YOUR MEETING WITH THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 21, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
21 September 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs Office
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the World Affairs
Council of Northern California
1. Action Requested: None. Background information only.
2. Background:
a. You are scheduled to address approximately 30
members of the World Affairs Council of Northern
California in the DCI Conference Room on Friday,
30 September. D/BONA will participate
with you. During the week that the Council is in
Washington and prior to their meeting with you, the
Council will be briefed by representatives from the
Department of Defense, State, NSC, foreign diplomats,
House and Senate members, and non-governmental
organizations. They will also be meeting with either Vice
President Bush or Admiral Murphy of the Vice President's
office. See attachment for identification of names and
agencies.
b. As you indicated on the 20 July memo, you will
give a 30 minute talk followed by 15 minutes of Q&A and
dialogue. Attached are background topics proposed by the
group from which you may wish t ks. You
can then turn the group over to bout
10:45 a.m. and you need not remain. will
speak on the "Soviet Threat."
c. This delegation of the Council is composed of
educational and financial leaders as well as professional
oeople from the Bay area east to Sacramento. We have told
that we prefer your remarks to be considered
o - e-record so that they can be more informative and
candid. As was discussed with a member of my staff with
the assistant to head of the Council, there is no one
connected with the media. We do not, however, have the
final list of attendees and cannot verify at this point if
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the World Affairs Council
of Northern California
someone is with the media. If media representatives do
attend, they will be here in a private, not professional,
capacity. As soon as we have this list, we will forward
it to you.
d. After the members of the World Affairs Council
have arrived, coffee and doughnuts will be served from
9:45-10:00 a.m. in the DCI Conference room. I will
introduce you at 10:00 a.m. The meeting will end at
noon. Members of the Public Affairs staff will be present
throughout the session.
e. We do not plan to tape this session.
,Q,,,_ George V. Lauder
~)'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
Names and agencies of the people the World Affairs Council will
STAT meet with prior to their briefing with you and
State Department
Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs
Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African
Affairs
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Kenneth Adelman, Director
Paul Warnke, Former Director
Foreign Diplomats
Ambassador from France, His Excellency Bernard
Vernier-Palliez
Ambassador from Japan, His Excellency Yoshio Okawara
China Peoples Republic Minister-Counselor (Political
Affairs), Ji Chaozhu
Since Caspar Weinberger is in China and Under Secretary of
State Eagleburger is at the United Nations, they will not be
meeting with the Council as planned.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
BACKGROUND TOPICS FOR
REMARKS TO THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
I. Changes in the International System and the Impact
on Intelligence
II. Intelligence and the Policy Process
III. Rebuilding Our Intelligence Service
IV. World Debt Problems
V. Terrorism
VI. Nuclear Proliferation
VII. Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan Activities in Central
America
VIII. Technology Transfer
IX. Soviet Active Measures
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
I. Changes in the International System and the Impact on
Intelligence
?July issue of NEWSWEEK featured article titled "Even in
Peacetime 40 Wars are Going On." Meant to shock and startle
readers, majority of whom are probably unaware of multitude of
violent disputes around world. But no surprise in the
corridors of CIA where analysts must follow all developments
around globe and assess their implications for U.S.
?Streak of wistful isolationism runs through our
history. Sometimes we wish to close eyes and ears to conflicts
in far-off places because believe or hope such violence will
not affect us. At one time, not long ago, this was true. In
1933, a tribal war in Africa or Asia was of no consequence to
U.S. Today might mean cut-off of a strategically vital mineral.
?War is only most extreme expression of international
tension. Must follow dozens of international issues at CIA
beyond comparatively basic job of monitoring and predicting
wars.
?International system has undergone dramatic changes
since 1947 when CIA was established. In post World War II
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
period, only U.S. stood at pinnacle of world power. Soviet
Union was our only serious rival.
?Have since witnessed rise of many independent states as
well as rise of significant nonstate actors, such as terrorist
movements and economic cartels. Our economy now much more
dependent and sensitive to international financial trends or to
economic health of other countries.
?National security depends on coming to grips with
complexities of this age. Result: Intelligence Community must
monitor more and more issues beyond traditional confines of
strict military and political analysis.
