DOD TESTIMONY ON USE OF POLYGRAPH BEFORE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000300380021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 5, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20603
March 5, 1984
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
Legislative Liaison Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Council
Department of Justice
SPECIAL
SUBJECT: DOD testimony on use of polygraph before Senate
Armed Services Committee
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to
the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
ASAP but not later than noon March 6. Hearing is March 7.
Questions should be referred to Hilda Schreiber
(395-4650 ) G r- -to ---------------------------------------------)-r
the legislative analyst in this office.
Naomi R. Sweeney for
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
STAT
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MAF; -5
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, USA (RET.)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
BEFORE
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
7 MARCH 1984
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MR. CHAIRMAN. I APPRECIATE' THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE TODAY TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE, EXTENT AND PURPOSE OF
THE CHANGES THE DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING TO ITS POLICY ON USE
OF THE POLYGRAPH.
IT APPEARS FROM CONTINUING MEDIA COVERAGE, AS WELL AS PUBLIC AND
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES AND COMMENTS, THAT A NUMBER OF
MISCONCEPTIONS CONTINUE TO EXIST REGARDING NOT ONLY THE
PROPOSED CHANGES, BUT ALSO THE VALIDITY OF USE OF THE POLYGRAPH
IN GENERAL. IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT BY CLARIFYING THESE
MATTERS I MIGHT PROVIDE A CLEARER AND MORE ACCURATE PERSPECTIVE
ON THESE ISSUES AND THEREBY ENCOURAGE SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S
PROPOSAL TO USE THIS UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUE AS A MEANS
TO ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY FOR OUR MOST SENSITIVE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
BEFORE ADDRESSING SPECIFICS OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSED USE OF
THE POLYGRAPH, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO ACQUAINT YOU
WITH SOME BASIC FACTS CONCERNING THE POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT,
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, AND HISTORY OF USE OF THE POLYGRAPH.
SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE FORERUNNER OF MODERN POLYGRAPH
INSTRUMENTS SOME 60 YEARS AGO, THE POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT HAS COME
TO BE PERCEIVED AS BEING CAPABLE, IN AND OF ITSELF, OF DETECTING
DECEPTION. THE TERMS "POLYGRAPH" AND "LIE DETECTOR," HAVE IN
FACT, BECOME VIRTUALLY SYNONYMOUS.
IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A "LIE DETECTOR."
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2.
THE POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT IS RATHER, A ELECTROMECHANICAL DEVICE
THAT IS CAPABLE OF MEASURING AND RECORDING CERTAIN PHYSIOLOGICAL
FUNCTIONS. ALL POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENTS USED BY THE DEPARTMENT HAVE
AT LEAST THREE, BUT MORE OFTEN 4 OR 5 CHANNELS WHICH RECORD,
AS A MINIMUM -- RESPIRATION -- ELECTRODERMAL RESPONSE -- BLOOD
VOLUME -- AND HEART RATE. SINCE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
TESTIMONY HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE
POLYGRAPH -- I WILL NOT REPEAT THAT INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.
I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT ATTACHMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE
POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT IS BUT ONE ASPECT OF A POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION. ESSENTIALLY, A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION CONSISTS OF
THREE PHASES.
IN THE FIRST --OR PRE-TEST PHASE-- THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINER
REVIEWS ALL THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE EXAMINEE,
AND THE FACTS OF THE PARTICULAR INVESTIGATIVE CASE. IT IS ALSO
DURING THIS PHASE THAT EXAMINEES WOULD BE ADVISED OF THEIR
RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, TO HAVE LEGAL COUNSEL AVAILABLE FOR
CONSULTATION DURING THE EXAMINATION, AND THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
THE EXAMINER THEN CONDUCTS AN IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW OF THE EXAMINEE
ON MATTERS PERTINENT TO THE EXAMINATION, AND DETERMINES THE
INDIVIDUAL'S MENTAL AND PHYSICAL FITNESS FOR EXAMINATION. IF THERE
IS ANY QUESTION CONCERNING THE EXAMINEE'S FITNESS FOR EXAMINATION,
THE EXAMINATION WILL BE POSTPONED PENDING EVALUATION BY COMPETENT
MEDICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSONNEL.
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3.
THE EXAMINER WILL EXPLAIN THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT AND DEVELOP -- IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
EXAMINEE -- ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS THAT ARE TO BE ASKED. SUCH
QUESTIONS MUST HAVE A SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO THE SUBJECT OF THE
INVESTIGATION. NO qUESTION MAY BE ASKED CONCERNING MATTERS SUCH
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS/AFFILIATIONS --RACIAL MATTERS --POLITICAL
BELIEFS OR AFFILIATIONS OF A NONSUBVERSIVE NATURE --OR OPINIONS
REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE POLICIES. I
WOULD HIGHLIGHT THAT SIGNIFICANT ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS
ARE QUITE OFTEN OBTAINED DURING THIS PHASE OF THE EXAMINATION
THE NEXT PHASE -- OR IN-TEST PHASE, CONSISTS OF THE EXAMINEE
BEING ATTACHED TO THE POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT AND BEING ASKED TO
GIVE A YES OR NO RESPONSE TO EACH OF THE PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED
AND DISCUSSED QUESTIONS.
IN THE THIRD -- OR POST-TEST PHASE -- THE EXAMINER REVIEWS THE
PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIONS REFLECTED ON THE CHARTS AND MAKES A
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION. IF NECESSARY, THE EXAMINER THEN QUESTIONS
THE EXAMINEE REGARDING ANSWERS GIVEN TO PARTICULAR QUESTIONS.
WITHIN DOD, THREE CHARTS ARE NORMALLY COLLECTED ON EACH EXAMINEE,
WITH OCCASIONAL VARIATION IN THE SEQUENCE -- BUT NOT THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE QUESTIONS. SIGNIFICANT ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS ARE ALSO
FREQUENTLY OBTAINED DURING THIS PHASE OF THE EXAMINATION.
THE EXAMINER THEN FORWARDS ALL INFORMATION AND MATERIALS CONCERNING
THE EXAMINATION, TO INCLUDE AN OPINION REGARDING TRUTHFULNESS OR
DECEPTION, TO A SUPERVISORY EXAMINER. IT IS ONLY AFTER THE
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4.
