THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE 84 AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE ON USE OF POLYGRAPHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000300360013-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 19, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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All of the statements made at
this hearing are filed under
Prepublication Review in two
volumes.
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_ CX 1ROOES. TER. CHAIRMAN
DANTE 1. FASCELL FLA.
DON FUOUA FLA
ELL10-T N LEVIW. GAIL
HENRY A WAXMAN, CALIF.
STEPHEN L NEAL N.C.
TOM LANTOS. CALIF.
JOHN H. ERLENIORN. ILL
WILLIAM F CLINGER J0.. PA
DAN.IUKTON. INO.
(Zongess of the united ~5tatez
Una of Rgresrncetfues
LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING. ROOM B-373
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20515
LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing on
The President's National Security Decision Directive 84
and Department of Defense Directive on Use of Polygraphs
Wednesday, October 19, 1983
9:30 a.m.
Dr. Kenneth J. Coffey
Associate Director (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Accompanied by:
Mr. Irving Boker, Evaluator-In-Charge, U.S. General Accounting Office
Dr. John H. Gibbons
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
U.S. Congress
Dr. John F. Beary, III
Associate Dean of Undergraduate Medical Education
Georgetown School of Medicine
Honorable George W. Ball
Former Deputy Under Secretary of State
Bob Schieffer, CBS News and Bruce Sanford, Counsel to the Society
Representing the Society of Professional Journalists
Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Michigan University Law School
Lucas A. (Scott) Powe, Jr., University of Texas
Constitutional Scholars on the First Amendment
Honorable Mel Levine
Member of Congress, 27th District of California
U.S. House of Representatives
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Richard Willard
Head of the Office of Intelligence Policy
and Review
U.S. Department of Justice
General Richard G. Stilwell
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
U.S. Department of Defense
Kenneth L. Blaylock
President
American Federation of Government Employees
Ralph Davidson
Chairman of the Board
Time, Inc.
Charles Rowe, Editor, The Free Lance-Star (Fredericksburg, Va.)
Representing the American Society of Newspaper Editors
Accompanied by:
Richard Schmidt, General Counsel to the Association
Joseph Ungaro
Executive Director, Gannett Newspapers
Representing the Associated Press Managing Editors Association
Jack Landau
Executive Director
Reporters Committee for a Free Press
Dennis Hays
President
American Foreign Service Association
Robert L. Park
Professor of -Physics
University of Maryland
Representing the American Association of University Professors
Heather Grant Florence
Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel of Bantam Books and
Chairman of -the Freedom to Read Committee of AAP
Representing the Association of American Publishers
Charles W. Maynes
Editor, FOREIGN POLICY Magazine
Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations
Patricia Derian
Board Member
Representing The Fund for Free Expression
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
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 1 n
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/I 7
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
rERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
B-206067
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20548
ca 18 1983
The Honorable Jack Brooks
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Subject: Effect of National Security Decision'
Directive - 84, Safeguarding National
Security Information (GAO/NSIAD-84-26)
Your May 18, 1983, letter requested that we assist the
subcommittee ;; its review
enthe closures IV andcVi;e which was
issued March On June 14, 1983, you sent a questionnare to those agencies
and offices that handle classified information. You asked the
General Accounting Office to review and analyze the responses,
which we did. Subsequently, we were asked to obtain additional
information from the agencies, pertaining primarily to their
experience with unauthorized disclosures and the ensuing inves-
tigations. Most of the information obtained from the agencies,
as a result of your questionnaire and our inquiries, is included
in enclosure I. Enclosures II and III, respectively, include a
listing of Executive information andransummarycofssoand me off thesinthat formatione classified in inform
obtained from those agencies.
Executive Order 12356, on national security information,
provides that the Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with the
order and implementing directives. That office furnished us a
listing of the agencies and offices handling classified informa-
tion, which was used by your staff to mail questionnaires. The
Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency were
excluded from our summaries because of the sensitivity of their
operations. We did not verify the information reported by the
agencies; however, in many cases we requested clarification.
Where actual figures were not readily available, agencies were
(009733)
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asked to provide estimates. Therefore, our compilation includes
actual figures and estimates.
Copies of this report will be sent to all agencies that
provided information and to other interested parties upon
request.
Sincerely yours,
Frank C.Conahan
Director
Enclosures - 5
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ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I
Responses To Questions Of The Legislation
and National Security Subcommittee
House Committee on Government Operations
QUESTION 1
Approximately how many full- and part-time people were
employed by the federal government as of December 31, 1982?
RESPONSE
There were 5,137,280 federal civilian and military
personnel.
QUESTION 2
Approximately how many federal employees and contractor
employees had security clearances as of December 31, 1982?
RESPONSE
There were about 2.5 million federal and 1.5 million
contractor employees with security clearances at the levels
shown below.
