A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100030005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

"COP
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A REVIEW OF THE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INTELLIGENCE
11.
COST TRENDS ...... ..... ...................
111.
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRODUCT ..................
100/
IV.
ORGANIZATIONAL DILE10 AS ......................
13
V.
SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES ...............
20
VI.
LEADERSHIP OF THE CO1%;1M1UNITY ..................
25
VII.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENS'E', LEAD RSIiIP .............
3~
VIII.
CHANGING FUNCTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND COSTS
39
IX.
TOWARD IMPROVEMENTS IN TIIE PRODUCT ...........
APPENDICES
44
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INTELLIGENCIs
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The operations of the intelligence community have pro-
duced two disturbing phenomena. The first is an impressive
rise in their size and cost. The second is an apparent-in-
ability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope
and overall quality of.intelligence products.
During the past decade alone, the cost of the intelli-
gence community has l I At the same time, spec-
tacular increases in collection activities have occurred.
Where satellite photography is concerned, the increases have
led to greatly improved knowledge about the military capa-
bilities of potential enemies.' But exparded collection by
means other than photography has not brought about a similar
reduction in our uncertainty about the intentions, doctrines,
and political processes of foreign powers. Instead, the
growth in raw intelligence -- and here satellite photography
must be included -- has come to serve as a proxy for improved
analysis, inference, and estimation.
The following report seeks to identify the causes of
these two phenomena and the areas in which construc-ive change
can take place. Its principal conclusion is that while
number of specific measures may help to bring about a closer
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relationship between cost and effectiveness, main hope
for doing so lies in a fungi .m ntal reform of the intea_:Li,rerce.
community's decisionmaking bodies and procedures.
This conclusion is advanced in full recognition that
reorganization will, at best, only create the conditions in
which wise and imaginative- leadership can flourish. In the
absence of reorganization, however, the habits of intelligence
community will remain as difficult to control as was the per-
formance of the Department of Defense prior to the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958.
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To understand the phenomenon of increasing costs, it
is necessary to consider briefly the organizational history
of the intelligence community. The National Security Act of
1947 and the National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs) of the late 1940s and early 1950s established
the basic division of responsibilities among agencies and
departments. This division had its origins in traditional
distinctions between military and non-military intelligence,
between tactical and national intelligence, and between
communications (COMINT) and non-coimmunications (or agent)
intelligence. Thus, CIA was directed to employ clandestine
agents to collet "non-military" intelligence and produce
`"national" intelligence. The Department of State was made
responsible for the.overt collection of "nor-military" in-
telligence. The National Security Agency (NSA) was estab-
lished to manage COMINT collection. The Military Services
were instructed to collect "military" intelligence as well
as maintain tactical intelligence capabilities for use in
wartime. All were permitted to produce "departmental" in-
telligence to meet their separate needs. While not ideal,
this division of functions and responsibilities worked rea-
sonably well into the mid-1950s.
Since that time, these traditional distinctions and
the organizational arrangements which accompanied them have
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become increasingly obsolescent. The line between "military?'
i?nd "non-military" has fad~-d; scientific and technical in-
telligence with both civilian and military applications has
become a principal area of endeavor for almost all intelli-
gence organizations Similarly, under the old distinctions,
the national leadership -- namely the President and the NSC --
concerned itself with "national" intelligence, while pre-
sumably only battlefield commanders cared about tactical in-
telligence. But a rapidly advancing technology which has
revolutionized the collection, processing, and communicat,on
of intelligence data casts doubt on the validity of the di.
Si_multaneou,'sly, techrloi-Iogical ? a(4vancces have crcLlt_ 2ci new
collection pos ai')ilities which do not fit conveniently wit-,in
a structure based on traditional distinctions and were not
covered in the original directives. Satellite photography,
telemetry intercept, electronic intelligence (FLINT), acoustic
detection, and radar have become some of the most important and
vital methods of intelligence collection not currently covered
by any uniform national policy.
The breakdown of the old distinctions and the app earance
of new collection methods has been a simultaneous proc:css
raising a host of questions about intelligence organizatiol .
Is FLINT related to COMINT, is it technical or military in
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nature, is it of primary interest to tactl.Cal or natt-OT1~ 1
Where should the radrli:' tracking of or
GOI1:aU1llGr.~?
the acoustic surveillance of Soviet i;allist:~c I:tiss Ie ;ub-
marines fit? Is telemetry more milar to CU~l:::'r`' or to
Who should be
LSI~?`'; who should analyze it:? r_espo.z"ii~:tc or
satellite photography? On the more mundane, but nonethelc.sss
cri-tical level, questions arise about the organizairional re--
sponsibilities for such topics as Sihanoukville supply in-
filtration, VC/NVA order of battle, and missile deployr::ents
Are these military o- non-milita_r1
area.
in the Suez Canal
issues? Is the intelligence about them tactical or national?
Who should be responsible for collectio:i and what collection
resources should be tasked?'
In the absence of an authoritativ0 governin;) body to
resolve these issues, the community has resorted to a series
of compromise solutions that adversely -effect its performance:
and cost. In general, these compromises have favored multiple
and diffuse collection programs and the neglect o-if difficult
and searching analytical approaches. The most serious of the
resulting problems are outlined below in brief form, and dis-
cussed in more detail in the appendices.
The distribution of intell igenCt' fllnct:i.Gils has become
increasingly fragmented and disorganize..d.
