NIGERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND CIVILIAN RULE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000200250002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1978
• Content Type: IM

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Assessment
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MORI # 663924
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Nigeria: The Evolution of
Foreign Policy and Civilian Rule
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Annexes
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NIGERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF
FOREIGN POLICY AND CIVILIAN RULE
Annexes
A. Nigeria in the North-South Dialogue
B. Nigerian Views of the USSR
C. Demographic Data
D. Economic Considerations
E. The Nigerian Armed Forces and International Peacekeeping
F. The Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs
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ANNEX A
NIGERIA IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE
Nigerian leaders have generally seen the North-
South dialogue as one means of establishing their bona
fides for leadership of the African states in the United
States and other multilateral settings. Although they do
not stand to gain very much from the specific propos-
als of the Group of 77 (G-77) on key issues, they lend
relatively uncritical support to the overall program for
a New International Economic Order. The North-
South meetings themselves do not engage Nigeria's
very best foreign service personnel, but its delegations
are typically loyal and sturdy in championing African
causes in caucuses.
Stances on Key Issues
Along with most other less developed countries,
Nigeria has moderated its stance from confrontation to
negotiation within the framework of the North-South
dialogue. It is, however, still a very strong advocate of
changes in the international economic order to benefit
the LDCs. In most instances, its delegations support
G-77 positions without significant modification or
interpretation.
- For political reasons, Nigeria unequivocally sup-
ports the G-77 concept of a Common Fund. It
views the "second window" as the most impor-
tant facet of the fund and would favor using this
mechanism to finance resource transfers to the
LDCs-including the underwriting of export
diversification, the processing of raw materials,
and the strengthening of research and develop-
ment capabilities. Lagos believes that direct
government contributions should be the major
source of funds. It also favors a greater role for
the LDCs in managing the fund than would
emerge from their respective share of
contributions.
Nigeria supports immediate debt relief for the
LLDCs, the landlocked countries, and those
classified as most seriously affected (MSAs) de-
spite its own small accumulated debt. While
concerned to maintain its good credit rating in
the commercial markets, the government views
debt relief for the poorer African countries as an
important means to increase aid flows.
Nigeria supports the concept of commodity
agreements as a way of protecting the purchas-
ing power of developing countries' earnings
from commodity exports. It exports four-cocoa,
palm oil, rubber, and tin-of the 18 commodi-
ties currently included in the United Nations'
Integrated Program for Commodities. Among
these, only cocoa is a substantial export earner at
present, although the government is seeking to
revive other agricultural activities eclipsed by
the oil boom.
Nigeria actively supports increased foreign aid
for developing countries, both bilaterally and
multilaterally. It is especially adamant that de-
veloped countries achieve the 0.7-percent-of-
GNP guideline for official development assist-
ance. Interestingly., the Nigerians have been
criticized by some African LDCs for not being
more forthcoming with their own economic aid.
Nigeria has taken an increasingly nationalistic
attitude toward foreign investment. Lagos sup-
ports G-77 proposals to strengthen a country's
bargaining position with foreign firms and at-
tempts to use investment policy as a club on
Western commercial ties to Rhodesia and South
Africa. The Lagos government is a strong critic
of what it terms exploitation of developing
countries by the multinationals, requiring that
foreigners participate on a partnership basis. A
joint-venture law is now strictly enforced requir-
ing at least 40-percent Nigerian ownership.
Other controls on foreign investment, though
tightening, are still loose by many LDCs'
standards.
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- Nigeria actively seeks increased and less costly
technology transfer to the Third World but
prefers to secure its own technical assistance on a
bilateral basis rather than through some interna-
tionally supervised technology clearinghouse.
Priority fields for the acquisition of technology
from abroad include petroleum and food proc-
essing, distribution facilities, and the develop-
ment of heavy industry.
- Nigeria is a leading moderate among LDCs in
the Law of the Sea negotiations. It is interested
principally in securing jurisdictional rights to a
proposed exclusive economic zone. Nigeria fa-
vors an arrangement, subject to bilateral agree-
ment, that would guarantee landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states access to the
sea and living resources of the coastal zones of
neighboring states. Nigeria supports easier LDC
acquisition of technology to exploit seabed re-
sources but is among the more constructive in
seeking practical means of implementation.
- Although any vested interest in the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (MTN) is muted by a still-
struggling manufacturing sector and a narrow
set of exports covered by other international
agreements, Nigeria is one of the more active
LDC participants. Lagos generally follows the
LDC line against proposals such as selective
application of safeguards while advocating LDC
exemption from countervailing duties and emer-
gency balance-of-payments measures. Nigeria is
a strong and vocal proponent of "special and
differentiated treatment" for the least devel-
oped countries in all areas of trade and for all
LDCs in the area of technical assistance. Lagos is
also concerned lest it lose some of the benefits
accorded by its participation in the Lome Con-
vention and other agreements.
Nigeria is one of the most active supporters of
G-77 demand for an expanded, permanent Gen-
eralized System of Preferences for trade with
LDCs. It is particularly displeased to be ex-
cluded from this system because of its member-
ship in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries. Like Indonesia, Venezuela, and Ec-
uador, it considers this treatment unfair because
it did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo.
