NSC MEETING ON START, 27 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200310010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
26 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
NSC Meeting on START, 27 March 1984
1 ! u are scheduled to attend a4,Nati onallSecuri tyCouncil.. meeti:ng~
tomo ow a ~ OO fours na the Cabinet Room l scuss no ec s i ons) the
status and.prospects for, major nuclear-~armst~control negotiati=ons,
Particularly INF and START. This "wi Tl be a principal plus one meeting
and `ill be accompanying you.
2. The SOYA paper at Tab A, that you have already seen, will serve
as a centerpiece for the meeting.
3. Your talkingc points are,,..at Tabs..D. & E. There aretwo.versions
here, ;one,, re arehd .by. Fri t Ermarth and another prepared? bpi,
has a second version of his talking points at Tab C,
which is EYES ONLY.) Rather than melding the two together and boiling
them down to the least common denominator, I thought it wiser to let you
see both of them so that you can get a feel for the differences of view
that are at play here. Fritzbelieves that the Soviets are unprepared to
make the necessary concessions required for real arms control arenas
is more optimistic about the prospects for an agreement this year if
the US wants one
4. Finally, I thought you might also find of interest the appended
draft SOYA Monthly which provides a rundown of the major arms control
negotiations. SOYA expects to publish this draft next month.
5. If I can do more to help you prepare for this meeting, please
call.
7A 6
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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:
FROM:
SUBJECT :
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
NSC Meeting, 27 March
1. This memorandum transmits your briefing book for the NSC meeting now
scheduled for 1400 on Tuesday, 27 March.
2. The topics of this meeting began two or more weeks ago as trade offs
and frameworks of the US START policy. A week ago at a meeting of the Senior
Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG), Richard Perle made it clear that he thought
the issue was not trade offs and the associated details, but rather US
strategy in arms control between now and the first Tuesday in November. That
idea was accepted by Mr. McFarlane. Consequently, the issue of START trade
offs has been replaced by the two issues now on the table as stated by Mr.
McFarlane:
o Soviet interest in arms control in 1984.
o US interests in 1984.
Last Thursday, Mr. FcFarlane said this NSC meeting is intended for discussion,
not decision.
3. The paper on Soviet interests was written by SOVA analysts. In
addition to the obvious evidence, this paper is based on two private chats we
had with Amb. Jack Matlock, NSC Staff, and Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant
to Deputy Secretary of State Ken Dam. The session with Mr. Matlock dealt with
his views on Soviet interests. The session with Dr. Timbie dealt with the
Reagan-Chenernko correspondence, as well as the Eagleberger-Burt/Dobrynin-
Sokolov talks in Washington and the Gromyko-Hartman talks in Moscow. The
paper does not refer to such exchanges but the paper is congruent with our
understandings of the contents of those exchanges. In any case, I think CtA 3 A
SOVA's paper is a good piece and the comments last Thursday of the SACPG
participants indicate they agreed. 25X1
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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 27 March
4. Attached (on left) is a Table of Contents tailored to these two
issues. I am skeptical that the OSD paper on US strategy, written by Richard
Perle but to be signed out to the President by Secretary Weinberger, will
arrive before the meeting. I asked Mr. Perle for a copy. In any case, I
expect that State Department, and perhaps ACDA, will write their own views of
the second issue. I have asked that copies be made available to You. either
through me or to you directly, but I doubt they will arrive too.
5. If there is anything more I may do to assist you on this subject,
please call and let me know.
Attachment:
As stated
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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984
SUBJECT: NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March
DDI/ACISi
(23 Mar 84)
Distribution:
Original
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- DDCI
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- ExDir
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- SA/DCI/IA
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- Exec Reg (w/out attachments)
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- DDI/NIC
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- ADDI
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- DDI Reg (w/out attachments)
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- C/ACIS
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- ACIS Chrono
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J L. %o 1%L 1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 March 1984
Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984
Summary
The Soviets appear to have adopted a
two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking
an inflexible line on INF and START, while
simultaneously expressing willingness to move
ahead on other security issues, and signaling
that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is
possible if Washington shows flexibility in
these other areas. They presumably calculate
that this strategy enables them to stand firm
on the central issues of INF and START,
without making themselves appear so
intransigent as to rally support for NATO's
policies or to demonstrate that they, not the
Administration, are responsible for poor US-
Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue
to probe for US flexibility on a range of
issues, with the aim of extracting the
maximum price for any marked improvement in
relations or arms control issues before the
US elections. The Politburo will be wary of
any major steps unless convinced that
significant gains are at hand for the USSR,
especially on their fundamental concerns in
START and INF.