?Nations which pose no military threat to us but whose
clout stems from possession of certain resources or from their
geographic locale must now be watched carefully, as must
regional rivalries with no direct U.S. involvement. Regional
rivalries that explode into open warfare can cause severe
international repercussions if conflict occurs in sensitive
part of the world. Two present day examples are Iran-Iraq war
and Libyan-Chad conflict.
?Rise of significant nonstate actors and complexity of
present day international relations required us to expand
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
analysis to include what are called transnational issues --
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, technology transfer, and
insurgency.
?Since these problems cannot be analyzed and understood
by looking at merely one country or just one dimension of
problem, have created new analytical centers at CIA such as
Technology Transfer Assessment Center where economic, military,
and political analysts are in daily contact, each providing
unique perspectives on the issue.
?Because of variety and quantity of problems
intelligence must follow today, also need even greater
flexibility and diversity in collection systems. To be of real
use, intelligence must be available to policymakers quickly if
crisis about to erupt. Collection systems must also respond
quickly to new and changing requirements.
?To rely on merely one type of collection operation such
as overhead reconnaissance is to invite disaster. Importance
of human intelligence, collection of information by
intelligence officers stationed overseas, has not diminished
despite technological advances in reconnaissance systems.
Human intelligence still necessary to answer very tricky
questions concerning intentions of foreign leaders.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
II. Intelligence and the Policy Process
?Intelligence is the painstaking, often tedious
collection of facts and then the clear evaluation of what those
facts mean.
?High-quality analysis cannot be just background
education if it is to be relevant. Our analysis must enrich a
decision maker's understanding of key problems which affect our
national security.
?Sometimes impact of intelligence on policy is immediate
and dramatic as with recent Soviet shootdown of a KAL
commercial airliner. Sometimes it may be years before our
analysis on, for instance, world supplies of strategic minerals
influences policy decisions.
?Intelligence must not only be accurate and relevant, it
must be timely. It will not help President to learn of a coup
in Africa the day after when he reads it in THE WASHINGTON
POST. In our volatile, complex world, when new crises can
develop overnight, it is a continuing struggle to meet all
these requirements. But I think, for the most part, we are
meeting these high standards.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?We produce wide variety of analytical products because
our national leaders have variety of needs.
?A very short analysis written today on, for instance,
fighting yesterday in Lebanon, is called current intelligence.
We deliver one example of this kind of analysis called the
Presidential Daily Brief to the President and a few others
every morning.
?Some analysis takes long-range view of a problem. This
is called estimative analysis. For instance, in our National
Intelligence Estimates, we look ahead five, maybe ten years,
and give our policymakers insight into important military,
economic, political, or technological trends.
?We are always striving to establish a dialogue between
those who produce intelligence and those who must use it. For
it is in this give-and-take that issues are defined and
intelligence refined.
?We have been helped in this task by fact that Bill
Casey is the first DCI to have Cabinet rank. He sits in on
Cabinet meetings and is privy to national policy decisions.
This kind of access is of enormous benefit to Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
Community. It helps us to more accurately pinpoint needs of
our primary consumers.
?It is important that policy drives the intelligence
machine. Periodically, SIG(I) of NSC meets under chairmanship
of DCI. The purpose is also to get requirements and priorities
of policymakers.
?Intelligence and op licy are like two sides of a coin.
They should be kept separate -- but not too separate. If they
are each a separate coin, then intelligence people risk
irrelevance. Policy people will pursue their concerns while
intelligence people grind out studies of little interest anyone
but themselves.
?Every week DCI also meets with Judge Clark, Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, Secretary of
Defense Weinberger, and Secretary of State George Shultz. Bill
also debriefs CIA officers who take PDB to White House. This
is but another means of learning what the President is
interested in.
?Some of criticism of intelligence analysis is based on
unrealistic expectations of what we can do. If one reduces all
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
intelligence analysis to just predictions and then looks for a
1000 batting average -- no intelligence service will measure up:
?We are interested in foreknowledge but we do not have a
pipeline to God. Nor do we have a crystal ball. We can deal
only in "probable" developments. But we should, and I believe
we do, provide professional analysis which probes and weighs
probabilities and presents a carefully selected range of
possibilities.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
III. Rebuilding Our Intelligence Service
?The decade of seventies was tough for intelligence.
