POSSIBLE REVISIONS IN THE NIE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001300030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
24 November 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT "Possible Revisions in the NIB Process"
On 8 September you sent me a memorandum entitled
"Possible Revisions in the NIE Process," outlining
certain experimental steps recommended by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and appending a
draft Presidential directive which amplified these recom-
mendations. In that memorandum you indicated that the
President would like my comments on these recommendations
and the proposed trial run. Attached for your information
is a copy of my 21 November letter to the President
setting forth the comments you requested on his behalf.
Attachment
WV E. Colby
George A. Carver, Jr./D/DCI/NIO/kes
..Distribution:.
Original- Addressee'w/att
1--- DDCI w/att
1 -- Executive Registry w/att,
1 - D/NI0 Chrono.w/att
1 - NIO/RI w/att
NSC review completed.
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' THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENC
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
24 November 1975
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Chairman
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Admiral:
As you know, in September the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs sent me a
memorandum outlining certain suggestions for experi-
.mental modifications in the process by which National
Intelligence Estimates are produced. These suggestions
were based on recommendations made by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in the letter you
sent the President on the Board's behalf on 8 August.
That September NSC Staff memorandum indicated that the
President desired my comments on the PFIAB recommenda-
tions and on the proposed experiments. Attached for
your information is a copy of my 21 November letter to
the President setting forth the comments which the NSC
Staff requested on his behalf.
Sincerely,
At tachment
GACarver, Jr./D/DCI/NIO/"kes
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - Executive Registry tic/att
1 - D/NI0 Chrono w/att
1 - NIO/RI w/att
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL -INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON; D. C. 20505
21 November 1975
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
c
P 1_ Vu mran your
Assistant for National S
ecurityAffairsesummar~ngocerta.in
recommendations submitted to you by your Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board regarding the production of National Intelli-
gence Estimates. Attached to that memorandum was a draft
-Presidential directive for undertaking and evaluating an
experimental modification of the present
process for devIel
estimates in two specific strategic areas: anti-submarineoping
warfare and the accuracy of ICBMs. I was asked to give you
my comments on the PFIAB recommendations and on the proposed
experiment. This letter constitutes my response. In
addition to my own views, it also reflects the views of my
colleagues in CIA and in other components of the Intelligence
Community responsible for contributing to our strategic
assessments of Soviet capabilities. The draft text of this
letter was reviewed, discussed and unanimously endorsed by
the United States Intelligence Board.
As summarized in the memorandum and the accompanying
draft directive, the new procedure would involve:
a. The development of an estimate of Soviet
capabilities in these two key areas by "an independent
.analysis group composed of Intelligence Community and
non-government representatives. This experimental
estimate would be a "purely intelligence document
which avoids net assessments." It would be something
independent of, and prepared separately from, the
National Intelligence Estimate in which Soviet
capabilities in these' areas are already considered:
NIE 11- 3/8- 75.
In early September T re
Dear Mr. President:
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b. A subsequent detailed net assessment of Soviet
and U.S. capabilities. In the two experimental areas,
the draft directive suggested that the net assessments
be prepared by an ad hoc working group established
under the auspices of the Interdepartmental Political-
Military Group.
c. A thorough critique of the net assessment by
an independent entity. In the experiment, as suggested
in the draft directive, the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee would make a comparison and critique of the
independently prepared estimates and the net assess-
ments described above, and compare both with the
treatment of the same subjects in NIE 11-3/8-75.
Through subsequent discussions with the NSC Staff and
the PFIAB Secretariat, we learned that:
a. The NSC Staff's summary recommendations were
intended to implement those contained in the PFIAB's
memorandum to you of 8 August 1975.
b. The recommendations for change were not
intended to apply to all National Intelligence Estimates
but only to estimates in the NIE 11-3/8 series (Soviet
Forces for Intercontinental.Conflict).
c. In suggesting the above-described experimental.
procedure, neither the NSC Staff nor the PFIAB intended
to disrupt or delay the preparation of this year's
NIE 11-3/8-75, which was then in its final stages of
preparation. It has now been approved by the United
States Intelligence Board and is being published.
I would like to comment on some of the points raised by
the PFIAB in its 8 August memorandum to you, which served as
the stimulus for these recommendations. That memorandum
expressed the PFIAB's view that last year's National Intelli-
gence Estimate on Soviet strategic capabilities -- NIE 11-3/8-
74: Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Throu h
1985 is seriously mislea ing in e presentation o a
number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of
complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence it is
deficient for the purposes it should serve." This view
appears to be based on a belief that:
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a. NIE 11-3/8-74 was not sufficiently explicit on
important uncertainties underlying our intelligence
judgments, particularly on a few vital technical issues
such as the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs and the progress
of Soviet research on anti-submarine warfare.
b. NIE 11-3/8-74 contained what appeared to be
"net assessments" of U.S. and Soviet strategic capabil-
ities, when detailed operational analysis of strategic
conflict required for genuine net assessment was lacking.
