CANDIDATES FOR NIO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00885R000100050051-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: November 21, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007105/25__CIA-RD286B00885R000100050Q51-5
28 November 1983
NOTE FOR: SA/DCI
FROM: EA/DDCI.
Dick,
FYI. The DCI gave the attached package
to the DDCI for action. He has sent a copy
ofthe 8. November memo to Judge Webster,
noting that it might be helpful for future
:discussions between Judge.Webster and the
DCI... He also noted that- the., had not
yet digested all of the relevant informa-
tion but would be anxious to talk to Judge
Webster once he had.
The DDCI probably has already advised
the DCI, but if he has not, you might want
to mention-that he believes that we could
do better than those listed as candidates
for the possible new NIO position.
Distr:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John Bross, Chairman
DCI Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis
1. Attached is a memorandum suggesting four names as possible
candidates for the NIO position. Another that occurs to me is 25X1
a former Chairman of COMIREX. John McMahon would recognize him. 25X1
2. In view of the discussion that took place at lunch about the
O'Malley Committee and the possibility of reconstituting it as an
operational committee, I suggest that you send a copy of our second
memorandum to you which deals with this subject. Bill Webster may have
been somewhat confused by the fact that no mention of the O'Malley
Committee is contained in our report to the Senate.
4. Attached is a copy of the second memorandum in case you wish to
send it to Judge Webster.
Attachments:
As stated
SO RET
John Bross
CL BY
DELL
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: DCI Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis
1. The quality of the NIO is critical to the success of the
undertaking.
2. The Commission considered and recommends the following
individuals in order of priority:
(1) Jim Nolan, former Deputy Assistant Director,
Intelligence Division/FBI. Currently at State
Department.
former NIO for Science and Technology.
(4)
o n A. Bross, Chairman
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25X~
25X
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0 8 NOV 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: The Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis
1. We have submitted to you a memorandum, ultimately destined for
the Senate Oversight Committee, which includes several recommendations
for restructuring the Intelligence Community both to improve its multi-
disciplinary analytical effort and to focus attention on strategic
deception. In formulating these recommendations the Commission made
certain assumptions which are critical to the successful implementation
of its recommendations. In addition during the course of its work, the
Commission came across a number of issues related directly or indirectly
to counterintelligence, which warrant your attention, in our view. We
would like to share all this with you in subsequent paragraphs.
The NIO for Hostile Threat & Deception Analysis
2. The success of the new structure the Commission is proposing
depends heavily on the quality of the personnel assigned to it, beginning
with its leader, the NIO for Hostile Threat & Deception Analysis. The
Commission believes that first and foremost this officer must be an
individual who has an established reputation in the Community as a
superior analyst. In addition, because this NIO will be interfacing
constantly with the counterintelligence community and delving into areas
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of concern to it, he should have counterintelligence experience. The
counterintelligence community does not respond well to outsiders treading
on its grounds. This NIO must also be able to promote harmonious working
relations with all components of the Community and project the image of a
Community-oriented, as distinguished from a departmental officer.
Finally, the Commission believes that the NIO should be an officer at the
SIS-4 or 5 level.
Structural Changes
3. With the creation of an NIO for Hostile Threat and Deception
Analysis supported by a full-time staff certain changes in the existing
structure of the Community are advisable. Our suggestions follow:
a. Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis Committee: There
is no need for such a committee. In its stead, we would
recommend the establishment of a Counterintelligence
Operations Committee chaired by the Assistant Director for
Intelligence, FBI, with membership limited to those entities
in the Community dealing with CI operations, namely; the
FBI, the CI Staff of the D0, OSI, NIS, Army Intel and the
DoD. This new CI Operations Committee would be a collegial
forum for the exchange of CI experience, the discussion of
mutual problems, the identification of inadequacies in and
potentialities for improving support required from
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non-intelligence agencies, ensuring awareness and an appropriate
exchange of information concerning technological developments of
interest to the CI community and the active promotion of R&D
programs in this field. It would have no control over opera-
tions and no directive or supervisory powers.
