BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR THE VISIT OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS, FRIDAY, 10 MARCH 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000300150013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 9, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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9 March 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC
SUBJECT : Background Materials for the Visit of the
University Presidents, Friday, 10 March 1978
1. Attached are the.followi:ng materials:
(a) Information can the three universities, Miami (Fla,),
Louisiana State, and the University of Washington,
(b) Memorandum on the Harvard Guidelines and related
matters that you asked me to prepare,
.
(c) BQkThe '5 letter transmitting the, report to the facultyPresident
2. 1 must apologize for the length of my memorandum on the
guidelines issue. I have. provided subtitles to assist you in finding
the parts you may wish to review. I am making copies available to the
other principal officers who will be meeting with the university
presidents so that all may have the same background on this issue,
Attachments
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SUBJECT: Background Materials for the Visit of the
University Presidents, Friday, 10 March 1978
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDA
1 - DDO
l - DDS&T
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - AD-M/NFAC
Info copies:
DDCI
GC
IG
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"%WWI %W
Academic Community "Guidelines" on Relations
with the Intelligence Community
The.[Select] Committee believes that it is
the responsibility of . . . the American academic
community to set the professional and ethical
standards of its members. This report on the
nature and extent of covert individual relation-
ships with the CIA is intended to alert [the
academic community] that there is a problem.
Background
Harvard University was the first of the major academic institutions to
respond to the suggestion of the Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church
Committee) quoted above. In May 1976 President Derek C. Bok of Harvard
appointed a faculty committee consisting of Archibald Cox, Don Price,
Henry Rosovsky, and Daniel Steiner (the Harvard general counsel). The
committee report, dated 12 May 1977, developed and transmitted to President
Bok six "Recommended Guidelines." A few days later the report and the guide-
lines were released to the press by President Bak. Since that time the latter
have served as the major focal point for much of the discussion of the same
issues on other campuses.
While the Harvard committee was drafting its report one of its members
called the Agency General Counsel and invited comment on its work. The call
resulted in an exchange between the DCI and President Bok in which it was
agreed that the Agency would send representatives to Cambridge to review the
draft. Those sent were John Waller, Inspector General, and >
Special Assistant to the DDCI (who has since retired). They spen severa
hours with the committee, going over the draft of the report and the guidelines,
and succeeded in having some changes made, though not all that they wished. The
completed report was subsequently mailed to the Agency on Tuesday, 17 May, with
an advisory (from Daniel Steiner) that it would be released to the press on
Thursday or Friday of that week. Apparently it was the hope of the Harvard
committee that the report might be considered and concurred in by the DCI so
that it might be released with CIA "agreement." At any rate, when the papers
were released to the press before the Agency received them the Harvard committee
apologized for the premature release. Admiral Turner's letter to President Bok,
dated '13 June 1977, which acknowledged and offered comment on the guidelines,
opened an exchange of correspondence and visits concerning the guidelines that
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continues to this day, for reasons that will be spelled out in the
following paragraphs.
The Harvard Guidelines
Let it be said first, however, that the Harvard committee endeavored
to approach its task in a positive spirit. Indeed, its report, after offering,
as its rationale, the statement of the Church Committee quoted at the head
of this memo, opened with a recognition of the importance to the United States
of "an effective system of foreign intelligence [which] can benefit considerably
from the support of research activities that directly or indirectly involve
universities and their faculty members." The introduction also noted that
although the proposed guidelines had been inspired by the discussion of the
CIA in the Select Committee report, "they should apply equally,to relation-
ships with other intelligence agencies of the United States." Further, in
a footnote to the passage just quoted, the committee said:
In a more general way this report may also be
useful in providing guidance for relationships with
other institutions, private and governmental, which
may constrain the academic independence of faculty
members or reduce their or universities' reputations
for independence and objectivity.
In the conclusion of its report the Harvard committee recognized that
its recommendations, if adopted, could "make it more difficult for the CIA
to perform certain tasks." Nevertheless, referring once again to "present
relations between the CIA and the academic community as outlined by the
Select Committee," the Harvard committee said: "We believe that the potential
harm to the academic enterprise [from a continuation of those relations], and
consequently to our society, far outweighs the potential losses that the CIA
may suffer."
