NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001300030014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 9, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, U.S. Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers
AUG 9 1973
Pursuant to the USIB meeting of 2 August, I am commenting on
the proposed appointment of National Intelligence Officers.
I concur in the general concept expressed in the memorandum
distribu e o SIB members. The NIO system would, it seems to me,
not only serve to replace the Board and Office of National Estimates;
it would also provide a flexible method of strengthening our inter-
agency work on other substantive matters as well.
My own questions about the proposal have mainly to do with the
scope of responsibilities of the NIOs, their relationships with other
mechanisms o e co unfit, an the list of geographic and functional
fields proposed for the NIOs. I realize that in trying a new approach
of this type, it is possible to go only so far in defining specific
duties, especially since much will depend on the officers selected.
Nevertheless, I believe it would be helpful to consider how the NIO
system might relate to the total community structure.
I suggest, for example, that we consider more specifically at
this time he o_tera#4,a1_im ---
p1.i a-tions
of the N system for the~-resent
U co~t]mie-srut^~ I assume that t e NTOs; supported by new
standing committees or by ad hoc groups, would take over some or all
of the functions previously performed by substantive-oriented committees.
But we will need to provide for a continuing method of dealing with
source problems in world-wide terms, such as the provision of USIB
guidance for programming on photography and SIGINT. In that connection,
it would be useful to define more precisely the role of the NIOs in
the formulation of requirements and priorities, the manner in which
we would deal with requirements matters which cut across geographic
and functional lines, and the mechanisms for translating substantive
needs into collection guidance.
NSA, ARMY, DIA, and USAF
reviews) completed..
State epartment review
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Beyond the USIB structure there is the question of defining the
role of NIOs on "consumer needs" and product review in support of
NSCIC and the NSCIC Working Group. There also is the matter of the
relationships to rRAC. While presumably the NIOs would not directly
involve themselves in resources issues, their work on requirements
and priorities could provide a significant input to IRAC's work on
resources.
I am not suggesting that we attempt to work out detailed answers
to all of the foregoing questions before launching the NIO system.
Initial emphasis should be placed on the use of the NIO system in the
preparation of interagency estimates and appreciations, moving more
gradually into other functions which prove to be workable and desirable.
Until we have a chance to test the system, I suggest that we not
dissolve any USIB committees which could be useful in supporting the
NIOs or in performing interagency functions which cannot adequately
be handled through the NIO mechanism.
I have a few specific suggestions on the list of areas for which
NIOs would be appointed:
1. I assume that the NIO for "Europe and NATO" would
also be responsible for all European Community matters,
but it may be useful to clarify this by changing the
title to "Europe, NATO, and EC".
2. While the geographic list should be kept to a
minimum, I believe it would be desirable to assign
to the NIOs responsibilities for areas not included
in the present list. The Arab World, for example,
is too restrictive to encompass Middle East problems.
Also in South Asia and Africa we have matters of
policy concern which warrant having an NIO contact
for the community on those areas. These needs could
be met by changing "Arab World" to "Middle East,
Africa, and South Asia".
3. With regard to the functional responsibilities, there
are overlapping interests which will on occasion require
attention to assure responsiveness to needs (e.g., "USSR
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and Satellites" and "Strategic Weapons and SALT",
or "Europe, NATO, and EC" and "General Purpose Forces"
and "MBFR"). While these matters can be dealt with
through the interaction of NIOs, I believe it is a
point worth emphasizing that special care should be
taken to avoid rigid separation between general areas
of responsibility.
4. I recommend that the title "Strategic Weapons and
SALT" be changed to "Strategic Weapons and Advanced
Technologies". Under this broader rubric I would
envisage responsibility for strategic weapons, SALT,
atomic energy affairs, electronics, the general field
of ASW, and air defense. All of these fields are
hardware-oriented and will require substantial technical
expertise in the provision of staff support to the NIO.
Ray S. Cline
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
9 AUG 1973
Mr. W. E. Colby
Director Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
I have read your proposal for National Intelligence Officers with
great interest, I am in basic agreement with the approach. Of course,
the concept needs some refinement prior to implementation but with
proper attention to such matters as reporting channels, it would appear
that a more responsive structuring of national intelligence would result.
I have specific comment at this time on the aspects indicated below.
