ELECTRIC POWER FOR CHINA'S MODERNIZATION: THE HYDROELECTRIC OPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000300050012-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 1, 1980
• Content Type: RP

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Center
Electric Power for
China's Modernization:
The Hydroelectric Option
A Research Paper
FR 80-10089U
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National
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Assessment
Center
Electric Power for
China's Modernization:
The Hydroelectric Option
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
on 31 January 1980,
Comments and queries on this unclassified report
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ER 80-10089U
May 1980
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Key Judgments
Electric Power for
China's Modernization:
The Hydroelectric Option
Shortages of electric power probably will restrain the development of
China's economy throughout the 1980s. Such shortages have been a major
factor in the recent slowdown of economic growth and probably will prolong
the current period of economic readjustment.
To help meet future power needs, the Chinese are seriously considering a
massive program to construct hydroelectric power stations. China has the
world's largest hydroelectric resources. Although the bulk of these resources
is located in remote areas of west and southwest China, an estimated
145,000 to 220,000 MW of exploitable hydroelectric capacity can be
transmitted to major industrial centers using China's existing technology.
This is about three to five times China's total installed capacity (thermal
and hydro) at yearend 1978.
The proposed new hydro projects are much larger than any previously built
in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and will undoubtedly require
extensive foreign assistance. The Chinese lack the technical, managerial,
and financial resources to build the huge hydroelectric projects that are
required to permit the economy to expand at an acceptable rate during the
1980s. Work on massive amounts of new hydro capacity will have to start in
1980 and 1981 to bring on line in the late 1980s enough hydroelectric plants
to maintain hydro's present share of generation. Chances are good that the
PRC will sign major contracts within a year or two to obtain foreign help in
building several of the projects currently under consideration.
The Chinese will probably push construction of new thermal plants to help
meet demand until the new hydro projects come online. The PRC is pushing
a short-term electric power policy to narrow the gap between supply and
demand during the current period of readjustment. This program calls for
accelerated work on thermal and hydroplants currently under construction,
increased utilization of existing plants, and nationwide conservation.
The success of China's hydroelectric program depends on a number of
factors. Political stability over the next five- to 10-year period is essential; a
return to the internal instability and confused economic planning of the past
would be disastrous. An adequate source of financing also is crucial to the
success of the program. The electric power industry, moreover, will have to
be given priority over most other industrial sectors for domestic capital and
for access to long-term foreign loans.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
China's Energy Supply
1
Energy Production Problems
1
Future Energy Needs
2
China's Electric Power System
2
Power Shortages
3
Future Demand for Electricity
Adjusting Electricity Supplies
4
Generating Options
Electricity Supply and Demand Prospects for
Mid- and Late 1980s
5
Meeting 1985 and 1990 Capacity Requirements
Hydropower in China
7
Hydroelectric Resources
7
Hydroelectric Development, 1949-79
Mixed Results
9
The Sanmen Fiasco
9
Small Hydroelectric Stations
9
Hydropower Development Plans
10
The Planning of Power System Expansion
10
Visions and Revisions: Readjusting Hydroelectric
10
Development Plans
The Suspended 10-Year Plan
10
Shifts in Priorities
11
Domestic or Foreign Technology
11
Allocation of Foreign Reserves
12
500-kV Transmission System in the Works
12
Outlook
13
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Tables
1. China: Energy Supply, 1978
2. China: Electricity Production 2
3. China: Generating Capacity in Large Power Plants 3
4. China: Meeting 1985 and 1990 Electricity Requirements 6
Corresponding to Selected Rates of GNP Growth
5. China: Geographical Distribution of Hydroelectric Resources, 1979 8
A-1. China: Large Hydroelectric Plants Under Construction I 5
A-2. China: Hydroelectric Plants of 100 MW or Larger 17
A-3. China: Proposed Major Hydroelectric Development Projects 21
B-1. China: Natural Gas Production 23
8-2. Source Notes for Appendix B 24
Appendixes
A. Chinese Hydroelectric Plants 15
B. China: Natural Gas Production 23
vi
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Electric Power for
China's Modernization:
The Hydroelectric Option
Introduction
China has embarked on a new program to exploit its
enormous hydroelectric resources. The present govern-
ment recognizes the need to improve the power system
and has put hydroelectric plants high on its list of
investment priorities. It has begun taking measures to
implement the hydroelectric development program
including investigations of what foreign countries can
provide in terms of technical help, equipment, con-
struction contracts, and financial aid.
This paper discusses the choices Beijing faces in its
attempt to overcome the problems of providing energy
for modernization and the role that hydroelectric
power might play in the modernization program.
Official information on China's plans is meager; we
believe the Chinese have not yet worked out all of their
priorities. Nevertheless, we have been able to piece
together the general thrust of their hydroelectric
construction program.
China's Energy Supply
China is well endowed with fossil fuel and hydropower
resources. Coal reserves of at least 1.5 trillion metric
tons are exceeded only by those of the United States
and the Soviet Union, ultimately recoverable oil and
natural gas reserves ' may amount to about 100 billion
barrels of oil and oil equivalents, and China leads the
world in hydropower resources.
These energy resources, except for oil, have hardly
been tapped. Despite a rapid growth in oil production,
in 1978 coal still provided 73 percent of China's
energy; oil was the source of about 23 percent; natural
gas and hydroelectric provided 3 and 1 percent,
respectively (see table 1).
' Ultimately recoverable reserves refers to that part of the oil in situ
that could eventually be located and produced given reasonable
assumptions about technology and development costs.
Table 1
China: Energy Supply, 1978
Units
MTCE '
Percent
Total
625.2 MTCE
625.1
100.0
Coal
616.0 MMT
458.4
73.3
Oil
94.7 MMT
142.0
22.7
Natural gas '
13.7 billion
cubic meters
18.1
2.9
Hydroelectric
53.0 billion kWh
6.6
LI
' Million metric tons of standard coal equivalent (7,000 kilocalories
per kilogram).
Million metric tons. Data are for raw coal.
' See table B-1 for a recently revised natural gas series.
More importantly, energy production has not kept up
with demand. This reflects both inadequate planning
and poor implementation of economic plans. The
Chinese must coordinate energy production with other
parts of their economic development program and
target an appropriate mix of fuels and electric power.
Energy Production Problems
China's energy industries suffer from a variety of
problems that Beijing must address as it readjusts
energy investment priorities. Shortages of all forms of
energy are common, and huge investments in new
production capacity are needed if economic growth is
to be maintained.
The rate of growth of oil output, for example, has
declined in the last few years because production at
large first-generation fields has reached a plateau and
high-volume production at the next generation has
been delayed by China's limited ability to handle some
technical aspects of exploration and development.
While the effects of slower growth of production can be
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mitigated for several years by substituting coal for oil
in power plants and by changing the refining mix, new
fields must be developed for future consumption and
export.
Increases in China's coal production during the past
two decades were achieved mainly by expanding
existing mineshafts and opening small rural mines.
This growth formula will no longer work; large-scale
investment in new, large, modern mines is required.
Future Energy Needs
Until a new economic development plan is announced,
the rate of growth of China's energy needs is left to
conjecture. We estimate that the 1970-1978
energy/GNP elasticity?that is, the ratio of the rate of
growth of energy supply to the rate of economic
growth?was 1.4. Chinese officials admit, however,
that their industries waste a lot of fuel, and energy
conservation efforts, which are part of the economic
readjustment program, were fairly successful during
1979. But these initial achievements for the most part
represent one-timci gains and it remains to be seen what
medium- to long-term effect, if any, conservation
programs will have on China's energy/GNP elasticity.
Several facets of China's present development policies
run counter to its conservation program. The Chinese,
for example, plan to increase investment in industries
that consume large amounts of energy, such as
nonferrous metals and transportation. Agriculture, no
doubt, will also become more energy intensive if trends
in mechanization and use of chemical fertilizer con-
tinue. In addition, demand for electric power in the
residential sector could take off if more televisions and
household appliances are put on sale in China.
Additional demand will be placed on energy growth by
China's desire to export oil and coal. China should be
able to meet its oil and coal export commitments to
Japan and a few other countries for the early 1980s if
new fields and mines come into production on sched-
ule. Any significant expansion of exports, however,
would require considerable luck in locating large
deposits of oil and large investments in development of
oilfields and coal mines as well as the infrastructure to
serve them.
