NSPG MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA, 25 JUNE 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200430005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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25 June 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT : NSPG Meeting on Central America, 25 June 1984
1. You are scheduled to attend an NSPG meeting on Central America
today at 2:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Dewey Clarridge
will be accompanying you. The agenda, which is at your left, indicates
that you are slated to provide a five-minute review of the "Contra
situation". Talking points on the state of the Contras, which were
prepared by Dewey, are at TAB A.
2. Back-up talking points prepared by Bob Vickers that cover: Cuban
efforts to promote an offensive in El Salvador this August; the
continuing arms flow from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas and the
possible delivery by the Cubans of MIG aircraft to the Sandinistas before
November, are at TAB B.
3. Finaly, at TAB C is the tasking memo from Bud McFarlane to
Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger concerning the need to determine what
additional allocations may be necessary under Section 21-D of the Arms
Export Control Act.
4. If there is anything else you need to help prepare you for this
meeting, please call.
--A QPZ
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These are the materials DCI had together
for the NSPG on Central America on 25 June.
Over to you for retention, disposal or
whatever.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Sandinista Posture on Negotiations
1. Attached are various Intelligence Community and CIA assessments
of the Sandinista attitude toward negotiations as well as recent
intelligence reports relevant to the Shultz trip to Managua.
2. In general, the Intelligence Community believes the Sandinistas
regard negotiations primarily as a tactic to ease external pressures and
buy time for their own revolutionary consolidation. They are not likely
to make concessions on democratization which would endanger their
internal control, and even if they temporarily agreed to stop aiding the
Salvadoran insurgents, they would resume support when conditions were
favorable. (See Tab A)
3. There is also considerable evidence that the Cubans are skeptical
of US intentions and are advising the Sandinistas accordingly.
Meanwhile, they are preparing for the worst and assisting Managua in
doing likewise. The Sandinista's themselves are portraying the Shultz
visit as a propaganda effort to save the contras, and they are telling us
that unilateral concessions are out of the question. (See Tab B)
4. One of the major dangers of the talks is that the Sandinistas
will attempt to establish private contacts which they may then reveal to
other countries in the region with the claim the US is attempting to sell
them out. This is a tactic the Cubans used against Haig in 1982.
Managua has always sought bilateral talks and agreements as a means of
dividing the opposition. They are attempting to establish private
contacts with the Honduran military, and have already held talks with
sympathetic Costa Rican officials in an attempt to get them to alter
government policy toward the Sandinistas. (See Tab C)
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TOP SFCRFTI L
NIE 83.3-83:
NICARAGUA:
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE INSURGENCY
30 June 1983
Excerpts from: Key Judgments
The present level and focus of insurgent activity are not likely to
influence the Sandinistas to make significant domestic or foreign policy
changes. Because of the depth of the Sandinista leaders' ideological
commitment, their experiences in adversity during many years as
anti-Somoza guerrillas, and the strong backing they receive from
Communist countries, we believe the chances are quite small that they
would back down. Thus, there would probably be little practical
difference in the level and quality of insurgency activity that would be
sufficient to severely destabilize the regime, to force significant
domestic policy changes, or to force it to reduce its commitment to
promote revolutionary change elsewhere in Central America. Accordingly,
requirements for external support would be similar in all three cases.
This does not preclude the possibility that the Sandinistas might suggest
a deceptive agreement to stop supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas in
exchange for a US commitment to withdraw support from the Nicaraguan
insurgents.
Excerpts from: Discussion
Pressuring the Regime: Sandinista leaders are committed
revolutionaries who endured hardship in their long struggle for power and
are prepared to continue doing so in order to retain it. They have
refused to compromise their revolutionary principles and have made
concessions to opponents only in those instances when repression
generated a popular backlash and undercut the regime's legitimacy. Even
then, however, the concessions were temporary, usually nothing more than
a tactic to buy time. As long as the regime can count on Soviet and
Cuban backing, a major alteration in policy is not likely, although
Sandinista leaders may periodically feign an interest in dialogue or
negotiations for their tactical and propaganda value.