1. The phrase "normal command channels" may need some
elaboration, or rephrasing. Within DoD, at any rate, "command
channels" may have a meaning that would not fit an inter-agency concept.
I believe wording could be found that would get the job done without
implying conflict with the statutory arrangements of the departments
represented on the USIB. I would appreciate a somewhat more specific
understanding of how the pick and shovel work for the NIOs would be
accomplished, as I can foresee possible problems in identifying
manpower of the necessary expertise and concurrent availability.
2. An NIO of the stature and capability envisaged would
certainly be able to better satisfy requirements for NIEs, NSSM
responses, DCI briefings, etc. While the NIO could in a practical
sense maintain "close personal contact with the NSC staff, " I am not
sure that other principal intelligence consumers (i. e. , SECDEF,
Chairman, JCS) could absorb this much contact with this many people.
In the case of the Department of Defense, this contact might more
appropriately be through the Director, DIA.
3. Some redundancy in NIOs would be a fairly obvious necessity
to allow for leave, illness, field trips. The talents needed in a back-
up man would not be likely to be available in ad hoc assignments. It
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might be better to have a more permanent arrangement for principal
assistants, in this way both redundancy and training for continuity would
be provided.
4. The tentative list of NIOs provided in the draft represents
a good approach to accommodating geographic considerations as well
as high priority subjects, and I would favor this rather than___
restructuring of the USIB committees, as as been discussed earlier
y t e staff, though the draft does not discuss the USIB, I
suggest that we should leave its' committee organization as is. Of
course t e s wi allow USIB to focus more directly on high level
intelligence planning as it is relieved of many of its detailed considera-
tions of estimates. It might concern itself for example with how well
the NIO structure is operating and insure its relevance and priorities
with respect to real-world problems. Obviously the USIB should
continue to address substantive matters of major import. In the matter
,of geographic orientation, we should consider a more active role for
V the CCPC. This group might well have a geographic orientation based
on expertise as to collection capabilities for specific areas, suggestions
to USIB for improvement, application of collection resources against
broad tasks set up by NIOs. Although it would not have to be a full time
operation, periodic rather than ad hoc meetings might be appropriate.
5. The candidates listed suggest a muted role for S&T intelligence.
This may not be wise, in the light of the increasingly powerful and
pervasive role played by technology in political, economic, and
security decisions. We have to think about electro-optics, communica-
tions, automation, space -- i. e, technology as national asset and
potential de-stabilizing factor.
6. A geographic division of the PRC may not be the best way to
order our work on Chinese matters. That country seems to be a
relatively independent, powerful and unitary actor on the world scene.
7. DoD will have some excellent nominations for a number of
these assignments, although some, for example the economic area,
are obviously not primary to us. In this connection, I envisage
vigorous support of this concept from DIA and other members of the
intelligence community to preserve our momentum in the direction of
unifying and streamlining intelligence activity at the national level.
CONFI D TIAI
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8. The foregoing comments have been set down rather hastily
considering the fundamental nature of the proposal. I will continue to
study the concept and provide my further thoughts as the matter is
brought into focus in staff review and discussion.
V. P. de POIX
Vice Admiral, USN
pirector
1CONFI DE N~ h AL
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755
Serial: N 0938
9 August 1973
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers (U)
1, The proposal to appoint National Intelligence Officers includes
two features that I consider improvements of our present practice.
Better coordination of the intelligence community's responses to NSSMs
is certainly desirable. Utilization of the key people concerned with
the production of national intelligence from all agencies is also potentially
beneficial, although it seems to me that it would be extremely difficult to
collect a group of a caliber and competence surpassing, or even equalling,
that of the BNE and the ONE staff,
2. The proposal also appears to have its drawbacks. I foresee a
new set of tasking, drafting, coordination and mechanical problems for
which no decision-making authority below the DCI is established, unless
the Chief NIO has more authority than is indicated in the proposal. I see
problems in having ten or so additional people reporting directly to the
DCI, or maintaining close personal contact with the NSC staff, In short
the proposal seems to create new organizational problems. Some of
these problems could be mitigated by sharper definition of the authority,
responsibilities and procedures of the NIOs . That definition would, I
think, need to include the assignment of considerable control to the Chief
NIO. It appears to me that a Chief NIO,given the needed executive
~aut ority, would function very much as a chairman of a board of national
V estimates in fact, if not in title. An apparent change from the present
setup would be that the chief officer, presiding over NIOs whose areas of
responsibility are more limited than the present BNE members', would
lack some of the flexibility that the BNE chairman now has.