Intelligence Community underwent a 40~ cut in funds and a 50~
cut in personnel.
?Congress began our restoration with FY '80 budget.
Congressional committees were so concerned about state of
intelligence they gave us even more than the President
requested.
?We have had budget increases, depending on which agency
you talk about, of some 15~ to 20~ a year for past three years;
now tapering off.
?What have we been doing with these increases? We have
Cp~A1.~
been hiring more people and shoring up badly-needed or ~~f G~ySi~'~'~~
neglected support systems. Some of you may have seen our
advertisements which is an unusual recruitment method for us
that has been very successful.
?Intelligence Community's manpower is still about half
of what it was in early seventies but that's O.K. Automation
has helped and with end of Vietnam, our mission has been
redirected.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?We have a new spirit of cooperation among various
agencies that make up Intelligence Community, due in part to a
renewed emphasis on making sure all hypotheses and alternative
conclusions are heard. C~-se~s r~--
?NFIB is functioning as a Board of Estimates. Each
Chief of the various intelligence agencies is encouraged --
indeed tasked -- to make sure conclusions and views of his
organization are fairly and adequately represented.
?Our analysts are also inserting a range of
possibilities into all of their analysis, hopefully better
preparing policymakers to cope with a variety of outcomes to a
problem or crisis.
?We are reaching out more to universities and think
tanks, searching out new perspectives. We recognize
intelligence organizations have no monopoly on truth. We are
holding more joint conferences and encouraging our analysts to
strengthen their school ties and to take additional courses.
?Congressional oversight is best protection we have.
U.S. citizen is well-served by this process. The two
Intelligence Committees of Congress are informed and are with
us for takeoff on all our covert action programs.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?Our relationship with Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence is excellent; but last year, unfortunately, House
Oversight Committee began to divide along partisan lines. This
causes us great concern because partisan oversight is no
oversi ht at all.
?Covert action is, of course, a politically sensitive
issue. Covert action is difficult because it's alien to our
open society. But if we aren't occasionally willing to use it
-- responsibly and with discretion -- then we are going to be
in trouble. There are occasions when the President needs an
option between open diplomacy or military force.
?Congress is also a huge consumer of our analysis. CIA
briefers are on the hill talking with members and staff every
day.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
IV. World Debt Problems
?Major problem facing world economy today -- inability
of many less developed and East European countries to repay
debts.
?Amount of these countries' debt enormous. Combined
medium and long-term debt grew from $55 billion in 1970 to $625
billion last year.
?Debt in and of itself not bad but becomes bi~c problem
when cannot be repaid. These countries debt service payments
accelerated rapidly in late 1970s. Last year reached $140
billion.
?At same time, ability of many of these countries to
earn foreign exchange needed to repay loans deteriorated as
prices for industrial raw materials and agricultural products
fell rapidly beginning in 1980. Also in 1979 oil prices and
interest rates sharply increased, and global recession
decreased demand for Third World goods. In other words, they
got less for what they had to sell and had to pay more for what
they needed, such as loans and oil.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?In 1975, only 15 countries were listed by International
Monetary Fund as behind in paying debts. In 1982 list had
expanded to 34 countries behind almost $19 billion.
?In the top-10 list of countries with serious debt
problems are our southern neighbors: Brazil and Mexico lead
the list, which also includes Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile.
The total debt of Brazil is $85 billion; Mexico is $83 billion;
Argentina is $37 billion; Venezuela is $34 billion; and Chile
is $18 billion.
?Crux of problem for U.S. is that costs of LDCs of
paying off these debts means declining standards of living in
these countries. Can easily lead to political and social
instability and growth of radical movements.
?Have already been riots in Rio and Sao Paulo over
economic conditions. Pace of illegal Mexican emigration to the
U.S. has picked up since its financial problems deepened last
year.
?Inability of these countries to honor repayment
agreements could also have a negative effect on economic
recovery in industrial world. LDCs have emerged as important
customers for industrial nations' products, but financial
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
strains have forced them to curb imports, especially of U.S.
goods. American commercial banks have major stake in debtor
countries, especially in Latin America. By end of 1982, U.S.
banks had lent almost $100 billion to Latin America.
