REVIEW OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001200200001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Review of
National
Intelligence
August 1976
Published by the Intelligence Community Staff
f
for the Director of Central Intelligence
Copy N ?
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 Approved F r Re'1 46/3
I
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Eva , a: ct :ion and Iirprovernen.t/ I CS d C
'('his is a first--.. tiss piece of work in term
both scholarship and ingenuity. I wish somethi g
like it could have been .dent ified with my shor
tenure on the IC Sta-.i, though I now reel a
little better deep down trecause it was somethin
along this line that 1. tried very hard to get t
old Product Review Crors to turn out.
Onward and upwal,
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Knoche
I)DCI ?.
Date 8/23/76
FORM I V SE P RE V ~O`.!5
5-7$
August 1976
Published by the lntellir.ence community Staff
for the Dire b r of t .niitral hitelligence
Top ret
I
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Review of
National
Intelligence
vol. 2 No. 1
Prepared by the Product Assessment and Improvement Division,
Intelligence Community Staff, for the
Director of Central Intelligence
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PREFACE
This will be the last issue of the RONI. The recent establishment of the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the steadily increasing emphasis of
the Director of Central intelligence on his Community responsibilities have
placed heavy new burdens on the Deputy to the Director of Central
Intelligence for the Intelligence Community and upon the Intelligence
Community Staff. These burdens are concentrated in supporting the DCI,
the D/DCI/IC, and the CFI in identifying, analyzing, and resolving critical
issues relating to the allocation and management of resources within the
Community.
Assessing the quality and relevance of Intelligence Community
production will continue to be a most vital part of this job. It will continue
to be performed by the Production Assessment and Improvement Division of
the Intelligence Community Staff, now lodged along with divisions
concerned with collection, in the Office of Performance Evaluation and
Improvement. But we shall have to place greater emphasis on performance
assessment that comprehends the entire intelligence process, from program
inception through requirements definition, collection, information
processing, analysis, and production, to impact on national policy. To do
this job well even on selected major issues will be an enormous task. It does
not appear that our manpower will allow substantive review of national
intelligence for these purposes to be efficiently accomplished and effectively
communicated through a journal like the RONI. The reader will note that
this issue of the RONI itself displays much more attention to matters of
Community activity and process than have previous issues.
The RONI helped to cultivate a self-critical spirit within the
Intelligence Community. Its many authors and contributors are to be
commended for their efforts. This office will enlarge on those efforts in
future product and performance assessment projects.
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Director, Office of Performance
Evaluation and Improvement,
Intelligence Community Staff
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Page
1. MATTERS OFGENERAL INTEREST .................... I
Community Principles ..................................
The Practice of Intelligence Analysis .....................
A National Sitrep .....................................
DIA's Experiment with Uncertainty ......................
It. SPECIFIC COMMENTARIES ............................
Military Intelligence ................................... 5
The Warsaw Pact NIE: Critics, Consumers, and ICS
Conclusions ..................................... 5
The results of a survey of consumer reactions to an
important National Intelligence Estimate
S&T Intelligence ...................................... 9
Recent Studies from STIC ............................ 9
A review of three papers concerning matters of
concern in the world of scientific intelligence
Political Intelligence ................................... 12
Presenting Political Research: A Case Study ............. 12
Interesting aspects of a recent paper on nationalism
in the Soviet Ukraine, including the readers'
response
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The Warning Problem .................................
Mayaguez Revisited .................................
A summary of actions taken by the Community to
remedy some of the shortcomings revealed during the
Mayaguez incident of May 1975
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IV. SPECIAL ARTICLE .............................. '..... .
CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security
Policy Making .................................... 27
A synopsis of the findings and principal recommendations
of a report from CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence
V. CORRESPONDENCE ................................... 31
A communication concerning problems associated with
the production of intelligence on friendly forces
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1. Matters of
General Interest
Community Principles
The Director of Central Intelligence has set
forth a number of principles intended to guide
the activities of all elements of the US Foreign
Intelligence Community. As presented in a
memorandum he sent to the National Foreign
Intelligence Board in May, these principles are:
1. Total objectivity is the hallmark of all
intelligence reports and estimates.
2. Strongly held dissents and differing
judgments within the Intelligence Community
will be carefully noted in Community-
coordinated products forwarded to policymaking
levels of the Government.
3. Representatives of every Community
organization must have the right to be heard and
to have their ideas and views given serious
consideration.
4. The freest possible flow of information,
both within and among the organizations of the
Community, and with the users of intelligence is
the constant goal. To assure that the fullest data
is available, cooperative arrangements must be
maintained with all Government agencies
working in the foreign affairs field.
5. We have an obligation to provide as much
information as possible on an unclassified basis,
but without derogation of the necessity to protect
sensitive sources and methods and to protect
information which truly requires sensitive
treatment.
6. Dependable intelligence is an essential base
for the formulation of national policy so
intelligence collection and production must give
priority to topics of major policy concern. Our
role is to provide information and professional
judgments on foreign developments, without
coloration by policy considerations.
7. The concept of an Intelligence Community
must he strengthened. We will be judged on
Community accomplishments and on the
effectiveness of our interaction in Community
problems as well as on our substantive end
products.
8. Continuing attention will be given to
improving the interface between national and
tactical intelligence capabilities, seeking to
capitalize on the potentiality of inputs to
national intelligence needs from tactical
resources in peacetime and the capabilities of
national resources to provide intelligence of
import to both peacetime force readiness and
wartime operations.
9. The Community must be action oriented
and responsive. Papers must move quickly,
deadlines must be met, decisions must be
reached and results must be demonstrated.
10. The limitations and restrictions on
intelligence activities already set by the President
will be rigidly observed and have the full support
of all intelligence personnel, in spirit as well as
aet.
l1. Improvement of the public perception of
U.S. intelligence will be given continuing
attention. Intelligence is a profession in which
pride can be taken and that pride should be
demonstrated. Within the constraints of
legitimate security requirements, the Intelligence
Community should strive to better public
understanding of our mission and of our product.
12. The Intelligence Community should be as
responsive as possible to Congressional inquiries.
Congressional support is essential to sustain the
effectiveness of the US intelligence effort, and
our coo eration is essential to such support.
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The Practice of Intelligence Analysis
CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence last
year invited intelligence officers to a seminar on
the practice of intelligence analysis. This session
led to some challenging observations and, at
least from the point of view of working analysts,
sonic real wisdom as well. Those at the seminar,
for example, generally agreed that:
? The "management" of analysis is a key
element in the intelligence process; it needs
additional consideration and effort at
improvement.
? The Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) and
the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP) is too
cumbersome, static, and time-consuming to
be of much help in the effort to improve the
analytic product.
