INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON IRAN, IN SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS PRECEDING SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL FAILURES: THE HAZARDS OF SINGLE-OUTCOME FORECASTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100100006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1984
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Intelligence Estimates on Irar, in Senior Review
Panel Report on Intelligence .'udgments Preceding
Significant Historical Failures: The Hazards of
Single-Outcome Forecasting
1. The Aborted NIE. In your memorandum of December 19,
commenting on the SRP report of December 16, you raised some
questions about our study of the estimative record on Iran. In
particular, you asked for a copy of the aborted NIE 34-1-78.
Copy was sent to you on December 23. This was dated August 23,
1978, and carried the title Iran: Continuity Through 1985; the
title was indicative of the basic theme, which avoided serious
speculation concerning any alternative to a continuation of the
Shah's regime. The cover note says an NFIB representatives'
meeting would be held on August 30, and NFI3 was scheduled to
consider it on September 12, 1978. NFIB never considered it, and
official burial by NFAC occurred on February 1 1979.
2. Speculation About the Shah. You have asked whether
there was speculation that t e S a_ was finished, and what the
alternatives might be. There was a little speculation in the
estimative work concerning the Shah, but only -n purely personal
terms: i.e., what would happen if he died, either of natural
causes or by assassination? Up until Novemoer 1978, the answer
was that the monarchy and political-social structure would
survive, held together by the Crown Prince, the Empress, the
elite, and the military.
What is interesting in this context is the apparent
absence of the kind of medical and psycho-medical analysis one
would have thought essential in a situation whire the individual
has such a key role. Judged by later event,, he Shah was not in
good physical health. Also much reporting on cnv--rations with
him showed him often depressed, moody, and `atolistic in his
reactons to the situation around him. (Mr. Amr,zegar, formerly
the Iranian IMF Executive Director, and now a (onsul*ant to the
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IMF, told me recently that the Shah went to his grave firmly
believing he had been overthrown as a result of a Soviet-US plot,
and that he hoped by leaving to save the throne for nis son.)
As indicated in our memorandum of December 16, it was
not until late November 1978 that the intelligence community
considered that the Shah might fall (tab K, p. 2, first
paragraph). A military regime was seen as c likely successor,
with a radical government based on the relicious opposition less
likely.
3. Senate Briefing Since writing the comnents for the
December 16 paper, Ihave come across an estimative item not
previo4sly at hand--a talking paper used in a briefing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 27, X978. The
briefing was done by a team headed by Bob Brwie, Director of
NFAC. The talking paper recognizes the substantial hut divided
opposition to the Shah, explains his reaction, says martial law
has greatly improved the situation, and precicts tha a
combination of reform, political liberty, and armed force will
put the Shah in a position where he "will probably meet the
challenge." Possibilities for overthrow anc a radical regime are
not mentioned. Copy of this paper is attached herewith.
4. Savak. Acquaintance over the years with various US
officials who were involved in Iranian relations has brought out
strongly the point that US views and intelligence we-e heavily
influenced by our long-term ties with Savak. Obviously effective
intelligence collection and analysis must be independent of other
national services, and in the Iranian case they clea'ly were not.
Attachment:
Briefing paper, "Situation in
Iran," dated 27 September 1978
ODCI/SRP/WCA:jsb
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI Registry (blind copy)
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
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