Nigeria supports G-77 demands for increased
voting strength within international financial
institutions-particularly the IMF and IBRD-
whereby the LDCs would get greater repre-
sentation and weight in decisionmaking. (A
recent IMF quota review, which took into con-
sideration the growing economic power of the
OPEC states, resulted in a doubling of Nigeria's
weighted vote to reach about 1 percent of the
total.) Interestingly, Nigeria-like many other
Third World nations-eschews weighting and
argues for a one-nation one-vote rule for new
organizations, such as the proposed International
Seabed Authority, because this would assure
G-77 dominance.
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ANNEX B
NIGERIAN VIEWS OF THE USSR
As a generalization, informed Nigerians probably
pay about equal attention to the USSR and the United
States. Many view the US and West European coun-
tries as basically more relevant to Nigeria's own
interests and those of Africa than is the Soviet Union.
They feel the US potentially can-if it would only
act-do more than the USSR to bring about positive
and lasting benefits both to Nigeria and in terms of
desired social and political changes in southern Africa.
They were by and large suspicious of Soviet as well as
Western political intentions toward Nigeria and Africa
in general, and, since Nigeria's independence, the
USSR has made little progress in influencing the
course of Nigerian foreign policy. Despite increased
unease about the Soviet and Cuban role in Africa,
many Nigerians feel that the Soviets and Cubans have
stepped into the breach in order to help Africans help
themselves. Specifically, many Nigerians see the two
countries as playing an important and progressive role
both in militarily supporting southern African liber-
ation movements and in helping independent African
governments maintain their hard-won independence
and territorial sovereignty.
Views of the USSR Relative to the United States
Nigerians believe that Nigeria, as an aspiring region-
al power with a strong sense of independence vis-a-vis
all the outside world, should strive for a comparative
balance in relations with the two superpowers. They
see this as helping to offset the impression held by
many Nigerians that Nigeria's foreign policy has tilted
excessively toward the US and as helping to make
Nigeria's professed nonalignment more credible and
its dedication to African and Third World causes more
apparent. They feel Nigeria should try to keep rela-
tions on a relatively pragmatic, issue-oriented basis
that militates against an overly close relationship with
either great power. In sum, Nigerians feel that their
country must maintain at least outwardly cordial and
normally productive relations with the USSR, in part
to balance its relations with the US and the West
generally. They see periodic exchanges of high-level
visitors between Nigeria and eastern bloc countries as
one of the most obvious ways to serve this purpose.
They see continuing some economic and military links
with the USSR as leverage on the West, an adroit
balance in an essentially bipolar world.
Historically speaking, Nigeria's relationship with the
USSR and the US has not always been interrelated. A
decline in relations with one does not automatically
mean improvement in relations with the other. The
tone and warmth of each relationship to a degree are
set independently from events occurring in the other
relationship. This phenomenon will probably become
even more noticeable should Nigeria continue to
become an increasingly important and confident po-
litical force in Africa and the Third World.
Views of USSR Relative to Africa
Nigerians display ambivalent feelings toward the
Soviet role in Africa. By and large they maintain that
while there are some grounds for concern over the
Soviets and Cubans in Africa, there are some sound
reasons for their presence. Many Nigerians feel the US
is excessively preoccupied with the matter. This atti-
tude reinforces Nigerian opinion that US policy to-
ward Africa is critically shaped by concern over
Communist influence. Many Nigerians feel that the
presence of Soviets and Cubans in Africa is of more
appropriate concern to Africans than to Americans.
Nigerians view Africa's priorities as the liberation of
southern Africa and the maintenance of the territorial
integrity of independent African states against the
threat of secession or invasion. In this regard, they
currently see the Soviets and Cubans as less of a threat
to African nationalism than the continuation of white
minority rule and the possible dismemberment of an
African state. Nigerians view Nigeria as a "progres-
sive" force in Africa and so far see the Soviets as
generally siding with Africa's progressive states over
southern Africa, the Horn, and Angola.
Soviet presence is regarded by Nigerians as intro-
ducing the risk of superpower confrontation on the
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continent to the detriment of Africa's interests as
perceived by Nigeria. The risk seems acceptable to
many Nigerians, however, so long as the Soviet pres-
ence is not so great that it provides a US
counterresponse.
At the same time, the more informed Nigerians are
becoming more concerned and ill at ease over the
growing Soviet-Cuban role in Africa. They see the
USSR as a white, possibly colonialist great power and a
greater potential threat to Africa than the Cubans,
whom Nigerians do not regard as surrogates for the
Soviets. These Nigerians realize that Soviet influence
might not always be exerted for African causes which
Nigeria supports. Nigerian ambivalence toward the
Soviets could turn hostile should Moscow be perceived
as pursuing policies which Nigeria viewed as antitheti-
cal to its own interests or to its definition of Africa's
interests.
Because of Nigeria's overall commitment to major-
ity rule, Soviet provision of arms to southern African
liberation movements is welcomed by Nigerians. In
this regard, from the Nigerian perspective, the Soviets
have long done more to support liberation movements
than the US. Although Nigerians tend to believe force
will be the only eventual solution to the problems of
southern Africa, the more pragmatic feel that moder-
ate Western initiatives toward a settlement should
continue to be given a chance-along, however, with
continued guerrilla pressure to move negotiations for-
ward. These Nigerians would be reluctant to see
further drastic expansion of Soviet-Cuban support on
behalf of Rhodesian or Namibian nationalists unless all
hopes for peaceful settlements collapse. They are
reluctant to see another Angola-type civil war and the
threat of a superpower confrontation. Nonetheless
they believe the possibility of future Cuban activity in
southern Africa will spur Western efforts to reach
settlements.