The six Harvard guidelines -- they are reproduced at the end of this
memorandum -- are difficult to summarize. They are so carefully drafted that
every word counts. The first two guidelines sanction university research
contracts and individual "research and analytical" consulting, if the contracts
are in accord with the university's normal practice (which excludes classified
research) and are made public and with the proviso in the case of consulting
that individual Harvard community members concerned "should report in writing
the existence of such an arrangement to the Dean of his or her faculty, who
should then inform the President of the University." The third guideline
sanctions open CIA (staff) recruiting on the Harvard campus but seeks to
discourage the participation of any member of the Harvard community in CIA
recruiting if any part of the procedure is covert. Similarly, the fourth
guideline advises against participation by members of the community in'Sntelli-
gence operations for the CIA" and in "propaganda activities if the activities
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involve lending their names and positions to gain public acceptance of
materials they know to be-misleading or untrue," The fifth guideline advises
Harvard community members against assisting the CIA in obtaining the unwitting
services of another-member of the community (and adds: "The CIA should not
employ members of the Harvard community in an unwitting manner").. The sixth
and final guideline advises that questions concerning the "interpretation and
application" of the guidelines should be taken up with the appropriate Faculty
Dean initially and then,"if necessary," with the President of Harvard or a
member of h.i's staff.
Impact of the Harvard Guidelines on the Intelligence Community
NFAC. The impact.of the guidelines on the academic relations of the
National Foreign Assessment Center is minimal. On some campuses the implied
obligation on the faculty to report any on-going relationships, such as
consulting, with the CIA might well deter timid faculty members, or members
of faculties or 'departments that are especially sensitive (because of the
presence of active agitators) from serving as open CIA consultants or even
attending conferences sponsored by CIA or in which CIA analysts are known
parti'ctpato,rs, This is evidently not the situation at Harvard at this time,
Consequently, except in rare instances of individual sensitivity, the Harvard
guidelines seem-more likely to be interpreted as offering specific sanction
to the kinds of open relationships with the CIA that NFAC profits by.
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Communications 'with. Harvard after Publication of the Guidelines
Admiral Turner's letter to President Bok of 13 June 1977 welcomed
Harvard's recognition of the need for an effective foreign intelligence
system and its acknowledgement of the contribution that academic community
-members could make to that system, The letter assured Bak that current CIA
policy calls for open contracting with. academic institutions and for overt
staff recruitment on campus, and forbids the obtaining of unwitting services
of American staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions. The
letter also informed Bok that it is Agency policy "to suggest to individual
scholars [wh.o agree to consult with the. Agency] that they inform appropriate
officials at their universities of their relationship with. CIA." But the
letter took exception to the guideline that "requires your faculty members to
report jconsultantship] arrangements in writing to the dean of their faculty,"
unless the same rule is applied to "liaison arrangements with industry, other
governmental agencies, foreign governments, etc." The DCI's letter also noted
the well-founded reluctance of some academic community.members to acknowledge
a relationship with the CIA and advised: "We intend to continue respecting
the wishes of individuals in this regard,"
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Fi.
Parenthetically, it might be noted that the guideline in question
does not seem to require Harvard community members to report their CIA
connections to the university; rather, it advises them to do so: The
individual should report in writing (etc.)." It is true that in his
letter calling the report of the guidelines committee to the attention
of the Harvard faculty Bok said:
I would expect Harvard and its faculty
and staff to be sensitive to the issues discussed
in the Report and to act consistently with the
Committee's guidelines in any relationships they
may have with-U.S. intelligence agencies.
Nevertheless, as will appear in the next paragraph, Bak himself clearly
regards the guidelines as advisory rather than.mandatory._
President Bok replied to Admiral Turner's letter on 12 July.. He
acknowledged the "similarities" of the DCI's and Harvard's approaches to
the questions raised by CIA and university relationships. On the DCI's
reservation regarding academic community members who might not wish to
report relations with the Agency, Bok's letter said:
Although I think it is better for such relationships
to be reported, the question seems to be one for individual
institutions and the consultants to decide. The difference in
our views may not, therefore, be of great significance.
In the next paragraph Bok nailed the two issues that would henceforth form
the crux of all our discussions with Harvard. He pointed out that the DCI's
letter had referred explicitly to recruiting for "staff employment", thereby
ignoring the issue of covert.recruitment raised in the Church Committee
report and by the Harvard guidelines committee, and had said nothing on the
guideline concerning "faculty and staff involvement in intelligence operations."