Table 2
China: Electricity Production
Year
Total Electricity
(Million kWh)
Per Capita
(kWh)
1949
4,300
8
1952
7,300
13
1957
19,300
30
1965
63,000
84
1970
107,000
126
1975
187,000
196
1976
203,460
210
1977
223,400
226
1978
256,550
256
The substitution of noncxportable hydroelectricity for
fossil fuels or thermally generated electricity could
reduce the rate of growth of demand for oil and coal
over the long run in China. Therefore, hydropower
resources offer an attractive and renewable energy
source for badly needed power generation in many
parts of the country.
China's Electric Power System
After 30 years of Communist rule, China's electric
power system is still in the early stages of growth.
Generation and transmission technology is about 10 to
20 years behind the West. Regional grids are not well
developed and local grids tend to be small with few ties
with their neighbors. Nevertheless, from 1949 to 1978
generation increased from 4.3 billion kilowatthours
(kWh) to 256.6 billion kWh, and annual generation
per capita grew from 8 to 256 kWh (see table 2).
Although China has about 90,000 power plants, most
are small; a few hundred large power stations
(capacities greater than 24 megawatts) generate most
of the power. Nearly 75 percent of the generating
capacity in large plants is thermal, mostly coal-fired.
The balance is hydro (see table 3). Thermal generation
predominates in north, northeastern, and central
China; hydropower in the south, southwest, and
northwest.
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Table 3 Megawatts
China: Generating Capacity in
Large Power Plants '
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Total
35,600
37,700
41,600
45,600
47,600
Hydro
11,300
11,600
12,100
12,700
12,800
Therinal
24,300
26,100
29,500
32,900
34,800
' Plants with capacities greater than 24 megawatts.
2 Data are for mid-1979. Data for other years show capacity on
31 December.
Power Shortages
China's electric power system has not grown fast
enough to meet the increasing demand from industry
and agriculture. There have been widespread reports of
factories operating at 70 to 80 percent of capacity
because of electricity shortages, and many new plants
have been unable to start operations because of
insufficient electric power.
In addition, inadequate transmission lines are
frequently overloaded, which multiplies losses and
undermines system stability. Blackouts, brownouts,
and fluctuations in frequency are nationwide prob-
lems. Moreover, the problems inherent in an inad-
equate power system have been compounded in recent
years by drought, which reduced hydroelectric genera-
tion in many parts of the country and increased the
need for electricity to operate irrigation pumps, and
localized coal shortages which undermined thermal
generation in some areas.
In order to maximize generation, the Chinese keep
little generating capacity in reserve. As a result, major
electricity users on the same grid often coordinate their
hours of operation in order to maintain a high load
factor. When demand exceeds supply, load is reduced
by cutting off low priority consumers. Residential
consumers, whose use is generally limited to a few
kilowatthours per month, have the lowest priority.
Average residential use in China is estimated to be
10 kWh per month per household which surpasses
India's but is minute when compared to about 900
kWh per month in the United States.
Future Demand for Electricity
In their recent drive to conserve electricity, the
Chinese have claimed that 10 billion kWh of electricity
can be saved annually if line losses in rural areas
reportedly as high as 20 percent of generation?are
reduced and if major industrial enterprises cut per unit
consumption to its previous minimum levels. While
some line losses can be eliminated by improving
transformer and circuit breaker maintenance, other
savings require investments to expand transmission
capacity. If such investments are approved, several
years would be required to install additional
transmission lines.
China's leaders are moving the economy along paths
that promise to continue past trends in growth of
electricity consumption. We estimate that China can
reduce growth of electricity consumption by only a few
percentage points at most within the next five years
without a decline in the growth rate of GNP. This
would slow the upward trend in the ratio of electricity
generation to GNP only slightly.
Through mechanization and the use of chemical
fertilizer, Chinese agriculture requires increasing
amounts of energy. Intensive cultivation requires not
only tractors and combines but pumps for irrigation
and drainage. Although many of these pumps are run
by internal combustion engines, electricity has become
the preferred power source in recent years. This policy
is likely to continue in order to free up petroleum
products for transportation use or for export.
China's heavy industry sector will become more
electricity intensive as the quality of metals produced
is upgraded. Planned increases in the output of high-
quality steel and steel alloys will require increased use
of electric furnaces. Expansion of rolled steel products
also will increase the intensity of electrification of the
steel industry. Beijing also plans new investments in
nonferrous metals, particularly aluminum and copper,
production of which requires huge amounts of
electricity.
Expansion of the light industry sector also will require
more electricity to provide lighting, motive power, and
perhaps some processing heat. Although light indus-
tries are not as energy intensive as heavy industries, the
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factories will require the construction of many new
power plants. New products from light industrial
plants, such as televisions and household appliances,
will spur electricity demand in the residential sector.
Adjusting Electricity Supplies
Power shortages probably were a major impetus for the
period of economic readjustment. The Chinese realize
that investments in power plants must be stepped up
relative to investments in other heavy industry and
have announced their intention to do so. Large power
plants, however, require four or more years to build.
Beijing therefore has adopted a short-term stralegy to
ameliorate the problem while officials draw up electric
power development plans for the mid- and late 1980s.
During the period 1979-81 Beijing is emphasizing
increased efficiency in electricity generation,
transmission, and use. Efforts are being made to boost
thermal power plant output by increasing the
utilization of turbogenerators through improved main-
tenance. People's Daily reported that such efforts
restored 2,400 megawatts (MW) of idle capacity to
service in 1978, facilitating the generation of an extra
40 million kWh daily in [979. Beijing also has adopted
the goal of reducing electricity consumption within
power plants and of lowering transmission losses from
the present 16 to 17 percent of gross generation to
below 15 percent. In Europe, by contrast, plant use and
line losses totaled 11.8 percent of output in 1976.
Consumers of electricity also are expected to avoid
inefficient and low priority uses.
China is speeding up power plant construction as well.
New additions to capacity during the adjustment
period will come from plants that already are well
under way. Beijing announced that work was being
accelerated on a number of thermal power plants as
well as the Baishan, Dahua (Guangxi), Longyangxia,
Wujiangdu, and Xierhe hydroelectric projects, some of
which may start generating by 1980.
Because of the long leadtimes involved, the push on
power plant construction will not have a great impact
within three years, the original length of the
readjustment period. In fact, it remains to be seen if
China can do much more by 1982 than prevent I he
shortages from getting worse. Beijing apparently
realized this and released modest electric power goals
for 1979: to increase generation by 7.2 percent above
1978 and to boost generating capacity by 2 percent. In
comparison, growth in these respective areas averaged
11.1 percent and 9.6 percent annually from 1975
through 1978. To better allocate electricity supplies
according to national priorities, China is centralizing
control of electricity distribution.
Generating Options
Nuclear, conventional thermal, and hydropower plants
constitute China's options for new baseload generation
to come on line throughout the 1980s.
It appeared that China had rejected nuclear power in
the spring of 1979 when it suspended a deal with
France for two 900-MW pressurized-water reactors
valued at about $2 billion. This deal was the culmina-
tion of a 1978 review of generating options and an in-
depth look at Western-made nuclear equipment. Some
Chinese leaders, however, renewed the call for nuclear
power during the winter of 1980. We expect that if a
Chinese nuclear power program is implemented, it will
be small initially, not exceeding a very minor fraction
of installed capacity before the end of the decade.
Most, if not all, new thermal capacity will be coal-
fired. China is shifting away from the use of oil for
power production and has been converting to coal
power plants that have boilers designed to use either
fuel. Natural gas supplies are still tight and natural gas
probably will not be a significant power plant fuel
through the 1980s.
At present, China appears to be leaning toward a mix
of hydroelectric and coal-fired plants that will balance
the local availability of water power and coal with a
construction pace in tempo with its overall moderniza-
tion effort. Because of the leadtimes for very large
hydro stations, coal-fired thermal plants will continue
to be the major source of new generation before 1987
beyond those power plants now under construction. We
estimate that in China an average of seven years will be
required from the day work starts until the first unit is
brought on line at a hydroelectric station with a design
capacity of 250 MW or more. Additional units could
be added at a much quicker pace. In the past, however,
Chinese hydroelectric construction was greatly slowed
by economic and political instability and it took an
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average of 14 years from ground breaking to comple-
tion of hydroelectric plants of this size.
When speed of construction is not a constraint,
hydroplants offer the Chinese many advantages.
Hydro stations consume no coal or oil?exports of
which the Chinese would like to increase. The environ-
mental impact of hydroplants, unlike those of thermal
plants, can be turned into benefits via multipurpose
development that combines irrigation, flood control,
improved navigation, or commercial fishery develop-
ment with power generation.
