strength in Iran will not increase proportionately more than non-Communist strength through 1953. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The current estimate of card-carrying members of the Communist Tudeh Party in Iran is from 20,000 to 35,000, with an estimated hard- core of 1,000. The membership may be roughly estimated at 8,000 in Tehran, 5,000 in the Azerbaijan area, 4,000 in the Caspian region, 1,000 in Isfahan, and 3,000 in the-Abadan area. The hard-core member- ship derives principally from industrial and transport workers,, students, teachers, professional men, and government employees. Members of organizations controlled by the Communists may be estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000; those in non-Communist organizations which have been infiltrated by the Tudeh Party,160,000; and the total controlled or strongly influenced by the Tudeh Party at from 170,000 to a maximum of 400,000, or from 1 to 2.3 percent of the estimated population. The party's members and followers may be estimated in the major cities at 30,000 in Tehran, 20,000 in Azerbaijan, 10,000 in the Caspian region, 4,000 in Isfahan, and 12,000 in the Abadan area. The bulk of the party members and sympathizers come from among skilled and unskilled workers, peasants, teachers, students, minor government employees, professional men, Kurds and religious minorities (Assyrians, Armenians, and Jews)._ The individuals are of all ages, with an estimated average membership in the party of three to seven years. Possibly 4,000 members-of the party have been active for over five years, with the "hard-core" members, who are in the 25 to i5 year age group, active for an estimated period of five to seven years. The quality of the "hard-core" leadership is believed to range from average to good. No information is available regarding the annual turnover of membership. The number of Tudeh sympathizers is extremely variable, depend- ing upon specific issues raised and concurrent circumstances at a given time. This fact, combined with the covert character of most Tudeh activities, makes estimates of Tudeh membership and following 'open to question. Although the general trend has been toward in- creased membership, the party's following appears to have dropped sharply following the re-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946, and the banning of the Tudeh Party in February 1949. On both of these occasions, the party tightened up its membership requirements, and the stricter policy also contributed to the drop in adherents. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Rigged elections, as well as the illegal status of the Tudeh Party, make estimates of electoral strength of doubtful reliability. C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Tehran elections, alone, provide a reasonable basis for estimates. There the Tudeh and supporter vote totalled 28,841, or roughly one- quarter of the over-all vote. All successful candidates supported the National Front government. Of the 80 nationally elected repre- sentatives, 6 from Azerbaijan (4 from Tabriz) are alleged. to have Communist connections. It is probable that some urban centers, such as Isfahan, the proportion of votes from Tudeh members and sympathizers was also roughly one-quarter. Current major Tudeh objectives and tactics are (1) to increase the party following to support its own candidates if the ban is lifted, otherwise to support "front" candi- dates or non-Communists who are amenable to bribery; (2) to plug simultaneously for free elections. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The current Tudeh policy appears to be to refrain from armed insurrection, but to fight back vigorously if attacked by other groups or the police. In recent cases of violent demonstrations, the estimated numbers of Tudeh followers involved ranges from 100 to 5,000. The number which could be brought out now for violent demon- strations under the most favorable conditions is estimated at a minimum of 35,000, a maximum of 200,000. The maximum number of party members capable of leading violent demonstrations.in key places probably does not exceed 500. On the basis of speculation, the party is probably capable of directing violent demonstrations in Tehran, Tabriz, the Caspian area, Isfahan,.and the Abadan area. Quality of leadership is probably average to good, and equipment is believed to include small.arms and home-made bombs as well as knives, clubs, etc. Tudeh sources claimed that 120,000 participated in the 1945 attempt to set up separate Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments under the protection of the Soviet Army; however, the actual force was probably not more than 50,000. There have been no reports that effective Tudeh para-military organizations exist. The party has ?relied upon groups of miscellaneous thugs in violent demonstrations. It is believed to be training young men for street. fighting, but no organized units are known to exist as yet. The maximum force avail- able throughout Iran now for armed insurrection is estimated at 200,000, but the number would depend on the issue involved and other circumstances. The quality of leadership would probably be good. The supply of available weapons and ammunition is probably inadequate now to equip potential manpower. No current plans or proposals for creating or activating a military resistance organization in case of war are known. In case of an East-West war, it is probable that Iran would lose its indepen- SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION dence in a matter of days. Under Soviet occupation or domination, practically all able-bodied men and, to a lesser extent, women, would probably ultimately be mobilized to support the USSR in its resistance to the West. This number can be roughly estimated at a maximum of 1,000,000. Leadership, arms, and equipment would have to be provided by the USSR. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Tudeh Party and its labor front, the Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU), were declared illegal in February 1919. Since then they have been operating largely clandestinely, but also overtly under the cloak of marW front organizations. Tudeh activities are hampered by (1) the governmentia imposition of martial law in the Tehran and Abadan areas; (2) a new press law which provides means of suppressing Tudeh publications; (3) new decrees forbidding the carrying of weapons and the holding of meetings without police permission; and (1) failure to weaken significantly the repressive potential of the police and-army. The government has the means to suppress Tudeh and its front organizations effectively, but is unlikely to do so as long as (1) the existence of the Tudeh threat is politically advantageous in carrying out internal and foreign policies and (2) the Tudeh is regarded as presenting no clear and crucial threat to the maintenance of power by a non-Communist government. The Communist Party, however, has exhibited impressive ability to circumvent repression in Iran. This record has been achieved largely as the result of (1) a skillful, organizational set-up whereby even its own members know only a few within the organization; (2) skillful direction of overt activities on the part of Communist groups; (3) skillful use of front organizations; (1) the parallel revolutionary and anti-Western propaganda and activities of the National Front (now in control of the government); (5) the lack of concerted effort by the government to repress Communist activities; (6) bribery of government officials; and (7) infiltration among officials within the Ministry of justice and'prisons. Although the government has declared martial law in Tehran and Abadan-Khorramshar (oil industry area), Communist organizational activity continues uninterrupted. Repressive action by the government, such as imposition of martial law, does have positive results, particularly in reducing the occurrence of demonstrations. In the field of press publication, however, repressive action does not appear to be very effective. Government efforts to combat Communist organization of labor usually takes the ineffective form of trying to persuade the workers to join non-Communist organizations which are led by known government "stooges" or by men who are not trusted by the workers. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The National Front government is currently encouraging non- Communist groups, such as the Pan-Iranists, SOMKA, and the Workers' Party, to clash in street fights with Communist-led demonstrators, and the police in each clash tend to act as a shield for these non- Communist groups. It should be kept in mind also that the existence of a genuine Communist "menace" in Iran is a useful factor in any government's efforts to obtain foreign economic aid and therefore it is probable that Prime Minister Mosadeq is not sincerely desirous of eliminating Communist activity in Iran. Tudeh front organizations, of which the most prominent are the Peace Partisans, the Society to Combat Imperialism, the Tudeh Youth Organization, and the Tudeh Women's Organization, are unhampered in their organizations. Their activities are controlled by the provisions of martial law and their utility to the Tudeh is primarily through the appearance of their members at mass demonstrations. Their propaganda parrots the lines set by Moscow. The size of the Tudeh "underground" organization in Iran is estimated to be at a minimum 20,000, maximum 35,000, with concentra- tion in Tehran, Isfahan, Azerbaijan, the Caspian region, and the Abadan area. The efficiency appears to be considerable in view of the success with which security is maintained. Communications appear to offer no difficulties. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The number of Communists in key industries in Iran is estimated to vary from 5 to 25 percent of the total labor force in such industries. There are an estimated 6,000 in the following categories; railway workers, 1,000 -- many in key operational positions; communications unknown, but believed to be significant; arms plants and arsenals, 200 in the Tehran area; oil workers, 3,000 to 5,000; bus and trick drivers, 1,000 in a strong Tudeh unit. The membership in the Tudeh Central United Council of Trade Unions is estimated at 6,000, although the clandestine nature of this operation raises some doubt of the estimate. The number of active, dues-paying members of Com anist unions at least equals and probably exceeds the total number of workers belonging to non-Communist trade unions. However, only 1/10 of the total industrial workers, and only 1/30 of the total workers in professional services and distribution trades are organized. Communist influence is exerted through factory councils set up under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Labor. In many cases Tudeh members are in control. The extent of their influence is indicated by the fact that the government postponed the 1952 annual congress for elections of the workers.' representatives on the High Labor Council for fear of possible Tudeh control. Tudeh unions do not have decisive control of the labor force in any key industry. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The strongest Tudeh unions are among railway workers, especially at the hub of traffic, Tehran. The railway is the principal distri- buting agency for imports and exports and for the movement of internal fuel supplies to sub-stations. Another strong union is that of bus and truck drivers. Provincial areas are entirely dependent upon these services for merchandise and passenger traffic. In Tehran, especially, Tudeh unions among the workers at the silo where the city's grain supply is stored, and among the bakers who prepare the city's daily bread supply, present a potential threat. The affiliations of these unions are not in all cases confirmed, but all are believed to be associated with the Communist-dominated ?RFTU. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND 0 ION ORGANIZATIONS The principal Tudeh youth organizations are the Tudeh Youth Organization and the Iranian Democratic Youth Club, which serves as the Youth Organizations front. The estimated membership is 4,000 to 6,000, mostly in Tehran. There are no other youth organizations as such in Iran, although youths do have an opportunity to engage in organized activities in the schools and colleges and in political activity through the following National Front associated organizations: (1) the Pan-Iranists, (2) SOMKA (National Socialists), and (3) the Workers' Party. The Tudeh Youth Organization is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and appears to be well led. It often works through the Democratic Youth Club to avoid arrest and its members have, along with the Communist-front Society to Combat Imperial- ism, been in the forefront of Tudeh demonstrations. The Tudeh Youth Organization is considered to be a school for training young members to become members of the Tudeh Party itself. The party enjoins TYO members to "struggle for peace" and strengthen their contacts with the masses. Membership is open to youths 12-23 years of age. There- fore, the Tudeh Youth Organization could potentially include the bulk of students from the fifth grade up to and including college levels. Unless the non-Communist government can meet adequately the aspirations of young Iranians for employment and opportunities, an increase of members in the Tudeh Youth Organization is probable. B. Students The principal Tudeh organizations among students are: (1) Iranian Students' Organization, (2) Students' Organization of Tehran University, (3) Society of tewish Students of Tehran University, (4) Students SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Organization of Tabriz University, (5) Tudeh Association of Higher Normal School Graduates, (6) Tudeh Association of Primary Normal School Graduates, (7) General Council of the Faculty of Science Students' Organization, and (8) Karaj Faculty Tudeh Organization.. The estimated strength in various centers is 2,000 in Tehran, 500 in Tabriz, and 100 in Shiraz. In demonstrations at Tehran University, Communists have been able to get support from as much as 1/3 of the student body. In early 1952, it was estimated that 30 percent of the secondary school teachers were affiliated with Tudeh. There are no comparable organizations in the universities and these are believed to be affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. They also have contacts with the Iranian Students Organization In Paris. The leadership appears to be good. The major current objectives are to (1) lead strikes at the universities; (2) campaign for a reduc- tion in tuition fees, entrance requirements, and graduation or passing marks; (3) campaign for various popular issues affecting the welfare of students; and (4).attempt to organize a conference of students of the Near and Middle East. At Tehran. University, expansion and action capabilities appear to be favorable, though probably less so than six months ago, since the government is beginning to exhibit more interest in controlling demonstrations, weeding out Tudeh students and professors and encouraging aggressive non-Communist organizations to counteract Tudeh demonstrations. Principal Tudeh organizations among women are the Iranian Women's Organization and the Society for the Protection of.Children. Membership figures are unavailable. These groups are associated with the Women's International Democratic Federation and the International Preparatory Commission for the Protection of Children. These groups agitate for women's rights; spread Communist ideology among women, girls and children; and exploit the humanitarian appeals inherent in any child-welfare program. The Iranian Women's Organization is unlikely to play a large role except under a Communist government, but the Pro- tection of Children program appears to have favorable prospects. D. Racial, Religious,. Nationality Minorities The organizations which Tudeh has established to work among minorities are principally the followings SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATICK Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 (1) Armenian (a) Progressive (youth organization) (b) Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization (a) Church Women's Union (d) Armenian Communist Party (2) Azerbaijani (a) Azerbaijan Democrat Party (b) The Azerbaijan Society (3) Kurds (a) Kurdish Democrat Party (4) Jews (a) Society of Jewish Students of Tehran University. Membership in the Armenian groups is estimated at 80 to 200, princiaplly in Tehran; in the Azerbaijani groups at 20,000, principally. in Azerbaijan; in the Kurdish group at 4,000, principally in Azerbaijan. Membership of the Jewish group is unknown, but small. The Armenian group is opposed by the majority of Armenians, but appears to have con- siderable potential for terrorist activities. There is no organized opposition to the other groups except from the government. The leaders of these groups are not ]mown, nor their international affiliations, if any. The objectives of these groups appear to be: (1) Armenian: to organize the entire Armenian Community to participate actively in Tudeh plans. (2) Azerbaijani:.(a) The Azerbaijan Society to act as a front in Tehran for the Democrat Party, (b) the latter to carry out subversive activities comparable to those being under- taken by Tudeh outside of Azerbaijan. Principal current theme is cultural and political autonomy for Azerbaijan. (3) Kurds: to conduct similar subversive activities in north-western Azerbaijan appealing for Kurdish cultural and political autonomy. (4) Jewish: Unknown. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 15'- Capabilities for expansion and action among all of these groups appear to be good. The grievances toward the central government among the Azerbaijanis and Kurds are such that the presence in those areas of strong military establishments is probably the only deterrent to a general uprising today. E. Sports Groups The Tudeh sports organizations are the Tudeh Mountaineers League,' the Tudeh Wrestlers League, the Tudeh Swimmers League, and the.Tudeh Basketball Players Association. The membership is probably small and unimportant from the point of view of sports, but significant in pro- viding training for street fighters and expanding contacts. In view of the increasing general interest in sports in Iran, the capabilities of these groups for expansion are good. F. Cultural Groups The principal Tudeh organizations are the Artists League, the Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization, and the Society for Combatting Illiteracy. There are no competing organizations. The illiteracy program is the most effective since it reaches people. unaffected by the regular school system through lack of opportunity or means to attend. The objective in organizing these groups is probably to provide additional targets for propaganda, but the illiteracy program has, in addition, the purpose of teaching Tudeh members or potential recruits to read and write so they can understand written orders and submit written reports and begin to read Communist literature. The capabilities of the Artists League appear limited, but those of the Armenian group are probably favorable among younger Armenians, and those of the Illiteracy Society are likely to be very favorable and an increasingly effective Tudeh tactic. C. 'Professional Groups The principal Tudeh organizations among professionals are (1) The Iranian Society of Democratic Lawyers, (2) The Judicial Society of Iran, (3) Union of Teacher Training College Graduates (4) Tudeh Medical Assistants Union, (5) Tudeh Union of Government Employees, and (6) National Association of Democratic Journalists. The member- ship is unknown but probably small. There are no effective non-Communist organizations in these fields, although the Communist membership is probably numerically a small proportion of the total employment. The jurists group is probably well-led and is affiliated with the Inter- national Association of Democratic Jurists (IADJ). Tudeh objectives through the legal groups appear to be to assure support for the Communist line regarding (1) international law, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURT~'Y INFORMATION -16- (2) the role of the UN in establishing peace, and (3) the "correct" interpretation of Iranian laws and the constitution. The teachers, organization is designed to spread the party line and add to the embarrassments of the government; that of the government employees, to facilitate Tudeh infiltration and eventual take-over; and that in the press, to enlist sympathetic Tudeh treatment in the press and support Tudeh's opposition to any restrictive official actions or legislation. The capabilities for expansion and action in all of these fields appear to be good. H. "Peace" and Other Organizations Supporting Pro-Soviet, Pro-Satellite and Anti-Western Programs The principal "peace" and anti-Western Tudeh front organizations are-(1) The Iranian Association for Peace, which has 10,000 to 15,000 dues-paying members concentrated in Tehran and Tabriz, although 900,000 signatures have been claimed by the organization; (2) The Free Iran Society, membership unknown, but concentrated in Tehran; (3) The Iran--Soviet Cultural Relations Society, with an estimated membership of 500, also concentrated in Tehran; and (4) The National Society for Combatting Imperialism in Iran with an estimated membership of 15,000, concentrated in Tehran, Abadan, Khorramshar, Isfahan, and Resht. The "Peace" group has no effective opposition and has been very successful in attracting support from all classes. It is believed to provide the headquarters for overt Tudeh activities. The Free Iran Society is actively opposed by the Tehran Chamber of Commerce and the Cultural Society by the Iran-America Relations Society, although there is some overlapping of membership. The anti-imperialist group is effectively opposed only by National Front groups. The direction of the associations appears to be generally very good and the Peace Partisans and cultural groups are affiliated with the international Communist fronts, the former with the International Partisans of Peace Movement, and the latter with the Soviet VOKS organization. The current objectives of these Communist organizations appear to be as follows: for the Peace Partisans, to urge all Tudeh members to join the front and to recruit membership from all classes, especially from those who would not join Tudeh or other more obviously Communist- controlled groups; for the Free Iran Society, to band together businessmen and small industrialists and to obtain an embargo against foreign, especially US, imports; for the Cultural Society, to serve as a propaganda tool for VOKS, directed primarily toward younger Iranian intellectuals; for the anti-Imperialist group, to capitalize on the oil dispute between the UK and Iran and on the xenophobic atmosphere prevailing in the country to destroy Western influence. This organization has been used as the principal agency for conducting mass demonstrations, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The capabilities for expansion and action of these organizations appear to be as follows: the Peace Partisans apparently have reached the peak of their ability to expand rapidly. However, a war scare would enhance the capability greatly. Aggressive action against its headquarters and demonstrations by groups adhering to the National Front, such as Pan-Iranists and SOMKA, aided by the police, has tended to reduce the field of activity. For the Free Iran Society, pros- pects appear to be limited because imports are being reduced by exchange shortages. For the Cultural Society, prospects are faitly good since the fact that it is ostensibly an Iranian Society permits the USSR to circumvent the Iranian Government's decree forbidding activity by foreign information centers outside Tehran. For the anti Imperialists, the prospects will vary with the intensity of the UK-Iran oil controversy. The government has recently severely limited the freedom of this group to hold demonstrations. No adequate information is available to provide the basis for a reliable estimate of the degree of Tudeh infiltration of non-Communist organizations. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Less than 200 individuals participate in top policy-making bodies in Iran. None is known to be Communist and perhaps not more than six to ten can be regarded as potentially sympathetic to Communism. However, any estimates must be treated with reserve as the willingness of non-Communists to cooperate with Communists would depend upon the specific issue and concurrent circumstances. Furthermore, bribery and pressure may lead to cooperation on either side. The highest estimates of Tudeh infiltration in the armed services are 1500 in the army, 600 air force, 110 gendarmerie, and none navy. Sympathizers' may number 5,000 or more, depending upon the specific issue involved and circumstances. The potentialities of infiltration do not differ greatly from those among Iranians outside the armed forces. The extent of Tudeh influence in top levels is believed to be negligible. at the present time. The National Police Force consists of approximately 20,000 men. The force is undoubtedly penetrated by Communists but the percentage is probably not very high as the police are notoriously susceptible, in any event, to bribery. The little information available concerning influence at the top indicates that penetration has not been accomplished. There is no reliable information on Tudeh penetration in the administrations of nationalized industries, but there may be 60.to SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 100 Communists among them, with sympathizers numbering perhaps 300, depending upon the specific issue. Their influence is of varying significance, but not yet controlling in. any instance. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION It is estimated that the number of Communists and sympathizers actively engaged in trying to mold public opinion numbers from 20,000 to 35,000, with a potential audience of 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 depend- ing upon the issue raised. The number of persons strongly influenced by the Communists regardless of the issue is estimated at a minimum of 170,000 and a maximum of 400,000. The influence on ostensibly non-Communist efforts to mold public opinion cannot be estimated with any precision as most newspapers and publications at times espouse causes encouraged by the Communists and accept material for publication from all sources. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Although there is undoubtedly some Communist infiltration of these groups, adequate information is not available to make an estimate. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Tudeh influence would depend upon the specific issue involved and concurrent circumstances. Almost identical Tudeh and National Front attitudes on some issues make it virtually impossible to determine what influence is Tudeh and what is non-Tudeh. Under such circumstances, Tudeh potential is high but its influence appears at the present time to be slight. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The principal current propaganda media in Iran are newspapers and publications and instruction in Tudeh cells, effectively supple- mented by numerous broadcasts from Soviet radio stations in Persian, Turki (Azerbaijani), and Kurdish. Of the 27 Tudeh publications now appearing, the principal ones are Besuye andeh, a Tehran daily morning paper with an estimated circulation of 6,000 to 8,000; Shahbaz, a daily evening Tehran paper with an estimated circulation of 3,; Farhan ian, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of 7,; and Dehqanan Iran, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of 2,000. These are.all published in Tehran by the Haghsh Jehan press, which is supplied by TASS via the Soviet Embassy with world-wide news coverage, and probably also with newsprint. The quality of the press appears to be adequate despite mobster raids by partisans of the National Front. It is probable that the presses which print the clandestine Tudeh papers and publications are located in the provincial centers and in Tehran, perhaps in some satellite Legation. SECRET - SECURITY-INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 So far as is known neither the Soviet nor satellite missions publish overt propaganda, although they all assist in the importation of publications from abroad in Russian, Persian, and Turki. Further- more, Soviet newspapers such as Pravda, and a great variety of cheap Soviet books are available in quantity in the bookshops and newsstands of Tehran and provincial cities. No information is available on the financial assets of importers. Internal broadcasting facilities in Iran are controlled by.the government and do not appear to be either controlled or influenced at the present time by Communists. It was reported In 1952 that there was a clandestine station in Tehran making infrequent broadcasts. The Communist radio programs, which are believed to have a significant listening public, come from the USSR. Radio Moscow broadcasts half- hour programs in Persian four times daily; Radio Baku gives programs in Persian three times daily; Radio Tashkent beams half-hour programs in Persian twice daily; and Radio Democrat (Azerbaijan) has programs seven hours a week in each language -- Persian, Turki, and Kurdish. It is the last station which is most vicious in its propaganda and which has probably the most effective impact on Iranians. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The major source of Tudeh revenue appears to be from membership dues and sales of publications, although no precise information is available. Considerable aid comes from Soviet-Iranian trade through private deals. and some from Communist organizations abroad, but no figures are available. Most commercial deals with orbit countries are carried on by official government agencies, but detailed inform- ation is.lacking. The Tudeh Party appears to have adequate funds, although reports indicate the necessity for continuous pressure on members to pay their dues and increase sales. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 19 - XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The following diplomatic personnel including and above the rank of attache are officially listed in Iran: USSR - 25; Czech - 3; Rummanian - 11; Polish - 1; and Hungarian - b. The total for all five countries is officially set at 37, but the actual staffs includ- ing service workers is probably nearer 150. All are currently located in Tehran, except for the temporary movements ofmembers of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the trips of various officers to and from the Soviet Union, usually via Pahlavi or Tabriz. The principal sections of the Soviet Embassy are (1) diplomatic, (2) consulate-general, (3) trade delagation, (4) VOKS, (5) Soviet hospital, (6) TASS, and (7) information and cultural services. It is estimated that the number of persons engaged in propaganda activities is between 50 and 100. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Soviet Hospital in Tehran has a staff of about 20 Soviet doctors and nurses. It is well-run, but fees are high and there is no free clinic. Exhibits of Soviet films, paintings, etc. are periodic and shown either by invitation at the Soviet Embassy or at the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society. The Soviet Embassy has. claimed that 100,000 people in Tehran read Russian, although the actual number is probably nearer 50,000. The Iran-Soviet Cultural Society has an estimated membership of 500, mostly in Tehran,,and provides the principal machinery for the dissemination of overt propaganda among the upper classes of Iran. Soviet domination and active operation of the Caspian Sea Fisheries under a concession due to expire January 31, 1953 provides the USSR with an invaluable means of unrestricted communication between Iran and the USSR, as well as the opportunity of supporting Soviet personnel and conducting activities in the Caspian area. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the Communist international organizations have instal- lations in Iran at the present time; nor have ary of them held congresses or conferences there. Fifteen Iranians attended the Moscow Economic Conference in 1952 and five Iranian Communists attended the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party the same year. There is some evidence that the Tudeh Party has received funds from Communist organizations abroad although information re- garding the amounts is unavailable. There is also some evidence that Iranian Communists sent some funds to aid Egyptian Communists and North Korean war casualties, although, again, the amounts are unknown. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK Tehran is the center for all Tudeh communications activity in Iran. Sub-centers appear to exist in Isfahan, Abadan or Ahwaz, Tabriz, Resht, and Meshed. The courier system, probably operating through the Tudeh truckers union, appears to be very effective. International terminals appear to be Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Warsaw, Geneva, Zurich, and Prague, and communications seem to be effective. It is assumed that the Soviet and, satellite missions in Tehran provide pouch service as well as radio communications through their own services. The closest contacts are believed to be with the USSR, which serves as the principal source of instructions, literature, and news- print. France is the principal headquarters for overseas activity among Iranian students, and Egypt is the main recipient of Iranian Communist donations and propaganda support. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 1 it" Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The principal recent non-Soviet or satellite foreign emissaries have come from Italy, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. In 1952, Pietro Nenni, leader of the Italian Socialist Party and vice-President of the World Council of Peace Partisans visited Tehran; in 1951, Yusuf Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Egyptian Peace Partisans came from Cairo with the declared objective of organizing a "conference of peace supporters to be attended by Middle, Near Eastern, and North African delegates.? And Munim Ghazali, Secretary of the General Students, Organization of Egypt arrived, probably for the same purpose. Also in 1951, Arif al Din, Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, visited Tehran; and in the same year ,Abd-al-Riaz.Hashimi and Mustafa al-Aria, well known members of the Lebanese Communist Party, came to Iran. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.13 COMMUNISM IN THE WORLD : CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAQ OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS . Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . . . . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . ? . . .. . ? ? . . . . . . . _ . ? . . ? 1 He Tactics . . ? . ? . .. ? ? ? . . ? ? ? ? . ? ? . ? . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . ? ? *G `000 000 2 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . ~+ I. Numerical Strength . . . . ~+ II. Electoral Strength .. .. .. 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 5 V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . 6 VI. Communist Influence in Social.. Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . ? . . . . 7 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . ? ? . . . . 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . .. 10 IX. Communist Infiltration of NDn--Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X. Communist Propaganda Media ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 10 X1. Financial Condition . . ? . . .. . . . 11 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . 11 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . 12 XIV. Communist Communication Network . 12 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN IRAQ: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Communist Party of Iraq, outlawed since its inception in 1927, had by 1951 been reduced to near impotence by a series of govern- ment roundups and trials. In that year, the party set out to rebuild its strength: it redefined its aims, called for the expulsion of all undesirable. elements, and decreed that party cadres were hence- forth to operate as a disciplined core under the cover of other broader groups. The party's program, issued in October 1951, aimed principally at (1) propagandizing the World Peace Appeal; (2) infiltrating and encouraging the trade union movement and organizing the workers of the State Railways; (3) organizing a campaign for the interests of slum dwellers; and (4) encouraging the formation of legal political parties representing labor groups. The party paid particular attention to the trade unions, but an attempt to organize a central Trades Union Congress was blocked by the Iraqi Government. The failure of a general strike called in connection with a nationalist memorial celebration on Portsmouth Treaty Day in January 1952 served to demonstrate the weakness of their October program. The party then began a new and somewhat more successful push to bring students and young intellectuals into the Communist fold by emphasizing nationalist themes and most recently concentrated upon the formation of a broad popular front in opposition to the present government and Western influence. II. TACTICS Changing Soviet policies, frequent government repression, and factionalism stemming from its own organizational weakness, have led the Iraqi Communist Party to engage in frequent shifts in tactics and immediate objectives. At present, the party champions, directly or through front organizations, the most popular issues of the day -- anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. It has likewise attacked govern- ment corruption and economic injustice, tying these themes to its anti-Western campaign by accusing the present ruling elements of being subservient to the British. Civil disorders have been fomented or prolonged and the party has not infrequently joined with other groups, including some of the extreme right in such endeavors. As in other Near Eastern countries the party has also made use of the national aspirations of various minority groups, especially the Kurds, whenever it appeared expedient to do so. In the latter half of 1952 the party profited from a favorable combination of factors. The establishment of the weak government of Prime Minister 'Umari in July 1952 resulted in four months of relative SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION freedom from government suppression. The government, uneasy at the prospect of trouble in the period of transition toward the elections of January 17, 1953, made little attempt to restrain the opposition parties, including Communists. At the same time the party began to develop more vigorous leadership, received increased support from the Soviet Legation and possibly from the Syrian Communist Party, and developed a more popu- lar propaganda line. In April 1952, Sharif al-Shaykh became Secretary General of the Iraqi Communist Party after his attendance at the Berlin Peace Conference and a visit to Moscow. His task has been to reorganize the party. Soviet support to the party apparently consists largely of Soviet propaganda carried out covertly. by Soviet Legation officials in Baghdad, who established contact with the Iraqi Lawyers' Association, provided it with newsprint, and utilized it as a dis- tribution point for Arabic language propaganda printed locally or in the USSR and Prague. Of particular significance in enhancing party strength and unity was the recent emphasis on promoting a nationalist united front. This tactic was apparently being carried out in response to a policy directive by Khalid Bakdash, leader of the Syrian Communist Party, delivered in August 1952. Bakdash called for cooperation with all democratic groups for the purpose of forming a national bloc in which Communists would play an important role. Communist influence soon increased in the leftist National Democratic Party (NDP) and the neutralist United Popular Front (UPF), both extremist nationalist groups with little representation in Parliament. The riots of November 22-25, 1952, and the abolition of all political parties and arrest of opposition leaders which followed, also frustrated Communist attempts to work through the Iraqi opposi- tion parties. The imposition of martial law in Baghdad province has likewise contributed to keeping the party more or less dormant, and may compel it to search for yet another method of operation, III. CAPABILITIES The greatest. handicap to the formation of a united front movement in Iraq is the need of the Iraqi Communist Party to utilize local party organizations, none of which has as yet great organiza- tional strength and forcefulness. As in its unsuccessful attempt to organize trade unions late in 1951 in order to achieve greater in- fluence in Iraqi national life, the party has once again found that the government can exercise sufficient pressure to collapse the broader organizational base of its movement. The Iraqi Communist Party organization remains largely intact. However, the important party functionaries are known to the government and could presumably be arrested comparatively easily. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 4 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The open manipulation of the January 1953 elections has assured the government, still dominated by the traditional elements grouped around former Premier Nuri a-Sa'id and the Palace, of an overwhelm- ing victory. Whether the opposition groups will decide or will have the chance to carry on activities outside Parliament, since they cannot function within it, remains to be seen. Unless the serious and fundamental organizational weaknesses of the opposition movement, especially those of the Communists, can be overcome, a Communist- dominated popular movement is unlikely to emerge in the near future. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 COMMUNIST( IN IRAQ: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH . Now estimated at 10,000 members, the Communist Party of Iraq contained only half that number a year ago. Its membership lacks internal organizational strength and resources. Though capable of attracting new followers rather rapidly under weak, yet reactionary governments, the Iraqi Communist Party will, at present, fade rapidly if subjected to determined suppression. The degree of Communist Party control over other organizations is hard to determine in an area where the party is still seeking to gain support primarily by championing issues already popular locally. The party appears to have achieved some penetration of the National Democrats and the United Popular Front, and several labor unions. The unions are small, poorly organized, and of no political importance. The two parties, officially disbanded after the riots of November 22- 23, 1952, but still operating informally have, on the contrary, an influence out of proportion to their numerical strength because they are vehicles for the extreme nationalists, the discontented young intellectuals of Baghdad, and the emerging, dissatisfied middle class. Altogether, a maximum of 12-15,000, or 0.3 percent of the total population of about 5,000,000, may be under Communist influence. Most of these are to be found not among the poor, most of whom are still bound to traditional ways, but among educated, urban, and Westernized groups -- young intellectuals, minor civil servants, teachers in secondary schools, and members of religious and ethnic minorities. Communists and Communist sympathizers are strongest in Baghdad, where all political life centers, less so in Basra, the Kurdish provinces of Sulaimaniya and Erbil, and in Najaf and Kerbela. While the bulk of the membership is illiterate, poorly disciplined, and inexperienced organizationally, the leadership core, derived primarily from the effendi and college group, tends to be contentious and jealous for prestige and power, and given to forming splinter movements. Under pressure, they have easily given up and turned state's evidence. Wholesale hangings during 1948 and 1949, and frequent arrests since, have sharply reduced the number of Communists whose membership dates back to an earlier period. The average age of the leadership is 19-30 years. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -5- II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Iraqi elections are closely manipulated by the government and, since the Communist Party is illegal, no Communist candidates are allowed. Fellow-travellers, broadly defined by the government to include almost any opposition, are discouraged and hampered in every way possible. The present party chief, Sharif al-Shaykh, was temporarily arrested in 1911.8 when he attempted to stand for election from Sulaimaniya. Communists last ran for Parliament in 1937, when 11 were elected as independents or through legal parties. Parties as such are of no significance. The January 17, 1953 elections took place under martial law, and parties, which are in most cases merely convenient labels for the followers of individual politicians, have been banned. Comparison of party electoral strength is therefore neither meaningful nor possible. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION There have been no Communist attempts at insurrection in the past. The maximum opportunity for armed uprising in the near future would be through inciting tribal insurrection either.in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has an irredentist nationalist movement, or among the Shia tribes of the south Euphrates. The Kurds might raise a force of 150,000 to-200,000 men, well-led, and redoubtable fighters. But they possess only rifles and limited ammunition, and while capable of giving the Iraqi army a sharp encounter, could be contained without too much trouble unless promptly reinforced from outside. At present, however,. the party has not the organization, strength, impetus, freedom, nor weapons to attempt to promote any such excitement. Since demonstrations are an acknowledged and time-honored form of political activity-in Iraq, the Communist Party.is prepared, as in the November 1952 riots in Baghdad, to cooperate, invited or uninvited, with any political group in fomenting or aggravating a riot. No recent riot, however, is known to have been initiated and carried on exclusively by Communist followers. The recent claim made by the local Communist Committees of Basra, Najaf, and Sulaimaniya in reporting to the Central Committee in December 1952 that they were capable of taking over and holding for a short time previously chosen key locations, typifies above all the romantic immaturity of many minor Communist functionaries in Iraq. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM Membership in the Communist Party, taking part in any of its activities, or publishing any matter expressing approval of its doctrines carry penalties ranging from seven years imprisonment to SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORb!&TION outlaw certain unions, notably the railway and Basra port workers' unions. About 14 unions are still recognized by the government, but none is of national scope. The two now reported to be Communist- controlled (January 1953) are not of strategic importance -- the cigarette workers and auto drivers, both in Baghdad. The dearth of capable labor leadership has permitted the Communists to gain influence on the directing level.in most unions at some time. The recent strike patterns indicate, however, that such influence is not decisive. No clearly political strikes have taken place in the past two years. Communists. may have aggravated disorder in strikes stimulated by economic grievances in Basra, Habbaniya (British military airport), and also in two oil-fields. Iraqi unions are not affiliated to WFTU. The ICFTU recently sent a delegation on a regional tour which included Iraq, and plans are being laid for a regional office to assist non- Communist unions in the area. This should go far toward minimizing causes of labor discontent and providing a more effective non- Communist channel for their expression. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A. Front Organizations 1. Students' Union. Also called the Council of Iraqi Students Union an the U ono Youth,l this organization maintains groups of probably not more than 20 to 30 students each in several colleges, Particularly the Law, Medical, and Higher Teachers' Colleges. It is reported that several of the leaders are maintained and financed in college by the Iraqi Communist Party in order to foster political activity among students. Their leadership talent is not conspicuous but Iraqi students have a tradition of political activity and are easily responsive to political agitation. It was this Students Union which was particularly active during the November 1952 riots in Baghdad. 3o far as is known, there are no non-Communist student organizations. The Union has sent, or attempted to send, a representative to World Youth meetings since 1949; for the last two years, the government has denied passports for this purpose. 2. Committee for Aiding Justice. A front group within the Iraq Lawyers' Association, the Committee for Aiding Justice is now .l. This organization may be iTe"ntioal with the Young Men's Democratic Association, said to have 500 members. SECRET - SECURITY INFOI&ATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the most active and effective center of Communist activity in Iraq. (See B-1 for a discussion of the degree of infiltration of the Lawyers' association.) 3. Partisans of Peace (Ansar al-Salam). Principally confined to Baghdad, this organization seems to be a secondary activity for most of the Communist and left-wing adherents of other organizations. Its actual membership is unknown. It was launched in 1950. The present chief of the Iraqi Communist Party, Sharif al-Shaykh, attended the Berlin Peace Conference in April 1952. The leaders of this front are predominantly Shia, including a respected divine and, until they were subjected to prosecution, two of Iraq's most noted living poets; they may have been mislead by an idealistic appeal to religious sentiment. Membership seems to have fallen off. Activity has been limited to rather mild demonstrations and to collecting. signatures for various petitions and protests, which have had incidental propaganda value to the Communist cause. 4. Armenian Progressive Society. The leader of the Iraqi branch of this regions organization cen ered probably in Jerusalem) is Krikor Bedrosian, an influential Communist. courier during and since World War II and a member of the Iraqi Central Committee, at present serving a five-year prison term. Its strength is unknown, though probably small. B. Infiltrated Organizations 1. Lawyers' Association. The Communists have shown considerable shrewdness and ability in gaining control of this, the one professional organization for lawyers in Iraq. By rigging elections, they have now managed to place Communists in both the presidency and vice- presidency, and, more important, Communists and Communist-sympathizers now hold all but one post on the powerful &dministrative Committee and all but two on the Disciplinary Committee. Infiltration of the Lawyers' Association is of considerable significance, because (1) all practicing lawyers in Iraq are required to belong; (2) the Association has semi-juridical powers, i.e., it can disbar lawyers who they believe have violated professional ethics; and (3) the social status of lawyers is high, and the legal profession plays a dominant role in Iraqi politics. .Announced Communist aims vis-'a-vis the Lawyers' Association are to use it (1) to spread propaganda; (2) recruit among students and intellectuals and other]awyers; (3) give wider currency and SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION greater respectability to Communist aims and propaganda lines; and (4) use the courts wherever possible as a platform from which to spread Communist attitudes and defend Communist suspects. This activity can be easily expanded because the current Communist line is especially appealing to frustrated young graduates of the Law College who. greatly exceed the number that can be absorbed into government service and the current opportunities for private practice. This group has regular contact with the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party and also with the Soviet Legation in Baghdad, through Boris Hhlysov, an attache, 2. Political Parties. Until officially banned at the end of November V5 Z,, two le Wing political parties, the United Popular Front and the National Democratic Party (both of which were infiltrated to some degree) readily collaborated with the Iraqi Communist Party and Peace Partisans toward their common aims of (1) abrogation of the Iraq-British Treaty and withdrawal of British forces, (2) full sovereignty, (3) nationalization of foreign oil concessions, etc. These parties had no particular brief for world Communism; collaboration was based solely on. what they conceived to be identity of interest on local issues. The IragiCommunist Party on its part was prompted by specific directives to use existing parties as a base to form a popular front movement. The parties have recently been banned, but the respective groups are meeting informally; it is not yet clear what form of organization the political opposition will assume or how much Communist influence it will contain. 3.. New Iraq Stage Group. Reported in July '52 to have presented a play at Fine Arts Institute attacking the government and using a Communist line. Nothing further known of this group. VII. CONUUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT No Communists are believed to be in government at the policy- making level. Small numbers have been discovered from time to time in the army, where the main effort has been directed toward the non- commissioned grades, especially in the technical services. The. latest such discovery, in September 1952 involved about 30 students in the Military Technical School;.16 students were convicted. A few police have turned to Communism, including several among the guards at the detention camp for political prisoners, where most Communists under sentence are held; police are somewhat more vulnerable to Communist appeal than the armed services because of lower pay, prestige, and morale. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 10 - VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Since the current Communist propaganda line is virtually synonymous with that of a large segment of the nationalist press, it is easy to place Communist propaganda material and thus emphasise party line themes without much prompting. All radio broadcasting originating in Iraq is goverznaent owned and free of Communist taint although not less anti-Western in its leading political commentary. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COZTUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Until the dissolution of all political parties in November 1952, the Istiglal party, a small group of right-wing extremists, occasionally collaborated with the Communists in common tactics and demonstrations. One or two members of the central committee of the United Popular Front, as well as the secretary of the National Democratic Party and a member of its administrative committee are suspected to be Communists. For an account of Communist infiltration into the Lawyers' Association, see VI.-B-1 above. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. MEDIA A1-Qa'idah,lcirculation unknown, is the official organ of the Iraqi ommur_ist Party. It is produced clandestinely and distributed by hand. In recent weeks it seems to be'printed on a press; formerly it was turned out on a Roneo machine. This small operation does not reach the general public, hence has far less impact than nationalist papers which, at times, echoed the Communist line. All conspicuously pro-Communist papers have been closed down subsequent to the martial law regime late in November 1952. There are no Communist owned or controlled printing establishments in Iraq. In 1952 a Lebanese Partisans-of-Peace-inspired book entitled America, the Land of Fictitious Freedoms was picked up in Baghdad. I pro a ly-reached t re country throug the distribution system. of the publishers who have branches in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. Soviet Legation Baghdad is believed to be financing and actively directing the recently expanded program of propaganda, both imported and locally printed. USSR broadcasts in Arabic are heard in Iraq.11 hours per week from seven short-wave transmitters. The time is a convenient one attractive to Iraqi listeners: 800 to 8:30 p.m, and 91.30 to 10:00 p.m. daily, with additional hours on Friday afternoon, the Moslem sabbath. Programs are received clearly, in good and fluent neo-classical Arabic and (in the case of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Azerbaijan Democratic clandestine station) good Kurdish. Listening to Moscow broadcasts is forbidden in Iraq, but there are indications that a good many do listen. Soviet broadcasts, however, pay little attention to internal Iraqi affairs. They emphasize any difficulties in Iraqi relations with Western powers. Azerbaijan station is also listened to widely in the Kurdish areas, both in Iraq and Syria, where it is about the only clearly-heard Kurdish-language broadcasting except for the very limited programs in Kurdish of Radio Baghdad. C Very little is known regarding party finances. The party is said to be so-poor as to be able only to pay small living allowances to its central cadre, its funds derived chiefly from sale of its publications, which in turn may be subsidized by the Soviet Legation. Subscriptions are solicited from members for special activities, such as sending of delegates to international front meetings. Occasional assistance may come from the party in Beirut or Damascus, and the Iranian Tudeh Party reportedly furnished a printing press. Until the large-scale Jewish exodus in 1950-51, the Iraqi Communist Party obtained large contributions by threatening wealthy Jews with future. difficulties if they did not contribute to the now defunct Communist front organization, the Anti-Zionist League. The Soviet Legation at Baghdad, the only official Soviet or satellite agency in Iraq, has an . attache, Boris Khlysov, who is the contact man with the Iraqi Communist Party's propaganda group and the lawyers' Association Dell. Overt propaganda activities of the Legation are not extensive] they appear to be limited to occasional invitational film showings at the Legation. No Iraqi-Soviet "friendship" societies are known to exist. The following are examples of information material hauled out by the Legation: The Social and State Structure -of the USSR, V. Karpinsky. In English, oscow, the Foreign Languages lishing House, 1948. Paper bound, 182 pp. Golden Prague (novel), Alexander Gonchar. In_English. FLPH Moscow-1990"-,(The Stalin Prize Novel 1947-48). The Years of War 1941-1945, Vassili Grossman, English. Same Publis5er, 1946. 451 pp. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 12 - Soviet Literature Monthly No. 2 of 1950, Moscow, in English. Voks Bulletin 1950, No. 62. The English edition of New Times. XIII. COMMJNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Iraqi delegates have attended: World Federation of Democratic Several unidentified Youth - 1949 Kurdish delegates alleged to represent Iraqi Kurdistan Peace Movement - 1950; 1951 Sharif al-Shaykh went from Syria to this meeting and returned via Moscow to Iraq to become Secretary-General of the Iraqi Communist Party. At some of the international front meetings Iraq has been "represented" by Arab students residing in Europe and probably deputed to go by Yusuf Ismail (alias Mustan), head of an Arab Communist group in Paris. This device served to overcome the denial ofpassports to personnel to attend such meetings. XIV. COMMUNIST COM!4JNICATION NETW(I K General supervision of the party in Iraq is thought to be exercised by the Syrian Communist Party. Instructions originating with Khalid Bakdash of Syria were last intercepted in the fall of 1951. An irregular system links the internal branches of the party, including members serving jail sentences. Contact with the Tudeh of Iran is maintained both through the Basra branch, which keeps in touch with Khorramshar, and via the northern border villages of Zaynawi and Khanaqin. The border is easily crossed at many points. Also, the considerable pilgrim traffic to and.from Iran to the Shia holy cities in Iraq offers excellent cover for passage of messages or personnel, and one very difficult to screen. Four Tudeh agents were reported to have come into Iraq in this way in 1952. SECRET .. SECURITY INFORMATION ? 0 C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.1+ COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ISRAEL OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . ... . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . . ? . . . 1 He Tactics . . .. ? . .. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 III. Capabilities . . ? . ? . . ? ? 3 ASSETS . . . . ? . . . . . . I. Numerical Strength . ? . . . .,. II. Electoral Strength . . . . . .. .. .. . III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action IV. Government Pblicy Toward Communism . . ... .. ? .. 6 V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . ..? .. ? . . 6 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . .. . ? . . ? ? .. ? 6 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government .. ... . ? . 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . ? IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties ? ? ? 7 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . ... . 7 XI. Financial Condition .,. 8 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 8 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . .. . ? . 9 XIV. Communist Communication Network . ? ? . ? ? . ? ? ? . 9 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM. IN ISRAEL: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES As expressed in the June 12, 1952 resolutions of the Israel Communist Party Central Committee, the major objectives of Israeli Communists are to (1) increase their influence among the working class and the new immigrants; (2) capitalize on economic conditions resulting from the government's austerity policy; and.(3) establish a Communist-controlled united front by creating peace committees wherever possible, expanding the activities of its front organizations. and seeking to organize common action with the extreme leftists of Mapam. Internationally, the party attacks Israel's resumption of relations with West Germany, opposes Israeli cooperation with the Weston military defense, and instead makes propaganda for the Soviet-sponsored 5 power peace pact, and increased commercial relations with the Soviet bloc. In June 1952, the party's leader Samuel Mikunis said that, once in power, the Communists would (1) void all treaties.with."warmongers"; (2) nationalize all foreign concessions; (3) dismiss all US experts and US army officers present in Israel as advisors: (4) call for the formation of a popular militia; and (5) adhere to the UN 1947 resolution on Palestine calling for the formation of a."democratic" Arab state in Palestine, and call for the return of Arab refugees and the restoration of their property. The Communists no doubt. find it difficult to gain the adherence of the working manses while at the same time attacking Mapai's economic policies. Labor has been the chief beneficiary of the socialist program of Mapai and there are far more dissatisfied elements among the middle class than among labor. Moreover, by paying increased attention to the Arab minority in.Israel, which like the Communists is anti- Zionist and has many grievances against the existing Israeli regime, the party, which can now marshal only five percent of the electorate, is also creating greater difficulties for itself in gaining recruits among Israeli Jews. The underlying strategic policy of the Israeli Communist Party has a double aim. Among the Arab minority, the aim is to attract Arabs to the party and the USSR so that when and if a separate Arab state is set up in former Palestine, in conformity with the 1947 UN resolution, this state will be Communist-controlled. As a parallel activity, Soviet diplomatic and religious personnel are attempting to entice the Greek Orthodox Arabs, who form a large proportion of the Arabs in Israel, away from Greek leadership SECRET - SECURITY INFCPXATION . Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 and orient them towards the Moscow Patriarchate. -Among the Jewish ? majority, the aim is to get control of all leftist and trade union organizations and create new ones with a view to isolating Israel from the West and orienting it toward the USSR. The Israeli Communist Party also directs Communist activity in Jordan, the. main object of which is to oust the British. The Israeli Communist Party at present is committed to constitutional procedures but may soon find it difficult to operate because of government repression and popular indignation caused by the current Soviet anti-Zionist campaign. There is no information on any preparations for underground activity. The party's principal motifs in propaganda appeals are: (1) the Mapai government is permitting the US to prepare Israel as a spring- board for an attack on the USSR and the precipitation of World War III; (2) bad economic conditions are due to excessive Mapai arms expenditures to support US aggressive aims; (3) justice must be given to the Arab minority and discrimination against them must cease. These themes in turn are carried through specialized media or organizations to the Arab minority, to intellectuals (for example, through the Academic Committee for Peace), immigrants from satellite countries (for example, through propaganda issued in.Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian in addition to Hebrew and Arabic), and, in still other ways, to students, and women. Among Arabs, the party has been able to capitalize chiefly on its attitude toward minorities, championing equal treatment for them. Among Jews, the party has benefited from sympathy among some for the official ideology of the Soviet state and the assistance which the Soviet bloc gave Israel at the beginning?of the state's existence. Among the latter, it has 'also found support because the Soviet regime put an end to Czarist pogroms and was-thought to have outlawed anti-Jewish discrimination. The USSR has also had some success in portraying itself as the principal force which destroyed Hitler and as the main enemy of fascism. The fact that there are still some 3,000,000 Jews in the USSR and satellite countries whose future might be jeopardized if Israel were to adopt a position of open antagonism to the USSR has until recently kept the Israeli Government from repressing Communist activities. The party's voting power in the Kneset (Parliament) and in municipal councils is augmented by tactical alliances-.with the left - wing of the Mapam Party and by supporting motions of other parties (even right wing) which attack the government. As a labor party,. SECRET - SECURITY INFO2MATI0N Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the Communist Party is a, member of Histadrut (general federation of labor unions and parties) and its key members participate in high Histadrut councils. Communists have occasionally also gained' - control or influence in non-Communist organizationsby cultivating the left-wing elements (especially Mapam) within such groups while- simultaneously attacking their right-wing opponents. This is facilitated by the pronounced doctrinaire factionalism which is characteristic of Israeli organizational life. The same tactics and conditions also work against the Communists. On occasion non-Communists have expelled Communists from collective settlemxents. The only trade union which the Israeli Communist Party is known to control is the Congress of Arab Workers. Its appeal here is based. on the party's opposition to Zionism and the Mapai government, and upon its championship of minority rights against discrimination by the majority. The principal source of new Jewish members seems to be from Communists or sympathizers arriving among new immigrants, especially from the satellite countries, Iraq, and North Africa. New Arab members seem to be recruited mainly from the Nazareth and Haifa (including Acre) areas, where Arab demands for equal pay and treatment with Jews and cessation of harsh treatment by the Israeli security forces have been championed by the Israeli Communist Party. The party also attempts to exploit traditional Greek Orthodox friendship for Russia. III. CAPABILITIES The outlook for the Israeli Communist Party to carry out its current objectives and further Soviet policy is diminishing daily. The disappearance of Mapam leader Mordecai Oren in Czechoslovakia, followed by the Prague trials and the case of the Jewish Soviet doctors have resulted in an increasing number of phyaical attacks against local Communist institutions, including Soviet Embassy property; a Russian bookstore, and Israeli Communist Party head- quarters in Jerusalem. On January 15, 1953, the Israeli Government forbade the circulation of the Israeli Communist Party newspaper, Qol ha'Am ("Voice of the People") among members of the armed forces and the party- may find its operations increasingly hampered. Histadrut is reported considering the expulsion of the Israeli Communist Party from its ranks. The developing situation will probably lead to a rapid decline in the party's influence among the Jewish majority at large and also among members of Mapam, where the extreme left elements can be expected to come under increasingly heavy fire. It is likely, therefore, that any increase in the relative and absolute strength of the Israeli Communist Party will be confined to the Arab community, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION which can be expected by approve rather than resent the anti-Zionist moves of the Soviet bloc. The conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalism, together with the anti-Zionist orientation of the USSR and Communism, have historically been the greatest disadvantages under which the Communist movement has had to labor, As the Arab-Jewish antagonism has increased, it has become increasingly difficult for the Communist movement to weld both Arab and Jewish elements together into a single effort of cooperation. In the past, Soviet anti-Israeli moves, such*as Soviet support in the UN for the internationalization of Jerusalem have always caused considerable defection from the party and reduced its influence. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ISRAEL: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH In the absence of concrete information, Communist Party strengtl in. Israel may be roughly estimated at about 5,000. The membership is drawn largely from unskilled labor and white collar workers, particular among Jewish immigrants from the Balkans and the Arab countries. Party membership is concentrated largely in the cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa, Nazareth, Jerusalem, and Rehovot, Arab membership especially in Nazaret and Haifa. The number of "hard-Dore" Communists is unknown, but their quality does not seem'to be high. Nothing is known regarding the quality of the party membership in terms of its readiness to incur hardships or cling to the party line. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communist Party vote in the 1951 election was 27,234 or about 3 percent of the total vote. In addition, the extreme left Mapam Party polled-86,,095 votes. In the same election, the other major parties received the following number of votes Mapai (government party) 256,456 General Zionists (opposition) 111,394. Ha Po'el ha-Mizrahi (government) 46,347 Herut (opposition) 45,651 The Communist vote in the five cities where they are largely concentrated compared with `the other principal parties as follows: General Communists Mapai Mapam Zionists Tel Aviv 6,240 59,700 150600 46,600 Haifa 4,369 42,800 15,300 21,400 Nazareth 3,146 246 325 478 Jerusalem 1,221 20,200 2,600 7,100 Rehovot 368 4,000 1,100 1,400 III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION There have been no recent cases of violent demonstrations, and it is estimated that not more than 300 persons could be recruited for any such demonstration. Although the policy does not seem to be to create violent demonstrations, probably because of efficient suppressive SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION methods of the Israeli police, orderly demonstrations of citizens carrying banners protesting against government policies have been organized by the Communist Party. Probably less than 500 weapons could be gathered by the Communists in case of a Soviet-Western war. There are no reports that the Communist Party in Israel sponsors azy paramilitary organizations. IV. GOVERN9dENT POLICY. TOWARD COMMUNISM The Israeli Communist Party and its front-organizations.have full freedom to operate openly lfut are watched by Israeli security services. Communists have been quietly ousted from'the army. Communists have freedom to travel abroad to Communist and front conferences. The policy of the government toward the party will probably become unofficially more repressive in the future, and the state is capable of controlling the party by force. V. CCMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Since Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor,"is controlled by the government Mapai Party, it is unlikely that the Communist Party has been-able to gain much of a foothold there. No data are available regarding the number of Communists in key industries, but it may be assumed that the proportion would be roughly the same as that shown for voting strength in the principal cities of concentration. Histadrut has no affiliations with international Communist confederations, having left the WFTU in 1950. VI. C OAMUNIS T INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL The following organizations are known to be Communist-front: Israel-USSR Friendship League, Organization of.Democratic Women (affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation), Tarbut La'am, Israel Peace.Comnittee (affiliated with the World Peace Council), Democratic Youth Federation (affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Youth), and the Academic Committee for Peace. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Of the 120 members of the Israeli Hnesset (Parliament), 5 are Communist and 4 are extreme left Mapam members who have been closely identified with the Communists. The number of Communists on the SECRET - SECURITY INFCIZMATION C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION various parliamentary committees is shown below, together with the total membership on these committees: Committees Communist members Total members House 1 .23 Finance la 15 Economic 1 '15 Foreign Affairs and Defense lb 15 Home Affairs 1 15 Constitution, Legislation and 1 23 Law Public Services 1 15 Labor 1 15 Total 8 136 a. eme left Mapam member Moshe Sne , b? Extreme left Mapam member Jacob Rift in. The number of Communists and O=nunist-sympathisers in the armed forces is unknown. It is believed that the extent of their influence in top lovel positions is nil. The number of, Communists and Communist_ sympathizers in the police and security services is probably small. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The number of people influenced by Communist propaganda in non- Communist-controlled educational, religious, or entertainment groups, or in. the non-Communist-controlled radio and press is believed to be not over several thousand. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-CM MIST POLITICAL PARTIES Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa*ir, the far left-wing group of Mapam, has been ideologically close to the Communists and cooperated with them. This influence and recent Soviet anti-Zionist moves has caused Mapam to split,- with only a minority joining the pro-Communist faction, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA There are five known Communist publications in Israel. Qol is a Hebrew daily, which also publishes weeklies in Bulgarian,. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Hungarian, and Rumanian. Circulation of the daily Qol h&'Am is about 2,000. The circulation of the weeklies is unknown. Pr-el srael, a Yiddish weekly, has a circulation of 300 to 400. Circulation figures for the Arabic-language monthly al-Ittihad and the Hebrew monthly Ha- Derekh are unknown. No information is a ailable regarding the Ara !o- anguage al-Darb. Qol ha'Am is believed to have its own printing press, but no ng Mfger is known regarding Communist printing facilities. Over 50,000 books per year, including technical and non-technical publications, are imported from the USSR. They are dumped on the market regardless of import quotas and at only nominal prices. It is presumed that they have a wide circulation, Lepac, Ltd., a Tel Aviv bookshop, is controlled by the Communist Party. It imports only Soviet books and is currently under investigation by the-Israeli Government for using.. surreptitious means to surpass its import quotas. The Israeli Communists do not control any radio facilities but have been allowed to speak occasionally over the government-controlled Israeli Radio. A 1951 survey of 1,737 Israelis showed that 28 percent regularly listened to Soviet bloo broadcasts. Those listening to USSR stations. were mostly of Polish (39 percent), Russian (24 percent), and Rumanian (10 percent) origin. Russian was the most popular language with 12 percent of those interviewed. .XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION In March 1950, the Israeli Communist Party collected over M,000 in a fund drive. In 1952, the party announced a fund-raising campaign with the ambitious goal of IL15,000. It is not known whether the local party receives help from Soviet or satellite legations or consulates. In 1950 Jewish Communists and fellow-travelers were said to be preparing a world-wide fund-raising campaign under the slogan of aid to Israel. -Tarbut la'Am ("Popular Culture") clubs were used as a front for this purpose in North and South America. Amounts collected are unknown, but one organization is said to have remitted $6,000 in goods and cash from the United States. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania have both Legations and consulates in Tel Aviv. Hungary and Bulgaria have Legations in Tel Aviv. Poland has consulates in both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 41 41 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION XIII. C=1UNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (YPFDY), and the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) have affiliated organizations in Israel. (See above under VI.) Two Israeli delegates attended the 19th Party Congress in Moscow in October 1952, one went to the World Peace Council meeting in Berlin in July of that year, and one left for Prague in January 1953 to attend the World Federation of.Democratic Youth Conference. XIV. COMMUNIST COGEMCATION NETWORK Soviet Embassy personnel appear to be cultivating Greek Orthodox Arabs in order to exploit the old antipathy between Arab and Greek Orthodox Church members and their Greek clergy. It is not known whether any financial assistance is given to the local-Conounists or whether there would be argt prospect of military assistance in case of an East-West conflict. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION On Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION n -6165.15 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MOROCCO OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -'SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . ? . . ? ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I? Objectives ? . . . . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 II. Tactics ? . ? . ? . .. ? . . ? ? . . ? . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? . . . . . ? 2 I. Numerical Strength . . . II. Electoral Strength ? ? ? . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. .. . . . ? ? ? 5 V. Communist Influence in L a b o r . . . ... . . .. . . ? 6 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and 6 Professional Organizations . . .. . . . . .. . ? . VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? . . ? . ?. 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ? . ? 6 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties .. . . . . . . . .. ? . . ? ? .. . . 7 X. Communist Propaganda Media ... . ? ? ? 7 XI. Financial Condition ? . ? .? 7 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . .. . . 7 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . .. ? . .. 7 XIV. Communist Communication Network .. ? ? . ? ? ? . ? ? SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION CO14MUNISM IN MOROCC01: OBJECTIVES. TACTICS. AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The over-riding immediate goal of the Moroccan Communist Party since August 1946 has been to persuade the local independence movements to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control and American imperialism. In the meantime, the Communists are seeking, through propaganda, to destroy sympathy among Moroccans for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans and to increase local hostility toward the French administration. The serious economic grievances of the population -- both native and French -- receive particular. attention from the Communists who have a strong influence in the cauntry's largest labor union. To achieve its immediate goals, however, the Moroccan Communist Party is faced above all with the task of recovering its own strength. II. TACTICS Having failed thus far in achieving a common front with the nationalists, the Communists have attempted instead to participate, uninvited, in strikes, demonstrations, and riots initiated by the nationalists, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly, Communist propaganda pamphlets have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the popular mind the need and desirability of a common front. Occasionally, such tactics are accompanied by attacks on the nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a popular front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating or conducting negotiations with the French. Moreover, Communists have been known to facilitate the arrest of nationalists and to claim credit for successful nationalist demonstrations. 1. Since the Communists have no party in Spanish Morocco and, in fact, are unable to operate in that zone to any appreciable degree, this discussion is confined to the French Zone and Tangier. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III. CAPABILITIES To date, the small Moroccan Communist Party has had practically no influence on the nationalist movement, largely because (1) the nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in non-Communist areas; (2) the nationalists are concerned with maintaining close ties with the Sultan; (3) financial support for the nationalist movement' is derived primarily from Morocco's upper middle class; (/+) the local Communist Party is largely French in membership, and (5) the present nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would dislike as much as that of the French. Moreover, the Moroccan Communist Party, never large, has declined to its lowest postwar strength. The capabilities of the Moroccan Communist Party at this time remain minimal either for achieving its own current local objectives or for furthering Soviet policy. It has always been hampered by the poor quality of its leadership. This is evidenced by the success of the Istiglal, Morocco's largest nationalist party, in infiltrating the Communist-dominated labor federation, UGSCM (Union G4'nirale des Syndicats Confea1r4 du Maroc, Moroccan affiliate of France's Communist-controlled CGT). Although Moroccans are legally forbidden to belong to unions and carry on union activities only by official toleration, Istigial has been able to gain control of the organization. Three factors have been largely responsible for the decline of Communist influence among labor: (1) the ability of certain nationalist leaders, (2) the ineffectiveness of Communist leadership, and (3) deportation by the French of the ablest and most in- fluential Communists in the party and the Union. There is little likelihood of early improvement in the Communist leadership potentials either in the party or its labor federation. In his statement to the Central Committee of the Moroccan Communist Party in late 1951, Ali Yata (Moroccan Communist Party leader, now deported and imprisoned) perceived certain additional and fundamental reasons for the party's failures. He noted that the party had become so panicky that excessive secrecy prevented the organization from getting anything done. From November 1950 to the end of 1951, the Central Committee had held only one meeting and that lasted only one day. For two years, no sectional or regional meetings had been held except in Rabat. Not a petition for the Stockholm Peace Appeal or a Five Power Conference had been circulated up to that time. A more fundamental problem remained unsolved, Ali Yata said, Those sections having primarily Arab membership neglect Morocco's European SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION minority, believe it dishonorable to use the French language, and have even rid themselves in an "arbitrary and authoritarian" manner of comrades who had retained some colonial prejudices instead of helping such men change their minds. In sections in which French membership predominates, All Yata often found a "paternalistic, colonist" attitude shown toward Moslem members. The Moroccan Communist leaders also find themselves in a dilemma because of conflicts in nationality among its membership. In pretending to be part of the Moroccan nationalist movement, the Communist Party alienates local French residents of the middle class who fear for their safety in an independent, nationalist Morocco, and loses many local skilled French workers who fear the competition of native labor without, however, gaining the support of nationalist Moroccans. This last group will continue to join instead the core of the nationalist movement - the Istiglal Party. Membership in Istiglal, though not without its dangers, at least does not put any Moroccan under the double jeopardy of being suspect as both a Communist and a nationalist as well as defenseless against present police controls and the future uncertainties of Communist intentions, All Yata, in his 1951 diagnosis, considered the weakness of the party to stem above all from the fact that it presented itself merely as a part of the nationalist movement. Although All Yata stated that it was correct for the Moroccan Communist Party in August 1946 to place "national liber- ation" at the center of its program, he criticized it for subsequently using the traditional bourgeois nationalist concept of "independence" to mean formal independence without any social content, thus sacrificing the distinctive content of the Communist Party's program. The party, he charged, dealt with all major nationalist problems, but failed to relate them to the daily needs of the laboring man. Thus it neglected the "vanguard" and the "fundamental armies" of national liberation until even the labor union movement "ceased to be oriented by us," while the nationalist movement itself was left to seek independence both through the UN, an instrument of "imperialists," and through the United States which now "occupies" Morocco. The French Government throughout 1952 has been increasingly firm in its repression of the Moroccan Communist Party. Some of the non- Moroccan leaders have been deported, and virtually all others not pre- viously arrested for some infraction, have been held under arrest since the December 1952 riots which followed the death of the Tunisian labor leader, Ferhat Hached. The Moroccan Communist newspaper L'Espoir,.long suspended from publication because of financial difficulties, had re- appeared during 1952 but both the Communist Party and its press have been legally proscribed since the December 1952 riots. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -4- The Communist labor federation maintains considerable strength in railway, highway transport, power, and electrical communications unions., and some strength in port unions, but it lacks capabilities for pro- ducing a complete tie-up by strikes in even a single industry without the assistance of one or both of the two anti-Communist European labor federations. The effective leadership of the Moroccan Communist Party and almost all of the hard-core has always been European. With the member- ship estimated now at not more than 4,000 or 5,000, this probably still remains true. The Moroccan Communists who have thus far found the majority of their recruits among French residents have more recently had some limited success among young French-educated Moslem intellectuals. If the effectiveness of its leadership were not at such low ebb, the Communist potentials in Morocco, even given the present membership, might present a totally different picture. During the past year, an unhealthy political atmosphere has developed in which an astute Communist leadership might find more fertile ground than at any time since the end of World War II. This situation is the outgrowth of a. combination of factors, including (1) severe French repressive actions against the nationalists, (2) the exile or arrest of all the principal nationalist leaders, and (3) the total failure of the nationalists to achieve any of their aims during the past two years. Because of the small number of Istiqlal members of leadership calibre and the impatience of younger, more radical, yet inexperienced members, the absence of such essentially moderate Istiglal leaders as Balafrej, leadership of an effective nationalist "underground" might become the prize of outsiders. However, the Communist Party appears at this time to be too impoverished financially and too feeble in membership, organization, leadership, and influence to capitalize on the opportunity presented to them by nationalist frustrations and the absence of the relatively moderate, anti-Communist and experienced top nationalist leadership. The Communists will probably continue their efforts to join forces with the nationalists; and, in the long run, there is some danger that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives they would accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it presently remains doubtful that the Communists will capture control of the nationalist movement in Morocco, Communist influence might ultimately induce the nationalist groups to adopt more anti-Western policies and increasingly to resort to direct action. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I. NUMERCAL STRENGTH The Communist Party of Morocco is known to be quite small; however, the exact size of the present membership is not known. A total strength of about 3,000 members would seem to be a reasonable estimate in terms of the known activities of the party. While the Moroccan Communist Party has recently-been most active in urban areas of the French Zone, particularly in Casablanca,' the geographical dis- tribution of party members is not known. The effectiveness of the party's leadership has diminished greatly as the result of the recent arrest of many of the principal leaders by the French Protectorate authorities. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Since no general election has ever been held in any of the three zones of Morocco, and since, in local elections, the native electorate by law and by choice is always very restricted, the electoral strength of the Communist Party of Morocco cannot be estimated. III.. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The origin of the December 1952 riots in Casablanca and elsewhere in the French Zone in Morocco is not definitely known. Probably it was essentially nationalist, although Communist agitators may have worked individually to provoke increased violence. Because of the relative weakness of the Communist Party, it has apparently hesitated to instigate violent demonstrations on'its own initiative during recent months. But party members may well have capitalized upon situations stemming from grievances voiced by nationalists and others. At present, the party has no ability to rally sizable elements of the population to violent action. It can only capitalize upon the discontent aroused by other, more popular groups. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM In the Spanish Zone, the local authorities have, of course, been relentless in their suppression of Communism ever since the advent of the Franco regime. In the French Zone, the Communists were tolerated, though hampered by the Protectorate authorities, until Eecember 1952. Since then, the party has been officially outlawed, its newspapers suppressed, and its leaders either arrested or deported fron the country. In addition, a number of less-important Communists have been taken into custody. In the international zone of Tangier, where Communist groups are still permitted, the local police restrain Communist agitation whenever such agitation can be construed as a possible threat to public order. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6- V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON LABOR Because of the numerical weakness of the Moroccan Cosa^'unists, no reliable estimate can be formed of their strength in key industries. Despite their modest numbers, the Communists, because of their discipline and energy, were for some time able to wield control over the largest labor federation in the French Zone, the General Union of Confederated Syndicates of Morocco (UGSCM), which is affiliated with the Communist- dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France. But the Communists eventually proved unable to withstand'a bid for control by the more numerous and better-led nationalists. Although important posts in the UGSCM are undoubtedly still in the hands of Communists, it is generally believed that leadership of this organization has, within the past year or so, definitely passed into the hands of the nationalists. The remaining two labor federations in the French Zone, the French Confeder- ation of Christian Workers (CFTC) and Workers Force (FO) are both anti- Communist. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although a considerable number of Communist front organizations were established in French Morocco immediately after World War II, few if any of these enjoyed any continued success. Consequently, by December 1952, when the Protectorate officials outlawed the Communist Party, most, if not all, of these front organizations had already ceased to function. Although information is not complete on the subject, it seems probable that if any such organizations exist at present, they are small and relatively inactive. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT No information is available regarding the number of Communists and Communist sympathizers at the higher levels of the government, including the armed forces, either in the Spanish or in the French zones. The number appears, however, to be extremely low. Insofar as the number of Communists and sympathizers in agencies of the government administering nationalized industries is concerned, no figures are available; but Communists are known to work at the lower levels in railroads, ports, telephone and telegraph installations, and in mining operations. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Except for occasional illegal pamphlets, the Communist press.is now non-existent in Morocco. Since radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, no Communist influence has been felt in this field. There is likewise no evidence of Communist infiltration in religious organizations. Though Communists are known to hold?posts in the school system in the French zone, it seems probable that the number of such persons is small in terms of the total number of teachers. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES In the Moroccan Socialist Party, there is no evidence of Communist influence. However, in the nationalist Istiglal Party, which follows an anti-Communist program, there are certain individuals, some of whom work as labor leaders in Istiglal-controlled labor federation (UGSCM), who are said to follow the Communist "line." Reports of unknown reliability have also circulated that certain opportunistic leaders of some of the smaller nationalist splinter groups have upon occasion voiced pro-Communist sentiments. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Suppression of Communism in the Spanish Zone is so rigorous and of such long standing that apparently very little propaganda activity takes place in that area. With'the outlawing of the Communist Party in the French zone toward the end of 1952, Communist propaganda in that region has been confined to occasional clandestine handbills and pamphlets. At least one of the pamphlets is thought to have been printed outside Morocco and smuggled in for distribution. Prior to the suppression of the Moroccan Communist Party, two Parisian Communist dailies circulated in the French Zone; but their total circulation was only about 225 copies daily, XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No specific information is available regarding the financial resources of the Moroccan Communist Party. The small scope of the party's activities before it was suppressed indicate that they were small. The infrequency with which the Communist "weekly" newspaper appeared is further evidence of the party's financial weakness. Urgent appeals to the public for donations were very frequent. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites have consular, diplomatic, or trade representatives in any part of Morocco. Though the Soviet Union is entitled by treaty to participate in the international administration of Tangier, it has never availed itself of this privilege. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As a result of the recent outlawing of the Communist Party of Morocco, Communist international organizations can no longer function actively in Morocco, except in the international zone of Tangier. Even before the suppression of the Communist Party in the French Zone, Communist international organizations had ceased to be active in that area. Infor- mation is not available concerning the existence or operation of such organizations in the international zone. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Connrunist Party of Morocco, like those of Algeria and Tunisia, is under the direction of the French Communist Party. The influence of the French Communist Party is known to be exerted, at least in part, by bench representatives to Moroccan Party Congresses. Furthermore, Communist couriers are known to pass through North Africa from time to time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.16 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, PAKISTAN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword . ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives e . . . . ? ? ? 1 II. Tactics . ? 2 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 4 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 6 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . ? 6 He Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 7 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . ? . . . 7 V.? Communist Influence in Labor ? . . . . ? ? . . ? . . . VI. Communist Influence in Social.. Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . ? 8 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . ? ? 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . ? . . . . . *a . . . . . ? ? . . . . . ? 10 X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 XI. Financial Condition . . ? ? . ? . ? . . ? . . . . . . 11 XII. Soviet.Satellite Official Assets . . ? ? 11 XIII. Communist International organizations . . . ? ? .. . 12 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . ? . . ? . ? ? . 12 SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800b80001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES The broad aims of the Communist party in Pakistan are to root out the vestiges and influence of Anglo-American "imperialism" in Pakistan and to.end the present regime in Pakistan and set up a "people's democracy." To achieve these larger goals, specific short- term objectives of the Communist party include (1) the withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth and the sterling bloc; (2) the nationali- zation of British-owned commercial enterprises in Pakistan; (3) the removal of British personnel from all branches of the Pakistan Govern- ment and especially from the armed forces; (4) the reorientation of Pakistan's import-export policy and the country's trade relations with a view to making the economy less intermeshed with that of the Western powers; (5) a change in status of Pakistan from a dominion to a republic; (6) the removal of the Kashmir issue from.the UN; (7) the reduction of Pakistan's defense expenditures; (8) the dissolution of the present Constituent Assembly and its reelection on the basis of a broadened franchise; (9) the withdrawal of the draft of basic princi- ples for the new Constitution recommended to the Constituent Assembly's Basic Principles Committee; (10) the repeal of laws granting the government the power to arrest persons without trial; (11) the con- fiscation of the holdings of large landowners without compensation. These objectives have been keyed primarily to the requirements of international Communism, with secondary emphasis on promoting the domestic political fortunes of the party. There are no indications now that the, objectives, all of which are being pursued simultaneously, are likely to be revised in the near future. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION H. TACTICS The party organization in Pakistan is following a united front policy. It appeals for the support not only of the working class but also of the peasantry and some bourgeois elements. Cutting across class boundaries, it appeals for the support of "anti-imperialist, anti- capitalist, anti-feudal, and democratic elements." It does not reject support from any quarter, left or right. Communist attempts to build this united front appear to follow constitutional procedures and avoid or at least deemphasize illegal activity and violence. To employ, or urge the use of, force would tend .to alienate the public, thereby isolating the party, and would also in- vite vigorous repressive action by the government. Opportunities do exist, however, for open activities and agitation. Past attempts to build a united front while employing violence have failed and there is no evidence at present of any positive preparations for launching a campaign of violence in Pakistan. While the present policy of the party in general envisages, neither the advocacy nor the instigation of violence, it does allow participation in outbreaks of violence in- stigated by others if fairly broad-based and deemed likely to benefit the party; under special circumstances, the party might be prepared to instigate violence on a limited scale. Even with regard to strikes, the party has directed its members to avoid fomenting strikes on the labor front, but has also advised them to lend full support when spon- taneous strikes do break out and then to make every effort to end them successfully and quickly. The present program of building a united front and observing constitutional procedures assigns a prominent place to propaganda and agitation. Among the major propaganda themes employed in Pakistan are that (1) Pakistan is independent in name only and that imperialism, with which the present government is allied, still dominates the coun- try, exploiting, it and retarding its cultural and economic development; imperialism, the Communists say, prevents industrialization and impedes the liquidation of feudal and semi-feudal systems of agriculture; (2) foreign imperialist domination of Pakistan can be ended, and real pro- gress achieved, as in China, only after the local bourgeois and feudal elements, and the Moslem League governments representing them, are de- feated and power transferred to the people; (3) they can be defeated if the people unite; (4) in more and more areas of the world, especially in Asia, the democratic forces are already rising up against the crack- ing imperialist system and its native servitors; (5) the imperialists will not hesitate to involve the world in a global war and in fact have SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION already launched their aggressive war in Korea; and (6) the USSR and the People's Democracies strive for peace and support the people of Pakistan and the colonial countries in their struggle for true independence. The party makes a concentrated effort to relate its major propa- ganda themes to the interests, problems, and grievances of specific sections of the population -- students, workers, women, etc. In parti- cular, the Communists seek to capitalize on nationalist, anti-imperialist feelings and economic interests by linking the rise in the cost-of-living to "capitalist-imperialist" preparations for war. In order to identify the party with the aspirations of the various sections of the population, they also agitate for a minimum wage law, agrarian reform, increased educational facilities, lower school tuitions, free medical aid, civil liberties, peace, and aid to refugees from India. In order to guide popular feelings on these issues in the direction the party desires, much of this propaganda and agitation is carried out through the various Communist front organizations tailored to reach and attract such special interest groups as peasants, workers, writers, students, women, and youth. Communication between the party in Pakistan and Communist forces outside the country probably does not represent any great difficulty: Communist publications are being imported, individual Communists and delegations come to, and go from, Pakistan fairly frequently, and both the USSR and Communist China maintain Embassies in the country. The transfer of funds is not so easy. Various roundabout devices are re- sorted to, prominent among them being the retention by the party of proceeds from literature shipped in from Communist countries. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 The ability of the party to attain its objectives is not great now and present indications are that it will not increase significantly within the next few years. An important factor severely limiting this ability is the condition of the party itself. It is a small organiza- tion and appears to have only a small popular following. Its representa- tion in the central and provincial legislative assemblies of Pakistan is negligible. In the past, the party has been plagued with internal dissension and disunity and this may still characterize to some extent the organization in Vest Pakistan. Also, the party appears to be financially weak. The party's own view of its deficiencies in East Bengal toward the end of 1951 was that it was disorganized at the sub- provincial levels, inefficient, lacking in sufficient mass contact and sympathy, inadequate in assuring publicity, and weak financially. Its financial position was in fact so bad that the party in East Bengal was even considering closing down the Provincial Center and some of the sub-provincial branches unless funds were forthcoming in the near future. Another important factor limiting the capabilities of the party is the strong position of the Moslem League and its attitude towards the Communist party. The League is the largest single political party in Pakistan and has the largest popular following. It led the movement for the establishment of Pakistan and has been the party in power at the national, provincial, and sub-provincial levels since the inaugura- tion of the Dominion in August 1947. Moslem League governments do not hesitate to move against the Communist party when action is called for and the party has been hit hard on several occasions by the repressive measures taken against it by the government. The association of two top Pakistani Communists with the abortive Rawalpindi conspiracy in early 1951 exposed the party to such government repression as to practi- cally inactivate it and its front organizations for a period of several months. The student demonstrations leading to rioting in Karachi during the first half of January 1953 presented the government with another opportunity, which it was quick to seize, for moving against the Communists. Despite the party's lack of ability to achieve its short-term objectives through its own unaided efforts, the Communists in Pakistan may possibly see some of their short-term objectives fulfilled in the next few years. This is possible largely because some of the short- term objectives of the Communists correspond to the goals of other diverse groups. The withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth, for example, is demanded by the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the largest .Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 opposition party in Pakistan, and by a number of other groups, some of them fanatical Moslem societies. There is a significant amount of popular sentiment for severance of ties with Britain and it is possible that within the next few years this sentiment, based on a .variety of motivating factors, may prevail. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 6 - COMNNNISM IN PAKISTAN: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH No precise figures are available for the membership of the Communist Party of Pakistan. The total almost certainly does not exceed 5,000 and may be considerably smaller. However, there may be as many as 50,000 members of organizations under Communist control. Even if all of these are considered to be strongly influenced by the Communist Party -- an assumption probably not justified -- the proportion of Communists and devoted followers in a total population of approximately 76,,000,000 is well under 1/100 of one per cent. Geographically, the Communist membership and following is con- centrated most heavily in the provinces of Punjab and East Bengal and in the capital city of Karachi. Communist Party members and sympathizers in Pakistan are drawn in largest part from the educated urban middle class. This is notably the case in West Pakistan; in heavily populated East Pakistan, the party's following apparently includes a proportionately larger number of workers and peasants. Very little is known about the tenacity with which members cling to the party. However, the precipitous decline in membership after the exposure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in March, 1951 (See Section III) and recurrent reports of frequent internal conflicts in the party indicate that at the present time the Communist movement in Pakistan is not particularly significant. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Pakistan has had no general elections since it emerged as a nation in 1947. Partial elections held in Punjab province in 1951 brought a vote divided as follows: Number of Estimated Percentage Party Seats Won of the Vote Cast Moslem League 143 51.1 Jinnah Awami Moslem 31 18.3 League Independents 16 23.7 Azad Pakistan Party 1 2.0 Jama'at-i-Islam 1 4.4 Islam League 0 .4 Communist Q .1 Total 192 100.0 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION In the Northwest Frontier Province in 1951 three self-styled "Communist sympathizers" ran on the ticket of the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the dominant Moslem League's major opponent. All were defeated. It is probable that Communist vote-getting power would be greater in East Bengal (East Pakistan) than in any of the West Pakistan provinces. The test of the party's overall electoral potential will not be made until the first general elections, which are not expected to be held before late 1953 and probably considerably later. The Communist Party proposes to participate in these elections. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The present policy of the Pakistan Communist Party in respect of the use of violence appears to be one of making common cause with other groups whenever demonstrations occur. The party has little or no inde- pendent capability for violent action. As was demonstrated in the Dacca riots of early 1952 and the Karachi riots in January 1953, however, it is ready to seize opportunities to join in demonstrations and to attempt to turn them to Communist purposes. In March 1951, the Pakistan Government arrested a small number of civilians and high ranking army officers on charges of conspiring to establish a military dictatorship and eventually a Communist state. Fifteen individuals were brought to trial and 14 were convicted. Although the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, as it is known, evidently did show connections between Communist members and sympathizers and a number of ranking army personnel, there is little evidence to suggest that Communist influence in the Pakistani armed forces is now other than negligible. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Communist Party is a legal political organization in Pakistan and is free to conduct political activities openly. Communist leaders, however, are kept under close surveillance by Pakistan authorities. Both the provincial and the central governments in Pakistan are vested with sweeping powers to deal with threats to public safety. The central government, for instance, is authorized by the Pakistan Security Act to detain individuals, disband organizations, and censor or ban publications under specified conditions. Neither provincial nor central authorities have hesitated to exercise these powers and have shown themselves able to withstand Communist agitation against the application of public security legislation. There is no evidence that the Pakistan authorities could not deal effectively with any likely Communist threat to the security of the state. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Communist influence among Pakistan workers is believed to be reflected mainly in the Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF), a Communist- dominated organization affiliated with the Communist international con- federation, the World Federation of Trade Unions. PTUF affiliates are estimated to have no more than 25,000 members, or from 5 to 10 per cent of the unionized workers in Pakistan. Factional differences occurred in the PTUF in 1951 and were still in evidence at the organization's annual con- ference in April, 1952. Few other details are available on the PTUF. In particular, data on the size and location of its individual affiliated unions are largely lacking. A small number of labor organizations led by members of the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the Pakistan Socialist Party, or by former members of the PTUF may be subject to some measure of Communist influence. The limited information available indicates that these organizations are of negligible importance in Pakistan labor. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Only sketchy data are available for the Communist front organ- izations active in Pakistan. Summaries of these data follow: Appealing to youth and student groups are the East Pakistan Youth League, with headquarters in Dacca, East Bengal, the East Pakistan Youth Federation, and the Democratic Students' Federation. The last named organization, which is centered in the West Pakistan cities of Lahore and Karachi, is reported to have about 200 members and an additional 300 sympathizers. The Purba Pakistan Mahila Samiti is the Communist-dominated women's organization in East Pakistan. It maintains contact with the Women's International Democratic Federation. Front organizations in "cultural" and professional fields are: (1) The Pakistan-Soviet. Cultural Association, with branches in Karachi, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Lyall- pur, Okara, Multan, Sukkur, Shikarpur, Hyderabad, and Dacca, is engaged in organizing lectures, conferences, and dis- cussions on various aspects of life in the USSR. (2) The Pakistan-China Friendship Society, with branches in Lahore and Kan:chi and perhaps in other cities of Pakistan, is devoted to promoting Pakistani good will toward Communi t China. SECRET - SECURITY INFOFiJ4ATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION (3) The Pakistan-Czechoslovak Cultural Society was reportedly established in December 1951. No other in- formation about the organization is at hand. (4) The All Pakistan Progressive Writers' Asso- ciation which has units in Karachi, Lahore, Gujranwala, and Lyallpur, includes several writers of the first rank and the Association is probably the most important Communist propaganda organization in Pakistan. (5) The All-Pakistan Theater Association, the main body of which is in Karachi, is closely related to the Progressive Writers' Association and the member- ships of the two organizations overlap. (6) The Three Arts Circle, located in Karachi, also promotes Communist propaganda. (7) The "peace" front in Pakistan is the Pakistan Peace Committee, with branches in Lahore, Gujranwala, Karachi, Peshawar, and Dacca. It is a standard Communist "peace" organization and presumably works under the guidance of the international Communist "peace" movement. None of these front organizations is presently a major or even a significant force in Pakistan. The membership of the various fronts is small. and to a considerable extent duplicating. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, which serves both as a central legislature and as a constitution-making body, has among its 79 members three known Communist sympathizers. There are no known Communists or sympathizers in the executive branch of the central government, and there are very few in the provincial governments. With the exposure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy, the Pakistan armed forces are believed now to be substantially free of Communist influence at any level. And there is no indication of extensive Communist infiltration into the police and security forces of the states and central government. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The Communist Party itself has virtually no impact on Pakistani public opinion, but some Communist influence is nonetheless exercised through front organizations and psrty-controlled or influenced publications. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFO 0 IX. C01240IST INFILTRATICN OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES The Jama'at-i-Islam, a right-wing religious-political organization devoted to furthering the principles of Islam, is known to have limited relationships with Communist front organizations, but the degree of Communist infiltration is insignificant. The small Pakistan Socialist Party has had some association with Pakistan Communists since its break with India's Socialist Party in 1947. A more important organization, the Azad Pakistan Party, which was founded in Lahore in 1950, is reported to have a Communist cell within its ranks. The leading figures in the Azad Pakistan Party are the wealthy Punjabi fellow travellers, Mian Iftikharuddin and Shaukat Hayat Khan. Communist influence in this leftist party is therefore believed to be substantial. The Jinnah Awami Moslem. League, which has thus far constituted the principal opposition to the dominant Moslem League, includes among its members a few known Communists and sympathizers. Their influence is presumably of some consequence although the party cannot be classified as Communist-controlled. The Civil Liberties Union of West Pakistan, an organization whose chief aim is to promote agitation against the provincial and central governments on the issue of civil liberties, is considered a united front of several opposition parties rather than a Communist-controlled organ- ization. Its leaders have, however, included prominent Communists and sympathizers. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Two students' papers, the Students' Voice and the Students' Herald, about which few details are available, are believed to be the only outright Communist periodicals in Pakistan. Pro-Communist domestic publications are the Pakistan Times of Lahore, published by Mian Iftikharuddin, with a circulation of 18,000-?_0,000; the Socialist, with a circulation of 1,000; and Imroze2 also published by Iftikharuddin, with a circulation of 3,000. Printing establishments available to Communists, if not under Communist control, are the People's Publishing House in Lahore,, the Pakistan Times Press in Lahore, and the Imroze Press in Karachi and Lahore. The quality of the work done by these publishing houses is good. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There is a substantial flow of Communist propaganda material into Pakistan from India, the United Kingdom, and from Soviet/satellite countries. Imports of periodicals from the USSR were halted by the Pakistan author- ities after the disclosure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in March 1951. However, the Soviet Embassy, the Czechoslovak Legation, and the Chinese Communist Embassy provide channels for the inflow of Communist books, pamphlets, and periodicals. Communist books and pamphlets are sold widely and cheaply in Pakistan cities. The Soviet Embassy in Karachi issues occasional press releases in the Bengali and Sindhi languages and a regular weekly bulletin in Urdu. The Communist Party of Pakistan has no domestic radio facilities and no apparent influence over radio programs. Moscow programs beamed to India and Pakistan are broadcast daily in English, Hindustani, and Bengali. A program from Tashkent, in English and perhaps Bengali, is also beamed to India and Pakistan daily. XI. FINANCIAL C0NDITION The Communist Party of Pakistan apparently has limited funds. For a period of more than a year, from March 1950 to May 1951, the party in West Pakistan is reported to have spent only the equivalent of US $8000 to ?$10,000. Available information is that the East Pakistan party is chronically in financial difficulties and presumably financially weaker than the West Pakistan organization. Sources of Communist Party income, in addition to or apart from subsidies from abroad, are membership dues, donations, levies on the incomes of party members, sales of propaganda material (supplied in largest part from abroad by the Communist movement), and, it is reported, profits from trade with the Coimnznist bloc. No data are available as to the absolute or relative importance of these various sources of income. A Karachi firm entitled Traders is reported to have been set up under Commmznist Party auspices to conduct trade with the USSR, with the profits to be divided on a 30-70 basis between the firm and the party; no information has been received as to success or failure of this enterprise. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Official missions from the Communist bloc countries to Pakistan. are the Soviet Embassy, with a staff of 14 officials; the Chinese Communist Embassy, with eight official personnel; the Czechoslovak Legation, the Polish Trade Mission, and the Hungarian Trade Mission. These three European satellite missions have a total of seven officials and an unknown SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -p-roved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 12 - number of clerks. The Soviet and Chinese missions engage in limited overt propaganda activities as the dissemination showing of motionfpicturestions like New Times and XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the Communist international organizations maintains offices in Pakistan. Pakistani representatives appear frequently at meetings of Communist international organizations. Recent movements of Pakistani Communists and sympathizers to Communist meetings abroad are summarized in the table: llowin f g o Date Size of Pakistan Meeting Delegation International Economic Conference aratory Committee) (Copenhagen) Oct. 1, 1951 (Pre 1 p World Peace Council (Vienna) Nov. 1-7, 1951 2-3 2 rld Economic Conference (Moscow) Apr. 3-10, 1952 W 17- 3 o Peace Movement (Peiping) May 28, 1952 5 Vienna Peace Congress (Vienna) Dec. 1952 4 South Asian Conference of Youth and Feb. 19-28, 1948 9 Students (co-sponsored by WFDY and IUS) (Calcutta) Asian-Pacific Peace Conference (Peiping) Oct. 2-12, 1952 30 World Congress of Peoples for Peace Dec.12-20, 1952 (Vienna) 1st International Conference in Defense Apr.12-16, 1952 of Children (sponsored by WIDF) (Vienna) XIV. COI1MTJNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK No detailed information is available on Communist communications systems and techniques in Pakistan. The geographic separation of East and West Pakistan poses a difficult communications problem for the Communist party in Pakistan; in practice, at least, party units in East Pakistan appear to be under the direction of the Indian Communist Party rather than under the authority of the Pakistan Party. South Asian Stalinist parties have traditionally looked to the British Communist Party for guidance, and Communist emissaries to the subcontinent have frequently been from UK or Commonwealth Stalinist groups Coommunist, who representedethe Ernest in the past. a .hi,hCrankingsAustralianCommunists Thornton., g SECRET - SECURITY INFORIATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION World Federation of Trade Unions at the 1950 conference of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation; T. E. McWhinnie of the WFTU secretar3,at, who was in Lahore in February 1952; and Ivor Montague of the World Peace Council, also in Lahore in February 1952. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.17 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD] CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY SYRIA - LEBANON OFFICE OF ThTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY I!1PORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword ? . . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . ... . ? . 1 He Tactics . . ? . ? ? ? ? . ? . ? . . . . . .. ? ? ? . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . .. ... . .. . .. 3 ASSETS 5 I. Numerical Strength .. .. . .... . .. .. .. 5 II. Electoral Strength .. ? ? .. ....... ? ? 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. . . . . ? .. ? 6 V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . . .. . .. . . 7 Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional. Organizations . . . ? . ? . . . . . . ? 8 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . ? . ? . . . 9. VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ? . . 12 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . 12 X. Communist Propaganda Media .. .. . . 12 XI. Financial Condition .. . .. . . ? . . 14 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets .. 15 XIII. Communist International organizations . ? . ? .. . ? 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network .. ? ? ? ? . ? . ? . 