? Intelligence analysis has been the stepchild
over the years in CIA's budget, but this is
now changing.
And one of the principal speakers at the
seminar observed that:
? The role of the analyst has important
aspects apart from the analytic process
itself: living with the bureaucracy,
consultation with fellow professionals, and
repetitive presentations of analysis in the
form of briefings, NSSM inputs, and the
like. It is in part the burden imposed by
duties such as these that set up a problem
facing the analytic staffs: that of providing
a suitable environment for analysts,
including sufficient working time (away,
from the meeting and consultation circuit)
for the conduct of real analysis.
? In the area of estimative intelligence,
analysts in the main proceed by
extrapolation from present trends. The
trouble with this is not that such
extrapolation is mostly wrong. On the
contrary, it is mostly right. Analysts thus
tend to become its prisoner, and this
sometimes leads to gross and damaging
misjudgments (cf., those made in September
1973 concerning the likelihood of war in the
Middle East). Any really expert analysis
must devote a disproportionately large
amount of attention to the prospect for
change and to the offbeat theory, so as to
maximize the ability to capture
discontinuity and change.
For more on the work of the Center for the
Study of Intelligence, see the article in Part IV,
"Intelligence Support for Foreign and National
Security Policy Making," which begins on p. 27.
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A National Sitrep
Representatives of the principal producing
agencies in the Community recently agreed on
general procedures for the issuance of a national
intelligence situation report during crises, this to
be delivered to very high-level consumers in lieu
of the three or four discrete sitreps that reached
these consumers in the past. Specifically, under
the auspices of the DC1, the Community's
principal producing agencies (CIA, DIA,
State/INR, and NSA) will, when international
events and the needs of the NSC and its staff so
demand, cooperate in the preparation of an all-
source national intelligence sitrep which will
reflect Community views and clarify any
important Community disagreements over
substance.
The DCI will assume responsibility within the
Community for deciding when and by whom a
national sitrep should be produced. Normally, he
will designate one Community component to act
as his executive agent and assume primary
responsibility for production and, more often
than not, this is likely to be CIA. There will be
times, however, when the nature of a particular
crisis-e.g., the Mayaguez incident-may
prompt him to name some other agency, such as
DIA.
In any event, each of the major producing
agencies will offer various forms of assistance to
the task force assembled by the producer: the
provision of analysts to be incorporated into the
task force and/or officers serving with the task
force in a liaison role, the submission of written
contributions to the publication itself, and the
extension of special support in the of
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DIA's Experiment with Uncertainty
Last January DIA initiated an experiment
designed to achieve more precise statements of
the confidence and probability of intelligence
judgments. This experiment received its initial
impulse from high-level DOD con-
sumers-principally Deputy Secretary
Ellsworth-who have repeatedly indicated
dissatisfaction with vague language of the
"it is believed . . ." or "hostilities possibly
will ..." character.
The trial run involved the incorporation of
both percentages (e.g., 30%, 50%, 90%) and
letters (A, B and C) in the texts of selected
Defense Intelligence Notices (DINS) and Defense
Intelligence Appraisals. The percentages
reflected the probability that a given judgment
was valid; the letters represented the analyst's
confidence in the source material: A =high
confidence; B=medium; C=low.
At the end of the trial period 750 readers of the
DINs were asked about the usefulness of the
experiment; 128 responses were received from a
broad spectrum of DOD consumers. A majority
favored the use of quantified expressions of
probability, believing that they helped to
increase their confidence in the information
provided and in DIA's judgment and, in
particular, helped to give greater credibility to
briefings based on the DIA material. * There was,
*Several analysts involved in the experiment, however,
have warned that the statement of percentages could convey
to at least some readers a degree of precision not justified by
the data at hand or the subjective nature of an analyst's
"hunch" regarding future events.
however, little enthusiasm for the alphabetized
expressions of confidence in sources. There were
a few votes for putting the numerical and
alphabetical statements at the end of' an article
so that the text would read more smoothly. The
respondents as a group indicated that the
expressions of uncertainty would be most useful
in current intelligence, somewhat less so in
estimative intelligence, and of least value in
basic intelligence.
DIA recently decided on the basis of this
survey to quantify the probability (in
percentages) of all major judgments and
projections in the DINs but to drop the
alphabetized evaluation of sources. It also
decided to experiment with similar procedures
for selected order of battle products and Defense
Intelligence Estimates.
Courses for DIA personnel in the assessment
and expression of uncertainty are now being
initiated by both the Defense Intelligence School
and the Intelligence Community's Information
Science Center, located in CIA's Office of
Training. This training, covering both theory
and practice, is intended to provide analysts and
supervisors with greater confidence and
consistency in the use of expressions
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uncertainty.
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II. Specific
Commentaries
Military Intelligence
The Warsaw Pact NIE: Critics, Consumers, and
ICS Conclusions
There has been considerable discussion
generated about the substance and format of
National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-75,
"Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," since its
publication in September 1975. Several elements
in offices of Assistant Secretaries of Defense
(OASD) have been the most vocal critics of the
NIE. This article will summarize the basic issues
involved in the discussion, outline the results of
an informal survey of the reactions to the NIIE, by
principal consumers outside of OASD and,
finally, discuss some "lessons learned" as they
might apply to future military estimates.
Controversy
NIE 11-14-75 concerns itself with the Warsaw
Pact forces-primarily ground and tactical air
forces-located in the European USSR and
Eastern Europe opposite NATO-and updates
its predecessor estimate, which was issued in
1971. The criticisms of the current NIE raise
issues in four general categories:
-Scope and Format. Is the Estimate too
narrow in scope and too sparing in the detail
it provides?
-Omissions. Does the NIE talk around, or fail
completely to address, a number of major
issues?
-Evidence and Supporting Rationale. Are
suitable rationales for its principal
judgments lacking, and are some judgments
offered without any supporting evidence?
With regard to scope and format, it was agreed
by the NIO and the other representatives of the
agencies participating in the NIE's development
that it would highlight those major issues on
which either significant new information
indicated that previous judgments should be
modified or on which substantial new work had
been accomplished by the Community, but that
the NIE should not devote much space to other
issues. Based on a recommendation by the
Director, DIA, the decision was also made to
limit severely the length of the Estimate and rely
on other coordinated intelligence publications
(e.g., MC-161-76 and Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning) to provide more
comprehensive documentation relevant to the
NIE's analyses.* The rationale for producing
such a "short and to-the-point" Estimate was
that the paper's intended audience was primarily
the most senior governmental policymakers.