The Nigerians reluctantly recognize that independ-
ent African states have the right to invite foreign
troops to help preserve their territorial integrity. Most
are unhappy over the presence of any foreign troops in
Africa, and prefer to see them withdrawn when
conditions permit this. In the recent Horn of Africa
conflict, Nigeria did not approve of Ethiopia's calling
for Soviet and Cuban help, but Somali aggression
made it palatable. Lagos did from time to time express
private concern over the massive infusion of Soviet
arms and Cuban troops in Ethiopia. It did not do so
vigorously, in part because of its own mediation effort
and because of its private sympathy for Ethiopia.
Nigeria's own civil war experience in crushing an
attempted secession also makes it reluctant to con-
demn publicly the use of foreign personnel to preserve
the territory of a fellow member of the Organization
of African Unity. As for Angola, the Nigerians are
privately embarrassed that the role of the Soviets and
Cubans continues to be so critical for the maintenance
of the MPLA in power and wishes President Neto
could be rid of them. Nigerians, nonetheless, continue
to accept the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola as
necessary for defense against the allegedly South
African-backed UNITA forces and to consolidate
Angolan independence under anti-South African
MPLA rule. There, as in Ethiopia, the Nigerians are
not likely to condemn the Soviet-Cuban presence
openly.
Closer to home, the Nigerians are more sensitive to
Soviet and Cuban activity. They view the Soviet and
Cuban presence in neighboring Benin with some
concern, for example, fearing that Cotonou might be
used as a base for interfering in Nigerian internal
affairs during the transition to civilian rule.
Views of the USSR in the Bilateral Context
In terms of strictly bilateral relations, Nigerians
would seem to want relatively little from the USSR.
Economic Sphere-Nigerians look primarily to the
US and Western Europe for trade, aid, and invest-
ment. They view the USSR as an occasionally useful
alternative to the West as a source of technology and
expertise they need for development. This serves them
as a useful counterpoise to basic dependence on the
West and helps give their proclaimed nonalignment
credibility. Overall, Soviet economic penetration in
Nigeria is quite modest. The Soviets account for less
than 3 percent of total foreign trade with Nigeria.
Lagos has turned to the Soviets in recent years for
support of only a few large contracts-construction
and staffing of an oil training institute, participation
with other countries in building a planned steel com-
plex, and construction of an oil pipeline. There is,
however, relatively little to show in the seven-year-old
steel project, which is a source of considerable annoy-
ance to the Nigerians.
For the future, conditions may be more favorable
for modest increases in Soviet economic penetration.
Nigeria's declining oil production and revenues, and
budgetary austerity projected at least through fiscal
year 1978/79, will cause the Nigerians to shop around
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for bargain prices on projects and credits. This, along
with Nigeria's recent tendency to work out state-to-
state economic arrangements, could provide some
greater opportunities for Soviet economic collabora-
tion. This seems unlikely to lead to any substantial
gains at Western expense.
Technical/ Education Training Sphere-Nigerians
clearly prefer Western degrees and technical training,
with American education becoming even more highly
regarded. The USSR is being accorded relatively small
numbers of technical trainees under the massive mid-
dle-level management training program that Nigeria
recently launched in cooperation with several foreign
countries, especially the US. There are fewer than 700
Nigerian students in all Communist countries versus
some 15,000 or more in the US alone.
Military Sphere-Nigerians, because of the cutoff of
foreign arms during Nigeria's own civil war, are
agreed on the need to diversify arms purchases to
avoid excessive dependence on any one source. None-
theless, they seem to regard the USSR as a more
reliable or convenient supplier of certain sophisticated
weaponry such as jet fighters than are Western coun-
tries. Many have not forgotten that the US and Britain
refused to sell fighters during the Nigerian civil war,
while the Soviets did-an act for which Nigerians are
still grateful. There is, however, considerable senti-
ment in the Nigerian Air Force today that, on techni-
cal grounds, Western fighter aircraft are preferable.
Nigerians also agree on the need to diversify mili-
tary training for Nigerian officers and specialists
among a variety of countries-currently the US, the
UK, India, and the USSR-for which Nigeria pays in
cash. Advanced staff training for hundreds of Nigerian
officers yearly in the United States and the UK is
particularly prized, though Nigeria has begun a pro-
gram to give more of such training at home and has
expressed interest in US assistance in developing the
Nigerian defense academy into a degree-awarding
institution. There are only about 25 to 30 military
advisers/technicans from the USSR in Nigeria in
connection with MIG-21 pilot training, and most of
the small number of Nigerian military trainees in the
USSR are being trained to maintain the aircraft. The
Nigerians are generally dissatisfied with the quality of
air force training provided by the USSR, along with
the lack of English-language capability among Soviet
advisers, and certainly with the racial attitudes.
Leftist Ideology in the Military-There is no evidence
of a core of pro-Soviet, leftist-oriented officers in the
Nigerian military. Generally speaking, there is little or
no adherence to any avant-garde ideology in either the
ruling military council or the officers corps itself. This
may be the result of the general ambivalence of the
officers corp toward Nigeria's intellectuals, including
homegrown socialists, who generally view the military
with disdain and feel they are less well educated and
less sophisticated.
Nigerian Communists and Socialists-Those few Ni-
gerians who pay the closest attention to the USSR, for
vested personal reasons, seem unlikely to emerge as a
major political force under civilian rule, although
leftist labor leaders could wield some influence.