0TThee old distinctions among national, departmental,
and tactical intelligence are out of date. Today,
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CIA is as likely to produce intelligence relevant
to, say, NVA/VC order of battle as DIP. or 1-11--C"V,
just as M11.CV produces many reports that are of
interest to the national leadership.
? Similarly, the relatively neat ordering of collec-
tion functions that existed after World War II has
broken down. CIA now engages in a wide range of
collection activities -- aircraft and satellite
photography, FLINT, COMINT, radar, telemetry as
well as clandestine, and ovcrL agent colluc'1ion.
NSA has added telemetry and ELINT to its CC%NINT
capabil i.ties. The Services now have a full panoply
of sensc:.s to perform a variety of functions --
tactical intelligence, surveillance, early warning,
and so oz.
Table I illustrates how almost all major com-
ponents of the intelligence community are in
.volved in each of its various collection and
production functions.
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2. The community T s act ivi ;_ic i_~ r. e dominated 1,?v co ,~ c c i.ion
c,zw,fctit_i_on and have b co_~1c~ unp)?oc uct~.ve c:u ,.c~.ilvc .
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Despite past massive increases is
the collection of photography, COMINT, ELINT, radar
and other sensor data, sizeable additional collec-
tion capabilities are planned to becor-Le operational
this calendar year:
The blurring of traditional boundaries has encouraged
community members to engage in a competitive struggle
for survival and dominance, primarily through new
technology, which has resulted in the redundant
acquisition of data at virtually all levels --
tactical, theater command, and national.
? Gross redundancies in collection capabilities have
become commonplace as exemplified by aircraft in
both CIA and Defense which collect photography,
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? Collection capabilities remain in operation beyond
their useful lives. As older systems lose their
attractiveness at the national lcvol, they are
taken over at the command or tactical level where
they' duplicate higher level activities or collect
data of little value.
0 Simultaneously, compartmentalization within various
security systems has served to h.i.de or obscure com-
ae ti_tiv capabilities from evalu :tion, comparison,
and tradeoff analysis..
3. T.vhe community' s growth is largely u ~~_Lann C~ 3I un-
guided.
0 Serious forward planning is often lacking as decisions
are made about the allocation of resources.
? The consumer frequently fails to specify his product
needs for the producer; the producer, uncertain about
eventual demands, encourages the collector to pro-
vide data without selectivity or priority; and the
collector emphasizes quantity rather than quality.
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community's activ:'.__:_es l ave becor"','_exceed i_ng ?`y ex -
? The fragmentation of intelligence functions and the
competitive drive for improved collection technology
are important reasons why the cost of intelligence
? A significant part of this cost growth is attributable
to the acquisition of expensive new systems without
simultaneous reductions in obsolescent collection
programs.
? in the z.bscnco of planni.ng and Guidance, interna.L.iy
generated values pr-eddmi:ri6 :e-in the conururi:;.ty' s in-
stitutions. These valucos favor increasing_iy ,sophi.sti.-
cated and expensive collection technologies at the
expense of analytical capabilities.
o Few interagency comparisons are contemplated. Po-
tential tradeoffs between PIIOTINT and SIGINT, between
PHOTINT and HUMINT, and between data collection and
analysis are neglected.
.0 While the budgetary process might be used to curb
some of the more obvious excesses, it cannot sub-
stitute for centralized management of the community.
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I I:L . ~?U1 STION;;_ AhOUT THE P} ODUC I
In a world of perfect :i nformati_on there would be no
uncertainties about the pre.,;ent and future intentions, capa-
bilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information,
however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part. Con-
sequently, the intelligence community can at best reduce the
uncertainties and. construct plausible hypotheses about these:
factors on the basis of what continues to he partial and
often conflicting evidence.
Despite the richness of the data made available by modern
methods of collection, and the rising co>ts of their acqui_ -
tion., it is not at all clear that our hypotheses about forai.gn
intentions, capabilities, and activities have improved com-
mensurately in scope and quality. Nor can it be asserted with
confidence that the intelligence community has shown much in-
itiative in developing the full range of possible explanations
in light of available data. Among the more recent results of
this failure to acknowledge uncertainty and entertain new
ideas in the face of it, has been a propensity to=overlook
such unpleasant possibilities as a large-scale exploitation
of Sihanoukville by the NVA to transship supplies, a continu-
ation of the SS-9 buildup and its possible MI_RVing, or Soviet
willingness to invade Czechoslovakia and put forces into the
Middle East.
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D? ' icul-Lies of this kind with the intelligence produce
are all the more disturbing because the need to explore and
test a number of hypotheses will, if anything, el.pa,_nd as the
Soviets project their military power and come to play more
direct global role. Yet there is no evidence that-the in-
telligence community, given its present structure,-will come
to grips with this class of prob_l_oms.
The community's heavy emphasis on collection is itse
detrimental to correcting product probler,,s. ?3ecau::e each
organization sees the maintenance and expansion of its col-
lection capabilities as the principal route to survival and
strengtl~ with tl:_t community, there is a ',trong presumption
in today's intelligence sei yup'` that,ddi ~iona.l data col.lec-
tion rather than improved analysis, will provide the answer
to particular intelligence problems. It has become common-
place to translate product criticism into. demands for en-
larged collection efforts. Seldom does anyone ask if a
further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth
its cost.
The inevitable result is that production remains the
stepchild of the community. It is a profession that lacks
strong military and civilian career incentives, even within
CIA. The analysts, with a heavy burden of responsibility,
find themselves swamped with data. The consumers, at the
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same time, treat their product as a free good, so that demand
exceeds supply, priorities are not established, tii~ system
becomes overloaded and the qua.Lity of the output suffers.
