NSPG MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA, 25 JUNE 1984

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CIA-RDP86B00420R000200430005-8
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RIPPUB
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T
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20
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December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 30, 2010
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5
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Publication Date: 
June 25, 1984
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86B00420R000200430005-8.pdf1.33 MB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 25 June 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM: SA/DCI/IA SUBJECT : NSPG Meeting on Central America, 25 June 1984 1. You are scheduled to attend an NSPG meeting on Central America today at 2:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Dewey Clarridge will be accompanying you. The agenda, which is at your left, indicates that you are slated to provide a five-minute review of the "Contra situation". Talking points on the state of the Contras, which were prepared by Dewey, are at TAB A. 2. Back-up talking points prepared by Bob Vickers that cover: Cuban efforts to promote an offensive in El Salvador this August; the continuing arms flow from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas and the possible delivery by the Cubans of MIG aircraft to the Sandinistas before November, are at TAB B. 3. Finaly, at TAB C is the tasking memo from Bud McFarlane to Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger concerning the need to determine what additional allocations may be necessary under Section 21-D of the Arms Export Control Act. 4. If there is anything else you need to help prepare you for this meeting, please call. --A QPZ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86BOO42OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 These are the materials DCI had together for the NSPG on Central America on 25 June. Over to you for retention, disposal or whatever. 26 June 1984 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT: Sandinista Posture on Negotiations 1. Attached are various Intelligence Community and CIA assessments of the Sandinista attitude toward negotiations as well as recent intelligence reports relevant to the Shultz trip to Managua. 2. In general, the Intelligence Community believes the Sandinistas regard negotiations primarily as a tactic to ease external pressures and buy time for their own revolutionary consolidation. They are not likely to make concessions on democratization which would endanger their internal control, and even if they temporarily agreed to stop aiding the Salvadoran insurgents, they would resume support when conditions were favorable. (See Tab A) 3. There is also considerable evidence that the Cubans are skeptical of US intentions and are advising the Sandinistas accordingly. Meanwhile, they are preparing for the worst and assisting Managua in doing likewise. The Sandinista's themselves are portraying the Shultz visit as a propaganda effort to save the contras, and they are telling us that unilateral concessions are out of the question. (See Tab B) 4. One of the major dangers of the talks is that the Sandinistas will attempt to establish private contacts which they may then reveal to other countries in the region with the claim the US is attempting to sell them out. This is a tactic the Cubans used against Haig in 1982. Managua has always sought bilateral talks and agreements as a means of dividing the opposition. They are attempting to establish private contacts with the Honduran military, and have already held talks with sympathetic Costa Rican officials in an attempt to get them to alter government policy toward the Sandinistas. (See Tab C) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 TOP SFCRFTI L NIE 83.3-83: NICARAGUA: THE OUTLOOK FOR THE INSURGENCY 30 June 1983 Excerpts from: Key Judgments The present level and focus of insurgent activity are not likely to influence the Sandinistas to make significant domestic or foreign policy changes. Because of the depth of the Sandinista leaders' ideological commitment, their experiences in adversity during many years as anti-Somoza guerrillas, and the strong backing they receive from Communist countries, we believe the chances are quite small that they would back down. Thus, there would probably be little practical difference in the level and quality of insurgency activity that would be sufficient to severely destabilize the regime, to force significant domestic policy changes, or to force it to reduce its commitment to promote revolutionary change elsewhere in Central America. Accordingly, requirements for external support would be similar in all three cases. This does not preclude the possibility that the Sandinistas might suggest a deceptive agreement to stop supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas in exchange for a US commitment