Orthodox pro-Soviet Nigerian Communists, who can
probably be considered to be under direct Soviet
influence or control, account for only a small fraction
of the Nigerian left. Accurate figures are unavailable,
but the underground Communist movement probably
numbers some 5,000 or so. Nigerian Communists
contribute to the prosocialist orientation of the Ni-
gerian left, but there is no evidence that they domi-
nate it. They are drowned in a babble of socialist
rhetoric-some of it highly unorthodox-that comes
from Nigeria's indigenous, homegrown leftists. Soviet
propaganda probably provides some grist for socialist-
oriented individuals among students, journalists, law-
yers, and university professors. Indigenous leftists led
the anti-Western outcry in Nigeria over Western
opposition to recognition of the MPLA government of
Angola in 1975 and over the assassination in 1976 of
former Head of State General Muhammad, who
backed the MPLA government against its South Afri-
can-aided rivals.
Nigerian socialists were well represented on the
government-appointed committee that last year drew
up Nigeria's new draft constitution for civil rule. They
pressed-unsuccessfully--for a constitution that would
have called for Nigeria to be declared a socialist state
and committed it to work for socialist economic goals.
The draft constitution calls for continuation of a mixed
economy, with the government to manage the major
sectors of the economy--more or less like the present
system. Nigerian socialists have been among the most
persistent critics of the draft constitution. The issue of
whether or not Nigeria should be declared a socialist
state, however, did not become an issue of contention
in the constitutent assembly, which recently reviewed
the draft constitution and which approved without
apparent difficulty the section calling for a mixed
economy.
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Looking toward civilian rule, a socialist-oriented
party built around indigenous leftists will probably
emerge in alliance with or alongside a resurrected
quasi-Communist party. Such groups are likely to be a
limited force in Nigerian politics, though the issue of
economic retrenchment and how to manage the econ-
omy may provide leftist politicians with some greater
ammunition in political campaigning. The major par-
ties that will emerge will be based principally on
ethnic and regional appeal and not on their economic
philosophy. There have been some public suggestions
in Nigeria that the leftist labor unions-12 formerly
WFTU-affiliated group among the 43 component
unions that make up the new central Nigerian labor
organization, the Nigerian Labor Congress-should
unite with socialists to form a political party. The
government's new draft constitution and the constitu-
tion of the Nigerian Labor Congress would seem to
forbid such a formal linkup. While socialists undoubt-
edly can count on private political support from leftist
trade unions, the US Embassy doubts that the socialists
could effect a political marriage with the entire
Nigerian Labor Congress, whose president is a pro-
Soviet leftist.
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ANNEX C
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Nigerian demographic data are among the poorest
in the world. Birth and death statistics are published
regularly only for Lagos and are not representative of
the rest of the country. There are no reliable census
data from which to calculate and project current
demographic figures.
The 1963 census, which enumerated 55,670,055
people, is still used by the Nigerian Government as a
foundation for population estimates from which rev-
enue allocations are calculated. Most observers believe
that the 1963 census was overenumerated by as much
as 9 million and that the numbers were exaggerated
more in the north than in the south. It showed that
nearly 53 percent of the population (30 million peo-
ple) lived in the predominantly Muslim north, a figure
that was challenged in the predominantly Christian
south.
A 1973 census was nullified because of its even more
controversial conclusions. It showed that, of an overall
population of 79,758,969 (believed to be inflated more
than the 1963 census), the portion living in the north
had increased to 63 percent (50 million people).
A recently completed voter registration campaign
showed that, of the 47,433,757 Nigerians who regis-
tered to vote, 52 percent lived in the former Northern
Region, 21 percent in the former Eastern Region, 22
percent in the former Western Region, and 5 percent
in the old Mid-West Region. Although the regional
percentages are commensurate with those from the
1963 census, the figures may have been manipulated
by the Electoral Commission.
All data in this annex have been taken from United
Nations demographic reports or are based on UN
figures unless otherwise indicated. The UN figures in
turn have been calculated from a combination of
projections from the 1963 census and a few current
Nigerian statistics.
Current Population
The mid-1978 estimate of Nigeria's population is
68,486,000. Nigeria is the most populous country in
Africa and the tenth most populous in the world. Its
population accounts for about one-sixth of the total
population of Africa.
A Nigerian demographer, writing in the Lagos
Daily Times in March 1978, estimated the population
to be between 87,000,000 and 104,000,000. He based
his calculations on the number of Nigerians who have
registered to vote (18 is the minimum voting age) and
on a low estimate of 42 percent of the population
under 15, a high estimate of 48 percent of the
population under 15. The Electoral Commission has
announced that the total number of registered voters is
20 percent larger than projected. In any event, basing
a population estimate on Nigerian statistics is a risky
business.
Population Density
Population density in Nigeria is 74 persons per
square kilometer, about the same as in the state of
Illinois, and more than twice the figure for all of
Africa.
Growth Rate
Nigeria's population is growing at a rate of 2.85
percent yearly, a rate which will double the popula-
tion in 24 years. The current crude birth rate is 49.2
per thousand per year; the crude death rate is 20.7 per
thousand per year. The birth rate is among the highest
in the world and nearly three times the rate for the
United States (0.93 percent yearly). The death rate is
also among the world's highest, although currently
lower than the rates for most West African countries.
