NOTE FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE FROM HELENE L. BOATNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 27, 1987
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B0c 9j QDJ 100110002-5
-`- Office of
Leadership Analysis
27 January 1987
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
anything, I can do to help.
1. Attached is one of the two copies of the
Iran post mortem that we have been able to
locate in Headquarters. We know of another in
OT&E. So far as we can tell without going to
the Records Center, it was distributed only
within the Office of Political Analysis. I, as
Director of Political Analysis, recommended
distribution to other offices and the other DD's
but Bruce Clary decided otherwise. He also
decided against distribution to INNP and DIA. I
can find no indication whetherV't tribution
outside the Agency was considered or undertaken.
2. We might be able to find out more by
going to the R--cords Center, but this would
probably take several days - especially with 21
people snowed in. Let me know whE if
L. Boatner
He 7D/IDA
Atts: Introductory Note
"Analysis of NFAC's Performance
on Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977
- 7 November 197$";
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
TOP SECRET
19 December 1979
Introductory note:
I am disseminating this report, completed under the aus-
pices of my predecessor as D/NFAC,because I believe it will
be helpful both to analysts and to managers in improving our
substantive product. Although it is directed to one issue at
one moment in history, it is a careful examination of some of
the pitfalls that are endemic to intelligence analysis. I
urge each of you to read it carefully and thoughtfully. I
particularly urge those of you who are line analysts and
first-line supervisors to draw from it useful ideas for
further improving our analytical work.
Bear in mind that this report was initiated and executed
as a limited endeavor. It was intended to look only at NFAC
itself within a short, specific time frame and in the light
of the circumstances that actually prevailed. It is not: ,
-- a retrospective analysis of the Iranian situation
-- a study of collection as well as analysis
-- an inquiry into the impact of policy on intelligence
-- an examination of the role of intelligence in
policymaking
-- an attempt to assess the role or competence of any
individual
Read it, therefore, for what it is. (C)
r Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Director
National Foreign Assessment Center
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
CONFIDENTIAL
NF:;C ~ 70 - 7 / -
5 October 1979
D/OPA-79-1152
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM : Helene L. Boatner
Director, Political Analysis
Next Steps on Iran Post-Mortem
1. I recommend fairly wide distribution of the Iran post-
mortem, because I believe it makes a number of valid suggestions for
the improvement of NFAC analysis. It is particularly, but by no means
exclusively, pertinent to the work of OPA. It is constructive in tone
and in my opinion generally fair and accurate. A recommended pattern
for distribution is attached.
2. If you agree, a number of steps need to be taken:
-- To attempt to deflect criticisms such as those made by
some who have already read it, of what the report is not,
I recommend an introductory note from you. A draft is
attached.
You should seek DCI permission for distribution. I need
an answer on this by next week if at all possible.
You should ask the DCI whether he wants to have the dis-
cussion of the report that Dr. Bowie apparently had
envisaged and may have promised him. If the DCI does
want such a discussion, you need to find out whether
he would like the two authors to participate. Both are
willing and still have the necessary clearances.
If dissemination is approved, OPA should clear dissemina-
tion outside NFAC with the DDO, since it includes material
still subject to their control.
to add a comment on his disagreemen on a matter of fact
It is fairly minor, and at the moment he is disinclined.
I should check again with on whether he wants 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Iran Post-Mortem
-- PPG should arrange for insertion of the introductory
note, printing of additional copies if that is neces-
sary, and distribution.
3. For your information, I am returning the various comments on
the report that were sent to Dr. Bowie, as well as the memoranda be-
tween him and the authors.
ne L. oatner
Her
Attachments:
as stated
The entire contents of this memorandum
are classified CONFIDENTIAL.
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Iran Post-Mortem
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - OPA Chrono
1 - OPA/PROD/MISC
NFAC/D/OPA/BOATNER:
(50ct79)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86BOO269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
14 June 1979
ME!4)RANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FRC61:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE :
Transmittal of "Analysis of NFAC's Performance
on Iran's Domestic Crisis, mid-1977 - 7 November 1978"
Memorandum for the Record from Robert R. Bowie,
"Retrospective Examination of Analysis on Iran
and the Data on Which It Was Based," 22 November 1978
1. Attached is our report on NFAC's performance in 1977-78.
It draws on all types of information available to NFAC. (AIUO)
2. This report is directed primarily to you but we have
written it in a way that we think it will be of use to others. We
recommend that you make it available to senior managers, middle
managers, and analysts in NFAC. We believe they will find much
that is of general interest to them in it. (Additional copies are
being held in PPG.) (AIUO)
3. We wish to note that we received strong cooperation from
all those in NFAC who dealt with Iran during the period. We also
received excellent assistance from support elements in NFAC, particu-
larly--but by no means exclusively- -Information Services Group of OCR.(AIUO)
4. This report was made available in draft to people in NFAC
who were involved in analysis of the Iranian situation, most of whom
gave us comments from which we benefited. It was also reviewed in
draft by a panel composed of three experienced NFAC officers and
three cleared consultants--none of whom had been directly involved
in Iranian matters. We found their comments very helpful but the
judgments and opinions in this report remain our exclusive responsi-
bility. (AIUO)
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Transmittal of "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's
Domestic Crisis, mid-1977 - 7 November 1978 (AIUO)
5. We would be pleased to discuss with you all or any part
of this report. (AIUO)
Attachments:
1 - Agenda for Panel Review Meeting
2 - "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis,
mid-1977 - 7 November 1978"
cc: DD/NFAC
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
2,501
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
4 December 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM
Chief, Planning, Management, and Evaluation Staff
1. You asked me to advise you on the disposition of the Iran
paper. I have had a brief discussion with D/OPA, and suggest the
following courses of action:
a. OPA has reserved in January to
,, conduct some business that win focus on ranchief problems,
attitudes, and needs. Helene has tentatively thought that she
would like the branch chiefs and division chiefs to read the post
j mortem before that meeting. She would commission a small panel
from the group to work hard on the study, drawing from it the key
points for the branch chiefs. The group would then discuss the
findings.
AeconurleI1udL1UI1; IcL lease eIlougn copies or Llle report ror
OPA division chiefs and branch chiefs, and encourage Helene to
pursue this course. If this is a fruitful experience, release the
report to other offices for similar purposes. The key factor in
this plan is that the report will be studied in a structured way.
