INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS PRECEDING THE SANDINISTA TAKEOVER IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100100002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 12, 1984
• Content Type: MF

SECRET At %k
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
5X1
Senior Review Panel N I C 02286-84
12 April 1 9~4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Member, Senior Review Panel
SUBJECT: Intelligence Judgments Preceding the
Sandinista Takeover in Nicaragua
1. This is a brief response to your request of 19 December
1984, on which you enlarged in a meeting on 12 January 1984, to
examine turning points in the Nicaraguan store, and the extent to
which the Intelligence Community identified them and speculated
on possible outcomes.
2. In hindsight, it seems clear that the assassination of
Pedro Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, on 10 January 1978 was a
seminal event in the developing resistance to omoza. To that
point, the radical opposition--the FSLN--had never exceeded some
200 members in strength; suffered from internal dissension; and
had little appeal to or influence on the population as a whole.
The moderate opposition was almost totally inactive and
unorganized. Chamorro's assassination generated an explosion of
anti-Somoza sentiment and activities, despite the absence of any
evidence linking him to the event.
3. During the following year the Sandinistas grew by a
factor of ten. A countrywide strike in early 1978 was 80%
effective--something that would have been unheard of the
preceding year. And foreign support--largely military supplies
provided first by Panama and Venezuela anc later by Cuba via
Panama--increased dramatically.
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4. -The enormous impact and potential consequences of the
Chamorro assassination were increase in anti~Somozaiactivitylinby
the Community, although of
the Winter and Spring of 1978 was well reported. By mid-March
1978 one perceptive analyst, writing in the CIA Latin American
Weekly Review, identified the Chamorroinci denttasnhaving a bleak
triggered the release of long pent-up d
prospect for Somoza. The importance of the assassination was
still ignored in a September 1978 IIM on the Situation in
Nicaragua, the first Community paper since 19ut t Fe odds
were a ieved to be against Somoza finishing out nhisfiermminths
1981. Nevertheless, as late as February i 9
before -he left the country, Somoza's chances of finishing his
his chances NID,maondnthcbuerrfeonrte his
onthan
term were rated ilt latedbetter
intelligence vac
departure.
5. External support for the Sandinistas, especially from
Panama and Venezuela, were early noted as critical toe theyFSLN.
but apparl did
The Cuban connection was closely monitored,
not amount to more than ideological example, addices trrraieniinng
and safe-haven until 1979. Mexican suppp
general, were almost ignored. On the other hand, the effect of
the loss of US support and the impact of its disapproval of
Somoza's human rights record, were noted as prime contributors to
weakening his position.
SRP/DCI:HCR:tb
Distribution
Original - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDS Registry (blind copy)
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
1 - Ea SRP Member
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 :5(161F 9P86B00269RO01100100002-6