b. The Counterintelligence Staff of the IC
The Commission's formal recommendation to create an NIO for
Hostile Threat and Deception Analysis assigns to that official
and his staff the responsibility for preparing an annual hostile
intelligence threat assessment. Since 1978 such annual reports
have been assembled by the CI Staff of the CI from separate
contributions by individual agencies. The Commission believes
the annual report should be an integrated product stemming
directly from the analytical work performed by the drafters. By
deleting the preparation of this annual report from the charter
of the IC Staff there no longer appears to be reason for its
Counterintelligence Staff to maintain its present size and
composition. Finally, with respect to the annual counter-
measures status report also assembled by the present CI Staff,
the Commission believes this responsibility should be assigned
to the IG/CM. To keep that responsibility within the Intel-
ligence Community structure involves the DCI unnecessarily
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in judgments of the efficacy of countermeasures in industry and
in the myriad of field activities of hundreds of agencies out-
side the Intelligence Community. The Commission sees the
Community CI Staff performing essentially secretariat support
tasks for the IG/CI, IG/CM and the Counterintelligence
Operations Committee and providing advice to other elements of
the IC Staff concerned with counterintelligence resource issues.
The Polygraph
4. The polygraph is both a countermeasures and a counterespionage
tool. Up to now the polygraph has led a turbulent and controversial
life. The Intelligence Community should have seized the issue years ago,
reached an agreement on the utility of the polygraph and orchestrated a
strategy to get its use accepted by all its own elements. We believe the
time has come, if not overdue, for the DCI to take the initiative to pull
together the entire Community on this issue. Concurrently with that
initiative, the Commission believes the DCI should also encourage and
finance the exploration of additional psychological testing mechanisms
which can be used to supplement the testing accomplished through the use
of the polygraph. This is particularly relevant to counterespionage
cases when analysis or human sources fail to resolve the question of
"bona fides."
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Counterespionage and Modern Technology
5. Advances in technology over the past 25 years have literally
revolutionized the collection capability of the Community. To the
Commission's knowledge the operational sector of the Community has not
put the same emphasis on exploring whether modern technology can assist
it in improving the various facets of its work ranging from undetectable
surveillance to ferreting out spies. The Commission recommends the DCI
charge the appropriate elements within the Intelligence Community to
explore with selected research organizations the relevance and appli-
cability of modern technology to the improvement of operational
methodology and techniques.
Dissemination of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Information
6. As you will have noted, the Commission concluded that the flow of
intelligence and counterintelligence information from collectors to
producers, including sensitive-source human and communications intel-
ligence,is operating on the whole quite well. In spite of this, some
analysts continue to complain that key intelligence is being withheld
from them. The Commission believes it is important to put an end to this
perception. This appears to be primarily a CIA problem and should be
resolved within the Agency.
5
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Congressional Relations
7. In the course of our work we met with staff members of both the
Senate and House Oversight Committees. We were impressed by what seemed
a very serious lack of communication between the Senate Committee and the
Intelligence Community on the general subject of counterintelligence and
deception. Criticism by individual Senators and members of the Committee
staff of what they perceive as counterintelligence problems are, to a
very considerable extent, based on misunderstandings, semantical diffi-
culties, inadequate briefings and lack of sufficient pre-hearing staff
work by the Community. Frequently the officials designated to appear at
SSCI hearings are not the ones who have the in-depth knowledge necessary
to respond to Committee concerns. Senate staff members were apparently
unaware until very recently of work which had been long underway in the
DI by
which was responsive to questions with which
the Senate Committee purported to be concerned.
The solution of this situation, however, is not simple. The Senate
staff is anything but a monolithic entity. No two staffers seem to agree
on anything or know or care very much what the other is doing or
believes. The staff director appears to have relatively little control
over the staff. A remedy must, nevertheless, be found.
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The situation in the House Committee staff contrasts very favorably
with the Senate staff. The staff director, Tom Latimer, seems to take a
very sensible and understanding view of the U.S. counterintelligence
program. He also seems to have the Committee staff under firm control,
at least on this issue.
Community Acceptance of the Commission's Recommendations
8. The Commission's recommendations for structural changes are ahead
of where the Intelligence Community now is. Were the Community to be
left to its own devices, the Commission is convinced that eventually but
only under pressure from external forces would it have come to the
changes we are now recommending. Should the DCI accept our
recommendations, the Commission sees merit in his offering to have the
Commission brief individual key members of the intelligence Community
before the structural changes are implemented. We also see merit in the
DCI's making the same offer to the Senate and House Oversight Committees
and their staffs.
John A. Bross, Chairman
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