The main shortcomings of hydro to the Chinese will be
the large inputs of materials needed for dam construc-
tion and transmission equipment, and the possible need
to flood good farmland for reservoirs. On the other
hand, thermal power may be constrained by
difficulties in transporting coal to power plants.
Electricity Supply and Demand Prospects
for Mid- and Late 1980s
Because of long leadtimes China must step up its
power plant construction activities during the early
1980s if power supply is to keep pace with the demands
of the economic modernization drive, which will be
particularly strong by the late 1980s. In addition to
those plants presently under construction, China will
have to add thermal power stations and perhaps small
hydros to cover short-term needs. They also have to
begin construction of proposed large hydroelectric
plants no later than 1982.
To estimate China's need for additional generating
capacity to 1990, we compared electricity demand and
power station construction scenarios. For most indus-
trializing countries, including China, the ratio of
electricity supply to GNP increases over time. Demand
was estimated by applying the projected trend of the
1970s in the electricity supply/GNP ratio to GNP
projections. Because China's modernization program
is emphasizing industries and activities that are
electricity intensive, we believe that despite conserva-
tion programs, the electricity/GNP ratio will continue
to grow at least at historic rates over the mid- to long
term.
'Data from the 1960s were not used because they were incomplete
and because the Cultural Revolution years were considered atypical.
China does not have a measure of national output that is equivalent
to GNP. NFAC estimates of GNP were used.
The growth of electricity demand through the 1980s
will be directly related to the rate and areas of
expansion of China's economy. We feel that a
7-percent rate of' GNP growth is consistent with the
industrial and agricultural targets announced under
the suspended 10-year plan (1976-1985) and repre-
sents the probable upper limit. During the period of
economic readjustment, which is likely to require three
or four more years, growth will be slower, perhaps on
the order of 5 percent. GNP growth, however, cannot
be sustained even at this rate unless China accelerates
new power plant construction. At the lower end,
electricity available from existing power plants and
those now under construction can sustain only a
3-percent rate of GNP growth, through the mid-
1980s?a rate of growth the Chinese would find
unsatisfactory.
Based on 3-, 5-, and 7-percent GNP growth rates,
electricity generation will have to increase 50 to 100
percent over the 1978 level by 1985 (see table 4).
Between 76,000 and 104,000 MW of capacity will be
needed for these levels of output. By 1990 electricity
output will have increased by 100 percent over 1978
production if the economy grows by 3 percent; 150
percent if the economic growth rate is 5 percent; and
215 percent if the economic growth rate is 7 percent.'
Capacity requirements for 1990 will be about 101,000,
130,000, and 165,000 MW, respectively (see chart,
page 7).
Meeting 1985 and 1990 Capacity Requirements.
Future capacity will come from three sources: power
plants now operating, those under construction, and
those not yet under construction.
During 1978 China averaged about 50,500 MW of
generating capacity, including about 5,000 MW in
small hydroelectric plants. By 1985, however, an
estimated 2,400 MW of present thermal capacity will
have exceeded its useful life for baseload generation.
By 1990, an estimated 7,800 MW of thermal units will
'Electricity is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for
economic growth. Power shortages can constrain China's growth,
but the elimination of shortages will not necessarily result in rapid
economic expansion.
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Table 4
China: Meeting 1985 and 1990 Electricity Requirements
Corresponding to Selected Rates of GNP Growth
1985
3-Percent GNP Growth
5-Percent GNP Growth
7-Percent GNP Growth
Electricity required in 1985 (billion kWh)
388
445
507
Output available from plants operating or under
construction in 1979 (billion kWh) '
380 to 411
380 to 411
380 to 411
Additional needs in 1985 (billion kWh)
0 to 8
34 to 65
96 to 127
Additional capacity required, 1980-85 (MW)3
0 to 1,300
5,700 to 10,800
16,000 to 21,200
1990
I dectricity required in 1990 (billion kWh)
512
644
809
Output available from plants operating or under
construction in 1979 (billion kWh) '
362 to 407
362 to 407
362 to 407
Additional needs in 1990 (billion kWh)
105 to [50
237 to 282
402 to 447
Additional capacity required, 1980-90 (MW)
20,000 to 28,000
44,000 to 53,000
75,000 to 84,000
' The higher figure for each year is based on the assumption that all
power plants under construction in 1979 arc completed at a fast but
achievable rate, that capacity under construction is 10 percent
higher than in the lower case, that hydroelectric plants have a
utilization rate of about 50 percent, that thermal plants have a
utilization rate of 68 percent, and that thermal units over 30 years
old and small hydros have a utilization rate of 25 percent.
The lower figure is based on the assumption that additions to
capacity lag behind the optimal rate by 10 percent; that hydroelec-
tric plants have a utilization rate of 46 percent; thermal plants, 68
percent; and small hydros, 23 percent. In addition we assume that
thermal units more than 30 years old are retired.
In both cases we assume that small hydro capacity levels off at
13,550 MW by 1985. After that date we believe that a growing high-
voltage transmission system will be the major source of new
be in this category. Old thermal turbogenerator units
are generally either scrapped or reserved for peak load
or emergency use. During the late 1980s, increasing
amounts of new capacity will go to replacing wornout
units.
By late 1979 more than 55 large power plants totaling
18,000 MW of capacity were under construction. At
the same time an estimated 8,000 MW were being
added to operating power plants and about 3,500 MW
of small hydro units were under construction. By 1985,
at least 25,000 MW of this should come on line.
Completion of units now under construction plus plants
in operation in 1979 would be barely adequate to meet
1985 needs if the Chinese economy expands at only a
3-percent growth rate, if power plants are completed at
electricity supplies for rural China. New small hydro units will be
added at a rate about equal to the rate of retirements of old small
hydros.
Electricity that will have to be generated at plants not yet under
construction in 1979.
' Computed by assuming that nearly all capacity supplying
additional needs in 1985 will be thermal units with a 68-percent
utilization rate.
? Computed by assuming that one-third of capacity added during
1980-90 but not under construction in 1979 is hydroelectric, with a
utilization rate of 46 percent, and the balance is thermal with a
utilization rate of 68 percent. These estimates take into account the
assumption made in footnote 3, above.
an optimal rate, and if above average rainfall boosts
hydroelectric output. If none of these conditions
obtain, additional generating capacity will be needed,
up to a possible 21,200 MW which corresponds to a
7-percent GNP growth rate. By 1990, power plants not
yet under construction will have to provide between
20,000 and 84,000 MW of capacity.
Hydroelectric plants of 250 MW or larger that are not
yet on the drawing boards probably could not come
into service until at least 1987. Therefore, the bulk or
capacity coming on line through 1985 and not under
construction in 1979 will be thermal.
China can build both thermal and large hydroplants to
meet capacity requirements for the late 1980s. By
1987 China's desire to harness very large hydropower
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sites now being considered can start to bear fruit. But
major economic planning decisions and commitments
to foreign contractors must be made soon.
In order to cover part of the electricity needs projected
for the late 1980s with hydropower, a substantial
amount of new construction must start shortly. For
example, for the 5-percent rate of GNP growth
scenario, if one-third of the capacity added after 1986
is to be hydro, work would have to start on about
12,000 MW of additional hydro capacity during
1980. If two-thirds of 1987-90 capacity additions are
to be hydro, work on about 26,400 MW of hydro
capacity should be initiated in 1980.
Because of the limitations of China's hydroelectric
construction industry and shortages of foreign ex-
change, Beijing is unlikely to commit itself in 1980 to
building more than 12,000 MW of capacity in very
large hydroelectric plants, and even this figure may be
high. Nevertheless, the figure is useful for illustrating
the increases in power plant construction that would
correspond to a 5-percent rate of economic growth. To
expand its economy at this rate to 1990, China should
have 20,000 to 25,000 MW of new power plants, both
hydro and thermal, under construction by the end of
1982. This is an 11-to 39-percent increase over large
plants under construction in 1979.
The prospect of undertaking such a potentially huge
program of power system expansion or of suffering the
costs of faltering economic growth in the mid- or late
1980s if power plant construction proceeds at a slower
pace poses a difficult problem for Chinese planners.
We would not be surprised if power supply difficulties
influenced the extension of the present readjustment
period beyond its originally slated three years. By
allowing more time for readjustment, Chinese planners
may be able to slow the growth of electricity demand.
