TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI SOVIET LEADERSHIP POLITICS -- THE CONTINUING SOAP OPERA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000400670015-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: MISC

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Approved For Release 2010/03/08: CIA-RDP86B00420R000400670015-9
SLLKI_ I /NUPUKN
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
SOVIET LEADERSHIP POLITICS -- THE CONTINUING SOAP OPERA
A number of developments on the Soviet leadership front in recent weeks
deserve passing note. None in isolation is particularly noteworthy; taken
together they still fail to point toward conclusive resolution of succession
or policy disputes. At most they suggest the continuing priority of the
"old guard's" retention of control and stability at the top, however
temporary, at the expense of clear policy choice.
Chernenko's primacy as "chairman of the board" has been strengthened by
a host of appearances and demonstrations.
After a short period of apparent protocol slights -- perhaps to chastise
him for pushing his luck in August during Chernenko's illness --
Gorbachev is clearly back in the status of heir apparent.
Ustinov's continued illness -- cause unconfirmed, but looking
increasingly terminal -- threatens to rock the delicate balance by
opening the Ministry of Defense and a Politburo slot.
Ogarkov seems to have.settled into a senior command position, but his
status remains enigmatic and rumors abound that his political fortunes
are still open. Meanwhile, in a recent article, he both vilifies the US
and touts the prospects for peace and arms control.
The Politburo made a major -- but not difficult -- tactical adjustment in
deciding to reengage the US in the arms control dialogue. Its immediate
objectives are political: To influence the Administration's priorities, the
Congress, and the alliance. However, in neither foreign nor domestic
affairs -- as indicated by Chernenko's statements, the 1985 Plan, and
continuing argument about "contradictions" in Soviet society -- have the
Soviets-settled on a broad strategic line for the next five years. This
will probably await the potentially lengthy process of succession and the
conduct of the 27th CPSU Congress.' Meanwhile, we can expect the Soviets to
maintain rhetocial consistency among conflict priorities, but not to resolve
or, if they can avoid it, confront basic issues.
SECRET/NOFORN
11'1' P "`h Approved For Release 2010/03/08: CIA-RDP86B00420R000400670015-9