16 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION c__, ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, the oldest, largest, and best-organized Communist movement in the Arab world, was outlawed in Syria in December 19+7 and in Lebanon in January 1948. Always closely linked since their inception in 1924, the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties became separate entities at the end of 1943, following the dissolution of the Comintern, but by January 1951 had merged again into a single organization. Khalid Bakdash, a Moscow-trained Communist of Kurdish descent, has been the leader and theoretician of the Communist movement in Syria. and Lebanon since 1935. Bakdash, head of the joint Central Committee of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party as now constituted, and other highly-placed members of the Communist Party hierarchy and the principal Partisans of Peace organizers in Syria and Lebanon are in close contact with the Soviet Legations in Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus, Syria. Bakdash is believed also to coordinate Communist activities in Iraq and to exercise a certain amount of influence over the Jordanian Communist Party, which, however, is controlled by the Arab Section of the Israeli Communist Party. Syria and Lebanon are declared, from the Communist viewpoint, to be in the phase of "democratic national liberation." The objectivckk. are: (1) to put an end to "imperialist political and economic domination" and eliminate the agents of the "imperialist powers"; (2) to liquidate the remnants of feudalism in Syria and Lebanon; and (3) to establish a popular democratic regime. In September 1952, Bakdash described the specific duties of the party as follows: (1) extension of the campaign.for peace and national independence through mass movements against the military projects of the Western powers and against the "treacheries" of the rulers in Syria and Lebanon; (2) the establishment of democratic freedom for the masses; (3) dissemination of propaganda concerning the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union; (4) attraction to the Partisans of Peace of the masses and notables, irrespective of social position, even regardless of their opinions of the internal situation. II. TACTICS The Communist Party in Syria has been forced to slacken both overt and covert activities since the establishment of the Silu-Shishakli military regime, though some front organization activity persists. The Partisans of Peace operates legally in Lebanon, where most party energy is channeled into "peace" activities. Communist strategy in both SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION countries continues to be concerned primarily with: (1) strengthening the labor unions and extending the labor movement among the unorganized masses; (2) encouraging political activity among the workers, particularly in support of "peace" and in opposition to the military projects of the "imperialist" powers; (3) organizing activities among the peasants in support of their demands for land and water. The holding of peasant conferences and the formation of committees to defend and direct these demands is an immediate goal. Propaganda targets for the creation of a people's-national front movement have been members of government, the.press, minorities (particularly the Armenians, the.Greek Orthodox, and the Kurds), teachers, student groups, intellectual and professional elements, women's organizations, and villagers. Up to the present, Soviet and Communist propaganda has made progress primarily by capitalizing on the parallels between (1) its alleged goals and those of local nationalism, and (2) the rising discontent of the urban bourgeoisie with the corruption, self-interest, and monopoly of power of the governing groups. Communist agitation among industrial workers in Syria has never reached serious proportions. Only two unions are considered to be under threat of Communist control, the Mechanical Loom Operators (Aleppo, no estimate of membership) and the Mechanics (Damascus, 187 members). Communist membership in these two unions is probably small. In Lebanon, Mustafa al-'Aria, the leading Communist, is president of both the Printers' and Typesetters' Union and of the Federation of Labor Unions, an unincorporated body of some 19 unions. Of an estimated total Federation membership of 10,000, only a small portion (300) can be considered Communist. The majority of the members are leftist or neutral and willing to benefit from 'Aris'e enegetic leadership. The Hotel, Cafe, and Restaurant Union (800 members) is powerful and Communist-controlled. 'Aris is also a member of the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions and has been a delegate to many Communist World Congresses. Few Communists in Syria and Lebanon pay regular dues, and the party depends largely upon contributions from wealthier members and sympathizers. Some of the contributions go toward party operations, most of the money being used for Partisan of Peace campaigns and special causes for which appeal is made locally. It is assumed that funds are also received from various outside sources, through the Soviet Legations or in the form of "presents" from front groups abroad. The Communists have never succeeded in electing their candidates to either the Syrian or Lebanese Parliaments. In the 1951 Lebanese general elections, however, it is believed that only direct interference by the government prevented the elections of at least one pro-Communist deputy. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION _3 - III. CAPABILITIES Communist capabilities for recruitment appear greatest among the students and professional men, especially those in the legal profession. Strongly nationalist reactions among politically sensitive elements in Syria and Lebanon against the Western "imperialist" and the US and UK role in the establishment of Israel have tended to make even wealthier men sympathetic toward the USSR as the enemy of the US and the UK. Some of these have become interested in Communism, or at least in participating in various front activities. This same intense nationalism, however, is also a danger to the Communist movement and has caused considerable deviationism within party ranks. The general trend in the area toward some form of socialism is a factor which the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party has been able to exploit. Lack of ideological sophistication among the various socialist parties of Syria and Lebanon has also made it relatively easy for the Communists to penetrate into some of them. The strongest factor limiting Syro-Lebanese Communist Party effectiveness is that the party promotes the interests of a foreign country -- the Soviet Union. Communism is also still widely held to be anti-religious and to be destructive off.mily life. Religion and family life are the two poles around which the life of the average Syrian and Lebanese revolves. Communism has had the strongest appeal for groups looking for outside support for nationalist or separatist demands, but the enthusiasm of some of these groups for the USSR has been noticeabZr tempered by a dislike of Communism as a political and economic system and by an antipathy toward all foreign,_including Soviet, control. The working class in Syria and Lebanon contains large. numbers of religious and ethnic minorities -- especially Armenians -- whose leadership cannot easily be imposed on Arabs and Moslems. The Kurds have shown a reluctance to join a Soviet-led Kurdish independence movement in the absence of large-scale Soviet support. Among the villages, in the autonomy-minded Druze and Alawite areas and among the tribesmen in the Jazirah, the predominant concern with regional and clan loyalties, rather than a political or class-conscious awareness of economic, social, and ideological problems is the principal barrier to Communist effectiveness among the masses. Widespread illiteracy among the workers and peasants of Syria has hampered the spread of written propaganda. Before the advent of reform-minded governments in Syria and Lebanon during 1952, nationalist organizations, both of the left and the right, accomplished much of the disruptive work the Communists SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -4+ - would normally have expected to do themselves. Major Communist opportunity in Syria and Lebanon appears to lie not in the present strength of the movement itself, but in the weaknesses of the regimes in power. The Syro-Lebanese Communist Party remains incapable of developing effective cadres in rural and urban areas and has not yet overcome the cultural and political estrangement of intellectuals from workers, city from countryside. Communism, theoretically appreciated according to Stalinist classics, and energetically pursued, appears to be embodied in Syria and Lebanon in only a handful of over-worked leaders. Should the present ruling groups fail to remedy the outstanding social and economic inequities in Syria and Lebanon, however, the traditional bulwarks against Communism will be seriously weakened. SECRET -.SECURITYINFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C0141UNISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Always closely linked since their inception in 1923, the Lebanon and Syrian Communist Parties split along geographical lines after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1944, but merged again into a single organization in January 1951. The Syrian section, which is closely supervised by the party's founder and prime mover, a Kurdish Moslem named Khalid Bakdash, has traditionally been stronger than the Lebanese. However, under the increasingly authoritarian Silu-Shishakli regime, Syrian Communists have been severely hampered in their activities in the past year, and the party is now virtually inactive in Damascus. The most recent estimates place the total Syrian membership in the neighborhood of 10,000 and the Lebanese at around 15,000; if sympa- thizers are included, these figures might be increased to 12,000 in the case of Syria, and 20,000 in Lebanon. There are approximately 30 front organizations in Lebanon, and some 25 such groups in Syria. From its beginning, the Syrian Communist Party made particular efforts to recruit among minorities with nationalist or separatist aspirations, or among those with a keen sense of their unequal position in the Syrian state -- Kurds, Alawites, Druzes, and Armenians. An estimated 45 percent of the total party membership in Syria are Armenians. Among the Moslems, the party has attracted professional men, writers, lawyers, students, and white collar workers. Except for Palestine Arab refugees, few workers and peasants have thus far joined, and Communist influence is not significant among the labor unions. There are perhaps 2,500 hard-core Communists in Syria; and around 4,500 in Lebanon, coming mainly from trade unions and minority groups. The leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party have demonstrated little discipline, initiative, or administrative ability, leaving the accomplishment of their party's tasks to particular individuals, rather than to effective cadres. Moreover,'as Bakdash has asserted, they "usually think only within the framework of the situation and activities of existing branch committees and cells 5nd often within 7 narrow provincialism which does not look beyond its quarter or city....They do not think of anything new." There is also a high turnover in personnel in both the Syrian and Lebanese sections. Communist Party membership in both Syria and Lebanon is con- centrated principally in the cities and larger towns. The following is a rough estimate of the distribution of party strength by towns: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Syria Lebanon. Aleppo ....4,000 Beirut ........8,000 Damascus ..2,000 Tripoli ........ 4s,000 Horns ......1,000 Mount Lebanon..3,000 Latakia ...l,000 II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Although Communism was legally outlawed in December 1947 in Syria and in January 1948 in Lebanon, the party has continued to present candidates in local and national elections in both countries. In April 1951, for example, a known Communist candidate was permitted to ran openly for public office in the Lebanese general elections. In Syria, the Democratic National Front, a Communist political front organization, presented a list of its candidates for the Syrian national elections held in 1949. In both contests, however, the Communists were defeated, regis- tering some strength only in Beirut, Aleppo, and Damascus. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Lebanese Communist Party habitually attempts to exploit local dissidence and unrest by organizing mass demonstrations and riots -- or more commonly projecting themselves into those already taking place. Although Communists in Damascus are disinclined to risk a serious clash with the armed forces, particularly the security police, they are known to have participated in demonstrations by both leftist and rightist groups. On October 12, 1951, aPartisans of Peace meeting in Horns clashed with police and was broken up with the temporary arrest of more than 100 of the estimated 800 participants; seven Communists were arrested. Before Colonel Shishakli's coup in November 1951 there were reports of clashes between small groups of Communists and members of the anti-Communist Syrian Social National Party, nearly all of which occurred in the Latakia area. Since the coup, Communist demonstrations and open clashes with opponents have virtually. ceased. The party is said to have terrorist and goon squads in the Aleppo area; but their numbers are probably small and their equipment scanty. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD C04MUNISM Although both the Syrian and Lebanese parties have been legally proscribed, successive Syrian and Lebanese administrations, with the exception of the short-lived, firmly anti-Communist Za'im regime in Syria in 1949, have not been consistent in their efforts to curtail Communist activities. It has been only recently that the Silu-Shishakli government SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOBN TICN in Syria has clamped down on Communist -- including front organization - activities. It refused exit visas to delegates to the Berlin Youth Festival. Partisans of Peace pamphlets have been seized and distributors of tracts sent to prison. Demonstrations have been frustrated in Damascus, but the police found it more difficult to cope with Communist and front organization activities in Aleppo and Homs, which are located in expanding industrial and agricultural areas. The illegal Syrian Communist Party confined its overt activities to issuing pamphlets and staging demonstrations, but was aided also by several Syrian newspapers which have often echoed the Communist line. The party has more freedom in Lebanon, where Communist printing facilities operate with only occasional obstruction from the Lebanese security forces. Beirut is the regional headquarters for Communist propaganda, and Communist literature printed locally and abroad is disseminated to other countries uncensored by the Lebanese authorities. V. C04MUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The manipulative labor strength of the Lebanese Communist Party is exceedingly small and is concentrated in essentially non-strategic labor organizations. In the Lebanese "Federation of Labor Unions", an unincorporated body of some 19 unions headed by the prominent Communist Mustapha 'Aris, only about 300 workers of the total 10,000 membership are estimated to be Communist Party members. Only the independent Lebanese Hotel Cafes, and Restaurant Workers Union (approximately 800 members) is Communist-dominated. The Conzress of Syrian Workers is the oldest and the major Communist front organization among Syrian labor, having been formed under Communist auspices in 1945. This clandestine organization, which'claimed a membership of 17,250 (probably greatly exaggerated) in 1950, is affiliated with the WFTU. The Congress has not been successful owing to poor discipline and to opposition from both labor and government. On the propaganda front, it has not been nearly as active or as effective as the "peace" groups. In December 1951, in conjunction with the Republican Student's Party, it unsuccessfully attempted to stir up a public protest against the repression of student groups in Barcelona and.the jailing of pro- Communist individuals in Greece. Key Communist labor organizers from Lebanon (Sa'd ad-Din Mu'minah, liaison man between the Syrian and Lebanese Communist labor movements), Jordan (Muhammad Qasim) and Syria (Ibrahim Bakri) and Iraq (Muhammad Fallah) were reported to have attended a congress in Damascus in SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION January 1952 over which Bakri presided. The following items were said to have been on the agenda: (1) the formation of a regional union of Near Eastern workers; (2) propaganda work within the unions; (3) bettering the economic condition of the workers; and (4) propaganda against the Western powers. The Society for the Salvation of the Worker. This Syrian group, with a current total membership of about 150, established itself in the fall of 1950 in the town of Masyaf, in the Alawite area. Generally it has been ineffectual in organizing labor groups in this region. Communist labor agitation occurs from time to time in Aleppo and Latakia but as yet has not reached serious proportions. According to available data, only two independent Syrian unions are under Communist control: the Mechanical Loom Operators' Union of Aleppo (membership unknown) and the Mechanics' Union of Damascus (187 members). There are no unions or guilds in Syria which can be classified as strategic. VI. CON1UEIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL. CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There are six main categories of front organizations in both Syria and Lebanon: women's organizations, intellectuals' organizations, youth groups, student groups, labor groups, and religious groups. In all of these, the main propaganda theme is "peace". A. Syria 1. The Partisans of Peace movement was built up around an inner core of Communists and dependable fellow-travelers who planned recruitment of members and formulated operations and propaganda programs. All of the members of the original Syrian National Committee of the Partisans of Peace were prominent members of the Communist Party in Syria. They formed the core of the expanded National Committee of 12 as it existed in 1951. By December 1951, branches had been established in all parts of Syria except Jebel Druze, and the National Committee had managed to penetrate the Surety Generale, the Deuxi6me Bureau, most of the government ministries, and a number of the political parties in Syria. No figures are available on the total membership. Financing appears to have been handled locally. 2. Women's Organizations have been established mainly by Communist member Miss Falak Tarazi, a lawyer by education. The daughter of the late Nuhanmad 'Ali al-'Abid, one-time President of Syria from June 1932 to December 1936, she is a protege of Mrs. Zahra' al-'Abid, president of the non-Communist Syrian League of Women's Clubs. Most of the members of the women's groups listed below are from the minority communities . None of these organizations is large or influential and membership on these groups probably overlaps to a considerable degree. SECRY - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECTRITY INFORMATION a. The League of Syrian Nationalist Women for the Defense of Peace is believed to have been organized by Miss Tarazi and Wisal Farhat Mrs. Khalid Bakdash) in September 1949. Little has been heard of its activities. b. The-League of Syrian Women for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood has been the most active of all women's front organizations. Membership is drawn primarily from Kurdish, Greek Orthodox, and other minority elements. They have on a number of occasions called at the US and other Legations in Damascus to deliver their messages, c. The-Women's Section of the Democratic Youth Organization. The women's section had about 100 members in December 1950. Activities of this group centered at Qamishliyah in the Jazirah (the Kurdish- Assyrian center). d. The League of Democratic Women as of May 1951 had a membership of about 150 in Syria? Headquarters were in Damascus at the home of Aminah 'Aril, wife of Najah Qassab Hasan of the Communist Party's Damascus Regional Committee. Most of the members appear to be from Christian and Kurdish minority elements. Activities centered on organ- izing-female students in support of peace and on spreading pro-Soviet propaganda in general. e. The League for Women's Rights. Little is known about its membership. 3. Student Organizations are believed to be confined to male students, in conformity with the general custom of segregation of the sexes followed in Near Eastern.countries, notwithstanding the contrary aims of other Communist front groups. a. The Student Youth Movement in Syria and Lebanon was headed by Wasfi al-Bunni of Homs and Ridwan al-Shahhal of Tripoli, both very active Communists. Bunni has recently been arrested in Syria and if his claim of Soviet nationality is upheld he will be deported to the USSR. b. The League of Democratic Students reportedly has a large membership. The leaders were reported to be five Syrian University students, one of whom, M,iharmad Amin, is the brother of the leader of the Partisans of Peace in Syria. The activities of this group are centered in the Syrian University and in the Third Tajhiz (government secondary school) in Damascus. c. Gob Sonen Hawi was founded in 1943 after the Kurdish Congress in Erivan as a Kurdish student organization. SECRET - SECURITY INFORM TION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 4. Youth Organizations a. The League of Democratic Youth actively participated in intensified front organization "peace" and "neutrality" propaganda in Damascus. Membership is largely from the minority elements. b. Heina, a Kurdish youth organization, was represented at. the Berlin Youth Festival. It is reported to have begun to form branches in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. 5. Organizations of Intellectuals, a. The Lea a of ian Writers, a group of Communists and fellow-travelers headed Ilya Dayrani, a member of the Greek Orthodox Community in Syria. He is reported to be a Communist and a teacher employed in the primary school section of the Ministry of Public Instruction. In May 1952, membership was composed of about 25 writers. Two of these were considered Communists and the rest fellow-travelers. The activity of this group consisted mainly. in contributing to the press articles of topical interest to the Communist propaganda efforts. Translations were made of various Russian authors such as Gorki and Tolstoy to which prefaces containing "peace" propaganda were added. b. The League of Democratic Lawyers was reported to consist mainly of students at the law school of the Syrian nly University. In May 1951 it was thought to have 35 adherents. Nassuh al-Ghaffari, a well-known lawyer and Communist Party leader, is probably closely connected with this group. Some adherents are in the Aleppo area* c. The League of Democratic Teachers':membership has been estimated a or 60, consisting mostly of young (male) teachers. Kamal 'Ayyad and Jamil Salibah, its leaders, were prominent in Syrian educational circles. 6. Religious Organizations A Moslem branch of the Partisans of Peace movement in Syria was reportedly formed in February 1951. B. Lebanon Front organizations in Lebanon follow the same general pattern as those in Syria. As in Syria, the Partisans of Peace is an active front group. The League of Democratic Women is in contact with the Syrian League for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood. The League of Democratic Students., and ague of Democratic Lawyers. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION also have branches in Lebanon. The Congress of Homeless Palestinians, organized in 1949, is directed by Communist sympathizers in contact with the Beirut Regional Committee of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party. It has branches at six refugee camps and at the American University of Beirut. Firm action by University officials is be- lieved to have greatly diminished Communist activity among the students. The ruling that demonstrations cannot be held on University grounds has proved a deterrent to Communist activity among American University students. "Zareh Nubar," a pro-Communist Armenian literary club was recently formed in Beirut for the propagation of literature on Soviet Armenia. Affiliated clubs are to be opened in Damascus and Aleppo, Syria. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Recent reports indicate that both the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties have managed to place a number of their members and sympathizers in the more sensitive agencies of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Thus, for example, the Syrian Army's Deuxijae Bureau and Police Security department are known to have been penetrated by-several Communists who are currently supplying information to local Communist regional committees concerning anticipated repressive measures to be undertaken by the military and security forces against the Syrian Communist Party. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 12 - VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Communist penetration of the Syrian and Lebanese school system is reported to have reached significant proportions. Communist activity at present consists not so much of establishing Communist groups 'per se among students or penetrating their existing organizations as in organ- izing them into front groups. These groups exist not only in the Syrian University in Damascus but also in its engineering school in Aleppo, in the government secondary schools (particularly in Aleppo), and in schools conducted by the. various religious communities in both countries (particularly the Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities). The teaching profession has been penetrated primarily at the university and government secondary school level, especially in Syria. The dean of the Syrian University is said to be a Communist and there are several professors who may possibly be members. A number of Palestine Arab refugee teachers, employed by the Syrian Ministry of Public Instruction, have been dis- missed for "Communist tendencies." The only front organization aimed specifically at the teaching profession appears to be the League of Democratic Teachers. Moreover, the government's official radio station in Damascus is reported to be heavily penetrated by Communist Party members and fellow travellers who have managed to secure relatively important administrative and operational positions. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Communist penetration of other Syrian political organizations, such as the Arab Socialist and Resurrectionist Parties, was reported to be quite extensive prior to the promulgation of a Shishakli-inspired decree in April 1952 outlawing all Syrian political associations and parties. The leaders of these parties were subsequently forced to flee Syria after an abortive plot against the existing regime was uncovered. Cells of a paramilitary character have reportedly been formed by the neo-fascist Islamic Socialist Front in Aleppo. This group, an offspring of the Ikhwan (Moslem Brethren) movement probably would not be adverse to accepting Communist tactical support in subverting the present regime. The Syrian Communist Party has also established some liaison with the clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Gregorian Armenian community, groups which maintain some influence with their own parochial political organizations. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Beirut serves as the geographic focal point for the distribution of Communist propaganda material in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. From Beirut, the clandestine party organs Nidal ash-Sha'b, As-Salem, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 13 - and al-Yanbu (Partisans of Peace publications which are currently proscribed in Syria), and AlTaria are distributed to many of these areas. Most of these papers suffer froi insolvency and local governmental suppression. Consequently, they appear only sporadically. Before its suppression early in 1951, the weekly organ Al-Sa was said to have printed 4,000 copies per issue, but the proportion of copies sold to those distributed free is not known. It may be signifi- cant that, unlike other Syrian newspapers, most issues of -SaYam do not have the price indicated on it. The paper was printed.at the Matba 'at Dimashq (Damascus Press) in Damascus. At-Tana is the monthly magazine published in Beirut by Antun Tabit, head of the Partisans of Peace organization in Lebanon and possibly also in Syria, where the magazine until,; recently circulated as well. Nidal ash-Sha'b is a clandestine Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party newspaper, probably printed in Beirut, which began to appear after the closing of the party's paper Sawt ash-Aha'b in December 1947. Vidal ash-Sha'b is published by a "Joint body.of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties," which Bakdash heads. Prior to the general-emalgatation'of the press instigated by the Shishakli regime in Septenbe, 1952, there were seven Syrian newspapers which at times gave evidence :'of Communist influence. Many of these were political party organs which, like other Syrian papers, had a small cir- culation (not over 2,000 copies for each issue) and were financially insolvent. These papers were: n-Nasr, a Damascus daily; Al-Ishtirakiyah, a Damascus weekly; Al-Hurrivah, a daily published in Aleppo; Al-Manar, of Damascus; A1-Hadarah, a Damascus daily; Al-Hawadith, an Aleppo daily; and Sada al-Ittihad, a Latakia daily. The Soviet campaign to subvert the Syrian press appears to date from the beginning of 1948, following the suppression in December 1947 of the Beirut-published cwt ash-Sha.'b (Voice of the People), organ of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties. Soon after this event, Soviet funds formerly allocated to this paper seem to have been diverted to (1) supporting the clandestine Nidal ash-Sha % and pamphlets, and (2) subsidizing and bribing of the editors and staff of existing newspapers. A number of editors are reported to have been offered newsprint and/or cash to adopt the Soviet line. The seven above-listed newspapers appear to have succumbed to Communist blandishments. Book publishing and distribution are now carried on from Beirut. Some of the Beirut publications have recently turned up in England and probably are circulating in Syria too. One volume which is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ' known to have been issued recently in Beirut is a tome by Vladimir Pozner (member of the French Communist Party and ex-Hollywood screen writer) called USA - The Land of Fictitious Liberties, translated into Arabic by 'Abdallah Sha'ito. No Russian-language publications are known to circulate in Syria. Apart from the Soviet orbit, Paris is an important source of Communist propaganda material. The Al-Yaqazah publishing house in Damascus prints and distributes books translated from Russian into Arabic by the "League of Syrian Writers." Distribution points for Communist literature include the Gloria Bookshop in Beirut (owned and operated by Haygazun Najarian). On sale at this shop is the official journal of the Cominform, printed in Arabic, as well as The USSR in Construction, a propaganda tract from Moscow, printed in French and English. The house of Aram Yeretizian, an Armenian Communist who lives in the Noshajian area of the Armenian quarter of Beirut, is the main center for all Communist pamphlet distribution among the Beirut Armenians. The Syrian Broadcasting. Station in Damascus on occasion broadcasts materials, particularly in news commentaries, which parallels the Communist propaganda line. The direction of the station has in the past been in- filtratecl by leftist, if not actually Communist, personnel at a high level. Ahmad ad-'Assih, a left-wing member of the Populist Party was director of the station for a time in 1949 and since late 1951 has been Acting Director; Kamal 'Ayyad, director in May 1951, was a leader of the front organization called the League of Democratic Teachers and was a suspected Communist. Najati Kassab Hasan, a Communist leader in Damascus, has assumed a position of importance in local newspaper and radio circles. He is regularly pub- lishing articles in the Damascus newspaper al-Nagaad and recently has begun broadcasting over the Syrian Broadcasting System. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Few Communists in Syria and Lebanon pay regular dues, and the party depends largely upon contributions from wealthier members. Some of the contributions go toward party operations, most of the money being used for Partisans of Peace campaigns and special causes for which appeal is made locally. It is thought that funds are also regularly received from various outside sources, through the Soviet Legation, or in the form of presents from Communist groups abroad. Thus, for example, while no Syrian publications are financed directly by the Soviet Union, cash sub- sidies disguised'as payments for advertising space or bulk purchases of particular issues are made by the Soviet press attache or by the TASS Agency representative to these papers when they publish TASS articles. This indirect form of subsidy avoids compromising the newspaper proprietor, who frequently has little control over editorial policy, and the trans- action is arranged privately between the editor and the Soviet press or TASS representative. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Syrian Communist Party finances do not appear- to be on a budget system, but are dispensed according to monthly commitments and resources. Party dues and contributions from non-Communist friends seem to be per- sonally disbursed by party leader Bakdash. However, the increased vigi- lance of the security forces of the present anti-Communist Syrian Govern- ment has severely hampered the fund-raising activities of the Communist Party in Syria. XII. SOVIET OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Legation in Beirut may be acting in part as the dis- tributing center for Cominform material for Syria and Lebanon.- Its activities in the propaganda field are both overt and covert; the latter seem to be under the direction of Feodor Bespalov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Legation. The Soviet Legation in Damascus appears to occupy a secondary position in this respect. The only two overt Soviet propaganda agencies in Syria are VOKS and TASS. Although VOKS has an active center in Beirut, in Damascus it seems to do very little in the way of overt work and appears to serve mainly as a cover for the covert activities of the Second Secretary of the Soviet Legation (Feodor.Pisarenko), which consist of (1) guiding the propaganda and other activities of the local Communist Party into con- formance with the party. line of international Communism, and (2) collecting intelligence information. TASS activities, until the recent Syrian Government clamp-down on the press and on foreign information activities, appear to have had three main aspects: (1) the distribution of TASS news and Soviet.Press Infor- mation bulletins issued by the Press Section of the Soviet Legation in Beirut; (2) the influencing of Syrian newspapers with cash or newsprint to print Soviet-produced or inspired items and otherwise adopt a line. favorable to the USSR; and (3) the transmission to.the USSR of local press items, frequently planted, for propaganda use by the Soviet and satellite press, radio, etc. In addition to being disseminated to the press through regular TASS channels, TABS and Soviet Press Information bulletins have been reported as having been distributed clandestinely by hand following the ban imposed by the Syrian Government on all foreign publications of this nature. The A1-Yagaza1c book shop iri D7i ascus, the largest publishing house in Syria, is subsidized by the Soviet Legation. XIII. COi?'Q4UNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Nearly all Communist front movements in Syria and Lebanon are geared today to the theme of "peace". Responsibilit for organizing groups in these two countries (and the Near Fast as a whole) was delegated to Khalid Bakdash and to a Middle East regional office of the World Peace Council, which was established in Beirut about May 1951. This office formed a Lebanese National Committee for a Conference of Peoples of the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Near and Middle East and North Africa which about December 1951 issued a proclamation calling for the convening of such a conference to combat Western inspired mutual security moves. No such meeting, however, ever took place. Six Lebanese delegates attended the Berlin Youth Festival held in July 1951. They were: Victor Mughabghad, Kamil Mohammad Tawfiq al-Harb, Robert Vahan Garabedian, Khalil 'Ali, Philippe Iskandar al-Rasi, and Ilyas Musa Fahad. All of these returning delegates were subsequently held for trial by the Lebanese Surete' Ggn;&rale. Despite an official Lebanese security board decision not to approve passports of any Lebanese intending to participate in the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952, a hitherto little-known Lebanese, Hussayn Sij'han, was able to attend by travelling via Egypt and Czechoslovakia. Upon his return to Beirut,Sijthan was eminently successful in acquiring audiences among the businessmen of the community to listen to his glowing praise of life in the Soviet Union. The leader of the Partisans of Peace in Lebanon, Antun Tabit, presented a report to a session of the International Peace. Council which met in Berlin in July 1952. It dealt with the "Struggle of the Middle Eastern people for peace and against war." Khalid Bakdash was accompanied by Mustafa al-tAris, Farajallah al-Hilu, Wasfi Bunni, Artin Madoyan, and Ohannes Aghabashian to the 19th Communist Party Congress, which convened in Moscow in October 1952. At this meeting Bakdash personally addressed the October 11 session and promised that "we, the Communists of Syria and Lebanon will do our best to' be worthy of the great honor of being called Stalints disciples." XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Soviet Legation in Beirut is the distributing center for Cominform and front organizations material for Syria and Lebanon. Beirut is the nodal point of Communist propaganda in Syria as well as Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. Khalid Bakdash and other highly-placed members of the Communist Party hierarchy, such as officials of the central command and the principal Partisans of Peace organizers, are in close contact with the Soviet Legations in Damascus and Beirut.' From the central command of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party, printed propaganda and directives are handed down to the Regional Committees. Instructions are sometimes delivered directly to representatives of district committees by the central committee, thus by-passing the regional committees. It is believed that theArmenian section of the party has its own lines for channeling directives and propaganda. SECRET - SECURITY INFOPMTION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET'- SECURITY INFORMATION The Aleppo regional cormiittee is-said to have 20 shock groups (terrorist squads), having no fixed headquarters, whose personnel is known only to the Regional Committee. The personnel of these groups is also .used for courier service between Aleppo and Damascus and between Aleppo po and the regions under its jurisdiction (Deir ez-Zor and Qamishliyah). clandestine newspaper Nidal ash-Sha'b,'the Lebanese Partisans of Peace periodical At Ta , tracts, and other publications are delivered from Beirut to Aleppo via Tripoli and Homs. Official party circulars and instructions are transmitted from Damascus by courier, and presumably are received direct from the Soviet Legation. Subversive printed matter is said to be given out by the Soviet Legation in Beirut for smuggling into Turkey via the Kurdish areas of north Syria. . SECRET - SECURITY INFOR1TION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.18 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, TUNISIA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION, TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives . . . . ? . . 1 He Tactics . ? . . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . ? . . . 1 ASSETS . . ? . . ? . . ? ? . 4 I. Numerical Strength . _ . . .. ~+ He Electoral Strength ? ? ? ? ?.. ? ? . ? ? ? ? 1. III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 4 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. . . ? 5 V. Communist Influence in Labor ? . . . . 5 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations .. .. . VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . ? ? ? ? ? . ? VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 6 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political 6 Parties . . . . .. . . . ? ? ? ? . . . . ? . ? . . X. Communist Propaganda Media ? . .. . ? . ? . . . ? .. 6 XI. Financial Condition .. . ? . . . ? ? ? ? . . ? . . ? 6 XII. Soviet-.Satellite Official Assets . . . . .. .. . . ? 6 XIII. Communist International organizations . ... . . . . 6 XIV. Communist Communication Network ? ? . ? . ? ? . ? ? ? 7 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to. achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN TUNISIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I . OBJECTIVES The over-riding immediate goal of the Tunisian Communist Party has been to persuade the local independence movements to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation ultimately for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control and American imperialism. In the meantime, as in the rest of French North Africa, the Communists are seeking, through propaganda, to destroy sympathy for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans and to increase local hostility toward the French administration. The serious economic grievances of the population also receive attention from the Communists. To achieve its immediate goals, however, the Tunisian Communist Party is faced above all with the task of reversing the steady trend toward decline in its membership and influence. II. TACTICS Having 'failed thus far in achieving a common front with the nationalists, the Communists have attempted instead to participate, uninvited, in strikes, demonstrations and riots initiated by the nationalists, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly, Communist propaganda pamphlets have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the popular mind the need and desirability of a common front. Occasionally, such tactics are accompanied by attacks on the nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a united national front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating or conducting negotiations with the French. Moreover, Communists have been known to facilitate the arrest of nationalists and to have claimed credit for successful nationalist demonstrations. III. C BILITIES To date, the small Tunisian Communist Party has had practi- cally no influence on the nationalist movement, largely because (1) the nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many. sympathizers in non-Communist areas, (2) the local Communist parties are largely French in membership, and (3) the present nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would dislike as much as they do that of the French. The capabilities of the Tunisian Communist Party at this time remain minimal, either for achieving its own current local objectives SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION or for furthering Soviet policy. It has always been evidenced by the notable failure of its efforts to persuade the nationalists --- especially the principal nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, and the labor federation allied to it - to form a united national front with the Communists. The Communist labor federation, USTT (Union . Syndicale des Travailleurs de Tunisie) has been unable to penetrate the nationalist UGTT (Union G(ner'ale Tunisienne du Travail) to any appreciable degree. Moreover, the USTT has been completely outmaneuvered by the nationalists whose rival union has steadily gained in membership and influence at the expense of the Communists. There is little likelihood of an early improvement in the caliber of Communist leadership in the party or its labor federation. The French Government throughout 1952 has been increasingly firm in its repression of the Tunisian Communist Party. Some of the non- Tunisian leaders have been deported, and virtually all of the others are being held under arrest. Both of its newspapers are suspended, and a clandestinely printed substitute for its proscribed French- language weekly, plus occasional mimeographed pamphlets and leaflets, ,represent the maximum of its apparent propaganda capabilities at this time. The Communist labor federation maintains its strongest position in port, mining, electrical communications, and railway but it lacks the strength to produce a complete tie up by strikes in even a single industry without the assistance of at least one or more of. the other three Tunisian labor federations. The effective leadership of the Tunisian Communist Party and almost all of the hard-core has always been European. With the membership estimated now at not more than 4,000, this probably still remains true. If the effectiveness of its leadership were not at such a low point, the Communist potentials in Tunisia, even given the present membership, might present a totally different picture. During the past year, a political atmosphere has developed in which an astute Communist leadership might find more fertile ground than at any time since the end of World War II. This situation is the outgrowth of a combination of factors, including (1) severe French repressive actions against the nationalists, (2) the exile or arrest of the principal Neo-Destour party and union leaders, (3) the death of the able, influential labor chief, Ferhat Hached, (4) the total lack of Neo- Destour progress in achieving nationalist aims during the past two years, and'.(5).the greater inclination of Tunisian nationalists to accept aggressive tactics as evidenced by increasing riots and sabotage. However, the Tunisian Communist Party appears at this time to be too impoverished financially and too feeble in membership, SFLRI T - SECURITY INFORMAITION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION organization, leadership, and influence to capitalize on the opportunity presented by nationalist frustrations and the temporary dislocations among the relatively moderate, anti-Communist, and experienced top Neo-4)estour leadership. The Communists will probably continue their efforts to join forces with the nationalists. In the longer run, there remains some danger that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives they would accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it presently remains doubtful that the Communists will capture control of the nationalist movement in Tunisia, Communist influence might ultimately induce the nationalist groups to adopt more anti-Western policies and more frequently to resort to direct action. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Exact figures on the membership of the Tunisian Communist Party are not available. But from what is known of the party and the scope of its activities, a maximum estimate would be 3,000 members. There are, in addition, probably a thousand or so "fellow travelers." It may, therefore, be concluded in the light of these estimates, that the Communists control only about one-tenth of one percent of the total population of the country. Because of the relative weakness of the Co-!imunists, it is difficult to estimate their geographical distribution. It is, however, safe to assume that they possess cells in most, if not all, of the principal cities. Information regarding Communist strength in the countryside is not available. Information is also lacking with regard to the proportion of Communist "militants" within the party ranks. The relatively limited scope of Communist agitation would, however, indicate that the number of party "militants" is very likely less than one thousand. Leadership of the party, in contrast to that of the nationalists, has not been outstanding. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH No popular elections have ever been held in Tunisia. In local elections, only a restricted number of natives can vote. Hence it is not possible to form any reliable estimate of the proportion of the local population which might be induced to vote Communist. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Although there have been many violent demonstrations and acts of sabotage in Tunisia during the past two years, some may but none are known to have been initiated by the Communists. Political violence of this type has usually been traceable directly to the Tunisian nationalists; however, the Communists regard an increase in tension between the nationalists and the French as favorable to their own interests. For this reason, it is possible that Communist agitators have helped to provoke incidents leading to violence. If this has been the case, however, they have been careful to remain in the background. In the light of present information, it appears that the Tunisian Communist Party, because of its lack of popular support, is unable to rally sizable elements of the population to violent action except insofar as it can capitalize upon nationalist sentiment aroused by other groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -5- IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Tunisian Communist Party was recognized as a legal political party in 1943, and was permitted to operate with relative freedom for some years thereafter. But during the past two or three. years the French authorities have steadily restricted its activities. During the riots of early 1952, several Communist leaders were arrested, and some are still under detention. After the murder of the prominent Tunisian labor leader Ferhat Hached in December 1952, additional Communist leaders were arrested, and Communist publications were suspended. Today, Communist meetings and demonstrations are prohibited, and foreign Communist newspapers are banned. No information is available concerning t_he present underground activities of the Tunisian Communists. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The number of Communists in key industries is not known. For several years the Communists have controlled one of four labor federations the Union Syndicate des Travailleurs de Tunisia (USTT). In 1948 the strength of this organization was estimated by the French authorities at between 25,000 and 26,000 members. But the USTT is known to have since, lost a great many of its members to the. nationalist unions and to other labor groups. The exact extent of its numerical decline, though considerable, is not known. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS After World War II, the Communists in Tunisia followed their usual practice of establishing organizations with seemingly nonpolitical ob- jectives. These groups included -- in addition to labor unions -- youth groups, cultural societies, peace groups, women's organizations and social service groups. But these organizations did not flourish, and today the few that remain are relatively inactive. Now that the French authorities have undertaken rigorously to curtail Communist activity in Tunisia, the membership and activities of such "front" groups may be expected to decline still further. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT No information is available concerning the number of Communists and Communist sympathizers at the higher levels of the government, including the armed forces. Undoubtedly, however, the number is quite small, for the French policy is to remove such persons whenever found. Figures are likewise lacking with regard to the number of Communists and sympathizers in those agencies of government administering nationalized industries. It appears likely, however, that Communists occupy some low-level jobs in ports, railroads, telegraph and telephone installations, and mining operations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VIII. COT01UNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The publication of Communist newspapers has been suspended indefinitely by the French authorities in Tunisia. Inasmuch as radio broadcasting is government-controlled, the Communists exert no influence through that medium. There is no indication that Communists have infil- trated religious organizations in Tunisia. Though some Communist school teachers have been reported, they are not thought to be numerous. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES No information is available concerning Communist penetration of non-Communist political parties in Tunisia. Repeated Communist attempts to forra a coalition with the Neo-Destour, the principal nationalist party, have been rebuffed in terms so strong as to indicate that Communist in- fluence in the leading circles of that party is negligible. Some leaders in the Old-Destour Party, one of the smaller nationalist groups, have at times collaborated in specific Communist-front activities. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Prior to their suspension in March 1952, Tunisia's two Communist weeklies had a total circulation of about 6,000 copies, a considerable number of which were given away each week. The indefinite suspension, by the French authorities, of all Tunisian Communist publications and the ban on foreign Communist literature, have reduced Communist printed propaganda to illicit handbills, which appear only occasionally. . XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Specific information regarding the financial resources of the Tunisian Communist Party is not available. Evidence exists that the Tunisian Communist Party has upon occasion received financial aid from the French Communist Party. Such aid, however, has apparently been relatively small, for it has not saved the Tunisian Party from continual financial embarrassment. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites have diplomatic, commercial, or cultural missions in Tunisia. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the front groups affiliated with Communist international organizations are at this time active in Tunisia. Nor have any congresses of Communist organizations been held in Tunisia in recent years. Certain SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Tunisian Communist leaders have, however, attended conferences of Communist-sponsored organizations in other countries. Information is incomplete, but Tunisian Communists are known to have attended such meetings in the Soviet Union, Red China, Poland, and Italy since 1950. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK It is known that the Tunisian Communist Party, like the Communist parties of Algeria and Morocco, is directed by the French Communist Party, and that representatives of the French Party attend meetings of the Tunisian Party and transmit advice and instructions at that time. Though Communist international couriers are occasionally reported to pass through North Africa, detailed information is not available on the subject. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.19 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, FRANCE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTI WT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFCR NATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I? Objectives 1 II. Tactics 2 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ASSETS . . . . 6 I. Numerical Strength .. 6 II. Electoral Strength .. .. . 7. III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 8 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . .. . 9 V. Communist Influence in Labor . .. . .. .. . . . . . 11 Vi. Communist Influence in Social., Cultural, and Professional Organizations . .. . . . . . . . . . . 13 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? . .. . ? . ? 14 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . ? 15 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . ? . ? . ? . . . . e .. ? . . . . ? ? ? 16 X. Communist Propaganda Media .. . 16 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . ? 19 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . .. . . ? . . . ? 19 XIII. Communist International organizations . . . ? .. .. 21 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . .. . . .. . . ? 22 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD C This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis. of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information. is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Ca4MUNISS'i IN FRANCE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The French Communist Party's immediate objective, and the one which promises to remain foremost for the duration of the cold war, is the establishment of a government in Paris which would break off France's alliance with the West. Short of this major goal, the Communists are chiefly interested in hampering specific pro-Western policies of the present anti-Communist French Government. Among these policies, the key ones are those of waging war on the Communists in Indochina and of participating in NATO and related plans for rearming Western Germany, especially the EDC., Accordingly, the Communists-are intent on securing immediate peace in Indochina on Ho Chi Ninh's termsp withdrawal of US forces from NATO bases in France, progressive reduc- tion in armaments, and rejection of any arrangement for rearming Western Germany. Always accompanying these specific goals are the Communists' various efforts to create a general frame of mind which is suspicious. of the US, dubious of self-defense efforts, and scepti- cal of the strength and viability of the West as a whole. Realizing, in brief, the' difficulties involved in making French opinion pro- Soviet, the Communists currently set their sights on encouraging neutralist and defeatist tendencies. There is no doubt that these Communist objectives are geared primarily to the furthering of Soviet foreign policy and impair the party's ability to promote its own popularity. The conditions under which the French Communists adopted their stand on the Indochina war is instructive in this connection. For some months after hostilities broke out in Indochina, in December 1946, between the French troops and Ho Chi Minh, the Communists, who were then participating in the cabinet, avoided taking an anti-national position on this issue. Accordingly, when the government made it clear, in March 1947, that it had no intention of opening negotiations with Ho, the Communists went along with this policy. It was not until after the Moscow Conference had ended the following month, with a break between the USSR and the West,; and with France definitely associating herself with the US and Britain, that the Communists parted company with the other parties in the government. In short, the Communists did not fashion their stand on Indochina on the basis of local French atti- tudes toward the war but, rather, on Soviet foreign policy require- ments. In the same way, the Communists' handling of the German rearmament issue illustrates the fact that their objectives are tailored to fit the needs of Soviet foreign policy.. Left to their own devices in shaping their policy toward German rearmament, the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION French Communists would unquestionably oppose all forms of such rearma- ment, thus enabling them to take a strong and consistent stand on a question which is traditionally of the greatest national concern. Instead, however, the party has been obliged, as a result of Soviet approval of East German rearmament, to modify its original position of thoroughgoing opposition to German rearmament and to distinguish between the rearmament of "democratic" East Germany and "imperialist" West Germany. II. TACTICS In pursuing their major objective, the French Communists' tactics are those of the "United National Front." This means, as the Communists; repeatedly point out, that they wish to make common cause with indi- viduals from all social groups regardless of their religious or political bent, on the basis of a broad program of "peace, national independence, and democratic liberties." In accordance with this policy, the Communists have set out to win the support not only of industrial workers and peasants, but also of white collar workers, shopkeepers, businessmen, and professional people. In contrast with the French Popular Front of the 1930's, the present United National Front is not an effort by the Communists to form alliances with entire non-Communist political parties and their leaders, but an attempt to attract indi- viduals and groups from all political parties and sections of society. Moreover, the Communists are not currently seeking, as they did in the 1930's, to remain in the background but are, instead, clearly announc- ing that they intend to remain at the head of the movement they hope to develop. The Communists' current tactics have been adopted in response to the increasingly unfavorable situation in which the French Communist Party finds itself. At present, and for the past five years or so, the party, despite its continued hold on about a quarter of the electorate and an important part of the trade union movement, has been facing increasing difficulties. This is evident, first of all, in the declining numerical strength of the party itself and of its various related organi- zatj.ons. Moreover, the party and its affiliated organizations have been increasingly unable to translate the numerical strength they retain into political action geared to attainment of their major political ob- jectives. Finally, the non-Communists have become increasingly anti-Communist and united in their opposition to the Communists regard- less of how much they disagree on other issues. As a result the Communists find themselves so isolated that alliances between themselves and non-Communist parties are out of the question. In attempting to break out of their isolation, the French Communists try to establish a minimum basis of agreement with SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMTION C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION non-Communists by proposing that these latter elements go along with them on issues which'involve the practically universal fear of war, the sub- sidiary but almost equally important fear of Germany, and the widespread dissatisfaction with certain aspects of French society. Thus the Communists' basic appeal is to the sense of international. insecurity, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the deep dissatisfaction which has long existed -- and. which would exist in the absence. of the Communists -- with what is widely regarded as the inadequate living standards, the inequality, and the generally restrictive nature of present French society. Accordingly, French Communist propaganda within the past year has emphasized such motifs as bacteriological warfare, West German rearmament, the war in Indochina, the Moscow Economic Conference, and various anti-American themes. At all times the Communists have tried to show that-these international causes are inextricably linked with pressing domestic problems, such as wages, housing for workers, heavy' taxes, and the maintenance of democratic liberties. These latter problems, the Communists assert, can be met only if France unloads herself of the burdens placed on her as a result of her membership in the Atlantic alliance. In making all these appeals, the French Communists have at their disposal propaganda mechanisms which still remain large and active, despite their decline in size and effectiveness in recent years. In addition, they have an extensive network of front organizations, although there is increasing evidence that these organizations are steadily growing less important in fact than they may seem on paper. They also continue to dominate an important segment of the trade union movement, where their current tactic is to make their appeals as attractive as possible by couching them in exclusively economic terms. As a logical extension of this tactic the Communists seek to encourage unity of action between their own union organization and the non-Communist unions. Finally, as a political party the Communists try to play down those domestic issues which divide them from non-Communist Frenchmen and to emphasize their alleged champion- ship of "peace" and higher living standards for the great majority of the country. III. CAPABILITIES Broadly speaking, and assuming there is no major change in the international situation, the prospect for the next several years is that the French Communists will remain incapable of creating a "United National Front" so numerically strong and powerful as to force the government to take cognizance of it in forming foreign policy. The likelihood is, rather, that the French Communists will remain locked up in their present isolation, incapable of affecting government policy and continuing gradually to lose their numerical and organizational strength and to display an ever increasing lack of dynamism. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The decline of the French Communist Party in size and influence since the end of the war, and particularly since 1947-48, has been very considerable. For these past several years,'moreover, the party has displayed an ever increasing lack of dynamism and an inability to translate its remaining numerical strength as a political party and trade. union movement into political actions. At no time since the big strikes of 1946-48 have the French Communists displayed any capacity for rallying considerable non-Communist trade union support. During 1952, on the two or three occasions when the Communists made particular efforts to give a show of popular strength in the form of mass.demon- strations, only the small corps of party militants turned out. At the same time, the French Communist Party remains one of the world's largest Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc, and it promises to do so for some time. In France itself it is a major politi- cal party, an important power in the French trade union movement, and a large and active propaganda machine. The party derives still further significance from the fact that it has had some success, although how much it is difficult to estimate, in penetrating the civil service, the lower levels of the armed forces, and various sensitive industries and communications services. The major factor contributing to the Communists' considerable staying power as a political party and force in the trade union move- ment is the party's ability to express the psychological revolt of many Frenchmen against existing social and economic conditions. The great majority of the 5,000,000 Frenchmen who vote Communist unques- tionably do so because they regard themselves as underprivileged and exploited by other members of society, and because they believe that the Communist Party is concerned with ameliorating their lot. Like- wise most of those who belong to the Communist-dominated trade union (CGT) do so because they view it as the only trade union organization which is strong and effective enough to wrest higher wages from employers. That the Communists, rather than a purely national French party, have succeeded in winning a near-monopoly of the strong protest sentiment which exists both in French politics and trade unionism is due largely to the evolution of the Socialists. While retaining their revolutionary vocabulary and traditions, the Socialists have long since become reformist in outlook and receive their chief support from government and other white collar workers rather than industrial labor. Under these conditions the Communists have become the heirs to the tradition of the extreme left, always an important tradition in French politics, and over the years they have succeeded in developing the conviction on the part of the majority of their supporters that they and they alone -- hold out the promise of "democratic" social and economic reforms. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORI':ATION In more specific terms the party's outlook, judged both by the evidence of its decline and the signs of its staying power, may be summarized as follows: In terms of party membership some further contraction can be-expected. No drastic reductions are anticipated, however, since the more opportunistic members have already been lost by the party and its present membership may be assumed to be quite stable. Organizationally, it is unlikely that the party will be split or seriously hampered by a purge which the Marty-Tiflon affair in the second half of 1952 may foreshadow. The front organizations may be expected to maintain their paper strength, but will be unable to gain non-Communist support for their various causes. The drawing power of the "peace" movement, in particular, will remain very limited, primarily because the character of the "peace" organization and its propaganda has become increasingly transparent. The present volume of Communist propaganda can be expected to remain about the same since the party has the financial capacity to maintain its propaganda program. As the public becomes more familiar with the Communists' techniques, however, it becomes less receptive to their propaganda. Nevertheless, some of the Communists' slogans will unquestionably continue to be picked up by non-Communists and used without their Communist labels. A continued decline of Communist influence within the Communist- led trade union (CGT) can be expected, and the CGT will remain incapable of actions threatening the government. If the CGT were to follow its current policy of purely economic emphasis for any length of time its outlook might be brighter, but such a development is unlikely. The Communist electoral and parliamentary position will remain fairly stable. As already indicated, the Socialists have a limited capacity for weaning away Communist voters, and the other non-Communist parties have very little such capacity. moreover, there are as yet no indications, despite the decline in the actual number of Communist voters, that the percentage of the Communist vote is decreasing. The decrease in the number of Communist voters can be turned into a per- centage decline only if the non-Communist parties succeed in maintaining their voting strength as the Communists lose theirs, and to date they have not done so because of abstentions by their supporters. Nevertheless, the non-Communist parties will unquestionably continue to keep the Communists in a state of isolation and, in this way, prevent them from participating in the formation of national foreign and domestic policies. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6- COMMdUNISM IN FRANCE: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Estimated membership of the French Communist Party (FCP), at the close of 1952, is about 450,000. It is not known how many persons, out of the total population of 40,000,000, are strongly influenced by the Communists. Judging by the votes of that half of the population which actually goes to the polls, it would appear that one out of four Frenchmen responds to some aspect of Communist activity. Geographically, FCP membership is concentrated in half a dozen centers: Paris and its industrial suburbs, the mining area of the north, the major port cities (La Pallice, Bordeaux, Marseille, Le Havre, Dunkerque), and the manufacturing centers of south-central France (especially Lyons and St. Etienne). Industrial workers are the preponderant element in FCP membership. Shortly after the war the party had a much more diverse class composition, but the loss of lower middle class elements since 1947-48 has reestablished the heavy predominance of workers in the party. Party sympathizers, judging from what groups vote Communist, have more varied backgrounds. According to the poll published last spring by Realit6s, a magazine similar to Fortune, the largest groups which vote Communist are factory workers (38%) and women who are not employed outside the home and who are presumably members of workers' families (22%). Thus 40 percent of the Communist voters come from groups other than the industrial working class. According to the poll, these groups include agricultural workers (8%) and a variety of lower middle class groups -- white collar workers, servants, tradesmen, farm operators, civil servants, small bond- holders, and retired persons. Only four percent comes from the liberal professions, other intellectual circles, and industrial cadres. But individuals of this type, and particularly the intellectuals are given so much publicity by the party that they sometimes seem more numerous than they are. FCP members are as a whole well disciplined. Nearly all of the party's major leaders are men who accepted the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. For a time after the war the party, as a result of its rapid expansion during the war and immediately thereafter, included a considerable number of members who were imperfectly disciplined. As this element left the party, membership declined from about 850,000 to 450,000 between 1947 and 1952, with the big drop (from 850,000 to about 600,000) taking place between 1947 and 1948. The present membership appears to represent a fairly stable group of convinced Communists who are fully aware of the party's anti-national character. Judging from a Communist Party statement SECRET - SECURITY INFOft L' TTON Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOfti6STiOi of a year ago, the current annual rate of turnover in FCP membership in about 30,000, or approximately seven percent. Leadership of the FCP is, generally speaking, competent, with the party weeding out less effective leaders from time to time. The long absence of Secretary-General Thorez, who has been under medical treat- ment in Moscow since November 1950, however, has left the party without strong d unified leadership at the top. One result of this situation has ap ntly been that of making personal differences among members of inner cir le, such as figured in the Marty-Tillon case, more significant than they were formerly. While the party's internal differences between the end of the war and 195]. ere restricted to its lower echelons and to the fellow-travelling fringe, the Marty-Tillon case of 1952 affected the party's high command, as Marty was a member of the secretariat and both men belonged to the Politburo. The basic issue in this case appears to have been the extent to'which the party should seek the cooperation of non-Communist elements. Both Marty and Tillon apparently believed that the French Communists should have proceeded on their own to seize power when France was liberated in World War II, and since that time they seem to have been strongly out of sympathy with the policy of collaborating with "peace partisans" and other groups remote from Communist discipline. At the same time, personal rivalries and antipathies undoubtedly played a part in the conflict between the two men and other FCP leaders, and it is probable that Thorez' absence also helped lay the party open to discord. With the party's action against Marty and Tillon still incomplete it is not clear whether these two men will be merely the first in a series of French Communist leaders who will be disciplined for their impatience with current FCP tactics. It can only be stated that during the past year the FCP has shown greater signs of internal dissension than at any time since the end of the war and that this dissension seems likely to grow as the party gives further evidence of its increasing ineffectiveness. There are no current indications, however, of any internal Communist crisis capable of disrupting the party or of producing an anti-Stalinist revolt. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH In national elections, the FCP polls about 5,000,000 votes out of a total of 19,000,000 votes cast, or slightly more than 25 percent. This vital statistic-on French Communist electoral strength leads to three important observations: 1) The FPC receives more votes than any other French political SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION party. It has held this record with remarkable tenacity throughout the postwar period, having been edged out of first place in only one (June 1946) of the four postwar national elections. The Communists' position as the leading party must be seen, however, in the context of the French multi- party system, in which the non-Communist parties are so numerous that it is very difficult for any single one of them to become the nation's largest party. Despite the FCP's electoral lead, therefore, it is decidedly in the minority as the half dozen parties supporting the present Mayer govern- ment represent about 11,000,000 voters, while the Communist voters number about 5,000,000. 2) Despite its position as the largest party, the FCP has been losing votes since the early postwar period, and partial elections held since the last national election of June 1951 show that this trend is continuing. That the Communists retain their lead and their percentage strength while losing votes is due to the abstention of non-Communist voters. The decline in Communist votes can be turned into a percentage decline only if the non-Communist parties succeed, as they have not done to-date, in maintaining their voting strength as the Communists lose theirs. 3) The FCP has a nationwide following throughout all geographical areas of France. Of the 103 electoral districts in the 1951 elections, there were only four in which the Communists polled 10 percent of the vote or less. This record for well-distributed support was untouched by any non- Communist party. At the same time there are certain regions where the Communists are particularly strong. These include Paris and the neighboring regions, extending to the industrialized areas on the northern coast; the center and southwest; and the Rhone valley and the southeast, including the Mediterranean coast. The FCP continues to lay heavy emphasis on maintaining and extend- ing its-electoral strength, even though the non-Communist parties devise various means of preventing the Communists from translating their electoral strength into representational strength. In elections the Communists are obliged to run alone since the non-Communist parties are unwilling to form electoral alliances with them. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Current FCP policy definitely emphasizes non-violent action, but this emphasis does not exclude the possibility of demonstrations, riots, or strikes should the party believe that such actions might secure popular support or be necessary from the point of view of Soviet foreign policy requirements. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION W Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMaTION -9- The last example of a violent demonstration by the FCP was the May 28, 1952 series of anti-Ridgway riots in Paris and some other towns, and the flurry of strikes which ensued. This episode was clearly designed to support Soviet propaganda to the effect that Ridgway was as unpopular in France as he had been in Japan, where the Communists had led a demonstra- tion at the time of his departure. On the occasion of his arrival in Paris the Communists staged demonstrations at several points in the city, and equipped rioters with clubs and other crude weapons for their fights with the police. The French police,who promptly cracked down on the rioters and arrested a large number of their leaders, have recently estimated that about 30,000 persons participated in these demonstrations in Paris and a number of provincial towns. The small size of this figure shows the FCP's current inability to rally popular support for violent action against the government. The FCP organization for planning and executing violent activity is believed to be the Service d'ordre, under the direction of the party's Central Committee. This Service, which is supposed to lead and control demonstrations called for by the party, is reportedly a small organization, depending for its "troops" on the militants of the party's various federa- tions. Another source of personnel for party demonstrations and the nucleus for any para-military action in the future is the Francs-Tireurs et Partisax which stems from the wartime resistance period. The membership of this grot is estimated at something under 50,000, and it is apparently a loosely organized body. Some of its members are persons with resistance experience, inasmuch as the Communists played a leading role in the military side of the anti-Nazi underground movement. Others, however, may be presumed to be new and untested. In any case, the spirit of the Francs-Tireurs is reported to have been adversely affected by the recent Tillon affair as Tillon was formerly the head of this organization. No large Communist arms caches have been found in France since the war, and it is not likely that any useful supplies of this sort exist. It would be contrary to the party's interests to maintain supplies of this kind, assuming it could do so effectively, because the discovery of them would expose the party to severe official reprisal. In the event of an all-out Communist attack on national defense, it is probable that the party would rely primarily on sabotage action by technical experts in strategic positions and on the presence of party members in various positions in the national economy, rather than on para-military action. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The FCP is a legal political party and as such enjoys freedom of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -_SECURITY INFORMATION - 10 - action within the limits of the law. During the past several years, however, and particularly since 1948, the government, without directly attacking the FCP as such, has considerably restricted Communist activities through a series of practices and restrictions. designed to maintain public order and protect national interests. Thus the government has transferred known Communists or Communist sympathizers from sensitive positions in the armed forces, the civil service, and the nationalized industries. It has frequently banned Communist demonstra- tions. In Parliament, the practice has developed of referring vital business to subcommittees inasmuch as the rule providing for proportional representa- tion on committees does not apply to subcommittees. Special press laws have also been enacted with a view to preventing deputies, who enjoy parliamentary immunity, from directing newspapers. Several directors of Communist publica- tions have used this protective device in the past. Moreover, foreign Communist publications have been prohibited. Despite the increasing stringency of the government's measures against the Communists, the party has thus far been inconvenienced rather than actually curbed. Its leadership and major front organizations are still virtually intact. Party members are not formally prohibited from holding trade union posts and government positions (including teachers' positions filled by the state), and the Communist-led trade union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent. Moreover, persons arrested for disturbing the peace in Communist demonstrations are usually given short sentences, and FCP leaders are still able to travel to the Soviet Union and to various inter- national front organization congresses where Soviet leaders are present. In 1952, the government began to fill some of the gaps in its anti- Communist program by initiating a series of actions aimed directly at a number of top Communist leaders. To this end the government has requested the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of six Communist deputies in order to prosecute them, as well as several other FCP and front organization leaders, on the charge of attacking the external security of the state. Parliament has not yet lifted the Communist deputies' immunity, however. Parliament has also been requested by the government to consider a bill which would provide the government with legal means for dismissing Communists from the civil service, but no action has been taken on this proposal either. Limits on the French Government's anti-Communist action have existed, though to an increasingly less important extent, for three main reasons; (1) the very size of the Communist problem, which renders it extremely difficult for the government to weed out party members from all positions- which might be identified as sensitive; (2) the widespread reluctance, especially on the part of the non-Communist left and center parties, to SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 11 - infringe on the principle of civil liberties lest the type of political witch hunt that was carried on by Vichy be repeated; (3) French public opinion generally does not attach any special stigma to Communists and fellow travellers, and it is still widely believed that a person may vote Communist or belong to a Communist-controlled trade union-or other organiza- tion without being disloyal. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE-.IN LABOR The number of Communists in France's key industries is unknown. Since the members of the Communist-controlled trade union federation (Confederation Generale du Travail, CGT) are by no means all Communists, as repeatedly indicated by the fact that the Communist leaders of the CGT cannot rally union rank-and-file.in behalf of Communist political causes, the strength of the CGT in a particular industry provides only a very rough and uncertain index to Communist strength in that industry. With this important reservation in mind about the CGT as an indicator of Communist strength, it may be pointed out that the CGT is stronger than any other union in nearly every key industry of France. This strength remains, despite the great decline of the CGT during the past five years, in the mines, the railroads, communications, docks and shipyards, and the metallurgical industry. In all these cases, however, correct perspective is maintained only if it is borne in mind that only from one-fourth to one- half of the total working force is unionized. In the realm of organized labor as a whole, the CGT is unquestionably the strongest single force and, in fact, stronger than the several non- Communist unions together. CGT membership is currently estimated at 1,500,000, while most of the remaining 1,000,000 organized workers are divided between the Catholic CFTC (about 600,000-700,000 members) and the Socialist FO (about 300,000-400,000 members). The Communists are able to maintain this lead primarily because the CGT is still considered by a large number of French workers as the only "real" trade union in-France. It has behind it a long tradition and prestige as a Marxist labor organization -- an important factor in a country where labor is strongly class-conscious. Moreover, when it leaves political issues alone and concentrates on economic demands, it still tends to function as the strongest and most aggressive champion of labor. The non-Communist unions, for their part, have remained weak, and unquestionably they have suffered from their widespread reputation of being connected with the government. Neither have the free trade unions found it possible to move toward close cooperation. They continue instead to be deeply divided by personal rivalries among their leaders and by the anti- clerical issue. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 While the Communists control the largest portion of organized labor, they have only succeeded in enrolling a fraction of the total number of wage-earners, estimated at 11,000,000. Thus the CGT is strong primarily in the sense that the non-Communist unions are weak and that the largest group of French workers is unorganized. Relatively strong though the CGT still is, moreover, it is only one-fourth as large as it was in 1946-47, prior to the wholesale defections it suffered as a direct result of the political strikes it called in the early stages of the cold war. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOIATION -13- VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND POMIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Communist front organizations in France, viewed in berms of their number, geographical distribution, and occupational or interest coverage, are very extensive. There are still well over 100 such organizations, each with a network of local organizations, and they are geared to the interests of a wide variety of groups, notably youth, students and teachers, women, nationality minorities, sports enthusiasts, veterans, and numerous professional groups. In addition there are, besides the CGT, the Peace Movement and a wide variety of cultural organizations. .The actual strength of these front organizations is impossible to assess, partly because their memberships overlap and are far from stable, and partly because some of the organizations, such as the Peace Movement particularly, have very loose rules concerning member- ship. In, any case, most of the fronts now appear to be nothing more than paper organizations, and in practically all cases they are so dependent on their Communist members that they can be said to have almost no strength apart from the Communist Party. Of the front organizations the one to which the FCP currently gives the most attention and care is the Peace 14ovement. Its active supporters are estimated at 50,000, most of whom are Communists, and it has an organization, at least on paper, which covers all of France. The basic units in the organization are the Committees of Peace, which are set up either at a place of work or in a neighborhood. Strong efforts are made to include non-Communists in these committees, but except for a few who accept honorary posts or support occasional specific "peace" activities, leadership at all levels is Communist. An insight into what lies behind the Peace Movement's nation- wide facade was offered in the famous Duclos notebook,. which the police seized at the time of his arrest in the anti-Ridgway demonstration last May. According to Duclos, the Peace Movement no longer has any effective organization below the regional level. That the movement has been losing strength is also indicated by the decline of its press; Before its weekly newspaper, Action, folded up in May (for failure to follow the new party line in support of East German rearmament, as well as for financial reasons), its circulation had fallen from 75,000 to 30,000. Of all the other fronts, the most important are those for women, youth, and various veteran and resistance organizations stemming out of the two world wars. The women's organization SECRET - SECURITY INFOF4ATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION _ 14 - (1'Union des Femmes Frangaises) still has local and regional units as well as a national office, although many of its local branches are reported to engage in little activity. Most of the work of the organiza- tion now appears to be done by women members of the FCP rather than by non-Communists, although a considerable number of non-Communist women are still willing to sign their names in signature campaigns. The major front organization for youth (Union de la Jeunesse kepublicaine de France) is important to the FCP both as a training group for the party and as the means of injecting a mass element into various Communist actions which can be represented as being of particular interest to youth. Thus the youth organization, under the close supervision of the FCP itself, concerns itself particularly with .such issues as'length of military service and the war in Indochina. The various veteran and related organizations are primarily concerned with the particular grievances and demands of their members, and they make a special effort to secure the participation of non- Communists. Nevertheless, their activities, like those of the other front groups, are clearly carried on by Communist members, and consequently have no genuine popular character. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT An over-all view of Communist infiltration into the French Government may be given by indicating the extent to which Communists are known to be present in various governmental bodies: A. National Government 1. The Cabinet. No Communists have been present in the cabinet since they were expelled from the government in May 19147. 2. Parliament. In. the lower house of Parliament (the National Assembly), the Communists have 100 seats out of a total of 625, while they have 15 seats out of a total of 320 in the consultative upper house (the Council of the Republic). 3. Civil Service and Nationalized Industries. In the civil service and nationalized industries, the num er of Communists in high- level positions is now believed to be negligible, but the number in minor positions probably remains sizeable. 14. The Internal Security Forces. In the internal security forces, Communist Influence is t oug t be slight. In the civil police, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. - 15 - however, there is apparently some infiltration. During the past year, 20 members of the Paris police force were suspended and 60 were trans- ferred to non-sensitive posts because they were suspected of Communist membership or leanings. 5. The Armed Forces. The relatively few Communist officers in the armed forces are almost all of junior rank. No Communist senior officer holds a post of command. 6. The Atomic Energy Commission. The French atomic energy commission was reorganized in 1951 with a view to eliminating Communist influence. Fragmentary reporting indicates, however, that some Communists and Communist sympathizers continue to be employed at the lower levels of the organization. B. Local Government In the field of municipal government, the Communists claim about 2,000 mayors out of a total of 37,930, and they have about 30,500 seats out of a total of 166,209 on the municipal councils. In the departmental councils, the Communists have 78 seats out of a total of 1,500. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION In circles and public institutions important in forming public opinion, Communists or Communist sympathizers are unquestionably present, but always in a decidedly minor way. Thus it appears that Communists have some influence among primary and secondary school teachers.as a result of their presence in the autonomous teachers' union. There are no estimates, however, on how many teachers either belong to the FCP or go along with some of its major causes. There are also some Communists on the faculties of the universities, but no estimate of their number is available. In the Catholic Church there are a few individuals, including some "worker priests" and the small group of Christian Progressives, whose social philosophy has led them to support the Communists, usually on such specific issues as peace and improved working-class living conditions. The abbe'Boulier is, as the most prominent of the Christian Progressives, frequently pointed to by the Communists as alleged proof of Catholic support for the"peace" movement and related causes. As far as is known, however, there is no considerable number of Communist sympathizers among either the parish priests or the higher clergy. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 16 - In the programs currently produced by the nationally-owned French broadcasting system (Radio Diffusion Fran ise RDF) there appears to be very little Coimmunis i uence. ter the war RDF was heavily infiltrated by the Communists, but since then the govern- ment has taken all, or nearly all, pro-Communist broadcasters off the air. An estimated two-thirds of RDF's technicians, however, are believed to belong to a Communist-controlled trade union. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES No non-Communist parties are believed to have been infiltrated by Communists. On the fringe of the FCP, however, there are two small parties, the Union of Progressives and the Unity-Socialist Party. Both of these groups are so obviously appendages of the FCP that they cannot be regarded as non-Communist parties which have been infiltrated by the Communists. R. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The chief propaganda medium for the FOP is the local Communist press. A mid-1952 review of Communist publications shows that the FCP and its related organizations publish three daily newspapers in Paris, 14 dailies in the provinces, 61 provincial weeklies, and 83 journals of greatly varying content and format. There are comics for children,,film and sports reviews, picture magazines, literary journals, a law review, international news reports, and professional magazines. for teachers, doctors, and specialized workers of various kinds. Circulation figures for these publications vary widely,. but it appears that at.least a dozen of the publications have circulations of over 100,000. In fact some of them (such as 1'Humanite Dimanche with a reported circulation of about 300,000) area a cove this figure. Nevertheless, circulation of the Communist press, including that of the official party organ, 1'Humanite has unquestionably been declining. L'Humanite's circ ation, as of January 1953, is estimated at 174,000 wi about 145,000 copies being sold and the rest given away), as compared with 2211,000 in 1950 and 450,000 in 1947. While the circulation of the entire French press is at a postwar low, 1'Humanite appears to have.suffered particularly heavy losses, and the same can apparently be said for a considerable number of other Communist publications. In the provinces, the 14 Communist dailies had a total circulation in 1952 of 639,500, compared with 756,600 in 1951. Despite its difficulties, 1'Humanite has increased from six to eight pages within the past year, indicating that the party is continuing to pump money into the paper to keep it alive. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFONMATION - 17 - To facilitate the printing and distribution of their various publications the Communists maintain a number of firms of their own, usually thinly disguised as commercial enterprises. These firms include a considerable number of publishing houses.,, printing companies, book- stores, and other companies whose business it is to see to the circula tion and sale of Communist publications. Communist radio propaganda in France consists almost entirely of broadcasts, in French, from the Soviet Union and the bloc. These broadcasts are as follows: 1) Radio Moscow Six broadcasts daily. 7:00 A.M. on 31, 41, and 49 meters 8:00 A.M. (on same wavelengths) 12:30 P.M. on 25 and 31 meters 7:00 P.M. on 41, 233, and 240 meters 8:30 P.M. on 49, 233, and 240 meters 10:00 P.M. on 41, 49, 233 and 240 meters 2) Radio Budapest Two broadcasts daily: 9:00 P.M. on 30 meters, 50, 40 meters 50, and 252 meters Midnight on same wavelenghhs. 3) Radio Prague One broadcast daily: "Tonight in France." This is the most important of the bloc's broadcasts. It seeks to create the impression that it originates from a clandestine station in France. On 233 meters 30. 4) Radio Warsaw Two broadcasts daily: 9:30 P.M. on 31, 48 and 278 meters 2:45 P.M. on 31 and 48 meters. SECRET - SECURITY INFOKMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFOI ATION -18- The potential French radio audience may be roughly estimated at 28,000,000. (The number of home radio sets is something under 9,000,000. In addition there are about 100,000 radios in public places. If it is estimated that an average of three persons listen to each set, the potential radio audience may be set at between 27,000,000 and 28,000,000.) How large a part of this potential audience listens to Soviet and . satellite broadcasts is unknown. No polls have been conducted, sofar as is known, to determine the extent to which Soviet bloc broadcasts are heard in France. C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION There appears to be very little dependable information available on FCP finances. The only fact which seems clear is that the FCPts expenses are considerable and its means of support are not easily visible. In roughly estimating FCP annual expenses, it may be assumed that these expenses are of two main kinds= salaries for party functionaries and 'propaganda expenses. Salaries, estimated at a monthly figure of roughly 30,000 francs, would amount to about $5,500,000. Propaganda expenses, admittedly extremely difficult to estimate, may be very roughly estimated at $28,500,000. Hence the party's total expenses, according to this very tentative estimate, are in the neighborhood of $35,000,000. In estimating FCP income, on the other hand, there are even fewer rough indicators at hand. The party's overt receipts (including dues and the standard remittances by Communist deputies and adminis. trative officials of part of their salaries) probably do not amount to more than about 10 percent of the party's total expenditures. How much income the party receives from its publications, the CGT, and front organizations is unknown; nor is it known how much revenue the party secures from controlled business firma. Such sources as these, however, probably do produce some income. It is also possible that the FOP secures some funds from the Soviet Union and the satellites through various channels, including especially the Communist-controlled Commercial Bank for Northern Europe. This bank, which.handles the accounts of most of the Communist organizations, is believed to be the intermediary for the movement of funds from the Soviet Union, the bloc countries, and the international offices of the major front organizations. In the winter of 1948-49 the National Assembly became disturbed by reports that this bank was allegedly giving advances to the FCP, but their concern came to nothing when it appeared that there was nothing irregular in the Bank's activities. It has also been reported that the WFTU, through its contacts with the CGT, has occasionally made arrangements for contributions by unions of the satellite states to French strikers. The Soviet Union and satellites maintain diplomatic establishments in Paris, with their missions being fairly small in size. According to the official French diplomatic list of January 1952, these missions were SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION made up as follows: Number in-Diplomatic Mission Soviet Union Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Embassy Is gat ion Legation (charge) Embassy 10 Finland Legation 5 Hungary Legation 8 Poland Embassy (charge) 7 Rumania Legation (charge) 3 The Bulgarian, Finnish, Hungarian, and Polish missions included persons specifically charged with press or cultural affairs, but how many individuals are actually engaged in propaganda activities is unknown. The Soviet Embassy, for its part, publishes the monthly Etudes Sovietiques. The French branch of TOSS is also a Soviet propaganda instrument and liaison agent of note. . _T W occupies part of the office of the Soviet Information Bureau in Paris, and some of the personnel of TASS and the Soviet Information Bureau appears to'be interchangeable. Also noteworthy is the considerable number of Soviet or satellite "friendship" societies. By far the most important of these societies is France-USSR with an estimated membership of about 60,000 throughout the country. Its local departmental organizations are clearly-directed by the Communist Party, and, like the other front organizations, it has no independent leadership and existence. Most of its non-Communist members merely attend meetings occasionally. The pamphlet published by the organization, France-USSR, has a circulation of about 117,000, which is a fair sized circulation for a periodical of its kind in France. Additional activities of France-USSR inolude holding lectures, showing films, helping to distribute Soviet books and magazines, and sending delegations to the Soviet Union. It appears that about a half dozen such delegations have been sent annually in recent years. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION I Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Other "friendship" societies, all of which seem to be little more than paper organizations, are= Amities Franco-Polonaises (French-Polish Friendship Society) France-Albania (France-Albania) Franoe-Bulgaria (France-Bulgaria) France-Espagne (France-Spain) France-Hongrie (France-Hungary) France-Roumanie (France-Rumania) France-Tchecoslovaquie (France-Czechoslovakia IIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the Communist international front organizations currently has its headquarters in Paris. The French Government expelled the head- quarters of the following organizations in 19512 the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Peace Movement, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the Interna- tional Association of Democratic Jurists. The French national organizations which are affiliated with these internationals continue, however, to have their headquarters in Paris. During the past two years (1951-52) only one of these international organizations held a meeting in Paris. The First International Conference for a Peaceful Solution of the German Problem, sponsored by the Peace Movement, was held in Paris May 12-14, 1951. This meeting was attended by 226 delegates from 13 European countries. No information is available on the number of French participants. A check on the participants in attendance at the various interna- tional front organizationst meetings, whether of working committees or full congresses, shows that French delegates were invariably present. Such meetings, moreover, are fairly frequent, and a review of them indicates that the international front organizations offer opportunities for approximately 50 contacts each year between French Communists or pro-Communists and Soviet or satellite representatives. The WFTU hold 22 conferences of various kinds from mid-1951 to mid-1952; the International Federation of Resistance, 7 meetings during approximately the same periods the Peace Movement, 12 sessions from January 1951 to SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 22 - November 1952; the woments organization, 5 sessions from early'1951 to July 1952; the lawyers, 5 from September 1951 to November 1952; and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, 16 meetings from August 1951 to the close of 1952. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK The FCP has no problem in maintaining connections with the Soviet Union and other portions of the international Communist apparatus outside France. As pointed out in the preceding section, FCP leaders and Communist sympathizers have numerous contacts with the Soviet Union and the satel?. lites, as well as with Communists outside the Soviet bloc, through the meetings of the international front organizations. In addition about a dozen FCP leaders travel to Moscow fairly frequently. That they bring back, at least occasionally, fairly specific instructions is indicated by the discussion in Duclost notebook of the way in which the directive for a change in the FCPts emphasis was transmitted from Moscow to the FCP in the spring of 1952. This directive, Duclos indicates, was given to Billoux by Thores, and it may be assumed -- although this point is by no means.certain -- that the latter had cleared this directive, at least in principle, with Soviet leaders. .Various delegations of Communists and pro-Communists who are leaders of the major front organizations also go to Moscow on missions. France-USSR is particularly active in this connection. The Soviet Embassy in Paris has good opportunities for keeping in touch with the FCP. A number of reports on contacts between the Soviet Embassy and the party indicate, however, that the Embassy tends to deal with the FCP through France-USSR, and specifically through its president, Fernand Grenier, rather than directly. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.20 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: - CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE NETHERLANDS OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword . i i OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1 I. Objectives'** .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? 1 ii e Tactics ? . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 4 I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . ? 4 He Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ? ? . 4 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 6 V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . ? ! ? . . ? 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 10 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 X? Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 12 XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . 13 XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check- list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec- tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ii Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: OBJECTIVZS, TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES In the Netherlands, the Communists' (CPN) principal objective is to detach the Netherlands from the Western camp and their secondary objective is to obstruct as much as possible the progress of Western unity under US leadership. During the June 1952 electoral campaign, for instance, the first point in the Communist program was the creation of a "peace loving and independent Netherlands." According to the Communists, this goal could best be reached by holding a Big Five conference, increasing East-West trade, halting rearmament, withdrawing Dutch units from Korea, seceding from NATO, cooperating with a united and "peace-loving" Germany, and breaking off all agreements between the US and the Netherlands. Since the government and all non-Communist political parties and labor groups in the Netherlands support moves toward Western unity, a closely related objective of the CPN is that of weakening the established political and social order by creating divisions and distrust between the government and the people and between the leadership and the rank and file of the non-Communist parties and labor unions. Although the Dutch Communists are interested in promoting their own growth, this objective is generally subordinate to the aim of advancing the strategic interests of the USSR. II.. TACTICS In order to attain its objectives the Dutch Communist Party seeks to win a direct following among all social groups. At their 16th Congress in Amsterdam last November, the Communist leaders issued a call for a "National United Front with all who are against the Americans and their collaborators," even including members of right-wing parties and classes. The Communists argue that once reactionary leadership has been repudiated by the rank and file of the various parties, no further obstacle will stand in the war of fruitful cooperation between the "democratic" and Communist parties. In their propaganda, the Communists generally relate political issues to economic demands, arguing that the workers' low standard of living is caused by the government's "war policy." Although the Dutch Communist Party poses most frequently as the champion of the underdog, advocating government construction of low-cost housing, reduction in the cost of living, and greater benefits for pensioners, it makes an attempt to be all things to all men. It appeals to the nationalism and anti- A-nericanism of some extreme right wing groups; it appeals to the moral scruples of religious groups by attacking "immoral films and reading SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION matter, such as American cartoons and newspapers"; it appeals to the bitter memories of the Nazi occupation in its protest against clemency for German war criminals and the rearmament of Germany; it appeals to Dutch business interests by playing up the economic advantages to be derived from an increase in East-West trade. Above all, it seeks to exploit the universal desire for peace and the fear of another war. The principal instruments in this campaign to gain a direct following among a great variety of social groups are the Dutch Peace Council and the Netherlands-USSR Association. By holding "peace congresses," "peace rallies," and "peace weeks," by agitating against the unloading of American arms and by collecting,signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal and later the appeal for a rive Power Peace Pact, the Netherlands Peace Council has sought to obtain mass support for Communist objectives. On the whole, its efforts have had little success. The Netherlands-USSR Association has reportedly been slightly more successful in its efforts to advance Soviet prestige through cultural media and has also served as a recruiting ground for new Communist members. In the labor field, indications are that the Communist leaders have abandoned hopes of building up their own Communist-dominated Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheids Vakcentrale, EVC) at the expense of the non-Communist unions, m=are concentrating Instead on direct infiltration of these unions, especially the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions, which is most closely allied with the Netherlands Labor Party. III, Capabilities The constant decline in numerical strength of the party and its front organizations (with the possible exception of the Netherlands- USSR Asso ciation) during the postwar period is a clear indication of the ineffectiveness of Communist propaganda. From a peak of 53,000 early in 1947, Communist membership dropped to about 33,000 by the end of 1949. Since then it has apparently remained fairly constant; estimates range from 33,000 to 40,000 with the lower figure probably being more accurate. In the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, Communist representation dropped from ten seats in 1946 to six following the June 1952 election. The Communists polled 6.16 percent of the total valid vote in this election (328,571), compared with 7.74 percent in 1948 (381,953). Membership in the Communist-dominated Unity Trade Union Central declined from an estimated 200,000 in 1945 to an estimated 70,000 in 1952. Circulation of the official Communist daily De Waarheid dwindled from an estimated peak of 400,000 in 1945 to the present estimated circulation of 100,000. The newspaper has been in serious financial difficulties at least since 1947. Periodic drives to increase Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the number of subscriptions have apparently met with little success. There is no prospect that the Dutch Communists will succeed in gaining sufficient popular support among the democratic parties and labor groups for their current anti-American policy to enable them to place any serious obstacles in the way of the official Netherlands policy of cooperation with the US and other Western nations. Certain supporters of the Labor Party and of the extreme right-wing parties are highly critical of American leadership but all these elements distrust the Communists far more then they do the US. Only a sharp increase in unemployment and a worsening of the local economic situation would be likely to siphon off support from the Labor Party to the Netherlands Communists, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -4- C0112, UNISI-i IN THE NETHERLANDS: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The estimated membership of the Netherlands Communist Party is 33,000. The aggregate membership figure of organizations controlled by Communists is about 125,000, but the actual total may be less as many individuals belong to more than one front organization and many members of such organizations as the Communist-controlled trade unions are not Communists. Slightly more than three percent of the popula- tion is influenced strongly enough by the Communists to vote the party ticket. The bulk of the party membership and sympathizers is drawn from the industrial working class and from members of the lower middle classes living on small pensions, with a few intellectuals, professional people, and white collar workers furnishing the rest. Geographically, Communist strength is greatest (1) in the highly urbanized and indus- trialized provinces of North and South Holland, including the three largest cities of the country, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, (2) in the industrial Twente section of the province of Overijssel and (3) in certain poorly developed, isolated rural sections, notably the eastern corner of the province of Groningen. In this latter area, the town of Finsterwolde (population: 3,240) has a Communist-dominated town council. The "hard core" of the Communist Party is only about 10 percent of the total party strength, or roughly 3,000. This hard core fur- nishes the militant leadership of the party. The rest of the member- ship is, on the whole, apathetic but continues to vote for the party in spite of numerous shifts in party line and tactics. The average age of the party leaders is between 45 and 50, and most of them joined the organization before the war. Several of the top leaders have been active in key posts in the party for fifteen or twenty years. Since the strength of the party prior to the war was never more than 10,000, at least two-thirds of the membership joined within the past five years. The "hard core" leadership is drawn almost exclusively from the laboring classes and is concentrated in the city of Amsterdam. A considerable number of old-guard Communists are located in some of the villages in the northern tip of the province of North Holland and in the small towns and villages of the province of Groningen. The membership of the party, which reached a maximum of 53,000 in 1947, dropped to 33,000 by 1950 and has remained constant at that level. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communist Party obtained 6.16 percent (328,571) of the 5,335,064 valid votes cast in the parliamentary elections of June 1952, compared with 7.74 percent (381,953) of 4,932,959 valid votes in the 1948 parliamentary elections, and 6.8 percent (329,365) of the 4,843,630 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION valid votes in the elections for the Provincial States in 1950. At present all non-Communist parties, except the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and the small Political Reformed and Catholic National Parties, are represented in the government. Since these three parties are as opposed to Communism as these parties in the governing coalition, the Communist Party is isolated in its opposi- tion. Following is the breakdown of votes and seats in the Second Chamber of the Dutch States General following the elections of June 1952. Party Number of % of Total Number of Votes Vote Seats Party of Labor 1,545,414 28.97 Catholic Peoples Party 1,529,464 28.67 30 Anti-Revolutionary Party 605,269 11.31 12 Christian Historical Union Peoples Party for Freedom 476,175 8.92 and Democracy 471,005 8.83 Communist Party Netherlands 328,571 6.16 Political Reformed Party 129,134 2.42 Catholic National Party 144,435 2.71 2 The Communists obtain the greatest number of votes in the cities of Amsterdam (22.35 percent of the total vote in the June 1952 parlia- mentary elections), Rotterdam (9.6 percent), and The Hague (6.6 percent). The Communists also are strong in the province of Groningen where they received 9.0 percent of the total valid votes in 1952. As Communist overtures to several of the democratic parties in 1952 to form a "National Unity Front" were unsuccessful, the party campaigned independently in the June elections that year. Its faction in Parliament is completely independent from the other opposition groups. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The current policy of the Communist Party is to pose as a law- abiding, peace-loving organization. Communists have been active in SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORP-ATION leading meetings and parades protesting commutation of the sentences of war criminals and the rearmament of Germany, however, these demon- strations have had no violent aspects. During World War II, the Communists participated in the anti- German resistance, but, with the exception of some individuals, they seem to have played only a subsidiary role. The Dutch Communists are believed to have some arms available in hidden caches although nothing specific is known, nor is there any detailed information on plans for execution of violent action. According to current reports the Communists plan to seize control of the railway network and to sabotage Dutch transportation in the event of war. The Netherlands Railways authorities are well aware of these plans and are closely scrutinizing any employees whose loyalty is questioned. There are also reports of an "agitation center" in Amsterdam which trains Communists for various tasks, but it is believed that this center concentrates on propaganda and developing leader- ship in the party, rather than on schemes for violent action. The Dutch Communists have no known paramilitary organization, and could probably rally no more than a 1,000 men for active guerilla warfare in the event of an East-West war. An attempt at armed insur- rection in peace-time is most unlikely in the Netherlands, for the Communists probably would have available to them for such an attempt only the several hundred "hard-core" members in the Amsterdam area. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISAN The Communists are a legally recognized party in the Netherlands and relatively few restraints have been imposed on their activities. The Dutch Constitution was amended in 1948 to grant the govern- ment wide powers in times of national emergency. This constitutional provision was implemented in 1952 by a law enabling the Queen in times of emergency, at the suggestion of the ihiinister of the Interior and with the approval of the States-General, to suspend normal legislative and judicial functions and to grant sweeping powers to the :Minister of the Interior, the Queen's Commissioners in the 11 provinces, and the Dutch mayors. Although these powers have never been invoked, they act as a restraining force upon the Communists. At the time of the passing of the bill, there was some talk in Communist circles of going underground, but such a step will probably not be taken unless the government becomes far more restrictive in its policy towards the Communists. SECRET - SECURITY INFORA,iATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION A further hindrance to the Communists is the practice of keeping Communist members of most town councils, provincial states and the States General from participating in key administrative and legislative committees. Since December 1951, civil servants have been prohibited by the Dutch government from being members of the Communist Party, its women's, youth, and labor organizations. Many of the municipalities of the kingdom have followed the lead of the national government in this matter. Members of the Communist party working for the government of the city of Amsterdam have been seriously inconvenienced by this action and some of them have resigned their membership in the party as a re- sult. The Communist trade union federation is not recognized as a bona fide bargaining agent by the government. Most of the trade unions in the Netherlands are combined into four major federations. In the Catholic and Protestant federations, the Communists are barred from membership. Of the 400,000 members in the Socialist federation (The Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions), less than one percent is Communist. The Communist Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheidsvakcentrale EVC) claimed 164,000 members in 1951, although its actual strength is probably no more than 70,000. Its four most important components are the General Union of Transport Workers (Algemene Bedrijfsbond Transport), which includes the dockworkers and claimed 13,000 members in 1951; the General Union of Workers in the Building Trades (Algemene Bond van Werkers in de Bouwnijverheid) with 33,600 claimed members in 1951; the* Union of Dutch Government Personnel (Bond van Nederlands Overheidspersoneel), which controls many of the manual laborers in the employ of the city of Amsterdam and claimed 18,900 members in 1951; and the I-?etal Workers'. Trade Union (Bond van Werknemers in de I?~etaalnijverheid en Aanverwante Bedrijfstakken) with 27,110 claimed members scattered through the aircraft, shipbuilding and other defense industries. The actual mem- bership of these unions is probably one-half the claimed membership. The Communists are not in control of any key industries, but- could probably considerably damage the economic life of the port of Amsterdam where the Communist transport workers' union controls a large number of longshoremen. Communist workers are too few in such vital industries as aviation and electronics to be a grave security threat. The Unity Trade'Union Central is affiliated with and active in the work of the WFTU. SECRET - SECURITY IIIFORI?ATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION The most important Communist front organizations in the Netherlands 1) The General Netherlands Youth Federation (Algemeen Nederlands Jeugdverbond) which has somewhat less than 5,000 members, a ou a o whom are concentrated in Amsterdam. It is the youth movement of the Communist Party and due to its weakness, offers practically no competi- tion to non-Communist organizations in the same field. Its leadership is composed of "hard. core" party members who control the organization, but the Federation suffers from a lack of trained youth leaders. The organization is an affiliate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. It is attempting to recruit new members by emphasizing hobbies rather than politics, but its capabilities for any expansion of membership or activity are limited. 2) The organization of Progressive Student Youth (Organisatie van Progressieve Studerende Jeugd), an affiliate of the In erne Iona U ion of tudents IUS , is composed of several hundred secondary school students. It is relatively unimportant in youth and student circles and its efforts to influence the texts used in secondary schools have been unsuccessful. The organization is in financial difficulties and its membership is quite static. 3) The Netherlands Women's Movement (Nederlandse Vrouwenbeweging, NVB) is the women's auxiliary of the Communist Party. Founded in it has about 5,000 members and is affiliated with-the Communist front , Women's International Democratic Federation. Its membership is fairly constant and the possibilities for growth are negligible. The Netherlands Women's Movement supports the Communist Party in all cam- paigns and actions. 4) The Netherlands-USSR Association (Vereniging Nederland-USSR) was formed in March 1948 through a merger of many oca groups o stimulate friendly relations and establish social and cultural ties between the two nations. Originally appealing to non-Communists as well as to Communists and their sympathizers, its strict adherence to the party line has eliminated most of the non-Cormmunist elements. The Association claimed a membership of 13,000 in 1951, but half that figure is probably more accurate. 5) The Netherlands Peace Council (Nederlandse Vredesraad) co- ordinates the work of various "peace" comma ees w is unction on a regional, local, and factory level. The Council claims a circulation of 20,000 for its organ Vrede (peace). The Council supports such movements SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 as the Stockholm Peace Petition, the Moscow Economic Conference, etc. Of late its rallies and meetings in behalf of world peace and its open con- demnation of the US and the West have received only a luke-warm reception. 6) The Workers' Cultural Union (Arbeiders Bond voor Cultuur), founded in 1948 and claiming 10,000 members n January 1,-fs in#ended to promote the cultural development of the workers along Communist lines. Its leadership has been rather inactive, and the Union itself is closely allied with the Union of Socialist Choral and Musical Societies in the Netherlands (Bond van Socialistische Zang-en Muziokverenigingen in Nederland) whose purpo a m-em ersiip -? in Novain er 1949 was 1* 600. The Musical Society's purpose is to enliven the meetings of Communist and Communist front organizations. 7) The United Resistance, 1940-1945 (Verenigd Verzat, 1940-1945) organization claims a membership of 1,000 and is a 1 37Esd with the international Communist front organization, the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR). 8) The Committee for Help to Indonesia (Comite Hulp aan Indonesia) and the Indonesian Association (Perhimpoenan Ind