This would not only give them a better opportunity to
sort out their development priorities and develop long-
range economic plans, but would also allow them to
base electricity generation on renewable water power
resources, rather than on coal, an exhaustable and
exportable commodity.
? Assuming new plants have an average size of 2,400 MW, which is
the range of plants the Chinese have been considering.
China: Additional Electricity Required
Billion kWh
900
Electricity vaUabIe
oapactty1i6 ser est,
Ctarlath140.4141
_
1981 82 83 84
85
86
87
88
89 90
I. Electricity generation required for stated GNP growth.
581435 2-80 CIA
Hydropower in China
China's ability to mobilize its hydroelectric industry to
meet electricity needs for the 1980s and 1990s will be
constrained by more than construction leadtimes. The
capabilities of its hydroelectric construction industry,
the quality of power system planning, its openness to
Western technology and availability of hard currencies
are central to an analysis of China's ability to increase
its dependence on hydroelectric energy.
Hydroelectric Resources
The size and location of resources have been persuasive
factors in Beijing's decision to increase the emphasis on
hydropower. The first thorough postliberation survey
of China's rivers?completed in 1955?placed the
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Table 5
China: Geographical Distribution of
Hydroelectric Resources, 1979
Region Mean Theoretical
Hydro Potential (MW)
Total 571,0001
North East
(Liaoning, Jilin, Heilungjiang)
North
(Hebei, Shanxi, Nei Monggol,
Beijing, Tianjin)
North West
(Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai,
Sinkiang, Ningxia)
15,800
1 L300
52,400
South West
(Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan)
Xizang
269,900
South Central
(Henan, Hubei, Hunan,
Guangxi, Guangdong)
148,100
56,500
Eastern China
(Jiangxi, Shandong, Jiangsu,
Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Shanghai)
16,900
' Chinese officials rate total mean theoretical hydro potential at
580,000 MW. But this includes about 9,000 MW for Taiwan.
mean theoretical hydroelectric potential of mainland
China at 536,000 MW.5 As a result of subsequent
surveys, the Ministry of Water Conservancy and
Power (MWC&P) raised this estimate to 571,000
MW 6 (see table 5).
With 330- kilovolt (kV) transmission capability?the
highest voltage now used in China?some 290,000
MW of hydro potential lie within reach of cities with
populations exceeding one million. Of this an esti-
mated 145,000 to 220,000 MW are now economically
exploitable. These figures will grow as 500-kV lines
come into use. So far China has developed only 13,000
MW of hydro capacity in large plants and an estimated
additional 11,000 MW of large hydroelectric plants
are under construction.
The most commonly sited figure for hydro potential, 545,000 MW,
includes Taiwan.
If Taiwan is included, 580,000 MW.
Current political and technological conditions preclude
the development of the remaining half of China's
hydropower potential. Rivers comprising the border
with the Soviet Union arc unlikely to be developed
unless relations between the two countries are patched
up. Part of the output of any new power plants on the
Yalu or Tumen Rivers would go to North Korea. In
addition, many hydrosites?including one with the
highest potential in the world?lie well beyond the
range of current Chinese transmission technology to
deliver power economically to major population
centers.
Hydroelectric Development, 1949-79
From 1949 to 1959 the Chinese made great strides in
their ability to develop hydropower resources and
embarked on an ambitious construction program.
Immediately following the revolution, the Chinese
surveyed their large rivers for energy potential. Under
the first five-year plan (1953-57) Beijing sketched?
with Soviet help?plans for the multipurpose develop-
ment of a number of rivers including the Huang He
(Yellow River), the Chang Jiang (Yangsi), and the Xi
Jiang (Pearl). A detailed plan for 46 high dams on the
Huang He had been fleshed out by 1954. With Soviet,
Czechoslovak, and East German aid China started 26
hydroelectric stations; 11 with a total capacity of 530
MW?more than twice China's 1949 hydro capac-
ity?were completed by yearend 1957.
Hydroelectric construction was greatly expanded
under the second five-year plan which began with the
Great Leap Forward. An ambitious hydropower pro-
gram called for work to begin on 275 projects with
design capacities totaling 25,000 MW, including
nearly all of China's present hydroplants larger than
500 MW.
The excessive efforts of the Great Leap Forward
crippled China's economy, slowing construction. The
Soviets dealt the hydro program another blow by
withdrawing their aid in 1960. Most planned hydro-
electric stations never got off the drawing boards and
many that did, especially the larger ones, were not
completed for more than 10 years.
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Just as economic collapse and international politics
took their toll on hydroelectric construction in the early
1960s, in the late 1960s and early 1970s the program
fell prey to internal politics. The Cultural Revolution
and factional political struggles destroyed much of the
hydro program's foundation that had been laid during
the 1950s. During the late l960s and early 1970s
hydro surveying, design, and research organizations
were dismantled and many technical personnel were
sent to the countryside as agricultural laborers.
By the late 1970s, however, China's hydroelectric
construction industry was again being strengthened.
Eleven hydro projects, each exceeding 250 MW
capacity, are now under construction (see table A-1).
These are providing Chinese engineers and geologists
with opportunities to develop or sharpen many of the
skills they will need to undertake much larger projects.
Mixed Results
Despite the unstable economic and political conditions
of the past, the Chinese have demonstrated that they
can design and build hydroelectric equipment and
plants in a variety of sizes and that under the right
circumstances they can complete plants of a few
hundred megawatts capacity in five years. China now
has about 100 large hydroelectric plants, more than 35
of which exceed 99 MW capacity (see table A-2 and
foldout). Nearly all the hydroplants have been built
since the revolution. Although the plants are not based
on sophisticated engineering, the tallest dam-147
meters?and the largest turbogenerator unit?rated at
300 MW?are significant achievements. On the other
hand, the Chinese are at least 10 to 20 years behind the
United States in high dam construction, turbogen-
erator design, and electricity transmission technology.
The Seamen Fiasco. As a consequence of inadequate
planning, the Chinese have run into some serious
problems at individual hydroelectric sites. The most
outstanding was the failure of the Sanmen project on
the Yellow River. This Soviet-assisted project
originally had a designed capacity of 1,100 MW. After
the dam was completed in 1960, the rapid silting of the
reservoir created a potential flood hazard in the
Guanzhuang Plain and at Xian. China blamed the
Soviets for failing to assess the rate of sedimentation
accurately. The Soviets charged that the Chinese
ignored the part of the plan calling for construction of
20 dams that would have trapped silt on the Yellow
River's tributaries upstream from Sanmen. Since
1960, the Chinese have modified the dam to sluice the
silt through, which also forced a reduction in designed
generating capacity to 250 MW.
The Chinese also have had difficulties with the giant
Gezhouba project located in Hubei. Unexpected prob-
lems, including silting, forced a two-year work suspen-
sion while the Chinese redesigned parts of the project.
Small Hydroelectric Stations
One area in which China has made great strides is in
tapping hydropower resources at sites with little
potential, making China unique in the use of small
hydrostations. As of April 1979, 88,000 of these plants
provided rural areas with a total of 5,380 MW of
generating capacity. The average size was only 61 kW
and their aggregate output was only 10 billion kWh
yielding a utilization factor of about 20 percent. This
mea ns that on the average the small hydros were
running at less than half the rate of other hydroelectric
power plants in China.
Small hydroplants contribute significantly to rural
China's development. They power pumps for irrigation
and drainage and provide electricity to rural house-
holds. In addition, they enable rural areas to run small
factories to manufacture chemical fertilizers, cement,
and agricultural machinery. Small hydro stations,
however, are not a panacea to rural electricity require-
ments. During droughts, when electricity is most
needed for running irrigation pumps, power output
often must be curtailed because of reductions in the
volume of water in small streams.
Beijing and provincial governments are actively sup-
porting the small hydro program in order to increase
rural productivity. Chinese officials have called for
small hydro additions of 1,000 to 1,200 MW per year
for 1979-81; about 1,500 MW per year for the 1980s;
and 2,000 MW per year in the 1990s. These plants,
therefore, will continue to be a significant source of
electricity for rural China at least until a nationwide
transmission system is developed.
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Hydropower Development Plans
The Planning of Power System Expansion
In reviewing power plant construction options,
Beijing's planners must consider the availability of raw
materials, skilled labor, generating equipment, and
foreign exchange?availabilities that are affected by
competition among ministries as well as by technical
constraints. Careful attention also must be given to
long-term economic planning of regions around power
plant sites and the way in which regional development
meshes with provincial and national development
goals.