As if this were not enough, production, instead of guiding
collection, is itself guided by collectors and the impetus
of technology. Since the military are the principal collec-
tors, they are more likely to focus on the needs and interests
of their own Services than on the issues of concern to the
national leadership, and they continue the wasteful practice
of counterpart targeting. Under such difficult conditions,
it is not surpri3ing that hypotheses tend to harden-into
dogma, that their sensitivity to changed condicioris- is not
articulated, and that new data arc not"sought to test them.
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IV.
cuest:i_ons about cost and product might exist even if he
intC'lli n e community posy :~':;C~d ` trong ~_C C C1:. h:It is
noLoworthy, however, that they have arisen under cOnCi:i'tions
the most marked of which is a lack of institutions governing
the community with the authority and responsibility to re-
solve issues without excessive comp:~romi_se, allocate resources
according to criteria of effectiveness, and consider the re-
lationship between cost and substantive output from z national
perspective.
This lack of governing institutions stems fundamentally
from the' failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to
anticipate the "constitutional" needs of a modern and techno-
loC;i.cally complex intelligence cor;mlunity. The primary intent
of the Act, understandably, was to prevent a recurrence of the
intelligence confusions and delays that occurred prior 'Co
Pearl Harbor. These problems were seen as having resulted
from defects in the central processing, production, and dis-
semination of intelligence. The critical need, accordingly,
was to create an organization which would have access to all
intelligence and report its estimates to the national leader-
ship.
In 1947, the size and cost of individual programs were
relatively small, and the scope and nature of the management
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problems caSSOCiated W1t11 i^Oday s co''ir.tunity llc're not c_nL.i.c].-
patod. Conseciucntly the issue o-"-' hole to plan ;rid riat:ionall.zf;:
the collection of intelligence did not seem o g_-cu; moment,
and the Act did not explicitly provide for a mechanism to per-
form these functions or evaluate the scope and quality of its
product.
There is an,)ther reason why the 1947 Act did co little
to provide strong leadership for the corununity: powerful in-
te'wests in the 14ilitary Services and elsewhere opposed (and
continue to oppose). more centralized management of_intelli-
ge_nce activities. Partly, this opposition arises from the
belief of the Services that direct control ovt r in e.lligence
pro(rams is essential. if they are toYconduct succevC:Lu .
terry operations; partly, it results from bureaucratic concerns.
The Services are reluctant to accept assurance that informa-
tion from systems not controlled by them will be available as
and when they require it.
Despite such opposition, the National Security Act of
1947 did stipulate that the CIA would coordinate the "in-
telligence activities" of the Government under the.dircctic..e_
of the :.National Security Council. 1-Iowover, the Ac--t also mad
clear provision for the continuation of "departmental __n-
telligence". Since then, three ]?residents have exhorted the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to play the role of
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community leader and coorulnci ::or, lout his authority over the
community has remaincC S":.121im l.i.. While the DCI has } een the
catalyst in coordinating sulb:tantive, intelligence production,
he has made little use of such authority as he possesses to
manage the resources of the community.
Realistically, it is clear that the DCI, as his office
is now constituted, cannot he expected to perform effectively
the community-wide leadership role because:
? As an agency head he bears a number of weighty op-
erational and advisory responsibilities which limit
the effort he can devote to community-wide -management.
I:e bears a particularly heavy bui den for the planning
and conduct of covert actions.
? His multiple roles as community leader, agency head,
and intelligence adviser to the President, and to
a number of sensitive executive committeesr are
mutually conflicting.
? He is a competitor for resources within the community
owing to his responsibilities as Director of CIA,
which has large collection programs of its own; thus
he cannot be wholly objective in providing guidance
for community-wide collection.
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;er_ c. nt of the co: aat-:i~:i i.y ` s re-
He controls only L-J
sources and must tlarccforc rely on pe suasion to
influence his colleacjues regarding the allocation
and management of the other
percent, which is
appropriated to the Dcpartnn:ent' of Defense. Since
Defense is legally responsible for these very large
resources, it feels that it cannot be bound by out-
side advice on how they should be usea.
? The DCI is outranked by other departmenta -l# heads who
report directly to the President and are his immediate
supervi ors on the National Security Council.
In spite of these hand i~caps, - the...I)C1 has established
several institutional devices to assist him in leading the
community.- They are the National. Intelligence Proc-rarm1 Evalua-
tion Staff (NIPS) and the National Intelligence Resources
Board (NIRB). However, the principal agencies have largely
ignored or resisted the-efforts of management by these bodies.
As a consequence, the NIPE and the HIRI3 have concentrated on
developing improved data about intelligence programs and
better mechanisms for coordination. Because of their work,
both institutions could prove useful to a strong community
leader; however, their contribution to the efforts of the
currently constituted DCI is small.
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In i}lc ab oric of an C'Tf:e tiV( ' :Lns't:J.tai.LioZ.l f auC4.'GIk
within \?,- ia.ch one official could )I;: hold re ;%on:~i}~1 and aac-
count. a}_):1 cu for the performanr.c and cost of the into L~icrone e
collaluni ty, the United State.,; .ntc.l` :igcnce 1,oa rd (USLh) , on
L J.
nally cstabli_shed to advise the DC L, has become a sort of
governing body for the community. Howevf r, the USI13 has proved
generally ineffective as a management mechanism for several
reasons:
? It is a committee of equals who must form coalitions
to make decisions.