President Bok concluded by offering to designate a member of his staff to
pursue possible "real differences" more fully.
Subsequent exchanges with Harvard have returned unfailingly to the same
two issues: After considerable staff preparation in the Agency, and presumably
at Harvard as well, Daniel Steiner came here on 27 September and discussed the
25X1 issues with a group consisting of the General Counsel, the Inspector General,
Coordinator Steiner informed the group that he had been in communi-
cation with Yale, Dartmouth, Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania, Cornell,
Brown, Columbia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Stanford, all
of which institutions, he said, were in general agreement with Harvard and were
considering the issuance of similar guidelines for themselves. When asked, he
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explained that on the two issues of covert recruitment and the "operational"
employment of Harvard community members his university would favor CIA
policies that would amount to a "mirror image of the Harvard guidelines,"
specifically prohibiting the two practices.
In sum, Steiner and the CIA group agreed that the dilemma was, genuine.
As: we saw it, the Executive H.ranch. had the responsibility to determine when
s,;ecret intelligence operations are necessary in the national interest and to
provide them under Congressional oversight. We conceded that the universities
had the responsibility for defining the guidelines under which they wished
their faculties to function. We suggested that in the few exceptional cases:
where the individual faced a conflict between his obligations as a member of
the academic community and as a citizen of the United States, the decision
should be left to h.im. At the conclusion of the-meeting Mr. Steiner expressed
his appreciation for our help and said he would communicate further after
consulting his colleagues at Harvard. He said he was hopeful of some
"creative compromise" because neither a public confrontation nor legislation
was desirable for either side.
25X1
After returning to Harvard, Daniel Steiner of 11 October 19.77 wrote a
brief letter tol asking if the following was a correct interpretation
of the CIA position;
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"Campaign to Stop Government Spying."
This propaganda campaign, which has been organized by two ex-Government
employees, Morton Halperin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and
former member of the staff of the President's Advisor on National Security,
and John Marks, former TMMR employee and author of The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence, with support from the American Civil Liberties Union and dozens
of other organizations devoted to civil liberties,is relevant because it has
publicized the Harvard guidelines by distributing the Harvard committee
report widely and urging other American higher education institutions to
adopt guidelines of their own. The two organizers of the campaign make no
secret of their objective, which is to impede and ultimately prevent all
secret intelligence "activities" in the United States in peacetime. The
campaign does- not extend to the production of secret intelligence in the United
States based upon foreign collection; it does extend to the use of anyone
(citizen or not) within the United States for that purpose without complete
disclosure.
Halperin describes the Harvard guidelines as their initial and minimum
position vis-a-vis the academic community. The campaign will certainly urge
more severe restrictions so long as the same do not limit private rights.
Halperin is frank to admit that the ACLU does not support his campaign's
advocacy of the Harvard guideline that advises members of the Harvard
community to inform the appropriate dean of CIA connections. It is evident,
therefore, that most if not all of the kinds of further restrictions that he
and Marks would favor, and on which they might expect to be supported by the
organizations with which they are affiliated, must apply to the intelligence
community, not to private individuals. Halperin also argues that as the CIA
succeeded in achieving the right to censor the revelations of the Church
Committee, the "full story" has still not been told. Moreover, he concludes
from this that the public and the academic community have no assurance that
abuses attributed to the intelligence community in the past have actually been
corrected. Finally, despite the fact that his initial drive is directed to
academic community, and his reservations regarding the Church Committee, he
makes it clear. that his campaign is aimed ultimately at Congress..
Influence of the Harvard Guidelines on the Academic Communiy
Considering the passage of time since the Harvard guidelines were
published, Harvard's own effort to stimulate similar action on the part of
sister institutions, and the Halperin-Marks campaign to give the guidelines the
widest possible favorable publicity, the impact upon the remainder of the
academic community has been surprisingly minor thus far. The following
paragraphs address developments at a few other institutions that are related to
or parallel the Harvard initiative.
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g UNCLASSIFIED ,ANN HqF ... N NFIDENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Background Materials for the Visit of the University
25X1
FROM: EXTENSION
fair, Academic ..Rela_t.ions a NFAC
NO.
DATE
9 March 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMM fi comment to show from whom
RE IVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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rUKM -620USEDITIO 5U5,. SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
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