That way everyone will consider the same issues and key lessons
will be blis-yhted.
b. The Advanced Analyst Seminar run by OTR for NFAC spends a
great deal of time studying mind sets, analysts attitudes toward
changing data, perceptions, and analyst thought processes. This
post morters would make an excellent case study for use in that
course--again under conditions that permit serious exchanges of
views about key lessons.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRE
Recommendation: Release 15 copies of this study to
OTR for use as case material in the Advanced Analyst Seminar.
2. If you agree to these recommendations, PPG will have to
be authorized to print additional copies.
cc: Director of Political Analysis
All portions of this memo are classified SE
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
ATTACHMENT I
Recommended Distribution:
OPA to branch chief level
ther production offices to Division Chief level
One each to the other DDs and to the Chief of NE Division,
DDO, with a note indicating that other copies are avail-
r
VV
able on a selective basis if desired and how to obtain
them.
One each to the Directors of INR and DIA. (?
VX
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
23 July 1979
Memorandum for Dr. Bowie
Subject: Comments re "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's
Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977 to 7 November 1978" dated
15 June 1979
1. In examining the subject postmortem analysis, it
should first be noted that it was a limited effort. It was
basically limited to the information available to NFAC
analysts without the benefit of State, Defense, and CIA
electronic messages and telephone conversations that were
closely held. Moreover, the analysis did not delve very
deeply into US policy aspects which had enormous influence
over both the analytical and operational/collection sides of
the Intelligence Community. Thus, a broader examination of
the matter would no doubt lead to some much different con-
clusions. In my own view, our "failure" in Iran was
considerably more one of a policy nature, to include the
lack of adequate policy-intelligence linkage, than an
intelligence breakdown.
2. Within the relatively narrow bounds of this effort,
I feel that the authors of the analysis did a good job; their
analysis is detailed, comprehensive, coherent and reasonably
free of bias. They have tried to identify those aspects of
this inquiry where hindsight has influenced their views, but
by their own admission, it is not possible to eliminate
hindsight entirely.
3. Again, given the limitations of the study, I agree
with the thrust of the author's main conclusions; namely that:
a. There were major deficiencies in the
information received from the field.
ALL PORTIONS ARE
CLASSIFIED SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
EYES ONLY
Subject: Comments re "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on
Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977 to 7 November
1978" dated 15 June 1979
b. There was a partial failure to challenge
underlying beliefs and assumptions, and focus on
the most important questions. Faith in the strength
of the regime; the Shah's willingness to use force
which in fact would save the situation (a dual
assumption); a conviction that the opposition was
weak and divided, and could not unite effectively--
these were among the most important beliefs and
assumptions. (Not realizing that the preservation
of the Iranian Armed Forces was essential and central
to the survival of a moderate government, with or
without the monarchy--this is an example of a failure
to link policy and intelligence.)
c. Current events drove the intelligence effort
with respect to Iran.
d. The managerial chain of responsibility did
not adequately review intelligence production in a
substantive sense.
e. The Intelligence Community lacks an estimative
mechanism which can focus on the issues important to
policymakers and produce analytical papers in a timely
manner.
4. Finally, I feel that the authors might have gained
some insights by tracing previous intelligence estimates on
Iran and including an examination of the Iranian military
buildup in their inquiry. To illustrate:
a. After the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran
and the return of the Shah to the country in 1953,
and on into the early 1960s, the strength and
stability of the Shah's regime was a constant source
of American concern. This is reflected in NIEs on
Iran of February 1960, February 1961, September 1962,
April 1963, and May 1964.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
EYES ONLY
Subject: Comments re "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on
Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977 to 7 November
1978" dated 15 June 1979
b. In the mid-1960s, apparently in the belief
that the regime had grown much stronger and was no
longer unstable, a shift in the outlook of the
Intelligence Community towards Iran occurred.
National estimates now indicated that the Shah was
in solid control, his White Revolution was working,
and the opposition was weak and divided. This is
reflected in NIEs on Iran of March 1966, May 1968,
September 1970, June 1973 and May 1975. However,
the last NIE, May 1975, after seeing "little prospects
during the next few years for a serious challenge to
the Shah's total control", also saw that "strains
within Iranian society seem destined to grow as other
sectors of life modernize and the pressure for political
participation becomes more insistent."
c. Soon after the election of President Nixon
in 1968, the so-called "Nixon Doctrine" was enunciated
in early 1969. This doctrine, among other things,
reemphasized the need for the United States to pursue
a strategy of collective security, but with a regional
defense policy which emphasized the use of the
indigenous forces of our friends and allies in the
region, particularly their ground forces, looking to
an American contribution of primarily air and naval
support. Under this doctrine, Iran was to be the
regional power in the Persian Gulf to fill the role
previously played by British forces and the United
States sold to Iran practically every new, sophisticated
military system we developed except strategic nuclear
weapons systems. We helped build a large, modern jet
air force, one of the largest military helicopter fleets
in the world, a large, modern army, and quite a
respectable navy. A horde of American citizens (retired
military, defense industry representatives, civilian
technicians, etc., and their dependents in some cases),
totaling over 40,000, inundated the Iranian military.
(The Americans involved in this buildup had long felt
that although Iranians can operate such sophisticated
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
EYES ONLY
Subject: Comments re "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on
Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977 to 7 November
1978" dated 15 June 1979
gear, they cannot maintain it without a substantial
American/foreign presence in the country.) The
impact of this American involvement had to have
undesirable social/cultural, political, and
psychological effects in Iran, not to mention the
consequences of diverting large Iranian resources
to expand and modernize a defense establishment
whose mission, nature, size and sophistication were
open to question. (The NIE on Iran of May 1975 does
touch on this problem.)
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
19 July 1979
1. The principal thrust of the Post-Mortern (P-M) is
the concept that NFAC (as the rest of the analytic commu-
nity) performed inadequately with respect to Iran in 1978
primarily because the analysts held a firm pre-crisis view
of Iran which caused them to give inadequate weight to
pieces of evidence tending to contradict this view. Two
misconceptions are cited in the P-M as fundamental:
--that the Shah would use force effectively to
suppress the opposition should he believe he
was in serious risk of losing control of
events, and
--that the opposition would split rather than
follow the extreme position insisted upon by
Khomeini.