We know little about the political process from :which
electric power construction results in China's centrally
planned economy. In any event, the relative political
strength of the Ministry of Power Industry vis-a-vis
other agencies competing fin capital and foreign
exchange probably will be an important factor in the
allocation of resources to power development.
On the other hand, the fact that almost all of the
ministries need ample supplies of electricity to carry
out their functions may make approval of power plant
construction easy to obtain. For multipurpose water
resource projects, in particular, many ministries, such
as Water Conservancy, Power Industry, Machine
Building, Communications, and Agriculture would be
involved. The involvement of so many ministries in
multipurpose projects, however, may make project
coordination difficult and provide greater opportunity
for conflict and misunderstanding.
The expansion of the electric power system, parlicu-
larly the development of hydroelectric resources,
makes good economic sense and should be politically
acceptable. There are good reasons to believe that
when the veil of the economic readjustment period is
lifted on a new development plan, hydroelectric
construction will play a major role. We believe,
however, that construction of large new projects will
not be completed until the late 1980s and early
1990s?much later than the Chinese presently expect.
Visions and Revisions: Readjusting
Hydroelectric Development Plans
China's hydroelectric construction program should be
strengthened by two recent measures: (a) the suspen-
sion of the 10-year plan (1976-85) and the establish-
ment of a period of readjustment (1979 to the early
I 980s) and (b) a reordering of priorities that will
increase the proportion of investment going to the
power industry even though investment in most other
heavy industries will be cut. These measures will
reduce growth in demand for electric power both in the
short term and the long term; thus, besides freeing up
funds for hydroelectric construction, they will allow
more leadtime for completion of hydroelectric projects.
The Suspended 10-Year Plan. A vague electric power
policy, a sketchy 10-year plan, unofficial generating
capacity goals for 1985 and 2000, and a list of proposed
projects had been loosely guiding power system devel-
opment for 1976 to 1978. The electric power develop-
ment policy called for the following measures:
? Both thermal and hydropower plants are to be built.
The choice is to depend on the availability of coal or
hydropower resources. Some thermal plants are to be
constructed in hydropower-rich areas to provide
backup in times of drought.
? Large, medium, and small plants arc to be
constructed.
? Large power plants, especially hydro stations, are to
form what the Chinese call the "backbone" of the
emerging power system.
? Small stations, especially those powered by water,
are to be built for rural electrification.
Until July 1979, directives for implementing this
policy were outlined in the now suspended 10-year
plan. It called for work on 20 hydro stations of at least
1,000 MW each?plus 10 very large thermal plants--
to be under way or completed by 1985. Many of the
hydro stations had been originally scheduled for
development during the 1950s (see table A-3).
During the fall of 1978 and winter of 1979 Beijing
seemed to be emphasizing very large multipurpose
projects on the Chang Jiang and the Huang He. The
mammoth 25,000 MW Sanxia project led the list.
Beijing discussed it seriously with the United States
and Japan and led Japan to believe that the Longmcn
(1,500 MW), Xiangjiaba (4,000 to 6,000 MW), and
Daliushu (1,500 MW) projects also had high priority.
Sanxia would have tied up large amounts of capital-
Japanese and Chinese estimates of its cost range from
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$7.8 to $12.5 billion to which transmission facilities
would add billions more. The project would require
eight to 10 years of construction, according to Chinese
estimates, before the first stage was operating and
would take 20 years to complete. Sanxia would absorb
tremendous amounts of resources, would have no
payoff for a decade, and would concentrate an
inordinate amount of generating capacity in one area
to the detriment of power system growth in the rest of
China. Nevertheless, there are some indications that
the Ministry of Water Conservancy would like to keep
the option of its construction open, probably for
possible long-term benefits from diverting water from
the Chang Jiang to the North China Plain.
Shifts in Priorities. In late 1979, the Chinese shifted
some priorities, though it is not clear that this shift is
permanent. Indeed, an official of the Ministry of
Power Industry told the US Economic Counselor in
Beijing that the electric power plan during the
readjustment period had not yet been decided. Vice
Premier Gu Mu told the Japanese that plans to build
Xiangjiaba, Longmen, and Daliushu have been
shelved. Chinese officials are still debating the Sanxia
project. Instead, projects like Longtan ' (3,000 MW)
and Jinping (3,600 to 4,500 MW) are receiving
increasing attention. These two projects are designed
to provide power to existing or proposed nearby
metallurgical facilities. Longtan will power a new
aluminum plant; Jinping will supply electricity to the
steel plants near the Sichuan-Yunnan border.
The review of the hydro development plan is likely to
be a lengthy process, because the debate is focusing
around issues that bring the Ministry of Power
Industry into competition with other ministries for
resources. Among the questions that need to be
resolved are: (a) the choice between domestic and
foreign technology, (b) the disposition of limited
amounts of foreign exchange, and (c) the extent of
transmission line development.
Domestic or Foreign Technology. if China is going to
proceed rapidly with hydroelectric plant construction,
equipment and engineering assistance must be ob-
tained abroad. The decision over what kind of foreign
assistance will be sought for which projects is yet to be
made. In deciding, Beijing faces a choice between self-
Also referred to as Lontai in some reports.
reliance and conservation of foreign exchange on the
one hand and on the other, speedier construction,
reduced input of raw materials, better project design,
and the opportunity to see Chinese engineers and
geologists trained in modern technology and construc-
tion techniques. The areas in which the Chinese will
particularly need help are:
? High-head projects where Chinese geological and
engineering capabilities appear particularly weak.
? Dams and generating equipment of advanced design
that will improve economic efficiency by requiring
smaller inputs of raw materials and lower cost per
unit of output than projects employing old
technologies.
? Heavy construction equipment and management
techniques to reduce construction times.
Considering their lack of state-of-the-art engineering
skills, the Chinese may have problems with hydro
projects that have very high heads. Apparently the
highest power dam in China is Liujiaxia, with a height
of 147 meters. Among the dams proposed for construc-
tion are some with heights of 230 to 270 meters.
Because the water pressures are so much greater at
these high dams, advanced engineering techniques are
required for the design of the dams and hydraulic
equipment. China's lack of experience with power
dams higher than 150 meters could be a serious
liability. Even in the United States, which has many
more well-trained engineers than China, there was a
recent instance of scroll cases for turbines on a very
high-head project failing during preinstallation tests.
Redesigning the scroll cases and building new ones cost
millions of dollars and kept the plant out of service for
more than a year.
It is generally believed that Chinese hydraulic struc-
tures were constructed with methods inadequate for
high-head development. The Chinese need better
design technology and greater mechanization of con-
struction if they are to erect high-head structures in the
200-meter range using turbines discharging water at a
high rate. The Chinese might be able to improve
designs on their own but this would stretch out the
design phase. Moreover, China would have to import
the sophisticated hardware needed for modern dam
construction.
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In the areas of dam construction and turbine and
generator production, Chinese designs and technology
are decades behind those in the West. With Japanese
or Western engineering, China could build dams using
less cement. Modern Western turbines and generators
arc more compact and use less steel than Chinese
models of the same power rating. French, German,
Norwegian, Japanese, Swedish, Swiss, or US firms can
design and build hydraulic turbines that deliver 10 to
12 percent more power than Chinese units of the same
frame size and they would require up to 40 percent less
steel to build.
According to Minister of Power Industry Liu Lanbo,
China's hydroelectric plant construction capabilities
are weakest in geological and hydrological surveying,
project design and planning, and construction manage-
ment. The lack of modern technology and a shortage of
experienced personnel needed to conduct geological
surveys is adding years to hydro construction projects,
according to Vice Minister of Power Industry Li Rui.
There are many indications that China will turn lo
foreign countries for assistance with hydropower
projects. For example, Beijing has announced that a
high priority has been assigned to imports that will
expand the electric power and other energy industries.
In addition the Chinese have been negotiating with
many Japanese, US, and European firms for their
participation in planned hydro projects. These firms
may have submitted cost estimates, feasibility studies,
and engineering assessments for a number of projects.
One of China's major goals in seeking foreign assist-
ance with hydro projects is to strengthen its own
hydroplant construction industry. The Chinese, there-
fore, will want to obtain the most advanced technology
and training for their engineers. Chinese officials also
have said they will look for technology that they can
easily assimilate and will seek licenses to manufacture
equipment when they can do so economically, rather
than import it.
