SENATOR PROXMIRE'S 27 AUGUST LETTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00191R000300600007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 6, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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? CONFIDENTIAL 0
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-232
6 September 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM: 25X1
Chairman
SUBJECT: Senator Proxmire's 27 August Letter
1. Action Requested: ,That you telephone Senator Proxmire, in lieu of a
written response to his letter, and advise him that public disclosure of
Intelligence Community security posture does not seem prudent..
2. Background and Discussion: The assurances requested in Senator Proxmire's
letter are impossible to give. Former DCI Walter.Bedell Smith was quoted by
the New York Times of 1 October 1952 as saying "Any intelligence agency would
be foolishly complacent if it did not assume that it would be penetrated some
time, somewhere."
3. It would be preferable for you to telephone Senator Proxmire and
advise him that it is unwise, from a counterintelligence standpoint, to reveal
publicly the full extent of the Intelligence Community security program. To
do less would be to give a false picture of our efforts to guard against
penetration and the exploitation of our personnel. The program will, in the
long run, speak for itself regardless of whatassurances may be given. To
proclaim our invulnerability would be intemperate.' Any hint that we are not
invulnerable, on the other hand, would not serve the purpose sought by
Senator Proxmire.
4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you telephonically express
your appreciation of Senator Proxmire's intentions. but decline to write the
requested'letter for the above reasons.
Attachment
Senator Proxmire's 27 AUG 85 letter
cc: D/OLL (Attn:
ALL, w/att
Watt 25X1
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?
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Senator Proxmire's 27 August Letter
eouty Director. Inte 'aence Con aun it
19 SEP 1985
A
Director, Intelligence ommuni to
/S/ John N.
2 5 SEP 1985
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date
Director of Central Intelligence
0 8 OCT 1985
2
CONFIDFNTIAL
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ItD STEVENS. ALASKA
LOWELL P WEICKER JR.. CONNECTICUT
JAMES A. MCCLURE. IDAHO
PAUL LAXALT. NEVADA
JAKE GIN. UTAH
THAD COCHRAN. MISSISSIPPI
MARK ANDREWS. NORTH DAKOTA
JAMES AMONOR. SOUTH DAKOTA
ROBERT W. KASTEN. JR;. WISCONSIN
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO. NEW YORK
MACK MATT1NGLV. GEORGIA
WARREN RUOMAN. NEW HAMPSHIRE
AR.EN SPECTER PENNSYLVANIA
PETE V. DOMEMCL NEW MEXICO
JOHN C. STENNIS. MISSISSIPPI
ROSERT C. SYRD. WEST VIRGINIA
WILLIAM PROXMIRE WISCONSIN
DANIEL K. INOUYE. HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS. SOUTH CAROLINA
LAWTON CHILES. FLORIDA
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON. LOUISIANA
OUENTIN N. BURDICK. NORTH DAKOTA
PATRICK J. LIANY. VERMONT
JIM SASSER. TENNESSEE
060IS DICONCINR. ARIZONA
DALE BUMPERS. ARKANSAS
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG. NEW JERSEY
TOM IMRKIN. IOWA
J. KERN KENNEDY. STAFF DIRECTOR
FRANC13 J. SULLIVAN. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
Hon. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
'Unittd j6tattz j6tnatt
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
August 27, 1985
The current spy scandal in West Germany sugbc~,ts that there has
been long term damage to West German and possible NATO intelligence
operations. Pbt only has the collection of foreign intelligence been
adversely affected but also Western counter-intelligence operations.
Obviously the extent of this damage will be known only to a few
.in West Germany and here in the United States. But the American public,
reading of the.defections and probable compromise of highly classified
Alliance secrets, must be uneasy about the potential for such penetration
of U .S. intelligence agencies.
3 SEP 1985
LOGGED
rLI Jai
I understand that there are extensive safeguards against hostile
penetration of our intelligence agencies such as use of the lie detector,
background checks, and monitoring of personnel. But the lesson of the
West German incident seems to be that obvious signals were overlooked by the
highest authorities-perhaps because of long standing personal relationships.
In order to reassure the American public, would you consider
discussing this problem in an unclassified response to this letter indicating
where possible the efforts you have taken to insure that such a penetration
and compromise of U.S. agencies on this scale is unlikely or impossible?
I believe that sane positive statement on your part would go long way to
dispelling a growing feeling among Americans that we too are riddled with
agents from the Warsaw Pact countries.
Any discussion of this issue would be appreciated.
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