COMMENTS ON SAUDI DESIRES FOR URGENT US INVOLVEMNT IN THE PEACE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000901870008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 5, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intclligencc
Washington, D.C 20505
NIC 06826-84
5 December 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Comments on Saudi Desires for Urgent US Involvement
in the Peace Process
1. Two things need to be kept in mind in viewing the Saudis desire
for public US pursuit of the peace process.
-- The chances of reaching any reasonably comprehensive peace
settlement is almost nil for the foreseeable future.
? -- Yet, the US cannot be seen to be abdicating responsibility
or interest in coping with this problem--classically
symbolic of Middle East tensions.
2. Prospects for Peace. Prospects are very poor for a comprehensive
settlement in that the PLO is still locked into its quest for unity above
all else. It will not give Hussein a mandate for negotiating, Hussein
will not negotiate without the PLO and an Arab mandate, the Arabs will
not give him such a mandate, and the Israelis don't really want to talk
with anyone about giving up the West Bank anyway. The Israelis believe
the West Bank problem is manageable from their point of view. It is
probably now unrealistic to think that Israel will ever give it up.
That said, this does not mean that the US can afford to
give up working at the problem. The Arab/Israeli issue has
long symbolized the Arab world's chief grievance in the
region; to ignore this is to cede responsibility and
leadership in the Arab world and stoke fires for another
Geneva meeting with the Soviets in attendance. Semblance
of action reduces the heat. Even if the problem is not
solvable, a bad turn in Arab/Israeli relations can be
deeply destabilizing to US interests.
This Memo is Classified
SECRET in its entirety.
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3. Managing the Problem. A number of issues are susceptible to
treatment. These issues are not central to the problem, and probably
will not lead to solution of the problem, but can contribute to lessening
of tensions, contribute to a daffy-today US participation in regional
diplomacy, encourage the moderates, and assist in the evolution of
regional problems in a relatively quiet (for the Middle East) fashion.
-- Improvement of Egyptian/Israeli Relations. The collapse of
ese relations would be disastrous for US interests and
would demonstrate that no Arab settlement with Israel is
possible. It would ultimately lead to renewed war between
Egypt and Israel.
-- The Quality of Life for the Palestinians. Even if Israel
never gives up the West Bank, the a estinians must be
allowed to develop meaningful economic and cultural
institutions within Israel--which they are presently
denied. Complaints will always exist, but a general
improvement--perceived by West Bankers and Arab states
alike--will remove some of the sting from this issue.
-- Improvement in De Facto Jordan/Israel Relations. Quality
of life in the West Bank will also help improve these de
facto relations; and other meaningful Israeli/Jordanian
accommodations can likewise be reached in the West Bank.
Improved Jordan/Israel de facto relations will partially
weaken Syria's ability to foment trouble in Jordan and the
West Bank.
Prominent US Discussions with Palestinian Leaders. The US
must be perceived as to ing to t e aestinians--whether
or not we recognize the PLO. There has never been a
prohibition against discussions with major Palestinian
figures--Kissinger only ruled out ne otiations. The US
must not be perceived as ignoring this major group. We
likewise need to encourage the emergence of moderate
Palestinians--wherever they may be--who are willing to talk
to the Israelis.
4. Talking to the S rians. I do not believe there is any
realistically conceivable formula which either the US or Israel could
propose which would enable Syria to join a peace process. Although many
debate this, I believe Syria values above all else its leadership role in
the region which springs from its leadership of the hardline group,
enabling it to set forth claims to Soviet arms, Arab money, the right to
manipulate the PLO in the struggle against Israel, and to "preserve the
Arab cause." That said, there are nonetheless important gains to be made
with Syria:
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-- Syria in the past has reached important tactical
accommodations with Israel and the US on specific issues.
Modest future such accommodations are possible. This will
never mean "peace" but it can sometimes help stabilize
certain local problems when it is in the Syrian interest to
do so.
Syria strongly desires to be recognized as a significant
player. It is the power without which no peace is
possible. Regular US discussions with Syria gratifies
them, inserts new and complicating factors into their
diplomacy, and delays them from crystallizing permanent
hardline views. Syria can probably never be brought around
but consistent massaging can reduce tensions,
confrontations, and soften the picture. This is very
important to Saudi Arabia, and would probably even reassure
Jordan.
-- Much of diplomacy in the Middle East consists of personal
relationships, images, perceptions and contacts. Including
Syria in regular high-level travel by envoys must not be
neglected even if major results will never really emerge.
Minor gains alone are worth it.
-- Close and'regular US consultation with Syria bugs the hell
out of the USSR. Despite the Soviet position in Syria, the
Soviets are deeply insecure in what they feel to be their
limited influence on Syria. They remain constantly fearful
Assad will cut a deal with the US. We may know Assad will
probably never take the major plunge, but the Soviets do
not know this. Assad's ties with the US give him
maneuvering room with the USSR and will prevent the Soviets
from ever being certain of their position in Damascus.
5. US arms sales to Arab allies is seen by them as a litmus test of
the sincerity of interest in their welfare and stability. Failure to
provide arms suggests to all (the internal and external enemies of any
state) that the US does not really value the relationship.
6. In light of the above, I believe it is important for the US to be
seen as continuing to work at the Middle East problem. Our Arab allies
expect it of us. Ambitious public goals and plans should be avoided.
Minor (but not insignificant goals) are achievable. It will gain time
and hopefully prevent major conflagration, but we must be equally
realistic that "peace is not at hand."
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SECRET
NIC 06826-84
5 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Saudi Desires for Urgent US Involvement
in the Peace Process
NIC/NI0/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 5 Dec. 84
Distribution:
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- SA/IA
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - NIO/NESA
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