2. Essentially I agree with the above position, al-
though I believe the P-M overstates and oversimplifies it.
At times the P-M even misrepresents the facts when they seem
to contradict its thesis. For example, in Paragraph 48 it
states that the drafting of the NIE on Iran "started early
in 1978 because it had been several years since the last NIE
was completed; it was not a response to specific events."
This is simply not accurate. The standard of passage of time
since the last NIE would have put other countries ahead of
Iran. I alone was responsible for recommending the scheduling
of the Iran NIE to NFAC management and there were two principal
reasons for my making this recommendation:
--the rather violent Community reaction to the
suggestions in Admiral Turner's 1977 AWACS letter
that the Shah's government might be subject to
political and/or security weaknesses indicated to
me that there were differences within the Intel-
ligence Community regarding the stability of a
nation important to our foreign policy, and
-information about collaboration between the
un erground leftists and the underground religious
rightists, compounded by the apparent inability of
SAVAK to make progress in suppressing these under-
grounds, caused me concern that the Community was
giving too little weight to these indications of
potentially effective opposition to the Shah.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
3. The motivation for my recommending the NIE, there-
fore, does not in fact support the theory that we went wrong
because of our strongly held views--nor does my title, "Iran:
How Reliable an Ally?"
4. The P-M makes the valid point that NFAC predictions
were hampered by the fact that in many ways the Iranian revo-
lution was unprecedented ("a major discontinuity" the P-M--
unfortunately--calls it) in that an entrenched regime with
the support of a well equipped military force was overthrown
by an unarmed mob. Also, the P-M notes, the past success of
the Shah in overcoming organized large scale opposition as
well as the demonstrated willingness of the armed forces to
carry out his orders in dealing with the populace reinforced
pre-existing beliefs that the regime could--and would--prevail.
Further, there was conventional wisdom that pro-Western dicta-
torships are overthrown by the left, not the right.
5. The P-M observation that we are hampered by our
tendency to try to give secular explanations for religiously
motivated behavior is also valid and was particularly obvious
to me during my service in NFAC (DDO officers, at least those
with long Asian experience, have learned better). As an NIO
I noticed this to be a problem particularly with analysts of
Israel who never thought I was serious when I urged them to
read Genesis--if necessary in the English translation. Earlier
this week in the NID I read a long article on the Arabs of
Khuzistan and found myself interested in the question of whether
they are Shia (as are most Iraqi Arabs) or Sunni--only to end
in frustration as the subject was never touched on. So the
problem remains.
6. Unfortunately I cannot wholly agree with the P-M
conclusion that there was no effort to influence analysis to
support policy. As I recall, the DIA representatives were
under orders to oppose my title, "Iran: How Reliable an Ally?"
because it seemed to cast doubt on the wisdom of our military
aid program.
7. The above notes are written off the top of my head
without the benefit of any files or research, so there may
well be an odd error of detail. Also, it should be remembered
that I left NFAC at the end of July 1978, so I have minimal
official knowledge of Iranian related events thereafter.
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
EYES ONLY
26 July 1979
Memorandum for Mr. Bowie
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
I. Report as a Whole
1. The examination of finished intelligence
on Iran over an eighteen months period contains a number of
useful insights and constitutes an interesting and informative
case study of certain aspects of the analytical problem.
2. But the study has severe limitations and serious
weaknesses. Some of these are inherent in the design of the
study. Others, probably more important, lie in the report's
failure to develop a concept of the role of intelligence
analysis in policymaking--to situate NFAC in that process--
and to consider the relationship between intelligence and
policy. These inadequacies in scope make the study less an
overall performance appraisal than a fairly sterile documentary
analysis, which may too easily be read as a search for scape-
goats among a handful of Iranian analysts and the management
chain in NFAC for what it chooses to term "an obvious intelli-
gence failure".
obscure, rather than
t ma
y
3. In so doing, the repor
highlight, the more important lessons to be learned from the
Iranian case.
II. Limitations in the Design of the Study
4. A very short time frame is used: summer of 1977 to
November 1978.
5. The study is an examination of "only the information quality that was available to NFAC time improve it."
that information or- what
(Introductory Note)
6. The authors note "several deficiencies in the infor-
mation available", but they state that "the subject ~~of
nvestigation (12).
collection is beyond the scope of our investigation"
ALL PORTIONS
ARE SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
Collection and analysis are two of the elements involved.
There is a third--and more important--dimension of the
problem: The relation between policy and analysis. The
report has little to say about the preponderant weight of
US policy and attitudes in the swiftly moving Iranian
situation the analysts were called upon to examine--or
about the effect those policies might have in altering
at the most critical junctures the ratio of forces in a
rapidly disintegrating environment.
7. At one point the authors note that "feedback from
policymakers would have helped in choosing alternative
interpretations to be treated" (iv). At another, they
observe that, "in the succeeding year after" the US
Government made its decision to push the Shah to liberalize,
NFAC's discussions of the problems involved were never
"more than a few sentences long" (5b). It does not seem to
have occurred to the authors that a closer relationship
between policymakers and the Intelligence Community might
have had advantages in assessing the implications or
consequences of policy options before decisions were taken
on the directions and use of US influence.
III. Results
8. Limitations in design often result in limitations
in product. What the study presents, in sum, is an exegesis
of texts, an analysis of manuscripts--in which the post-
morticians grade a mixed score card of published materials.
The product is less a single critique than three separate
studies woven together:
-- the postmortem itself
-- an essay on management and organization
-- an independent analysis of Iranian
events
Each of these bears a brief look.