There has been no argument about the need
for detailed force data tables/projections or
extensive treatment of such significant topics as
Warsaw Pact combat effectiveness, warning
(surprise attack) in Europe, the role of tactical
air, developments in the Western Military
Districts, Warsaw Pact command and control,
Pact buildup and logistics capabilities, etc. The
question is to what degree these subjects should
have been thoroughly examined in the NIE, or
Annexes thereto, rather than in other intelligence
issuances. From the OASD standpoint, the
answer now seems to be: "to the maximum
degree."
The second related area of general concern is
the question of whether NIE 11-14-75 failed
completely to address, or "papered over" a
number of major issues. On this point, a
comparative reading of the 1971 and 1975
`"rhe current estimate contains, therefore, only four tables
of supporting data and nine figures, whereas the 1971 version
had over 30 tables, plus numerous figures and maps.
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Estimates shows that only two major substantive
topics were discussed in 1971 that do not appear
in the current paper. (These topics-general
purpose naval forces and forces on the Soviet-
SINO border-are now the subject of other NIEs
and are so referenced in NIE 11-14-75.) As noted
earlier, however, the limited treatment some of
these subjects receive in this particular NIE is the
essential point at issue.
Additionally, the fact that only one major
dissenting footnote appears in the document has
been used to characterize the NIE as a
"consensus" Estimate which has allegedly
skirted contentious issues. This has been
vigorously denied by the participants, who assert
that no serious disagreements were encountered
during the preparation of the NIE and in no case
were any disagreements papered over.
The third general charge, that the Estimate
offers too little in the way of supporting
rationales and evidence for its analyses and
judgments, turns on the question of how much
source information should properly be included
in an NIE. In the case of NIE 11-14-75, the level
of supporting detail varied because it was
determined by considerations of length and,
more important, security classification. Certain
users-particularly in OASD-strongly believe
that all supporting rationale and evidence should
be presented in as much detail as possible,
particularly when significant new judgments
about shifts in Warsaw Pact concepts, plans, and
capabilities are being discussed.
A Consumer Survey
These, then, are the basic issues pertaining to
NIE 11-14-75 which have developed from the
dialogue between the drafters of the Estimate
and consumers (and critics) in OASD. In order to _
assess the reaction to this Estimate of other major
consumers, an informal survey was conducted in
March 1976 by members of the Intelligence
Community Staff. Contact was made with some
thirty consumers in the NSC Staff, Department
of State, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Chairman's Staff Group; Office of Director,
Joint Staff; J-5; and SAGA), OMB, DDR&E,
and ACDA. Again, in order of the identified
issues, the reactions of these readers can be
summarized as follows:
-Users at the NSC Staff, State and DDR&E
felt that NIE 11-14-75 suffered from
insufficient documentaiton of force data
and supporting analyses and considered its
predecessor Estimate vastly superior in
scope and format. On the other hand,
certain consumers in OJCS and OMB found
the compactness of the current Estimate to
their liking and thought that detailed
annexes were neither required nor desired.
-Those contacted were apparently not
bothered by the lack of more dissenting
footnotes in NIE 11-14-75. There was,
however, general agreement among most
consumers that the Estimate should have
covered In somewhat greater detail (or with
more clarity) certain major issues. The three
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most frequently named were: force
effectiveness, warning, and the Pact tactical
air offensive scenario. There was also some
expression of the viewpoint that the current
Estimate's treatment of force trends was
weak and poorly presented,
-The issue of whether the Estimate's
principal judgments were suitably
supported was not a particularly
bothersome one to most of the consumers
contacted, with the notable exception of
OMB representatives who argued that more
evidence should have been cited and
discussed.
-The NIE's use of source data and the degree
to which it expressed uncertainties did not
pose any significant problems or raise any
serious questions for most of the consumers
contacted, although OMB representatives
suggested that a section containing
"Comments on Intelligence Sources and
Gaps" would have been helpful.
-Some of those interviewed at the NSC Staff
and OMB lamented the lack of their
organizations' participation in the early
stages of an estimate's development. They
felt that direct, systematic involvement by
more users in the Terms of Reference process
would be desirable; they also suggested the
creation of regular means for user responses
following the estimate's publication.
The reaction to, and use of NIE 11-14-75 in
the OJCS arena calls for additional comment, It
is clear that the Estimate has received exposure
at the most senior military levels (as well as at
OSD, State, and the NSC).* It is also apparent
that no significant problems were raised at OJCS
by the Estimate's scope, format, or whatever.
Among those who read it, the NIE was
characterized as "good, short, and to the point";
a "useful background document for concepts
papers"; a "helpful addition to the general body
of knowledge" on the subject; and a "fine
starting point for establishing perspectives on
future studies."
*On this point, while the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently did not
read NIE 11-14-75, they were made fully aware of the issues
and policy implications therein.
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The degree to which the "national
intelligence" contained in the Estimate has
actually been "used" in the J(:S arena is,
however, another issue. There is, for example, the
nagging question of whether NIE 11-14 would
have received high-level exposure at OJCS had it
riot previously generated controversy among
OASD elements. Moreover, several senior officers
in the Strategy Division (J-5) stated that the NIE
was, in fact, not used at all in their routine
business because they had to rely on the joint
Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)* or
used only what DIA provided. Others in
pertinent branches of the European Division (J-
5) stated that they had not seen the Estimate
before they specifically requested it (in response
to this survey). As it turned out, several of these
officers said the Estimate could have been useful
for projects they had earlier completed.
A related factor that affects the degree to
which NIE 11-14-75 was exposed and used at
OJCS (and elsewhere) is the document's security
classification. While this Estimate has been
universally complimented for its incorporation of
all-source data and its dissemination at a level of
classification which permitted wider distribution
than certain previous estimates, some consumers
urge that the Estimate (or a sanitized
supplement, as per NIE 11-14-71) be issued at
the SECRET/TOP SECRET level to facilitate its
accessibility still further.
Conclusions and Recommendations
What are the principal "lessons learned" from
the foregoing as they may apply to future NIEs?
The first seems to be to reaffirm that no single
NIE can be all things to all people. Certain
consumers expect an estimate to serve both the
policy maker and his staff by containing (as did
NIE. 1.1-14-71) an easy-to-read narrative
summary of highlights, plus detailed annexes
with force data tables/charts/projections and
supporting analyses. These consumers look for a
single publication (i.e., a "handbook") that can,
to the maximum possible extent, answer all their
questions on a given subject, be the agreed
*The JIEP is an annual JCS publication which, insofar as
it addresses material presented in NIEs, must agree with the
NIEs. It need not, however, cover all the same issues or limit
itself to issues raised in the NIEs.
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reference for all pertinent force statistics, and,
accordingly, minimize the problems involved in
acquiring and researching other source
documents for related information. On the other
hand, some consumers prefer an NIE that is
short, to-the-point, deals primarily with
significant new issues and limits itself to an
exposition of the Community's best judgments
on a given subject area (as did NIE 11-14-75).