This memorandum was prepared by
Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office of
Soviet Analysis, with contributions from other SOVA analysts.
Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief, Current
Support Division,
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The Soviet Calculus
1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current
Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need
to keep the deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously
damaging the Soviet political position in Europe--including the
effort to fan anti-INF sentiment--and calculations regarding the
US election campaign.
2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US
that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations.
Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do
anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the
present Administration by enabling it to claim a major success in
the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they
apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the
Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations
on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral
improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to
have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this
time if convinced it would serve their interests.
3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the
prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF, and
probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms
control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made
West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in
the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and
belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that
domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and
increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-
Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance
to a position more acceptable to Moscow.
4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these
pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with
whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings
about the consequences of the first deployments. In private
Soviet demarches at this level, as well as public commentary,
they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF,
claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the
East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles
subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as
their "gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to court
West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider
multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French
into direct discussion of INF and their own forces' role. It
appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will
try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF
issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR. the
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE.
5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in
the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-
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basing countries--particularly the Social Democrats in West
Germany--to speak out forcefully against INF deployments.
Further, Moscow has maintained and perhaps even raised the level
of its direct and covert support to the West European peace
movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed
missiles--along with announced basing sites--will provide a focus
for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided
movement. Moscow's efforts in this area probably will be
tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the charge of
manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face
the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their
opposition activities against Warsaw Pact countermeasures.
Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult
for them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public
opinion.
Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks
6. Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the
repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn
had suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater
flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several
recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm
line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of
public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return
to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from
Europe. In talks on 10-12 March with senior US arms control
specialists in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth
Conference, as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March with
visiting leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party, the
Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations, some
implying and others asserting outright that neither negotiation
could resume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles were
withdrawn from Western Europe
7. Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also
dismissed as a solution to INF the "walk-in-the-woods" formula.
By rejecting both the walk-in-the-woods formula and a merger,
these officials seemed to be closing the door on two potential
avenues which some Soviets had speculated as recently as January
could lead to a revival of the talks.
8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume
this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment
schedule and taking the UK and French systems into account
somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent
statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a
representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be
resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first
secretar
also has suggested that the USSR would be more interested in
resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He
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also raised the possibility of an INF negotiation involving the
US, USSR, France, and the UK.
9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat
stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations in
discussions with correspondents than the general line would
indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray
the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely
interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the
Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also
probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through
which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be
conveyed.
10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they
eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO
INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and
START negotiations. However, while the Soviets hope to use
negotiations to limit US strategic programs, their R & D programs
provide them with the capability to compete with or without arms
control agreements. Strategic offensive systems currently in
development and flight-testing provide the Soviets with the basis
for improving their strategic capabilities under SALT II Treaty
limits or those of their START proposals, as well as in the
absence of any arms control constraints. There is room under
SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed SLBM
systems (the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23), the ALCM-equipped Bear H and
Blackjack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS-X-24 ICBM. Further,
the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS-X-25 is a
"modernized" SS-13 is intended to permit deployment of this
system as well. While the Soviets at START have thus far
insisted that long-range SLCMS and GLCMS be banned, they are
testing such systems and are well-positioned to deploy them in
the absence of a ban on them.
11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that
would eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban
testing and deployment of all space-based weapons. In addition,
they have announced a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons in
space, as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their
immediate aim probably is to preclude the development and
deployment of the US direct-ascent ASAT interceptor, while their
longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating its
technological capabilities into systems such as space-based
lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic
Prospects for Progress on Other Issues
12. Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March
that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary--
particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the
demilitarization of space--could prepare the way for a "dramatic
breakthrough" in US-Soviet relations despite the impasse in START
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and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the
most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears
intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms
control and reduced international tensions despite the USSR's
continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the
Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where
progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental
US or Soviet positions.