? It is do ninated by collectors and pros ucers who avoid
praising critical c;uoslions about the collection pro-
,
grams o,_-,.rated by their collcarjues.
? As a result, USII3's collection requirements -- which
are an a.;gregate of all. requests, new and old -- mean
all things to all agencies, thus leaving them free
to pursue their own interests.
Since policy-level consumers are not represented on
the Board, they are unable to give guidance as to
priority needs.
Even within the Department of Defense, there is no cen-
tralized management of intelligence resources and activitiess.
Although the Assistant Secretary for Administration has been
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given responsibility in t h` s tocjetiier witi a sm 1.1_
staff for resource analysis, his efforts to master the Defense
intelligence complex have proved of little avail !car several
reasons. L irst, not all Defense programs come under- his pur-
view, and this limits his ability to do cross-program analysis.
Second, he remains responsible for his functions as Assistant
Secretary for Administration.
Below the level of review provided by an Assistant
Secretary, manac,cinent leadership is stil absent. The
Directors of DI:A and NSA ar themselves unable to =control
the activities of the components supposedly subordinate to
them but operated by the Military Ser_vic ss. Because of a
history of comp::omise s and Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is similarly unable to
control a large part of his program which is run by the Deputy
Director for Science and Technology (DD/fE.T) in CIA.
This lack. of lower-level leadership shows up?in the fol-
lowing ways:
? The current failure of NSA adequately to direct
Service cryptologic activities, c_ganize them into
a coherent system, or manage LLINT activities.
0 Large-scale Service-controlled tactical intelli-
gence assets, inflated by the war and partly dupli-
cating both national and allied capabilities, but
programmed and operated outside of the cormunity.
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a.ctiviti.es, includ:i ng: dur].ication in cho co:L: fiction
]fie sense :Cntoilic er~ce ]?ro< 3:am ((Mill) a_Id on- D'
0 A host of \m esolvc,cL :)ro)1ems =t:onccrr~:~. ~.c.; o .?gr J.rc_tio:z
and the allocation o3. resou-ce withi:;k both Gcacral
:in t{ernally overlapping
activities among va;rous mapping, charting, anti
geodesy agencies, and the several investigative
services; and inadequate supervision and control of
counteri ntelligenc'UU activities.
It follows from this analysis that the I1resident` s ob-
jectives can be achieved only ii reform addresses foul or-
ganizational i. sues:
? The leadership of the intc1lic;er_ce community a
whole.
0 The direction and control of Defense intelligence
activities.
0 The division of functions among the major intelli-
gence agencies.
0 The structuring, staffing, and funding of the
processes by which our raw intelligence data are
analyzed and interpreted.
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V. !7,-,)ECI-FTC
The effectiveness and of iciency of the intelli Sr,ct;,;T MORI this page
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The role of the i.I;.u. cndc? t a_cvi.: w mec:la ani, 13e-
cause of the secrecy surrrounding the operations of
the intel_licjencc rc~:,,,rlni :.y, the need for Stronq in-
dependent review mecha.ni::ms within the Executive
i3ranch remains particularly important. Since the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Poarc
(P1 EA)3) , the "40" Committee, the Office of Science
and Technology (OST) , and the Office. cf Mangy ement
and Budget (OMB) already exist to perform this
function, the only issues. are how they car:. - be
strengthened, to what extent they need larger and
more pe::rlnent staffs, and whether new re ft-,j
boards ,should be cJ:chtc d; ' cs aci: ll.v to eva_'_uete
the anu:Lytical and estimating ac: -iviti_es of the
community.
Subsequent sections do not address all of these issues;
nor do they exhaust the list of organizational possibilities.
Only the most salient options are presented w _th respect to
the leadership of the community, the Department of Defense,
.and functional reorganization. Each is described in schematic
form.
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VI. LEADERSIIIP OF TIIE CO!, MUNITY
~. The effectiveness of new leader of the commnunity will
depend critically on his ability to control intelligence re-
sources and make his decisions stick.. Basically, there are
three different roles he can play in this respect, each with
different organizational implications. They are:
? As legal or direct controller of all or most intelli-
gence resources.
As de facto manager of most resources even though
they are not appropriated to him.
? As coo' dina~,or of i so.urc.es.. that are appropriated
elsewhe!{e, 'as now.
Although each of the three basic approaches could be in-
stitutionalized in a number of different ways, the principal
options that accord with these roles are listed below.
A Director of National Intelligence (Option #1), with
25X1 .the bulk of thel lintelligence budget appropriated
to his office. That office would control all the major col-
lection assets and research and development activities, which
are the most costly programs of the community and are most
likely to yield large long-term savings. The :director would
also operate the Government's principal production and
national estimating center and retain the CIA's present
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responsibility for covert action programs. Defense and State
would retain production groins, both to serve their own leader-
ship and to provide competing centers in the analysis of in-
telligence inputs to the national intelligence process. The
Defense Department would maintain budgetary and operational
control over only the selected "tactical" collection and
processing assets necessary for direct support of military
forces, although these assets should be subject to the DNI's
review.
This option affords a number of advantages:
.? It pinpoints responsibility; the President knows who
is in charge.
0 it permits major economa.es-`through rationalization of
the community's functions and through the elimination
o.f,duplicative and redundant capabilities.
?. It establishes a management system which can deal com-
prehensively with the implications of evolving tech-
nology and make efficient choices between competing
collection systems.
? It brings producers and collectors closer-together
and increases the probability that collectors will
become more responsive to producer needs..