Similarly, with regard to citing evidence and
supporting rationales and detailing uncertainties
and data limitations in an estimate's judgments,
certain consumers expect an exhaustive
accounting of these factors, while others seem
content simply to receive the judgments
themselves.
Based on the consumer reactions to NIE 11-
14-75 outlined above, however, the experience
with this particular paper did uncover several
points of some consequence that could be of
relevance to any future military NIE:
-Many consumers outside of the Intelligence
Community have, for a variety of reasons,
considerable difficulty (and display some
reluctance?) in acquiring and using other
intelligence source publications to answer
questions or gain force data information not
answered or reflected in the NIE itself.
Hence, if the Estimate is not to be
formatted as a full-blown "handbook" of
all relevant data and analyses, it perhaps
should provide an annotated bibliography
of source documents (keyed to the various
paragraphs of the NIE) where the consumer
could readily find in-depth treatment of the
issues in question.
-Moreover, if the Estimate is to include only
a minimum amount of force data tables and
supporting analyses-relying on the
availability of this information in other
coordinated intelligence publications-con-
certed efforts should be made to insure
the timely completion by the Community
of all such documentation necessar25lC1
support fully the Estimate's principal judg-
-A format which incorporated the following
two suggestions would, in our view and in
the view of several of those we consulted,
enhance the value of a military NIE to the
principal consumers: (1) A short "Summary
and Conclusions" section with each major
paragraph annotated with the paragraph
number(s) in the main body of the Estimate
where the summarized point/issue is
discussed; and (2) a well-developed "Force
Trends" section that cogently summarizes
at the outset of the Estimate "what's new"
regarding the pertinent force's doctrine,
posture, capabilities, etc. since the
preceding Estimate.
-Consideration should also be given to
producing a sanitized supplement to the
NIE at the non-codeword security
classification level in order to
broaden/facilitate consumer access to the
Estimate's major themes.
As a final point, we would urge that, following
the completion of major military papers, an NIE
"Briefing Team" be organized to "get the
message" of the Estimate out to as many
consumers as possible. Such a procedure might,
in addition, stirpulate a timely and continuing
exchange of informed views on the s
bj
u
ect
throughout the producer-user mmunity. I
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S&T Intelligence
Recent Studies from STIC;
During 1975, the Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee (STIC) of USIB
published three studies which were particularly
well received by a wide range of consumers.
These three dealt with issues associated with the
transfer of Western technology to the USSR;
matters of current priorities for the producers of
S&T intelligence; and areas of science and
technology which may be of comparable concern
in the future. The discussion below suggests why
these studies were made, provides a summary of
the more important findings, describes the
overall reactions of consumers, and, where
appropriate, identifies the actions STIC has
undertaken in response.
Technology Transfer
Military Implications of Technology Transfer
to the Soviet Union examines specific areas of
Western technology which, if acquired by the
USSR, might benefit Soviet military
capabilities.* STIC set up an interagency
working group (consisting of members from CIA,
DIA, NSA, State, the three Services, ERDA, and
Commerce) to draw together and assess
information available within the Intelligence
Community on this topic. This group focused its
attention on four advanced technology
areas-transport aircraft, semiconductors, digital
computers, and air traffic control systems-of
special interest to the Soviets. Unrestricted
technology transfer in these particular arc is
offers the Soviets a potential for significant
military gains.
By the end of March 1975, the working group
completed its study. The overall conclusion, not
suprisingly, was that the cumulative effect of
growing technology transfer from the West (US,
Canada, Japan, and Western Europe) will result
in some selective improvements in the Soviet
*Military Implications of Technolo Transfer to the
S
oviet Union, SIC-75/1, April 1975
military posture over the next five to ten years.
The rate and degree of improvement, however,
could not be determined confidently because of
the multiplicity of countries which could supply
the technology and the uncertainty about Soviet
capabilities and intentions to adopt the
technology for military purposes.
The main value of the report comes from the
side-by-side comparisons of US and Soviet
technology in the areas selected for study. For
example, in the transport aircraft section of the
report, the discussion includes the relative
standings of the US and USSR in many aspects
of engine, avionics, and airframe producton
technology; an assessment of Soviet deficiencies
and the factors causing them; and Soviet
attempts to acquire foreign technology and the
potential gains to the Soviet military from such
acquisition. This type of discussion, relatively
thorough in detail, provides useful insights into
Soviet shortcomings in production and
management techniques.
The report has been disseminated to a wide
audience within the Intelligence Community
and to high-level consumers in the Departments
of Commerce, State, and Defense, and the
National Science Foundation. Comments from
many consumers have been uniformly
complimentary, attesting to the value of two
significant features-the high quality of the
report itself and the appetite among certain
consumers for technology-by-technology
assessments by the Intelligence Community.
STIC has organized a working group to follow
up with more of these studies. The four
technologies discussed in this paper are being
updated to reflect current Soviet capabilities
and activities. Also, four additional areas-
superconducting technology, signal processing
technology, precision machine tools, and micro-
circuitry manufacturing and testing technol-
ogy-are being reviewed for their military
implications.
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f
S'I'IC's second report, Intelligence Priorities
for the Sciences and Technologies, is a display
list which identifies those areas of most
significance to national intelligence. * STIC
hopes that the highlighting of these areas will be
helpful to management in its deliberations over
the apportionment of resources for collection and
production.
The display itself consists of three priority
groupings, each containing a list of S&T areas
and sub-areas felt by STIC to be of greatest
significance within the groups. A majority of
STIC member agencies agreed upon the relative
ordering of the priority groups and issues. The
selection and ranking criteria attempted to
transcend individual organizational interests so
that truly national concerns were represented.
Various national intelligence guidance
documents, including DCID 1/2-US
Intelligence Objectives and Priorities-and the
KIQ program, were taken into account.
This STIC document, too, was distributed
fairly widely, but primarily to various
organizations and individuals within the
Intelligence Community (or closely related to it).
The response has been highly favorable. STIC's
identification of areas in S&T intelligence which
are of highest significance serves a twofold
purpose. First, such a listing gives consumers who
do not follow S&T matters daily an idea of what
issues currently enjoy national level interest.
Second, and more important, the interagency
exercise of determining relative prior-
ities-always a fun game-forces S&T intel-
ligence elements to look critically at the
balance of effort between national and
organizational priorities. This in itself increases
communications among the S&T intelligence
collectors, producers, and consumers.
As can be expected, there was some dis-
satisfaction with the final groupings of
priorities. Certain agencies felt that particular
areas or sub-areas in the lower priority groupings
deserved a higher ranking (especially if the
agencies concerned were expending considerable
*Intelligence Priorities for the Sciences and Technologies,
S'1'IC 75-3, September 1975,
time and effort on the so-called lower priority
items).