13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding
Soviet goals and public positions:
-- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground
nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes;
-- resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban
treaty, suspended by the US;
-- an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
-- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
-- an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said
conditions for an accord are "beginning to ripen."
He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle
of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons
destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on
chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an
agreement under which there would be effective control of the
"whole process of destruction--from beginning to end." 25X1
told the US delegation to the Conference on 25X1
Disarmament in Geneva that the Soviets are preparing to table a
draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. 25X1
14. Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent
Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have indicated that
the USSR attaches high priority to initiating "unofficial" talks
with the US on limiting the deployment of weapons in outer
space. A Central Committee staff member, Stanislav Menshikov,
arrived in the US recently with the primary purpose 25X1
of helping or anize such a conference. q.r;X1
Menshikov, said that 25X1(1
ere is no need for the US and USSR to resolve differences on
INF and START before engaging in a dialogue on other security 25X1
issues such as chemical warfare and space weaponry.
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15. Chernenko's claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these
issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral
relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement
as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet
leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to
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the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a
firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet
concerns in START and-INF before agreeing to any dramatic
bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for
signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in
accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:
a freeze on further INF deployments, particularly
Pershing IIs;
an agreement to take into account UK.and French systems;
or
an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic
systems the Soviets consider most threatening--SLCMs,
ALCMs, MX, or the D-5 SLBM.
The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold
progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now,
it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic
negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns
would be addressed, but this line is doubtless intended in part
to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a
definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response
to specific US initiatives.
16. Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made
toward agreement on "norms" to govern relations between nuclear
powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in
the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area
would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade
crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence
of the KAL shootdown. Chernenko, however, raised this
possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could
lead to a breakthrough" in relations, perhaps to signal that
agreement on this Doint would not be of comparable
significance.
17. Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR
talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an
early breakthrough. A deputy director of the Institute for the
USA and Canada said in late February that the Soviets would not
have agreed to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark
that suggests Moscow believes the principal advantage of the
talks lies in the possibilities they offer for wedge-driving
between the US and its allies. This view probably has been
strengthened by Western press reports of differences between the
US and West Germany over the Allied position. Even if the
Western allies were to agree on softening their position
regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would be unlikely
to accept Western proposals on verification to the extent
necesary for an early breakthrough in the talks.
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substantive issues.
18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on
Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the
importance of an agreement on the non-use of force as a step
toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko,
however, did not refer to this proposal, and although the Soviets
appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory
measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on
this point alone would evoke any response from them on more
have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is
possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among
them could be part of a package to improve bilateral relations.
19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other
issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to
a significant lowering of international tensions. These include
a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a
nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an
agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of
nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean,
and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these
proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require
major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals
therefore appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts
to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may
Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics
20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control
policy rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions
in this area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about
half a dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the
Defense Council's executive secretariat, the General
Staff--through its Main Operations Directorate--coordinates the
flow of information to the Defense Council decisionmakers. This
arrangement assures the military a highly influential role in the
arms control policy-making process. Information and policy
proposals are channeled through the General Staff from the
Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Military Industrial
Commission, and specific Central Committee staffs, notably the
International Denartment and International Information
Department.
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22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual
views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly
sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations
with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech ref ro
decision that was made before Andropov's death.
23. We do not know the full range of differences within the
Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to which.Chernenko
and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for
significant changes in US positions, especially before the US
elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however,
that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would
be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening
American defense posture.
24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the
Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any
measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they
are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on
significant arms control issues.
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Lentrai -nicfugcncc f gcncy
Washinpon. D C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 February 1984
Soviet Views on a Possible Summit Meeting
Summary
Certain trends in Soviet policy during the final
weeks of Andropov's tenure, and Chernenko's seeming
interest in greater efforts to improve bilateral
relations, suggest that the Soviets might be willing to
consider a proposal for a summit meeting. Nonetheless,
domestic power considerations would affect the internal
debate on the idea, and some Soviet leaders would be
skeptical about the value of a summit at this time. The
Politburo probably would agree only if confident that it
would bring progress on one or more of the issues of
concern to Moscow--INF, limiting weapons in outer space,
START, MBFR, chemical warfare, or regional issues,
particularly the Middle East.
