BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR CIRIS BRIEFING TO ASD(1)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00612R000200020068-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: February 22, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
22 February 1972
SUBJECT Background Materials for CIRIS Briefing to ASD(I)
1. Attached is a part of the DCI/NIPE history prepared personally
by John Bross as his final official act after turning over his duties
to Mr. Tweedy.
2. This statement covers the period from the establishment of
DCI/NIPE in the McCone era (ca 1963) through 1 January 1971. Mr. Bross,
assisted by did the research and writing of this history
and completed it in March 1971.
3. Because of the frank comments herein, this could not be shown
to outsiders, and probably could have only limited circulation within
NIPE. However, I thought that as part of your background you should
have the opportunity to see through the eyes of the then D/DCI/NIPE
how he viewed the development of a community mechanism to display re-
sources and functions and targets.
1-. There are numerous documents backing up this history. I am
holding them until the Hall briefing is over; then I will be returning
them to files. In the meantime, you may want to look at
some of them, an i_ so, I will have them handy.
5. I have not called this to Mr. Tweedy's attend on. Do you think
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VII. A Consolidated Presentation of Intelligence Resources (TOD and CIRIS)
It will be remembered that in Mr.. McCone's original letter announcing
Bross' appointment the need for an inventory of intelligence resources was
mentioned. Quite obviously some kind of consolidated presentation of
intelligence activities with costs was a highly desirable facility for program
evaluation purposes. The trouble was that the programs of the Intelligence
Community were submitted in four different packages, all of which used
different vocabularies and were broken down in different categories determined
by the parochial needs of the individual components concerned to describe their
activities, objectives and resources. The costs of the SIGINT community
were prepared in the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) in terms of
60 sub-elements, each one of which was concerned with some particular aspect
of .the SIGINT program. Some of these sub-elements dealt with substantive
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dL
etc. or with what were essentially matters of administration support. The
CCP not only included the cost of the National Security Agency but also the
cost of the activities of the cryptologic agencies of the Military Services. The
latter were ultimately budgeted through the individual military departments.
The activities for which DIA was responsible, including service attaches,
some peripheral reconnaissance, mapping and charting, etc. were presented
in the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP) which, as in the case of NSA,
included the costs of DIA and also of those intelligence activities of the Military
Services and overseas commands which were conducted under the overall
supervision of DIA. The costs of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
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were reviewed by the Executive Committee of the NRO on the basis of a
presentation prepared by the D/NRO on which interested participants in the
Program were afforded an opportunity to comment. Finally the CIA program
was formulated on the basis of categories which were decidedly different from
those of any other program and which were particularly suited to the needs
of CIA.
In the early days of the Staff various discussions were held with repre-
sentatives of Defense agencies, particularly, DIA, with a view to determining
whether some consolidated presentation of intelligence resources was feasible.
It was reasonably obvious that the authority to enforce the formidable rearrange-
ment of reporting procedures necessary to accomplish a consolidated program
was completely lacking. The DCI had a general coordinating responsibility
`.r% but no specific authority in this matter, and no element of the Defense Depart-
ment was competent to carry through such a scheme in the absence of strong
backing from the Secretary of Defense personally. Bross explained the problem
to the then Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget on a number of
occasions and as of the Summer of 1966 it was generally agreed that the NIPE
Staff would continue on an ad hoc basis to assimilate information concerning
the costs of the activities of the several agencies and programs engaged in
intelligence and consolidate data for the purpose of showing how much money
was spent on intelligence aimed at coverage of the Soviet Union or the Middle
East countries, or for training, etc., etc., but no attempt would be made to
accomplish a formal combined program presentation.
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Mr. Roy Tod, whose background included some twenty years of
intensive experience with intelligence, both military and civilian, preceded
by training as a financial analyst on Wall Street, was responsible for this "do
it yourself" approach to the acquisition of managerial data. His energetic,
imaginative and resourceful efforts resulted in the compilation of voluminous
data on all aspects of the intelligence effort. By 1965 he was in a position to
furnish the PFIAB with reasonable approximations of the total cost of intelli-
gence including the totality of expenditures and personnel charged against
each individual agency or major subordinate component/ of the Community
or against major functional activities such as "Positive Intelligence" (which
in turn consisted of "collection", "processing," or "production") and other
principal types of intelligence activity. Also, the general cost of coverage of
some geographic targets such asSoviet Ft#riia was developed from this data.
Thus, by 1965 a very considerable beginning had been made towards the
establishment of a central depository of information about the cost of various
activities, programs and functions involved in U. S. foreign intelligence.
