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April 15, 1983
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Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 A .___.7 ,r 1000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 4743 r m stated represented 117.5% of their combined salaries. Senator Dole released a summary of their joint return, highlights of which indicate that Dole earned $135,750 for speaking en- gagements, that of this, or $51,500 was donated directly ~to charity. An itemized listing of the charitable donations is attached. As a result of the honoraria income from speaking engagements. Dole paid $34,782 in Federal taxes in addition to those taxes withheld from his Senate salary. This figure represents 25.62% of the honoraria earned, and 57.34% of his Senate salary. As a conse- quence, Dole retained only 36.44% of the honoraria income after deducting the chari- table donations and additional Federal taxes. In the future, Dole will channel these contributions directly to charity through the auspices of the Dole Foundation, a newly formed public foundation organized for the benefit of handicapped citizens in Kansas and across the nation. Other highlights of the return indicate that none of Dole's income was from stocks or bonds and that he had no tax-sheltered o income. His only other income was f radio programs that netted him $6,397, he received $7,709.73 in interest from savings accounts and certificates of deposit, and a non-taxable tArmy of r$12,596.74, which the Senator receives as a result of injuries sustained in World War II. Detailed summaries of the Doles' joint re- turns for the years 1978 through 1982 are attached. Honoraria Donated to Charity-1982- Senator Bob Dole Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Kansas........... $3,200 Kansas Elks Training Center for the Retarded .............................................. 1,500 American Lung Association of Kansas .................................................. 1,800 Institute of Logopedics, Inc., Wich- ita, Kansas .......................................... 200 Foundry Methodist Church, Wash- ington, D.C .......................................... 10,000 Kansas Jaycee Cerebral Palsy Foun- dation, Inc ........................................... 3,200 Leukemia Society of America, Kansas Chapter .......................... .. 1,600 SENATOR AND MRS. BOB DOLE-TAX SUMMARIES-1978-1982 ' $436,676 income ....................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................... ...... 125,741 Coniboed salaries ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 142,147 honoraria ....... ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22,196 Empbyee busnness ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 414.480 ....... The Salvation Army, Kansas City, Kansas .................................................. Kansas Foundation for the Blind....... LakemarY Center, Paola, Kansas ....... Kansas Chapter, American Heart Association .......................................... Kansas Children's Service League ..... Kansas Association for Mental Health .................................................. Capper Foundation for Crippled Children, Topeka, Kansas ................ National Kidney Foundation of . Kansas and Western Missouri ......... United Negro College Fund, New York, N.Y ............................................. Kansas Wesleyan College, Salina, Kansas .................................................. Kansas Society for Crippled Chil- dren ....................................................... Kansas Association for Retarded 1,400 2,800 2,400 2,500 2,000 1,500 2,000 4,000 4,000 1,000 2,000 Citizens, Inc ......................................... 2,000 WETA-TV 26, Washington, D.C......... 2,000 Total honoraria donated to charitable organizations ......... 51,500 2$293, 8 6 266,850 116,011 17,873 257,695 Adjusted gross iname ............................................. .. ........................................................................... perfect: 150 150 ^... :: ...................................................................................................._......................................... 2~3 20,426 - ` ' State, local a other .....:.............................................................................................................................. 69 110 588 46 ...... . .................................. , ....... Nd t $201,559 $96,391 $125,889 $221,711 60 663 61,910 101,500 95,518 , 29,850 20,325 22,500 56,334 695 5 1,470 5,588 11,764 , 198,164 88,921 120,301 215,932 150 150 150 150 ]1.600 5,304 9.666 14,675 2,450 2,525 2,548 2,316 19,919 6,411 1,938 30,114 /"/ 6,157 24.358 12,106 12,111 052 80 38,424 36.538 18, . 19,861 21,888 32050 29,750 ... era ................... qia' ens ................................................................................................................................................................................ 12,376 5,858 37,372 31,577 Total F I es D?b .............................................................................................................. ................................._..,,........................_..........._....._.. 142,564 93,534 -._. 50000115 INerdi 51111 vmu ................. ................................__ inane from rods programs, but eadudes $12,596.74 in non taxable retirement pension ham U.S Army Senator Date MOM as a result of hrdudes $51500 In tmarh donated &e* to charily (see attachment), and $6,397 net inpaies sustained in Wald ar Ia Includes $30 500 in" orraaria donated directly to charity. 3$2,374 stan4ard Now mortgage interest Mellon iecluded in Employee Business Expens?? WHITE PAPER ON NATIONAL wissues affecting their balance ell object to the importances the USIC this paper, since recognition oft the funda- unrelenting conflict between the SECURITY t the Council mental Y , e lational defense paces-on n. ? Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, derives its identity from such disagreement. United States and the USSR, at every level, Mr. Edward Walsh has prepared for We are an organization of American busi- is the linchpin of the USIC perspective on elves Americans -al defense. id u- r o ful and provocative "white paper" on national security. It is meticulously re- searched, carefully written, and sug- gests some imaginative answers to some of the most vexing questions facing us in national security policy. I believe all Senators will profit from studying it carefully. I ask that the United States Industrial Council's White Paper on National Security be printed at this point in the RECORD. The material follows: UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL WHITE PAPER: NATIONAL SECURITY PREAMBLE This paper is a statement of the United States Industrial Council's views on the critical issues of national defense. It is a broad statement, an attempt to look to the future, with a sense of concern about the nregent the vast and complex Issues oI nae,aunaa _- U.S.-Soviet relations since the oeconu curity must necessarily provoke disagree- World War and even earlier is characterized force levels in Central Europe with the ment within the American business commu- by conflict and competition for political, Western allies. Rather, a cursory look at nity. Those who facilely separate national economic, and military leverage in every recent history shows that the Soviets have -security from more immediate economic corner of the globe. Although this point scored their greatest political and military seems so elementary as to hardly be worth gains in the years when Western diplomats nessmen who cons e first. Furthermore, as businessmen, we see a Furthermore, the reality of U.S.-Soviet clear link between the defense of our nation conflict is no longer as apparent as it once and those allies who share our political ~ Two decades longer diplomatic obfuscation values, and the preservation of the vital and was. and overwrought idealism by liberal U.S. po- precious economic liberties that enable us to licymakers have distorted the image of the our continue pryour shareholders, prosperity and security Soviet Union, transforming it from that of families, ollneies, and employees, our country. oursour an aggressive, totalitarian, militaristic su- INTRODIICTION perpower, as the USSR was recognized to be o into an economically trou- ars ag t The United States Industrial Council has long recognized the need for America to remain militarily strong. The Council mem. bership. is composed of patriotic business- men who believe that our precious political and economic liberties, including the free- dom to participate in a free enterprise eco- nomic system, are purchased by constant vigilance against internal and external en- emies. Forty years ago, those enemies were the forces of militarism and fascism. Today, the principal threats to our nation are Soviet imperialism and the puppets of internation- , twen y Ye bled, insecure, and backward rival to the U.S., but still a rival that yearns for friend- ship with the American people. Backward it may be. Economically weak it certainly is. Yet, in international affairs, the Soviet Union today is essentially the same as it was under Stalin: aggressive, ambitious, deceitful, and militaristic. This reality has never changed, even in the years of preten- sions to "detente," when trade and cultural contacts with the Western democracies ex- panded greatly. Neither has it been altered by fifteen years of discussion of strategic Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 S 4744 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE believed them to be April 15, 198 growing more concilia- Soviet naval aviation maintains 1,440 air- Theater nuclear weapons, based in tory. craft, including the supersonic Backfire. Europe, are a key indicator. The United The Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962 which can attack ships from long ranges States has 108 intermediate-range nuclear is probably the most useful point of demar- with cruise missiles or bombs. The Backfire missiles, which are more than offset by cation from which to trace the modern U.S. is also a strategic bomber in the Soviet Air some 750 Soviet land-based theater nuclear Soviet military relationship. At that time, Force. The Soviet Navy also has some 400 missiles of varying types, including the the United States enjoyed nuclear suprem- fixed-wing aircraft for anti-submarine war- newest, SS-20, a mobile missile based in acy over the Soviets in a 10:1 and was thus able to faatio of down boldly fare In 1981, the US. Navy Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Premier Khrushche's attempts to base nu- face battle force vessels, including 3comba- UThese figures are the key to the U.S.