SOVIET VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE SUMMIT MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200310004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 27, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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/ Central Intciligencc Agency
Washin?ton.D C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 February 1984
Soviet Views on a Possible Summit Meeting
Summary
Certain trends in Soviet policy during the final
weeks of Andropov's tenure, and Chernenko's seeming
interest in greater efforts to improve bilateral
relations, suggest that the Soviets might be willing to
consider a proposal for a summit meeting. Nonetheless,
domestic power considerations would affect the internal
debate on the idea, and some Soviet leaders would be
skeptical about the value of a summit at this time. The
Politburo probably would agree only if confident that it
would bring progress on one or more of the issues of
concern to Moscow--INF, limiting weapons in outer space,
START, MBFR, chemical warfare, or regional issues,
particularly the Middle East.
Soviet Probes on Summit Prospects
1. In late 1983 and early 1984, there were several approaches
Eastern bloc diplomats, whom we believe to be intelligence officers
Moscow to convey signals to the US through unofficial channels, hin
the arms control dialogue and holding
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summit meeting. Just before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, a Soviet diplomat
the USSR remained open to the idea of a 1984 summit,
-SOYA M 84-10028
Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office of
Soviet Analysis, and has not been coordinated outside that
office. Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief,
Current Support Division, telephone 25X1
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but only if it could be "substantive." Be said the key to such a meeting was
progress in the INF talks, particularly over the issue of UK and French
systems. 25X1
2. Soviet public statements on bilateral relations during this period
remained generally negative and avoided any mention of the possibility of a
summit. Statements consistent with the idea occasionally appeared, however,
such as a remark by a Moscow television commentator on 25 December that the
USSR was "ready to deal with any US President." Responding to President
Reagan's speech of 16 January, General Secretary Andropov said a week later
that the Soviets needed no convincing as to the usefulness of dialogue and
that there were possibilities for "serious discussion" of a number of
problems. Along with not wishing to appear less willing to be conciliatory
than the President, Andropov may have adopted his more moderate tone in part
out of concern that Moscow's militant statements durin the fall of 1983 had
aroused excessive alarm among the Soviet public. 25X1
3. The accession of Konstantin thernenko as General Secretary has given
additional impetus to the hints of interest in reestablishing a dialogue that
had begun to appear in the final weeks of Andropov's tenure, and may have
increased Moscow's willingness to consider the idea of a summit. The new
leader has the reputation of having supported Brezhnev's policy of improving
relations with the US, which placed a high value on personal diplomacy.
Chernenko's accession speech professed interest in settling international
problems through "serious, equal and constructive talks," and his speech at
Andropov's funeral reiterated readiness for "talks on the basis of equality
and equal security." Chernenko's supporters, at least, might favor a summit
as a way of enhancing the new leader's stature as a world statesman both at
home and abroad. 25X1
4. The day after Chernenko's accession t p the toParty st a deputy
director of the Institute of the USA and Canada
under Chernenko, Moscow would be more inclined to assess US initiatives on
their merits and to strike a deal in 1984, even if it improved the President's
chances of being reelected. He stated that negotiations on limiting weapons
in space were not far behind the resumption of INF talks as a Soviet priority,
and that if an agreement on space could be reached. a summit might be possible
that the Soviets want the US to propose merging
Hungarian diplomat,
INF and START talks and that agreement to do so could be announced at a summit
meeting.
5. It is uncertain to what extent the remarks of these two individuals
were directed by Moscow, and in any case they probably came too soon after
Chernenk is accession to have reflected his influence.
-however, a close relationship to an
advisor of Chernenko that the Soviet leadership
is discussing the possibility of a summit meeting in late May 1984. He said
that Politburo member and Party Secretary Gorbachev is taking the lead in
advocating the idea. These allusions to the possibility of a summit may be
trial balloons to establish whether the prospect will help induce the US
administration to make new arms control initiatives.
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6. Despite the desire to get a dialogue going again and Chernenko's
apparent inclination to seek improved relations, a proposal to hold a summit
meeting this year almost certainly would arouse intense debate in Moscow.