to withdraw support from the Nicaraguan insurgents. Excerpts from: Discussion Pressuring the Regime: Sandinista leaders are committed revolutionaries who endured hardship in their long struggle for power and are prepared to continue doing so in order to retain it. They have refused to compromise their revolutionary principles and have made concessions to opponents only in those instances when repression generated a popular backlash and undercut the regime's legitimacy. Even then, however, the concessions were temporary, usually nothing more than a tactic to buy time. As long as the regime can count on Soviet and Cuban backing, a major alteration in policy is not likely, although Sandinista leaders may periodically feign an interest in dialogue or negotiations for their tactical and propaganda value. If the insurgents were intent on pressuring the regime to change domestic or foreign policies, they would have to threaten Sandinista control seriously and generate greater popular opposition. It is important to note, however, that this would entail virtually the same strategy as the one discussed above to destablize the regime severely. In the unlikely event the Sandinistas could be cowed into making meaningful concessions, the insurgents would need a coordinated negotiating strategy and agreement on their future course of action after neotiatios. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Iq Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 RR RUEAIIS ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH STUO59 1 RR RUEHC DE RUEHUB #3146/01 1661610 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 1141 54OZ JUN 84 FM USINT HAVANA TO SECSTATE WASHUC 4627 BT EZ1: S E C R ET HAVANA 3146 EXDIS EZ2: FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY FROM JOHN A. FERCH E . O . 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PEEL, CU, US SUBJ: THE CUBAN VIEW OF CUBAN/US RELATIONS -- NO EVIDENCE OF ACCOMMODATION TO "NEW REALITIES'' 1. (SE- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY : THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONCLUDED BOTH TEAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE REELECTED AND THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGING THE ADMINISTRATION PRODUCTIVELY. THIS DOUBLE CONCLUSION LEAVES THEM HANGING IN A POLICY SENSE. WHILE THEY PROBABLY DECIDED TO INVITE REV. JACKSON TO CUBA IN ORDER TO CREATE A PRESS OPPORTUNITY FROM WHICH THEY MIGHT INFLUENCE US PUBLIC OPINION AND THUS INDIRECTLY CONSTRAIN THE ADMINISTRATION, THAT VISIT COULD BACKFIRE FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE. PERHAPS WE CAN HELP BRING ABOUT THAT POSSIBILITY. THE CUBANS RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE FACING A NEW SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR IN THE WAKE OF DUARTE'S ELECTION BUT HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ADMIT THE LOGICAL RESULTS OF THAT CONCLUSION. END SUMMARY. 3. '.CITE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS USUALLY ADEPT AT ADJUSTING ITS FOREIGN POLICIES TO ACCOMMODATE "NEW RAALITIES". THEY ARE SECRET PAGE 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 MASTERS OF DEFENDING THEIR POSITIONS WITH THE. TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK MANUEVER. THE TWISTS AND TURNSDURING RECENT MONFHS=.ON THE: ISSUE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SETTLEMENT PROCESS IS A CASE IN POINT. TWO OTHER "NEW REALITIES" RECOGNIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ARE THE PROBABLE REELECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE NEW SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA REPRESENTED BY THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE IN EL SALVADOR. I HAVE BEEN LOOKING CLOSELY FOR EVIDENCE OF CUBAN' `TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS THESE LATTER DEVELOPMENTS BUT HAVE FOUND NOTHING. THE PENDING VISIT OF REV. JACKS , HOWEVER, MIGHT SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT SUCH TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS MAY BE AT HAND. TO PROBE THIS HYPOTHESIS, I MET TODAY (JUNE 13) WITH CARLOS MARTINEZ SALSAMEND'I, SPECIAL. ASSISTANT TO CUBAN VI 'E l S RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. HIS REMARKS INDICATE THAT WHILE THE CUBANS CONTINUE TO TRY TO C ...>R .N H, ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THIRD PARTTIES, THEY HAVE NOT BEGUN TO CONSIDER MORE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE'S IN THEIR POLICIES. CHANGES IN THEIR POLICIES. 