? It allows the Director to evaluate fully the con-
tribution each component makes to the final product,
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enabling ready identification of low performance
elements and permitting subsequent adjustments to
their mission.
it provides one responsible point in the community to
which high-level consumers can express their changing
needs.
0 It facilitates the timely selection and coordination
of the intelligence assets necessary to provide in-
telligence support to the President in periods of
crisis.
Creation of a DNI has At ieasK five potential disadvan-
tages:
? it gives still further responsibilities to the DCI.
Amajor criticism of the present confederate organi-
zation is that the DCI is overloaded and cannot be
expected to perform well the many functions now
assigned to him. As noted, these includesubstantive
advice to the President and to several high-level
committees, day-to-day management of a large operating
program, appearing as a witness before Congress, and
running numerous sensitive collection and covert
action projects. It should be noted, however, that
with adequate staff and competent deputies, the
his
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Director should be able to delegate rc-sponcibilities
and ease his task. Also, under this option, the
DCI' s power would be commensurate with his present
responsibilities.
? This option could generate s-::astantial res=istance
from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
over the transfer of intelligence functions to a new
agency. It would also necessitate fundamental changes
in the National Security Act which might cause major
congressional resistance and open debate on a range
of sensitive national security issues.
? Even if all U. S. Gdvernment,?-intelligence assets were
transferred to the Director,.there would ramain the
serious and continuing problem of finding ways to
meet the intelligence needs of.Defense without, at
the same time, causing the Services to reconstitute
their own intelligence activities, even at the expense
of other programs.
? There could be adverse reaction from the news media
and the public to a consolidation of such sensitive
activities under the control of one man, even though
so many of them already are controlled, in principle,
by the Secretary of Defense.
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_9
it is possible that this option will continue the
present dominant influence of collectors relative
to producers and consumers in the intelligence
A Director of Central Intel:.i.gence (Option #2), with a
strong Presidential mandate and a substantial staff. NSA,
NRO, and DIA would remain under present jurisdiction." The
CIA would be divided -- one part supplying the DCI staff and
intelligence production component, the other part, principally
current CIA collection organization, comprising a new agency
under a separate. director. The DCI would have senior status
within the Government and would serve as principal intelli-
Bence adviser t) the NSC. He would produce all National ;
Intelligence Estimates and other national intelligence re-
quired by top level national decisionmakers, and would control
the necessary production assets, including NPIC. This would
include continued management of a national intelligence
process that involved the participation, and inputs from,
other intelligence production organizations.
Under Presidential directive, the DCI. would review and
make recommendations to the President on the Intelligence
plans, programs, and budgets of his own office, a reconstituted
CIA, and the Department of Defense. He would also present a
consolidated intelligence budget for review by the OMb. By
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this means the Director would be able to guide resource allo-
cation and influence consnur_ity orcanization.
Although Option #1 offers the greatest promise of-
achieving the President's objectives, this option has ad-
vantages over it and over the.present situation in the fol-
lowing respects:
? The DCI would be freed from the day-to-day management
tasks incumbent upon the head of a large operating
agency with major collection and covert action re-
sponsibilities. This would enable him to devote
most of his attention to substantive' intelligence
'matters, the tasking of collectors, and community
resource management issues as'they relate~to his
production activities.
? This option eliminates the present situation in
which the DCI.serves as both advocate for agency
programs and judge in community-wide matters, a
role which diminishes the community's willingness
to accept his guidance as impartial.
? The reforms could be accomplished, without major
legislation, by a reorganization plan and Presidential
directives to the DCI, ,-,he Secretary of Defense, and
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? This option would offor improvements in efficiency
and effectiveness without the major disruptions in
the community required under option one.
? It would enhance the stature of the community leader
while. avoiding the potentially dangerous concentra-
tion of power inherent in option one.
Option 42 has several potential. disadvantages:
? Responsibility for the community as a whole would
be more diffuse than under option one.
0 The abi:.ity of the DCI to supervise the retailed
activiti-es of the e orating parts of
would be weaker.
n__mmiin- i .h
0 The new DCI, compared to the DNI under option one,
would have to rely on persuasion and the process of
budgetary review rather than directive authority in
order to eliminate redundant and duplicative activi-
ties, resolve trade-off issues, and reduce overhead.
Q He would lack the ability to mobilize., deploy, ane
target collection assets in a time of crisis, unless
given specific Presidential authority.
A CoordinatSr. of National Intelligence (Option 3), who,
under Presidential mandate, would act as White House or ESC
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Intelligence Coimammunity, directing particular
Intelligence resource and management i-ssueE?
o,
o Representing the concerns and needs of national
policy level consumers-
.0 Evaluating the suitability of intelligence output in
light cf consumer demand.
overseer of the
attention to:
Under this arrangement, CIA, Defense, and State intelli-
unchanged.
gence responsiAlities would remain essentially
? -d concerns of the
would express the views an
The Coordinator
. -, roc.uct needs
l Security Council on p
president and the.Nation.
future
he would provide guidance on p -eseiit and
and quality;
collection priorities; he would critique and evallUate the
current performance of the community, identifyi S gaps and -
oversights; and he would conduct studies of specific intelli
ence community activities as required. But he would not be
g Nor
responsible for the actual production of intelligence.
would he have any direct control over resources.
This option offers two advantages:
The creation of this position would provide a means
for more direct representation of Presidential in-
terest in the Intelligence Community. Consumer
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representation in the intelligence process would be
? No legislation would be required, and the president
would be spared a number of bureaucraic tittles.
