POLYGRAPH STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000300370016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 2, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Polygraph Study
} _ Director of Security
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F1-i S 1 EDITIORM 61 0 USE PREVIOUSONS
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8 FEB' 1984
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
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6 FE 1984
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column *her each comment.)
Attached is a recently pro-
duced study by the Personnel
Security Subcorlittee of the DCI
Security Committee.
It.is a collection of anecdotal
reports on the utility of the poly-
graph. The study was launched
some months ago by SECMI in antici-
pation that considerable Congres-
sional attention on polygraph looms
up ahead. Because at this late
date laboratory studies of poly-
graph reliability or validity would
be impossible to mount, the
decision was made to focus on
polygraph's main strength anyway:
its incredible utility, i.e.,
its ability to serve as a useful
tool in the context of a total
security program.
I personally think this piece
would be extraordinarily valuable
to anyone who goes to Capitol Hill
on polygraph testimony in the fore-
seeable future.
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committe*
PERSONNEL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
PerSSub-002-84
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM
FROM:
Chairman, PerSSub
SUBJECT: Polygraph Study
Forwarded herewith is PerSSub-001-84, same Subject, in
response to your tasking contained in SECOM-D-172, dated
11 August 1982. It represents the final report on the matter.
Contributions to the study were received from CIA, FBI,
NSA, the Departments of Air Force,Army, Navy and State. The
remaining member organizations do not employ the polygraph in
their security programs.
The PerSSub made every effort to provide this report to
you in a timely fashion, realizing that it will be of use to
Intelligence Community representatives testifying before
congressional committees in the near future. The anecdotes
were prepared for presentation in an unclassified forum, and
in such a manner that neither the subjects nor the contribu-
tors could be identified. I anticipate that the DCI will
agree to their release in their present form.
The contributing organizations and their polygraph
divisions were all most cooperative throughout this effort.
Special recognition is in order for the CIA and NSA members
and will be forthcoming.
Chairman, PerSSub
Attachment:
PerSSub memorandum 001-84 w/att.
SECRET
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 `1\11~ 1111-1\1 I I C I
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r DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
S.curity Con mittoo
Serial: PerSSub-001-84
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM
Chairman, PerSSub
Polygraph Study
701
~~ In accordance with your tasking contained in SECOM-D-
172, dated 11 August 1982, the PerSSub undertook a survey
designed to establish the utility of the polygraph as a security
device within the Intelligence Community. This report represents
the results of that effort.
The survey makes no pretense of objectivity. It was
designed to demonstrate that the polygraph is useful in eliciting
admissions which would not otherwise be forthcoming by other
investigative means. The survey did not address the scientific
validity of the process, its scientific reliability or the effect
the quality of the examiner's training may have on results. Its
utility in bringing out previously unattained information was the
only concern.
The survey was limited in scope to the period datin
g
from January 1980 to September 1983, with a few cases drawn from
earlier years. By essentially limiting coverage to this short
timeframe, the survey therefore represents but a sampling of a
larger body of evidence which supports the utility of the
polygraph.
All agencies of the Intelligence Community utilizing
the polygraph contributed. The identities of the contributing
entities have been masked through a unique numbering system, the
key to which is retained by Chairman, PerSSub. Any inquiries
arising regarding a particular case will be referred by Chairman,
PerSSub to the proper contributor who will respond in keeping
with the policies of the agency involved.
The 51 selected cases are reported in anecdotal style
,
contain only the salient facts and are intended to be presentable
in an unclassified forum. The issues run the gamut from
Espionage to Security Violations. Because this is an
Intelligence Community survey, however, numerous criminal cases
from those Intelligence Community agencies having a law-
enforcement function as well were specifically excluded. In each
case, the use of almost-identical wording is intentional to help
preserve the anonymity of the contributor.
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Serial: PerSSub-001-84
The sole conclusion drawn from this effort is that
there exists an ample body of evidence to prove that the
polygraph brings out critical information otherwise denied. The
exemplars are but a fraction of material available to support the
utility of the polygraph. Our contention is not that the
polygraph is perfect but that it is so successful as to justify
its retention in our inventory of investigative tools. Its use,
or threat of its use, was sufficient to deter Christopher John
Boyce from seeking a position at a super-sensitive installation,
and David Henry Barnett from attempting reinstatement with CIA.
In Great Britain, the Russian spy, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, also
conceded that the polygraph would have deterred him from joining
GCHQ or would have exposed him while there. Again, how many
others have been deterred by threat of polygraph is a matter for
frightening speculation.
The PerSSub does not endorse the polygraph as a panacea 25X1
for all security ills. The polygraph -is not considered in
isolation, and is always used in conjunction with other
investigative tools. Recognizing its limitations and applying it
judiciously, the polygraph is essential in obtaining otherwise
unattainable information.
The following 51 anecdotal summaries clearly support
the premise that the polygraph is a valuable and useful tool in
the security programs of the Intelligence Community.
Chairman
Personnel Security Subcommittee
Attachment:
As stated above (summaries)
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