In the Fall of 1966 the decision not to press for authority for a formal
consolidated presentation of intelligence programs was reversed. As the
result of a review of the requirements process, initiated by the BOB, the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget concluded that a consolidated "display"
of resources used by the Intelligence Community, arrayed against the
objectives against which they were targeted was an essential prerequisite
to further progress towards rationalizing and reducing expenses for intelligence
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purposes. The views of the Director, BOB, in this respect were submitted
in a letter dated October Z9, 1966 to the Director of Central Intelligence who
agreed that a consolidated presentation of intelligence resources should be
developed. A similar proposal to the Secretary of Defense* met with approval
although a memorandum directing establishment of a "target-oriented display"
of Defense intelligence resources was only issued by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Cyrus Vance, on 8 April 1967. It was also agreed that a committee
of representatives of the DCI, DOD and BOB should be constituted to
develop terms of reference for the display.
Terms of reference for preparation of the so-called "display" were finally
approved on 1 August 1967. In the meantime an irleragency working group to work
out the format for the display had been established, with representation from
Defense (Systems Analysis) and the Bureau of theBudget which was chaired by
of the NIPE Staff. Advisory representatives to this group
were designated by various agencies of the Community.
After rather prolonged consultation, during the course of which some
rather heated differences of opinion developed with respect to the general
structure and kinds of categories appropriate for a consolidated presentation
on intelligence resources, agreement was finally reached in November of 1967
on the format for what became known as the first TOD.
There were several kinds and levels of differences in reaching agreement
on the first TOD's' structure. One was between the various echelons of the
Defense Department and the representative of the DCI (generally supported by
the Bureau of the Budget). Responsibility for overall supervision of DOD's
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*Letter, dated 10 November 1966, from Charles Schultz to Robert McNamara.
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interest in the TOD had been given by Mr. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, Mr. Horwitz. Actual responsi-
bility for negotiations and for recommendations about the format of the TOD,
however, was given to the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Alain
Entoven, who delegated responsibility to his Deputy, Dr. Ivan Selin, who in
turn depended heavily on the advice of his assistant, Dr. William Wollenberg.
Generally speaking, Systems Analysis pressed for categories such as "early
warning" which involved implicit subjective judgments and did not appear to
the representative of the DCI as realistic or practical at that initial stage of
TOD. It is possible to say that such and such a program is targeted against
Russia. Whether or not it produces "early warning", however, is a matter
involving an evaluative conclusion. "Early warning" implies something more
than a category heading for reporting basic factual data. Accordingly one
level of dispute existed at the level of the Committee representing the DCI,
Secretary of Defense and BOB and charged with developing the format,
categories and general procedure for the TOD. At this-level the views of the
DCI representative prevailed.
A second level of dispute involved the attitudes of the participating
intelligence agencies, particularly NSA. Ultimately all the agencies, except
NSA, agreed to participate and submit data in conformity with the categories
which had been developed. NSA consistently resisted efforts to require sub-
missions which-NSA insisted were incompatible with their own established way
of presenting management data. This was partially a manifestation of NSA's
customary resistance to any kind of outside managerial supervision. It also
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reflected, in part, genuine inability on the part of NSA to break out many of
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its costs in terms of rather specific target categories. It was very difficult
for NSA, honestly, to know the costs
I Although NSA
did contribute data called for inthe first TOD submission, which was completed
in December 1968, the problem of the degree to which NSA could be relied
upon to respond to the requirements of a consolidated display matter
of continuing negotiation until 1970.
A third and different kind of problem, which can better be characterized
as an uncertainty rather.than a dispute, was the question of whose responsi-
bility it really was to preside over the development of the TOD and maintain
its safe custody. Initially the Secretary of Defense proposed that the Committee
established to formulate terms of reference for the TOD be chaired by a
Defense Department official, Mr. Herbert Benington (then with Systems
Analysis). This was acceptable as a first move but the DCI was reluctant
to lose control-of the TOD for two reasons. As he wrote the Deputy Secretary
of Defense*:
"In order to be useful the categories included in the
display will have to be formulated with due regard to
national intelligence objectives and targets as they are
*See letter to Cyrus Vance, dated April 19, 1967
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established in USIB and my representatives should
be helpful in ensuring that this is done.
"In view of the sensitivity of the data involved and
in light of my statutory responsibility for protection
of irielligence sources and methods, we will want to
ensure that adequate procedures are established to
safeguard the information displayed. "
A substantial dilemma, however, was presented. The DCI was concerned
with the categories used in the TOD and the security of its information. On
the other hand it was recognized that the DCI and his representative had no
authority whatever to issue calls or require submission of data from com-
ponents of the Defense Department
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Ultimately it was decided to resolve this dilemma in favor of DCI control
and on 27 June 1967 Bross wrote Solis Horwitz, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Administration, offering to assume responsibility for acting as
chairman of the Committee responsible for completion and presentation of
the TOD. An unspoken assumption underlying the decision to ask for the
chairmanship was the realization that only the DCI staff, with its immediate
access to the facilities of CIA and USIB machinery, possessed the knowledge
of intelligence and the continuity necessary to make the project a success.