It is more than twice the rate for the United States.
The growth rate has risen steadily since the 1960s,
largely a result of improved health conditions and a
declining mortality rate. It is expected to reach 3.0
percent by 1980 and remain above 3.0 for the rest of
the century. The population is projected to reach
100,000,000 in the early 1990s (see table C-1).
Economic development is hard pressed to keep up
with population growth. Few officials, however, are
concerned with the rapid growth and there is no
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organized family planning program. Most officials
believe that the economy can absorb the expected
population increase.
cities. While unemployment continues to be a serious
problem for the young and little educated, skilled and
semiskilled workers are in short supply.
Table C-1
Population Projections for Nigeria
(thousands)
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
High variant
62,925
72,473
84,271
98,722
116,159
136,934
Medium
variant
62,925
72,469
84,215
98,439
115,261
134,680
Low variant
62,925
72,437
83,907
97,313
112,397
128,749
Life Expectancy
Life expectancy for Nigerians born in 1978 is 43.5
Age Structure
The Nigerian population, like that of other develop-
ing nations, is a youthful one. About 46 percent of the
population is under 15 years of age. The corresponding
figure for the United States is 28 percent. The median
age in Nigeria is less than 17; that in the United States
is 28.
Table C-2
Estimate and Projection of Percentage Distribution
of Nigerian Population by Major Age Group
Based on
(medium variant)
0-4
5-14
15-64
65 +
1970
18.3
26.5
52.9
2.2
1985
19.1
27.0
51.4
2.5
2000
18.4
27.9
50.9
2.8
The Labor Force
The Nigerian economy cannot absorb all of the new
entrants into the labor force, which is believed to
comprise between 3 million and 4 million wage
earners. Each year, more than 700,000 Nigerians
become potential entrants into the labor force-most
from the primary schools, about 50,000 from the
secondary schools, 2,000 from the universities. Many
of the candidates, however, continue their education,
many of the women marry, and many of the men stay
on the farm. Of the rest, about 116,000 obtain jobs,
according to the 1975-80 Nigerian Development Plan.
Probably about 200,000 Nigerians enter the ranks of
the unemployed each year. Most of the unemployed
are unskilled rural youths who have migrated to the
Urban Population
More than 20 percent of the Nigerian population
lives in towns of 20,000 or larger; about 11 percent
lives in cities of 100,000 or larger. The 1975 popula-
tion of Lagos was 1,060,848; including suburbs, it was
1,476,837. There are 26 other cities with populations
of more than 100,000.
The cities have grown at a much faster rate than the
rest of the country. Lagos is growing at a yearly rate of
more than 100,000. (A recent US Embassy estimate
placed the yearly increase at 250,000.) The rapid
urban growth has contributed to problems shared by
other major cities in developing countries: slums,
unemployment, lack of services, and high crime rates.
Education
The Nigerian literacy rate is estimated to be about
25 percent, a figure that has increased steadily since
independence. (The 25-percent rate may be mislead-
ing because many of those classed as literate have
fewer than four years of schooling.) Literacy varies
geographically: it is highest in urban areas of the south,
lowest in rural areas of the north. The Ibo and Yoruba
have a much higher literacy rate than the Hausa and
Fulani.
The north lags far behind the rest of the country in
quantity and quality of education. Few northerners
have received secondary schooling and few have been
Western educated. Most of Nigeria's educated man-
power comes from other parts of the country. The Ibo
surpass all other groups in educational level and have a
disproportionate number who have been trained in
Western universities.
Nigeria has a higher percentage of university gradu-
ates among its population than other black African
countries but otherwise has a low overall level of
education. The government has taken steps to rectify
this deficiency. It now spends more of its budget on
education than on any other developmental sector. It
embarked on a program in 1976 that is to increase
primary-school enrollment from less than 5 million in
1975 to 11 million in 1980, secondary-school enroll-
ment from less than 500,000 to 1 million. Enrollment
is being increased from 23,000 to 53,000 in the
university system with the addition of seven universi-
ties to the existing six.
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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
Oil is not a flexible foreign policy instrument for
Nigeria because of its own heavy economic depend-
ence on oil revenues. Finding new customers would be
too costly to Nigeria for Lagos to reduce or cut off oil
shipments except for the most dire political reasons.
The usefulness of oil as a political tool will be even
further reduced over the next several years as Nige-
ria's requirements for oil-generated income rise.
Agriculture is more of a burden than an asset in the
making of foreign policy. Major agricultural exports
are depressed and food imports are growing.
Economic Setting
Nigerian economic development has progressed rea-
sonably well since the onset of oil production two years
prior to independence in 1960. Led by petroleum
sector development and continuing good performance
in agriculture, real economic growth averaged a mod-
erate 5 percent during the early 1960s. Temporary
disruptions caused by the Baifran war (1967-70)
caused economic growth to decline sharply during
1966-68. Nevertheless, the economy was on the mend
even before the war ended, and the lost ground had
been recovered by 1970. Nigeria's present gross do-
mestic product (GDP)-around $30 billion-under-
writes a per capita income of nearly $400. Conse-
quently, although backward by OPEC standards, the
country ranks among the middle-income developing
countries and ranks high among African neighbors.