When STIC decided to coordinate and
publish this study, there was agreement that the
priority groupings would be updated when
necessary to reflect changes in national S&T
priorities. Although the priority areas are not so
dynamic as to require an annual revision, the
discussion engendered by the publication of this
document has pointed out the necessity for a
refined priority list. A ST1C subcommittee has
taken the initial steps to update the priority
display. We recommend that the revised display
include a short explanation of why particular
S&T areas or sub-areas are placed in one or
another priority grouping.
Following up on the priorities display, STIC
has completed a preliminary study of the relative
resource expenditures by various agencies for the
production of finished intelligence on the
sciences and technologies listed in all three
priority groups. Despite serious difficulties
attending the effort, STIC found that for the
most part those areas enjoying Priority Group I
ranking also enjoyed the expenditure of a higher
percentage of production effort by the
Intelligence Community. STIC is also preparing
an analogous study of the utility and adequacy
of collection assets being applied to the higher
priority groupings.
Emerging Technologies
The publication on the priorities for the
sciences and 4 technologies discussed above
identified those areas of significance to national
intelligence today. A third STIC publication,
Views on Emerging Areas of Science and
Technology Potentially Important to National
Security, concerns the early recognition of
advances in those sciences and technologies
which are now emerging but whose full impact
on the military and economic security of the US
may not be appreciated for several years.*
Two main factors underline this concern for
our ability to identify S&T areas of particular
significance in the future. One is that if these
*Views on Emerging Areas of Science and Technology
Potentially Important to National Security, STIC 75-4,
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areas are recognized early enough, the
Intelligence Community will find it easier to
collect and analyze useful information while
such information is still relatively easy to obtain.
The other simply reflects everyone's awareness of
the need to keep a close eye on developments in
science and technology which hold the promise
of surprising us in the future, if exploited by
other countries.
STIC's part in adding to the useful literature
on future technologies has been a major project
whose goal is to stimulate early planning for
future collection and analysis of new and
unusual intelligence targets. The "Emerging
Areas" report is the result of the first phase of the
project. Between 15 and 20 scientists and
engineers-all renowned figures in their
respective fields, including two Nobel Prize
winners and some former and current Defense
and Intelligence Community contractors-were
interviewed for their views on areas of science
and technology particularly important to the
military or economic security of the US in the
1980's. Care was taken during the interviews and
the interpretations of results to minimize possible
biases which could distort the results.
Specific areas which received considerable
attention from the respondents included the
biological sciences, computer sciences (especially
inexpensive, but complex computer systems),
novel energy sources, and laser technology. The
interviews also revealed a concern for more
general threats, such as economic warfare,
weather/climate control, and nuclear
proliferation. And one of the more fascinating
overall results of the study was the weight of
opinion that tomorrow's surprises will come in
the life sciences, in such areas as genetic
engineering and understanding the brain and the
nature of thought. The potential importance of
the life sciences to national security apparently
transcended the individual specialties of those
interviewed, few of whom specialize in any of
the biological fields.
This STIC product, too, has been well received
by the intelligence Community and its
consumers. Like the report on S&T intelligence
priorities, it is both informative and thought-
provoking. The results represent the subjective
judgments of those interviewed as well as those
interpreting the responses. Thus, areas of and
opportunities for disagreement abound. Once
again, consumer comments have included the
general concern that, "Yes, that area is
important, but this one can be even more so."
STIC is following up this part of the project
with a second set of interviews. During the
second phase, additional scientists and engineers,
those whose backgrounds represent an even
broader spectrum of skills and expertise, are
being contacted. The results of both sets of
interviews will be combined, and STIC expects
to be able to make some additional
recommendations which will deserve scrutiny in
the future.
The importance of many of these areas of
concern is now only beginning to emerge.
Persuading the Intelligence Community to
expend time, money, and effort on areas which
are not of immediate or near-term interest has,
historically, been difficult. Some of these
concerns may seem to be "way out," the
consequence of an overactive scientific
imagination. But so were thoughts of ICBMs
and lasers not too many years ago.l
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Political Intelligence
Presenting Political Research:
A Case Study
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CIA's Office of Political Research has
produced a study on Ukrainian nationalism
which deserves attention both for its format and
its substance.
"Nationalism in the Soviet Ukraine"-The
Intelligence Contribution
This study was issued in two versions: aC
45-page, single-space
published edition with specific citations to
supporting documents; and a much shorter
version-a 16-page, double-space executive
summary] 1 The
former was clearly aimed at those policy staffers
and intelligence analysts with time for and
interest in the particulars of the subject. The
latter was addressed to senior level officials, but
presumably would also serve those with only
peripheral interest in the subject and those
without exotic clearances.
There is no consistent Community policy
regarding the use of footnotes in finished
intelligence, but there are at least three
arguments favoring the practice. First, it helps to
maintain substantive continuity and an analytic
memory. Second, it reassures readers that there is
indeed some basis for the analyst's judgments
other than whim or intuition. Some readers, even
at the highest levels, occasionally feel the need
for that kind of reassurance.**
Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," OPR III,
nd PR 75-III, August 1975.
**For example, in the case of a recent joint
OPR/OSR/SALT Support Staff paper ("SALT and Soviet
Decision-Making: Institutions and Actors,"
December 1975,1
pu is ed without footnotes, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and Deputy Secretary Ellsworth requested the CIA authors to
provide as much as possible of the raw data and other
finished intelligence used in preparing the paper. The authors
ccordingly forwarded
annotated copies of the study with attachments containing
excerpts from the sources used. The requestors formally
commended them for their timely and effective response.
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Another reason for listing source citations is
that it helps to measure (and demonstrate) the
contribution of intelligence information. A piece
of conventional wisdom among critics of the
Intelligence Community has it that a clever
journalist or a diligent academician can track all
important political developments on, say, the
Soviet scene as well as or better than an
intelligence analyst. But the source citations in
this OPR study suggest that the journalist or
academician operates at a disadvantage. Of the
137 footnotes to the study, 28 consist of
references solely to classified intelli ence
information nd
another 14 to unc asst to in ormation from
Intelligence Community sources
112 other footnotes are a
mix o intelligence and open (academic or
journalistic) sources. The other 83 reflect
information presumably available to any
academician or journalist-but of course also
available to the intelligence analyst.