If the insurgents were intent on pressuring the regime to change
domestic or foreign policies, they would have to threaten Sandinista
control seriously and generate greater popular opposition. It is
important to note, however, that this would entail virtually the same
strategy as the one discussed above to destablize the regime severely.
In the unlikely event the Sandinistas could be cowed into making
meaningful concessions, the insurgents would need a coordinated
negotiating strategy and agreement on their future course of action after
neotiatios.
TOP SECRET
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RR RUEAIIS
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
STUO59 1
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHUB #3146/01 1661610
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 1141 54OZ JUN 84
FM USINT HAVANA
TO SECSTATE WASHUC 4627
BT
EZ1:
S E C R ET HAVANA 3146
EXDIS
EZ2:
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY FROM JOHN A. FERCH
E . O . 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEEL, CU, US
SUBJ: THE CUBAN VIEW OF CUBAN/US RELATIONS -- NO EVIDENCE OF
ACCOMMODATION TO "NEW REALITIES''
1. (SE- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY : THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONCLUDED BOTH
TEAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE REELECTED AND THAT THERE IS
NO POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGING THE ADMINISTRATION PRODUCTIVELY.
THIS DOUBLE CONCLUSION LEAVES THEM HANGING IN A POLICY SENSE.
WHILE THEY PROBABLY DECIDED TO INVITE REV. JACKSON TO CUBA
IN ORDER TO CREATE A PRESS OPPORTUNITY FROM WHICH THEY MIGHT
INFLUENCE US PUBLIC OPINION AND THUS INDIRECTLY CONSTRAIN
THE ADMINISTRATION, THAT VISIT COULD BACKFIRE FROM THEIR
PERSPECTIVE. PERHAPS WE CAN HELP BRING ABOUT THAT POSSIBILITY.
THE CUBANS RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE FACING A NEW SITUATION
IN EL SALVADOR IN THE WAKE OF DUARTE'S ELECTION BUT HAVE NOT
YET BEEN ABLE TO ADMIT THE LOGICAL RESULTS OF THAT CONCLUSION.
END SUMMARY.
3. '.CITE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS USUALLY ADEPT AT ADJUSTING
ITS FOREIGN POLICIES TO ACCOMMODATE "NEW RAALITIES". THEY ARE
SECRET
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MASTERS OF DEFENDING THEIR POSITIONS WITH THE. TWO STEPS FORWARD,
ONE STEP BACK MANUEVER. THE TWISTS AND TURNSDURING RECENT
MONFHS=.ON THE: ISSUE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SETTLEMENT PROCESS
IS A CASE IN POINT. TWO OTHER "NEW REALITIES"
RECOGNIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ARE THE PROBABLE
REELECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE NEW SITUATION
IN CENTRAL AMERICA REPRESENTED BY THE ELECTION OF
PRESIDENT DUARTE IN EL SALVADOR. I HAVE BEEN
LOOKING CLOSELY FOR EVIDENCE OF CUBAN' `TACTICAL
ADJUSTMENTS THESE LATTER DEVELOPMENTS BUT HAVE
FOUND NOTHING. THE PENDING VISIT OF REV. JACKS ,
HOWEVER, MIGHT SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT SUCH TACTICAL
ADJUSTMENTS MAY BE AT HAND. TO PROBE THIS
HYPOTHESIS, I MET TODAY (JUNE 13) WITH CARLOS
MARTINEZ SALSAMEND'I, SPECIAL. ASSISTANT TO CUBAN
VI 'E l S RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. HIS REMARKS
INDICATE THAT WHILE THE CUBANS CONTINUE TO TRY TO
C ...>R .N H, ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THIRD PARTTIES,
THEY HAVE NOT BEGUN TO CONSIDER MORE SUBSTANTIVE
CHANGE'S IN THEIR POLICIES.
CHANGES IN THEIR POLICIES.
