SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE VIEWS ON SEPARATING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT FROM CLANDESTINE SERVICES AND OTHER COLLECTION FUNCTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00963R000200050014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 1, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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2 E>41 A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM James H. Taylor
11 Comptroller
SUBJECT
: Senate Select Coudidttee Views on Separating National
Intelligence Product from Clandestine Services
and Other Collection Functions
2 E>41 A
1. You askedlif we would annotate portions of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence's (SSC) report of last year dealing with the
question of separating national intelligence production and analysis
(the DDI) and the Clandestine Service (DDO). Your question is complex
and in fact is central to the deliberations surroundin.
Having said this, we nevertheless hope this paper will give you
a useful response.
2. Among other things, the SSC recommended consideration of
major organizational changes in the Intelligence Community. Briefly,
the Committee proposed that the DCI be given statutory responsibility
and authority for establishing national intelligence reguirements,
preparing the national intelligence budget, and providing guidance
for U.S. national intelligence program operations. Within this broad
framework, the Committee believed that the Executive Branch and
the Congress should: "...give careful consideration to removing the
BCI from direct management responsibility for the Central Intelligence
Agency. This would free the DCI to concentrate on his responsibilities
with regard to the entire intelligence community and would remove
him from any conflict of interest in performing that task. It might
also increase the accountability of the Central Intelligence Agency
by establishing a new and separate senior position---a Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency?responsible for only the CIA."
3. Let us comment on this basic recommendation, which has
been incorporated into one of the present Select Committee's draft
bills. Three points should be made. First, this recommendation
further separates the DCI from the Intelligence Community by
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apparently eliminating his line authority over the one element of the
Community which he does now control directly?the CIA.
4. Second, by giving the DCI budgetary but not line command
authority over the Community, the proposal raises a question as to
what the Director's job is in contrast to that which is currently
exercised, under statute, by O.B.
5. Third, taking away the DCI's line authority over CIA would
leave the new Director of the Central, Intelligence Agency (D/CIA)
accountable to the NSC (or possibly the President) for operational,
production, and policy natters and to the DCI for budgets. The possibility
for undesirable end runs and general confusion is considerable,
and it is not clear, if a streamlined management structure is our
goal, that we would have gained very much. If the CCP and the NRC)
were made similarly accountable to the DCI for budgetary matters
but remained accountable to the Secretary of Defense for operations
(or were made accountable to the President and the NSC), the problem
would intensify. '
6. Let us return to the Senate report which states: "The
Committee believes that several important problems uncovered in
the course of this inquiry suggest that serious consideration also
be given to major structural change in the CIA?in particular, separating
national intelligence production and analysis from the clandestine
service and other collection functions. Intelligence production could
be placed directly under the DCI, while clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence from human and technical sources and covert operations
would remain in the CIA." Thus the DCI of the future would exercise
line management control only over the production and analysis function
(presumably the CIA Intelligence Directorate plus the flIO structure).
He would "own" the production function but be responsible only for
the budgets of, and the tasking* of, whatever portion of the balance
of the Intelligence Community for which he is given authority.
Removing the DDI from CIA would leave a "residual CIA," responsible
for clandestine collection and related technical and other support
*It is not clear what the Senate report has in mind in suggesting
that the DCI have tasking authority over the whole Community but
not line control. The implication is that the DCI will have the
authority to tell others what to do but not to force them to do
it, althouah his bud'4eta(y powers may help ensure that they listen
when he talks.
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(the DW and parts of DDS&T and DDA); some technical collection
(DDS&T); the management of certain overhead programs under delegation
from the NRP (assuming present arrangements remained unchanged--which
they might not); and covert action.
7. The Committee then goes on to note the advantages and dis-
advantages of this approach. These are stated below together with
our comments in each case:
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The advantages of such a step are several:
The DCI would be removed from the conflict of interest
situation of managing the intelligence community as a
whole while also directing a collection agency."
This is generally true, but it should he noted that he
would not be responsible for managing the intelligence
Community--but only for proposing, defending, and administering
its budget.