Moreover, in the present instance the
information collected by the Community
imparts a special quality to the study by showing
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Ukrainian nationalism, than would otherwise he
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The paper concludes that nationalism in the
Ukraine is "growing," or at least becoming
"more vocal." Contrary to the initial judgments
of the Intelligence Community (but even more
contrary to the judgments of Western media),
the study indicates that Shelest's Ukrainian
nationalism was at least as important a factor in
his removal as his opposition to detente. And
contrary to what is inferred in open, non-
intelligence sources about Shelest's successor,
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who otherwise seems to
be a vigorous foe of Ukrainian nationalism, this
study indicates that under certain circumstances
(but only after Brezhnev's departure), he too
might find it desirable or expedient to cater to
local interests in an effort to strengthen his own
power. *
The author of the study reports that she has
received no reaction from policy-level
consumers, but that several analysts have
commented on it. One can speculate about
possible reasons for the lack of high level
response. First, the study was self-initiated,
rather than aimed at meeting a specific request.
Second, many high level policy makers feel they
do not have the time to read even an executive
summary unless the subject is directly and
explicitly related to their current concerns. In the
case of another recent OPR paper, "Changing
Soviet Perceptions of World Politics and the
USSR's International Role," also issued in two
versions, we have learned that some high-level
recipients of both versions did not find time to
read either, even though the subject was of great
importance and the DCI addressed a cover note
to these particular recipients. Perhaps they felt,
on the basis of its broad title, that the study was
unlikely to serve their immediate needs.*
At the October 1975 meeting of the NSCIC
Working Group, one high-level consumer
commented on the difficulty of inducing those in
his position to read more intelligence products.
His remarks were offered in the context of a
discussion of two intelligence papers which he
had read in preparation for the Working Group
meeting and which he described as excellent.**
He said he normally preferred to read material
rather than have it briefed to him, because he
believed he could absorb information about
three times as rapidly in this way. But, clearly,
many consumers would rather be briefed. He
then implied that he expected this circumstance
to persist, almost regardless of how concisely and
artfully intelligence papers were packaged.
The paper, written b
1975 as 0 113,
and PR-75-113M (the execu-
tive summary), The cover note
from the DCI, wit tie u study attached, was sent to
selected recipients on 30 December. The paper was brought
up for discussion (and generated some controversy) at USIB
in January 1976. At least partly due to the discussion at
USIB, the paper attracted numerous comments from other
analysts and consumers below the top echelons,
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The Warning Problem
Mayaguez Revisited
In its post-mortem examination of the
Mayaguez crisis, the Intelligence Community
Staff identified certain problems and deficiencies
adversely affecting the Community's
performance during that crisis and made specific
recommendations to correct them. * Actions
taken since then-either in direct response to
those recommendations or, indirectly, as a result
of the impetus provided by the Mayaguez
incident-are summarized below.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. The
Community should establish effective
communications channels with all elements of
the Government that are from time to time
involved in crisis monitoring and management.
Specifically, it should maintain contacts with
systems that issue warning to merchant marine
vessels and commercial aircraft.
Actions Taken:
-Under the direction of an interagency ad
hoc group, a number of special and
improved procedures and systems were
developed for providing warnings to U.S.
flag ships and aircraft. These include the
development of a U.S. Flag Merchant
Vessel Locator Filing System, maintained
by the Naval Ocean Surveillance
Information Center, to provide reporting of
port arrivals/departures and the at-sea
positions of all US flag merchant ships
engaged in international trade; and
implementation of new procedures to ensure
that upon issuance by the Defense Mapping
Agency of a special warning to U.S. ships,
the Maritime Administration also notifies
shipping owners and operators so that these
companies may issue alerts on their
communications facilities. These and other
measures constitute the first effective means
*Post-Mortem Report, "An Examination of the Intelligence
Community's Performance Before and During the Mayaguez
Incident of May 1975"
published August 1975.
of linking the Intelligence Community's
warning apparatus with those other U.S.
departments and agencies, such as the Coast
Guard, the Maritime Administration, the
Defense Mapping Agency's Hydrographic
Center, and State Department's Office of
Maritime Affairs, which share responsibility
for air and marine safety.
-At the request of the IC Staff, the NSC Staff
asked each government agency to furnish
information on the functions of any
watch /operations centers it maintains here
and abroad. The results of this survey are
now being compiled into a directory which
should improve communications between
all concerned government elements,
including those which normally have no
need to communicate with each other but
which might have to do so under crisis
conditions.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. Existing
procedures for handling critical intelligence
should be revised and clarified so as to ensure
appropriate action on the part of the various
watch and operations centers, to make certain
that individual CRITIC messages are
disseminated simultaneously to appropriate
addressees, and, in general, to clarify other
aspects of the system's procedures.
Actions Taken:
-A revised and expanded version of Director
of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID
7/1) concerning the "Handling of Critical
Information" was prepared by the
Intelligence Community Staff and
approved by USIB in December 1975. This
Directive defines critical information as
information concerning foreign situations or
developments which affect the security or
national interests of the US to such an
extent that it may require the immediate
attention of the President or other members
of the NSC. The DCID clarified and
improved the procedures governing the
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recognition of critical developments abroad,
the transmission of information on those
developments to appropriate operations
centers in the Washington area, and the
passage of that information to senior officers
of the Government.
-A new document-the "Handbook of
Standard Operating Procedures for the
Reporting of Critical Information"-was
developed by the intelligence Community
Staff in conjunction with the Departments
of Defense and State and the principal
USIB member agencies. This document
expands on the material presented in DCID
7/1, spells out in some detail the proper
procedures for handling so-called CRITIC
messages (those messages which contain
critical information and which are handled
on a highest-priority basis), and provides
guidelines and instructions applicable to all
elements of the government concerned. The
Handbook was approved by USIB and
has been published as an Attachment to
DCID 7/1. A condensed, unclassified
version of these CRITIC procedures has also
been prepared and given wide dissemination
throughout the U.S. Government.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. Certain stand-
ard operating procedures of the various
Washington area watch and operations centers
should be revised to establish a set of common
Community-wide standards.
-USIB has approved revised operating
procedures for the National Operations and
Intelligence Watch Officers Network
(NOIWON), the system designed to provide
for simultaneous conferencing and
exchange of information among the seven
key watch centers in the Washington area.
The new procedures now require that the
NOIWON be activated upon receipt of a
CRITIC or other alert advisory.
-CONTEXT (Conference Text Editing)-a
unique computerized system combining
secure voice and a visual text capability in a
remote conferencing mode--is expected to
become operational in 1976 with terminals
at CIA, NSA, DIA, and State. The system
will facilitate the analysts' preparation of
time-critical intelligence products, such as
crisis situation reports, and will also permit
emergency meetings (including those at the
NFIB, formerly USIB, level) to be
convened in a remote conferencing mode.
CONTEXT will eventually be enhanced
by a remote display capability that will -
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Post-Mortem Recommendation.