With the fourfold increase in oil prices in 1973-74,
the Nigerian Government embarked on a massive
development plan emphasizing infrastructure, educa-
tion, and industrialization. The resulting spending
spree sent consumer prices up at a 35-percent annual
rate and created a monumental backup of ships and
goods at the country's ports. Nigeria's balance-of-
payments surplus quickly dissipated, and Lagos en-
tered the Eurocurrency market this year for more than
$2 billion to maintain acceptable reserves of foreign
exchange. Despite these problems, real GDP growth
during 1975-77, although below planned levels, aver-
aged a respectable 7.5 percent a year. Most of the
expansion occurred in the construction, manufactur-
ing, and government services sectors.
The oil boom has exacerbated a range of socioeco-
nomic problems, particularly in Nigeria's rapidly
growing urban areas. In Lagos and other big cities,
attendant problems of high urban unemployment and
underemployment, overcrowded transportation facili-
ties, exorbitant rents, and traffic congestion rank with
the worst in the Third World. At the same time, a
relatively few businessmen and the government elite
have been able to accumulate substantial new wealth.
Although the government has made some strides in
using petroleum revenues for social betterment, the
average Nigerian still feels that he has benefited little
from oil wealth. Urban dwellers grumble over infla-
tion, corruption, and poor living conditions, while low-
ranking military personnel resent the perquisites of the
military elite.
Oil
Oil is by far Nigeria's most important economic
asset. It is a major world producer of high-quality,
light crudes and ships the bulk of its output to the
industrialized West. Nigeria is a close second to Saudi
Arabia as a source of US imported oil. The United
States, in turn, is by far the most important customer,
absorbing approximately half of Nigeria's exports.
Petroleum dominates the Nigerian economy, account-
ing for 35 percent of GDP, 90 percent of foreign
exchange earnings, and 80 percent of total public
revenues.
In terms of oil reserves, at 20 billion barrels Nigeria
ranks well below the leading Middle East producers.
At the same time, petroleum revenues are the key to
financing the expansion of the country's economic
base, before the oil fields are exhausted. These facts
have governed official oil policy for the past several
years and have given a sense of urgency to the ongoing
multibillion-dollar industrialization program. Current
reserves would sustain the recent average production
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rate of 2 million barrels per day through the end of
this century.
To conserve oil resources and yet maintain a high
level of vital revenues, the present regime has followed
an aggressive oil policy that has placed severe strains
on government relations with the producing oil com-
panies. Lagos has imposed production ceilings on most
of the oilfields. In many cases, these ceilings are so low
that wells are producing at uneconomic levels; in
others, the reduced flow rate is causing wells to
become clogged with sand, affecting their productive
capacity. Until recently, the government focused its
pricing efforts on maximizing per-barrel revenues
through several unilateral price increases that made
Nigerian oil among the most expensive of the crudes
produced by members of the Organization of Petrole-
um-Exporting Countries (OPEC). Company profits
during much of the 1975-77 period hovered around 30
cents a barrel, which officials claimed was inadequate.
Investment flows were cut to a trickle.
Nigeria is feeling the impact. Production capacity
has declined from 2.5 million b/d to 2.3 million b/d, a
result of (1) the absence of proper routine mainte-
nance to prevent wells from sanding up and (2)
normal depletion of developed reservoirs without
bringing enough new wells into operation. In addition,
Lagos has been hit hard by the increased availability
of cheaper North Sea and Alaskan oil and has failed to
keep pace with price reductions by traditional com-
petitors, particularly Algeria and Libya. Monthly out-
put slipped from an average of 2.1 million b/d last
year to 1.5 million b/d in March, the lowest in more
than six years.
Since last summer, the government has indicated
that it is finally coming around to a more pragmatic
petroleum policy. Lagos first attempted to get oil
investment on the move again by providing a package
of increased tax writeoffs and other financial incen-
tives to expand oil company operations and to speed
up development of high-cost offshore areas. More
recently, it has adopted a more flexible oil pricing
policy designed to boost sales and stabilize company
profits during the current world market slump. Lagos
has cut prices twice this year and is offering an
additional discount to customers who raise their lift-
ings beyond the average for the January-March 1978
period. Liquefied natural gas exports could offset
some of the decline in oil exports, provided some
major problems are overcome. Current plans call for
building one LNG facility with a capacity of 2 billion
cubic feet per day and an estimated price tag of $7-8
billion. Foreign oil companies participating in the
project are to provide one-third of the cost, but they
are hesitant to put up their share without government
guarantees of some kind. The companies anticipate an
unstable political environment associated with the
return of civilian rule. Lagos has also been unable to
secure firm orders for the LNG. It is counting on the
US to become the sole market for the LNG exports,
but the US administration's energy program may well
hold US purchases below what Lagos has in mind.
Nigeria could be exporting LNG by 1983 if all the
obstacles are removed within the next six months or so.
Nigeria and OPEC
Nigeria views its membership in OPEC as one of its
most important and beneficial foreign associations.
Nigeria's main aim in OPEC is to maximize its oil
revenues, and its policy, under the Obasanjo regime,
has been to press for the highest possible oil prices. In
view of prospects for only limited increases in oil
production and Nigeria's growing revenue require-
ments to maintain economic growth, Lagos can be
expected to support maximum oil prices.
Loyalty to OPEC and the high priority it assigns to
its own development needs have prevented Lagos
from selling oil at concessionary prices to other Afri-
can countries to win political support for its claim to
continental leadership. The only relief that Nigeria
supports is to participate in OPEC's special oil fund,
which assists developing countries in financing in-
creased oil import bills.