Level of
Federal
Contractor
clearance
employees
employees
Top Secret
463,599
266,922
Secret
2,054,906
940,324
Confidential
17,378
305,507
Total
2,535,883
1,512,753
Of the total number of federal employees--5,137,280--about 9
percent had top secret clearances and 40 percent had secret
clearances.
QUESTION 3
Approximately how many federal and contractor employees had
access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) as of
December 31, 1982?
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ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I
RESPONSE
There were 112,660 federal employees and 15,090 contractor
employees with SCI access.
QUESTION 4
Approximately how many federal employees had authority to
originally classify information and how many could classify
information on a derivative basis?
RESPONSE
There were 5,703 federal employees with authority to orig-
inally classify information and 2,484,541 who could classify
information on a derivative basis. Derivative classification
occurs when an individual (1) reproduces, extracts, or summa-
rizes classified information, (2) applies classification mark-
ings derived from source material, or (3) follows instructions
included in a classification guide. Generally, most federal
employees can apply classification markings on a derivative
basis up to, and including, their level of clearance. The
following tabulation shows the number of individuals with
original classification authority and those who can classify on
a derivative basis.
Number of employees
Highest level of
who can classify information
classification
Originally Derivatively
Top Secret
1,015
428,287
Secret
3,233
2,040,206
Confidential
1,455
16,048
Total
5,703
2,484,541
QUESTION 5
How many agencies used the polygraph during calendar year
RESPONSE
Six agencies--the Departments of Defense, Justice,
Treasury, and Health and Human Services, Postal Service, and
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ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I
Tennesses Valley Authority--were using the polygraph; however,
the latter four agencies were using it primarily in connection
with criminal investigations and employee misconduct.
QUESTION 6
Approximately how many polygraph operators were employed as
of December 31, 1982?
RESPONSE
Agencies employed 194 polygraph operators and had 14 under
contract as of December 31, 1982. Twenty-eight of the govern-
ment polygraph operators and the 14 operators under contract
were not being used in connection with national security
matters.
QUESTION 7
During calendar year 1982, approximately how many books,
articles, speeches, and other materials were reviewed during the
prepublication process?
RESPONSE
The following tabulation shows types and quantities of
information reviewed during calendar year 1982.
Books
68
Articles
7,805
Speeches
2,887
Pages not specified
92,918
Articles & Books not
specified
1,859
Other
7,463
QUESTION 8
What was the average number of working days that elapsed
from the date of receipt of a request for prepublication review
of a document to the date that the requestor was informed of the
final results?
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ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I
RESPONSE
The following shows the range of time (in days) reported by
the agencies for the prepublication process.
Number
of
days
Books
9
to
30
Articles
1
to
22
Speeches
1
to
20
Others
5
to
74
QUESTION 9
During calendar 1982, approximately how many employees were
assigned and how many working days were used for prepublication
reviews, Freedom of Information Act requests, and requests for
mandatory reviews for declassification under Executive Order
12356?
RESPONSE
Agencies used about 2,994 full-time
315,340 working days to review the three
information, as shown below.
Estimated number of
employees assigned
employees and about.
categories of
Estimated number of
working days used
Prepublication
review 145
9,276
Freedom of
Information Act 2,577
295,312
Mandatory reviews 272
10,752
Total 2,994
315,340
QUESTION 10
How many unauthorized disclosures of classified information
were there during calendar years 1978 through 1982? How many of
these were made through writings or speeches of current of
former employees, and how many involved SCI?
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ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I
RESPONSE
Eight agencies reported unauthorized disclosures of clas-
sified information during the 5-year period. Six of these
agencies reported 328 known unauthorized disclosures of clas-
sified information. The other two agencies were unable to
provide specific information. Of the 328 reported unauthorized
disclosures, 21 were made through writings or speeches and, of
these, possibly 2 involved SCI. (In one the disclosure was
made during questioning by a reporter.)
QUESTION 11
How many unauthorized disclosures of classified information
were investigated internally?
RESPONSE
Two Hundred Eighty-three cases were investigated
internally.
QUESTION 12
As a result of the investigations of unauthorized
disclosures, how many cases resulted in administrative action
against the suspects and how many resulted in prosecution and
conviction?
RESPONSE
Administrative action was taken in 11 cases, but there were
no prosecutions or convictions.
QUESTION 13
In how many investigations of unauthorized disclosures was
the polygraph used; what were the results of the polygraph; and
when deception was indicated, how many cases resulted in admin-
istrative action?
RESPONSE
The polygraph was used 36 times during 2 investigations.
Deception was indicated two times (nondeception indicated in the
other 34), and administrative action was taken once.
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ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I
QUESTION 14
How many unauthorized disclosure cases were reported to the
FBI for investigation?
RESPONSE
Thirty-nine cases were reported to the FBI for
investigation.