4. SALSAMENDI READILY VOLUNTEERED THAT THE CUBAN GOVIE'RNMENT ASSESSES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CHANCES OF REELECTION AT BETTER THAN SIXTY PER CENT. THAT ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, HAS NOT LET THEM TO CONSIDER HOW THEY MIGHT MANAGE THE BILATERAL RELATION MORE PRODUCTIVELY DURING A SECOND ADMINISTRATION. THE APPARENT REASON THAT THEY REJECT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY HAVE CONCLUDED WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE ANY OF THEIR INTERESTS. SALSAMENDI CONTRASTED THE LIKELY COURSE OF USG/SOVIET RELATIONS DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WITH USG/CUBAN RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT THEY ANTICIPATE THAT FOLLOWING HIS REELECTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL SEEK TO REDUCE TENSIONS THAT EXIST IN THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT WILL DO THIS, ACCORDING TO SALSAMENDI, BOTH BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM US ALL,IIS AND FROM THE US PUBLIC, AND BECAUSE HE WILL SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AS THE CAPSTONE OF HIS EIGHT YEARS IN OFF'ICE'. AGAIN ACCORDING TO SALSAMENDI, NO SUCH PRESSURES OR DESIRES TO LEAD THE PRESIDENT TOWARDS IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CUBA. TO THE CONTRARY, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS "TEAM" HAVE, IF ANYTHING, REVERTED RECENT'LY' TO THEIR INITIAL VERY HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA. ILLUSTRATING THIS ALI.,EGED TREND, HE POINTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 9 SPEECH WITH ITS MANY ATTACKS AGAINST CUBA. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IN THIS RESPECT HAS BEEN FIXED BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HAVING REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT CUBA IS THE SOURCE OF CURRENT TURBULENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THAT IT SEEKS TO SECRE"I' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86BOO42OR000200430005-8 t x:x ' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 PAGE 000 COHMUNI'LE THE REGION AND BRING I'.I' WITHIN THE SOVIET ORBIT AND THEREBY TEIRE'ATEN THE SECURITY OF TIDE U.S. THE AE)hIINISTRATION C:;ANNOJ AL`.i'ER ITS COURSE, NOR DOE S. IT WANT TO. SECRETARY SHULTZ' REAFFIRMATION_ FOLLQ4I.NG HIS TRIP TO NICARAGUA OF THE FOUR NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS I3HTWEEN THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA IS FURTHER I~.VI F USG INFLF;XIRIL ITY `SALSAMC.NDI I'IERE FOCUSED ON,.THE SI:?CRETARY'S INSISTENCE THAT THE SANDINISTAS ELIMINATE WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIETS. FOR THE CUBANS, SUCH INSISTENCE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT PRESIDENT R.E,AGAN WILL NOT COUNTENANCE ANY EFFORT TO IMPROVEBILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS BEING THE CASE, CUBA MUST PREPARE FOR A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, W'IHIICHI WOULD INVOLVE USG MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THE PREPARATIONS AND THUS CUBAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS AGAINST THE Us IN 'I:`HE SECOND ADMINISTRATION ARE CENTERED ON IMPROVING CUBA'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THEREBY MAKING THE COST OF ANY US AGGRESSION UNACCEPTABLE. 5. TURNING TO THE VISIT OF REV. JACKSON, SALSAME.NDI WAS LESS EXPLICIT. HE SAID THAT THE CIJI-AN GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY HAS WELCOMED R.F.V. JACKSON'S ANALYSIS OF THE CIN'Tli;=si.., AMERICAN CRISIS. THEY UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, TH VL REV. JACKSON IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CUBAN AND CENTRAL A111"RICAN POLICIES. NEVEERCTHELESS, THEY WELCOME CONTACT WITH AMERICANS SUCH AS REV. JACKSON WHO SHARE VIEWS SIMILAR TO THE;:1:F3 OWN. SALSAME NDI AT THIS POINT LAMENTED THE FACT THAT CUBAN/US CONTACTS DURING THE PAST THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS, BE THEY WI'T'H ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS OR OTHER AMERICANS, HAVE FALLEN FAR BELOW THE LEVEL, THAT HELD DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. HAVING GIVEN THIS RATHER INANE EXPLANATION OF THE CUBAN INVITATION, SALSAMENDI CAME CLOSER TO WHAT IS PROBABLY T.-HEIR TRUE' PURPOSE BY SAYING THAT THE, VISIT WILL, BE WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN TI-EE US AND THROUGH SUCH PUBLICITY MAY INDIRECTLY AFFECT USG POLICIES. 6. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SALSAMEN D I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE CONSTITUTES A NEW "REALITY" THAT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED. HE THEN IMMEDIATELY DISCOUNTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT REALITY BY ASSERTING THAT DUARTE DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY INDEPENDENT FORCE IN EL SALVADOR. HE IS A CREATURES, OF US POLICY AND AS SUCH IS AN OPPORTUNIST WITHOUT PRINCIPLES, MORE TO THE POINT, DUARTE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SALVADORAN MILITARY AND THEIR ALLIES IN THE ECONOMIC ELITE OF THAT COUNTRY. AS PROOF OF HIS TI?IE? S.IS, FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY IMO'TLEY. FROM JOHN A. FERCH SALSAMENDI POINTED TO DUAR'TE'S "F'LIT'-FLOP" REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GURERII-J AS. WHEREAS DURING HIS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN DUARTE INDIGATI.D THAT HE WOULD S E C R H T :~vkc' `~el'N~t h ale a.~.r,,. r -: ? :. , :.. '?` Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 u; ,. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 PAGE 00014 NEC' 0"I,1 WITH THE GUERRILLAS, HE NOW RULES OUT THAT POSSIBILITY. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THAT DUAIZTE'S f.=IRS'.1:''' ASK IS TO ESTABLISH HIS ADMINISTRATION AND THUS HI CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT IN TIME, SALSAMENDI ARGUEI) THAT DUARTE DID NOT HAVE TO CLOSE HIS OPTIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN THE GUERRILLAS OFFERED TO ENTER INTO TALKS, DUARTE COULD HAVE KEPT HIS SILENCE. HE DID NOT HAVE TO RULE OUT TALKS "WHILE GUNS ARE ON THE TABLE." ,BY RULING OUT TALKS, DUARTIEE REVEALED BOTH HIS SUBSERVIENCE TO THE MILITARY AND THE FALSITY OF US CLAIMS THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK A MILITARY SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR. BECAUSE DUARTE IS IN EFFECT A FICTION AND BECAUSE THE GUERRILLAS CONSTITUTE A MILITARY/POLITICAL REALITY, THEY CANNOT BE IGNORED OR PUSHED ASIDE. THE ELECTION OF DUARTE THUS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE A "3F.GNIFICANT" NEW DEVELOPMENT. 'T. CO;-IMi NT: I READ FROM SALSAM} NDI'S REMARKS THAT THE CUBAN GOVEI N31ENT HAS NOT YET COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM POSED BY A SECOND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT IS UC;`I ERMINED `I'0 SUSTA:IN ITS CURRENT POLICIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA . FOR THE IM1OMENT, THEREFORE, THE CU, , t RL. STANDING PA'T'. THE INVITATION TG REV JACKSON DOES NO'S CONS`TI~'trr~. _ TACTICAL DEPAR'PURF FROM THE STANCE THEY HAVE 141.l ERR THE PAST" TEN MONTHS. RATHER, THEY ARE SIMPLY SEIZING AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO BUILD PRESSURE WITHIN THE US AGAINIST THE ADMINISTRATION'S CENTRAL AMERICAN POI.,ICIE.~,< IN THIS SENSE THE INVITATION DOES NOT DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM CASTRO'S EFFORTS EARLIER THIS YEAR TO CONVINCE OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIN THA'I' 'T'TII:Y SHOULD UNITE TO PREVENT THE USG FROM INTERVENING MILITARILY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I, THEREFORE EXPECT CASTRO DURING THE VISIT TO ATTEMPT TO-CONTRAST THE ADM- i STRATION' S ALLEGEI) INTRANSIGENCE IN THE REGION WITH CUBA'S FLEXIBILITY. LL BEMOAN THE, ADM. . ,A`;'ION'S INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE ROOTS OF THE CE?NTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS AND EXPOUND UPON HIS OWN VISION OF AN INDIGENOUS UPRISING AGAINST SOCIAL/POLITICAL REPRESSION. WE WILL HEAR MUCH ABOUT THE NEED TO COMBAT POVERTY AND TO PERMIT THE CENTRAL, AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE THE PROFOUND SOCIAL/POLITICAL REFORMS THEY. DESIRE. USG SECURITY CONCERNS WILL BE DISMISSED AS A FIGMENT OF ITS PARANOIA. 8. IN USING THE VISIT TO REINFORCE; AMONG OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THIS VERSION OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, CASTRO WILL, FACE TWO PROBLEMS. FIRST, IF HE LETS HIS PERSONAL ANTIPATHY TOWARDS PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOW, HIS REMARKS IN THIS CONTEXT COULD WELL BACKFIRE, EVEN AMONG CONVINCED OPPONENTS OF OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY. SECOND, SCIFT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 PAGE 0005 HE WILL HAVE TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT '!'HE CONTADORA PROCESS BUT AT THE SAME TIME AVOID BEING PINNY DOWN ON THE SPECIFICS OF THAT PROCESS. HE WILL OBVIOUSLY 'PRY TO SIDESTEP THE ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN NICARAGUA. IF HE SLIPS AND ASSERTS, AS THE SANDINISTAS ON OCCASION HAVE, THAT THOSE ISSUES CONSTITUTE AN UNJUSTIFIED INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NICARAGUA AND THUS INFRINGE UPON ITS SOVEREIGN'PY, HE ALSO RISKS A PUBLIC RELATIONS BACKFIRE. CASTRO IS AN ASTUTE ENOUGH POLITICIAN AND THUS PROBABLY WILL NOT SLIP. HOW, THEREFORE, CAN WE, PUSH HIM CLOSER TO THAT POSSIBILITY? OBVOUSLY, DURING THE PRESS CONF'E:RENCES(S) THAT HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE DURING THE,. VISIT, SOME JOURNALIST MIGHT BE WILLING TO PIN HIM DOWN AND FORCE AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF THE CUBAM POSITION ON VERIFICATION AND PLURALISM IN NICARAGUA. SIMILARLY, PROPER QUESTIONING COULD REVEAL THE HOLLOWNESS OF THE CUBAN STAND ON CONTADORA. 9. FOR THE RECORD, MY APPROACH IN TIIIS CONVERSATION WAS_TO. THROW OUT SUBJECT MATTER AND LET SALSAMENDI TALK. BECAUSE I WAS SEEKING HIS VIEWS, I SOUGHT TO AVOID A DEBATE. THUS, I SIMPLY SAID AT THOSE POINTS WHERE OUR ANALYSES DIFFERED OR HIS INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POLICY ERRED FROM THE FACTS, THAT I DISAGREED. AT NO POINT DID HE QUERY ME. FEDCH Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Iq Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200430005-8 F M : GUA TO PUEH4./SECSTATE W.ASiDC IMM, 'OIATE 1056 INFO RUt.HLL/CPNTADORA CPLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE PUFHOL1 MEMBASSY BONN 4P2 FUE;HLD/..M:MHASSY LOND)4 350 PUEEHML /NMEMBASSY MOSC'DW 295 RUFHFR/.4MEMBASSY PARIS 461 RUEHRO/,.MFm9AS5vY POM! 540 RUD1