4. SALSAMENDI READILY VOLUNTEERED THAT THE CUBAN
GOVIE'RNMENT ASSESSES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CHANCES OF
REELECTION AT BETTER THAN SIXTY PER CENT. THAT
ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, HAS NOT LET THEM TO CONSIDER
HOW THEY MIGHT MANAGE THE BILATERAL RELATION MORE
PRODUCTIVELY DURING A SECOND ADMINISTRATION. THE
APPARENT REASON THAT THEY REJECT SUCH A POSSIBILITY
IS THAT THEY HAVE CONCLUDED WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO
ACCOMMODATE ANY OF THEIR INTERESTS. SALSAMENDI
CONTRASTED THE LIKELY COURSE OF USG/SOVIET RELATIONS
DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WITH USG/CUBAN RELATIONS.
HE SAID THAT THEY ANTICIPATE THAT FOLLOWING HIS
REELECTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL SEEK TO REDUCE
TENSIONS THAT EXIST IN THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.
THE PRESIDENT WILL DO THIS, ACCORDING TO SALSAMENDI,
BOTH BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM US ALL,IIS AND FROM
THE US PUBLIC, AND BECAUSE HE WILL SEE AN
IMPROVEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AS THE CAPSTONE
OF HIS EIGHT YEARS IN OFF'ICE'. AGAIN ACCORDING TO
SALSAMENDI, NO SUCH PRESSURES OR DESIRES TO LEAD THE
PRESIDENT TOWARDS IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CUBA.
TO THE CONTRARY, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS "TEAM"
HAVE, IF ANYTHING, REVERTED RECENT'LY' TO THEIR
INITIAL VERY HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA.
ILLUSTRATING THIS ALI.,EGED TREND, HE POINTED TO THE
PRESIDENT'S MAY 9 SPEECH WITH ITS MANY ATTACKS
AGAINST CUBA. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IN
THIS RESPECT HAS BEEN FIXED BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS
AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HAVING
REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT CUBA IS THE SOURCE OF CURRENT
TURBULENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THAT IT SEEKS TO
SECRE"I'
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COHMUNI'LE THE REGION AND BRING I'.I' WITHIN THE SOVIET
ORBIT AND THEREBY TEIRE'ATEN THE SECURITY OF TIDE U.S.
THE AE)hIINISTRATION C:;ANNOJ AL`.i'ER ITS COURSE, NOR DOE S.
IT WANT TO. SECRETARY SHULTZ' REAFFIRMATION_
FOLLQ4I.NG HIS TRIP TO NICARAGUA OF THE FOUR NECESSARY
INGREDIENTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS I3HTWEEN THE U.S.
AND NICARAGUA IS FURTHER I~.VI F USG INFLF;XIRIL ITY
`SALSAMC.NDI I'IERE FOCUSED ON,.THE SI:?CRETARY'S INSISTENCE
THAT THE SANDINISTAS ELIMINATE WITH CUBA
AND THE SOVIETS. FOR THE CUBANS, SUCH INSISTENCE
CLEARLY INDICATES THAT PRESIDENT R.E,AGAN WILL NOT
COUNTENANCE ANY EFFORT TO IMPROVEBILATERAL RELATIONS.
THIS BEING THE CASE, CUBA MUST PREPARE FOR A
WORST-CASE SCENARIO, W'IHIICHI WOULD INVOLVE USG MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THE PREPARATIONS
AND THUS CUBAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS AGAINST THE Us
IN 'I:`HE SECOND ADMINISTRATION ARE CENTERED ON
IMPROVING CUBA'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THEREBY
MAKING THE COST OF ANY US AGGRESSION UNACCEPTABLE.