Aside from the pros and cons of any substantive initiative accompanying the
proposal, the Soviets would consider carefully its possible impact on the US
political scene, and individual Soviet leaders would be keenly aware of its
implications. for Chernenko's personal status. West European support for the
idea would also enter into Soviet deliberations, as Moscow continues its
efforts to convince public opinion in the NATO countries of its good faith in
seeking to reduce international tensions.
Potential Sources of Opposition
7. One view in Moscow, evident in a number of commentaries and private
statements since last September, holds that there is no possibility of
reaching an agreement with the present US administration on major issues such
as arms control. Moreover, a number of reports during the final months of
Andropov's regime indicated that the Soviets were determined to do nothing to
enhance the administration's prospects for being reelected, although most
Soviets appear to believe that those prospects are good whatever Moscow
does. Those holding such views would be likely to argue against the idea of a
summit, unless they could be convinced that an agreement could be reached that
would address some of Moscow's concerns. Without the prospect of positive
results, they would likely assert that a summit would be primarily a US
propaganda show staged to help the President get reelected. A Japanese
newspaper reports that an editor of Novosti voiced these views in expressing
doubt last Friday that a summit would occur this year.
8. It is also possible that some members of the Soviet leadership would
be cool toward a move that enhanced Chernenko's status, preferring that his
personal authority continue to be limited by a collegial relationship. There
appears, however, to be a tendency in Moscow to seek to establish Chernenko's
authority as quickly as possible. Ogarkov, for example, has already referred
to him as Chairman of the Defense Council.
9. It is likely that the two Politburo members most influential in
foreign policy decisions, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister
Ustinov, would at least be skeptical about the idea of an early summit, and
might oppose it. In an "interview" with TASS last June, Gromyko acknowledged
that a summit could produce major results under proper conditions, but he
asserted that these were lacking on the US side. He noted, however, that
things would look different if there were signs of US readiness to conduct
relations "in a serious and constructive manner." He has not indicated that
he has seen such signs yet. in his speech last month to the tbnference on
Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm, Gromyko said that US statements of
readiness to talk while continuing to deploy missiles were "verbal
camouflage," and that the USSR will not engage in talks that serve as a "cover
for militarist plans." In a speech on 27 February, Gromyko repeated
Andropov's implied condition'that the new US missiles must be withdrawn from
Europe in order for INF talks to resume.
10. Ustinov has not directly addressed the idea of a summit, but in an
article in Pravda as recently as 23 February, he was critical of US intentions
in a manner that suggests he would be highly skeptical of a summit's
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advisability. His Armed Forces Day address-traditionally an occasion for
tough rhetoric--was not as forthcoming about the desire for dialogue as
Chernenko had been or, indeed, as Ustinov himself had been on a similar
occasion a year earlier. He accused the US administration of seeking to deal
with the USSR from a position of "strength, threats, and pressure."
Outlook
11. The existence of a strongly pessimistic strain in Soviet thinking
about relations with the US, and the possible coolness of Gromyko and Ustinov
to the idea of a summit, do not mean that the Soviets would necessarily reject
such a proposal. It is likely, however, that Moscow would agree only if
confident that it would yield some tangible benefit. Judging from public and
private statements, the following issues are those on which the prospect of
progress would seem most likely to lead the Soviet leadership seriously to
consider a summit meeting:
The Soviets accord highest priority by far to securing US agreement
to a formula for resuming the INF talks that would ensure that UK and
French systems are accounted for in some forum, and freeze further
deployments by either side while negotiations continue.
Other arms control issues are of lower priority to Moscow, for now at
least. Depending, however, on how the Soviets weight the potential
political impact, both domestically and in the US, the prospect of
movement on one or more of these issues might. tip the balance in
favor of a summit. They include limitation of weapons in outer
space, START, MBFR, and chemical warfare.
-- The Soviets have also expressed interest in serious bilateral talks--
though not necessarily a summit-on critical regional conflicts in
which both sides have an interest in avoiding confrontation, most
notably the Middle East.
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