SUPERVISORY EXAMINER HAS MADE AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE
POLYGRAPH CHARTS AND REVIEWED ALL ASPECTS OF THE EXAMINATION
THAT AN OFFICIAL OPINION IS RENDERED REGARDING TRUTHFULNESS OR
DECEPTION. I WOULD PARTICULARLY NOTE THAT THIS OPINION APPLIES
ONLY TO THE OUTCOME OF THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. DOD POLYGRAPH
EXAMINER PERSONNEL DO NOT MAKE DECISIONS REGARDING THE FINAL
OUTCOME OF INVESTIGATIVE CASES IN WHICH A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
HAS BEEN-ADMINISTERED. MOREOVER, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THE
RESULTS.OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION MAY BE CONSIDERED ONLY IN THE
CONTEXT OF OTHER INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT AND NOT CONSIDERED
CONCLUSIVE, IN THEMSELVES, OF THE MATTER UNDER INVESTIGATION.
BASICALLY, NO ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN SOLELY ON AN ANALYSIS
THE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS AN AID
IN SUPPORT OF OTHER INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES SPANS A PERIOD OF
MORE THAN 60 YEARS. AS EARLY AS 1917, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PREDECESSOR TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION -- WAS USING
THE POLYGRAPH ON AN OCCASIONAL BASIS TO RESOLVE CRIMINAL CASES.
AT ABOUT THIS SAME TIME, THE POLYGRAPH WAS FIRST USED IN A
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.
IN THE AREA OF SECURITY SCREENING, THE POLYGRAPH WAS USED IN
THE EARLY 1940'S --TO SCREEN POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES AT THE OAK
RIDGE ATOMIC FACILITY AND LATER, NEAR THE END OF WORLD WAR II --
TO SCREEN 274 GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR WHO WERE BEING CONSIDERED
FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE POST-WAR GERMAN GOVERNMENT.
IN THIS LATTER INSTANCE, 110 OF THE INDIVIDUALS WERE NOT
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5.
RECOMMENDED DUE TO ADMISSIONS OBTAINED DURING THE POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAZI PARTY, GESTAPO SS -- OR
COMMUNIST PARTY. ONE OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S IDENTIFIED AS A
NAZI PARTY MEMBER PROVED TO HAVE BEEN THE PARTY TREASURER FROM
1933 TO 1938.
IN 1947, THE NEWLY FORMED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BEGAN
USING THE POLYGRAPH IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS -- FOR INVESTIGATION
OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS--AND FOR SCREENING OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES.
BY 1950, CIA WAS SCREENING ALL APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH
THE AGENCY.
IN MAY 1951, THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY -- PREDECESSOR
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, BEGAN USING THE POLYGRAPH TO
EXPEDITE THE CLEARANCE PROCESSING OF MORE THAN A THOUSAND
EMPLOYEES WHO HAD BEEN HIRED BUT WHOSE CLEARANCE WOULD HAVE
OTHERWISE BEEN DELAYED PENDING COMPLETION OF THE BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION. BECAUSE OF THE KOREAN WAR, THOSE INVESTIGATIONS
WERE TAKING AS LONG AS 18 MONTHS TO COMPLETE. BY 1953, AFSA-NSA,
WAS GIVING POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS TO ALL APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT.
AS USE OF THE POLYGRAPH BEGAN TO EXPAND WITHIN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, THE CONGRESS BEGAN TO EXAMINE ITS USE MORE CLOSELY.
CONSEQUENTLY, IN 1963, THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE, HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE,
INITIATED EXTENSIVE HEARINGS INTO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S USE
OF THE POLYGRAPH.
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6.
AS A RESULT OF THE HEARINGS, THE DEPARTMENT, WORKING CLOSELY
WITH MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF, DEVELOPED AND ISSUED
DOD DIRECTIVE 5210.48 WHICH, AT THAT TIME, WAS VIEWED AS THE
FIRST COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO PRESCRIBE UNIFORM POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES CONTROLLING USE OF THE POLYGRAPH AND SELECTION,
TRAINING AND SUPERVISION OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS. THIS
DIRECTIVE, REVISED IN 1975 -- AND MOST RECENTLY AMENDED IN
1979 --GOVERNS THE DEPARTMENT'S CURRENT USE OF THE POLYGRAPH.
UNDER CURRENT POLICY GUIDANCE, THE POLYGRAPH IS USED AS AN
INVESTIGATIVE TOOL -- AND ONLY AFTER INVESTIGATION BY OTHER
MEANS HAS BEEN AS THOROUGH AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT AND ONLY WHEN
THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE EXAMINED CONSENTS TO THE EXAMINATION. ADVERSE
ACTION CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR REFUSAL TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.
ESSENTIALLY, THERE ARE 4 TYPES OF CASES IN WHICH THE POLYGRAPH
MAY BE AUTHORIZED. FIRST -- TO ASSIST IN RESOLVING SERIOUS
CRIMINAL CASES (THOSE INVOLVING OFFENSES PUNISHABLE
BY DEATH, OR CONFINEMENT FOR ONE YEAR OR MORE.) SECOND --
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS (INVESTIGATIONS
OF ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION,
AND ALLEGED ACTS OF ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE OR TREASON.) THIRD --
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (WHICH WOULD INVOLVE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH
TO ASSIST IN DETERMINING THE RELIABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE -
OR WHO CLAIM TO BE -- AGENTS, SOURCES OR OPERATIVES.) AND,
FOURTH -- PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS FOR TWO PURPOSES:
ONE, TO ASSIST IN DETERMINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS
FOR EMPLOYMENT, ASSIGNMENT OR DETAIL TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
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7.
AGENCY AND NSA CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION; TWO, TO ASSIST IN RESOLVING
DEROGATORY INFORMATION DEVELOPED DURING A PERSONNEL SECURITY
INVESTIGATION OF DOD MILITARY, CIVILIAN OR CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES,
WHEN SUCH INFORMATION CAUSES DOU13T THAT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IS CLEARLY CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE INVESTIGATION HAS REACHED AN
IMPASSE.)
IN ADDITION TO THESE GENERAL CATEGORIES OF USE. THE POLYGRAPH
MAY ALSO BE AUTHORIZED WHEN REQUESTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
EXCULPATION, BY THE SUBJECT OF A CRIMINAL, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
OR PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION.
AS I INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, THE DEPARTMENT'S ORIGINAL POLYGRAPH
DIRECTIVE WAS DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC
CONCERN FOR SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT MISUSE AND ABUSE. I WOULD
NOW LIKE TO SUMMARIZE FOR YOU THE LIMITATIONS AND CONTROLS
THAT HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO OUR EXISTING DIRECTIVE.
AUTHORITY TO APPROVE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS IS LIMITED TO THE
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS,. DIRECTORS, NSA AND DIA
AND MYSELF. FURTHER DELEGATIONS MUST BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED
BY ME. LIMITATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN PLACED ON WHO CAN CONDUCT
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE FOLLOWING
ARE THE ONLY DOD ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATIONS -- TO ACQUIRE OR POSSESS POLYGRAPH EQUIPMENT OR TO HAVE POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS:
. U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND
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8.