Allocation of Foreign Reserves. One stumbling block
for China in negotiating foreign contracts will be
financing. Ministries have been directed to submit
plans for earning foreign exchange when they apply for
permits to import technology or equipment. Because
the Ministry of Power Industry does not have its own
source of foreign exchange, it probably must look to
other ministries for support in foreign exchange
requests. For example, the Ministry of Power Industry
and the Ministry of Metallurgy are working together
on plans to build hydropower stations and aluminum
smelting plants. The above-mentioned Jinping and
Longtan projects also may be built jointly with the
Ministry of Metallurgy.
The Ministry of Metallurgy is not a very large earner
of foreign exchange and will have difficulty providing
hard currency for the power plants and the metallurgi-
cal facilities that will consume the power. The State
Planning Commission, therefore, may not be easily
persuaded that the projects can be paid for.' Neverthe-
less, there are some indications that the Chinese hope
the new metallurgical facilities will allow them to
swing from a large net metals importer to a metals
exporter. For example, foreign exchange for the Ertan
project is supposed to be derived from sale of steel,
titanium, and vanadium produced at a nearby steel
plant.
China also has been looking abroad for financing for
hydroelectric projects and seems to be exploring the
possibility of obtaining aid from countries that would
supply hydroelectric technology or equipment. For
example, China formally asked Japan for a loan in
September 1979 to finance eight development projects.
Three hydroelectric projects?Longtan, Shuikou, and
Wuqiangxi?with an estimated cost of $3 billion were
part of the package, though the former two have since
been dropped.
500-kV Transmission System in the Works. To make
effective use of large new power plants, China will have
to step up the capacity of its transmission system.
Many of China's transmission lines are now routinely
overloaded which undermines the stability of the grids.
Both economic and technological factors are at the root
of this problem. Investment in transmission facilities
has been inadequate. Like China's hydroelectric de-
' Other agencies that must review a request to build a large
hydropower plant include the State Economic Commission,import-
Export Control Board, and the State Administration for Foreign
Exchange Control.
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sign and construction technology, its high-voltage
transmission technology is at least 10 years behind that
in industrialized nations. China reportedly still has
transmission system problems that the United States
eliminated when the electric power industry was in its
infancy.
The standard long-distance transmission voltage in
China is 220 kV. The country has only two 330-kV
lines, spanning about 1,000 km in Shaanxi. In com-
parison, the Soviet Union had 23,800 km of 400- to
500-kV lines at yearend 1978.
China is now installing three 500-kV transmission
lines. One will carry power from mine-mouth thermal
plants in Anhui to Shanghai, one from Yuanhao
Mountain in Liaoning to Dongbei; and one from
Pingdingshan in Henan to Wuhan. In addition, China
plans to use 500-kV lines at the Gezhouba project and
to develop 500-kV intra- and interprovincial grids.
Grids utilizing 500-kV lines are likely to appear first in
eastern China around Shanghai and then in the
Beijing-Tianjin area. As new large hydroelectric plants
come on line they will probably transmit power over
500-kV lines.
Five-hundred-kV lines can economically send five to
six times the power, about 2.5 times the distance than
can 220-kV lines. In addition, by increasing voltages to
500 kV from 220 kV transmission losses are reduced
80 percent, all other factors being kept the same.
Initially China will probably import nearly all of its
500-kV equipment. Recent US visitors to the Xian
Switchgear Plant reported that Chinese 500-kV circuit
breakers were only in the developmental stage. In
recent months Beijing has been negotiating the pur-
chase of 500-kV switchgear, transformers, and substa-
tions with Japanese and Western firms. In July
equipment was ordered?for a line from Pingdingshan
to Wuhan that is scheduled to go into operation in late
1980. Another Chinese order for 500-kV equipment
placed with ASEA (Sweden) cost $20 million, accord-
ing to press reports. Nevertheless, the Chinese want to
manufacture their own 500-kV hardware.
At this point, it is difficult to assess how soon China
can start producing 500-kV equipment. If Beijing had
production licenses in hand, it would probably take a
few years to tool up, train technicians, and arrange for
supplies of raw materials.
The installation of 500-kV lines also is not likely to
proceed rapidly. The lack of trained manpower,
technology, materials, and equipment will hamper
China's efforts to build a 500-kV system. The Chinese
have little experience with high-voltage lines and,
regardless of how much information and technology
they may import, they are likely to make many
mistakes. In addition, materials such as steel for towers
and aluminum for conductors are in short supply and
construction equipment and techniques are primitive.
Cost may be another factor impeding the installation
of 500-kV lines during the next few years, especially
when nearly all the equipment will have to be
imported, In the United States, such lines now run
about $600,000 per km to install. At these prices the
costs of constructing 500-kV lines to deliver all of
Gezhouba's output to Wuhan would be at least $490
million.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s China will probably be
manufacturing 500-kV equipment and using it to
deliver power from some of the large power plants that
will be completed around that time. Also, by the mid-
1980s China could have laid the foundations for some
regional 500-kV grids.
Outlook
Chinese leaders are well aware of the need for
increasing inputs of electrical power to move the
economy forward and they recognize the value of
tapping China's vast hydroelectric resources.
Before they can move forward, however, the Chinese
must overcome two obstacles: project priorities must be
established?most likely in coordination with other
components of development plans?and funding, par-
ticularly in hard currencies, has to be arranged.
Fortunately, both issues can be dealt with to some
extent on a piecemeal basis. It seems unlikely that the
Chinese will wait until 1982 to make or announce all of
their decisions. To delay starting survey work on
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hydroelectric projects until 1982 would push comple-
tion dates toward 1990, which in turn would hamper
economic development in west, south, and southeast
China where coal supplies will be a problem.
It is highly doubtful that China by itself can develop
many of the most promising sites for hydroelectric
plants within a time frame compatible with desired
rates of economic growth. Foreigners will most likely
play a critical role in China's hydro development
program. In any event, the long leadtimes required and
Beijing's lengthy deliberations about power system
development plans will be reflected five to 10 years
down the road in a power supply that may slow
economic growth in the late 1980s and probably will
institutionalize blackouts and brownouts as everyday
features of Chinese life.
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Appendix A
Chinese Hydroelectric Plants
Table A-1
China: Large Hydroelectric
Plants Under Construction
Project and Location
Planned Capacity (MW), Planned
Units, and Annual Construction
Output (kWh) Sequence '
Notes
Gezhouba
Hubei on the Chang Jiang
2,700 MW
21 units
13.8 billion kWh
CS: 1970 Dam will be 70 meters high, and 2,560 meters long. Reservoir capacity
will be 1.5 billion cubic meters. This is the first dam on the Chang Jiang.
The project will have two power houses. The first power house will have
a capacity of 965 MW and was reportedly two-thirds complete in
September 1979. Technical snags, including the unexpected problem of
silting, caused suspension of work from November 1972 to October
1974. The project is closely related to future development of the Sanxia
(Three Gorges) and the Chang Jiang water diversion schemes.
Longyangxia
Qinghai on the Huang He
1,600 MW CS: 1978 Concrete gravity arch dam will be 172 meters high. Reservoir capacity
6 billion kWh will be 25 billion cubic meters. Longyang reservoir will regulate flow of
water to four existing power stations enabling them to produce another
500 million kWh per year. First generation had been scheduled for 1983,
but this date may be pushed back by reported construction delays.
Baishan
900 MW CS: 1975 The concrete gravity arch dam is 150 meters high and 670 meters long.
Thin on the Songhua Jiang 3 X 300 MW
Ankang
Shaanxi on the Han Shui
800 MW
4 units
CS: 1978
EFG: 1982
Wujiangdu
Guizhou on the Wu Jiang
630 MW
3 X 210 MW
3.34 billion kWh
CS: 1970 Arched concrete gravity dam is 165 meters high. This is a pilot project in
EFG: 1980 the utilization of water resources in limestone areas, known for their
complex geology.
Lubuge
Yunnan on the Huangni He
600 MW EFG: 1985 Tunnel providing a head of 350 meters. Rock-filled dam will be 98
4 X 150 MW meters high. Resevoir capacity will be 100 million cubic meters. A road
has been built to the construction site and a power line brought M.
Dahua
Yunnan
500 MW
EFG. 1982
A low head project located near Kunming.
t tS ..... ? III III II
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table A-1
China: Large Hydroelectric
Plants Under Construction (continued)
Project and Location
Planned Capacity (MW),
Units, and Annual
Output (kWh)
Planned
Construction
Sequence'
Notes
Wanan 500 MW CS: 1978
Jiangxi EFG: 1985
Luan He 450 MW
Hebei on the Luan He 520 million kWh
Darn is 107.5 meters high and 1,040 meters long. Reservoir capacity will
be 2.9 billion cubic meters. A multipurpose project, it will supply water
to nearby areas and supply power to the North China grid.