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
9. Retrospective Analysis What the authors think
they would have concluded--or examined differently--or
qualified in lesser or greater degree--is of course closer
to the mark. It is also possibly the least interesting
part of the study. They have much of interest to say about
such matters as the nature of Khomeini's appeals, the
strength of the religious opposition, the Shah's moods, the
political effects of economic slow-down, and the attitudes
of non-elite groups--much of which has analytic value. But
their analysis of the key elements in the Iranian revolution
(as contained in the sections of the report following p. 53)
has surprising omissions as an illustration of what the authors
maintain "a sustained and thorough evaluation of the most
important questions" (21) would have involved. It is a bit
surprising to find so little by way of a critque of analysis,
or estimative judgments, or available information on such
matters as:
-- the early and progressive organization of
the opposition (money, agents, initial
weapons, communications, linkages)
-- the effects of corruption, at many levels
of Iranian officialdom
-- reactions to repression and SAVAK operations
-- differential impacts of inflation, living
standards and social mobilities on Iranian
expectations
-- demographic changes in age groups, organization,
unemployment
-- land reform (decreasing small-holder incomes,
transfer of mosque estates to the Pahlevis,
operations of the Shah's village agents)
-- special role of the trade unions (particularly
in the oil fields)
-- student organization and agitation, at home
and abroad
-- bases of an apparently widespread anti-
Americanism below elite levels
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
Retro-respective views of Iranian events might have been
expected to deal with many, if not most, of these matters.
10. Management/Organization Essay The authors seem
to have in mind an organizational model which differs from
NFAC, and much of their analysis reflects their preferences
for:
-- a more directed research effort. They
write: "management must take the burden
of re-ordering priorities and ordering
that selected in-depth studies be under-
taken. Working level analysts cannot
be expected to take the initiative in
shifting from the normal mode of analysis
to one that is more appropriate to the
situation" (20).
-- an office of estimates. The authors observe
that the present lack of a separate NFAC
mechanism with estimative capacities "may
have contributed to the difficulties" (41).
They note that "the mechanism that once
existed where a current office and an
estimative office looked at issues from their
different perspectives was not a cure-all,
but it did offer on a regular basis opportunity
for different approaches to surface" (vi).
"The exchange involved sharpened argument
and caused people to examine assumptions...
Its demise is a considerable loss" (33).
Absent such a mechanism, they appear to
suggest the problem is insoluable: Analysts
today have been "conditioned over years to
keep an eye as close as possible to the
facts and reports rather than draw out the
implications... The system. . .has stronger
incentives for writing for the NID" (23).
They conclude that "when people are not
used to writing analytical papers, one
cannot expect them to be able to do so
when the need arises" (26).
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
11. These reflections seem part of those "general
beliefs", about which the authors dilate elsewhere, that
they feel largely pre-determined the subsequent analysis
of the Iranian problem. Their view of analysts, particularly
those at senior level, seems curiously constricted. But
those who hold similar organizational preferences will no
doubt be more responsive to the line of criticism which the
authors make of NFAC performance during the period reviewed--
criticisms which in turn generally reinforce their predilections
on desirable organizational mold. The point is not so much
that the authors' arguments are right or wrong, but that their
implicit assumption appears to color much of their own
analysis. The case for a revised or a revived estimates
office should be argued on its own merits. (The old Board
mechanism is not generally remembered for its immaculate
record of Iranian prediction.)
12. Postmortem Two'initial points should perhaps be
-- No other intelligence service, whatever
its organizational form, appears to
have done much better.
-- The report's specific findings on NFAC
performance in the 1977-78 have an
unusually tentative and qualified nature.
13. The postmortem itself involves at least several
separate matters: (a) underlying conceptions, (b) analytical
judgments, (c) process and performance.
(a) 'Underlying Conceptions The authors' most
basic judgments appear to be t Fat: "The problem lay
less in incorrect interpretation of specific bits of
information than in a misleading analysis of the
situation which pre-dated the crisis" (5) --that
variations in analyst performance were attributable
to "general beliefs about Iran which long pre-dated"
the protests (4) --that those beliefs were in turn
related to whether the analyst was a "liberal or
conservative" person (5) --and that the authors could
not analyze "how and why this belief formed" (6).
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
This underlying concept--in which epistemology replaces
analytics--presents a number of problems. If accepted, it
would undercut much of the report's subsequent critique.
It would provide a somewhat uncertain criterion for the
future selection and training of NFAC staff. And in a
period in which crises were still unresolved, it would
not provide much help to policymakers weighing their
current options. The "general beliefs" argument may account
for a fundament. ambiguity in the study which the drafters
never openly confront or clearly resolve: whether there was
an inevitability to the course of events in Iran which a
"non-misleading analysis", long pre-dating the crisis, should
have foreseen from the beginning--or whether the Iranian
outcome lacked pre-determination, turned on options and
decisions which were not fore-ordained, and remained in
question until a very late stage. Was there inevitability
in the overthrow of the Pahlevi dynasty? If not, how long
was the outcome in doubt? If so, how much earlier than
November, 1978 should it have been foreseen? Despite
their meticulous inquiry, the authors never offer an
explicit findings on these questions which would seem to
be basic to the formulation of an opinion on NFAC's performance.
(b) Analytic Performance Apart from suggestions
of how the authors believe they would have handled certain
aspects of the problem differently, their judgments on
the specific conclusions reached by the analysts at the
time events were unfolding, are exceedingly diffident
an dtempered. As examples:
-- "...even in retrospect it is hard to say
why he (the Shah) did not crack down" (ix)
-- "No definitive answers were possible, but
a more thorough weighing of the evidence
and a more penetrating analysis of the
problem were" (xi)
-- (White Revolution) The problem of liberalizing
a repressive regime "was great enough to
have called for much more attention and
analysis" (65). Analysis which was made
was "plausible", "made sense", "made
eminent sense", but was also "a typically
American view" (sic). The authors note
that they differ on the extent to which
such ethnocentrism may have affected
intelligence production" (66-67)
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Subject: Notes on the Iranian Postmortem
-- (Shah's willingness to use force)
Various signs should have been noted,
"but it would have been impossible to
say exactly how significant they
were" (71)
-- (Splits in the opposition) "This is
not to say that the evidence was so
overwhelming that the analysts should
have automatically accepted it. But
there should have been a probing of
the reports..." (94) "No definitive
answers were possible, but a more
thorough weighing of the evidence and
a more penetrating analysis of the
problems were." (95)
-- (Religious Opposition) "Unless one used
that (a pro-Khomeini, anti-Shah)
perspective, the evidence would not
stand out as especially significant"
(107)
-- (Contacts) "The most they (the analysts)
could have done was to have pointed out
that vital information was lacking and
to have asked for a change in the
priorities of information collection
in the field" (130)
-- (Policy Biases) Policy did not have a
strong and direct impact on analysis.