I
The option h ,~~, .L- oral marked disadvantages :
0 There is the potential for unproductive competition
between the Coordinator and the White Iious staff.
0 Achievement of the President's management and re-
source control objectives is unlikely.
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yI , DEPARTMENT 02 DEEEN %E` LEADERSF'IP
Although the President has indicated his desire to in-
stitute community-wide reform, changes within the Department
of Defense alone could improve the allocation and management
of resources and reduce the overall size of the intelligence
budget. Provided that care is taken in making them, these
reforms need not be incompatible with subsequent decisions
about the governance of the community -as a whole.
Within the Department of Defense; there ias :giver been
an individual with formal responsibility for -nanacement of
all DoD intelligence activities. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense hi si on teal l it has charged with this task, but he
has very little staff to assist him and can devote only a
modest amount of time to the complex intelligence issues that
arise within his domain. Consequently, if the problems of
Defense intelligence are to be resolved in a fashion satis-
factory to the President, it will be necessary either to
create a Director of Defense intelligence (DDI) with specific
responsibility for the Department's collection assets, or
provide the Deputy Secretary with major staff support in the
form of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Neither of these posts would be incompatible with options
two and three relating to community-wide leadership reform.
However, the DDI concept conflicts with option one, in which
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the bulk of U. S. .intelligence resources would be-appropria-
ted to a Director of "-National Intelligence.
A Director of Defense Intelligence would have the auth-
ority and responsibility to direct and control all Defense
intelligence activities. He would allocate all --_, Defense
intelligence resources, including those for tactical intelli-
gence, the funds for the NRP, and budgets for other national
programs under departmental jurisdiction. Iie would report to
and represent the Secretary of Defense in all matters re-
lating to the management of intelligence resources; review
the need for, and conduct of, sensitive intelligence collec-
tion and operations; review all Defense intelligence "require-
ments" with resource implications t'order to evaluate need
and determine priorities; serve as the principal~Defense
representative on the USIB; and monitor other DoD programs
which have clear implications for the collection of intelli-
gence. Under this option the DDI would be able-to reorder
completely the Defense intelligence collection structure as
deemed appropriate.
The DIA would be involved in collection management only
if so directed by the DDI, and would concentrate on the pro-
ductio_ of finished intelligence for the Secretary of Defense
and other national consumers.
it is important that the Director of Defense Intelligence
be responsive to tasking by the community leader, who wo-.'ld
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be the principal substantive intelligence of='iciai of the
Government. Both the coTrrunity leader and the DDI should re-
ceive authoritative guidance about national consumer interests.
This could be provided by a Cou_lcii of Intelligence consti-
tuted within the NSC and with the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, anC.
the Secretary of Defense as its members. The restructuring
of USIB and revision of NSCIDs can help in establishing the
appropriate DCI/DDI relationship.
The post of DDI has great prospective advantages:
? It would provide for
management authority in one individual, which would
allow authoritativp,comparisons and decisions about
competing collection programs.
? It would provide for the centralization of direction
and control over all Defense intelligence activities,
including conduct of sensitive intelligence collec-
tion operations.
But there are possible drawbacks as well, in that the
position would:
? Concentrate great power at a single point in Defense.
This could possibly diminish the community leaders
access to information, as well as his ability to
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task collection systems in support of _rational in-
`elligence product::-oz, and design balan.c~c collec-
lion programs, in support of his production respon-
sibilities.
? Superimpose a large staff over those of other major
intelligc?tee manacers within Defense (the-Directors
of DIA, NSA, and IRO), although u reduction in
various coordination staffs should be possible a`
the same time.
An Assistant Secretary of Defense for intelligence ASD/I)
who would act as'the principal staff assistant to the Secretary
onsibilit eswould be similar to those of
of Defense. His xesp
?'--he DDI, except that he would not exercise direct control over
Defense intelligence collection programs, and would not be a
member of USIB unless the Board were reconstituted to advise
the DCI on the allocation of collection resources.
This option has a number of advantages:
it allows for effective cross-program anai.ysis within
?
It avoids the con(-ntration of power inherent in the
DDI option, if that is considered a danger.
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? Compared to the DDI, an ASD/I v ould be sc.o_e likely
to respond to the needs o= the rc_ sent DC ox the
community-wide leader established under either option
two or three.
The post has a number of potential weaknesses in that.;.
compared with the DDI, it would probably:
o Lack both the strong mandate provided to the DDI
and direct authority over Defense intelligence
activities, including those carried out by the
program managers.
? Make the ASD/I vulnerab-tee to "end ruts" by major
comp one.its within the .Defense ir.te:~ l_i ence co:-a-
47' who might wish to appeal Jiirec-tly to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
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9
VI 11. Cii7~NGING UNC`210N2\L ?.:') CG...
D..,.r- ..g the aas,. two vca- S , tLc uud 1 of t:~ C. .:.l 3 -L- C~ a.1 ]: c e
~., ~ c~e
nce
a y V V:. . . ~
..vttututter~; 11017 . It; , e
uc;v' ; M aSi.: L4 11.1 t;o:t5iaitt ni.u ull ti
dollars, as shown in the following chart.
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To achieve further economies, particulary without major
reorgani-nation, will be difficult for several reasons.
0 Savings that we foresee as immediately feasible
are likely to be counterbalanced to a considerable
degree by further pay and price increases.
0 With the heavy R&D costs for proposed new systems,
25X1 Li
there already is built into the 1-~u~ get a strong
upward bias which may prove difficult to control,
particularly considering the intense interest in
high-technology and expensive new systems for SALT
and other purposes.