. U.S. ARMY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
U.S. MARINE CORPS LAW ENFORCEMENT SECTION
U.S. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
? U.S. AIR FORCE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
EXAMINATION.
TECHNICAL REPORTS OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION -- WHICH INCLUDE
THE EXAMINER'S PREPARATIONS, EXAMINER'S NOTES, THE POLYGRAPH
CHARTS, AND OTHER TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE EXAMINATION -- ARE
NOT RELEASABLE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY CONDUCTING THE POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION -- EXCEPT AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
THE REPORT OF RESULTS OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION -- WHICH INCLUDES
A SYNOPSIS OF THE EXAMINATION, THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS ASKED AND
EXAMINEE'S ANSWERS, THE OPINION REGARDING TRUTH OR DECEPTION, AND
ANY ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE EXAMINEE -- MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE
WITHIN DOD -- TO OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSONNNEL SECURITY,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. THE
REPORT OF RESULTS MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE --OUTSIDE DOD -- TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WHEN THE EXAMINATION REVEALS ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF A FEDERAL OR STATE LAW -- AND, TO THE PERSON EXAMINED
OR THEIR LEGAL COUNSEL, WHEN REQUESTED. IN ALL INSTANCES, AN
ACCOUNTING IS MAINTAINED OF THE DISSEMINATION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974.
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9.
CONTROLS HAVE ALSO BEEN ESTABLISHED ON POSSESSION AND MAINTENANCE
OF POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENTS. ALL INSTRUMENTS MUST BE MAINTAINED
IN SECURE STORAGE TO PREVENT DAMAGE OR MISUSE. FURTHER, RECURRENT
CHECKS ARE MADE TO ENSURE THAT THE INSTRUMENTS ARE PROPERLY
CALIBRATED AND THE EXAMINER IS REQUIRED TO NOTE THE SERIAL
NUMBER OF THE INSTRUMENT USED AND THE DATE IT WAS LAST CALIBRATED,
IN THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TECHNICAL REPORT.
SINCE THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINER PLAYS SUCH AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN
THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION PROCESS, OUR POLICY PRESCRIBES
PARTICULARLY STRINGENT STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION, TRAINING
AND SUPERVISION OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS.
TO BE SELECTED AS A DOD POLYGRAPH EXAMINER AN INDIVIDUAL MUST
BE --A U.S. CITIZEN -- 25 YEARS OF AGE -- A GRADUATE OF A 4-YEAR
ACCREDITED COLLEGE OR EQUIVALENT AND HAVE TWO YEARS EXPERIENCE
AS AN INVESTIGATOR -- BE THE SUBJECT OF A BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION AND THE SUBJECT Of A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. THE LATTER REQUIREMENT
HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A MEANS OF ENSURING THAT AN EXAMINER
FULLY REALIZES THE IMPACT OR EFFECT OF THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
ON INDIVIDUALS THEY MAY SUBSEQUENTLY EXAMINE. AT THE PRESENT TIME,
THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 150 CERTIFIED POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS IN DOD.
UNDER THE POLICY GUIDANCE OF MY OFFICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY MANAGES THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR DOD POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS.
THE COURSE OF STUDY IS 12 WEEKS AND THE CURRICULUM INCLUDES
COURSES IN:
. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
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10.
METHODS OF INTERROGATION
BASIC ELEMENTS OF NORMAL, ABNORMAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY
? CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL CONCERNS
PHYSIOLOGY
FUNCTIONING OF THE POLYGRAPH, ITS CAPABILITIES AND
LIMITATIONS
AND, DOD POLICY ON POLYGRAPH USE
FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION EACH CANDIDATE
FOR POLYGRAPH EXAMINER MUST SERVE A PROBATIONARY PERIOD OF FROM
6 MONTHS TO ONE YEAR. DURING THIS TIME THE CANDIDATE MUST CONDUCT
A MINIMUM OF 25 EXAMINATIONS UNDER THE DIRECT SUPERVISION OF A
CERTIFIED DOD POLYGRAPH EXAMINER. ONCE THE CANDIDATE HAS BEEN
CERTIFIED, IT-IS REQUIRED THAT THEY CONDUCT A MINIMUM OF 18
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS SEMIANNUALLY TO MAINTAIN THEIR
PROFICIENCY AND, THAT THEY RECEIVE REFRESHER TRAINING AT LEAST
ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS. TO HIGHLIGHT THE QUALITY OF OUR TRAINING,
IT IS POINTED OUT THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES --
TO INCUDE THE FBI AND THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE -- TRAIN THEIR
EXAMINERS AT THE DOD POLYGRAPH SCHOOL.
AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE ROLE OF THE SUPERVISORY EXAMINER
IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S SUCCESS IN MAIN-
TAINING QUALITY CONTROL OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.
ON THE BASIS OF THIS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, WE CAN
NOW PROCEED TO ADDRESS -- IN A MORE MEANINGFUL WAY -- WHY
THE DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING CHANGING ITS POLYGRAPH POLICY --
OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY AND UTILITY OF THE
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11.
POLYGRAPH -- AND DETAILS OF THE CHANGES THAT ARE BEING CONSIDERED.
ONE POINT ON WHICH THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT IS THAT THERE IS
CERTAIN INFORMATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT REQUIRES
PROTECTION IN THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING THE SECURITY AND
INTEGRITY OF OUR COUNTRY. THERE IS ALSO A CONSENSUS THAT
THIS INFORMATION FALLS INTO DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF SENSITIVITY
AND THAT-`THE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS THAT WHICH
INCLUDES CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS, CERTAIN RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
t4ENT PROJECTS, AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.
BASICALLY, THERE IS A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO PROVIDING SECURITY
FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION -- PHYSICAL SECURITY (SAFES, GUARDS,
ALARMS, ETC) -- INFORMATION SECURITY (CLASSIFICATION, ACCOUNTABILITY
AND RESTRICTION ON DISSEMINATION AND REPRODUCTION) -- AND --
PERSONNEL SECURITY.
HISTORICALLY, THE GOAL OF PERSONNEL SECURITY IS TO DETERMINE THE
TRUSTWORTHINESS OF INDIVIDUALS --PRIOR TO THEIR BEING GRANTED ACCESS
TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR ASSIGNMENT TO PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE
DUTIES-- AND ON A CONTINUING BASIS THEREAFTER. IT IS EVIDENT THAT
INSTALLATION OF THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND SOPHISTICATED PHYSICAL
AND INFORMATION SECURITY SYSTEMS ARE TO NO AVAIL, IF THE
CLEARED AND TRUSTED EMPLOYEE ELECTS TO COMPROMISE OUR SENSITIVE
INFORMATION TO OUR ADVERSARIES. THUS, PEOPLE ARE CENTRAL TO THE
SECURITY ISSUE.
