ACDA DRAFT REPORT ON H.J. RES. 87 H.J. RES. 98 AND H.J. RES. 120 RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH SPACE ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000200280021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 10, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 200W
February 10, 1984
STAT
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
Legislative Liaison Officer-
Department of State
Department of Defense
2Efffral Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
your agency has already reviewed the attached (p
informally) . U1- A,
ii
SPECIAL
ACDA draft report on H.J.Res. 87, H.J.Res. 98,
and H.J.Res. 120, resolutions dealing with space
arms control. (We have been advised by ACDA that tip
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to
the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1984.
Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler ( 395-4710)
the legislative analyst in this office.
Enclosures
cc:
Al Burman
John Eisenhour
SPECIAL
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1/' ~
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
Dear Mr. Chairman,
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
',Nashington, D.C. 20451
I am writing in response to your predecessor's letter of November
15, 1983, giving me the opportunity to comment on H.J. Res. 87,
r . J. Res. M and A.J. Res. 120.
H.J. Res. 87 and H.J. Res. 120 call for initiation of space arms
control negotiations with the Soviet Union. This issue has been
under study by the U.S. Government for some time, during recent
months more intensively than ever.
As you know, the United. States has a long-standing commitment to
effective arms control that improves U.S. and allied security and
reduces the risk of war. This includes significant efforts in
the space arms control area. The US commitment was in part
responsible for the leading role which the United States took in
the negotiation of a number of existing major international
agreements that impose limits on space weapons, including the
Outer Space Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the
Limited Test Ban Treaty which H.J. Res. 87 mentions in its
preambular paragraphs. It also led to our proposal to the USSR
for bilateral negotiations on anti-satellite arms control, which
brought about the three rounds of talks held in 1978-79. The
commitment today is reflected in the U.S. National Space Policy,
announced by the President July 4, 1982, which states:
"The United States will continue to study space arms control
options. The United States will consider verifiable and
equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise
limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems,
should those measures be compatible with United States
national security."
The 1978-79 talks sought agreement limiting ASAT capabilities and
use. These talks, however, revealed significant substantive
differences between the two sides. Further study
The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on House
Affairs
Foreign
House of Representatives
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since* hen has brought the potential problems of space arms
control into sharper focus. Until we have determined whether
there are, in fact, practical solutions to these Problems, we do
not beligve it would be productive to engage in formal bilateral
or multilateral negotiations of specific arms control measures.
H.J. Res. 87 and 120 both state that the arms control agreements
they advocate should be verifiable. Verification is one of the
central problems of anti-satellite arms control. Satellites that
serve U.S. and allied national security are few in number, so
that any cheating on an anti-satellite ban, even on a small
scale, could pose a disproportionate risk to the U.S.
An example of the difficulty inherent in verification is the
Soviet ASAT interceptor system, which has been operational for
over a decade. To date, no satisfactory way has been found of
effectively verifying elimination of this interceptor under an
ASAT ban. It is relatively small and is fitted to a Soviet space
booster used for other space launch missions. We do not know how
many such ASAT systems have been manufactured, and it would be
relatively easy for the-USSR,to maintain a covert supply for use
in a crisis.
Verification problems apply to other aspects of ASAT arms control
as well. Simply determining whether an object hundreds of
kilometers above the earth has in fact been attacked can, in some
cases, be extremely difficult. To date, Soviet space arms
control proposals have addressed none of these verification
difficulties.
In addition, the threat of rapid breakout would be inherent in an
arms control agreement which banned all anti-satellite systems.
Breakout potential could exist even if the Soviets, upon agreeing
to a ban on ASAT systems, were to destroy all of their existing
systems. The Soviets could retain the technology to rebuild
quickly a system in which they would have confidence. In the
event of such a breakout, US space assets previously thouqht
secure would suddenly be threatened. The U.S. could proceed with
passive defensive measures for its satellites, but given the long
lead-time inherent in the design and development of space systems
such measures would take an extended Period to develop and
deploy: In addition they would be very expensive and might not
be totally effective. Thus, breakout potential is an important
element'in assessing the merits of space arms control provisions.
There are also problems in defininq what constitutes a space
weapon. For example, ground-based anti-ballistic missiles, such
as the 100 nuclear interceptors permitted the USSR by the ABM
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Treaty. and which are deployed around Moscow, could be fired from
their silos in direct attacks against satellites overhead.
Furthermore, some non-weapons space systems could have
characteristics which make them difficult to distinguish from
weapons systems.
The Soviet ASAT has the capability to attack US low-altitude
satellites in a broad spread of orbital inclinations. The
Administration is currently pursuing the Miniature Vehicle
program so as to provide a capability to deter Soviet attack on
U.S. satellites and those of our Allies, and, within such limits
as are imposed by international law, to deny any adversary the
use of space-based systems that provide support to hostile
military forces. In addition to the Soviets' existing anti-
satellite weapon, there is a growing threat posed by present and
prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons
themselves, are designed to support directly the USSR's
terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict, for example to
provide targettinq information on U.S. and allied surface fleets.
These satellites can be destabilizing if they provide information
needed for the conduct of surprise attacks against US and allied
forces. U.S. development of an anti-satellite capability is also
partly in response to this threat.
The Adminstration is continuing to study both the specific and
general difficulties which have been described above. It is in
the process of assessing the merits of a number of anti-satellite
arms control proposals. An interagency group composed of the
Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
other agencies has been exploring a broad range of possible ASAT
arms control options and the difficult issues involved in outer
space arms control. In addition, the United States has been
actively involved in establishing a working croup to discuss
outer space issues at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, with a view to determining what, if, any new arrangements
might be needed or desirable to further the peaceful uses of
space.
H. Con. Res. 98 calls for support for the President's efforts to
Cevelop strategic defensive systems to make nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete. I certainly agree with the general thrust
of the resolution, and believe it would be helpful for the
Congress to go on record as supporting the President's decisions
on this subject.
However, on such an important subject, I believe the support
should be expressed very carefully and should be focussed more on
the President's decision to pursue a research and development
program.
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I believe the resolution would benefit if its language were
changed to reflect more closely the precise form of the
President's recommendations. In his speech of March 23, he
stated that "consistent with our obligations of the ABM Treaty
and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our
Allies..,.I an directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to
define a long-term research and development program to begin to
achieve our ultimate goal of eliminatinq the threat posed by
strategic nuclear missiles."
The President also noted that such an effort could pave the way
for arms control measures to eliminate ballistic missiles
themselves, and noted that the United States "will continue to
pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a
.position of strength that can be ensured only by modernizing our
strategic forces." Some reference to these elements also might
be desirable. With such changes, I believe the resolution would
be of significant assistance toward the President's objectives.
Sincerely,
Kenneth L. Adelman
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