"But we cannot completely rule out the
possibility that the subtle influence
of US policy may have made it a bit
harder for the analysts to realize that
the Shah's position was becoming
precarious" (131)
The foregoing quotations--largely from the italicized
"Conclusions and Evaluation" sections of individual chapters--
have an elusive quality. No explicit judgments are given on
what "more probing", "more thorough weighing", etc. would
have produced. They stand in some contrast with the values
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
Subject: Notes on the Iranian Postmortem
the study elsewhere attaches to "sharp and explicit
predictions" by analysts. And, as the authors note
elsewhere "it is much harder to tell whether there was
an intelligence failure in (the sense that)-given the
information available, did NFAC ignore or misinterpret
events in ways and to an extent that consumers can
legitimately expect should not and will not occur." (i)
(c) Process and Performance Similarly, in
dealing wit the particulars of-the people involved and
their interactions, the study seems reluctant to come
to grips with specifics:
(i) Analysts A total of 5.6 analysts on Iran
are noted. There are a few generally favorable
references to the senior analyst; little on the
others. The study obviously considers their
products, in greater or lesser degree, inadequate,
but avoids the more central question of the
competence of the analysts for their tasks,
in such matters as selection, background, training,
and previous evaluation. Were there variations
in their individual performance or output? Were
the published assessments mainly individual or
joint products? If both, which was more effective?
Were there differences in their coordination
nrnrfircc ahilitipC to intPCratP Cnmmiinity
correspond with length of experience, tenure on
Iran, language capability, field trips, advanced
training, if any? The study does not treat such
matters. Its undifferentiated use of the term
"the analysts" is not of much help to managers
seeking to improve performance.
(ii) Management Similarly the study uses
"management and "managers" scores of time without
discrimination or definition. What was the
approval chain above "the analysts", and how
numerous and layered? What is the evidence for
"an absence of substantive review", as asserted
in the author's statement that: "In the case of
Iran, there was also a failure of what can be
called intellectual or analytical management in
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
the absence of substantive review of what the
analysts were writing." (26) Were there no
exceptions? Where in the management chain,
should critical, substantive reviews have been
made? How many times? At what levels? Where
did the breakdown in systematic evaluation
occur? How was coordination carried out among
the analysts and between NFAC's several offices
concerned with Iran? With what results? Was
this, in practice, an analyst or a management
responsibility? What should it have been? Were
there no challenges to NFAC's analysis on Iran
by other agencies prior to meetings on a prospective
NIE in the fall of 1978? What was the nature of
NFAC-DDO relationships during the period? Were
there differences in NFAC and
If not, this bears on NFAC per ormance. If so,
whose management responsibility was it to probe
for discrepant bases? The study does not tell
us much about how the system worked in practice.
(iii) NIO Performance A curious picture
emerges: The NIO is said to have shifted his
view to distrust of the Shah's capacities in early
October 1978 (76)...to have lost faith in the
political analysts' judgment about the same time
(35)...not to have engaged in full exchanges
of opinion with them (55)...to have been uncom-
municative about inter-agency meetings on Iran (35).
If these matters were regarded as significant for
NFAC's performance, was there an indicated remedy
short of the re-establishment of an estimative
office? If so, why was it not pursued? What was
the general relationship between the "managers"
at office levels and the NIO during this period?
What should it have been? What accounted for the
difference? A related series of questions might
concern the State Desk Officer, whom the authors
admiringly identify as "probably the most
pessimistic official in the government" (34).
What is the evidence for this description? When
and at what point and on what issues did this
officer dissent or demur from NFAC's analytic
community? Were his views known to "the managers"
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
Subject: Notes on the Iran Postmortem
and "the analysts"? If not, why not? Were his
views well grounded or the products of "general
beliefs"? Why did INR disregard, or fail to
relay,them to NFAC?
14. These matters seem far from peripheral to an
exercise styled an "Analysis of NFAC's Performance on
Iran's Domestic Crisis". Textual criticism alone is
flat and one-dimensional, and, whatever its merits for
documentary analysis, should not of itself constitute
a performance appraisal.
IV. Summary
15. The issues touched upon in the study are broader
than those analyzed by a report which is essentially a
documentary critique. They include the basic question
of how the United States Government organized itself to
report on Iranian developments as an integral part of
the policymaking process--the place of NFAC in that process
and in that integration of effort--and the specific
operations of NFAC which resulted in its finished production.
The study is interesting and informative, and
obvious y done with painstaking care. For reasons noted above,
it should not be regarded as a definitive appraisal of NFAC
performance on the Iranian crisis.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
NFAC #5170-78
22 November 1978
MEMORAKOU1i FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT: Retrospective Examination of Analysis on Iran and the Data
v;1'3i sd a s.Yi
1. This memorandum establishes a two-man team to examine the
record of NFAC analysis on the Iranian domestic political situation
over the past year or so. I wish to determine if we in NFAC have
failed to use information, did not have information, have allowed
judgments to be determined by a mind-set, have not pushed.the system
to produce data, and so on.
2. Accordingly, I have asked cleared NFAC
consultant and Professor of Political Science! and
25X1
ormer y Deputy Director
OT ine ices o Political Research and Regional and Political
Analysis, is a Middle East specialist of long standing who has
served in the' Clandestine Services and the Office of National
Estimates as well as in NFAC. The two provide a balanced team of
one person experienced in methodology and another with more tradi
tional area and disciplinary background.
3. Messrs. are to undertake an examination
of the field reporting on Iranian domestic affairs for the past
12-18 months. This is to cover reporting from DDO, the US Embassy,
the Military Attache, COMINT, and unclassified sources. They are
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SUBJECT: Retrospective Examination of Analysis on Iran and the
Data on Which It Was Based
to match the reporting, in a chronological balance sheet, as
it were, with the analytical and reporting output of NFAC. This
approach will enable them to produce systematic evaluation of
how the available data was used (or not used) in analysis of the
Iranian situation.
4. Messrs. will work under my authority
and submit their report to me. They will have access to all
information and to all NFAC output. I anticipate that they will
get needed cooperation from other Agency components. Their
report will, drawing on the balance sheet referred to above,
reach judgments on the quality of our analytical performance,
on our use of information, on the adequacy of information and the
'like. Should they disagree, I expect each to present his judg-
ment, buttressed by appropriate argument.