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-Planning has largely been completed to
make maximum use during crises of new
technical collection systems. For example,
under the direction of the NFIB Committee
for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX), a new staff (manned on a 24-
hour basis by DOD and CIA personnel) will
provide the means
-The Defense Department's Collection
Coordination Facility, which is expected to
become operational late this year, will
permit consolidation of DOD time-sensitive
requirements and more efficient tasking of
technical collection systems.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. Contacts
between the operational and intelligence
communities should become more frequent and
open, especially at the working level. The
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responsibility for developing a better way of
exchanging appropriate information should rest
in the first instance with the Intelligence
Community, especially the intelligence
Community Staff and the National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs).
Actions Taken:
-The Intelligence Community Staff has
inaugurated semi-annual conferences of the
heads of Community and non-Community
operations/intelligence centers to encourage
closer cooperation among operational and
intelligence elements and to discuss and
resolve matters and problems of mutual
concern. Three such conferences have been
held since the Mayaguez incident and a
fourth is planned for late 1976.
-The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs)
convene frequent interagency meetings of
working-level analysts, collectors, and
policy or operationally oriented officers to
ensure that they all are familiar with current
problems and activities affecting their areas
of responsibility. These meetings provide an
opportunity for wide-ranging, frank
discussions of problems facing the policy
maker and the Intelligence Community and
serve to improve the Community's posture
in times of crisis.
-The Pacific Command has established in
Korea an all-source "fusion center"-which
seeks to combine both operations and
intelligence functions in one location-to
provide more effective support to
Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, especially
during crises. This center collocates J2
(intelligence) and J3 (operations) personnel
and provides for the immediate use of
information on US and allied force
operational data in the intelligence and
warning process.
-Modernization of the National Military
Indications Center (NMIC) and the
National Military Command Center
(NMCC) facilities will, when completed,
allow for much closer coordination between
the operational and intelligence functions of
the military and permit them to provide
more effective support to national
authorities.
-Other measures-such as the development
of the previously mentioned CONTEXT
and NOIWON systems-will also
contribute to effective exchanges of
information between the operational and
intelligence communities.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. The way in
which the Community issues warnings of
impending developments to NSC members and
other national consumers should be improved.
The Alert Memoranda system should be refined
and become the firmly established Community
vehicle for alerting top-level consumers to the
existence of potentially serious threats (other
than strategic threats) to US interests.
Actions Taken:
-At the DCI's request, the Intelligence
Community Staff prepared a
comprehensive study of intelligence Alert
Memoranda, which concluded, inter alia,
that these memoranda serve as effective
instruments of warning for decision makers.
-Revised procedures defining the
responsibilities of the National Intelligence
Officers and other elements of the
Community for the preparation,
coordination, and issuance of intelligence
Alert Memoranda were approved by USIB
on 15 December 1975.
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-The NIOs are reviewing Alert Memoranda
procedures to ascertain what improvements
are feasible without inhibiting the vehicle's
flexibility and capacity for quick response.
One improvement (now implemented)
provides for the automatic notification of
appropriate US Ambassadors that an Alert
Memorandum is being prepared and asks
for their comments by a stated deadline.
-Within the Defense Department, Alert
Memorandum distribution procedures have 25X1
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to key policy makers.( 25X1
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I , P
Utz \~ li .
IV. Special Article
CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making
The following is a synopsis of the findings and
principal recommendations of the January 1976
report of the CIA Center for the Study of
Intelligence (CSI) concerning intelligence
support of foreign policy. The CSI study team
perused relevant literature and discussed the
subject with numerous CIA and policy officials,
but the report is not intended as a definitive
statement of the Agency's position. Rather, it is
intended to stimulate thought and discussion,
both on the conclusions themselves and on their
broader implications for the role of intelligence
in the policy making process. Though dealing
specifically with the CIA's role, the paper's
conclusions in many instances apply to the
Intelligence Community as a whole., Readers'
comments are invited and mau be addressed to
I. The dividing line that in traditional theory
separates intelligence and policy has become
obscure. Intelligence feeds into the policy
making process in a wide variety of forms and at
many different levels. A significant part of the
intelligence message conveyed to top policy
makers is unidentifiably imbedded in policy
papers or inextricably interwoven in sets of
options. The tendency of intelligence and policy
to become intertwined early in the decision-
making process has intensified in recent years.
Recommendations
To increase intelligence producers' specific
understanding of the policy making process:
summaries of theoretical work on decision
making, organizational dynamics, and
psychological factors should be distributed to
analysts and supervisors on a regular basis by an
individual with full-time responsibility for that
task; Agency training courses should place more
emphasis on the subject; Agency officers should
serve in policy-related slots whenever possible
and share their perspectives with other
intelligence producers in appropriate forums.
II. The widespread use of human filtering
mechanisms on the consumer side results in the
failure of much written intelligence meant for
high-level policy makers to reach them in its
original format and in the appropriate context.
CIA intelligence sometimes becomes just another
anonymous bit of information, and even when
particular intelligence documents are forwarded,
principals often read only summaries written and
attached by their aides. Policy makers, moreover,
take aboard copious quantities of so-called
unfinished intelligence. They prefer to get raw
items of current import immediately, rather than
to wait even a few hours for the raw factual
report to be accompanied by interpretation. The
problem here is that the policy staffers'
compilations of such data may not be sound or
consistent in their use of intelligence
information. And they may not accurately reflect
the originator's view of what should be brought
to the policy makers' attention.
Recommendations
To increase the impact of the Agency's
products and services on the policy making
readership: executive summaries should precede
all memoranda; a paper should identify the
implications of the issue for the US; alternative
interpretations should be presented, as should be
speculation (clearly labelled as such); a new
product should be considered-a "Morning
Briefing Notes," electrically disseminated,
providing informal, non-coordinated summaries
and comments on significant overnight traffic,
such as State and Defense cables, DDO reports,
intercepts and press, not accounted for in the
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III. A great deal of important intelligence is
transmitted orally, through both formal,
prepared briefings and informal exchanges.
Discussions that DDO Division Chiefs have with
Assistant Secretaries of State and NSC Staff
members should be widely recognized within the
CIA as constituting important, though informal,
avenues for the passing of substantive
intelligence and feedback on policy needs for
intelligence. The strong natural linkages between
the DDO and certain policy makers probably
could be exploited in the overall intelligence
support process more effectively than at present.
Recommendation
To improve the substantive analyst's access to
informally exchanged intelligence information
and to the DDO officer's useful insights on the
policy milieu and the policy maker's
requirements, there should be regular meetings
for this purpose between DDO Division Chiefs,
representatives from DDI production offices, and
the NIOs.
