LETTER TO EDWARD P. BOLAND FROM LINCOLN D. FAURER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000300350008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 2, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

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..- us- i 864
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE -*-----
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYLAND 20755
Serial: N1086
12 August 1983
The Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chairman Boland:
component of NSA's overall personnel security program, as explained
in somewhat greater detail below. Needless to say, I request
you advise me if I can provide any other assistance or information
which. would be useful in avoiding this possibility.
By way of general background, I should state that the "NSA
Polygraph Program" includes three types of polygraph interviews:
(a) a general polygraph-assisted interview as a required part of
the initial clearance process for NSA civilian employees and
employees of some NSA contractors--this program has been in effect
for over thirty years; (b) the so-called "aperiodic" program,
instituted only last Fall--limited, mandatory counterintelligence
polygraph interviews of randomly selected civilian employees,
military assignees and the employees of NSA contractors; and (c)
infrequently, specific "investigative" interviews in respect to
discrete incidents (e.g., suspected fraud, unauthorized disclosures).
The NSA program as just summarized is applicable to NSA civilian
employees, military assignees to'NSA, NSA contractors' employees
as to whom NSA has security cognizance, and detailees to NSA
with SCI access: the simple fact of receipt of NSA information
does not place an individual within the program. Polygraph inter-
views are conducted in accordance with DoD guidelines, which
prohibit the taking of action concerning an individual solely on
the basis of the results of the polygraph examination, with
"results" in this sense understood to be indications on the
The purpose of this letter is to express to you my concern
about House of Representative action last week which removed a
general exemption for the National Security Agency (NSA) from
section 1111 (limiting certain Department of Defense (DoD) poly-
graph programs) of the 1984 DoD Authorization Bill. As you may
know, the subject of DoD polygraph programs had arisen during
Senate consideration of its authorization bill, and after a
similar expression of my concern, Senator Chafee had kindly
undertaken to lead efforts to ensure that a provision permitting
continuation of NSA polygraph programs would be included in the
Senate bill, which occurred, I understand, with bipartisan support.
I trust you can understand my concern that the House's action
could result in legislation impairing what I believe is a vital
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polygraph "chart," not any substantive information which might
be developed in the course of a polygraph interview.
With respect to these three "types" of programs, the first,
"clearance" polygraph-assisted interviews, have, as stated, long
been utilized by NSA and provide the principal experience upon
which NSA security personnel base their general confidence in
the polygraph as a useful interview/investigative technique. As
you can appreciate, however, the clearance polygraph is of limited
utility as a counterespionage technique, since agent recruitment
would most likely occur after an individual had secured a security
clearance--there is reason to believe, though, that clearance
polygraphs are a deterrent to hostile penetration attempts. A
major gap in the clearance process is that military assignees to
NSA have not historically been polygraphed, either by NSA upon
assignment or by the services in connection with their initial
clearance decision.
The second type of program, the "aperiodic" counterintelli-
gence polygraph interview of currently cleared civilian, military
and contractor personnel, is a relatively recent development.
Institution of this program can be traced to former Deputy
Secretary Carlucci's memorandum of 5 August 1982, although I
want to emphasize that NSA was contemporaneously analyzing the
issues which would be raised by NSA's own implementation of such
a program, and, further, that NSA has certain small, voluntary
counterintelligence polygraph programs for personnel assigned to
certain, closely-held compartments. As a practical matter, I
recognize that perhaps the most significant aspect of Mr. Carlucci's
directive was that it authorized the polygraphing of appropriately
cleared military personnel, an action which had been a contro-
versial matter within the Department of Defense. Further, I
certainly understand that an aspect of Mr. Carlucci's decision
was the substantial backlog which had developed with respect to
security reinvestigations of currently cleared personnel. In
any event, I believe the result of Mr. Carlucci's directive--the
"aperiodic" polygraph program--to be an extremely significant
upgrading of NSA's counterespionage program.