TRADITIONALLY, THE KEYSTONE TO PERSONNEL SECURITY HAS BEEN THE
PERSONNEL SECURITY FIELD INVESTIGATION, WITH THE NATURE AND EXTENT
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12.
OF THIS INVESTIGATION DEPENDING UPON THE LEVEL OF SENSITIVITY
OF THE INFORMATION INVOLVED. ESSENTIALLY, SUCH INVESTIGATION
WOULD INCLUDE -- CHECKS OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES..-- EMPLOYMENT --CREDIT REFERENCES -- AND INTERVIEWS
WITH FRIENDS, NEIGHBORS, CO-WORKERS, AND OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE
IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THE INDIVIDUAL'S RELIABILITY AND
TRUSTWORTHINESS.
HOWEVER, COMMENCING IN THE MID-1970s, A NUMBER OF EVENTS TOOK
PLACE WHICH SERIOUSLY ERODED DOD PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.
THESE EVENTS INCLUDED: A CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED REDUCTION IN DOD
INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES-- THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF
1974 ON THE WILLINGNESS OF PERSONS OR ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE
RELEVANT INFORMATION -- LIMITATIONS PLACED ON ACCESSIBILITY OF
SCHOOL RECORDS -- AND, ISSUANCE OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS
THAT CAUSED MANY LOCAL JURISDICTIONS TO SEVERELY LIMIT ACCESS TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE EVENTS WAS: A SERIOUS DEGRADATION IN
OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- LESS
RELEVANT INFORMATION BEING AVAILABLE -- AND, A SIGNIFICANTLY
LESS VALID INVESTIGATIVE PRODUCT.
THIS SITUATION-- WHILE IN ITSELF A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN--WAS
FURTHER COMPLICATED BY ANOTHER, MORE THREATENING TURN OF EVENTS --
ESPIONAGE WAS ON THE UPSWING. AS PRIMARY EXAMPLES, CONSIDER THAT
THE CASES OF BOYCE & LEE, KAMPILES, LT COOK, CWO HELMICH AND
WILLIAM HOLDEN BELL. ALL WERE UNCOVERED IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN
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THE LATE 1970s AND END OF 1983. THESE CASES INVOLVED THE
COMPROMISE TO OUR ADVERSARIES OF INFORMATION RANGING FROM
THE MOST SECRET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MATERIAL TO TOP
SECRET COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
13.
THUS, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT SPECIAL EFFORTS HAD TO BE TAKEN TO PROTECT
OUR MOST SENSITIVE RESOURCES VITAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY.
IN LIGHT=OF THIS CRITICAL SITUATION, IN 1982 1 APPOINTED A SELECT
PANEL, COMPOSED OF SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS, WHO WERE CHARGED
WITH REVIEWING THE DEPARTMENT'S PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
FROM TOP TO BOTTOM AND DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLUTION
OF THE PROBLEM. THE PANEL WAS. CHAIRED BY MR. DAVID 0. COOKS,
THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ADMINISTRATION.,
AND WAS COMPOSED OF:
THE NAVY GENERAL COUNSEL
. THE ARMY DIRECTOR OF THE GENERAL STAFF
. THE AIR FORCE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LOGISITICS
. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NSA
. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AMONG THE GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE PANEL WERE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON THE ISSUANCE OF
CLEARANCES, IMPROVED ADJUDICATION OF SECURITY CASES, AND
REINSTITUTION OF THE REGULAR REINVESTIGATION OF CLEARED
INDIVIDUALS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS TAKEN ACTION IN ALL THESE
AREAS TO IMPROVE SECURITY.
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14.
OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, THE PANEL RECOMMENDED A COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE SCOPE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TO ASSIST IN DETERMINING
THE INITIAL AND CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF
INDIVIDUALS IN POSITIONS THAT REQUIRE ACCESS TO EXTREMELY
SENSITIVE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
BY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SCOPE, WE MEAN THAT NO QUESTIONS SHALL
BE ASKED-CONCERNING THE INDIVIDUAL'S LIFESTYLE-- THAT IS, NO
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THEIR SEXUAL PREFERENCE, ALCOHOL USE,
CREDIT SITUATION, OR SIMILAR AREAS OF PERSONAL CONDUCT. ON THE
CONTRARY, QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THESE EXAMINATIONS WILL BE STRICTLY
LIMITED TO THOSE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL HAS:
EVER ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE OR SABOTAGE AGAINST THE-UNITED
STATES OR KNOWS ANYONE WHO HAS.
EVER HAD ANY UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES
OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.
EVER BEEN APPROACHED TO GIVE OR SELL -- OR EVER GIVEN OR
SOLD CLASSIFIED MATERIALS TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS -- OR
KNOW ANYONE WHO HAS.
IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT, THEN, THAT THE DEPARTMENT DEVELOPED A
PROPOSED REVISION OF ITS POLYGRAPH POLICY -- TO SUPPLEMENT OUR
INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM -- TO DETER AND DETECT ESPIONAGE. I WILL
DETAIL THE SPECIFIC CHANGES SHORTLY -- BUT FIRST, WANT TO COMMENT
BRIEFLY ON OUR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY CONCERNING USE OF THE POLYGRAPH
AS SUPPORTED. BY OUR EXTENSIVE FIELD EXPERIENCE WITH THIS UNIQUE
INVESTIGATIVE TOOL.
WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE POLYGRAPH IS NOT INFALLIBLE. WE ARE AWARE
OF THE VARYING CLAIMS OF THE RESEARCH DONE TO DATE REGARDING THE
ACCURACY OF THE POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT WITH CLAIMS RANGING FROM --
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NO BETTER THAN TOSS OF A COIN -- TO UPWARDS OF 97% ACCURACY,
ALTHOUGH OUR ASSESSMENT SHOWS IT TO FALL IN THE HIGHER RANGE.
WE ARE AWARE THAT THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA)
RECENTLY CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE AVAILABLE
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY AND ACCURACY OF THE POLYGRAPH, WHICH IS
CRITICAL OF THE METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH THAT
HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THIS AREA. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ADVISED
OTA THAT WE BELIEVE THE REPORT IS INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE IN ITS
ANALYSIS OF THE STUDIES AND RESEARCH THAT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED.