5. 1 believe that a situation such as that in Iran, in
which developments have run counter to conventional wisdom,
offers us an opportunity to examine the way we do our business,
to search out analytical, conceptual, informational, resource r,r
other weaknesses and to take steps to remedy such weaknesses as
are found. Lessons learned in this examination should be appli-
cable to intelligence analysis in other areas.
Robert R. Bowie
cc: D/ORPA
ORPA
-2-
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
20 July 1979
These comments are my first reaction upon completing the report on
the NFAC performance on Iran in 1978.
1. The report seems to me to be much affected by hindsight
despite the express recognition of this danger. The premise that
the events which took place were bound to happen underlies much
of the discussion. There does not seem to be any element of
contingency where events might have taken a different turn had
conditions been different or had the Shah or others followed a
different course. My perception of the way in which events unfolded
was certainly different at the time. That, of course, could be a
mistake. But even in retrospect, I cannot convince myself that the
actual course of events was inevitable until rather later than is
implied in much of the discussion of the report.
2. The report stresses the fact that two assumptions which
underlay much of the analysis proved to be wrong:
a. that the Shah would actually use force to supress the
opposition if he thought there was a serious chance
of his losing control, and
b. that the opposition had split.
The first of these premises certainly did affect much of the analysis
In view of the past it would not seem reasonable to expect substantial
evidence to have reached the contrary view, especially since the Shah
was clearly in full control of the army and SAVAK.
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
3. My memory of the second premise is somewhat different.
It was not assumed that the opposition had split but rather that it
would not coalesce under Khomeini. No effort was devoted to trying
to analyze the sources of discontent of the different groups. This
indicated the extreme disparity among them and the divergence in
what they objected to in the Shah's rule. We also supported the view
that a number of these groups actually preferred that the monarchy
should continue though essentially as a constitutional monarchy with
greatly reduced powers. Since this was diametrically opposite to
Khomeini's commitment to get rid of the Shah, it did not seem probable
that the various groups would be united with the sole aim of getting
rid of the Shah. Events in the last six months have certainly shown
how widely the various groups did differ and still do about what they
really wanted to achieve.
4. The report recognizes that on many points our problem was
the evidence available to the analysts. Yet it does not seem to me
to give adequate weight of the effect of this on their conclusions.
At various points the report refers to the estimates in the fifties
and sixties which stressed the weakness of the Shah and the likelihood
that he would not be able to maintain his throne (usually the Fall
that is placed just beyond the period of the estimate as I recall
it). The experience of nearly twenty years during which the estimates
had cried wolf must have induced some self-doubt on the part of the
analysts. The fact that the estimates had been repeatedly proven
wrong and that the Shah had indeed endured should have led any
analyst to await persuasive evidence before finding that the Shah was
doomed when the evidence was so fragmentary and obviously so limited
regarding the strength and extent of the opposition. This certainly
contributed to the hesitation of analysts to reach a final judgment
that the Shah would not be able to surmount the turmoil of the 1978
period.
5. My memory is that in late August the NIE was presented to
me in draft. At that time I took issue with what seemed to me the
conflict between two portions of the estimate, (a) the discussion of
the Shah tended to indicate great confidence and continuity either
through his own continuing to hold the throne or by the continuance
of the same policy even if lie were succeeded by his son or by a
military regime, and (b) the analysis of the problems which faced
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
Iran over the coming years. I felt that those problems surely made
even the continuance of the monarchy more doubtful or uncertain than
the estimate flowed, although I did not anticipate that his throne
would be in jeopardy so soon.
6. I want to also reread my testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in September. My recollection is that I indicated
pretty clearly that I found that (a) the opposition was substantial
and extensive though highly divergent in its aims, (b) that the
threat to the Shah was real and substantial but that (c) on balance
he still would have a good chance to surmount the troubles. My
assumption, as I recall it, was that he would show the skill to
reach out and tap the moderate forces which seemed to want continuance
of a constitutional monarchy and that he would be prepared to make the
changes in actual power which were required for that result. The second
assumption was that he had the means to repress the more extreme
opposition and would be prepared to use them. Both of these premises
turned out to be wrong but even as late as September and October they
did not seem to me to be unreasonable on the basis of past experience
and the evidence up to that time.
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
17 July 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Bowie
SUBJECT: Post-mortem
Critique of the Post-mortem
1. The post-mortem is done with great care and
conspicuous analytical acumen.
2. The overall judgments are close to the mark.
Obviously, NFAC failed to anticipate the course of events
in Iran that took place late in 1978. It is also correct
to say that NFAC did receive some evidence that pointed
to the Shah's vulnerability. On the critical question
of whether or not NFAC's estimates were unreasonable in
the light of all information, and thus on whether there
was a culpable intelligence failure, the post-mortem
does not give a flat answer. The refusal to give a
flat answer is clearly laudable. A flat answer, one way
or another, is not supportable. The realistic question
had to center on the degree (and, of course, kind) of
estimative weakness. Here the balance of judgment
elaborated in the post-mortem points to a higher degree
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : C - 01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
of unreasonable failure than can be defended conclusively.
Even though the authors know and acknowledge the difficulty
of evaluating estimates made before the advent of hindsight,
they do not seem to have overcome this difficulty completely.
Indeed, there is considerable evidence for the thesis that
the constraints of hindsight knowledge cannot be entirely
neutralized in the process of post-mortem judgment.
3. It is also important to clarify the precise object
of estimative failure. The Iranian revolution was clearly
an unusual, virtually unprecedented, event which nobody,
not even the Iranian revolutionaries themselves, were able
to foresee in detail. The authors of the post-mortem, there-
fore, were right in limiting the object of intelligence failure
to the Shah's ability to stay on top and to the strength of
his opposition. Any attempt to do more, that is, to estimate
not the probability of revolution but its precise evolution
would have come up against an intractable order of difficulty.