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ENCLOSURE II ENCLOSURE II
EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND OFFICES
THAT HANDLE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Department of Agriculture
Agency for International Development
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Civil Aeronautics Board
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
Export-Import Bank
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Reserve System
General Services Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Board for International Broadcasting
U.S. International Trade Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Marine Mammal Commission
Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Labor Relations Board
National Science Foundation
National Transportation Safety Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Peace Corps
Office of Personnel Management
U.S. Postal Service
Executive Office of the President
Securities and Exchange Commission
Selective Service System
Small Business Administration
Department of State
Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
United States Information Agency
Veterans Administration
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ENCLOSURE III ENCLOSURE III
~ of employees
Axel of access: Agwicy amployan- Top Secret
Secret
Canflawtial
Contractor welafass- Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
CI *mm": Agency ?IOyese
Corrtrsetar employes
gsncles emolOying or con! ractIng for polygraph apsra-as
Isnaer of polygraph aperatv'a employed In 1982:
Agency 0010fss
contractor
gencles with ur.fl1 ?Iied dlaclaeures of classified
Into motion in last 5 years
char of loan iouutlra?ISd diselorres In Iaet 5 yews
4. r sops !I. writing or apssarsaI
By "M am or currw" 6010"m
Involving 3:1
*0" of dlseloauras Imestlgstad Inters!ly
4naer of dlaclasur $ re0arted to FBI for Investigation
Nisaaar of Invstigations inwlving the use of a polygrW:
Nodr of tlmos polygraph wad In Investigations
then used, polygraph results stand: Detapttan
Non decgtIon
Inoaglualve
No opinla:
Nusosr of tlsas aominlstMlve action was mom when
deoaptfan was Indloped
Niweur of tlme,s aaslnlstretive action was taken as e
result of other Investlgstiohe
Numar of Investigations raalting In proseortlon and
conviction
Information ootalned
From Ewscutive 8ranCn Agencies
tarot Nend1? ClsssIfled Inforwatian
10TAL
DEPT.
OF
DEFENSE
OE'T.
OF
STATE
Darr.
OF
JUSTICE
OFT.
OF
ENT3GY
IW.EAR
"TORY
!OMISSION
DEPT. OF
1W dPCR- 071431
TATION AMCIES 2/
5,137,280
3,350,582
14,688
56,536
17.390
3,770
94,749
1,992,985
463,599
344,610
13,147
25,775
4,800
1,960
531
22,776
2,054.906
1,993,940
1,629
4,555
2,300
0
4,468
47,964
17.378
9,325
0
869
0
1,810
256
5,102
256,922
105,632
330
246
160,000
317
0
397
940,324
669,504
1,760
112
66,000
0
0
2.948
25,507
304,996
110
80
0
219
0
109
112,660
102,107
4,352
2,472
240
42
40
3,407
15,040
14,318
163
20
499
0
0
90
6
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
4
194
112
0
54
0
0
0
28
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
328
21
I
1
0
17
2
0
2
, 1
0
0
0
1
0
4/
283
137
88
3/
0
11
47
4/
39
16
10
3/
13
0
0
4/
36
2
2
3/
34
34
N/A
WA
WA
N/A
/
0
0
0
0
11
5
4
3/
2
0
0
4/
IAbm not Include National Saarlty Agency.
2/Ooes not Include Central Intel IIgoras Agency.
3/Infortle,tlon was not provided In time, for Inclusion In the chart.
4/1nforse,lIon was not Val table.
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.arch 11, 1983
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE - 84
Safeguarding National Security Information
As stated in Executive Order 12356, only that information whose disclosure would harm
the national security interests of the United States may be classified. Every effort
should be made to declassify information that no longer requires protection in the
interest of national security. `
At the same time, however, safeguarding against unlawful disclosures of properly
classified information is a matter of grave concern and high priority for this
Administration. In addition to the requirements set forth in Executive Order 12356,
and based on the recommendations contained in the interdepartmental report forwarded
by the Attorney General, I direct the following:
1. Each agency of the Executive Branch that originates or handles classified
information shall adopt internal procedures to safeguard against unlawful disclosures
of classified information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide as follows:
a. All persons with authorized access to classified information
shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of
access. This requirement may be implemented prospectively by agencies
for which the administrative burden of compliance would otherwise be
excessive.
b. All persons with authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement
as a condition of access to SCI and other classified information. All
such agreements must include a provision for prepublication review to
assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.
c. All agreements required in paragraphs l.a. and l.b. must be
in a form determined by the Department of Justice to be enforceable
in a civil action brought by the United States. The Director,
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), shall develop standardized
forms that satisfy these requirements.
d. Appropriate policies shall be adopted to govern contacts
between media representatives and agency personnel, so as to reduce the
opportunity for negligent or deliberate disclosures of classified
information. All persons with authorized access to classified
information shall be clearly apprised of the agency's policies in
this regard.