?U.S. government, in collaboration with other
governments and banks, is dealing with debt readjustments on a
case-by-case basis involving five elements -- debtors' internal
economic adjustments, new commercial bank financing, government
loans, IMF loans, and global economic recovery.
?For U.S. intelligence, task is to closely monitor these
countries' economies as well as political and social
repercussions of their financial difficulties to assess any
adverse impact on our national security.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
V. Terrorism
?On 18 April 1983, a pickup truck drove up to U.S.
embassy in Beirut. Seconds later an explosion ripped apart
central section of the seven story building. Over 100 people
injured; 57 killed including 17 Americans. This is but latest
tragic example of how terrorist groups increasingly threaten
U.S. lives and property overseas.
?Our task is to track and, if possible, infiltrate these
groups. Infiltration is not easy. Groups now using more
sophisticated security procedures.
?A handful of countries -- Syria, Libya, Cuba, the USSR,
East Germany, Iran, and South Yemen -- provide arms, money, and
training to terrorist cells. Most worrisome development is
that for some of these countries, terrorism is becoming an
accepted instrument of state policy.
?U.S. citizens are primary targets of radical groups.
About 200 Americans killed since 1968; about half victims of
indiscriminate attacks; but more and more terrorists are
specifically singling out Americans for assassination.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?In part, it is extreme envy for our standard of living;
in part, because our freedoms and beliefs are anathema to those
who support totalitarianism or anarchism.
?U.S. diplomats are most frequent victims but American
businessmen are next likeliest target. U.S. firms have paid an
estimated $125 million in ransom over past 10 years.
?Most common type attack is a bombin~c. Have recorded
nearly 4,500 such attacks worldwide since began keeping records
about 15 years ago. Greatest number of terrorist attacks now
occur in West Germany, Lebanon, Spain, and France.
?Concern in intelligence for this growing threat to U.S.
lives and property reflected in fact we have established a new
analytical center in CIA specifically devoted to tracking
terrorist groups.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
VI. Nuclear Proliferation
?Current conventional wisdom describes nuclear weapon
systems almost totally in terms of the U.S. and USSR, but such
a fixation already outdated.
?In future, a conflict in Asia might involve nuclear
threats from Pakistan, India, and China, possibly even USSR and
certain Arab states.
?As example illustrates, nuclear proliferation likely to
become greater threat.to stability of international system in
general and to U.S. interests in coming years.
?Developing countries have greater access to nuclear
material and weapons-related technology. More countries
beginning to export nuclear materials. Brokers, skilled at
circumventing government export policies, now specialize in
discreet buying and selling of nuclear-related equipment.
?Time between making fissionable material and building a
nuclear weapon has shrunk -- leaving U.S. less room for
diplomatic action. Development of small nuclear forces is
easier, even without nuclear tests.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?Developing countries banding together more often to
resist new nonproliferation initiatives or strengthening of
existing codes. Claim other problems such as U.S. - USSR
disarmament must be addressed first.
?Besides our concern for long-term nuclear threat to our
people, there are more immediate, destabilizing political
effects when a nation considers developing nuclear weapons.
Very fact that a state begins research and development can
exacerbate regional tensions and strain our relationship with
otherwise friendly countries.
?For example, in Latin America, our differences with
Argentina's and Brazil's efforts to develop certain nuclear-
weapons-related facilities and their unwillingness to sign
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty could hamper U.S. efforts to
restore our influence in region.
?Finally, threat of nuclear terrorism increases in
direct proportion to nuclear proliferation. Increasing number
of foreign facilities capable of producing nuclear materials
expands potential sources for terrorists and increases the
difficulty of refuting false threats.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
VII. Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan Activities in Central
America
?Soviets do not want war--just the fruits of war.
?To accomplish this, Soviets have designed a low-risk,
low-profile strategy that makes maximum use of surrogates to
front for them, allowing the Kremlin to stay half-hidden in the
shadows.
?It is a "clever" strategy that is particularly
difficult for an open democratic nation like ours to counter.