Agreement on this proposal was obtained and the Interagency TOD
Committee worked productively under the general direction of D/DCI/NIPE
and ASD(SA) to produce TOD'I in 1967-8 and TOD-II in 1968-9. As to who
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should be the custodian of the TOD and responsible for its security, with
the creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board in May 1968, it was
decided, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's concurrence, that the NIRB
should be responsible for custody. *
Largely as a result of the persistence and diplomacy of
agreement was finally reached on the composition of the data and the format
for the first consolidated presentation which was finally completed in
December of 1968.
With the advent of a new Administration a question, of course, arose
concerning the viability of the TOD. The DCI, however, was prepared to
defend it as an essential basis for the assertion of his coordinating authority,
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The new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Mr. Robert Froehlke,
immediately saw the value of the TOD as a management tool for his new office
and also moved to its defense.
The principal obstacle to smooth development of a perennial TOD
presentation continued to be NSA. As chairman of the interagency working
group on the TOD, I arried the main burden of negotiations on this
front which was by no means painless. He was assisted by Mr. Seidel who
was later loaned to Mr. Froehlke's staff for a period that lasted about a year.
Mr. Seidel contributed substantially to the education of the Froehlke staff and
indeed participated as a Defense Department representative in discussions with
representatives of NSA, DIA and other components of the Community designed
to achieve agreement on a new structure and format for the TOD.
*See letter from Bross to Horwitz, dated 22 April 1968.
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The new Director of NSA, Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, * was particularly
adamant in his opposition to the whole concept of the TOD. Although he con-
ceded the need of the Secretary of Defense's representative for information
required for overall managerial review purposes and the need of the DCI for
information on resources for coordination purposes, he felt that the kind and
amount of data required for the TOD (or indeed for any other overall presentation
of administrative type data which was proposed) was grossly excessive. He
continued consistently to oppose the TOD largely on the (not always acknowledged)
grounds that it was calculated to induce detailed interference with his managerial
authority by outsiders (the DCI and his representatives) or superior echelons
(Mr. Froehlke's office).
These issues were the subject of debate in the NIRB during the course of
which gave a series of lucid and effective presentations on the
objectives, history, design and present status of the effort to achieve a.
comprehensive, consolidated,!, display, for managerial and coordinating
purposes, of intelligence resources, arrayed by target, function: and agency.
In addition, cross walks were constructed so that the TOD could be related to
resources tabulations as prepared by the ASD (Comptroller) and by CIA's
O/PPB. Thus, these figures provided control totals which TOD displayed
in target terms, a type of visibility that'could not be accomplished in traditional
budget-type presentations.
Mr. Froehlke continued to be impressed with the necessity of continuing
the TOD, or something like it. He suggested one concession which was to
*Appointed in July 1969
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change its name. As so much opposition had developed around the "TOD"
he thought that something might be gained by calling it something else.
Accordingly, it was decided to adopt the designation Consolidated Intelligence
Resources Informational System (CIRIS) instead of TODD This was, in fact,
a better title since the consolidated presentation was intended to relate
resources to intelligence missions and functions as well as to the geographic
and subject targets of Now intelligence activities.
With Mr. Froehlke's support for the basic issue -- the continued need
for a consolidated presentation -- the NIRB stood firm, and agreement was
finally reached on the format for the display required for resources program-
med for the third annual TOD/CIRIS exercise. This was carried on in
Calendar Year 1970 and focused a4FY71. The Intelligence and Research
Bureau of the Department of State, under. Ray Cline, added its resources
information to CIRIS as Mr. Cline joined as a member of the NIRB.
As of December 1970, therefore, the concept of what originally had
been the TOD was accepted and work was going forward. In the meantime
in the name of the DCI had long since worked out arrangements with
CIA for machine processing the data received as a service of common concern
to Community managers. Equipment for a terminal was procured and installed
in #new space made available in the CIA Headquarters Building to accommodate
and provide secure facilities for CIRIS and its staff. Technical and security
installing a similar terminal, tied to CIA's computer, in the
offices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) in the Pentagon
were under investigation.
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As the year 1970 closed it appeared that the DCI had achieved centralized
control of a reporting mechanism capable of providing information, in depth
and pretty much as needed, about the resources deployed or in process of
development by the U. S. Government for national foreign intelligence purposes.
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