5. TURNING TO THE VISIT OF REV. JACKSON, SALSAME.NDI
WAS LESS EXPLICIT. HE SAID THAT THE CIJI-AN GOVERNMENT
OBVIOUSLY HAS WELCOMED R.F.V. JACKSON'S ANALYSIS OF
THE CIN'Tli;=si.., AMERICAN CRISIS. THEY UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER,
TH VL REV. JACKSON IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE
DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CUBAN AND CENTRAL
A111"RICAN POLICIES. NEVEERCTHELESS, THEY WELCOME CONTACT
WITH AMERICANS SUCH AS REV. JACKSON WHO SHARE VIEWS
SIMILAR TO THE;:1:F3 OWN. SALSAME NDI AT THIS POINT LAMENTED
THE FACT THAT CUBAN/US CONTACTS DURING THE PAST
THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS, BE THEY WI'T'H ADMINISTRATION
OFFICIALS OR OTHER AMERICANS, HAVE FALLEN FAR BELOW
THE LEVEL, THAT HELD DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.
HAVING GIVEN THIS RATHER INANE EXPLANATION OF THE
CUBAN INVITATION, SALSAMENDI CAME CLOSER TO WHAT IS
PROBABLY T.-HEIR TRUE' PURPOSE BY SAYING THAT THE, VISIT
WILL, BE WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN TI-EE US AND THROUGH
SUCH PUBLICITY MAY INDIRECTLY AFFECT USG POLICIES.
6. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
SALSAMEN D I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT
DUARTE CONSTITUTES A NEW "REALITY" THAT MUST BE
ACKNOWLEDGED. HE THEN IMMEDIATELY DISCOUNTED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THAT REALITY BY ASSERTING THAT DUARTE
DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY INDEPENDENT FORCE IN EL SALVADOR.
HE IS A CREATURES, OF US POLICY AND AS SUCH IS AN
OPPORTUNIST WITHOUT PRINCIPLES, MORE TO THE POINT,
DUARTE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SALVADORAN
MILITARY AND THEIR ALLIES IN THE ECONOMIC ELITE
OF THAT COUNTRY. AS PROOF OF HIS TI?IE? S.IS,
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY IMO'TLEY. FROM JOHN A. FERCH
SALSAMENDI POINTED TO DUAR'TE'S "F'LIT'-FLOP" REGARDING
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GURERII-J AS. WHEREAS DURING HIS
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN DUARTE INDIGATI.D THAT HE WOULD
S E C R H T
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NEC' 0"I,1 WITH THE GUERRILLAS, HE NOW RULES OUT THAT
POSSIBILITY. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THAT DUAIZTE'S
f.=IRS'.1:''' ASK IS TO ESTABLISH HIS ADMINISTRATION AND
THUS HI CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS
AT THIS POINT IN TIME, SALSAMENDI ARGUEI) THAT DUARTE
DID NOT HAVE TO CLOSE HIS OPTIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS.
WHEN THE GUERRILLAS OFFERED TO ENTER INTO TALKS, DUARTE
COULD HAVE KEPT HIS SILENCE. HE DID NOT HAVE TO RULE OUT
TALKS "WHILE GUNS ARE ON THE TABLE." ,BY RULING OUT
TALKS, DUARTIEE REVEALED BOTH HIS SUBSERVIENCE TO THE
MILITARY AND THE FALSITY OF US CLAIMS THAT IT DOES
NOT SEEK A MILITARY SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR. BECAUSE
DUARTE IS IN EFFECT A FICTION AND BECAUSE THE
GUERRILLAS CONSTITUTE A MILITARY/POLITICAL REALITY,
THEY CANNOT BE IGNORED OR PUSHED ASIDE. THE
ELECTION OF DUARTE THUS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE
A "3F.GNIFICANT" NEW DEVELOPMENT.