IN SOME INSTANCES CONCLUSIONS ARE ASSERTED WITHOUT ANY SUPPORTING
EVIDENCE AND WE BELIEVE THOSE CONCLUSIONS TO BE IN ERROR. IN
OTHER INSTANCES, IDENTICAL DATA IS USED TO SUBSTANTIATE
DIFFERENT AND OFTEN CONTRADICTORY CONCLUSIONS, AND FINALLY,
DOD POLYGRAPH PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES ARE INACCURATELY
DESCRIBED, AND DOD'S PROPOSED POLYGRAPH USE, INACCURATELY
PORTRAYED.
THE BOTTOM LINE IS THIS, AS THE RESULT OF EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE
IN CIA, NSA AND DOD, WE ARE CONVINCED THE POLYGRAPH PROCESS WORKS.
THE DEPARTMENT HAS DEVELOPED A REPORT --COPIES OF WHICH I HAVE
MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU- WHICH WE BELIEVE DEMONSTRATES THE
UTILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH. SOME OF THE MORE INTERESTING HIGHLIGHTS
OF THIS STUDY ARE THAT: WITHOUT THE POLYGRAPH AS AN INVESTIGATIVE
TOOL, A NUMBER OF ESPIONAGE CASES WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN SOLVED;
THERE HAS BEEN MORE RESEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE DETECTION OF DECEPTION
IN THE LAST SIX YEARS THAN IN THE PREVIOUS SIXTY YEARS; AND,
THERE IS NO DATA SUGGESTING THAT THE VARIOUS POLYGRAPH TECHNIQUES
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16.
AND APPLICATIONS AT DOD HAVE HIGH FALSE POSITIVE OR HIGH FALSE
NEGATIVE ERROR RATES.
OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE , IT IS FELT THAT THE PRECISE ACCURACY
OF THE POLYGRAPH PROCEDURE WOULD ASSUME OVERIDING IMPORTANCE ONLY
IF WE INTENDED TO RELY EXCLUSIVELY ON AN ANALYSIS OF POLYGRAPH
CHARTS AS A BASIS FOR MAKING DECISIONS -- BUT WE DO NOT. THERE
IS NO CHANGE BEING CONSIDERED TO THE DEPARTMENT'S BASIC POLICY
THAT THE POLYGRAPH IS TO BE USED ONLY AS AN AID IN SUPPORT OF
OTHER INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES. AGAIN, WITH RESPECT TO ACCURACY,
IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT OTHER INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES SUCH
AS BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS, SPECIFICALLY, OBTAINING INFORMATION
FROM WITNESSES SUCH AS NEIGHBORS, CO-WORKERS, AND CREDIT
REFERENCES, MUST ALSO ADMIT TO SOME POTENTIAL FOR ERROR. IT
HAS NOT BEEN SUGGESTED THAT SUCH TECHNIQUES BE IGNORED OR
BANNED. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ANSWER HAS BEEN TO FORMULATE
CONTROLS ON THESE TECHNIQUES TO BOTH PREVENT ABUSE AND MINIMIZE
THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR. WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH IS ALSO
THE PROPER ONE TO TAKE WITH RESPECT TO USE OF THE POLYGRAPH
AND THAT SUCH CONTROLS ARE EVIDENT IN BOTH OUR CURRENT AND
PROPOSED POLYGRAPH POLICY DOCUMENTS.
WITH RESPECT TO THE VALUE OF THE POLYGRAPH AS AN AID IN INVESTI-
GATION, I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PROVIDE YOU A FEW EXAMPLES OF THE
DEMONSTRATED UTILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH.
IN THE AREA OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY -- THE GREATEST USER OF THE POLYGRAPH FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
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PURPOSES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT -- LAST YEAR USED THE POLY-
GRAPH IN APPROXIMATELY 20% OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS OF FELONY
CRIMES AND ABOUT 95% OF ITS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS FOR
WHICH THE MAXIMUM PENALTY IS 15 YEARS OR MORE. AS A RESULT,
THE ARMY SOLVED 65% OF THEIR FELONIES WHILE THE NATIONAL
AVERAGE FOR THE SAME PERIOD WAS ONLY ABOUT 20%.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE IN THE CRIMINAL AREA -- A RECENT REVIEW OF DOD
STATISTICAL DATA CONCERNING USE OF THE POLYGRAPH IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS DURING 1982 REFLECTS THAT IN AN AVERAGE OF 10%
OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS, ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS WERE OBTAINED
FROM THE SUBJECT DURING THE PRE-TEST INTERVIEW AND THAT ADMISSIONS
OR CONFESSIONS WERE MADE IN APPROXIMATELY 40% OF ALL CASES WHERE-
DECEPTION WAS INDICATED, DURING THE POST-TEST PHASE OF THE
EXAMINATION. BEAR IN MIND, WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE MECHANICAL
CHARTING OF PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIONS -- BUT ACTUAL RELEVANT
ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS OBTAINED FROM THE SUBJECT HIMSELF
THROUGH THE SKILLED INTERVIEWING OF THE PROFESSIONAL POLYGRAPH
EXAMINER.
IN THE PERSONNEL SECURITY AREA -- EXPERIENCE WITH THE POLYGRAPH
IN NSA, CIA AND DOD HAS DEMONSTRATED THE HIGH UTILITY OF THE
POLYGRAPH IN IDENTIFYING APPLICANTS WHO WERE CLEARLY UNSUITABLE
FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THOSE SENSITIVE AGENCIES. THE POLYGRAPH WAS
INSTRUMENTAL IN PREVENTING THE EMPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WHO
ADMITTED THEY HAD BEEN SENT BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE TO PENETRATE
NSA AS WELL AS PERSONS WHO WERE OTHERWISE COLLABORATING WITH
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HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING NSA CASES:
AN APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH NSA REACTED
TO QUESTIONS ON THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
CONCERNING ESPIONAGE, CLANDESTINE CONTACTS,
AND RELATED QUESTIONS. HE ADMITTED THAT IF
EMPLOYED, HE WOULD SELL-CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
TO A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IF HE COULD
GET ENOUGH MONEY FOR THE INFORMATION TO ENSURE
THAT HE COULD LIVE COMFORTABLY.
AN APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT WHO WAS ABOUT TO RETIRE FROM
MILITARY SERVICE REACTED TO QUESTIONS
ABOUT' -INTENDING TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES. THE APPLICANT THEN DESCRIBED
SEVERAL VISITS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY TO MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS TO DEFECT TO THE SOVIET UNION.
AN ARMY SERGEANT WHO HAD ACCESS TO CRYPTOLOGIC
INFORMATION APPLIED FOR A CIVILIAN POSITION.