Although Nigeria fully supports OPEC, it has ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with members attitudes toward
sub-Saharan Africa. Lagos takes a particularly jaun-
diced view of the activities of radical Arab states in
black Africa, especially those of Libya and Algeria,
which are regarded as potential competitors for lead-
ership in Africa. Recently, Nigeria has begun to
complain that the Arab states have not extended as
much support to southern Africa's struggle for major-
ity rule as Africa has for the Arab position in the
Middle East.
Agriculture
Nigeria's agricultural sector will not pick up the
anticipated slack in oil earnings. Indeed, any increase
in rural export earnings will depend largely on favor-
able market prices rather than increased output.
Agricultural production, the pre-oil backbone of the
Nigerian economy, has not recovered from the devas-
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tation of the 1967-70 civil war. Production has de-
clined because of limited availability of fertilizer and
other inputs, the loss of productive labor as young
farmers migrated to higher paying jobs in the cities,
and-in the case of export crops-low government-
controlled producer prices. During the past several
years, these problems have been exacerbated by dis-
ease and adverse weather that have had a particularly
severe impact on the peanut and cocoa harvests. As a
result, Nigeria-formerly the world's leading peanut
exporter-is now importing peanut oil, and has
slipped from its pre-civil-war position as the second
largest cocoa producer to fourth.
Government efforts to revitalize agriculture offer
little change for significant improvement. Although
government-set producer prices for major export crops
were raised substantially during 1975-77, farm in-
comes have barely kept pace with inflation.
Federal commodity boards are attempting to induce
farmers away from subsistence living and into market
farming by guaranteeing a ready market and a mini-
mum income. A long list of conditions, however, has to
be met to qualify for loans, and it is uncertain whether
the boards' prices are sufficiently attractive. Moreover,
only a small fraction of the targeted credit volume to
farmers has been made available, despite government
pressure on commercial banks to increase agricultural
loans. Some progress has been made in government-
sponsored irrigation schemes, but other major pro-
grams involving commercial crop and livestock devel-
opment projects have been given low priority by the
regime.
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SECR
THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES
AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
Overview of the Nigerian Armed Forces
The Nigerian armed forces, the largest in black sub-
Saharan Africa, are capable of maintaining internal
security, but do not have the capabilities in logistics,
maintenance and troop transport for sustained combat.
Although poorly qualified to constitute a large interna-
tional peacekeeping force, the armed forces are capa-
ble of contributing two or three battalions, including
the one already serving with the United Nations
Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
The Nigerian Army is a force of some 225,000 men.
(Even the Nigerians are unsure of the exact Army
strength, indicating the lack of organization and con-
trol which characterizes the force.) The Army is
basically an infantry force organized into four divi-
sions. A major reorganization plan designed to reduce
the size of the force and improve its mobility and
other capabilities has been under way for several
years, but its effects so far have been very limited.
Although Nigeria is moving to phase out obsolescent
items and upgrade the quality of its inventory, the
Army's supply of weapons and equipment is generally
adequate for its missions. Nigeria's ability to support
its forces with locally produced materiel is limited,
and most arms and equipment are purchased from
Britain and the USSR. Weapons on hand include
Scorpion light tanks; Saracen armored personnel carri-
ers; Panhard, Saladin, and Ferret armored cars; 105-
mm and 122-mm howitzers; and 20-mm and 40-mm
air defense artillery.
ANNEX E
become habituated to living at the expense of the
populace. The level of training, moreover, is extremely
low. Training during recent years has been limited to
some ceremonies, a few firing exercises, and an inten-
sive competitive sports program. Little combat-associ-
ated training takes place.
Logistics and Organization
Because of Nigeria's limited air and sea transport
capabilities, extensive external logistic support would
be required to move anything more than small num-
bers of Nigerian troops and their materiel to a peace-
keeping operation. Nigeria's ability to transport and
support forces abroad is confined primarily to the Air
Force's six C-130H and three F-27/28 aircraft supple-
mented by civil aircraft. While the C-130s have
performed well, first in shuttling about 2,500 Zim-
babwe guerrillas and recruits between Mozambique
and Tanzania in mid-1977, and then in assisting civil
aircraft in transporting the 81st Infantry Battalion and
its equipment to Lebanon, major problems persist in
the areas of maintenance, logistics, and trained person-
nel. An example of the severe pilot shortage is the
availability of only three qualified crews to fly both
the C-130s and the F-27/28s.
The Navy, largely a coastal patrol force, is not
capable of contributing to troop transport or support
activities since its one light cargo ship is inoperable.
Although the Army staff is currently attempting to
develop a logistic system along the lines of the United
States Army logistics will remain a serious problem for
some time to come. Inept maintenance personnel and
poor repair practices cause a high proportion of
weapons and equipment to be out of operation at any
one time. For example, the Nigerian Army purchased
5,000 trucks from the United States, but in a short time
over half were inoperable or destroyed because of
misuse and the lack of preventive maintenance. Sup-
ply procedures are inadequate to support long-term or
large-scale combat operations.
Quality of Personnel
Many
officers are involved in their own personal enterprises
and are frequently absent from their duties.
because of
years of living outside military quarters, the force has
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SECRET
Nigeria's air and sealift capabilities are unlikely to
increase significantly in the future. The Air Force has
focused on developing its fighter and helicopter units
rather than on enlarging its fleet of transport aircraft,
and, although the number of pilots on duty will grow,
few are likely to be assigned to the transport group.