4. While the post-mortem is a bit too harsh in
estimating the degree of intelligence failure, it is in any case
the identification and discussion of the reasons to which this
failure (whatever its true degree) 'is to be attributed that
constitutes the principal value of the post-mortem.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA- 01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
5. This contribution of the post-mortem deserves
serious study. There is nothing new in the analytical frame-
work which the authors bring to bear. The underlying model is
taken from existing intelligence theory, especially the theory
of threat perception
Factors Contributing to "Intelligence Failure"
according to post-mortem)
6. The main factor is the prevalence of strong
assumptions about the Iranian political situation, especially
the assumption that the Shah was basically strong and could
survive any likely challenge and the assumption that the
opposition was divided and weak. Given the persistence of
these pre-existing beliefs, the importance of conflicting
information was downplayed. Conflicting information did not
induce a re-examination of basic preconceptions.
7. Related to this fundamental factor of preconception
is the absence of routinely subjecting information to
alternative analytical assumptions in all crucial cases. (The
problem here is that critical cases may not be recognized when
one basic preconception is almost uniformly and strongly held.)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RE
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
8. The prevalent assumptions were also supported by
certain prejudices, i.e., that modernization tends to be
stabilizing, that the Shah's liberalizing policy was good
and likely to be stabilizing, and that religious factors
were not a major or key determinant of Iranian behavior.
9. For a number of reasons, information on the Iranian
domestic situation was inadequate. The main reason, in line
with the assumption that the Shah's hold on power was solid,
was that information on Iranian domestic politics had a
relatively low priority. Informational contact was over-
whelmingly with the Iranian government and elite.
10. Another basic factor contributing to the intelligence
failure was the format of NFAC intelligence production and
the norms that guide it. The main emphasis is on a -reporting of
recent events that stays as close to the "facts" as possible.
The piecemeal nature of this reporting discourages a new look
at the stream of information that cumulates over time. When
a formal estimate is laid on, the prevalent production process
discourages indepth analysis. One cannot tell from the product
how analysts arrived at the conclusions which are commonly only
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
asserted and not supported by sufficient evidence. The
disinclinations to entertain alternative underlying assumptions and
he inclination
to state the chosen assumption explicitly, andt/to refrain from
making sharp predictions obstruct the analysts' understanding
of the implications of their driving beliefs.
11. An insufficient pool of knowledgeable analysts
added to the weaknesses of the production process. Undue
emphasis on frequent reporting reduces the resources available
for estimative analysis. Lack of numbers also is one reason
why there is little peer-group review and discussion. (The
fact that most analysts are isolated is another reason for
this lack.)
12. Analysts also drew insufficiently on outside non-
governmental experts on Iran. Some of these did not share
official preconceptions and were sensitive to, and in possession
of, information that would have helped to provoke a new look at
the situation evolving in Iran.
13. There was, furthermore, a failure to pay proper
attention to the political consequences of economic develop-
ments in Iran, especially when an economic downturn added to
widespread unemployment, and an inability to integrate political
and economic analysis.
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-R 110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
14. NFAC management is alleged to have failed to
impose a critical review and challenge on NFAC reporting
and estimative analysis.
15. Finally--and this is an intriguing point--while
analysts prefer, for understandable reasons, a short time
frame for estimative purposes, the time frame set for the NIE
on Iran turned out to be too extensive. The crucial problem
of instability turned out to be short-term. Asking questions
about longer-term stability reinforced the assumption that
there was no short-term problem.
16. There is perhaps one angle--an extremely sensitive
one--which the post-mortem may be said to have neglected. The
post-mortem argues that there was enough information to call in
question the underlying assumption on the solidity of the Shah's
power and the weakness of his domestic opposition. Yet if a
serious re-examination of this preconception had taken place,
it would have been hard to avoid the impact of US policy toward
Iran. Not only may US policy on human rights and political
liberation have pushed the Shah farther than it was safe to go,
there is also the question of whether he felt that his option
of restoring order by using the military was weakened by US
policy.
SECRE 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA- 4 00110002-5
17. The post-mortem does not explicitly distribute
weight to all the factors that are said to have detracted
from a better estimative performance. They seem to suggest,
however, that the ones listed under 6, 7, and 10 were the
primary ones. This judgment, too, has merit although
informational shortfalls also deserve to be ranked highly.
18. Three questions remain to be answered: (a) Which
parts of the post-mortem are accepted? (b) Should the NFAC
weaknesses it expressed be remedied, at least in part?
(c) If so, how should this be done?
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
SECRET
18 July 1979
Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
Estimates on Iran: 1960 - 1975, The Record
NIE - Outlook for Iran - 16 February 1960
Estimative emphasis is on the stability of the Shah's
regime and chances of an upheaval. The military and security
forces are seen as main support of Shah but also as chief
potential threat to his regime. (A coup attempt might take
place any time.)
While the odds on an upheaval are difficult to assess,
on the whole the chances are estimated to be against a coup;
but a coup might be triggered by civil disturbances threatening
public disorder.
However, the paper notes new internal threats generated
by economic developments and difficulties that are apt to
weaken the Shah's position. The "long-run importance of this
civilian opposition cannot be discounted." "If a dramatic
issue and effective leadership should emerge, the opposition
would probably be able to mobilize popular support for attacks
on the present order."
NIE - Prospects for Iran - 28 February 1961
Focus primarily domestic. Growing political unrest of
urban middle-class more openly manifested. "While a political
upheaval could take place in Iran at any time, the odds are
ALL PORTIONS
ARE SECRET
SECRET
r
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
against such a development in the next year or two. However,
profound political and social change in one form or another is
virtually inevitable. The nature of Iranian politics and the
character of the Shah make it unlikely that this change will be
evolutionary"
SNIE - Political Prospects for Iran - 7 September 1962
Focus internal. "Before long (the Shah) will almost
certainly again become the direct target of political pressures
and general discontent. As long as he retains control of the
army and security forces, the chances are that he will be able
to ride out such crises, but each time a serious crisis rises,
the possibility of his overthrow or even his voluntary abdication
will be present."
SNIE - The Iranian Situation - 10 April 1963
Focus internal. Conclusion similar to above: Forces are
set in motion that it will be difficult to organize and direct.
However, chances of Shah remaining in control are good.
NIE - Iran - 20 May 1964
Focus domestic. It is held to be uncertain whether
modernization will prove relatively peaceful or whether
violence and revolution are in store. Shah's reforms
stimulate and shape forces that must bring eventually
profound changes in Iranian society, one way or another.