DURING THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, HE REACTED
TO VARIOUS RELEVANT QUESTIONS. IN THE POST-
TEST INTERVIEW, HE ADMITTED TO VARIOUS PETTY
CRIMES AND MISCELLANEOUS WRONGDOING. THE
POLYGRAPH 'EXAMINER NOTED CONTINUED SPECIFIC
REACTIONS TO RELEVANT QUESTIONS AND WHEN THE
SERGEANT WAS REEXAMINED SEVERAL WEEKS LATER,
THE SAME SITUATION CONTINUED. HIS ACCESS WAS
WITHDRAWN AND AN INVESTIGATION OPENED. WHILE
THAT INVESTIGATION WAS STILL IN PROGRESS, HE
WAS FOUND DEAD IN HIS AUTOMOBILE. IT WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY DETERMINED THAT HE HAD BEEN ENGAGED
IN ESPIONAGE ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
HAD COMPROMISED EXTREMELY SENSITIVE INFORMATION.
AN APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT WHO HAD LIVED ABROAD
FOR SEVERAL YEARS ADMITTED THAT SHE WAS CULTIVATED
FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BY THE HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND FINALLY OFFERED A POSITION IN WHICH SHE
WAS TO TRAVEL TO ANOTHER COUNTRY UNDER A FALSE
IDENTITY, BUT AS A U.S. CITIZEN, THEN OBTAIN
EMPLOYMENT IN THE TARGET COUNTRY (NOT THE U.S.).
SHE SAID THAT AFTER TWO DAYS OF THOUGHTFUL
DELIBERATION, SHE DECLINED. SHE HAD NOT
PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THIS TO U.S. AUTHORITIES,
AND DID SO DURING THE POLYGRAPH TEST ONLY AFTER
REACTING TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS.
THESE ARE BUT A FEW EXAMPLES, MANY MORE ARE AVAILABLE.
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FURTHER, LET US CONSIDER INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY NSA DURING
SCREENING EXAMINATIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN
CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON THE BASIS OF
A PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION -- BUT NOT SUBJECT TO A
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION -- WHO SUBSEQUENTLY APPLY FOR A POSITION
WHERE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION IS REQUIRED. A STUDY DONE BY NSA
IN 1981 OF 318 SUCH APPLICANTS FOR CIVILIAN POSITIONS WITH
THAT AGENCY REFLECTS THAT -- 12% ADMITTED TO ENGAGING IN
MISDEMEANOR CRIMES -- 4% ADMITTED TO FELONY CRIMES -- AND
4% ADMITTED USING COCAINE OR HEROIN. IN ALL THESE INSTANCES,
THE INFORMATION HAD PREVIOUSLY GONE UNDETECTED.
SIMILARLY, IN 1982, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEWED 113
CASES IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS UNDERWENT POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
TO RESOLVE INFORMATION THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE
OF A PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION. UP TO THAT POINT IT WAS
NOT POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL LEADS THROUGH FIELD INVESTIGATION.
81 OF THE 113 INDIVIDUALS EXAMINED -- OR 72%-- INDICATED DECEPTION
ON THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. ADMISSIONS WERE OBTAINED IN 71 OR 88%
OF THESE DECEPTION INDICATED CASES, WITH 20% OF-THE ADMISSIONS INVOLVING
UNREPORTED APPROACHES BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE --ATTEMPTS TO
COMPROMISE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION --OR FOREIGN CONNECTIONS BARRING
ACCESS. ANOTHER 49% INVOLVED DRUG USE AND 31% INVOLVED OTHER
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
AND NOW, TO THE CHANGES THE DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING TO ITS
POLYGRAPH POLICY. AS YOU WILL RECALL, THERE ARE ESSENTIALLY
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4 TYPES OF CASES IN WHICH THE POLYGRAPH MAY BE CURRENTLY
UTILIZED -- CRIMINAL, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CASES.
FOLLOWING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SELECT PANEL, THE DEPARTMENT
PROPOSED TO EXPAND ITS USE OF THE POLYGRAPH IN THE PERSONNEL
SECURITY ARENA TO INCLUDE:
REQUIRING POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO NSA. AT PRESENT, WHILE ALL CIVILIAN AND
CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AT NSA ARE REQUIRED TO UNDERGO A
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, THE ONLY MILITARY PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO NSA WHO ARE CURRENTLY EXAMINED ARE THOSE WHO
ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED
POSITIONS AFTER ALREADY SERVING THERE.
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION OF PERSONNEL IN POSITIONS DESIGNATED
BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS
CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE POSITIONS.
ASSIST IN DETERMINING THE INITIAL ELIGIBILITY OF
DOD CIVILIAN, MILITARY, AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
FOR. ACCESS TO INFORMATION PROTECTED WITHIN "SPECIAL
ACCESS PROGRAMS," ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO EO 12356
AND DEPARTMENTAL DIRECTIVES, AND, TO DETERMINE, ON
A RANDOM BASIS, THE CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY OF THOSE
PREVIOUSLY GIVEN ACCESS TO SUCH INFORMATION; PROVIDED,
THAT USE OF THE POLYGRAPH IN ANY SUCH PROGRAM SHALL
BE APPROVED BY THE DUSD(P), BASED UPON A FINDING
THAT USE OF THE POLYGRAPH IS WARRANTED DUE TO THE
EXTRAORDINARY RISK TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY IF THE
INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED WERE COMPROMISED. REQUESTS
FOR DUSD(P) APPROVAL MUST COME FROM THE HEAD OF THE
DOD COMPONENT WHO CREATED THE SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM
CONCERNED.
ASSIST IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY OF DOD CIVILIAN,
MILITARY AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL FOR INTERIM ACCESS
TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION, PRIOR TO
COMPLETION OF THE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION.
ALL OF THESE WOULD BE LIMITED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SCOPE
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION; THE FIRST THREE WOULD PROVIDE FOR
INITIAL AND APERIODIC EXAMINATION. QUESTIONS WILL NOT BE
ASKED DURING THESE EXAMINATIONS CONCERNING THE INDIVIDUAL'S
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LIFE STYLE BUT RATHER WHETHER THEY ARE, OR KNOW ANYONE WHO
IS, INVOLVED IN ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, OR UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.
IN COMPARISON TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF DOD PERSONNEL ACCESSING
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, WE WOULD APPLY THE PROPOSED POLICY
TO A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF PEOPLE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT
LESS THAN 1% OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DOD CIVILIAN, MILITARY
AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY DOD WOULD BE AFFECTED
BY THE PROPOSED CHANGES. FURTHER, THE DEPARTMENT'S APPROACH
IN THIS MATTER IS NOT TO POLYGRAPH EACH AND EVERY INDIVIDUAL
ON A RECURRRENT BASIS. RATHER, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT SELECTION
OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE PERSONNEL ON ASTRICTLY RANDOM
BASIS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE A DETERRENT EFFECT.