3. The tentative list of areas of responsibility fails to include
Arab world- and South Asia
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4. It is not clear from the proposal how these NIOs would relate
to USIB committees, or whether some USIB committees would be
disestablisheda We need to know how this ties in with the ideas we
have heard on reorganizing the USIB committee structure.
5. In sum, while I see some merit in the proposal, I would need
a fuller definition of the problems it attempts to solve, and of the
responsibilities, the organizational structure, and the interrelationship
of NIOs with other intelligence bodies before reaching a conclusion as
to whether the proposal has advantages that could not be more readily
realized by tasking the existing USIB organizations.
C7"kM
~j I ey-dAL
LOUIS W. TORDELLA.
Acting Director
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9 August 1973
L.~ l
v`
Mr. William E. Colby
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
The following comments on your plan for National Intelligence
Officers which you circulated at the USIB meeting of 2 August, are
based more on my 3 1/2 years experience as a member of the Board
of National Estimates than on my brief tenure as alternate Treasury
Representative to USIB.
I think the NIOs can strengthen the Agency and the intelligence
community support to policymakers. It has been clear to me that the
NIEs were not closely enough tied in to the NSSM process and that the
intelligence contribution to the NSSMs was either duplicative or some-
times at variance with NIEs on the same general subject. I would
expect that the NIOs would remedy this by taking the lead in providing
the intelligence input of the community for all NSSMs. In my view the
NIO should concentrate on providing an objective intelligence assessment,
including comments on the reaction to various US policy options but
should avoid taking a position on pure policy issues, in order not to
involve the intelligence community in' policy disputes.
It seems to me important to maintain the high standards of
analysis, clarity and brevity which the NIEs have attained and hopefully
to improve the standards of the NSSMs in this regard. This will be
very difficult to do unless some of the high quality staff personnel in
the Office of National Estimates are retained to do the drafting of the
final product. Much of the basic research and initial work can be done
by various offices within CIA and by contributions from USIB member
agencies, but a committee or a busy NIO cannot pull it together and
produce a tight, well-reasoned product. I, therefore, hope you will
retain a good nucleus of the present ONE staff, both as assistants to the
NIOs and in the small editorial staff you propose.
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Your plan does not indicate very clearly how the community
products will be coordinated, though I understand there was some
discussion of this at the 2 August USIB meeting. Although it was
sometimes time-consuming, the thorough coordination of the NIEs
has made them a truly national product and I would hope that this
attribute will not be lost. On other products this may be less
important, and a quicker process of coordination could be worked
out. In this way the intelligence community can be more responsive
to the often rushed needs of the policymakers. In all cases, however,
I assume the NIO will reflect the differing views of the various
community members when they are not reconcilable.
These are the major comments and questions which came to
mind in reading your brief outline of the functions of the NIO. I
would hope we could have a further discussion of the plan at an early
USIB meeting.
J. FOSTER COLLINS
Acting Treasury Representative
to USIB
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 MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers
1. (U) Reference is made to:
9 AUG 1973
a. ACSI DA memorandum to.the DCI, subject: Improving the USIB
Structure and Procedures, dated 2 April 1973.
b. Director, DIA, 1st Indorsement to ACSI memorandum, subject:
Improving the USIB Structure and Procedures, dated 11 May 1973.
c. Draft DCI memorandum for USIB Members, National Intelligence
Officers, distributed at the 2 August 1973 USIB meeting.
2. (C) ACSI DA has reviewed the draft memorandum which would establish
National Intelligence Officers. Our earlier views
on
improving the
USIB
structure and procedures are indirectly related to
the
establishment
of
National Intelligence Officers. They were provided
to
the then DCI
in
April (reference la). The Director, DIA, commented
on
our views in
his
indorsement of 11 May (reference lb).
3. (C) We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the DCI's draft.