- clear weapons in Cuba. The concensus tant ships, amphibious vessels, patrol craft, Soviet military balance. They do not tell the among Western observers of Soviet affairs is minesweepers, and support ships. The Navy whole story, since the forces of our NATO that that humiliation ensured Khru- had 87 attack submarines and 34 interconti- allies and the Warsaw Pact countries have shchev's removal from power, which took nental ballistic missile-firing subs (SSBN), not been included. However, the essential place in 1965, orchestrated by a triumvirate for a total of 121, of which 115 are nuclear- "correlation of forces," to employ the Sovi- led by Leonid Brezhnev, who was to lead the powered.e The Reagan defense program ets' term in the military context, remains USSR until his death in November 1982. proposes to increase the total number of the same even when the totals for those If Brezhnev's accession to power was vessels, including submarines, to 526 by 1984 countries are considered: clear superiority in rooted in Soviet military shortcomings, he and aims at a 600-ship navy by the late numbers in manpower and most weapons quickly set about redressing them. Even as Eighties.e the Soviet government accepted President U.S. naval aviation, by 1984, is expected to onstrated technological superiority for the Lyndon Johnson's invitation, at the Glass- muster 16 tactical air wings, including 3 Western allies. boro summit in 1967, to begin strategic arms Marine air wings and 24 land-based patrol The general perception of Soviet advan- limitations talks, the Soviets were building squadrons and support aircraft. Total oper- tage in numbers, and Western lead in tech- their armed forces, both conventional and ating naval air strength will reach 4,940 air- nology, the "quantity versus quality" view, strategic, into the largest military machine craft by 1983. This will include 643 fighters has been the heart and soul of U.S. national in history. That buildup continues today. and 1,075 attack planes,* as well as antisub- security policy for nearly a generation. The COMPARISON OF FORCES marines, patrol, transport craft, trainers, American strategic arsenal was developed Although It Is impossible to determine ex- and others. and deployed, at least in part, to serve as a actly at what level the military capabilities The Soviet Air Force is divided into three nuclear "umbrella" over our Western Euro- of the United States and the Soviet Union separate air divisions, frontal (tactical), long pean allies, whose conventional forces were are equal, all experts believe that, since the range, and transport. The tactical division not then, and are not now, expected to be a mid-Sixties, the military balance has been possesses some 4,800 fixed-wing combat air- match for the massive Soviet and Warsaw transformed from one of clear-cut American craft, 250 transports, and 3,500 helicopters. Pact formations stationed in Central and supremacy in nearly every area to a condi- The transport air arm has approximately Eastern Europe even in concert with ours. tion of "parity," or "rough equivalence," 600 medium and long range cargo planes. Instead, should war come to Europe, the which means that the Soviets, while remain- Soviet long range aviation maintains a force allies would rely on superior mobility, armor Ing behind the U.S. in certain fields, have in of over 800 bombers and support aircraft, and anti-air defense, and theater nuclear fact surpassed us in others. It is clear, more- including 156 bombers capable of carrying weapons. over, that the Soviets, while improving and nuclear weapons. These include about 70 The American lead in the application of increasing their military capabilities across- Backfires. The Soviet air defense force con- sophisticated technology to weaponry is still the-board, have put special emphasis in the sists of roughly 2,500 fighter aircraft, in- today a significant factor in assessing the areas in which the U.S. formerly held over- cluding the sophisticated Foxbat, which can U.S.-Soviet military balance. In certain whelming superiority: naval power and in- operate at an altitude of 25,000 meters. The areas-for example, the employment of mi- tercontinental ballistic missile forces. Soviet Air Force also possesses an early- croelectronics in air defense-the U.S. lead To gain a clearer insight into the current warning AWACS-type aircraft and is devel- remains dramatic. The Israeli Air Force's U.S.-Soviet military balance, it is necessary oping a newer version of it.e to look at the figures on the forces that The United States Air Force is expected to f qesses In June 1982, ubung Syrian air te de- of Soviet- ch- comprise it. In doing so, we recognize that have 26 active tactical air wings of 72 planes niques e of coordinating early A warning, tech- the capabilities and weaknesses of specific in 1984. These would eventually be com- tion, and attack, clearly warning, that and attack, demonstrates that weapons systems and military units vary posed of high-performance F-16 and F-15 in the greatly, and that the military establish- jet fighter-interceptors. Bomber versions of has advanced United to States, higit level technology has very high level of sophis- ents of both superpowers are configured these planes are also planned. The Air ticatiorL rnents different missions. Still, the disparities Force expects to have 20 strategic bomber Never are startling. For example, in 1981 the squadrons by 1984. The B-1 strategic must be must be to eet, the pwhat U consideration Soviet armed forces numbered more then bomber program has been revived, after policy what the national not se- 4.8 million men. Soviet ground forces are or- being canceled by President Cartr In 1977. the polcy should be in the is threl not ganized into 180 divisions, including motor- Eventually, 100 B-is are expected to be e present. trend What matters mot the he itary ized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions, de- built.e term trend establishments the evolution of thmilitary ployed in Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and Soviet strategic forces are likewise formi- theme mh have both superpowers. The Afghanistan. These forces are armed with dable. Since the mid-1970s the Soviets have theme may a against So been "U.S. antquality" a the 50,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery pieces. developed three new land-based interconti- rayed ngnear Soviet "quantity." But They possess more than 5,200 helicopters. nental missiles (ICBM), the SS-17, -18, and trend in nearly every criterion of military military In contrast, the American armed forces are -19. The SS-18 is the world's largest rocket, The relationship betoday the ve r more caisely expected to number 2,127,000 men and more than twice the size of the U.S. Minute- U.S. quality vs. Soviet quality and quantity. women by the end of 1983. U.S. ground man III. All these missiles are configured as In short, the fundamental assumptions on forces will be composed of 16 Army and multiple-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), which U.S. defense policy has long been three Marine divisions, that is, multiple warheads mounted on a based have been fractured. The perennial The Soviet Navy boasts 360 major surface single launcher. Soviet ICBM forces now warnings about Soviet efforts to "catch up" warships and amphibious vessels, up from boast five types of launchers (SS-11, -13, with the U.S. in military power are on about 260 in 1965. In addition, the Soviet -17, -18, -19) for a total of 1,398. The Soviet longer relevant. Although the perception of fleet includes 935 smaller missile and patrol Navy, furthermore, possesses 950 subma- U.S. technological superiority in certain vessels and minesweepers, and some 755 lo- rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), areas remains valid, the Soviets have caught gistical and auxiliary ships. The Soviet Navy which carry a total of about 2,000 war- nuclear powered. Of these, 270 are torpedo- The strategic forces of the United States foe Sixties apparatus through firing attack submarines, the latest class of include 1,000 Minuteman II and III ICBMs, Soviet Sxties military and Seventies, the trends to which is believed to be the fastest and deep- and 43 Titan II ICBM launchers. Each Min- that the Soviets not, pment demonstrate est, diving in the world. The balance of the uteman III is capable of carrying three been, content with are "rough and never have conventional submarine inventory is com- MIRV'd warheads. Currently, the U.S. bee, content with In- clear military Im- posed of cruise missile-firing boats that can SSBM forces carry 616 Polaris, Poseidon, or stead they are pressing for clear military s- strike at surface targets from a distance of Trident SLBMs.s The U.S. Air Force's stra- p Thus cty over the onclusion is amply supported by the 60 miles. The newest, Delta class of Soviet tegic bomber squadrons include some 300 recent history of Soviet and U.S. spending submarine is a strategic weapon, armed with long-range bombers. ballistic missiles that can reach targets in [Charts are not printed.] gr defense. The chart below provides a the United States from most of the oceans penhin illustration pe the trends in military of the world. Footnotes at end of paper. senart by superpowers: [Chharts a re e not not printed] Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 April 15, 1983 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 4745 ?The chart reveals not one, but two signifi- tions about our relations with the Soviet the tactical and strategic capabilities of our cant trends: first, the nearly inexorable Union,. China, the Middle East, the nations armed forces. It should be emphasized that growth in Soviet military outlays; and, of Latin America, and our allies in Western those efforts do not attempt to suddenly second, the precipitous decline in U.S. de-' Europe have been shaken and revised. The overturn the ratio of federal dollars devoted Tense expenditures in the years 1968-1976. developing nations of the "Third World" to domestic social programs and military The U.S. Defense Department, in its 1981 commanded greater attention from both su-. spending. The President's program aims at a report on Soviet military power, estimated perpowers. The repercussions of the Viet- much-needed reorientation of budget ex- that in 1979, the Soviet Union outspent the nam tragedy were felt throughout American penditures, in order to improve our de- United States on defense by 70 percent. policymaking, and the pursuit of "detente" fenses. A larger share of the budget will be Gen. David C. Jones, who retired as chair- with the Soviets blurred our assessment of spent on the military, but the weight of fed- man of the Joint Chiefs Staff last year, their Whiil our nation's hpolicies and positions domestic e programs, will as illustrated on the a Year suggested Posture in Statement h his Fiscal more 1982 conservative Military with regard to all nations will constantly be chart at the top of page 14. In other words, Posture to reflect changing conditions, our figure of 50 percent, nt, or a dollar figure of amended the claim by the opponents of the Presi- $450 billion over the past ten years. The strategic world view, as it affects national dent's program that funding is being shifted the should paper, constant. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that security, the USIC be- The President's original defense proposal to t percent gross n the al Soviet devote Lionel product t to military expenditures. The e lieves that the centerpiece of that strategic the projected defense expenditures of 11.811 Soviet defense sector is the first priority of view should be the conviction that . trillion through the years 1982-87. That the Soviet economy. In contrast, U.S. de- Soviet Union is the greatest threat to our figure reflects an average real growth rate fense spending in relation to GNP is depict- security, and that the Soviets or their of 8.1 percent, which is not excessive in ed below: agents are close to the center of most re- light of the trend of the seven preceding [Chart is not printed.] gional political crises that endanger the years, 1975-81, during which defense spend- The conclusion to be drawn from the evo- United States' interests. ing rose at a real rate of only 1.8 percent.10 lution of Soviet and U.S. military spending For American policymakers to formulate (See second chart on page 14.) is not that the United States should mimic strategy, from which the technical eonfigu- [Charts are not printed.] the Soviets in every weapon ordered and rations of weapons systems are derived, it is first necessary to examine Soviet Interns- THE POLITICAL PROBLEM forces allocated ocated to defense. Comparisons in tional behavior. an unremitting pattern of As a result of the Administration's efforts, s and expenditures are only useful be subversion, terror by proxy, and active ag- discovering the direction most likely to be certain improvements in military prepared- taken by both sides into the future. Until gression in every corner of the globe, result- ness can already be noted, especially in 1978, the disparity in the trend was unmis- ing, in recent years, in the assimilation of manpower levels. The Defense Department takable: the USSR regularly and dramati- Vietnam, North Yemen, Angola, Nicaragua, has accelerated research, testing, and evalu- cally increased its military spending, regard- Mozambique, and Ethiopia into the Soviet ation of a number of new weapons, both tac- less of overall economic growth year-to- orbit. Soviet efforts continue throughout trcal and strategic, that are needed to re- year. In contrast, American military ex- Central America and Southern Africa. Af- dress the imbalance between both the penditures declined consistently, both in ghanistan is under the Soviet heel. The So- NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force real terms and as a percentage of GNP, with viets supply arms to Syria' Iraq, and Libya, levels and the strategic nuclear arsenals of the exception of the bulge on the graph which function, in varying degrees, as Soviet the United States and the USSR. Because of during the years of the height of the Viet- clients. India has also signed a treaty of its demonstrated resolve, the Administra- nm War. friendship with the USSR. In 1980, accord- tion has incurred the anger of the perennial The chart on Page 9 demonstrates that to the Defense Department, some 20,000 enemies of strong defense: the social welfare United States military preparedness vis-a-vis Soviet military advisers were stationed in 28 constituency, liberal and radical. religious the Soviet Union has declined markedly countries. The Soviets employ approximate- activists, and extreme left, pro-Soviet indi- over the years. It shows also that Congres- ly 35,000 Cuban proxy troops in 20 coun- viduals and organizations. At the same time, sional concern for military readiness has de- tries. In short, the Soviet strategy is funds- concern about the Reagan defense propos- teriorated. mentally aggressive and offensive. It has als has been expressed by others who nor- had significant successes in recent years, mally support defense increases: business- A STRATEGY FOR DEFENSE compared with only a few setbacks, for ex- men, conservative Congressmen, and various The position of the United States Indus- ample in Egypt, Chile, and Jamaica.? pro-defense analysts and schema. trial Council is that both of these trends The Soviet strategy aims at the United replied to those must be reversed, if our political and eco- States and its allies through a variety of po- This paper im- nomic liberties-and those of-our allies-are litical, economic, and covert means. The who s s defense yse repplied t it ose mabuildup Is e to be safeguarded against the multiple Kremlin attempts to restrict Western access orl: detailed talreagnit ue of tthe forms of Soviet aggression, subversion, and to mineral and energy resources critical to Soviet it pape tally that Umilitalies ary h bas as ryuild uilduup y he he and must be purely vo- intimidation that have been made possible industry. The underdeveloped, unstable na- cally hat values std interests and by the Soviets' achievement of military tions of Southern and Central Africa, which fensive se o our f our alliesHowever, er reseand might. As a business organization, the USIC provide the bulk of the free world's supplies who do sow ve some measure leaves the analysis of the specific means by of chromate, platinum-group metals, cobalt, d tio of increased those who dy support s meat be are which our national security can be en- and manganese are under pressure from eate both hanced to those professionally trained in Soviet operatives, especially Cuban troops. oei, well. for the such matters. A sophisticated debate is Through the means of legal and illegal sou soundd reasowinasoning In and the fair m, , eher ther Questions taking place in political, military, and public "technology transfer," the USSR has Administration. eagan policy forums on the nature of weaponry tapped Western sources of sophisticated Th g r oections s to the hef Rd: an that the Defense Department should pro- new technologies for both military and civil- defense e e program these obj has seems t to iled fo deol w(th cure into the future, in light of cost, mis- ian applications. The U.S. Industrial Coun- the sion, and rapidly developing technologies. cil has long opposed, and continues to the problem Administraration ion has wl of excessive c co Insofar as the participants are honorably oppose, trade with Soviet bloc countries in th that poli meet tical realexcs save do l ats sts for weapons e ys o in delivery; further d reduc; engaged in determining how the United such strategic goods and technologies. Cur- ns li and ether States can best defend itself and its inter- rently, there are ten agreements on scientif- Lio in soc sociall w we spending ore, the e- ests, the USIC stands apart from the is and technological cooperation in effect etitlmnts pr elfarlfare e g theref cuts debate. However, it is clear that many of between the U.S. and the USSR. These have fense nnshb Department must take or e, : (3) the c uts if those who object to building new, larger nu- eased the efforts of Soviet spies to obtain fthudg t c is to be min- clear-powered aircraft carriers, high-per- access to classified U.S. industrial and scien- is e seeking balancenced or a a vri formance jet fighters, and other weapons tific information with potential military of n new nvdiate a a are uninterested in, or antagonistic to, the uses. clear strategy weapons, has play a in wgallhich ed d; ( tg 3 those th aving a wc critical national security challenge facing Since the Soviet strategy is offensive, the cl wuld play le; w ; (4) hmee the ed the the United States in the mid 1980s. strategy of the United States must be to Soviet o has p uce e yhav tc terms, the co d- The Council believes that the fundamen- counteract that offense. Despite the slan- tal consideration in deciding what weapons ders of leftists at home and abroad, the U.S. promised on the defense budget in the way should be tested. evaluated, and procured by seeks only to defend fundamental political pr Politics as usual. the Defense Department is. simply put, that freedom. Our strategy is defensive in The first of these charges has been leveled weaponry must reflect a coherent strategy. nature; thus, the military posture through at the Defense Department for many years. This unremarkable axiom has served as the which that strategy is expressed, and the Cost overruns are to be found in nearly underpinning of defense planning through tactical organization and weaponry it de- every government project, and modern the postwar decades. In recent years, howev- ploys, will be configured for defense as well. weapons, developed on the frontiers of tech- er, questions have arisen as to what the U.S. For this reason, the USIC strongly sup- nology, seem particularly prone to them. strategic view should be. Long-held assump- ports President Reagan's efforts to increase Still, Defense Department officials of the Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 S 4746 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 15, 1983 Reagan Administration have shown them- tion's chief political asset: a steadfast, unwa- reprisal. It was essential to the theory that selves to be sensitive to this charge and vering commitment to national defense. the Soviets have the confidence that