Soviet Probes on Summit Prospects
by
1. In late 1983 and earlv 1984. there were several approaches
Eastern bloc diplomats used by
Moscow to convey signals to the US through unofficial channels, hinting at
Moscow's interest in resuming the arms control dialogue and holding out the
possibility of a summit. In late December, an East German diploma
that success at the 18 January meeting between secretary
Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm could pave the way for a 1984
summit meeting. Just before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, a Soviet diplomat
the USSR remained open to the idea of a 1984 summit,
-?SOVA M 84-10028
This memorandum was prepared by
Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office o
Soviet Analysis, and has not been coordinated outside that
office. Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief,
Current Support Division, telephone
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but only if it could be "substantive." He said the key to such a meeting was
progress in the INF talks, particularly over the issue of UK and French
systems.
2. Soviet public statements on bilateral relations during this period
remained generally negative and avoided any mention of the possibility of a
summit. Statements consistent with the idea occasionally appeared, however,
such as a remark by a Moscow television commentator on 25 December that the
USSR was "ready to deal with any US President." Responding to President
Reagan's speech of 16 January, General Secretary Andropov said a week later
that the Soviets needed no convincing as to the usefulness of dialogue and
that there were possibilities for "serious discussion" of a number of
problems. Along with not wishing to appear less willing to be conciliatory
than the President, Andropov may have adopted his more moderate tone in part
out of concern that Moscow's militant statements during the fall of 1983 had
aroused excessive alarm among the Soviet public.
3. The accession of Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary has given
additional impetus to the hints of interest in reestablishing a dialogue that
had begun to appear in the final weeks of Andropov's tenure, and may have
increased Moscow's willingness to consider the idea of a summit. The new
leader has the reputation of having supported Brezhnev's policy of improving
relations with the US, which placed a high value on personal diplomacy.
Chernenko's accession speech professed interest in settling international
problems through "serious, equal and constructive talks," and his speech at
Andropov's funeral reiterated readiness for "talks on the basis of equality
and equal security." Chernenko's supporters, at least, might favor a summit
as a way of enhancing the new leader's stature as a world statesman both at
home and abroad.
after Chernenko's accession to the top Party post,
under Chernenko, Moscow would be more inclined to assess US initiatives on
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their merits and to strike a deal in even if it improved the President's
chances of being reelected.
negotiations on limiting weapons
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in space were not far behind the resumption of INF talks as a Soviet priority,
and that if an reement on space could be reached, a summit might be possible
in 1984.
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that the vies want the US to propose merging
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INF and START talks and that reement to do so could be announced at a summit
~
ng.~
7
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Ithe Soviet leadership
is discussing the possibil
ity of a summit meeting in late May 1984.
25 25X1
Party Secretary Gorbachev is taking the lead in
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advocating the idea.
These allusions to the possibility of a summit may be
trial balloons to establish whether the prospect will
help induce the US
administration to make new arms control initiatives.
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6. Despite the desire to get a dialogue going again and Chernenko's
apparent inclination to seek improved relations, a proposal to hold a summit
meeting this year almost certainly would arouse intense debate in Moscow.
Aside from the pros and cons of any substantive initiative accompanying the
proposal, the Soviets would consider carefully its possible impact on the US
political scene, and individual Soviet leaders would be keenly aware of its
implications for Chernenko's personal status. West European support for the
idea would also enter into Soviet deliberations, as Moscow continues its
efforts to convince public opinion in the NATO countries of its good faith in
seeking to reduce international tensions.
