THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100040024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 10, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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10 February 1%7
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Inspector Cie eral' s Survey on roreign
Intelligeace Collection Requirements
1. This is a brilliant study for which the authors deserve
great credit. With the single exception of the section on the P11104
(which I will discuss later). I have no significant fault to find with the
exposition which tho survey provides of the present workings of the
requirements process or with the diagnosis of what is wrong with this
process. The specific recommendation* of the report for the most
part involve further examination of certain problem areas. IrAsofar
as these areas extend beyond the Agency and inv3Ive the community,
it would be helpful if the NUM_ &aft could participate or be consulted
before final action is taken. Specifically. reconsnendations 1. 2, 3,
IC 17, IS, 19, 20, 22 and 23 appear to me to fall in this category.
The balance of the recommendations involve action which is of exciu-
eive concern to components of the Agency. Any comments which I
NMe to offer on these recommendations are gratuitous as they must
obviously be dealt with within the line of cornrrsaz,d.
making.
Z. Three general observations rary. however, be worth
a. A strong Collection Ouidance Staff seems an
essential prerequisite to further progress in the
direction of greater rationalisation of intelligence
requirements and resoarces. All the recent stu.dies
which have been undertaken of various segments of
the intelligence effort the Ad hoc Study of &O INT 25X
Requirements. the Nolting Report, the Bissell Report, etc.)
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developed the same theme which is central to the
nt survey. This is the importsece of establishing
an effective dialogue between the users of intelligence
(i.e., the analytical components of Vie comneicnity,
particularly DM, DDS4T and 1134E in CIA) on the one
hand. and the collectors and processors of intelligence
data (NSA. Dl3P, tillt0. etc. ). The problem is to
familiarize the consumers of the product with the
potentialities and peculiarities of the ay-stems that
produce the product, and vice versa.
CIA must play a loading part in this process, The
ma *gement of the community mast inevitably turn to
CIA. in most cases, for objective guidance ?e to whether
Information is really necessary and why. it recent
proposal from NSA to onpand certain facilities in
affirms that some of the traffic which would be inter-
cepted by these facilities would provide "a wealth of
intelligence information on developments lel
But hoist much do we rainy need to kW./ about develop-
meatsbin I an not ev4geratiag that CIA can
answer is quesnon alone. It should however, take
the lead in finding out.
The Collection Guidance Stafi of IA wa designed
to fill the need for an instrumentality to bridge the gap
between busy analysts and busy collectors. It seems to
me to have worked well under difficult circumstances.
Given strong support and fail access to the 'forking details
of collection systems and programs, I believe that this
Staff can go a long ways towards providing the information
and analysis necessary to permit and support a realistic
and disciplined analysis of the intelligence community'.
informational needs.
b. As indicated aberve. I fully agree with the thought
that CIA must take the lead and bear the responsibility
in the effort to identify and refine our basic :Leeds.
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C. I also agre. that the DC1 is xn a strong position
to make his own views and the views of the Agency effective.
As pointed out in the report, the DCI is Chairman of USIB
and chairmen of all OSIB conarnitteei are directly responsive
to his deadership and, incidentally, with one exception, on
hie payroll. The DCI is also, as thr, report points out, *
member of the Executive Committee of the PIRO. His
representative. participate actively in the formulation
and review of aU Defense Department intelligence programs.
He ha. had the active support and eacouragement of the
Illu.reau of the Budget, the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Hoard and the President peraonally in connection
with his role as the coordinator of intelligence activities.
This role has been specifically defined as including the
responsibilityl jointly with the heady of departments
concerned. a ensuring the efficiency, as well as the
effectiveness, of foreign intelligence programs. An
essential element of this rele is the responsibility for
making a definitive ciatimmina.tiork of the needs of the Govern
-
*tient for intelligence.