We found his new approach to be in accord with the President's
5 November 1971 reorganization memorandum and to be an improvement
over the present system for producing substantive intelligence at the
national level. A closer working relationship between the producer
and the ultimate customer should improve the product. We are concerned,
however, with three areas, as follows:
a. It is not clear who will assist the National Intelligence
Officers in drafting the products and evaluating them. Mention is made
of "panels of experts". We are unclear whether these will be formed
from the same people who assisted in drafting the NIEs in the past and
V whether the USIB Committee structure will continue to be used to support
these panels. For example, when scientific and technical data was
DAMIZC
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
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VX,
DAMI-ZC
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers
needed for an estimate the drafters could turn to one of the scientific
and technical committees of USIB for an agreed input. The draft paper
does not indicate what happens to the USIB Committees which have proven
their worth over almost two decades. While some streamlining of the
USIB Committees appears in order, their relationship, if any, with the
National Intelligence Officers should be described. We in Army derive
great benefit by participating in the deliberations of these USIB
Committees, particularly in using their products in the formulation
of plans, doctrine, force structure, weapon systems and in research and
development activities.
b. The draft paper describes a product to be known as "national
intelligence". To the best of our knowledge this term has not yet
been defined. This could lead to problems as the National Intelligence
Officers are appointed. For example, would the intelligence in the
General Purpose Forces category which presumably includes such items
as the Rear Services of Soviet Forces fall exclusively in the "national
intelligence" category? If national is used then what term will be
used to describe that intelligence needed, for example, by the Military
Departments and the operating forces? Thus we suggest that the use of
the term "national intelligence" be reviewed.
c. While recognizing the need to appoint only the highest qualified
individuals as National Intelligence Officers, we suggest consideration
be given to limiting their tenure to three or four years. Adoption of
this suggestion would provide a great incentive to those younger, promising
OLIVER B. PATTON
Brigadier General, GS
Acting ACofS for Intelligence
Copy furnished:
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20330
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IN
National Intelligence Officers (U)
Mr. William E. Colby
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
9 AU G 1973
1. (C) I think that your proposal for the appointment of
National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) is a good approach to
revising the national estimate system. Highly qualified
and aggressive individuals in such positions should certainly
provide better management and more responsive intelligence
reaction to national requirements. I have in mind a number
of people who would be excellent NIOs and I will provide
their resumes by separate memorandum.
2. (C) I believe the proposed NIO structure should be
constrained to a geographic breakout. Functional subjects,
many of which cut across geographic boundaries, should be
retained and modified as necessary through the existing USIB
committee structure. Provision for establishment of "special"
NIOs, such as Disarmament should be made. USIB would act
upon these "special" NIO requirements appointing them for a
s
ecifi
d
i
p
e
t
me. Further review is suggested of the proposed
geographical NIO areas since certain major geographic entities
are not included.
3. (C) I recommend that consideration be given to support-
ing each of the NIOs with a USIB committee for each NIO area
of responsibility. This would provide a tasking and pro-
duction base for the NIO, as well as a channel of direct
communication to the Principals.
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4. (C) The proposal that USIB member agencies provide
assistants and secretarial aid to the NIO on an ad hoc basis
should be reviewed for an alternative arrangement. The NIO
should have a permanent staff which is directly responsive
to his needs and is attuned to his attitudes and thoughts.
The ad hoc assignment of transient help would not accomplish
that purpose.
5. (C) I would be very interested in reviewing, when avail-
able, a detailed plan for operation of the NIO system. Of
particular interest is the NIO-Member Agency relationship and
the tasking lines for production.
OL D. FA ER, Brig Gen, USAF
cting Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DATE: 15 August 1973
TO, Mr. Colby
FROM: GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT:
REMARKS:
1. From our recent conversations, I gather
you are weighing inputs from USIB members
and from your colleagues within the Agency in
the process of making your decisions on the NIO
question. Appended are some thoughts and
suggestions on what NIOs should be established
at this time, people whom you might want to
consider for selection to these positions, and
the kind of support structure this concept will
need in order to function the way I think you
want it to function.
2. As you will note, the attached was
written before I learned that Ramsey Forbush
is to head the new Office of Political Research.
K-7curge T.. arver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affair
11
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15 August 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
1. The Mix. Given the current state of the world and the
President's resultant major concerns and (at another level) your
desire to have one or two NIOs established whom you could
reasonably anticipate disestablishing in the not too distant future
in order to make the point that this is a flexible panel which can
and will be adjusted as circumstances warrant, it seems to me that
you should start with a group of ten -- seven with geographic and
three with functional responsibilities:
a. Geographic
(1) The USSR and Eastern Europe
(2) Western Europe, encompassing EEC
matters /relationships and the political manifestations
of NATO .