Dahua
Guangxi on the Hong Shui
First phase: 400 MW
4 units
2.1 billion kWh
CS 1975 Darn is 79 meters high, 967 meters long. This multipurpose project will
EFG 1980 create a channel for 200-ton ships and provide irrigation.
Tungjiang
Hunan
250 to 300 MW
CS: 1958 but was Darn will be 157 meters high.
suspended until 1978.
Er.\- Shizuishan
Ningxia-Nei Monggol border
on the Huang He
200 MW
Taipingshao 160 MW EFG: 1980
Liaoning
Chingpo 108 MW
Heilongjiang 3 X 36 MW
' CS?Construction started. EFG?Expected date of first
generation.
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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table A-2
China: Hydroelectric Plants
of 100 MW or Larger
Plant Name and Location Capacity (MW), Units, and Construction
Annual Average Output (kWh) Sequence '
Liujiaxia
Gansu on the Huang He
Notes
1,225 MW S&P: 1952-1958 Dam is China's largest: 147 meters high and 840 meters long. Project
4 X 225 MW plus I X 300 MW CS: 1958 also provides irrigation, flood control, ice flow control, and area for fish
5.7 billion kWh FG: 1969 breeding.
CC: 1974
Danjiangkou
Hubei on the Han Shui
900 MW
OX 150 MW
4.5 billion kWh
CS: 1958
FG: 1968
CC: 1973
Dam is 110 meters high, 2,549 meters long. Project also provides
irrigation, flood control, drinking water, and improved navigation.
Gongzui
Sichuan on the Dadu He
750 MW
7 units
CS: 1966 Dam is 85 meters high, 447 meters long. Project improved navigation,
FG: 1971 irrigation, flood control, and fish breeding on the Dadu He. Preparations
CC: 1979 are being made for second stage of the project. Reportedly darn height
will be increased to 150 meters, raising capacity to 2,000 MW.
Supong (Dong Sul) 700 MW CC: before 1949 Dam is 106 meters high, 900 meters long. Reservoir capacity is 6 billion
Liaoning on the Yalu Jiang
7 X 100 MW cubic meters. Output is shared with North Korea.
Xinanjiang 652.5 MW CS: 1957 Dam is 105 meters high, 462 meters long. Reservoir capacity is 17.8
Zhejiang on the Fuzhun Jiang 9 X 72.5 MW FG: 1960 billion cubic meters. Reservoir produced 2.5 million kg of fish annually
2 billion kWh CC: 1977 in the early 1970s and provides flood control, irrigation, and navigation.
Plant seems to have been designed for peak load generation.
Dafengman
Jilin on the Songhua Jiang
567 MW
8 units
2 billion kWh
Built prior to 1949. Dam is about 100 meters high, 1,030 meters long. Supplies power to
Dam was damaged during Anshan, Fushun, and other nearby industrial centers.
the war and the Soviets re-
moved some generating
equipment Reconstruction
started in 1950.
S&P: 1950-53
CS: 1953
FG: 1956
CC: 1959
Zheji 435 MW CS: 1958 Hollow concrete dam is 100 meters high, 900 meters long. Reservoir
Hunan on the Si Shui 6 X 72.5 MW FG: 1962 capacity is 1 billion cubic meters. Zheji dam protects hundreds of
2.35 billion kWh thousands of hectares of farmland from floods and has improved
navigation along a 300-km stretch of the Si Shui. It is heavily used for
irrigation.
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OT;
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table A-2
China: Hydroelectric Plants
of 100 MW or Larger (continued)
Plant Name and Location Capacity (MW), Units, and Construction
Annual Average Output (kWh) Sequence '
Notes
Jililung 420 MW CS: 1958 Dam is 48 meters high, 290 meters long. This is a low-head hydroelectric
Zhejiang on the Fuzhun Jiang 6 X 50 MW plus 2 X 60 MW station.
Xingwenping
Sichuan on the MM Jiang
400 MW CS: 1963
Huladao Un bong 400 MW
Jilin on the Yalu Jiang
Fengtan
Hunan on the Yuanshui
400 MW
4 X 100 MW
2.0F, billion kWh
CS: 1970
FG: 1978
CC: 1979
Yanguo 352 MW CS: 1958
Gansu on the Huang He FG: 1961
CC: 1974
Yili Cascade 322 MW CS: 1956 A four power station cascade.
Yunnan on the Yili He FG: 1958
Bikou
Gansu on the Bailong Jiang
300 MW
3 X 100 MW
CC: 1977
Huan-jen 290 MW CS: 1958
Liaoning on the Hun He FG: 1968
Xinfenghe
Guangdong on the Xinfeng He
290 MW
4 X 72.5 MW
1.2 billion kWh
CS: 1958
FG: 1960
CC: 1962
The concrete dam is 128 meters high, 450 meters long. Reservoir
capacity is 13 billion cubic meters.
Qingtongxia
Ningxia on the Huang He
272 MW
8 units
1.3 billion kWh
CS: 1958
FG: 1967
CC: 1978
Gutian Cascade 262 MW in four power stations CS: 1950
Fujian on the Gutian Xi FG: 1958
CC: 1971
Supplies power to the North Fujian grid.
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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
San men
Henan on the Huang He
250 MW CS: 1958 Project was to have had a capacity of 1,100 MW but silting problems
5 X 50 MW FS: 1973 forced the Chinese to redesign Sanmen with fewer and smaller units.
CC: 1979 Design capacity is now 250 MW. Dam's 110 meters high, 960 meters
long. The reservoir reportedly flooded about 130,000 hectares of
farmland, 150 km of railroad tracks, and 2,000 populated areas
requiring relocation of 600,000 people.
Maotiao Cascade 240 MW in five power stations CS: 1958 The fifth power station was completed in December 1979. Planned
Guizhou on the Maotiao He capacity was to be 300 MW in six stations.
Xijin 228.8 MW CS: 1958 A low-head project.
Guangxi on the Xi Jiang 4 X 57.2
Fengshapa
Guandong on the Dong Jiang
225 MW CS: 1970
3 X 75 MW FG: 1973
Bapan 180 MW CS: 1969
Gansu on the Huang He 5 X 36 MW FG: 1975
CC: 1979
Zelin
Jiangxi on the Xiu Shui
180 MW CS: 1958 Reservoir capacity is 7.2 billion cubic meters. Original planned capacity
4 X 45 MW was 264 MW with annual output of 690 million kWh.
Xier Cascade 175 MW in two power CS: 1958, but When completed the project will have four hydroelectric stations along a
Yunnan on the Xier He stations apparently suspended 20-km section of the river with a total capacity of 255 MW. The third
until 1966. station is under construction.
FG: 1971
Hunanzhen
Zhejiang on the Wuxi He
170 MW CC: 1979 Dam is 129 meters high and 440 meters long with reservoir capacity of 2
4 X 42.5 MW billion cubic meters.
Huanglungtan
Hubei on the Du He
150 MW CS: 1969
2 X 75 MW CC: 1974
Chencun
Anhui on the Shu Xi
150 MW CS: 1958
3 X 50 MW CC: 1975
Shiquan
Shaanxi on the Han Shui
135 MW FG: 1973
3 X 45 MW CC: 1975
Shuangpai 130 MW
Hunan on the Xiang Jiang
Tianqiao
Shanxi-Shaanxi border
on the Huang He
120 MW
4 X 30 MW
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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table A-2
China: Hydroelectric Plants
of 100 MW or Larger (continued)
Plant Name and Location Capacity (MW), Units, and Construction
Annual Average Output (kWh) Sequence '
Notes
Pao-te
Shanxi
120 MW
Ansha
Fujian on the liulong Xi
115 MW
3 units
CS: 1970 Dam is 92 meters high.
FG: 1975
Longchi Cascade 108 MW in four power stations CS: 1955
Sichuan on the Longchi River FG: 1957
Mashek 100 MW
Guangxi on the Yung River 3 units
CS: 1970
CC: 1977
' S&P: Surveying and planning.
CS: Construction started.
FG: First generation.
CC: Construction completed.