they have been publicly aggressive in demanding The Administration's waffling on defense too could launch a retaliatory strike, not- that contractors keep tight reins on costs. is unfortunate, because it is taken by long- withstanding that an unprovoked U.S. first Excessive costs are also a function of other time opponents of larger defense budgets as strike against the USSR was as unthinkable problems: in the procurement process, for a sign that defense will be slashed back if then as it is now. Thus, the United States example, unwarranted political consider- the political pressure is sufficient. This kind relaxed its lead in nuclear weapons in order ations have led to contracts being awarded of pressure takes various forms. Currently, to allow the Soviets to "catch up" with us to firms ill-equipped to fulfill them to sped- an influential school of defense analysis is and join us at a level of nuclear weaponry fications or on time, or to contracts being arguing that the U.S. can obtain better de- that the authors of deterrence thought awarded for weapons no longer needed or fense by ordering updated versions of older would create a stalemate. This slowdown in wanted. This indictment can be leveled at tanks, smaller, less sophisticated aircraft building strategic weapons meshed well with Congress as well as at the Administration. carriers, diesel-powered rather than nuclear- the political realities of the Vietnam years, On the second objection, while the USIC powered submarines, and simpler helicop- when it was difficult enough to get defense does not believe that the Defense Depart- ters and other conventional weapons sys- appropriations through Congress. But it ment should be given carte blanche to spend tems. The "simpler is better" option may had a highly theoretical rationale: that each whatever it likes, it does state, as one of the well be worth evaluating where more com- side would deploy a "countervalue" nuclear pillars of the USIC Declaration of Policy, plex weapons have failed repeated testing capability-the power to inflict "unaccepta- that a credible defense must be maintained. and force readiness requires as-soon-as-pos- ble" civilian casualties on each other-such This is a judgment on principle, not on an sible delivery. Nevertheless, it should be that the horror of nuclear war would in economic or political calculation of what considered on a case-by-case basis, not as a effect deter it. the nation can afford to spend on national general rule. Those who advocate buying all The problem with deterrence was that no security. The Council believes that defense smaller, cheaper, and simpler weapons with- one explained it to the Soviets. As the Sovi- is the ultimate social welfare program, out regard for mission or battle conditions ets built their strategic arsenal to the level which determines whether the United in which they would likely be used are prob- of the awesome power they boast today, it States will be able to continue to provide ably more interested in cutting defense became clear that they were not content both social services to the undeprivileged spending than in insuring adequate military with a stalemate. Instead they were building and economic freedom to the businesseman. preparedness. The "cheaper is better" nuclear weapons large enough and powerful The third and fourth points are startling school is in some ways a convenient, some- enough-and building enough of them-to opposites. That they are voiced at all dem- what respectable smokescreen for outright destroy the American missiles that made up onstrates the central problem of the Reagan enemies of strong national defense. our "deterrent." Administration's defense planning- the Ad- TTY PROBLEM OF "DETERRENCE" In late 1976, the President's Foreign Intel- ministration has not adequately explained It is in the strategic area where the Ad- ligence Advisory Board suggested that the or defended its policy. The dichotomy was ministration risks losing the support of nation's intelligence community, as part of illustrated in a speech by Secretary of De- longtime believers in strong national de- the annual National Intelligence Estimate, fense Caspar Weinberger on April 19, 1982 fence-the "defense consensus," as a result conduct an exercise in strategic theory, uti- to the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. of its failure to articulate its policy, or more lizing competing teams to challenge and Weinberger outlined a strategic view that precisely, the link between strategy and defend deterrence. The challenge team, the USIC believes is the correct one. He weapons-building. This is especialy true called the "B" team, won. The N.I.E. conclu- called the USSR a "mature and aggressive since the spread of a popular movement sion, that the Soviets possessed a "counter- superpower" and explained that "the calling for a bilateral "freeze" on develop- force" or anti-missile capability, sent shock United States seeks to deter Soviet aggres- ment of strategic nuclear weapons. Despite waves through the U.S. defense and foreign sion against the United States and its allies its roots in the pro-Soviet Left of Western policy establishment. by maintaining the capability to respond ef- Europe, the freeze movement is also an ex- Today the Soviets possess, in their 300- fectively at the lowest level of violence."" pression of the fears of many well-inten- plus SS-18 ICMBs, each of which carries ten At the same time, however, he stated that tioned Americans that the nuclear arms warheads, the capability to destroy our the Administration might make "certain "race" is out of control. These fears are a land-based deterrent. budget reductions" in the defense budget culmination of some twenty years of lack of The unprecedented Soviet strategic build- for fiscal year 1983. Without retreating understanding by the American people of up that gave birth to the counterforce capa- from any defense commitment, he suggested the direction of our nuclear arms policies. bility took place, in the height of irony, that the door was open to cutting the de- Despite the president's efforts this lack of during the years of strategic arms limitation fense plan the administration had suggested understanding still exists. talks between the U.S. and the USSR. The one year earlier. The distrust, apprehension, and fatalism SALT II treaty was signed in Vienna on Needless to say, the perception was one of displayed by the American people towards June 18, 1979, by President Jimmy Carter. A contradictions: of wanting to maintain and new strategic weapons sought by the Ad- little more than a year later, an anonymous even augment - military commitments, yet ministration is not a lack of support for a Carter Administration official leaked the willing to make spending cuts. In the U.S. stronger national defense. Rather, it is the story that Mr. Carter had signed Presiden- Congress today, there exists a mentality outcome of the legacy of a strategic weap- tial Directive 59, which proposed a sea that is utterly closed to imprecations about ons policy created by engineers and social change in strategic policy.14 Deterrence in national security needs. Thus, while two sig- scientists, instead of experienced military its former sense-utilizing assured destruc- nals were delivered by the Administration, officers, during the Sixties.12 This policy tion-was to be augmented by a policy of only one was heard: that the defense budget came to be known as deterrence. It grew out fighting a "limited" nuclear war. Soviet mil- could be cut. And cut it was. of the search for a policy to control nuclear itary installations, including missile silos, This is not to suggest that politics can be weapons, in recognition of the new world of communications centers, and command kept out of defense spending considerations. warfare that such weapons introduced. As posts, would be targeted, in recognition that Horsetrading is inevitable, due to the reali- Daniel Patrick Moynihan describes it, "the the Soviets contemplated nuclear war in ties of the task of getting legislation nuclear power was to deploy its forces so terms far less theoretical than most U.S. through Congress. But the USIC is con- that if attacked, it could attack back, inflict- strategic thinkers. If they possessed the cerned with adherence to principle, not with ing assured destruction on the party that ability to destroy our land-based missile swimming with the political currents of the had attacked it in the first place."13 Assured force with a first strike, then deterrence was day. The Council's view is that the Reagan destruction was the key, which, it was obviously less credible. While the U.S. stra- Administration's initial request for obliga- thought by the theorists who surrounded tegic missile forces based in submarines tional authority for defense reflected genu- Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, would survive such a first strike, the retali- ine determination to build up our defenses. would deter the United States and the atory power of the SLBMs is less intimidat- It was not extravagant (a 14 percent in- Soviet Union from ever using nuclear weap- ing to the Soviets than the land-based force crease in fiscal year 1982 and about 7 per- ons. In 1969, Donald Brennan of the of ICBMs and bombers, which would be the cent through 1986) in view of the continu- Hudson Institute used the term "mutually targets of first strike. ing Soviet buildup and the decline in U.S. assured destruction," coining the acronym The development of the SS-18 was the defense capabilities over a ten year period. MAD, which became the watchword of poli- key to the end of deterrence as originally The Administration, however, miscalculat- ticians and analysts who opposed the policy, envisioned by U.S. planners. It skewed the ed the incipient power and ideological dedi- and the siren of the disarmament movement nuclear "balance" in favor of the Soviets, cation of the anti-defense lobby. While of- in the Eighties. who have been striving not for balance, but fering to compromise on defense spending, The key to deterrence in this sense, there- for superiority. In July 1974, Secretary of it failed to extract important concessions on fore, was the calculated certainty of a State Henry Kissinger asked rhetorically: other budget items. This ignited the opposi- second, retaliatory nuclear strike. Each side "What in the name of God is strategic supe- tion to defense spending in Congress that would forever refrain from nuclear attack riority? What is the significance of it ... at had been neutralized by the Administra. on the other, it was thought, out of fear of these levels of numbers?" Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 April 15, 1983 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 4747 In 1979, Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggest- considerable. Rather, the question is will it ar war may be "winnable"-an idea foreign ed an answer. "Strategic superiority is the work? Will it insure "survivability" of the to posture ddeterrence. .l Moreover, the ree coup elf roe power to make other people do what you MX? want them to do."15 It is apparent, from the debate on the MX our strategic policy towards defense, and a What the Soviets wanted the U.S. to do and its several basing plans. that the tech- turning away from a contradictory policy of was negotiate, and negotiate we did: the nology of ICBMs has surpassed develop- maintaining offensive nuclear weapons to fruit of those negotiations was SALT If, an ments in missile protection. The concept of enforce a policy which, while intended as agreement which amounted to a limitation the "superhardened" silo is something of an defensive, always projected the impression on numbers of launchers, but not on killing abstraction. There is no way of knowing that the U.S. strategy is identical to that of power. The 306 SS-lft were not affected. how much protection for the MX would be the Soviets. The Soviets retained the prerogative to eon- required, or how much could be provided, in This image of U.S. strategy, though unin- tinue research and development of means to any on-the-ground basing mode, against a tended, contributes to the current political increase the number of warheads that could barrage of warheads launched by dozens of difficulties of strategic weapons programs. be carried by their superheavy counterforce SS-18s. What is known, however, is that The confusion, misunderstanding, and ap- weapon. whatever basing mode is approved, the Sovi- prehension of many Americans over the to defeat merits of deterrence have developed over rkin i b g n wo eg covrvrmven.vs AND aoUNZ`enroscg eta will immediately The Carter Administration's answer was a it. On December 6, 1982, Soviet Defense the years and are shared by many strategic Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov said exactly thinkers themselves. For example, Edward pledge to deploy the MX missile, a highly accurate replacement for the Minuteman III, that, like the 88-18, would carry ten warheads. Unlike the Minuteman and like the 88-18, the MX would be a counterforce weapon, capable of destroying Soviet mis- siles in their silos. The possibility that the United States may build the MX is of profound strategic importance. As a counterforce, missile-kill- ing weapon, it represents a shift away from the Sixties-vintage theory of deterrence. Albert Wohlatetter, one of the earliest stra- tegic thinkers, recognized that since the heart of deterrence was the implicit threat of a second strike, the theory required that the missiles of both sides be invulnerable. The 88-18 renders the U.S. Minuteman vul- nerable-a development that causes deter- rence in its original sense to collapse. Con- ceivably the MX could redress this imbal- ance. But what then? Wohlatetter warned that it was Impossible to Insure missile invulnerability for all time. Missile components deteriorate with age, even as the enemy works constantly to achieve a new advantage. Thus there can be no final deterent. This is the realization we have arrived at today. Over the years, the United States has phased out obsolete ICBMs. The Minute- man II was a replacement for the older Titan II, and the Minuteman III was an update of the former. Now, however, we face an unprecedented situation, a pause hi the evolution of nuclear weapons strategy. The Reagan Administration, like the Carter Administration, has been unable to find a politically acceptable MX basing mode that will be invulnerable to attack by the current generation of Soviet missiles and that can be rapidly constructed Early on, the Ad- f that: "If the present White House leader- ship ... challenges us by starting MX mis- sile development, the Soviet Union will deploy in response a new ICBM of the same clans, and its characteristics will not be infe- rior to those of the MX missile in any way." is As Wohlstetter made clear, there can be no final deterrent There was, at one time, an attempt to avoid the competition in city-destroying "countervalue" nuclear weapons of the 1960x. As the implications of deterrence, and of Wohlatetter's insights became clear, he and other strategists recommended an anti- ballistic missile defense for the U.S. Minute- man.'' Secretary McNamara, committed to deterrence, counseled against an ABU since one of the tenets of deterrence is that U.S. cities must remain vulnerable to attack, if the Soviets were to be assured that they could deter an American first strike by thea- tening reprisal against those sties. But Mc- Namara did not win the ABM debate. On June 24, 1966, the Senate voted to deploy an ABM system, the Sentinel Three days later, the Soviets agreed to begin the arms limita- tion talks that led to SALT 1, signed by President Nixon in Moscow on May 28, 19'72. The centerpiece of SALT I was that neither side deploy an effective ABU defense. The dismantling of the single U.S. ABM site near Grand Farts, North Dakota was not reciprocated by the Soviets. In violation of SALT 1, they continued research and devel- opment of ABM, violations of which were at times both clandestine and blatant. The 1962 report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported publicly the U.S. intelligence community's suspicions that the Soviets had continued to wort on an ABU system: "A new phased-array radar is being constructed near Moscow. This radar will probably serve ministration ruled out Mr. Carters pkm o a battle management role for the up the de in - Utah, , in which the e throughout roism- graded Moscow (ABM) system, serts tts ofNevaevadaa d" and basing si- or possibly replacing existing (ABM radar) files would be transported among 4 ao w.~ systems." launch sites-a "shell game" that was uffi- Today,,. the United States has no vets sb subsequent criticized. i site the MX ABM defense for its cities. They remain A quproposal abandoned in open to Soviet attack, even as the Soviets hardened Minuteman silos s was aned have amassed a huge arsenal of superheavy dened of a a plan to locate cg. it configuration isrr ation weapons that could destroy the heart of the ppack" ~~ "dense U.S. deterrent, the land-based ICBM, in an ead C silos in Wyoming. near Cheyenne. ced The counterforce strike--and then attack pack" proposed was announced by President our defenseless cities. Such is the legacy of Reagan late in November 1982. It would deterrence, a strategic theory born of politi- apart, on silos the t located theory cal science and sociology, but practiced from pl 100 moreore than 2,000 missiles m,000 feet eet apae th.. ripe h. siiv nne.ian_ eu wind be t So iet _ that at ar .& v miss"`" tralized by the first one that exploded, in ass vmeaaa when the opposition is reinforced by Soviet phenomenon called "fratricide," that would Furthermore, U.S. vulneraffiity is sggra- agitation and propaganda. The nuclear protect the MXs that survived the first ex- vated by the clumsy evolutioniour strategic "freeze" movement carries such a, risk. plosion. policy is nrtldergoiag, from one of counter- The Reagan Administration's handling of As with the Carter "shell game" plan, value-deterrence to one of counterforce ca- the shift in strategic policy that the MX im- "dense pack" encountered heavy criticism, pability. In Presidential Directive 59, our plies has not been effective. One might not only from the anti-defense lobby. but strategists recognized that their Soviet argue that the Administration lass not ex- from traditionally defense-minded ortgant- counterparts were thinking about the un- plained the policy at all. It has failed to re- zations and Individuals, including pro-de- thinkable, and bad been for years. A coun- spored to the change of the anti-defense fense conservatives in Congress. Their prin- terforce strategy, in which weapons and sail- lobby that the MX is but another terrifying cipal objection is not cost, which at an esti- ftary installations, but not cities, would be weapon in an endless arms race. The real mated $35 billion throughout the decade, is attacked, represents the concept that nucle- case for the MX, that it is a defensive Luttwak, a conservative supporter of Presi- dent Reagan's defense plan, wrote in August 1982 that "It was always clearly understood that if for some inexplicable reason the Soviet Union were to launch large numbers of intercontinental weapons upon our cities, then our own use of surviving nuclear weap- ons to destroy the Soviet population would serve no rational strategic purpose and no moral aim."'" Yet the inevitability of such a second strike was the -foundation of deterrence. If deterrence was effective in preventing nu- clear war, it was because, despite the plati- tudes about a desire for peace recited by U.S. political leaders over the years, the Soviet Union has been kept sufficiently un- certain as to how the United States would really react to nuclear attack. A shift away from deterrence, in its origi- nal, abstract formulation. to a defensive counterforce posture, In which Soviet mis- sile silos and other military sites, rather than sties, would be targeted, carries both benefits and risks The benefits are, first, that because this policy is purely defensive, it is the only sensible and moral policy for the United States to have. Second. it dem- onstrates a seriousness of purpose about protecting national Interests, and about the realities of nuclear war, that the Soviets have always understood. Should the MX be deployed in a basing mode that would afford protection from a Soviet attack to a number of missiles sufficient to destroy the Soviets' capacity to launch a third strike, then "deterrence" of a Soviet first strike would remain valid. This is the fundamental goal of the Reagan Administration in back- ing the MX program. The risks of a counterforce policy are pri- marily political Because a counterforce policy is a genuine warfighting