0 The U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia will permit
reductions in SIGINT and HUMINT resources, Dut they
will only partially offset the above cost increases.
0 Some of the largest savings can only result from
shifting and consolidating current activites in
such a way as to redraw the functional boundaries
of the major intelligence organizations.
Despite these difficulties, it is the case that .
tional boundaries can be withdrawn without a -major reorganiza-
tion of Defense intelligence or the community as a whole.
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- ?1
should stress, however, that ac-.:io_is of this char cter. will
still leave a number of co .:unity--wide issues unresolved and
at the same time arouse all the op-position of the- military
Services and the Joint Chiefs -o = Staff. Moreover-, . with the
rapid evolution of technolocy, furthar changes is boundaries
and comparable upheavals -- will probably have 'to= follow in
the future.
With all these cautions, there are a number of specific
functional actions that can be taken at the present time.
Among the most important are the establishmelt of NSA as a
truly national cryptological service with author 4y over al
signal intelligence, and the consolidati:,n of a rummer of
activities now operated sej agate. y-;.hv tha Military Services.
The effect of these changes should be to achieve economies
of scale, eliminate excessive duplication, and promote com-
petition among like activities so as to weed out the less
productive programs.
The following table of possible savings; while only an
astimate, indicates what economies might be feasible as a
'result of redrawing functional boundaries, consolidating
activities, and eliminating duplication:
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2 -
A major issue arises iin connection with cha_ ,es of such
scope and magnitude. It is whether we should attemot to make
the reforms now, or await more general reorganization and al-
low the head of the community to exercise his judgment and
authority in instituting them. Our current judgmen is that
reductions of this magnitude should be attempted only after
a reorganization has significantly improved the capabilities
of the community to direct, control, and monitor program
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changes. We also believe that the economies shone b~, ef-
fected over a period of years. Without t ;ae:smm_ two,- conditions,
the reductions could prove illusory or r ns n~,, and a
heavy price in disruption and lowered morale mig =L follow.
It should be noted that the anticipated savi.gs'come
Primarily from collection activities; major analical and
estimating capabilities are not affected. Their improvement
is the subject of the next section.
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4 -
IX. TOWARD -IMP ROV :MEATS IN. THE PRUDUCT
Much of the emphasis by the into-iligenco community and
the bulk of its resources go to high tecfnoloEy necessary
to overcome barriers to information in the U.5SR and China.
Ye- this stress on the technology of-collection --- adiaittedly
important -- comes at a time when improved analysis is even
more important.
Because of the keener competition from the Soviets, and
the narrowing gap in relative resources devotee to ceense,
the U. S. must refine its evaluation of foreign capabilities,
intentions, activities, and doctrines rather than assume that
it has 'the resources to insure against ball possibilities
The community must also ixnpr:ove its?Current political esti-
mates and find ways of becoming more responsive to national
consumers and their concerns. -
Important improvements in performance may be feasible
without major. reorganization. But preliminz.ry investigation
suggests that higher quality is much more likely_to come
about within the framework of a coherently organized com-
munity which is focused on imps.-oving output rather than. in-
put. Indeed, it seems a fair assumption that the President
would be willing to rebate some of the cote -it;ial-- savangs from
the community if he had any hope of improved performance as
a consequence. As of now, however, he has :-o such assurance
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and may reasonably argue as 4, for currenr: ptrtoraLancc: , he
should at least obtain the benefit of lower costs
Even if we knew how to i casure the bene-:its of intelli-
Bence, it would be difficult to relate specific ct_unges in
programs to improvements in venom=zance. Nonetheless; ex-
perienced observers believe that the o-lowino. sty: ~s - all
of them comparatively inexpensive -- should increase the use=
fulness of the product to the. national leadership:
? Major consumer representation to and within the in-
telligenee community, perhaps throug- a rtstructur(;d
USIl3, a high-level consumer council, or other insti-
tutionalized ways off: ~ communicatinq co.-~suitr~r needs,
the competition of ideas, including a DIA with improved
organization and staffing as a major comxxetitor to CIA
in the area of military intelligence.
priorities,.. and evaluations to intelligence producers.
? Assessment of the intelligence 22roduct though quality
control and product evaluation sections within the
production organizations themselves.
? Upgrading existing analytical centers to increase
? Periodic reviews by outsiders of intelligence nroru _s.
of the main working hypotheses within tha community,
and of analytical methods being used.
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? net assessment group established at_ thc= national
level which, alcng wvaith thc. 'SSM i~roc:ess; will keer,
questioning the and challer_gin'_ ; it to re--
is ine and support its hypotheses.
? Stronger incentives to attract good analvgts, better
career opportunities to hold then as analysts instead
of forcing them to become supervisors in order to
achieve promotion, and a more effective use of er-
sonnel already trained and experienced intintelii
? Increased resources and improved organizationai ar-
rangements wi thin th ri .tvI is Ejn e co.nun?tv for
research on'-improved methods of analysis and esti-
mation.
It is probably premature to -recommend the detailed
measures. necessary to improve the quality and scope of the
intelligence product. In the near future, this issue should
be considered at greater length by the leadership of a re-
organized community. Indeed, the leadership should be
specifically charged with the task of product improvement
as a matter of the highest priority. What steps will prove
Feasible will depend on the particular type of reorgan-zatic:~
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selec- :d, and, in the present circu:`nstances, it :ay be well
to be guided in the choice ay considerations of economy in
the use of resources. But it should be stressed, in con-
clusion; that improvement of the product at current budget
levels is simply mother way of achieving the efficiency that
is so desperately needed within the intellicgenca community
as it is presently constituted.