(3) China
(4) North Asia, including Japan. I
would separate this from the China account
because over the next three to five years
Japan's regional role and worldwide impact --
particularly in the economic, monetary and
energy spheres -- and our interacting
relations with Japan (deliberate or inadvertant)
are going to be matters of sufficient complexity
and importance that they should not be melded
with the also complex and important, but
different, China account.
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(5) Southeast Asia. This will need a separate
NIO, at least for a year or so. If the area quiets
down (even if the Indochina penninsula comes
under North Vietnamese hegemony) and ceases
to be a matter of pressing concern to the U . S. ,
you may be able to drop Southeast Asia from the
NIO panel after 18 to 24 months. (This is a
conditional hypothesis, not an estimate.)
(6) The Middle East, here envisaged
as encompassing the Arab World (including the
North African littoral), Iran, Pakistan,
Afghanistan (if the Great Game recommences)
and India.
(7) Latin America. This is included as a
legitimate discardable. At the moment -- with
unrest in Chile, uncertainty in Argentina
and volatility endemic elsewhere -- a
defensible case can be made for having a Latin
American NIO for the time being. With luck,
however, this is one you should be able to
disestablish in a year or so. If necessary,
you could then resurrect it later to make the
point that the mix of the panel is never
immutable and will be periodically adjusted
in light of actual need.
b. Functional
(8) Strategic Arms and SALT-related matters.
(9) Conventional (non-nuclear) forces.
This would encompass questions relating to
general purpose forces (i . e . , armies), MBFR
matters and naval forces, especially the Soviet
Navy. I know that in some circles it is
fashionable to think of the burgeoning Soviet
Navy primarily in "strategic" terms -- i . e . ,
a collection of mobile platforms capable of
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launching nuclear weaponry. Maybe I read
too much Mahan at too impressionable an age.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that the classical
concepts and considerations of sea power (i.e. ,
quite apart from nuclear weapons considerations),
though they may be out of fashion, are far from
outmoded and should not be ignored.
Approximately three quarters of the earth's
surface is covered by oceans, under which lie
untold petroleum, mineral and other resources
which technology now stands on the threshold
of making it feasible to tap. Hence, over the
next decade and beyond, a nation's capacity to
operate -- or protect her operations -- in distant
seas may make even the traditional (pre-
nuclear, pre-missile, pre-airplane) impact
of sea power pale by comparison.
(10) Economics, encompassing (among
other things) monetary and energy questions.
Over the next three to five years, this area
will probably include the U.S. Government's
most urgent and vital policy problems, hence,
its greatest immediate intelligence needs.
2. The People. Whether the NIO concept works or founders will
hinge in large measure on the caliber, ability and temperament of the
people you select to serve as the first NIOs. A number of considerations
have to be weighed, including political ones, in several senses of
that term. As we have discussed, salting the panel with a DDO
Division Chief or two could go far to enhancing the receptivity to
this concept within the Agency (particularly the DDO). You have asked
other USIB members to submit nominations and noses will be out
of joint if you reject all external suggestions. You have able and
distinguished officers now affiliated with the Board of National
Estimates -- e.g. , Ramsey Forbush,
(to name but three) whose talents it would be foolish not to exploit
within the restructured Agency in some suitable capacity. On the
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other hand you want a synergistic whole that is greater than the sum of
its parts and should avoid being mouse-trapped into setting any precedent
of slots (either given ones or a given number) "belonging" to Agency
or USIB components. Also, if the NIO panel is to be meaningful, it
cannot be allowed to be used as a vehicle for solving "disposal" problems.
3. In his 27 July 1973 letter to you, 25X1
a recommendation I regard as a dangerous in alley. 25X1
contends you should pick managers ("aggressive, management-
oriented individuals") not "high-level analysts" or "area experts."
That effective NIOs will have to be skillful managers (and diplomats)
is a patently obvious truism; but unless you pick people who them-
selves are also substantively solid in their respective spheres of
responsibility, you will be well down the slippery slope toward
the "bureaucratic layering" problem which some of the NIO concept's
more strident critics have insisted would be the inevitable
consequence of its implementation.
4. After weighing all of the above considerations, plus some
others, the following list of possible NIO candidates is offered for
your consideration:
a. USSR and Eastern Europe.