strategy, it incites fervent domestic criticism, as demon- strated by opposition to the construction of the MX. Furthermore, because it is a mili- tary strategy, not a political theory, it rests on a sophisticated analysis of Soviet weap- ons capabilities and wartime probabilities, rather than on the stark and simplistic "eye for an eye" threat of mutually assured de- struction. Thus, a counterforce policy is complex and more difficult to explain to the public. In a democracy, these political and educational problems, if mishandled or ig- nored, have the potential of turning into a Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 S 4748 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 15, 1989 weapon that represents a move away from to upgrade them.19 More than 70 percent of ture. That is because the technology of the arms race of the Sixties and Seventies, U.S. military overseas communications are space, current and potential, enables the has not been made. Moreover, the Adminis- now routed by satellites. Since the United ,U.S. finally to break free of the long-term tration is wrong to claim that real progress States is more dependent on satellites for policy of threatening the Soviet populace in strategic arms reduction talks will be communications. command, and control (C3) with annihilation in response to a Soviet helped along if the U.S. builds the MX. The than the USSR, the U.S. is more vulnerable first strike. Instead, through a purely defen- American people saw the hope of "real prog- to severe C3 breakdowns, should a Soviet sive array of weapons that would reach ress" in arms talks dashed by SALT II and ASATS prove to be effective during conflict through space and actually operate in space. will not consent to new missiles as bargain- or diplomatic crisis. As a result, President the U.S. would have the capability- ing chips. The irony of arms control talks Ford authorized the resumption of U.S. re- through non-nuclear means-of preventing bearing fruit only if new weapons are built search on ASAT just before leaving office in such a first strike from ever taking place, or as a result of them is too overwhelming to 1977. However. President Carter placed a short of that, to greatly limit the destruc- persuade anyone, as the Carter Administra. cap on spending on the ASAT program in Lion it would cause. tion learned. the expectation that limits on such research Even so, the political difficulties of the would be negotiated with the Soviets. The This is the fundamental premise of High MX are not wholly the Administration's Reagan Administration, in turn, reversed Frontier,22 an approach to the strategic de- fault. The significance of the MX as a coun- this decision and assigned a high priority to fence of the United States and our allies terforce weapon derives from its sophisticat- protection of U.S. C9 systems. that offers a chance to go beyond the ed technology, which provides unprecedent- The mission of ASATS. then, is of vast po- present competition in strategic nuclear ed hitting power against Soviet silos. To the litical and military significance. The Soviets weapons-a competition which saps the will- naked eye of the layman, the MX appears intend to use this weapon to put out the ingness of many Americans to support new no different from any other giant nuclear eyes and ears of U.S. surveillance and com- expenditures for defense and which fails to missile. Most Americans think of any con- munications systems, not only in the event ensure adequately our security in any event. flict which involves the use of nuclear weap- of war, but during severe political crises. High Frontier is a multi-faceted concept of ons as the holocaustic destruction of cities The implications of this Soviet capability U.S. exploitation of the "high frontier" of and civilians. The distinctipn between an and of the Soviet space program in general outer space that is only partly military. It anti-weapons strategy (counterforce), and overshadow many other defense issues. envisions as well in the pursuit of space ex- mutually assured destruction (countervalue) The Soviet military space program goes ploration a vast array of civilian commercial is not readily apparent. Further, the MX is beyond the ASATS. According to the De- and scientific benfits. just as capable of being used against cities partment of Defense, the Soviets have been The credit for the birth of High Frontier as against missile silos. Thus, it represents a launching an average of 75 spacecraft per as a highly integrated strategic option for shift away from the deterrence of the Mc- year, a pace four to five times that of the the United States belongs to Lt. Gen. Daniel Namara era, but not the clean break with it. U.S. The annual payload placed into orbit 0. Graham, U.S.A. (Ret.). Gen. Graham, The Reagan Administration seems caught by the Soviets has been approximately who formerly served as director of the De- between two nuclear strategies, disavowing 660,000 pounds, or ten times that of the fense Intelligence Agency, recognized in the the old (in effect ratifying P.D. 59), but thus United States. It is estimated that 70 per- late 1970s that the nuclear deterrence in the far failing to enunciate the new. Therefore cent of this effort is the purely military pur- McNamara sense was doomed to both politi- it is perceived by both allies and enemies as poses?20 Moreover, Soviet research appears cal and military failure. He saw that the having no broad, long-term strategy at all. aimed at building a major war-fighting ca- fundamental contradiction of an ostensibly While a case can be made for building the pability in space. A large space booster, defensive strategy utilizing offensive weap- MX as a counterforce weapon, large politi- which is thought to have six to seven times ons (ICBMs) would become untenable in the cal and technological problems obstruct its the launch weight capability of the U.S. face of (1) growing disillusionment with the deployment. Currently, it appears nearly Space Shuttle, is under development. Such "arms race'; (2) the rundown in the U.S. de- impossible` to achieve a domestic political a vehicle would be a huge step towards a fense infrastructure vis-a-vis the Soviets'; concensus on new ICBMs in the United major, permanently orbiting space station, and, most importantly, (3) the unwillingness States (witness opposition of the conserv- manned by as many as 120 cosmonauts.21 A of the Soviets to abide by the central pre- ative Mormon Church to basing the missile space station would feature both offensive sumption of deterrence: that both sides re- in Utah). No genuinely survivable, political- and defensive strategic weapons, including frain from targeting each other's missiles. ly feasible basing mode has been found. As powerful advanced lasers and "particle- A central theme of High Frontier is that suggested earlier, the technology of nuclear beam" weapons that transmit thermal the basic technology needed to defend the missile attack seems to have outrun that of energy. These not only would be aimed on nuclear missile protection. U.S. satellites, as in ASATS, but also would United States from Soviet nuclear attack fic al- The USIC recognizes these realities. The have the capability of hitting targets on ready exists.a, No spectacular scientific breakthrough would be required-only the Council believes that the United States earth. must look beyond the technological and po- To counter the ambitious Soviet military time, funding and bureaucratic effort neces- litical battles over land-based strategic nu- space program, the United States has also sary to develop the requisite space vehicles clear weapons to the newest realm of scien- made great strides in the research and de- which would feature weapons, radars, and tific, political and military competition- velopment of space-based technology for de- other systems that grow out of today's tech- space. fense. The Space Shuttle program is a great nology. The virtues of High Frontier are step towards meeting the Soviet challenge, that it is both straightforwardly devoted to HIGH FRONTIER: AN OPPORTUNITY as a "space plane" to monitor and inspect defense (destroying enemy missiles) and Ever since the launch of the Soviet Sput- Soviet satellites. The Shuttle technology is fully compatible with the longtime U.S. pos- nik in 1957, it has been obvious that the So- a basis for future permanent U.S. space in- ture of counteracting Soviet advantages in viets recognized the vast strategic signifi- stallations. and the Shuttle serves as a mass and numbers with technological so- cance of space. Even now, they are striving model for reusable space ferries that would phistication (referred to on page 7). As Gen. mightily to achieve military mastery over it. transport men and material to and from Graham explains: "A bold and rapid entry Throughout the short history of space ex- such permanent outposts in space. Into space, if announced and initiated now, ploration, the United States has stressed The potential of these diverse, complex, would end-run the Soviets in the eyes of the peaceful scientific study, while the Soviets and expensive projects is as yet not fully ap- world and move the contest into a new have pursued military advantages. They preciated by all sectors of the U.S. defense arena where we could exploit the technolog- began in the Sixties, by testing a fractional establishment. To the public, the concept of ical advantages we hold." In stressing the orbital bombardment system, literally, space as a theater of future warfare remains defensive nature of High Frontier, he adds bombs in orbit. Through the 1960s, both the in the realm of science fiction. Yet, as tech- that "This is far preferable to pursuing a Soviet Union and the United States, in re- nology forces us inevitably to confront the numbers contest here on earth, which will sponse to the Soviet effort, conducted re- ultimate, critical necessity of advancing into be difficult if not impossible for us to search on anti-satellite systems (ASATS), or space militarily in order to ensure our sur- win, 24 "hunter-killer" satellites. The U.S. program, vival, the weapons and only partly-formed The elements of High Frontier needed to however, stagnated and was discontinued in tactics of space conflict must be incorporat. ensure the defense of the United States, are the early Seventies. In February 1976. the ed into the United States' overall national three: Soviets resumed testing of their ASATS, security strategy. Again, the fundamental (1) A quickly deployable point defense for shortly after a U.S. satellite was "blinded" nature of that strategy is defensive, not of- U.S. ICBM silos which could destroy incom- by a mysterious beam of light over Siberia. fensive. ing Soviet warheads. Such a system would The Soviets today have an anti-satellite The looming importance of space-oriented be a version of the Sentinel and Safeguard vehicle that can intercept target satellites technology in the superpowers' order of ABM, originally intended for just that pur- on their first orbit. They have the capabili- battle gives the United States an unprec- pose. This point defense system would rely ty to employ anti-satellite vehicles in less edented opportunity to redefine and re-ex- on a large number of small conventional than strategic levels of conflict and are pur- plain, in the clearest possible way, the de- projectiles fired at enemy warheads close to suing research and development programs fensive intent of our overall military pos- their targets. Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 April 15, 198 ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 4749 (2) A first-generation spaceborne missile defense, which would employ current "off- the-shelf" technology to destroy Soviet mis- siles upon launch, including theater nuclear weapons such as the SS-20. Such a system would be capable of defending itself and other C' satellites from attack. (3) A second generation space defense able to destroy enemy targets anywhere in space or on earth, using advanced lasers and/or particle beams. In addition, High Frontier calls for a utili- tarian space vehicle capable of inspection, repair, and maintenance of orbiting both C' and defense satellites and other space vehi- cles; and a workable civil defense program implemented in the United States." As noted, the first requirement of a point defense against incoming enemy missiles ex- ploits the ABM technology of the early sev- enties and since the dismantling of the U.S. ABM program. High Frontier projects 2-3 years for such a system to be deployed. The first- and second-generation active space defense vehicles would take advantages of existing satellite and Space Shuttle technol- ogy and is envisioned to be deployable within twelve years. High Frontier is not an obscure scientific theory, nor a program of the defense and aerospace industries that stand to benefit from its adoption. It is not a radical restruc- turing of American defense policy-basic re- search in all of its features has been con- ducted by the Department of Defense for years. Instead, it is a new perspective on the re- quirements of national defense and the po- tential of science: a blend of highly sophisti- cated space technology with the critical need to reorient our national security policy away from the politically intractable and strategically unsound posture countervalue- deterrence, toward a clearly defined, straightforward, and politically acceptable stand on defense. Adoption of High Frontier as our approach to strategic policy is not abandonment of the desire to "deter" Soviet attack. It is deterrence on the basis of our ability to actively protect our cities, our in- dustries, and our military installations rather than on a threat to destro0r Soviet cities in exchange for our own. High Fron- tier is a move away from deterrence through mutually assured destruction. It is deterrence based on the ability to ensure the futility of attack. PROCUREMENT FOR DEPENSE The momentous decisions of military strategy facing the United States today are underlined by a host of other, less theoreti- cal, but no less urgent, problems These can be summed up in the question: How does the U.S. address its national security re- quirements in an era of economic difficulty and budgetary austerity? It is clean that, de- spite the aminous and growing Soviet threat, the warring interest groups that seek a growing share of the federal budget will not miraculously unite to support needed expenditures for defense. In order to make their case most persuasive, therefore, the Defense Department and the Adminis- tration must make the absolute best use of the authorized appropriations for defense. In order to restore the credibility of our de- fenses by building the essential weapons and conducting the essential research, the DOD, the Administration, and the relevant Congressional committees must look hard at the less critical elements of the defense budget. These include, first and foremost, procurement and personnel. The general problem of excessive costs in weapons procurement has already been re- ferred to in this paper. Department of De- fense acquisition practices, procurement regulations, procurement methods, procure- ment policies, and procurement procedures adversely affect our military posture and our military readiness. Our country's defense needs a free enter- prise-oriented Defense Department capable of effecting the following goals: (a) To affect economic efficiency (b) To stabilize Defense procurement (c) To affect strategic responsiveness (d) To encourage competition (e) To double source procurement (f) To affect Defense planning through multiyear procurement (g) To enforce planned production rates (h) To manage materiel required for oper- ational readiness and war (I) To maintain effecive materiel mainte- nance management in support of "trigger" readiness Our defense preparedness and our mili- tary "trigger" readiness will experience a quantum jump improvement of our Defense programs' specifications require the con- tractors to provide five-year warranties on all military systems and military materiel. Procurement of services, particularly of op- erations and maintenance services as they relate to materiel readiness, is another source of needless coats and waste. In the current system of operations and mainte- nance service procurement, technical com- petence takes a back seat to low price. The short-term effect of this procurement system is a third-rate, inadequate product which the fighting man is required to accept with no questions asked. The long-term effect is the degradation of materiel worth billions and an inadequate state of materiel readiness that directly affects our national security. Inflexible budget restrictions in this unglamorous but critically important area of procurement-a "penny-wise, pound- foolish" approach-has led to technically in- ferior operations and maintenance services. Much of this problem could easily be solved. The armed services should have the authority to procure, through preferential purchasing power, the creativity and irmo- vation needed to solve operations and main- tenance problems that adversely affect readiness, in lieu of the mandatory low-bid procurement practices now in effect. This change not only could solve service materiel problems that affect readiness, but also could produce orderof-magitude cost reduc- tions and life-cycle savings. Procurement of top-quality operation and maintenance serv- ices, even at higher costs, would save bil- lions and achieve "trigger readiness," which is the readiness our fighting forces need in order to win and survive." OUR DEFENSE SASS The future of American shipbuilding, of the American merchant fleet, and of the American shipyard defense mobilization base cannot surpass ten more years if the present U.S. maritime policy is not restruc- tured to benefit these United States. According to Edward J. Campbell, Chair- man of the Shipbuilders Council of America and President and C.E.O. of Newport News Shipbuilding, "it would be encouraging to be able to report that the Administration's 'policy,' announced In 1982, will assure the resurrection of our merchant fleet. It will note Not a single merchant vessel will be constructed or converted in U.S. shipyards as a result of this policy. In fact, it will in- stead encourage U.S. shipowners to use their profits to finance construction or ac- quisition of foreign-built ships" 47 Furthermore, in order to ensure the de- fense of the United States, the Defense De- partment should restrict its sources of weap- ons systems to American firms. Our defense cannot be dependent on a foreign nmbiliaa- tion base. Our friend or ally today could plead neutrality or side with our enemy in time of war. Our industrial defense mobilization base is thin and weak. Our Defense Department does not maintain the following essentials: (a) Lower tier defense suppliers for critical parts and material (b) A skilled labor base (c) An advance production base (d) An exotic raw material supply base There is an urgent requirement to correct these problems and deficiencies by forcing changes into our defense programs. The onus for this change is on the Administra- tion, and it must be supported by the Con- gress. PERSONNEL AND PENSIONS The issue of personnel costs also comes to the fore when defense priorities come under hard scrutiny. The need for adequate man- power at affordable costs is an extremely sensitive national question. The military draft gave way to the all-volunteer Army in 1972-part of the bitter legacy of the Viet- nam experience. Since then, the all-volun- teer concept has received mixed reviews. Yet it is the extent of U.S. military commit- ments, rather than the quality of the troops attracted to military service, that poses the future challenge. Of the 2.1 million Ameri- cans in uniform, some 529.000 are serving in 129 countries and aboard ship. Over the next five years the armed services plan to increase active duty forces by 9-10 per- cent." At the same time, it is estimated that number of 18-year-old American males will fall from 2.2 million to 1.7 million by 1990. Higher manpower requirements and a small- er pool to draw on will make recruiting far more diftieudt. Nineteen eighty-two was the best recruiting year ever for the services, due to economic recession and substantial increases in military pay and benefits en- acted in 1980 and 1981. But continual in- creases to attract personnel will be difficult to justify. Miltar'y pay became competitive with the private sector in 1972 and since then has exceeded it in many areas. The question of whether the nation will be forced to return to the draft is one that is destined to arise again. It is an extremely complex question, involving economic as well as military considerations. The drafting of