'T. CO;-IMi NT: I READ FROM SALSAM} NDI'S REMARKS THAT
THE CUBAN GOVEI N31ENT HAS NOT YET COME TO GRIPS WITH
THE PROBLEM POSED BY A SECOND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
THAT IS UC;`I ERMINED `I'0 SUSTA:IN ITS CURRENT POLICIES
IN CENTRAL AMERICA . FOR THE IM1OMENT, THEREFORE,
THE CU, , t RL. STANDING PA'T'. THE INVITATION TG
REV JACKSON DOES NO'S CONS`TI~'trr~. _ TACTICAL
DEPAR'PURF FROM THE STANCE THEY HAVE 141.l ERR THE
PAST" TEN MONTHS. RATHER, THEY ARE SIMPLY SEIZING
AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO BUILD PRESSURE WITHIN THE
US AGAINIST THE ADMINISTRATION'S CENTRAL AMERICAN
POI.,ICIE.~,< IN THIS SENSE THE INVITATION DOES NOT
DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM CASTRO'S EFFORTS EARLIER
THIS YEAR TO CONVINCE OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIN
THA'I' 'T'TII:Y SHOULD UNITE TO PREVENT THE USG FROM
INTERVENING MILITARILY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I, THEREFORE
EXPECT CASTRO DURING THE VISIT TO ATTEMPT TO-CONTRAST
THE ADM- i STRATION' S ALLEGEI) INTRANSIGENCE IN THE REGION
WITH CUBA'S FLEXIBILITY. LL BEMOAN THE,
ADM. . ,A`;'ION'S INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE ROOTS
OF THE CE?NTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS AND EXPOUND UPON
HIS OWN VISION OF AN INDIGENOUS UPRISING AGAINST
SOCIAL/POLITICAL REPRESSION. WE WILL HEAR MUCH ABOUT
THE NEED TO COMBAT POVERTY AND TO PERMIT THE
CENTRAL, AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE THE PROFOUND
SOCIAL/POLITICAL REFORMS THEY. DESIRE. USG SECURITY
CONCERNS WILL BE DISMISSED AS A FIGMENT OF ITS
PARANOIA.
8. IN USING THE VISIT TO REINFORCE; AMONG
OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THIS VERSION OF
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, CASTRO WILL, FACE TWO
PROBLEMS. FIRST, IF HE LETS HIS PERSONAL ANTIPATHY
TOWARDS PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOW, HIS REMARKS IN THIS
CONTEXT COULD WELL BACKFIRE, EVEN AMONG CONVINCED
OPPONENTS OF OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY. SECOND,
SCIFT
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HE WILL HAVE TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT '!'HE CONTADORA
PROCESS BUT AT THE SAME TIME AVOID BEING PINNY
DOWN ON THE SPECIFICS OF THAT PROCESS. HE WILL
OBVIOUSLY 'PRY TO SIDESTEP THE ISSUES OF VERIFICATION
AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN NICARAGUA. IF HE
SLIPS AND ASSERTS, AS THE SANDINISTAS ON OCCASION
HAVE, THAT THOSE ISSUES CONSTITUTE AN UNJUSTIFIED
INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NICARAGUA
AND THUS INFRINGE UPON ITS SOVEREIGN'PY, HE ALSO
RISKS A PUBLIC RELATIONS BACKFIRE. CASTRO IS AN
ASTUTE ENOUGH POLITICIAN AND THUS PROBABLY WILL NOT
SLIP. HOW, THEREFORE, CAN WE, PUSH HIM CLOSER TO
THAT POSSIBILITY? OBVOUSLY, DURING THE PRESS
CONF'E:RENCES(S) THAT HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE DURING THE,.
VISIT, SOME JOURNALIST MIGHT BE WILLING TO PIN HIM
DOWN AND FORCE AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF THE CUBAM
POSITION ON VERIFICATION AND PLURALISM IN NICARAGUA.
SIMILARLY, PROPER QUESTIONING COULD REVEAL THE
HOLLOWNESS OF THE CUBAN STAND ON CONTADORA.
9. FOR THE RECORD, MY APPROACH IN TIIIS CONVERSATION
WAS_TO. THROW OUT SUBJECT MATTER AND LET SALSAMENDI
TALK. BECAUSE I WAS SEEKING HIS VIEWS, I SOUGHT
TO AVOID A DEBATE. THUS, I SIMPLY SAID AT THOSE POINTS
WHERE OUR ANALYSES DIFFERED OR HIS INTERPRETATIONS
OF OUR POLICY ERRED FROM THE FACTS, THAT I DISAGREED.
AT NO POINT DID HE QUERY ME.
FEDCH
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