(1) The optimum choice for this job
(2) I u s ruled out, the next logical
candidate would be 25X1
(3) A dark horse you might want to
consider before making a final selection is
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25X1
person you might want to look at is
who
b. Western Europe (including EEC, NATO, etc.).
No internal (i.e., Agency) candidate springs immediately
to mind, though you might want to give some thought
to
is perhaps someone
else that might be considered. In many ways, however,
this is a post you might want to fill from outside the
Agency, e.g. , from State. If you go this route, one
P 25X1
c . China. In this you want a Sinologue who is not
an ideologue (and that almost clears the board).
(1) in many respects, is a
very attractive candidate. Though management
is not his strong suit, he has other talents
and abilities which, on balance, might make
him your best bet.
(2) r obvious Agency
possibility, as is I would personally
give a slight edge to ver either of
these two, but that may simply be because I
have worked more closely with =the
past several years and, hence, currently
know him somewhat better.
d. Japan.
(1) The real internal (Agency) candidate
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25X1
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(2) In the interim (of a year or so)
25X1 ~s an obvious candidate who could pro a y
do the job very well.
(3) If you want to reach outside (and high) to
get someone who would be prickly but would make
life interesting all around, think abouti I
(1) For several reasons
obvious candidate for this bille .
(2) Despite the above, I would strongly
and unhesitatingly recommend
25X1 ould do the job superlatively
we
because I have watched him, in effect, do it.
Also, his behavior and style would serve as a
useful model for the other new NIOs to emulate.
f. The Middle East (as defined above).
(1) If all other things were equal, this would
be an optimum slot to fill with a present or
former DDO Division Chief.
obviously comes immediately to mind. e
names of lalso
naturally suggest themselves.
(2)1 resence and background
makes other things not equal. As
de facto deputy -- and, often, alter ego -- e
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(3) Another candidate who should be
considered before any final selection is made
is f OCI.
g. Latin America.
(1) This "expendable" slot is also a
"natural" billet for another senior DDO officer
well versed in Latin-f merican affairs, e.g. ,
(2) It is also a position you might want to
consider giving t hose
abilities need no re ersa tor you an whose
area of greatest personal expertise is in fact
Latin America.
h. Strategic Arms and SALT-Related Matters.
This one is tricky. For balance, objectivity and
other related considerations, I think it ought to be an
v Agency officer. Ls on ous
candidate (he was for such
another. Whoever is picked, it will be
essential that he interface synergistically, not counter-
productively (how's that for modern jargon) with
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9
Carl Duckett's activities. You will have to lay out,
clarify and adjudicate the ground rules of
his activities vis-a-vis Carl's -- and vice versa.
i. Conventional Forces. This position is a natural
for a senior DIA officer or other DOD official, probably
(but not necessarily) military. If military, you want
a bright Major General clearly on the way.. up. If
possible, you should get his next assignment quietly
greased in advance with the Secretary of Defense, e.g.,
the Deputy's slot in DIA or a juicy line billet such as
(at a minimum) command of a division. Anyone
more junior than a Major General would (a) be
hobbled before he started,
military career, or (c) both. .s
one obvious candidate but there are doubtless others.
j. Economic Matters. In many respects, this will
be the toughest slot of all for which to find the right person.
(1) I know the model for exactly the sort of
L/
(2) If you stay inside the Agency, Jim
is certainly one possibility and
is another. Apart from these,
OER is the obvious place to look. I have the
highest regard for the OER people with whom
I have worked but have known a rather
specialized group in a rather specialized
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context. Of those I know -- apart from
I has the necessary
rains , exi i, i an potential but so far 25X1
as I am aware he does not now have the
background. Others who know OER better,
across the board, may have additional
worthwhile suggestions.
(3) If you go outside the Agency but stay
within the government, Treasury, OMB or the
staff of the Council of Economic Advisors might
be your happiest hunting grounds. I doubt
if you could find what you want in State.
25X1
(4) Outside the government,
25X1
(5) Before making a final selection,
suggest you, or someone, talk to
5. Essential Support. If the NIOs are to do the jobs you want them
to do, they are going to need at least three kinds of essential support:
a. Each one will need his own secretary,
whom he should choose, and one assistant, in
whose choice he should have a major say. The
latter should be young, bright, knowledgeable
and energetic -- probably in the GS-12/14 range.