Potential Sources of Opposition
7. One view in Moscow, evident in a number of commentaries and private
statements since last September, holds that there is no possibility of
reaching an agreement with the present US administration on major issues such
as arms control. during the final months of 25X1
Andropov's regime indicated that the Soviets were determined to do nothing to
enhance the administration's prospects for being reelected, although most
Soviets appear to believe that-those prospects are good whatever Moscow
does. Those holding such views would be likely to argue against the idea of a
summit, unless they could be convinced that an agreement could be reached that
would address some of Moscow's concerns. Without the prospect of positive
results, they would likely assert that a summit would be primarily a US
propaganda show staged to help the President get reelected. A Japanese
newspaper reports that an editor of Novosti voiced these views in expressing
doubt last Friday that a summit would occur this year. 25X1
8 It is also possible that some members of the Soviet leadership would
be cool toward a move that enhanced Chernenko's status, preferring that his
personal authority continue to be limited by a collegial relationship. There
appears, however, to be a tendency in Moscow to seek to establish Chernenko's
authority as quickly as possible. Ogarkov for example, has already referred
to him as Chairman of the Defense Council. 25X1
9. It is likely that the two Politburo members most influential in
foreign policy decisions, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister
Ustinov, would at least be skeptical about the idea of an early summit, and
might oppose it. In an "interview" with TASS last June, Gromyko acknowledged
that a summit could produce major results under proper conditions, but he
asserted that these were lacking on the US side. He noted, however, that
things would look different if there were signs of US readiness to conduct
relations "in a serious and constructive manner." He has not indicated that
he has seen such signs yet. In his speech last month to the Conference on
Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm, Gromyko said that US statements of
readiness to talk while continuing to deploy missiles were "verbal
camouflage," and that the USSR will not engage in talks that serve as a "cover
for militarist plans." In a speech on 27 February, Gromyko repeated
Andropov's implied condition that the new US missiles must be withdrawn from
Europe in order for INF talks to resume.
10. Ustinov has not directly addressed the idea of a summit, but in an
article in Pravda as recently as 23 February, he was critical of US intentions
in a manner that suggests he would be highly skeptical of a summit's
-3-
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advisability. His Armed Forces Day address-traditionally an occasion for
tough rhetoric--was not as forthcoming about the desire for dialogue as
Chernenko had been or, indeed, as Ustinov himself had been on a similar
occasion a year earlier. He accused the US administration of seeking to deal
with the USSR from a position of "strength, threats, and pressure."
Outlook
11. The existence of a strongly pessimistic strain in Soviet thinking
about relations with the US, and the possible coolness of Gromyko and Ustinov
to the idea of a summit, do not mean that the Soviets would necessarily reject
such a proposal. It is likely, however, that Moscow would agree only if
confident that it would yield some tangible benefit. Judging from public and
private statements, the following issues are those on which the prospect of
progress would seem most likely to lead the Soviet leadership seriously to
consider a summit meeting:
The Soviets accord highest priority by far to securing US agreement
to a formula for resuming the INF talks that would ensure that UK and
French systems are accounted for in some forum, and freeze further
deployments by either side while negotiations continue.
Other arms control issues are of lower priority to Moscow, for now at
least. Depending, however, on how the Soviets weight the potential
political impact, both domestically and in the US, the prospect of
movement on one or more of these issues might tip the balance in
favor of a summit. They include limitation of weapons in outer
space, START, MBFR, and chemical warfare.
The Soviets have also expressed interest in serious bilateral talks--
though not necessarily a summit-on critical regional conflicts in
which both sides have an interest in avoiding confrontation, most
notably the Middle East.
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SECRET
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR DCI
1. Moscow's current policy toward the US is to maximize pressures on
the administration during an election year to extract concessions,
especially in arms control.
-- The basic Soviet aim -- admittedly a long shot -- is to
deflect the Reagan Administration from its main foreign policy
course of rearmament and tough competition with the USSR.
-- 1984 offers their best, perhaps last, chance to do this.
2. But they have not, repeat NOT, made any fundamental decisions to
change their own basic po icies to mitigate the competition yet. The notion
that the Soviets are at a basic turning point of policy because of Chernenko
is mistaken.
a. They were moving toward more tactical flexibility before
Chernenko acceded to power.
b. Even if Chernenko is more powerful than he sometimes looks,
the leadership is not in shape to make a major departure from
the strategies of the past decade.
-- Remember, on things that matter most to the US, Andropov
was not that different from Brezhnev.
c. The Soviets have no reason to embrace a fixed view of the US
now. In the Soviet view ...
-- Reagan will probably be reelected, but it's not certain.
-- Even if he is reelected, economic and political realities
are likely to make his reach greater than his grasp in
defense and foreign policy during a second term.
d. The Soviets are very unlikely to hold the view that "it's
better to strike a deal before the election than after."
It will be impossible to sign, much less ratify, a major
"agreement" e.g., INF, before the election.