2. Each agency of the Executive Branch that originates or handles classified
information shall adopt internal procedures to govern the reporting and investigation
of unauthorized disclosures of such information. Such procedures shall at a minimum
provide that:
a. All such disclosures that the agency considers to be seriously
damaging to its mission and responsibilities shall be evaluated to
ascertain the nature of the information disclosed and the extent to
which it had been disseminated.
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b. The agency shall conduct a preliminary internal investigation
prior to or concurrently with seeking investigative assistance from other
agencies.
c. The agency shall maintain records of disclosures so evaluated
and investigated.
d. Agencies in the possession of classified information
originating with another agency shall cooperate with the originating
agency by conducting internal investigations of the unauthorized
disclosure of such information.
e. Persons determined by the agency to have knowingly made such
disclosures or to have refused cooperation with investigations of such
unauthorized disclosures will be denied further access to classified
information and subjected to other administrative sanctions as
appropriate.
3. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information shall be reported to the
Department of Justice and the Information Security Oversight Office, as required by
statute and Executive orders. The Department of Justice shall continue to review
reported unauthorized-disclosures of classified information to determine whether FBI
investigation is warranted. Interested departments and agencies shall be consulted
in developing criteria for evaluating such matters and in determining which cases
should receive investigative priority. The FBI is authorized to investigate such
matters as constitute potential violations of federal criminal law, even though
adrd nistrative sanctions may be sought instead of criminal prosecution.
4. Nothing in this directive is intended to modify or preclude interagency
agreements between FBI and other criminal investigative agencies regarding their
responsibility for conducting investigations within their own agencies or departments.
5. The Office of Personnel Management and all departments and agencies with
employees having access to classified information are directed to revise existing
regulations and policies, as necessary, so that employees may be required to submit
to polygraph examinations, when appropriate, in the course of investigation of
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As a minimum, such regulations
shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate adverse consequences will follow
an employee's refusal to cooperate with a polygraph examination that is limited in
scope to the circumstances of the unauthorized disclosure under investigation'.
Agency regulations may provide that only the head of the agency, or his delegate,
is empowered to order an employee to submit to a polygraph examination. Results
of polygraph examinations should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other
information obtained during investigations.
6. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director, Office of Personnel
Management, is requested to establish an interdepartmental group to study the federal
personnel security program and recommend appropriate revisions in existing Executive
orders, regulations, and guidelines.
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 AC. d-.OGRE, ML C$A..UAN
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Lt OTT N. LI .a AS. GA
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RL
WILLIAM 1 CUwGIR. JR. to
DAN SUR7ON. MD.
lZongre z of the Al nited ~5tatez
tionse of .ePrammtibts
LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING. ROOM B-.373
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20515
May 18, 1983
Honorable Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General of the United States
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548
The Legislation and National Security Subcommittee is reviewing the Presidential
Directive, "Safeguarding National Security Information," issued March 11, 1983.
Because of th2 potential impact of this Directive on our security interests, the
morale of Government employees, and the efforts of the Government to recruit well-
qualified personnel, the inquiry is of special importance.
It would be appreciated if you would assist the inquiry by gathering the following
facts pertinent to an evaluation of the Directive's possible impact:
1. a list of agencies which have classified material, the number of employees
in each agency, and the current plans of each such agency to implement the non-
disclosure agreements retrospectively or prospectively;
2. the number of persons, by agency and department and for the private sector,
with access to classified information and Sensitive Compartmented Information;
3. the number of persons with authority to classify information;
4. the number of trained polygraphers employed by each agency or' department in
the Federal Government in that capacity and their required qualifications;
5. the number of persons currently employed in the pre-clearance for publication
of employees' and former employees' written material by agency and department; the
number of books, articles, and speeches they typically review in a month; and the
average turn-around time for clearance of each type of material;
6. the number of unauthorized disclosures of classified information for each
of the last five years of which the Executive Branch is aware; the highest level
of classification of the material disclosed in each instance; and the highest
classification to which the discloser (if known) was authorized access.
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/30: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300360013-8 LOSURE V
Honorable Charles A. Bowsher
May 18, 1983
Page 2
It is understood that certain agencies and departments may not be able to
supply all of the data requested with specificity. If an estimate is all that
can be obtained, the Subcommittee would appreciate learning the facts which
might affect the parameters of the estimate. If the information is simply
unknown, that fact will also be valuable. It is also possible that, as your
work progresses, further areas which require more facts may appear.
Because of the magnitude of the policy involved and the possibility that
the Directive will be implemented quickly, it is hoped that you will find it
possible to devote maximum staff resources to this effort.
Thank you very much for your attention to this request. With every good
wish to you, I am
12
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