IV. Policy makers value the Agency's products
and services, but they tend to like some kinds of
intelligence more than others. They most
appreciate receiving unique pieces of
information of the kind only intelligence sources
can provide. Analysis of unfamiliar or
particularly complex material is also coveted; the
Agency's work on technical/scientific and
military/strategic subjects is highly regarded,
and economic analysis is enthusiastically
received by those who specialize in the economic
field. There is less admiration for the kinds of
intelligence that correspond to most policy
makers' own expertise, e.g., interpretive
reporting on foreign political developments. In
the areas of their own competence, policy makers
tend to look to intelligence for the "facts," and
they profess to regard much of the Agency's
interpretive work as of marginal utility. They do,
however, appreciate political analysis that
answers specific questions or performs a special
service by using new techniques, exploiting
unfamiliar materials, adopting an imaginative
approach, or developing an unusual insight.
Recommendations
To increase the policy maker's receptivity to
the Agency's political interpretation and
analysis, further study is needed of the efficacy of
various methods-e.g., team approaches, cross-
disciplinary t raining, structural
reorganizations-which seek to foster truly
integrated inter-disciplinary analysis. Political
analysts (not just NIOs who specialize in
political subjects) should be given the
opportunity, encouragement, and incentive to
take especially vigorous initiatives to develop
and sustain personal relationships with
consumers.
V. Policy makers genuinely desire probing, in-
depth analysis in all fields, and there is
recognition that CIA has been gaining ground on
this front. There is, however, little confidence in
most predictive intelligence-whether the
Agency's own or the formal estimates of the
Intelligence Community. Policy makers seem to
be less interested in estimative judgments per se
than in the basis for them; i.e., the laying out of
the forces at work, the possible turning points,
and the leverage-or lack of it-that the US
might have in determining the outcome.
Recommendation
To improve predictive intelligence, there is
need for serious study of just what a realistic
estimative mission ought to be and of what
resources should be devoted to it.
VI. The perennial-and probably intermin-
able-problems of insufficient feedback and
secretiveness concerning policy plans hinder
intelligence responsiveness and adversely affect
intelligence quality. Moreover, while most policy
makers are reasonably enthusiastic about
receiving intelligence, they are continually
distracted from even reading it, let alone
commenting on it, by the pressures of day-to-clay
operational matters and the urgent demands that
non-intelligence people, paper, and problems
levy upon their time and energy. Since we take as
given that these problems will never disappear,
initiatives for improved relationships must come
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largely from the intelligence side. CIA must
improve its capabilities to independently assess
the questions the policy makers need answered
now and to independently anticipate the
problems they are likely to be faced with in the
future.
Recommendations
To increase communication with the policy
maker: intelligence products should, to the
extent feasible, be addressed to intended
recipients by name; more products should be
especially tailored for the mid-level
consumer-the policy staffer; producers in any
case must make a greater effort to determine the
intended audience before they begin to produce.
Beyond this, consideration should be given to the
establishment of broadly-based mechan-
isms-perhaps computer based for improving
intra-Agency awareness of ongoing policy
support activities and for helping to make policy
makers more aware of the full range of
potentially relevant intelligence products and
services; such mechanisms should serve as
supplements to, rather than competitors with,
the NIO system and the Key Intelligence
Questions function.
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II^o^~
UL4 ~~
V. Correspondence
The following letter was written in response to
an item appearing in the RONI of June 1975. It
addresses (eloquently, we think) a problem the
Community faced in Vietnam-and still faces
elsewhere-vis-a-vis the acquisition and
production of objective intelligence on friendly
forces and governments.
As a more-or-less close observer of the agony of
Indochina over the past 25 years, I feel
compelled to offer an early comment on the
"very preliminary look" at the Community's
coverage during the final months in the June
RONI (1975). Over the years, the Community
generally has done a credible job of analyzing
the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and likely
courses of action of the Communists in
Indochina than of the non-Communists. This
was true in the French war in the early 50's, as
well as in the 60's and 70's. Most of the "shock"
developments throughout these three decades
have been related to the unanticipated failures or
deficiencies of the non-Communists-political
and military-in coping with foreseen levels of
Communist capabilities and pressures.
The only "real" surprise of the Dieh Bien Phu
campaign was the paralysis of the French
command-and its loss of nerve-.when
confronted with the reality of the onslaught by
Viet Minh forces whose strength and
preparations had been assessed accurately and in
detail by intelligence. The confident "let them
come" challenge by the French on the eve of
battle was replaced by shock and dismay when
their artillery and air support proved ineffective
in breaking up the expected Communist assaults.
The late 50's and early 60's were marked by
misplaced confidence in the anticipated
performance of Vietnamese military and security
D
forces against the well-defined and clearly
growing Viet Cong threat.
The real "shock" of the Tet offensive stemmed
primarily from exaggerated perceptions of the
cumulative effects of the application of U.S.
military power over the preceding two-and-a-
half years, rather than from a lack of indications
of an impending major enemy offensive.
In the final denounement, the surprise
factor-as noted in RONI-was the collapse of
ARVN (when the realization hit home at all
levels that ARVN would no longer be supported
in the manner to which it had become
accustomed, i.e., the B-52's would never return),
rather than the accurately assessed weight of
enemy pressure.
This record clearly highlights a long-standing
source of frustration to intelligence analysts and
their consumers-that of making net assessments
in "real-world" situations when inputs on one
side of the equation are influenced by the
subjective views and judgments of operating
officials committed to the successful execution of
policies, strategies and programs. Too often is the
net judgment subverted or dominated by the
overconfident and insistent views of operators
and policy-makers concerning the "progress"
achieved by friendly activities: The "success" of
Operations Atlante and the expansion of the
Vietnamese Army in 1953-54; the impact of U.S.
training for ARVN in 1956-62; the effectiveness
of U. S. search and destroy operations in 1965-67;
the "success" of Vietnamization in 1973-75, inter
a]ia.
Although the intelligence appraisals were
often less than perfect, they were generally more
pessimistic-or realistic-than the judgments of
the operating officials. But the impartial
intelligence appraisals were often discounted or
ignored, or in some cases simply watered down,
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by the more subjective, optimistic-and
influential-views of the operators.
Clearly, one lesson to be learned from our
Indochina experience is the need to evolve a
mechanism for providing the policy maker with
truly objective net assessments in situations
where the U.S. is operationally committed-a
mechanism that will effectively blend, if not
balance, the voices of the Pollyannas with those
of the Cassandras. The record of Indochina to
the end shows that the influence of the
Pollyannas was unduly prominent, to the
detriment of the national interests of the U.S.
and of the Vietnamese and American peoples.
GEORGE W. ALLEN
Director
Imagery Analysis Service
(DDI/CIA)
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