The appearance of a deal-in-the-offing would probably
help the President's reelection prospects, something
which the Soviets do not want to do, according to all our
sources.
-- Soviets would see a high risk that a reelected Reagan
administration would break away from a pre-election
agreement in principle.
CL BY SIGNER
nrri nano
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SECRET
3. They want to create the appearance, particularly to the top levels
of the USG, that they are ready for "a deal." But they are not yet ready on
their own part for the concessions necessary to make "a deal" of real or
lasting value for the US.
-- This accounts for the faintest hints of reasonableness in some
public statements (recently turned hard again) and private
encouragement from Dobrynin on prospects for relations.
4. Even this narrow tactical purpose on the Soviet part, however,
makes them willing to engage in an arms-length minuet.
-- This offers the US the opportunity to create the image of
slight immprovement in US/Soviet relations, of benefit to us
with allies and publics.
-- The risk for the US is that the Soviets -- having a more
disciplined system -- will manipulate us more effectively than
we manipulate them.
5. Given the Soviet tactical interest, we can probably keep alive
their willingness to engage in exploratory dialogue, at least to the extent
seen since January, without major concessions on START, INF, and other areas
where we are far apart e.g., ASAT, Chemical Weapons).
-- A cautious US approach would concentrate on CBMs (e.g.,
HOTLINE) and peripheral issues ... at least for some months.
6. To get more dramatic movement we probably have to consider more
costly concessions. The crucial concession the Soviets are clearly loo ing
for is a moratorium on INF deployments.
-- The Soviets believe that an INF moratorium, and perhaps just
talk about a moratorium, could rekindle the INF controversy in
Europe and stop futher US deployments-permanently.
7. During the election, the Soviets will try to create an atmosphere
in which the two US candidates compete in terms of who can better create
amity with Moscow.
-- This will create pressure for US concessions.
8. If the US holds firm during a period of maximum political
"vulnerability", i.e., 1984, this will go a long way to creating the
conditions for a more genuinely flexible Soviet posture in 1985-1988.
-= During the latter period US political freedom of movement will
be greater.
SECRET
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-? . The results of our defense programs will begin to show.
-- A stronger Soviet political leadership with better prospects
for longevity may'emerge and be better equipped to engage in
longer-term planning and genuine give-and-take.
10. Throughout 1984 we have to remember the supreme importance of
preserving the kind of credibility in Moscow that would allow us to manage a
real crisis which could blow up at any time, e.g., in the Gulf.
It would be dangerous to create the illusion in Moscow that
the US cannot for political reasons risk a worsening of
relations such a crisis could entail.
SECRET
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Proposed Talking Points for DCI at NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March 1984
1. As always, the Soviets are acting in arms control in five areas of
increasing political sensitivity:
o public statements, as in TASS, et al.
o unofficial bilateral exchanges of views, as in Dartmouth Group, et al.
o official exchanges, as in MBFR, CDE, SCC, etc.
o private or semi-private feelers, as in Dobrynin's "leaks" to Boston
Globe, et al.
o official letters between President Reagan and General Secretary
Chernenko.
2. There is not, and probably cannot be, substantive consistency in all five
channels from day-to-day or even week-to-week. It is too hard to
orchestrate all that.
3.
The mix of "positive" and "negative" channels varies over time; in some
cases, as today, public statements and official letters are congruent in
substance.
4. In fact, I think it is clear the Soviets are purposely "talking out of
both sides of their mouths."
5. The key question is whether any meaning is there for the US.
6. The USSR clearly is looking for US "concessions", such as taking UK and
French nuclear missiles into account somewhere. Such steps by US would:
o look good in their own right to USSR.
o let the USSR out of the political box they created when they left
INF and START.
o be useful for any internal arguments in USSR that this leadership
knows how to deal with the US.
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7. In any case, the Soviets will be tough bargainers in normal diplomatic
channels or private ones. 1984 will complicate in obvious ways any US or
USSR efforts to:
o identify areas of mutual interest for any progress,
o actually work it out.
8. The Soviets appear to have adopted a .two-pronged strategy on arms
control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously
expressing willingness, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet
relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other
areas.
9. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm
on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear
so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate
that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet
relations.
10. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for flexibility on a range of issues,
with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement
in relations or arms control issues before the US elections.
11. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that
significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their
fundamental concerns in START and INF.
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cripple the Nicaraguan economy,
but no more.
Fred Francis, NBC News, on the
Nicaraguan border.
Eighteen Marines Killed in Crash
CHUNG:; Eighteen U. S. Marines
are believed dead in a helicopter
crash 170 miles southeast o-f
Seoul, South Korea.
The Marines were engaged in
war game maneuvers with South
Korean servicemen. Eleven South
Koreans are also believed killed.
The Marine chopper apparently
went down in rugged mountains
because of bad weather.
This is the second time in
week these military exercises
have been marred by an incident.
On Wednesday, a nuclear-powered
submarine rammed the U. S.
Aircraft Carrier Kitty Hawk in
the Sea of Japan.
,;ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT ABC TV
6:30 PM MARCH 25
No News of Relevance to DOD
NBC SUNDAY"'" "NIfG4T N"EWS NBC- TV
6 30:;,P.Mk MARCW;z,~,;?A<
US ' Soviet Dialoque Unlikely
JOHN PALMER': French President
"Francois Mitterandcalled:on the
United States and the Soviet
Union today to resume their
dialogue and end what he called a
!period of mutual silence. But as`
Marvin Kalb reports, that silence,
especially on the part of the
Soviet Union, is likely to
continue.
MARVIN KALB: According to U.S.
experts, the new Soviet leadership
has decided not to respond posi-
tively to.. President Reagan's
re
t
cen
overtures for an improve-
CBS SUNDAY EVENING NEWS ment in relations.
CBS TV 6:00 PM MARCH 25 Just'back from Moscow, two
retired generals, Brent Scowcroft
Arens Denies Weinberger Remark and David J
MORTON DEAN: Israeli Defense
Minister Moshe Arens emphatically
denies some remarks attributed to
him in today's New York Times
Magazine.
The cover article says Mr.
Arens called Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger, quote, "a?
prime candidate for psychoanaly-
sis." Mr. Arens also disputes
another point in the article,
that he once offered to return
disputed border territory to
Egypt in exchange for a meeting
with the Egyptian defense minis-
ter.
The editor of the New York
Times Magazine says he stands
behind the story.
ones, with bleak assess-
;ments about resuming nuclear arms
negotiations anytime soon.
Scowcroft had a message from
the President for the new Kremlin
leader, Konstantin Chernenko.
':But the Russians never gave him a
chance to deliver it. Jones
`wanted to talk with the Soviet
'Chief of Staff, General Ni=koli
,,Atgargov. But no meeting was ar-
ranged.
The current view is that
Chernenko, after earlier indica-
tions that he'd like to improve
relations, has either changed his
mind or been reined in by the
Communist Party and military
bureaucracies; his view now
described as not wishing to help
the President get reelected, but
prepared with half-steps to keep
,the lines of communication open.
French President Francois
Mitterand, appearing on NBC's
"Meet the Press," urged the
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U.S. SAYS MOSCOW
REFUSED A GETTER
FROM PRESIDENT
PRIVATE ENVOY REBUFFED
Scbwcroft, Carrying Reagan's
Note, Wasn't Given Chance
to See Soviet Leaders
By LESLIE H. GELB
Spetlal toThe New YorkTimes
WASHINGTON, March 23 - A pri-
vate American envoy carrying a per-
sonal message from President Reagan!
to Konstantin U. Chernenko in Moscow
was not given the opportunity to meet
with the Soviet leader or any other top
Soviet official, according to Adminis-
tration officials.
The officials said the envoy, Lieut.
Gen. Brent Scowcroft, retired, the
chairman of the President's Commis-
sion on Strategic Forces, made known
to Soviet officials when he was in Mos-
cow xwo weeks ago that he had a per-
sonal Presidential letter and some
additional authorized comments, but.
never heard anything back and wasi
never given an explanation.
U.S. Elections Seen as Factor
In Moscow, Western diplomats who
have talked with Soviet officials say
they believe the Soviet Union is likely
to remain cool for some time to Ameri-
can overtures because of uncertainty
over the American elections and other
factors. But President Francois Mitter-
rand, ending two days of talks in Wash-
ington, said he believed Moscow may,
be reassessing its position on arms con-
trol talks, and he warned against
"creating new causes of dissension" in
East-West relations. [Page 3.]