I certainly share the PFIAB's view that "National Intelli-
gence Estimates should be among the most important documents
issued by the Intelligence Community." NIE 11-3/8-74 was
the product of a still-continuing evolutionary process
through which the Intelligence Community is endeavoring to
make each of these major annual assessments of Soviet
-strategic capabilities better than those of preceding years.
While I would not contend that NIE 11-3/8-74 was a perfect
document, I cannot agree with the PFIAB's contention that
it errs by "projecting a sense of complacency" or, for that
matter, in offering any judgments "unsupported by the facts."
There are clearly specific issues on which individual
members of the PFIAB differ with the Intelligence Community's
conclusions. But the estimate as a whole depicted Soviet
strategic capabilities that are steadily improving in many
areas and will continue to improve, even in a climate of
detente and even if a SALT Two agreement is successfully
negotiated. I hardly consider this judgment any valid basis
for complacency, even though NIE 11-3/8-74 also concluded
on the basis of rigorous analysis of all available evidence --
that the Soviets are unlikely within the next decade to have
deployed operational weapons systems enabling them to launch
an attack that would prevent devastating U.S. retaliation.
With respect to the specific proposals of the NSC Staff,
my comments are as follows:
a. I welcome the evaluation, by consumers, of the
utility of our intelligence products and any suggestions
on how those products can be made more informative and
enlightening to the policy officials for whom they are
written.
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b. I also welcome any improvements in the U.S.
Government's procedures for developing net assessments
of U.S. capabilities with respect to those of potential
or putative adversaries. This task goes well beyond the
scope of intelligence estimates -- which, by definition,
are focused on the capabilities and intentions of
foreign powers. It is a task, however, to which a
sound intelligence input is essential. As you know,
at various times over the past several years, the net
assessment function has oscillated between the NSC
Staff and the Department of Defense. The responsibility
for net assessments needs to be more clearly assigned
and a better mechanism-needs to be developed for
producing them on a regular, systematic basis -- drawing
on intelligence inputs plus the details of U.S. capa-
bilities and operational plans. The Intelligence
Community will, of course, provide any support or
assistance it can to new procedures, or experiments
with new procedures, designed to improve the quality
of U.S. net assessments.
c. The intelligence estimating experiment proposed
by the NSC Staff, however, gives me some trouble. Our
annual estimates on Soviet strategic capabilities --
the NIE 11-3/8 series -- utilize all the information
known by and the best analysis available to the U.S.
Government. Undergirding the production of the actual
estimate itself -- e.g., NIE 11-3/8-75'-- is an ext.ensive
research program examining specific aspects of Soviet
capabilities in considerable detail, a research program
involving not only all concerned elements of the
Intelligence Community but also drawing on the views
and talents of knowledgeable experts in specific fields
outside the government. It is hard for me to envisage
how an ad hoc "independent" group of government and
non-government analysts could prepare a more thorough,
comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities
even in two specific areas -- than the Intelligence
Community can prepare.
An "independent" group could,-of course, produce a
sharply drawn set of scenarios, outlining various capabilities
the Soviets might be able to develop. Such alternative
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scenarios or hypotheses were indeed discussed, and carefully
weighed, in and during the process through which NIE 11-3/8
75 was prepared. The actual estimate, however, reflects my
strong belief that intelligence has a dual set of responsi.-
bilities to those for whom it is produced. It clearly has
the responsibility of warning its consumers of risks and
potential problems, of various things the Soviets might do.
What some miss or ignore is'that intelligence also has a
responsibility for making an assessment of the relative
likelihood of such unpleasant contingencies, of saying what
capabilities -- in its best judgment -- the Soviets are not
likely to develop in given time frames. Our present process.
for producing national estimates is designed to discharge
both sets of responsibilities, not just the first.
All of us in the Intelligence Community are constantly
seeking ways in which we might improve the quality and
utility of our estimates. This year's NIE 11-3/8-75, in
fact, has incorporated several innovations, including the
discussion and assessment of developments of low probability
but of great potential significance, should they occur. Two
separate sessions of the United States Intelligence Board
were devoted to this estimate before it was issued. On
14 November, the Board spent the entire day on a thorough
presentation, which included adversary debate, of the evidence
and alternative judgmental conclusions in seven critical
areas, including both ASW and ICBM accuracy. On 17 November,
the Board addressed the actual text of the estimate, and its
Key Judgments, page by page.
The published version of 11-3/8-75 will be in the hands
of concerned consumers, including the PFIAB, within the next
few days. I would suggest that the best, most efficient,.w.ay
to proceed would be for those consumers -- especially the'
PFIAB -- to scrutinize NIE 11-3/8-75 and ascertain the extent
to which it overcomes or rectifies what they may have
perceived as deficiencies in NIE 11-3/8-74. After this
process of review has been completed, my representatives --
or those of my successor -- can then sit down with members
of the PFIAB and the NSC Staff to discuss specific courses
of action most likely to be of value in our joint, continuing
quest for a better national intelligence product.
ti!I by
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