"--The concern that the DCI's national intelligence judg-
ments are compromised by the impulse to justify certain
covert action operations or by the close association
of the analysts with the clandestine service would be
remedied."
Tnis seems true enough, though "compromised" is a word
with which many would argue. On the other side of this
coin, it should be noted that many believe that a problem
is the lack of a close relationship between analysts and
the clandestine service which may lead to "operations for
operations' sake" rather than operations which respond
to analytical needs.
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"?The problem, seen by some in the intelligence community,
of bias on the part of CIA analysts toward the collection
resources of the CIA would be lessened."
If this in fact a real problem, the statement would appear
to be true.
"--It would facilitate providing the intelligence production
unit with greater priority and increased resources neces-
sary for improving the quality of its finished intelligence.'
We doubt this. The proposed formulation would not? in and
of itself improve the rCI's ability to do what he now
has the authority to do if he deems it appropriate. Though
hardly a,powerful argument, the reverse could also be
true: In trying to be even-handed on budgetary
matters, the DCI might tend to shy away from proposals
to enhance his own organization at the possible expense
of others.
"--Tighter policy control of the Clandestine Service by the
National Security Council and the Department of State
would be possible."
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We doubt this. In fact we believe that the reverse would
be true: By making the clandestine service responsible
to two masters instead of one, whatever problem presently
exists would get worse, not better.
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"--The Director would be able to focus increased attention
on monitoring Clandestine Services."
Without line control over the clandestine service, it is
hard to see how the DCI would be in a position usefully to
focus increased attention on the clandestine service.
Why, in the last analysis, should the clandestine service,
which would report through a new DCIA to the NSC, respond
to the DCI 's interest? The new DCI would be in the same
position OMB is now--they control the money but have never
been able to get deeply into sensitive operational detail.
"?Internal reorganization of the Directorate for Intelligence
and the remainder of the CIA could be facilitated."
We think there is little validity to this point. In fact,
several significant reorganizations have taken place during
the past year under existing arrangements--particularly
in the Directorate for Intelligence.
The Committee notes that: "There are potential drawbacks as well:
--The Director of Central Intelligence might lose the influ-
ence that is part of having comand responsibility for the
clandestine services."
We agree, and have argued above why this might well be
the case.
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"--The increasing, though still not extensive, contact between
national inteDigence analysts and the Clandestine Service
for the purpose of improving the espionage effort right be
inhibited."
Again, as pointed out above, we agree. it is important
to note, however, that for cover, security, and other
reasons, the relationship between DDI analysts and DDD
operations officers generally will probably never be
a close one at the working level (though there is and
should be a close relationship at the top).
"--The DCI would have managerial responsibility over the
former CIA analysts which right place him in a conflict-
of-interest situation in regard to the production of
intelligence."
We do not understand this point and hesitate to coment
on it, though this possibly refers to the DCI's
responsibility to prepare national estimates taking into
account the views of other Commutity Production entities,
such as DTA. If this point is accurate, it should be
noted that the DCI has lived with this problem for 30
years; the SSC approach represents no change.
"--ahe increased number of independent agencies would increase
the 'fills coordination problems."
In our view, it is not the "increased number of independent
agencies" which would increase his coordination problems
but his lack of line control over one part of the Community---
Ci----which would increase that problex.
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"?If the clandestine services did not report. to the tYCI,
there would be the problem of establishing an alternative
chain of command to the President."
We agree and have so noted above. ?
"?The Clandestine Service might be downgrack,d and fail
to secure adequate support."
We see no particular reason why this should be the case.
This could happen under present arrangements as easily
as it might under the new formulation.
8. We hope this paper has been helpful to you. We have attached
an earlier paper provided to Mr. Knoche which comments on many of the
same issues from a somewhat broader perspective.
./ James H. Taylor
Attachment: 2E>0.4
As stated
dtd. 16 Mar 77)
Distribution:
Copy I - DCI Watt
C py 2 - DDCI w/o/att
"Copy 3 - hit w/o/att
Copy 4 - DDI ujatt
Copy S - DDO Watt
ILLE GIB
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