3. The only recommendation of the report which gives me
hi. is recommendation 1, which calls for the establishment of
rnmittee to review DCID. Noe. 1/2 and 113. This recorn
sn ada ion is based on the portion of the report which deals with
sive priority national intelligence objectives end points
dequacie. in the present PN) list and in the process through
so-called priority objectives are established and applied
igence effort. The report says La effect that the PNIOs
and general to serve a. useful guidance for intelligence
t nobody pays any attention to then; and that they should
be sharply reduced. In effect the report proposes that we adopt, as
I intelligence priorities, what Sharman Kent refers
death'. category of issues or developments which, if
undetected, might threaten the very existence of the United States.
4. I think it is unfair to the Care Cimmitte. which estab-
lished the present PITiOs to suggest that they were unaware of the
problem. Otte trouble with any attempt to establish a basic list of
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fundarnetal intelligence objectives is the difficulty of getting any
two people to agree on what the list ought to lns. The report itself
illustrates this problem to some degree by suggesting that over.
preoccupation with Communism has diatorted intelligence thinking
and presumably oar attitude towards priorities. This U rsly
suggests the difficulty of achieving agreement as to what really
constitutes the most significant threat.
5. What seems to have puzzled the Cline Committee even
e difficulty of establishing a list of priority Objectives which
bject to the criticism of being either too broad and general
specific and ephemeral to serve any useful porpose. Early
warning is presumably on everybody's list oi PNI0s. Probably some
billion dollars' worth of intelligence activity is patified. one way or
another, by the need for early warning of an impending military attack.
Simply saying, or even establishing, that the activity contributes
something to "early warning." however, doesn't prove that it is a
priority activity. The Soviet missile program ii another example.
Presumably Soviet missiles constitute a militan threat of the first
order. To say this, however, is not very helpful geidance in deter-
mining which of the many collection systems which produce data on
missile, to expand or eliminate.
6. At the other end of the spectrorn, the signal from A213.4
associated engagement redar is probably too narrow, specific and
ephemeral a target to warrant inclusion in a list of P/410s although
It is certainly a priority objective.
7. What the Cline Committee dii in the face of this dilemma
wits to identify a number of broad problems Suct as missiles, early
warning, etc. It then recommended that some committee, staff or
other mechanism be established to subject these problems to continuing
analysis for the purpose of identifying those elements of the preblern
which could be resolved with available data; thore elements which
required additional analysis; and those which juktilied collection of
additional data. If such a mechanism were functioning today. it might
determine that we have enough pictures of ABM sites but require
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from L1NT, I ling
S. They lact that no att?mpt?
eo years ago was in some caapilAera
eussione with various senior offi7ials of the community
as of 1964, it would have been _Lifficult if not
establish a working staff in the iornmunity which
could p ch a function with any eifectivonees. My conclusion
at the time was that & staff or committee, chergee with that function.
was at host likely to develop into a harmless int totally eninfloantial
paper will, What / did dent the time was to try to etrengthon the
thartor and composition of the Critical CoUectioi Problems Committee
(CC PC) to give USIA at blast an improved competence to accomplish
a continuing review arid analysis of the collectior effort in priority
areal* and *Met whatevor improvement* appeared approprtato. including
the allocation of additional resources.
9. It now seorrLig to nto at least worthwhile ezaminiog the
p* Ability of giving this Committee of 03111 the ieepoasibility for a
*Miming review of priority national latelligente objectivas across
the board with a view to identifying the specific activities (analytie*1,
research, processing or collection) that appear..neded to assure optimum
coverage of or insight into the problem.
10. I have already re om E image in the iii
broaden its scope sad give it r.iporsib*Hty for *11 critical
programs. Properly itatfee, it sear s to me that it cos
clime in conneetton with the PNI0a eom.arabIa to the one
0.
11. In conclusion. I ahead nake it 4eam that I baire no
a review of DCII) 1/2 and 1/3by a grow, ander the chairman
DDI. I do not thiak, however, that, is the absence of somo
chastiser, a restatement of PI41K7e by iteelf is likely to
actove very much towards furtitor refinement aid abarveiting of the
fort.
ExDir- Comptroller
4 - DDI 3 - NIPE Chrono
DDS&T
9 - NIPS 141
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