THE VALUE OF THE POTENTIAL OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AS A
DETERRENT IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT IN A NUMBER OF THE
ESPIONAGE CASES UNCOVERED IN RECENT YEARS, THE SUBJECTS OF
THESE CASES INDICATED THAT THEY HAD SPECIFICALLY REFUSED
DIRECTION FROM HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE TO PURSUE EMPLOYMENT OR
ASSIGNMENT TO ACTIVITIES WHERE THEY KNEW THAT THEY WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO UNDERGO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.
AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE POLYGRAPH IS
NOT INFALLIBLE, AND, THEREFORE, OUR POLICY WITH RESPECT TO
ADVERSE ACTION BASED ON ANALYSIS OF POLYGRAPH CHARTS IS AS
FOLLOWS:
WHEN DECEPTION IS INDICATED BY THE EXAMINER'S INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE POLYGRAPH CHARTS, IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW OF
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THE SUBJECT WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE EXAMINER,
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RUNNING OF THE CHART, TO
RESOLVE THE INDICATION(S) OF DECEPTION.
WHEN THE INDICATED DECEPTION IS NOT RESOLVED WITH THE
SUBJECT EITHER THROUGH FURTHER INTERVIEW OR ADDITIONAL
CHARTS AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION,
THE SUBJECT WILL BE SO ADVISED AND THE RESULTS OF THE
EXAMINATION FORWARDED TO THE REQUESTING AGENCY.
22.
WHEN THE REQUESTING AGENCY, AFTER REVIEWING THE POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION RESULTS, DETERMINES THAT THEY RAISE SIGNIFICANT
QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT'S CLEARANCE/ACCESS STATUS,
THE SUBJECT WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERGO
ADDITIONAL EXAMINATIONS BY-THE EXAMINING AGENCY, USING THE
SAME OR A DIFFERENT EXAMINER.
WHEN THE SUBJECT ELECTS TO TAKE A SECOND EXAMINATION
AND THE RESULTS CONTINUE TO INDICATE DECEPTION, OR
WHEN THE SUBJECT OF AN INITIAL EXAMINATION RESULTING
IN INDICATED DECEPTION RAISING SIGNIFICANT QUESTION
RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT'S CLEARANCE/ACCESS STATUS
DOES NOT ELECT TO BE REEXAMINED, COMPREHENSIVE
INVESTIATION OF THE SUBJECT SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN TO
RESOLVE THE INDICATED DECEPTION UTILIZING THE RESULTS
OF THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AS AN INVESTIGATIVE LEAD.
WHEN THE COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED
AND NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION HAS OTHERWISE BEEN DEVELOPED
RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT'S CLEARANCE/ACCESS STATUS, ADVERSE
ACTION MAY NOT BE TAKEN AGAINST THE SUBJECT OF THE POLY-
GRAPH EXAMINATION. EXCEPTION TO THIS PROVISION MUST BE
PERSONALLY APPROVED BY THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; OR IN
THE CASE OF OTHER DOD COMPONENTS, THE SECRETARY OR DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
THE QUESTION IS ASKED "WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF THE INDIVIDUAL
REFUSES TO TAKE THE EXAMINATION?" OUR PROPOSED POLICY CONCERNING
REFUSALS IS AS FOLLOWS:
. WHEN A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION --IN
DESIGNATED SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS -- INDIVIDUALS WHO
REFUSE TO TAKE SUCH AN EXAMINATION MAY BE DENIED ACCESS
TO THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN QUESTION, PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, THAT THE DOD COMPONENT CONCERNED SHALL ENSURE
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS RETAINED IN A POSITION OF EQUAL
GRADE AND PAY THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE SUCH ACCESS OR
SHALL ARRANGE LIKE EMPLOYMENT AT ANOTHER DOD COMPONENT.
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WHEN A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A
CONDITION FOR SELECTION OR ASSIGNMENT TO A POSITION
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE --I.E., INITIAL OR
CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT, ASSIGNMENT OR DETAIL TO NSA,
ASSIGNMENT OR DETAIL TO CIA, AND CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE
POSITIONS IN DIA -APPLICANTS AND/OR NOMINEES WHO REFUSE
TO TAKE SUCH AN EXAMINATION MAY BE NON-SELECTED OR
NON-ASSIGNED.
TERMINATING THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN EMPLOYEE, OTHER THAN AT NSA,
OR DISCHARGE OF A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY, ARE NOT CONSEQUENCES
THAT MAY_ BE EMPLOYED AS A RESULT OF REFUSAL TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION.
FINALLY, THERE IS THE MATTER OF PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONCERN THAT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT THESE
CHANGES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON EMPLOYEE MORALE.
DURING MY TESTIMONY, I HAVE DETAILED MANY OF THE SAFEGUARDS
THAT HAVE BEEN OR ARE PROPOSED TO BE ADOPTED TO PROTECT THE
RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. HOWEVER, IN THE INTEREST OF CLARITY
AND ACCURACY, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO BRIEFLY
STATE EACH OF THESE SAFEGUARDS AT THIS TIME:
. INDIVIDUALS MUST BE GIVEN TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF THE
DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.
INDIVIDUALS MUST BE ADVISED OF THEIR RIGHT TO OBTAIN AND
CONSULT WITH LEGAL COUNSEL AND TO HAVE LEGAL COUNSEL
AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION DURING THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.
INDIVIDUALS MUST BE ADVISED OF THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
EXAMINEE MAY, UPON HIS OR HER OWN VOLITION OR UPON ADVICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL, TERMINATE THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AT
ANY TIME.
NO RELEVANT QUESTIONS MAY BE ASKED DURING THE EXAMINATION
THAT HAVE NOT BEEN REVIEWED WITH THE EXAMINEE PRIOR TO
THE EXAMINATION.
ALL QUESTIONS ASKED CONCERNING THE MATTER AT ISSUE MUST
HAVE A SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO THE SUBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.
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PROBING OF A PERSON'S THOUGHTS OR BELIEFS AND QUESTIONS
ABOUT CONDUCT WHICH HAVE NO SECURITY IMPLICATION OR ARE
NOT DIRECTLY INVESTIGATION
RACIAL
(E.G., RELIGION,
AFFILIATIONS.
TECHNICAL QUESTIONS NECESSARY TO THE POLYGRAPH TECHNIQUE
MUST BE CRINTRUSIVEAQUESTIUNS~SSING, DEGRADING OR
UNNECESSARILY
. RELEVANT QUESTIONS ASKED DURING POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
ADMINISTERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING IN DETERMINING
ELIGIBILITY FOR IINITIAL OR
INFORMATION MUST
INTELLIGENCE TOPICS.
