LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM GRIFFIN B. BELL
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86B00963R000200100024-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 31, 2003
Sequence Number:
24
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 24, 1978
Content Type:
LETTER
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Body:
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August 24, 1978
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
f11A R?,~istry 1
-/ -a 9~ 3
Re: United States v. William Peter Kami.les
I have your letter of August 19, 1978, regarding the
Kampiles case. I assure you that we all appreciate the
significance of the compromise of thel manual. We will,
of course, do what we can to minimize any further exposure.
In this regard my answers to your questions are as follows:
(1) Attempting to proceed on only a portion of the
document would not eliminate the problems of exposure .
pretrial or at trial. I agree that the two passes constitute
separate offenses and that an indictment could be drawn
stating as an alleged offense only those pages in the first
pass. However, during pretrial discovery, under Rule 16(C),
Fed. R. Crim. P., Kampiles would be entitled to discover,.
upon request., the entire manual on the ground that, although
not charged with passage of the latter sections, he requires,
those sections because they "are material to the preparation
of his defense." We would, of course, seek a protective
order limiting access to the manual. At trial, even though
formally charging only the first few pages, the Government
may be required to introduce the entire document. This in.
fact occurred in United States v. Dedeyan (D. Md. 1975).
There, the Government alleged the passage of only seventy
pages of a 130 page."Secret" document and the court, reject-
ing the Government's contentions that the remaining sixty
Classified by Derivative --Ltr to the
Attorney General from Director, CIA
dated August 19, 1978
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification - Indefinite
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pages were irrelevant to the charge, required the Govern-
ment to produce the entire document both for discovery and
at trial.
(2) It may not be possible to make deletions in the
manual for purposes of pretrial discovery or use in evidence
at trial. Because the entire manual is arguably material
to the preparation of ICampiles' defense, a court will insist
on its being produced in its entirety during pretrial dis-
covery. At trial, the Government is usually not permitted
to introduce documents into evidence with deletions unless
agreed to by defense counsel. As you will recall, defense
counsel in United States v. Moore (D. Md. 1977) did agree
to certain deletions from documents and the documents were
received in evidence in that form. Invariably,defense
counsel will not agree to deletions because deletions create
an inference in the minds of jurors of sensitivity of infor-
mation greater than would result from actual exposure to the
information itself.
(3) Usually, formal declassification is not required..
As I am sure you are aware, Executive Order 11652 does not
allow for limited declassification for purposes of prosecu-
tion. The validity of post-prosecution classification,
however, has never been litigated. We will seek a post-
trial sealing order from the court.
(4) It is possible, but far from certain:, that the
manual can be offered in evidence and yet kept from public
view. Protective orders, secure handling in clerks'
offices, and post-trial sealing have been successfully used
in both Moore and United States v. Boyce and Lee (C.D. Calif.
1977) to protect classified documents. The availability of
such procedures, however, and, in particular, post-trial
sealing, depends on the court and, while we can safely say
that virtually every court would grant protective orders
and provide for secure handling, the likelihood that a
given court will order post-trial sealing is less certain.
For example, while that procedure was ordered in Moore and
Boyce-Lee, the Government's requests for such orders were
denied in Dedeyan and United States v. Humphrey and Truong
(E.D. Va. 1978).
(5) Again, the scope of testimony required concerning
the manual cannot be predicted with certainty. While the
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Government could undoubtedly limit testimony it elicits to
a general description of the system, defense counsel would
be entitled to cross-examine on the entire manual. It must
be anticipated, therefore, that the scope and detail of the
testimony required will encompass the entire manual but
should not involve matters not contained in the manual or
elicited during direct testimony.
(6) As we know from our experiences in recent cases,
the defendant will be entitled to the manual on pretrial
discovery. In those cases the court has issued a protective
order providing for secure storage of the classified materials,
limitations on the persons to whom such materials may be shown,
the maintenance of a record of persons to whom the materials
are shown and the times when shown, and the sanction of con-
tempt for any person having access to the material who violates
the terms of the protective order. In addition to the manual,
you may expect that pretrial discovery will include Kampiles'
personnel and security files and any other materials which
fall within the terms of Rule 16, Fed. R. Crim. P.; the
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. ? 3500; or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963). If any materials in those categories require
special treatment, the Government will seek protective orders
covering their handling.
(7) Kampiles' confession is, of course, critical to
the Government's case and you correctly state that a con-
fession stan.dina alone is insufficient to convict. You are
incorrectly advised, however, that the criminal acts must
be established independent of his confession. Corroboration
of the confession is required, but "the corroborative
evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the state-
ments, to establish the corpus delecti." Opper v. United
States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). The Government need only
establish the trustworthiness of Kampiles' confession,
which may be established here by, among other things, his
CIA employment, access, the fact that the copy of the manual
which Kampiles claimed he sold to the Soviets is missing
from CIA files, airplane tickets establishing his travel to
Greece, bank records establishing receipt of money by
Kampiles, and descriptions of the Soviet Embassy in Athens
and the DDI Operations Center corroborating descriptions
given by Kampiles in his confession. Assuming the
admissibility of the confession, therefore, and assuming
the Agency extends the same degree of cooperation to the
prosecution that it has extended in past cases, the chances
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of success are good. In this regard, you will recall that
in each of three recent espionage prosecutions involving
the CIA (Moore, Boyce-Lee, and Humphrey-Troung), the Depart-
ment has obtained convictions despite the significant and
unique problems which arose in each case.
(8) The only commitment required of the Agency in
advance of indictment is that which has been required in
every past case involving the CIA - full and complete
cooperation in the prosecution. As Department attorneys
have discussed with your counsel, the Department is proceed-
ing on the assumption that the full text of the II document
can be used at trial, if it becomes necessary despite all the
precautions which we will take. Of course we will entertain
any showing you may wish to make of an overwhelming national
security reason for doing otherwise. At this stage there are
no decisions as such for the Agency to make; prosecutive
judgments and decisions, as you are well aware, are solely
the responsibility of this Department based, in cases such
as this, in part on your advice and assistance.
With respect to the on inal source of information
regarding this compromise of II material, I fully appreciate
the extraordinary sensitivity of the source. I assure you
that the Department will do all in its power to protect the
source.
The Department intends to present the case for indictment
to a grand jury in Hammond in the Northern District of Indiana
this Friday, August 25. I am well aware that the compromise
of the manual, and the proaeci~tion of this case pose serious
problems for your Agency. They are, however, problems which,
as you know, have been overcome in the past and which can be
overcome in this case. Given the harm Kampiles has done the
CIA and this country, I am sure you will agree that Kampiles
must be prosecuted to the full extent of the law and that we
must do what can be done to accomplish this.
Yours sincerely,
rea s
cc: Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
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