young men into the military imposes an economic cost, in that their economic pro- ductivity is lost to the nation while they serve. Still, the USIC believes that national security considerations should take prece- dence. However, there is no question but that one benefit of military services-the mili- tary pension system-must be reformed. Some 55 percent of the military payroll. or $16 billion in fiscal year 1983 " is devoted to pensions There are a host of costs, in terms of both economics and military readiness, associated with this overgenerous system. The attractiveness of the pension system encourages skilled military personnel to leave the service when they are most valua- ble, to seek private employment while eligi- ble for military retirement pay. The mili- tary pension program comes directly out of annual appropriations for defense; there is no budgeting of future pensions costs. The Reagan Administration intends to propose limitations on annual cost-of-living adjustments for retirees whose retirement pay is greater than that of similar personnel retiring under other federal pay scales. In addition, the Administration plane to pro- pose that the defense budget include the cost of pensions being earned by personnel on active or reserve duty. Currently, the Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7 S 4750 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE budget includes only the pensions being paid to personnel who have already re- tired.30 CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION This White Paper is an explanation of the beliefs of the American businessmen who compose the United States Industrial Coun- cil regarding our national security needs. The USIC staunchly supports President Reagan's five-year plan to increase Ameri- ca's defense capabilities. This White Paper examines the state of our military prepared- ness, and makes recommendations intended to improve it. First and foremost, it de- scribes the evolution of the Soviet Union's armed forces into a military machine that in many areas is now the equal of our own, and in others actually outclasses our forces. Soviet military power is currently on display in Afghanistan, exacting a cruel and bloody toll on an innocent population. However, as this White Paper explains, Soviet forces are an effective tool of Soviet policy even with- out being used. The ominous reality of a giant war machine is an invaluable diplo- matic weapon. Soviet bluster and bullying in the United Nations and other international forums, and the Soviets' vast propaganda and disinformation operations are founded on the USSRs power to wreak destruction on any nation on earth-except the United States. The U.S. must remain the bulwark of free- dom and defense against Soviet aggression- both blatant and subtle. This White Paper features recommendations on how the United States can continue in that vital mis- sion. These include: (1) The U.S. must augment and improve its conventional and strategic forces; (2) Protect our sources of strategic miner- als in the Third World; (3) Develop a non-nuclear space defense capability as an eventual alternative to land-based ICBMs; (4) Institute additional safeguards against the transfer of military-applicable technol- ogy and hardware to the Soviet bloc: (5) Provide the armed forces the authority to award procurement contracts for mate- riel and services to the best performer; (6) Restrict critical military contracts to U.S. firms; (7) Rebuild our shipyard/defense mobili- zation base; (8) Reexamine the performance of the all- volunteer force in light of the dwindling manpower pool and budgetary restraints on recruiting and retention; (9) Reform the military pension system in order to reduce its cost. These recommendations are broad. They deserve further study. Some of them have already been considered, and undertaken, by the Reagan Administration. Others should be seriously discussed and debated by the Administration and Congress. Our goal in proposing them, however, should not be subject to debate: that it falls to the United States to safeguard the liberties and the heritage of the free world. This is our re- sponsibility. We cannot ignore it; we cannot shrink from it. FOOTNOTES 1 Soviet Military Power (Dept. of Defense) n.d. 1981, pp. 27-40, 47. 2 Force Summary, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute (May, 1982) pp. 217-219. 3 Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1984 (U.S. Government Printing Office) p. 5-11. 4 Proceedings (May 1982), pp. 217-219. h Soviet Military Power, pp. 31, 60. 6 Budget, FY84, pp. 5-9. ' Soviet Military Power, pp. 53-60. B Budget, FY84, p. 5-13. 2 Soviet Military Power, p. 88. 1? Budget, FY83, p. 3-16. Leslie H. Gelb, "Weinberger Sees Flexibility in Military Spending," New York Times, April 20, 1981. 12 Daniel P. Moynihan, "The SALT Process," from The New Yorker quoted in Congressional Record, August 6, 1980, p. S10967. Moynihan, p. S10967. ~? Richard Burt, "Carter Said to Back a Plan for Limiting Any Nuclear War," New York Times, Aug. 6. 1980, and Michael Getler, "Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War." Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1980. I. Moynihan, p. S10973. 16 Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Says It Would Build Missile to Match MX," New York Times, Dec. 7, 1982. If Moynihan, P. S10968. "Edward Luttwak, "How to Think About Nucle- ar War," Commentary (Aug., 1982). p. 27. 1I Francis X. Kane, "Anti-Satellite Systems and U.S. Options." Strategic Review (Winter 1982), p. 59. 20 Soviet Military Power, p. 79. 21 "The New Military Race in Space," Business Week, (June 4, 1979). p. 142. 22 Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham USA (Ret.), High Frontier: A New National Strategy (High Frontier, Washington, D.C.), p. 1. 23 Graham, p. 7. 2* Graham, p. 3. 25 Graham, p. 7. 26 Tad Stanwick, "The Fleet Readiness Problem," The Stanwick Corp., (unpublished letter, July 20, 1982). 21 Edward J. Campbell, Leaders, Jan.-Feb.-Mar. 1983, p. S2. --Council of Economic Advisers. Annual Report, February 1982. p. 87. 29 Budget, FY 84, p. 5-8. 30 Budget, FY 84, p. 5-14.? UTAH'S "GRAND CIRCLE OF THE SOUTHWEST" AN UNFORGET- TABLE ADVENTURE ? Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I would like to take a minute to share with you the wonderful opportunity for an un- forgettable adventure that Utah has to offer. I will not detract from the "Greatest Snow on Earth" offered by the Wasatch Mountains in Utah or the other wonderful opportunities there, but that is only the tip of the adventure iceberg. This last year I was presented with a serious problem in the southern part of my State. The road from southern Utah to the north rim of the Grand Canyon was not scheduled to open until July 1. I investigated, and we got the road open by Memorial Day. In the course of this investigation I found disappointed visitors from 41 States and 13 foreign countries who had come to see this great wonder of the world and were prevented from doing so. But I found much, much more; and I have worked to be certain that the wonderful adventure of a life- time to be found in southern Utah can be better understood and enjoyed by more citizens of our country and, indeed, the world. On this 900-mile circle, referred to as the "Grand Circle of the Southwest," can be found 7 na- tional parks-approximately 20 per- cent of all national parks-including the Grand Canyon in Arizona, 6 na- tional monuments, 1 national recre- ational area, 19 State parks, and 1 tribal park and historical monument. All of these natural wonders can be visited in the comfort and convenience of your own car on self-guided tours or, if you wish, in motor coaches, on modern paved highways-an adven- ture unmatched anywhere in the world. April 15, 1983 While, naturally, I would suggest that you come to Salt Lake City to start your adventure, you can join the grand circle of the Southwest from any of five major U.S. highways or from the Interstate System along its route. Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Denver are all portal cities. The entire grand circle of the Southwest is designed to be covered in as little as 7 days or you can take as long as you wish. Several days could easily and enjoyably be spent at each of the areas described. The Grand Canyon needs no intro- duction. Internationally and national- ly it is recognized as one of the won- ders of the world. To those who wish, they may ride the raging Colorado River on an unforgettable raft trip or ride to the bottom of the canyon on mules. Of course, part of this grand adventure can be a flight by a fixed- wing aircraft or by helicopters over and through the Grand Canyon; The Grand Canyon alone is an adventure in and of itself-an adventure never to be forgotten. Lake Powell, featured on the cover of United Airlines March issue of United Magazine, has more shoreline than the United States has on the Pa- cific Ocean. It is, in reality, another spectacular "Grand Canyon," coupled with a different perspective and with the added dimension of water and water experiences. Houseboats. Swim- ming and water sports in the shadow of spectacular beauty. Again, an ad- venture in and of itself. An adventure never to be forgotten. Navajo National Monument. Monument Valley. Valley of the Gods. Hovenweep National Monument. Natural Bridges Monument. News Paper Rock Historical Monu- ment. Canyonlands National Park. Dead Horse Point State Park. Arches National Park. Goblin Valley State Reserve. Capitol Reef National Park. Bryce Canyon National Park. Cedar Breaks National Monument. Zion National Park. Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. Rainbow Bridge National Monu- ment, and more. Volumes can, and have been, written about the awe-inspiring beauty and unforgettable adventure to be realized at each of these fascinating sites. You will also find on your adventure around the grand circle of the South- west modern motels, restaurants, and other facilities with folks eager to help you. Or you may wish to camp at many of the improved or wilderness sites around the "Circle." Friendly fellow adventurers will add to your en- joyment of these natural wonders. I would urge all Americans and our international visitors to take advan- tage of the marvelous opportunity to visit the grand circle of the Southwest and to share this joy with millions Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430016-7