American administrations have on !
several occasions used private go-be i
tweens known to be respected in Mos-
cow to deliver high-level messages to
Soviet leaders at times of difficulty in
formal Soviet-American relations. Ad-
ministration officials said they could
not recollect any previous instance of
Soviet officials' refusing to receive an
envoy and a message 4t appropriate
levels.
Administration officials read this as;
another sign that top Soviet leaders are
either unwilling or unable to agree on
restarting nuclear arms talks or any
Continued on Page 3, Column 1
Moscow Refuses a Message.
From President)
visible negotiating contacts unrest
Washington first makes concrete ges-'
tares or concessions.
On. Thursday, Arthur A. Hartman,
the United States Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, said in Washington that
the two countries were involved in talks
that "could lead to some kind of
progress on the more serious issues."
He added that he hoped for a resump-
tion of talks on a cultural and scientific
exchange accord that expired in 1980.
The message taken to Moscow by
W. Scowcroft, according to the
sources, was that Mr. Reagan was pre-
pared for serious and wide-ranging
talks and accommodations with the
Soviet Union, including suggestions on
the stalled nuclear arms talks, if Soviet)
negotiators would return to the bar-
gaining table.
Responses `Pretty Frosty'
This was said to be identical to other;
Presidential messages in recent
weeks, starting with Vice President;
Bush's meeting with Mr. Chernenko aI
month ago at the time of Yuri V. Andro-1
pov's funeral. At least two other letters.
were said to have been exchanged by'
the leaders since then.
A high State Department official
said, "Essentially, we've been telling
them that we're serious and ready to
engage, and their responses have all
been pretty frosty."
. Soviet officials were said to have told
Mr. Scowcroft and American diplo-
mats that they viewed these entice-
ments as a trick to lure Moscow back
into negotiations in order to convince
the American public and world leaders
that a serious dialogue is under way,
and thus help Mr. Reagan's re-election
prospects without advancing the ne-
gotiations. They have called for Ameri-
can deeds, not just words, and in
particular some commitment to elimi-
nate the medium-range American mis-
siles recently deloyed in Europe.
Mr. Scowcroft went to Moscow for
four days as a member of a private
group of American foreign policy ex-
perts to engage in informal talks with
Soviet officials. Known as the Dart-
mouth Group, it has, with varying
membership, met with Soviet arms
control experts yearly for almost two
decades. Mr. Scowcroft was out of the
country and unavailable for comment,
but other participants characterized.
the exchanges as the most negative
ever.
The sources also said Gen. David C.
Jones, the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and another mem-
ber of the group, asked to meet with top
Soviet generals and was refused. ..
Administration officials said Hans-
Jochen Vogel and Egon Bahr, two lead-
ers of the West German Social Demo.
cratic Party and established advocates
of improving East-West relations, were
in Moscow at the same time as the
Dartmouth Group and were received
by Mr. Chernenko. But, the officials
said what Mr. Chernenko said to them
was no more promising than what was
told to the Dartmouth Group.
3 Theories on Soviet Position
There are three competing theories
in the Administration to explain the
hard-line Soviet position.
One is that Soviet leaders are in
agreement about rejecting any activity
that might help Mr. Reagan's re-elec-
tion prospects and believe his Adminis-
tration's bargaining position would not
be much different in a second term
than it is now. Accordingly, there is not
much incentive to restart talks now.
The second is that a leadership strug-
gle is under way in Moscow, with some
wanting to resume the dialogue and
others opposed, and as a result they,
cannot agree on doing anything new.
The third is that Moscow means what
it says, that if Washington made con-
cessions first, it would go back to the
Geneva arms control talks, which have
been suspended since December.
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Us LLLUTIUN HEN
AFFECTING MOSCOW
Surge by Hart Among Several
Factors Cited in Continued
Cool Washington Ties
By JOHN F. BURNS
'z special toTMr4ewYo,tTimes
MOSCOW, March 23 - Despite ef-
forkS by the Reagan Administration to
break the impasse in Soviet-American
relations, Western diplomats and visi-
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