However, the Shah, supported by the armed forces, seems
likely to dominate Iranian political life for some time to
come.
NIE - Iran - 24 March 1966
Focus domestic and foreign policy. Shah is aware that
his domestic position depends on US support. He will probably
remain firmly in control though the bulk of the educated
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
middle class will remain estranged from his regime. Religious
conservative opposition is also noted but it is said to be
muzzled and leaderless. The opposition is highly unlikely to
come to power because it is disparate and fragmentary.
Special Memorandum - The Shah's Increasing Assurance - 7 May 1968
Focus mainly external. The Shah is said to have dramatically
strengthened trle position of the monarchy during the past decade.
He has undercut the already fragmented opposition by carrying
out economic and social reforms. From a timorous, titular
monarch he has turned into a self-confident potentate. Longer-
range problems remain, but for some time to come the unrest of
earlier days seems under control. Over the long term, the Shah's
policy of rapid industrialization will probably not provide a
satisfactory substitute for greater political participation, but
for some time to come the unrest of earlier days seems under
control.
SNIE - Iran's International Position - 3 September 1970
Focus primarily external. Shah's internal position is
said to be solid. The economy is booming. There is no
organized opposition. The conservative Muslim clergy is only
mumbling.
NIE - Problems in the Persian Gulf - 7 June 1973
Focus on external problems. The Shah is keeping domestic
ifrustration and hostility under firm control by means of the
'White Revolution" and repression of dissent.
NIE - Iran - 9 May 1975
Focus both domestic and external. "We see little prospect
during the next few years for a serious challenge to the Shah's
authoritarian control over Iran's internal affairs." Nevertheless,
his monopoly of decisionmaking is incurring political costs in
terms of growing alienation and discontent. Strains within
Iranian society seem destined to grow.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
S~CRE1
Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
Comment
1. Estimates were more frequent during the 1960s
(especially early 1960s) than in the 1970s. Why?
2. The main focus of the first five estimates was on
Iran's internal affairs. In 1966 the emphasis shifts to its
foreign role. The last estimate (1975) dealt with both sides.
3. Relatively speaking, the analytical and estimative
quality of estimates was better during the first part of the
1960s than afterwards. The earlier estimates reflected an
understanding that rapid economic development was bound to be
destabilizing in this autocracy and that a violent upheaval,
though not imminent, was almost certain to occur in the longer
run. (In retrospect, these estimates were very good.)
4. The NIE of March 1966 breaks with the estimative
thrust of the preceding papers. The new tone is strongly
established in the Special Memorandum of May 1968. The Shah's
position is now seen as solid and the opposition, even though
present and perhaps growing, is perceived to be weak and divided.
It appears that this new estimative thrust prevailed through
1978 and the approach (seen in retrospect) of a revolutionary
crisis.
5. The intriguing question is: Why did this change in
basic assumptions occur in 1966 and 1967? I do not know and
can only list some possibilities.
a. Was it induced by a "cry wolf" phenomenon?
(This is not very plausible because the earlier
estimates placed the probability of a serious upheaval
in the far future.)
b. Was it induced by Iran's rapidly expanding
armed forces and by their perception as an effective
means of suppressing any active opposition?
c. Was it induced by a deterioration in the flow
of information? And if so, why did this happen? Was
it largely that information on Iran's domestic politics
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
was given a reduced priority because of the new
prevailing assumption that the Shah's hold on power
was firm?
d. Was it induced by a change in US policy
toward Iran? And if so, in what manner?
e. Was it induced by a change in the quality
of the analysts?
f. Was it a consequence of INR's contraction?
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
EYES ONLY
23 July 1979
Memorandum for Dr. Bowie
Subject: Postmortem
1. You asked for further reflection following your
discussion with the SRP.
2. I still think that the postmortem is a fine report
despite serious questions that can be raised about it.
3. To clarify one point I made in my review of the
postmortem. If one believes in some failure of intelligence
in the Iranian case, the failure was not that of having failed
to raise as a serious possibility the precise nature and timing
of the Iranian Revolution and of its development (so far).
The estimating failure rather was one of attributing too much
solidity to the position and capabilities of the Shah and of
underestimating the strength of the opposition and of its
capacity to coalesce under propitious circumstances. There
was nothing inevitable about the actual developments and
outcome of the events that are now known as the Iranian
Revolution. Several possible intervening factors could have
modified or postponed the revolutionary events or led to a
different denouement.
4. There is one part of the problem which the authors of
the postmortem did little to penetrate, perhaps because they
felt unable to do so. US policy toward the Shah may well
have had a major impact on Iranian developments. In ways
as yet unclear and speculative, the intelligence failure may
have resulted in part from this policy, (a) in terms of
structuring attention to Iranian realities and the procurement
of information; (b) in terms of discouraging intelligence
analysts from pursuing questions that might have been, or
were felt to be, uncomfortable to policymakers (because they
were assumed to cross the boundary between intelligence
and policymaking) and (c) - and perhaps most of all - because
US policy helped to bring about the actual course of events
in Iran.
ALL PORTIONS ARE
CLASSIFIED SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
SECRET
EYES ONLY
Subject: Postmortem
5. To the extent that the relative failure of intelligence
resulted from the interlinkage of policy and intelligence
mentioned under (4) the remedies suggested by the postmortem
are incomplete, perhaps seriously so. But they are not, in
my opinion, misplaced. Indeed, nearly all the suggestions are
in line with deficiencies previously noted by the SRP and
others in other estimates.
6. I find it difficult to give any advice on what should
be done with the postmortem. Three possibilities occurred
to me: (a) to circulate a summary and/or excerpted version;
(b) not to circulate the postmortem beyond its present range;
and (c) to circulate the original postmortem with a brief
critical commentary. I do not like any of them because (a)
and (b) might stimulate thoughts that unwelcome truths are
being suppressed, and (c) might lead to a defensive reaction
in NFAC and be exploited unfairly by critics elsewhere.
Unless knowledge of the postmortem can be closely limited,
(c) might be least undesirable course of action. I do think,
however, that (a) and (b) are also legitimate choices because
the purpose of a postmortem is to identify deficiencies in
order to mitigate them. And that is the responsibility of
NFAC management.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5
Approved For Release 2007/02/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110002-5