. RESULTS OF AN ANALYSIS OF POLYGRAPH CHARTS MUST BE
CONSIDERED IN THE TINTTHOF OTHER EMSELVESINOFSTHEAMATTEKFFORT,
AND NOT AS CONCLUSIVE
UNDER INVESTIGATION.
. WHEN A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION RESULTS IN A FINDING OF
INDICATED, THE IGHT TO
DECEPTION
REQUESES
USING THE SAME OR A DIFFERENT EXAMINER.
. INDIVIDUALS TRANSFERRED OR REASSIGNED TO A NONSENSITIVE
LOSS UNDERGO
ANY TO
NOT INCUR EFUSAL
A
SHALL THEIR
IN GRADE,
POSITION IN EXAMINATION WITH
A POLYGRAPH RANK OR PAY.
THE FACT THAT AN INDIVIDUAL REFUSED TO UNDERGO A POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION SHALL NOT BE UDISSEMINATED TO THE
SUPERVISOR OR R EMPLOYER,
BEING CONSIDERED. POLYG . ANY ACTIONS TAKEN IN INVAPPLOLVING PERSONNEL ORE
APPEALABLE IN ACCORDANCE
SECURITY APPEALS PROCEDURES.
PRIOR TO THE EXAMINATION, EXAMINEE MUST BE ADVISED OF
THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLYGRAPH
INSTRUMENT, INCLUDING AN EXPLANATION OF THE PHYSICAL
OPERATION OF THE INSTRUMENT AND THE PROCEDURES TO BE
FOLLOWED DURING THE EXAMINATION.
EXAMINEE MUST BE ADVISED IF THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
AREA CONTAINS A TWO-WAY MIRROR OR OTHER DEVICE, THROUGH
WHICH THE EXAMINEE CAN BE OBSERVED AND IF OTHER DEVICES
SUCH AS THOSE USED IN CONVERSATION MONITORING OR
RECORDING, WILL BE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE POLYGRAPH.
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TECHNICAL REPORTS SHALL BE RETAINED
BY THE OFFICE CONDUCTING THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AND SHALL
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NOT BE DISSEMINATED EXCEPT AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
THE RESULTS OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION MAY BE MADE
AVAILABLE ONLY TO:
OFFICIALS WITHIN DOD RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY,
INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS OUTSIDE DOD WHEN THE
EXAMINATION HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE OR REVEALS
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE INDIVIDUAL
EXAMINED.
YHE EXAMINEE OR HIS OR HER LEGAL COUNSEL, UPON REQUEST.
DOD COMPONENT MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE BOARD (NFIB) AND OTHER NFIB MEMBER AGENCIES
PROVIDED THERE IS AN OFFICIAL NEED FOR THE INFORMATION
AND THE THIRD AGENCY LIMITATION WILL BE APPLIED.
.0 THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, GENERAL
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION, UPON RETIREMENT OF THE FILE.
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS SHALL BE ADMINISTERED ONLY BY DOD
POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS WHO HAVE BEEN SELECTED, TRAINED, AND
CERTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED DOD POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES.
THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED ABOUT THE IMPACT ON THE MORALE
OF THOSE EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO EXAMINATIONS UNDER THE PROPOSED
CHANGES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EMPLOYEE MORALE WILL BE ADVERSELY
AFFECTED SINCE ONLY QUESTIONS OF A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NATURE
MAY BE ASKED, AND THE RESULTS-OF THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR JUDGMENTS RESPECTING
THE EMPLOYEE. THIS ASSESSMENT IS SUPPORTED BY A 1982 AIR
FORCE SURVEY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO, AS PART OF A PILOT PROJECT,
UNDERWENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SCOPE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
IN CONNECTION WITH DETERMINING THEIR ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS
TO EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY CLASSIFIED USAF PROJECTS.
SUBSEQUENTLY, THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE REQUESTED TO COMPLETE A
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QUESTIONNAIRE, ON A STRICTLY ANONYMOUS BASIS, REGARDING
THEIR REACTION TO THE EXAMINATION. MORE THAN 98% OF THE
INDIVIDUALS RESPONDING INDICATED THAT THEY--WERE NOT OFFENDED,
HUMILIATED OR DEGRADED BY THE EXAMINATION-DID NOT FIND THE
EXAMINATION TO BE AN UNWARRANTED INTRUSION ON THEIR PRIVACY --
FELT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS ENHANCE THE
SECURITY OF THE WORK ENVIRONMENT -AND, WOULD UNDERGO A
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION IN THE FUTURE. THIS SURVEY AND A
NUMBER OF OTHERS ARE DETAILED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S REPORT ON
ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH, COPIES OF WHICH HAVE
BEEN PROVIDED TO THE COMMITTEE.
IN CONCLUSION MR. CHAIRMAN, WE BELIEVE --ON THE BASIS OF OUR
EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE POLYGRAPH-- THAT THIS UNIQUE
INVESTIGATIVE TOOL CAN, WHEN PROPERLY CONTROLLED, BE EMPLOYED
IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS AND PRIVACY OF
OUR EMPLOYEES, AND YET PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH A GREATER
DEGREE OF SECURITY ASSURANCE WITH RESPECT TO OUR MOST
SENSITIVE PROGRAMS THAN WE NOW HAVE. WE BELIEVE THE MERE
POSSIBILITY OF BEING SUBJECTED TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WILL
ACT AS A POWERFUL DETERRENT TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT
CONSIDER AN ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE OR COMPROMISE SUCH PROGRAMS.
RECENT HISTORY CLEARLY INDICATES THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE THAT
CAN BE CAUSED BY EVEN ONE PERSON WHO HAS ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
INFORMATION WHO IS WILLING TO SHARE THAT INFORMATION WITH
OUR ADVERSARIES. aS HAS BEEN SAID, THOSE WHO IGNORE HISTORY
ARE DESTINED TO REPEAT IT. PERSONALLY, MY RANK AND RECORD
NOTWITHSTANDING, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT AN INTRUSION ON MY
26.
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27.
PRIVACY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ASK ME PRIOR TO GIVING ME THE
CAPABILITY TO DO SUCH HARM, WHETHER I AM WORKING FOR THE OTHER
SIDE. INDEED, IT ONLY SEEMS PRUDENT THAT IT DO SO.
ONCE AGAIN, MR. CHAIRMAN, I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TODAY AND HOPE THAT I HAVE BEEN
SUCCESSFUL IN CLARIFYING FOR YOU THE NATURE, EXTENT AND PURPOSE
OF CHANGES TO OUR POLYGRAPH POLICY NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION.
WE WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE COMMITTEE MAY WISH TO OFFER
US IN THIS REGARD. I WILL NOW BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS
YOU MAY HAVE.
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