Any direct response by West conveniently condemned as
imperialistic.
?Strategy at work today in our own backyard in Central
America. Soviet theorists have not overlooked fact that
strategically the Caribbean Sea and Central America form this
nation's fourth border. Half of all of our foreign trade
passes through either Panama Canal or other Caribbean sea
lanes. Soviet control of these sea lanes could destroy our
capacity to resupply Western Europe in an emergency and could
tie our forces down on our southern border.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?During Vietnam War, critics of U.S. policy scoffed at
domino theory. With the fall of South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, they should be less sanguine. All should be
concerned about a similar process in Central America where
border areas not clearly marked and where there is a history of
inequities to fuel political violence.
?Cuba, backed by Soviet arms, money, and advisers, is
using contacts nurtured over more than 20 ey ars to provide
political and military training, as well as propaganda support
to violent groups intent on establishing Soviet and Cuban
surrogate states.
?Extent of Soviet military aid to Cuba to help in
Castro's quest is staggering. Soviet military deliveries to
Cuba increased dramatically in 1979 to more than 65,000 tons by
1981 and continues at high rate today. Improvements to their
armed forces and stronger Soviet-Cuban military ties have
enabled Cuba to assume a more influential role in this
hemisphere than its size or resources dictate. Soviet
assistance to Cuba now totals more than $8 million a d`~.
?Cuba's immediate goals are to consolidate control of
Sandinista government in Nicaragua and, with their aid,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
overthrow governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and later
?They move quickly to exploit any opportunity. Within a
week after Sandinistas took over Nicaragua, 100 Cuban military
and security personnel were in Managua. Today there are about
8,000 Cubans, including some 2,000 military advisers. These
are supplemented by some 50 Soviet military and 100 economic
advisers. Soviet personnel assisting the Sandinistan security
services, even Nicaraguan general staff. East Europeans,
Libyans, Vietnamese, and PLO personnel all active in Managua.
?Sandinistas engaged in a hu~ce military buildup.
Somoza's National Guard numbered about 9,000 before 1979 and
about 15,000 at height of fighting. Sandinistas now have
25,000 regular troops and 50,000 in active reserve and militia
forces. Have built 40 new military bases stocked with medium
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and mobile rocket launchers,
from the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations.
?1979 was beginning of partnership between Havana and
Managua in exporting subversion to rest of Central America.
Partnership has resulted in building of numerous guerrilla
training camps in Nicaragua, shipment of tons of weapons, and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
establishment in Managua of a guerrilla command and control
facility.
?One example of well-orchestrated arms shipments: On 15
March 1982, Costa Rican Judicial Police discovered a house in
San Jose at which was hidden a cache of about $500,000 worth of
weapons, explosives, uniforms, and false visas. These were to
be transported through Costa Rica to El Salvador by Nicaraguans
in vehicles with hidden compartments. These arrests happen all
the time.
?Guerrillas in El Salvador are using arms to go after
economic targets, to try to force government into a static
defense posture. Not been successful, to date, in either
disrupting electoral process or in defeating government forces
despite daily directions from Cuban and Soviet advisers.
?But struggle will continue because Soviets and Cubans
are well aware strategic stakes are high. Economic costs also
high. Production in Central America has plunged some 20$ since
onset of leftist guerrilla activity in 1979. In El Salvador
alone, guerrilla attacks have cost government an estimated $700
million. Vicious cycle begins to develop since stagnant
economic conditions foster more violence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?Soviets and Cubans believe that U.S. government and
American people are unable to maintain a consistent policy of
opposition. Would be naive to think they will be content with
just Nicaragua or just El Salvador. Extreme leftist groups
with Soviet and Cuban backing are already at work in Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
VIII. Technology Transfer
?Modern warfare and modern weapons systems depend upon
advanced technology: microelectronics, communications,
computers, advanced metal-making equipment and so on.
?Soviet Union's economy inefficient, overcentralized,
and suffers from a lack of innovation. So who provides the
R&D, the technological genius, behind the massive Soviet
military build-up? We do.
?A few startling examples:
-- Soviets had the plans to the C-5A before it flew.