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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table A-3
China: Proposed Major Hydroelectric
Development Projects
Project I station Capacity (and Units) Notes
In the Chang Bang Basin
Baihetan Yunnan-Sichuan border near 10,000 MW Concrete dam will be 270 meters high. Geological surveys and designing
Ningnan on the Jinsha Jiang are under way.
Ertan
Sichuan on the Yalong Jiang 3,000 MW
near Dukou
Annual output will average 16 billion kWh. Dam will be about 240
meters high, 900 meters long. Construction time expected to be five
years. Cost is estimated at $1.5 billion. Project will provide power to
Panzhihua steel mill and titanium and vanadium production facilities in
the area.
limping Sichuan on the Yalong Jiang Stage 1: 1,500 MW Annual output will average 11.4 billion kWh for the first stage; 8.9
about 175 km north of Dukou Stage 2: 1,500 to billion to 18.2 billion kWh for the second stage. Upgrading the first
N.) 3,000 MW stage will generate another 9.1 billion kWh. The first stage will consist
,-- Stage 1 upgrading: of a low dam and two 16 km power tunnels across a loop in the river to
1,500 MW create a 300-meter head. The second stage, located a few km upstream
from the low dam, will be a high dam with a head of 165 or 265 meters
depending on the design chosen. Two more power tunnels may be added
to the first stage after the second stage is completed. Power will be used
at a nearby steel plant.
Sanxia Hubei on the Chang Jiang near 25,000 MW Annual output will average 120 billion kWh. Concrete gravity dam will
Yichang (25 X 1,000 MW) be 230 meters high. Construction time will be eight to 10 years to first
First phase, 10,000 MW generation; 20 years to completion. Cost reportedly estimated at $7.8-
12.1 billion. Much geological survey work has been done, but a dam site
has not yet been selected.
Xiangjiaba
Sichuan-Yunnan border on the 4,000 to 6,000 MW Earth-rock dam will be 130 meters high. Geological surveys and design
Jinsha Jiang near Pingshan work are under way.
On the Huang He
Daliushu
Ningxia near Zhongwei Xian
1,500 MW Geological surveys had not yet begun as of December 1978.
Longmen
Shaanxi-Shanxi border
1,500 MW
(5 X 300 MW)
Annual output will average 6 billion kWh. Dam will be 200 meters high.
Reservoir capacity of 12.5 billion cubic meters will eventually be
reduced by sediment to 3.8 billion cubic meters. Geological surveys were
under way in December 1978.
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table A-3
China: Proposed Major Hydroelectric
Development Projects (continued)
Project
Xiaolongdi
Location
Capacity (and Units) Notes
Henan
1,600 MW Annual output will average 6.5 billion kWh. Dam will be 151 meters
(4 X 400 MW) high. Reservoir capacity of 12.7 billion cubic meters will eventually be
reduced to 3.8 billion cubic meters by sediment.
Projects on Other Rivers
Longtan Guangxi on the Hong Shui, 3,000 MW Annual output will average 13.4 billion kWh. Concrete arched gravity
16 km upstream from Tian'e dam will be 200 meters high. Reservoir will hold 16.5 billion cubic
meters. Two years will be needed for geological and hydrological surveys
and designing before construction can begin. Construction will take
about six years. Cost is estimated at between $970 million and 81.55
Longtan is being planned in ccmjanction with an aluminum
plant.
Tienshengqiao
L.4
Guizhou-Guangxi border on the
Nanpan Jiang near Xingyi
Stage 1: 800 MW
Stage 2: 1,600 MW
Stage 1 upgrading:
400 MW
Annual output of first stage will average 4.7 billion kWh; the second
stage, 5.3 billion kWh. The first stage will have a low diversion dam and
two 11 km pressure tunnels to create a head of 200 meters. For the
second stage a high darn will be built upstream from stage 1, creating a
reservoir capable of holding 9 billion cubic meters of water. After the
second stage is completed, stage I will be upgraded to 1,200 MW,
generating 8.3 billion kWh. Work on stage one has reportedly begun.
Shuikou Fujian on the Min Jiang 1,400 MW Annual output will average 5 billion kWh. Dam will be 95 meters high.
(7 X 200 MW) Construction will reportedly take six years. Cost is estimated at $840
million of which $630 million will be in foreign exchange. Shuikou will
supply power to factories that may be built in Fujian by foreigners,
particularly overseas Chinese.
Wuqiangxi Hunan 1,500 MW Annual output will average 7 to 8 billion kWh. The darn will be 100
meters high. Reservoir will have capacity of 5.7 billion cubic meters. At
least six years will be needed for construction; cost is estimated at $810
million, of which foreign exchange is $690 million. This project is
supposed to supply power to Wuhan.
Datengxia
Guangxi on the Hong Shui near 1,200 MW Annual output will average 5.5 billion kWh before upstream reservoirs
Guiping are built.
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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000300050012-2
Appendix B
China: Natural Gas Production
Table B-1.
China: Natural Gas Production
Billion Cubic Meters
Percent
National Sichuan
Other
Sichuan Share
1957
0.67
0.66
0.01
98.5
1965
1.11
0.85
0.26
76.6
1970
3.84
1971
4.80
1972
5.54
2.55
2.99
46.0
1973
6.39
1974
7.35
2.72
4.63
37.0
1975
9.19
3.40
5.79
37.0
1976
10.20
5.10
5.10
50.0
1977
12.48
1978
13.73
7.53
6.20
55.0
1979
14.51
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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP86600985R000300050012-2
Table B-2
Source Notes for Appendix 13
National
1979 State Statistical Bureau Communique. (FBIS,
30 Apr 80, L-2)
1978 Derived from 1979 output and the claim that 1979
output increased 5.7 percent over 1978. (FBIS,
30 Apr 80, L-2)
1977 Derived from output in 1978 and the reported
increase of 10 percent over I 977. (FBIS, 5 Jan 79,
E-28)
1976 Derived from outupt in 1977 and the reported
increase of 22.3 percent over 1976. (FBIS, 27 Dec
77, E-9)
1975 Derived from output in 1976 and the reported
increase of 11 percent over 1975. (FEIS, 6 Jan 77,
E-19)
1974 Assume a 25-percent increase 1975 over 1974.
This rate is justified by 1975 having been a year of
rapid recovery from a previous very poor economic
year for China, and is in line with the recovery rate
achieved by the economy as a whole.
1973 Derived from 1974 output and the claim that 1974
increased nearly 15 percent over 1973. (FBIS,
3 Jan 75, E- 10).
1972 There is no official claim that allows direct
calculation of 1972 national gas output. It was
assumed that output in 1973 increased by 15.25
percent the midpoint between the increase of 15.5
percent in 1972 and 15.0 percent in 1974. Output
in 1972 then was calculated as 6.40 ? 1.1525 or
5.56.
1971 Derived from 1972 output and the claim that
during the first 8 months of 1972, output increases
15.5 percent over the same period of 1971 (FEES,
28 Sep 72, B-1).
1970 Derived from 1971 output and the claim that 1971
increased 25 percent over 1970 (Beijing Review,
21 Jan 72, p. 3).
1965 Derived from 1976 output and the claim that 1976
was 9.2 times 1965. (FBIS, 16 Aug 77, El)
1957 Derived from Sichuan output and Sichuan's as-
sumed 99 percent share of total output in 1957.
Sichuan
Residual derived by subtracting reported natural
gas output at Daqing and Panshan fields and an
estimate for other oilfields from national output.
The 55-percent Sichuan share is compatible with
Chinese claims that Sichuan was still producing
most of China's natural gas. (PHIS, 27 Sep 78,
L-11)
Derived from 1965 output and the claim that 1976
Sichuan output was 6 times 1965. (FBIS, 2 Jun
77, J-1)
Derived from 1965 output and the claim that 1975
output was 4 times 1965. (Chengdu, 4 May 76,
FRES, 5 May 76, J-2)
Derived from 1965 output and the claim that 1974
Sichuan output was 3.2 times 1965. (FRES, 16 Jan
76, J-1)
Derived from 1965 output and the claim that 1972
Sichuan output was 3 times 1965. (Xinhua
Chengdu, 16 Sep 73)
Derived from 1978 output and the claim that
between 1965 and 1978, Sichuan gas output
increased nearly 8 times. We have calculated
using 7.9 times. [ See Sichuan 1978 note (Dagnng
Ban, 16 Aug 79, p. 12)]
Sichuan output was 0.66 billion cubic meters (Dill
Zhishi, No. 10, 1958, p.458)
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China: Hydroelectric Power Plants
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