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CC -MENTS ON "A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE CO.MMUN. TY'
1. The Review raises, on behalf of the President. a valid for
e .an.ining the intelligence community, with the objectives of improving the
overall quality of intelligence products and reducing the community's size
and coat. While there may be differences of opinion as to the causes of,
and solutions to, the problems the Review describes, it is worth our mo- t
serious consideration to see what we can do to bring about the desired
improvements.
2. The principal thrust of the Review'deals with resource control
and management, and it is here that the most significant improvements
can be made. The law, President ~nA other directives .ve
ILLEGIB
been silent as to the role the Director o Central Intelligence was to play
in resource management. Lacking clear direction toward a stronger
position regarding resource requirements and allocation, the evaltation
of their effectiveness, the selection of new systems, and the phasi -.g out
of the old, the Director has had little basis to balance his coordinz Ling
authority over substance with a comparable authority over resource.
The Review quite properly recognizes that nearly of 25X1
the total resources are funded and controlled by the Secretary of Defensc
The Department of Defense must therefore be very heavily involver in
a y changes directed toward improvement in resource management and
control.
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i:, obc.l enough legislation to a~:k for at this tir.:_e. L. fa , ..._ 1::-,
3, '::ihe Secretary of Defense has n-1 .,de a food be
i 3 t _ ; FS1 z:rLt Sect ctary of Defen e .s.ur
Iva t t:o : ti intelligence. In ;i F7o:3 a c; 3~ to nont of
the '~ creL';ary of Defense reC03T'Y a~ d d tLie Cre-lZio-.1 o:t .i ec -< !>,;w wj'
;~'c Cs Lar and two additional lat3E1:'r At s: G;i'eta Diet o:r e n i? t w<
civilian. r u:4ervioory managenien6- c the .f.)epartmert. i n
c r t'ar devoting his full tinic to Departs jent of #)c ei- ~:: o ra t .=.~ u
aeti?c .tic::; u-nd reporting to ona o' t1-1a two 'I.-Yc Duty secret
to sr L w c_$rzs iderable improve2?: eat over the pr sCXia c3 ~ i`3i1 u . ?:
c . ;isiation which would be r;:cyuis ed uu:a c t^ iti r O :ion l I
--view could well lead to a wrap ie in t h A < ; Congress w ch -,n t ..t ...
.z: aL.zPculate the intelligence eii:ort. There are other C}r L~:s i:. ~o
t.; wions 1 and II, but these alone are e=o'sh to rule tea, o ti F-~>ai y~.
C,3: ,emu -L :?- ;
oi~: `Sonti. And the Review itsel. seems to recogni : tat
G:2 ~tawil built-in problems to miulmiz'e its chances of beings -vc-.:y
?
L!-.at some variant of these three Options vrhiw cc:ala ue ticcc
lei :~~ c? a =. ,
r existing Presidential authority and -without
y,3 t'a greatest hope of aceoiriplishirzg the reyide~ t`s objectiveo.
.'. Given the wide deploys erat of re3ources, disparate
a.ad itri .ctioiial boundaries vathin the cor3'urntanity, it is vas. j
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:. _
t_ actor c Central Intullit ace : n2 c "Ti . 1 ~ '. t; I,;;
F..1 t
J7:is":3s4y`. should, however, uricav: an M~~?.:3 opr e :w 'Y. arm. J c r.: F .
ccc~ E Le iS effectively.
.' the President desires that the )C1 coor inat* the 1-kjW
uL
c= intL, i,ence community, t r s could be done to
security Council ire Live to it's SCI, .c : ? cret
.._ e, ad the Secretary of State. Such directive s.-ould a
-a i $ o Vide for DCI coordiratic.x of .? o jramt s...~:4 N+ .== ..
i ' 1r.at ' view before sub!'Y?i5 z i m Go t '.o _'reside'nt. . `vJ:.
xor continuous progra> = reviUW and, coort?ination '=;
Results would dap-And in? la:-h ! part on ':Le caw r' ~ ~
the: cr t xry of Defense and the Scereta .y of State and,
o ot.;; b residential support.
b. the product will never be as good as we Would lino.ar to
b_oweve r, be as good a- we can rzf, F:e it. The Levis
?D; si ilityof separating production up-its of CIA frcr ?~g e CCj.
~d z to ensure objectivity. This would be a gr;;at .tip>t~kc. 1"
ist ?atively quite simple to ensure that the ce'-lec?.or i.
~n ,Ls usually have collateral from other, and uc..: =c'ti' c
atc' of the information he collects. The fact tam=.`
~::, _aiso minimizes this risk. In any case, to d} i s
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 pproved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100030005-1
out c of, and intimate tho3 a u_Y;it- -'4 ~ _ ...
. x.:e1.li^;eiice Agency and leave tilt ..Jireci:o; oa Contr. L I v"3~i"
s nd to support production woLi i t ko away %,-hat
7tc "1 3 or the intelligence process. T' y ,s 3 ik '~ ctalt dot i.Gr.: iu c s i`_tw
pros:;;s and the product is predictable.
donee throe-h a high-level consumer council has much to
3. the Prevident should 4i_ ect tha; the .Directcr of
is r-.c ch to be desired, and the Review's 3u -estion that this ; ~i,
3irrv>ly ii;ntt vi . #.
7. rorrie mechanism to bring the consumer cioser to
r.,_cess