PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST THREAT TO MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00017R001301050065-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: July 3, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
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Executive Secr tary
Date
3637 (10.81)
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July 3, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Protection Against Terrorist Threat to Movement of
Nuclear Material (C)
We have reviewed the submission concerning the Japanese
Government's request to approve the retransfer of 189kg of
fissile plutonium from LaHague, France to Japan. This material
originated in the United States, was recovered from spent power
reactor fuel in Japan, and was originally transferred to France
for reprocessing so that it could be used for breeder reactor
tests and operations in Japan. (S)
U.S. statutes and international agreements require that the U.S.
provide assurance that the fuel will not be diverted from its
intended purpose. France has agreed to naval escort of the
shipment, aboard a commercial vessel, from its port of
embarkation to a point 1,000nm at sea. The vessel will then
proceed through the Panama Canal and into the Pacific Ocean. The
Japanese have agreed to provide armed escort for the shipment
from a point 1,000nm at sea to its point of debarkation in Japan.
Documentation on the details of this transfer are contained in
the analysis prepared by DOE at Tab A. (S)
The State, DOE, CIA, JCS, and NSC members of the Terrorist
Incident Working Group (TIWG) agree that this shipment poses a
significant target for terrorist action and should be protected
when not under escort by France or Japan. The fact that this
shipment will pass close to U.S. territorial waters and through
the Panama Canal poses the threat that terrorists, using a
relatively simple device, could contaminate a large area with
radioactive material. (S)
Given this threat to our own interests/security and our
statutory/international obligations, the TIWG has recommended
that we plan to escort the commercial vessel. The group has
further proposed that contingency planning should be undertaken
by our specialized JSOC units for a recovery mission, should one
become necessary.
Declassify: OADR
SYSTEM II
90741
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SECRET
SECRET 2
The Administration must advise the Chairmen of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs that we have made arrangements for safe delivery.
Your agreement, in principle, to such security arrangements by
COB July 6 will allow us to apprise the Congress that appropriate
security provisions are being made. We may then proceed to
notify the Japanese that the shipment will be permitted. Your
assistance in this regard is much appreciated. (S)
Robert C. McFarlane
cc: The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
The Honorable Donald Paul Hodel
The Secretary of Energy
The Honorable William J. Casey
The Director of Central Intelligence
General John W. Vessey, Jr.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Attachments
Tab A - DOE Analysis of Retransfer of Special Nuclear
Material dated June 1983
SECRET
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Annex C
Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
In accordance with established interagency procedures with regard to the
handling of subsequent arrangements, DOE has sought the concurrence of
the State Department in the use of the recovered plutonium and also has
consulted with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Nuclear
Regulatory Cairn iss ion (NRC), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the
Department of Commerce (DOC). A notice of this arrangement and a non-
inimicality determination will be published in the Federal Register for at
least 15 days before this request is granted. Also, before approving the
proposed use, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate as required by Section
131 b.(1) will be provided with a copy of this report containing the reasons
for entering into this arrangement.
Section 131 b. of the Act stipulates criteria that must be taken into account
prior to entering into any subsequent arrangement for the transfer for repro-
cessing the U.S.-supplied special nuclear materials or of special nuclear
materials produced through U.S. assistance or the subsequent transfer to a
non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500
grams resulting from the reprocessing of any such material or the subsequent
retransfer of any plutonium.
These criteria pertain to whether the proposed retransfer, (and in this case
the use of the recovered plutonium)., will. result in a significant increase
of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that
approval is requested.
In particular, Section 131 b (2) of the Act provides that:
"The Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent
arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in a
facility which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies
or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior
to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978 or for, subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon
state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams
resulting from such reprocessing unless, in his judgment, and
that of the Secretary of State, such reprocessing or retransfer
will not result in a significant increase of the risk of
proliferation beyond that which existed at the time that
approval is requested. Among all the factors in making this
judgment, foremost consideration will be given to whether or
not the reprocessing or retransfer will take place under
conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States
of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the
non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the diverted material
into a nuclear explosive device."
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Section 131 b (3) of the Act provides that:
"The Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in
entering into any subsequent arrangement for the repro-
cessing of any such material in any facility that has
processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the
subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to
the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any
non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities
greater than 500 grans resulting from such reprocessing,
that such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place
under conditions comparable to those which in his view,
and that of the Secretary of State, satisfy the stan-
dards set forth in paragraph (2) "
This subsequent arrangement will be made pursuant to Section 131 b (2).
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