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Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 15, 2009
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Publication Date: 
September 6, 1985
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86M00191R000300600007-0.pdf133.33 KB
Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86MOOl91 R000300600007-0 ? CONFIDENTIAL 0 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Security Committee SECOM-D-232 6 September 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Director, Intelligence Community Staff Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff FROM: 25X1 Chairman SUBJECT: Senator Proxmire's 27 August Letter 1. Action Requested: ,That you telephone Senator Proxmire, in lieu of a written response to his letter, and advise him that public disclosure of Intelligence Community security posture does not seem prudent.. 2. Background and Discussion: The assurances requested in Senator Proxmire's letter are impossible to give. Former DCI Walter.Bedell Smith was quoted by the New York Times of 1 October 1952 as saying "Any intelligence agency would be foolishly complacent if it did not assume that it would be penetrated some time, somewhere." 3. It would be preferable for you to telephone Senator Proxmire and advise him that it is unwise, from a counterintelligence standpoint, to reveal publicly the full extent of the Intelligence Community security program. To do less would be to give a false picture of our efforts to guard against penetration and the exploitation of our personnel. The program will, in the long run, speak for itself regardless of whatassurances may be given. To proclaim our invulnerability would be intemperate.' Any hint that we are not invulnerable, on the other hand, would not serve the purpose sought by Senator Proxmire. 4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you telephonically express your appreciation of Senator Proxmire's intentions. but decline to write the requested'letter for the above reasons. Attachment Senator Proxmire's 27 AUG 85 letter cc: D/OLL (Attn: ALL, w/att Watt 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86MOOl91 R000300600007-0 Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86MOOl91 R000300600007-0 ? CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT: Senator Proxmire's 27 August Letter eouty Director. Inte 'aence Con aun it 19 SEP 1985 A Director, Intelligence ommuni to /S/ John N. 2 5 SEP 1985 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date Director of Central Intelligence 0 8 OCT 1985 2 CONFIDFNTIAL Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86MOOl91 R000300600007-0 Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86M00191 R000300600007-0 ItD STEVENS. ALASKA LOWELL P WEICKER JR.. CONNECTICUT JAMES A. MCCLURE. IDAHO PAUL LAXALT. NEVADA JAKE GIN. UTAH THAD COCHRAN. MISSISSIPPI MARK ANDREWS. NORTH DAKOTA JAMES AMONOR. SOUTH DAKOTA ROBERT W. KASTEN. JR;. WISCONSIN ALFONSE M. D'AMATO. NEW YORK MACK MATT1NGLV. GEORGIA WARREN RUOMAN. NEW HAMPSHIRE AR.EN SPECTER PENNSYLVANIA PETE V. DOMEMCL NEW MEXICO JOHN C. STENNIS. MISSISSIPPI ROSERT C. SYRD. WEST VIRGINIA WILLIAM PROXMIRE WISCONSIN DANIEL K. INOUYE. HAWAII ERNEST F. HOLLINGS. SOUTH CAROLINA LAWTON CHILES. FLORIDA J. BENNETT JOHNSTON. LOUISIANA OUENTIN N. BURDICK. NORTH DAKOTA PATRICK J. LIANY. VERMONT JIM SASSER. TENNESSEE 060IS DICONCINR. ARIZONA DALE BUMPERS. ARKANSAS FRANK R. LAUTENBERG. NEW JERSEY TOM IMRKIN. IOWA J. KERN KENNEDY. STAFF DIRECTOR FRANC13 J. SULLIVAN. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR Hon. William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Mr. Casey: 'Unittd j6tattz j6tnatt COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS WASHINGTON, DC 20510 August 27, 1985 The current spy scandal in West Germany sugbc~,ts that there has been long term damage to West German and possible NATO intelligence operations. Pbt only has the collection of foreign intelligence been adversely affected but also Western counter-intelligence operations. Obviously the extent of this damage will be known only to a few .in West Germany and here in the United States. But the American public, reading of the.defections and probable compromise of highly classified Alliance secrets, must be uneasy about the potential for such penetration of U .S. intelligence agencies. 3 SEP 1985 LOGGED rLI Jai I understand that there are extensive safeguards against hostile penetration of our intelligence agencies such as use of the lie detector, background checks, and monitoring of personnel. But the lesson of the West German incident seems to be that obvious signals were overlooked by the highest authorities-perhaps because of long standing personal relationships. In order to reassure the American public, would you consider discussing this problem in an unclassified response to this letter indicating where possible the efforts you have taken to insure that such a penetration and compromise of U.S. agencies on this scale is unlikely or impossible? I believe that sane positive statement on your part would go long way to dispelling a growing feeling among Americans that we too are riddled with agents from the Warsaw Pact countries. Any discussion of this issue would be appreciated. Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86M00191 R000300600007-0 Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86M00191 R000300600007-0 Approved For Release 2009/09/15: CIA-RDP86M00191 R000300600007-0