-- Soviet trucks used in Afghanistan came from a
plant outfitted with $1.5 billion modern
American and European machinery.
-- Precise gyros and bearings in SS-18 ICBM from
U.S. designs.
-- Radar in Soviet AWACs virtually ours.
-- Starting with set of plans for U.S. Sidewinder
Air-to-Air missile, Soviets built a copy, saving
7 years in R&D time.
-- List goes on and on.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?Soviet appetite for U.S. and Western European
technology is voracious. About 30$ of technology requirements
met by legal, open means such as subscribing to AVIATION WEEK
or by attending international conferences. 70~ to 80$ of their
technology requirements satisfied by illegal means, relying on
their intelligence services.
clandestine
acquisition of Western technology has highest priority in KGB
and its military counterpart the GRU.
?A national-level program approved at highest party and
government levels. Now several thousand intelligence officers,
under various covers ranging from diplomats and journalists to
businessmen, dedicated solely to this effort.
?Soviets hide behind dummy trading companies or
sometimes engage bona fide European firms as middlemen to
obscure ultimate destination. More than 30 Communist country
owned-U.S. charted firms are in the U.S.; 300 in Western Euro e.
?Since early 1970s, Soviet and East European in-
telligence services emphasizing collection of
manufacturing-related technology, in addition to weapon R&D
designs. Your famous Silicon Valley in California is favorite
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
target for acquiring semiconductors and computer manufacturing
designs.
?Has also been an increased emphasis on acquiring brand
new technology emerging from our universities and research
institutes. Particularly distressing because our commercial
sector's security precautions have traditionally been no match
against hostile intelligence operations.
?Intelligence Community is redoubling collection and
assessment efforts. At CIA, have established a new analytical
center, the Technology Transfer Assessment Center, to improve
our analysis. We then pass our intelligence to Justice
Department, FBI, Commerce, and other government components.
?In policy arena, government also taking such measures
as tightening export control and restrictions on activities of
Soviet and East European nationals in U.S. Getting Europeans
to put squeeze on Soviets by exposing their covert expansionism
showing where they have been duped.
?Nations of world beginning to focus on this problem.
In last six or seven months, some 100 Soviets have been
expelled from countries because of their illegal attempts to
steal technology.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
IX. Soviet Active Measures
STAT
?Active measures is Soviet term for all operations aimed
at influencing policies of other nations, as distinguished from
intelligence. Includes what we would call covert action but is
much broader. Refers to an orchestration, at the highest
level, of all Soviet instrumentalities, overt and covert, in
pursuit of worldwide Soviet objectives.
?Soviet active measures include: diplomacy, propaganda,
agitation, disinformation, forgeries, clandestine radio, press
placement, and political influence operations.
?Primary target is U.S. Common aim of influence
operations is to insinuate Soviet views, in a nonattributable
fashion, in foreign governmental, journalistic, academic, and
artistic circles.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
?Strategic objectives are to denigrate U.S., isolate it
from its friends, influence public opinion against U.S.
military programs and against CIA, and undermine political
resolve of West to oppose Soviet encroachments.
?Soviet active measures in Western Europe well
documented. In summer of 1977, Soviets initiated an intensive
worldwide campaign against U.S. production of neutron bomb.
?Campaign in Eastern Europe faithfully mirrored Soviet
effort. World Peace Council, a Soviet front, went into
action. Staged incidents in Istanbul, Accra, Stuttgart,
Frankfort, Lima, Tripoli, and Tanzania. There followed media
pickup in Western Europe. First came the "hack comment" from
fronts and CPs. Second type of comment, and the far more
important, was that of non-Communists situated politically in
center or on left. Adverse editorial treatment given neutron
bomb by this non-Communist journalistic sector was Soviets'
real propaganda success.
?While Soviets initiated the neutron bomb campaign, more
often they exploit something already there. Desire for peace
is strong among all nations. When it becomes a "movement",
Soviets will try to manipulate, to finance it. When it
revolves around a controversial issue, particularly one with
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3
military implications like modernization of theater nuclear
forces in Western Europe, they really move in a massive arsenal
of "active measures" to push issue in direction they wish.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP86B00885R000600870003-3