The third type of polygraph program, polygraph interviews
in respect to specific matters under investigation, has long
been authorized by DoD and NSA regulations, on a voluntary basis.
NSA's most frequent usages in this respect have been in connection
with the investigation of security issues raised by possible
illegal or improper actions, or unauthorized disclosures by
currently cleared personnel. National Security Decision Directive
84, issued in April 1983, directed a modification of this type
of polygraph interview by authorizing agenpies to require
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individuals to participate in polygraph interviews in connection
with the investigation of specific unauthorized disclosures, and
to withdraw access to classified information (or, take other
"appropriate administrative action") if an individual declines
to participate. NSA has revised its regulations to authorize
such mandatory polygraph interviews. No unauthorized disclosure
investigative polygraphs under this mandatory program have yet
been directed. I am certain that such polygraph interviews will
only be required in cases with serious security ramifications
and when other information provides indications that the inter-
views will be useful.
As I am certain you appreciate,'section 1111 of the House
DoD Authorization Bill as it now stands would have the effect of
precluding the second ("aperiodic") and third ("investigative")
types of NSA polygraph programs in their current "mandatory"
form. Subsection (b) of the counterpart provision in the Senate
DoD Authorization Bill (stating, "The restrictions prescribed in
subsection (a) with respect to the use of polygraph examinations
in the Department of Defense shall not apply to the National
Security Agency of the Department of Defense") has the opposite-
effect, and would permit continuation of the NSA programs described
above. 'Of course, I prefer the Senate version and would request
that you consider action aimed at similarly maintaining these
important NSA personnel security programs.
On the subject of NSA's polygraph programs in general, I
want to assure you of my personal concern and satisfaction that
NSA's utilization of the polygraph is free of abuse and.reasonable
and prudent overall. NSA polygraph interviewers are well-trained,
experienced and closely supervised, and stringent quality control
and privacy protection precautions are taken. There is full
disclosure to participants in the various polygraph interviews
of the purpose and nature of the interview, and all questions
(except for "control" questions) to be asked in the interview
are reviewed with the participant; all individuals are provided
a form stating the purpose and possible uses of the polygraph
interview. Even under the "mandatory" programs, any particular
polygraph interview will be halted at the request of the partic-
ipant. Most importantly, to repeat what was said before, no
action may be taken concerning an individual based solely on the
results of the polygraph examination. The effectiveness of these
precautions is established by the fact that the NSA polygraph
program is generally held in high regard and there have been, to
my knowledge, no sustainable allegations of abuse or malpractice
over its extended history. I will, of course, insist that these
same high standards be maintained in any NSA program.
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i recognize that controversy surrounds the general subject
of "polygraphing" and that this controversy has perhaps been
heightened by concern that mandatory "investigative" polygraphs
in unauthorized disclosure cases might be misused. Although I
believe that the "mandatory" nature of both the aperiodic and
investigative programs is essential to their success, I want to
assure you that even a refusal to participate in either of these
two "mandatory" interview programs would not necessarily lead to
any adverse action or even a withdrawal of clearance, since many
additional factors would also have to be evaluated in such a
case. The draft DoD Polygraph Program Regulation listing of
such factors (e. q., the individual's reason(s) for refusal;
record of service performance; other information affecting the
individual's clearance status; the sensitivity of the infor-
mation involved) simply states the kind of common-sense
considerations that I would insist upon in any such matter. In
any event, investigative polygraphs have always been relatively
infrequent and I would not anticipate that the authority to
direct mandatory polygraphs in the investigation of unauthorized
disclosures would lead to any substantial increase in their
occurrence; certainly, in view of the concerns I understand
exist, I will require modification of NSA internal directives to
ensure that all such polygraph interviews are personally
approved by me and I will permit their usage only in cases
concerning serious unauthorized disclosures.
I trust that these assurances, in light of NSA's extensive
and abuse-free experience with polygraph interviews, are
sufficient to convince you that the Agency should be permitted
to continue its current uses of this useful investigative
technique.
Sincerely,
LINCOLN D. FAURER
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
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