SOVIET INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION IN 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200310013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 23, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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JC1,~7CC 1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 March 1984
Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984
Summary
The Soviets appear to have adopted a
two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking
an inflexible line on INF and START, while
simultaneously expressing willingness to move
ahead on other security issues, and signaling
that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is
possible if Washington shows flexibility in
these other areas. They presumably calculate
that this strategy enables them to stand firm
on the central issues of INF and START,
without making themselves appear so
intransigent as to rally support for NATO's
policies or to demonstrate that they, not the
Administration, are responsible for poor US-
Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue
to probe for US flexibility on a range of
issues, with the aim of extracting the
maximum price for any marked improvement in
relations or arms control issues before the
US elections. The Politburo will be wary of
any major steps unless convinced that
significant gains are at hand for the USSR,
especially on their fundamental concerns in
START and INF.
This memorandum was prepared byl
Office of
Soviet Analysis, wi contributions r o e analysts.
Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief, Current
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The Soviet Calculus
1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current
Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need
to keep the deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously
damaging the Soviet political position in Europe--including the
effort to fan anti-INF sentiment--and calculations regarding the
US election campaign.
2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US
that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations.
Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do
anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the
present Administration by enabling it to claim a major success in
the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they
apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the
Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations
on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral
improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to
have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this
time if convinced it would serve their interests.
3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the
prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF, and
probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms
control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made
West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in
the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and
belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that
domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and
increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-
Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance
to a position more acceptable to Moscow.
4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these
pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with
whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings
about the consequences of the first deployments. In private
as public commentary,
they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF,
claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the
East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles
subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as
their "gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to court
West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider
multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French
into direct discussion of INF and their own forces' role. It
appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will
try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF
issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE.
5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in
the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-
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basing countries--particularly the. Social Democrats in West
Germany--to speak out forcefully against INF deployments.
Further, Moscow has maintained and perhaps even raised the level
of its direct and covert support to the West European peace
movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed
missiles--along with announced basing sites--will provide a focus
for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided
movement. Moscow's efforts in this area probably will be
tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the charge of
manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face
the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their
opposition activities against Warsaw Pact countermeasures.
Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult
for them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public
opinion.
Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks
6. Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the
repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn
had suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater
flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several
recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm
line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of
public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return
to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from
Europe. In talks on 10-12 March with senior US arms control
specialists in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth
Conference, as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March with
visiting leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party, the
Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations, some
implying and others asserting outright that neither negotiation
could resume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles were
withdrawn from Western Europe.
8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume
this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment
schedule and taking the UK and French systems into account
somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent
statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a
representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be
resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions.
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9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat
stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations in
discussions with correspondents than the general line would
indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray
the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely
interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the
Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also
probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through
which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be
conveyed.
10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they
eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO
INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and
START negotiations. However, while the Soviets hope to use
negotiations to limit US strategic programs, their R & D programs
provide them with the capability to compete with or without arms
control agreements. Strategic offensive systems currently in
development and flight-testing provide the Soviets with the basis
for improving their strategic capabilities under SALT II Treaty
limits or those of their START proposals, as well as in the
absence of any arms control constraints. There is room under
SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed SLBM
systems (the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23), the ALCM-equipped Bear H and
Blackjack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS-X-24 ICBM. Further,
the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS-X-25 is a
"modernized" SS-13 is intended to permit deployment of this
system as well. While the Soviets at START have thus far
insisted that long-range SLCMS and GLCMS be banned, they are
testing such systems and are well-positioned to deploy them in
the absence of a ban on them.
11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that
would eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban
testing and deployment of all space-based weapons. In addition,
they have announced a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons in
space, as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their
immediate aim probably is to preclude the development and
deployment of the US direct-ascent ASAT interceptor, while their
longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating its
technological capabilities into systems such as space-based
lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic
missile defense.
Prospects for Progress on Other Issues
12. Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March
that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary--
particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the
demilitarization of space--could prepare the way for a "dramatic
breakthrough" in US-Soviet relations despite the impasse in START
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and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the
most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears
intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms
control and reduced international tensions despite the USSR's
continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the
Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where
progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental
US or Soviet positions.