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25X1
He/she could come from anywhere in the Agency,
or community, and should probably come on a two-
year rotational detail.
b. Collectively the NIOs will need the support
of what for lack of a better label may be termed
a Secretariat. This would handle the receipt
and routing of traffic (a major problem I will
not even raise here), the keeping of book on
pending, extant and completed projects or requests,
oversight of files and records, production details,
etc. , etc. One person who could manage this
activity with great skill would beF
c. The NIOs -- individually and collectively
will need adequate space in which to work.
Each one will have to have his own office plus
appropriate space for his/her assistant and
secretary. The Secretariat will have to be
housed somewhere. The system will function far
better if all the NIOs work in reasonable physical
proximity to each other, sharing conference
rooms, etc. , and close to the supporting
Secretariat. The risk of inefficiency, confusion
(or chaos) will be materially enhanced if they
are scattered all over the building.
6. Officers and/or an "Office." In past discussions of this
concept, many words have been uttered and written -- some with passion --
on the pros and cons of having a panel of separate and essentially
autonomous officers (NIOs) versus grouping the NIOs under the umbrella
of an office. In your note to USIB you indicate that your present thinking
runs along the following lines:
"One National Intelligence Officer will
be assigned administrative authority for the
National Intelligence Officers. He will
chair meetings of National Intelligence
Officers for discussion of production
standards, work schedules, quality control
and product review. He will be assisted
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by an Editorial Staff to provide central
editorial standards, schedules and
assistance for the National Intelligence
Officers. "
7. The above is a trifle delphic, perhaps not. It
t/
itself also be a full-time job, and then some. I do not think anyone
can be both a substantive NIO and simultaneously the overseer of
his panel peers. At least one of his two spheres of responsibility
would not get proper attention, probably neither would be well
discharged.
generally making the NIO concept work, across the board, will of
could be read as an intention to assign this oversi ht function to one
of the substantive NIOs as an additional duty, making him a sort of first
among equals. If that is indeed your intent, seven plus years experience
in a somewhat analogous endeavor has convinced me that this approach
will not work. Being a substantive NIO and properly discharging what
I think you envisage an NIO's responsibilities as encompassing
will be a full-time job (and then some). If you have ten substantive
NIOs, each with two aides, plus a Secretariat of some sort (even
small) you are talking about a group of 35-40 people. Several of
the individual NIO's areas of responsibility will inevitably overlap --
some occasionally (China and the USSR, Japan and China), some
constantly (USSR, Strategic Arms, Conventional Forces).
Refereeing disputes, being sure nothing falls between cracks, ensuring
some uniformity of quality (not to mention format) in output, and
8. The choice, really, is not one office or no office. It is:
a. One office, each of whose members functions
for you and is constantly available to work directly
/ with you; but for which oversight responsibility
V (on your behalf) is clearly assigned, or
b. Ten largely independent offices, each
reporting to you, each likely to be working
at some degree of cross purposes with one or
more of its collegial confederates, and
consequently placing a great burden on your
(and/or General Walters') time and attention.
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9. There is no need for any elaborate "front office" structure in
the NIO panel, but I do think there is a need for one person to be the
panel's manager (full time) -- unless you want to take on that chore
personally or assign it to General Walters. The manager's alter ego
or "deputy" certainly can (and should) be one of the substantive NIOs,
but I do not see how the manager himself can be if the system is going
to work.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Geo ge A. Carver, Jr.
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MAT=TOP AND BOTTOM
UN(:LAssIi F:D CONFIDENTIALIX L tiF:(;ItF:T
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
EA/DCI
2
Mr. Colby
s
Exec Sec/USIB
The responses from State, DIA, NSA,
Treasury, Army and.Air Force to your draft
paper on NIOs are attached. We have not yet
had definite word from General Giller regarding
AEC comments. The FBI and the Navy chose not
to comment. The Acting CIA Member did not
provide additional comments as he felt that you
were fully informed of the Agency's position.
At least a few days prior to next week's
meeting you may wish to consider having me:
a. Circulate copies of all of these
comments to each of the Board Principals, or;
b. Circulate a new draft of the NIO
paper which take the comments into consideration,
or;
c. Circulate both the comments and a
revised draft of the NIO paper.
UNCLASSIFIED
Exec Sec / USIB
CONFIDENTIAL--_x
13 Aug 7
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