Similarly, the Navy's plans for modernization and
expansion call for purchases of frigates and patrol craft
but not transport ships.
Mobilization Capability
The Army was able to deploy the 81st Infantry
Battalion to UNIFIL on relatively short notice, but
few other units are likely to match this state of
readiness. Given time, Lagos could devote resources to
preparing additional battalions for possible peacekeep-
ing roles. Indeed, in anticipation of the formation of a
UN Zimbabwe Force, part of the Anglo-American
plan for Rhodesia, Nigeria indicated its willingness to
contribute and in October 1977 designated the 29th
Infantry Battalion as the unit that would be sent.
Presumably training for this or a comparable mission
is continuing, but the state of readiness is unknown.
Those ground force units that were sufficiently trained
and equipped for overseas duty could be supplement-
ed by the National Police Mobile Force (NPMF), a
paramilitary organization that is considered superior
to the Army in terms of training, discipline, communi-
cations, and equipment maintenance. However, dur-
ing the transition to civilian rule the Federal Military
Government will probably prefer to keep the mobile
police readily available in case of domestic unrest, and
the new civilian government will probably make
similar calculations, so it is unlikely that the NPMF
will be deployed abroad in the foreseeable future.
For a wide variety of reasons, which are probably
not subject to change except over the long term, the
Nigerian armed forces are ill prepared for a major role
in an international peacekeeping force, although a few
battalion-size units could be assembled to form part of
a larger force.
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ANNEX F
THE NIGERIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
The Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is
headed by a commissioner, usually a member of the
Supreme Military Council (SMC), the collegial body
that governs Nigeria. The current Commissioner is
Maj. Gen. Henry Adefope. The Commissioner is as-
sisted by a career staff headed by a Permanent
Secretary. The ranking civil servant within the Minis-
try, the Permanent Secretary serves as head of the
Ministry's civil service establishment and as the chief
adviser to the minister. The incumbent is John
Ukegbu. The Ministry is divided into 14 major sec-
tions, which appear in the Nigerian Office Directory
as follows:
Protocol Department
Administration Department
Economic Department
Consular and Legal Department
Passport Section
Internal Liaison Unit
International Organization Department
Information and Cultural Department
European Department
Pilgrimage Commission
Americas Department
Asia and Pacific Department
Overseas Communications Branch
Internal Audit Section
There are approximately 220 professionals/quasi-
professionals in the MEA. Major policy decisions are
made by the senior government and MEA officials,
but there are approximately 45 individuals in the
MEA, ranging from high to middle level, who are
involved in the policymaking area. (That number
excludes members of those departments concerned
with internal and administrative functions.)
Those senior government members most involved in
foreign policy decisions attended military schools in
the United Kingdom, including Lt. Gen. Olusejun
Obasanjo, Chairman of the SMC; Lt. Gen. Theophilus
Y. Danjuma, Army Chief of Staff; and Brig. Shehu
Yar'Adua, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters.
MEA Permanent Secretary Okegbu, was educated in
the United States and has an advanced degree in
agricultural economics. The less influential MEA
members who have some input into policymaking
were educated primarily in Nigeria.
The average high- and middle-level MEA official is
in his forties and pursued his higher studies in Nigeria,
but a good number attended schools abroad, predomi-
nantly in the United Kingdom and the United States.
A high percentage of these officers are career foreign
service officers.
Nigeria has accredited ambassadors to all but nine
of the 111 countries with which it has diplomatic
relations. It also has representatives at the United
Nations, at the European Economic Community, and
with the Vatican.
Available information indicates that of the 72 ac-
credited Nigerian ambassadors 24 received their high-
er education in the United Kingdom, with approxi-
mately five having achieved an advanced degree,
three of them in law. The most frequently attended
British schools are the University of London, Cam-
bridge, Oxford, Lincoln's Inn, and the Royal Military
Academy (Sandhurst). Three ambassadors received
their postsecondary education in the United States and
attended Harvard and Cornell and the Universities of
Connecticut and Pittsburgh. Two ambassadors were
educated in France and Italy. The remaining ambassa-
dors received their higher education in Nigeria. The
majority of Nigerian diplomats have MEA back-
grounds, but there are a few whose backgrounds are in
economic or administrative affairs. Some have come
through the ranks of regional government and later
into the MEA.
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Nigerian embassies vary in size from four to 69
individuals. Most of the Nigerian missions in Africa
are relatively small-for example, four individuals in
The Gambia, five in Tanzania, seven in Kenya, and
nine in Benin. There are, however, 13 in Ethiopia,
presumably in part because of the presence of the
Organization of African Unity there. The Nigerians
have eight persons at their Embassy in Turkey, 11 in
West Germany, 13 in France, and 69 in Great Britain;
the USSR rates 17, while Romania has five. There are
five Nigerians in Japan, 11 in the People's Republic of
China, two in Iraq, 11 in Tunisia, and 10 in Saudi
Arabia. There are 27 individuals in the Nigerian
Embassy in the United States and 18 at the UN
Mission.
In the last few years, the FMG has stressed an
increase in educational facilities and the availability of
education in Nigeria. In 1974 the university enroll-
ment in Nigeria was 25,000. This may be the begin-
ning of a trend in the country resulting in an increase
in the number of totally Nigerian-trained diplomats
and government officials.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
24 April 1980
TO:
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