13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding
Soviet goals and public positions:
-- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground
nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes;
-- resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban
treaty, suspended by the US;
-- an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
-- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
-- an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said
conditions for an accord are "beginning to ripen."
He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle
of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons
destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on
chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an
agreement under which there would be effective control of the
"whole process of destruction--from beginning to end." Reliable
sources have told the US delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva that the Soviets are preparing to table a
draft treaty to ban chemical weapons.
14. Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent
Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have indicated that
the USSR attaches high priority to initiating "unofficial" talks
with the US on limiting the deployment of weapons in outer
15. Chernenko's claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these
issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral
relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement
as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet
leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to
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the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a
firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet
concerns in START and?INF before agreeing to any dramatic
bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for
signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in
accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:
a freeze on further INF deployments, particularly
Pershing IIs;
an agreement to take into account UK and French systems;
or
an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic
systems the Soviets consider most threatening--SLCMs,
ALCMs, MX, or the D-5 SLBM.
The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold
progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now,
it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic
negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns
would be addressed, but this line is doubtless intended in part
to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a
definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response
16. Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made
toward agreement on "norms" to govern relations between nuclear
powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in
the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area
would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade
crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence
of the KAL shootdown. Chernenko, however, raised this
possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could
lead to a breakthrough" in relations, perhaps to signal that
agreement on this point would not be of comparable
to specific US initiatives.
significance.
17. Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR
talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an
early breakthrough. A deputy director of the Institute for the
USA and Canada said in late February that the Soviets would not
have agreed to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark
that suggests Moscow believes the principal advantage of the
talks lies in the possibilities they offer for wedge-driving
between the US and its allies. This view probably has been
strengthened by Western press reports of differences between the
US and West Germany over the Allied position. Even if the
Western allies were to agree on softening their position
regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would be unlikely
to accept Western proposals on verification to the extent
necesary for an early breakthrough in the talks.
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18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on
Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the
importance of an agreement on the non-use of force as a step
toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko,
however, did not refer to this proposal, and although the Soviets
appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory
measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on
this point alone would evoke any response from them on more
substantive issues.
19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other
issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to
a significant lowering of international tensions. These include
a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a
nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an
agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of
nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean,
and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these
proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require
major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals
therefore appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts
to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may
have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is
possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among
them could be part of a package to improve bilateral relations.
Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics
20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control
policy rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions
in this area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about
half a dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the
Defense Council's executive secretariat, the General
Staff--through its Main Operations Directorate--coordinates the
flow of information to the Defense Council decisionmakers. This
arrangement assures the military a highly influential role in the
arms control policy-making process. Information and policy
proposals are channeled through the General Staff from the
Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Military Industrial
Commission, and specific Central Committee staffs, notably the
International Department and International Information
Department. Individuals from the Academy of Sciences and
probably the personal secretariats of Politburo members can also
inform Soviet leaders on arms control issues, but do not have
access to the details of military plans and programs.
21. Of those highly visible Soviet spokesmen on arms
control issues, three have inter-agency access to official arms
control policy information. They are Chief of the General Staff
Nikolay Ogarkov, his first deputy, Sergey Akhromeyev, and Nikolay
Chervov, chief of the Main Operation Directorate's Treaty
Negotiating Directorate. Vadim Zagladin of the International
Department and Leonid Zamyatin of the International Information
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Department are believed to have some limited inter-agency access,
as do high-level officials of the Foreign Ministry. Public
figures of prominence-such as Aleksandr Bovin, an Izvestiya
commentator, and Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the Institute of
the USA and Canada, probably have little information on the
specifics of the formulation of arms control beyond that gleaned
through personal connections with other members of the political
22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual
views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly
sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations
with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo
elite and from instructions on the party line.
decision that was made before Andropov's death.
23. We do not know the full range of differences within the
Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to which.Chernenko
and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for
significant changes in US positions, especially before the US
elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however,
that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would
be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening
American defense posture.
24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the
Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any
measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they
are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on
significant arms control issues.
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