RECOMMENDED DISCUSSION ITEM FOR MEETING WITH MR. MCFARLANE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000700030039-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 18, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC #02397-84
18 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
r Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT:
Assistant Nationa Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
Recommended Discussion Item for Meeting with Mr. McFarlane
1. Recommendation: Despite Western protests and Soviet avowals that
they do not intend to change the rules in the Berlin air corridors, the
Soviets continue unilaterally to impose restrictions and the West has not
yet developed a strategy -- beyond continued talking with the Soviets -- to
deal with the situation. I recommend that you discuss this matter with Mr.
McFarlane during you regular meeting with him. Suggested talking points are
provided as Attachment #1.
2. Background:
-- Air access to Berlin is governed by a post-war agreement that
established the three corridors;
In the early 60's the Soviets unilaterally imposed a 10,000
foot flight ceiling in the corridors. The Allies rejected the
ceiling in principle but accepted it in practice.
In the fall of 1979 the Soviets began imposing minimum
altitudes (usually around 5,000 feet) over some training
areas. Despite Allied apprehension over the precedent a modus
vivendi was developed for the sake of flight safety and the
West accepted the Soviet restrictions. A joint CIA/DIA
retrospective has shown that the Soviets have indeed used the
reserved air space for air exercise activities.
CL BY SIGNER
RVW 18 APR 90
DECL OADR
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On 20 February of this year the Soviets began periodically
imposing minimum flight levels for the entire length of one or
more corridors. The Soviets claimed that their intent was to
ensure flight safety. But these reservations forced flights
going into Berlin to use an undesirable landing pattern, as
can be seen in the graphic that constitutes Attachment #2.
Although objecting that the Soviets had no right to impose
such reservations, the Allies have obeyed them in practice.
They have continued to protest the Soviet reservations at
various levels but have so far rejected the advice of US
mission Berlin (given on 8 March) that we should fly through
the restricted area to demonstrate to the Soviets that we have
no intention of simply acquiescing in their attempt to change
the air regime."
A retrospective study of the reservations since 20 February
shows that the Soviets behaved prudently in that they
initially did not fly in the air space they had reserved.
Havting established that the allies would not fly through the
reserved air space, however, they have now begun to use that
air space for air exercises.
On 12 April Dobrynin (as-well as the Soviet Ambassadors in
Paris and London) was called in to be told that the
"unilateral assertion of the primacy of Soviet flights cannot
continue". Dobrynin averred that the Soviets had no
intentions of precipitating a crisis or making a unilateral
change to the air regime (see attachment #3 for the account of
the Eagleburger-Dobrynin meeting).
On 13 April State convened a meeting at which DAS Niles
briefed the Dobrynin meeting and expressed the hope that the
Soviets would now stop imposing reservations. I argued that
that was an optimistic scenario and that we should develop a
strategy to be implemented if the Soviets did not desist from
imposing reservations. The rest of the meeting was
inconclusive and no such strategy was developed (as can be
seen in Attachment #4 - the State cable summarizing the
meeting).
On 16 and 17 April the Soviets once again imposed reservations.
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3. Current Situation: In sum, we keep protesting the reservations,
the Soviets keep imposing them, and we have no plan for dealing with their
tactic of sweet talk and tenacity on the issue. As you know, we are
examining the possibility that the Soviet air reservations constitute but a
larger pattern of activity, (bigger military exercises and the possible
escalation in Afghanistan, etc.) designed to intimidate the U.S. But action
on Berlin cannot await the completion of that examination. The longer the
situation is allowed to develop as it has so far, the harder it will be to
reestablish acceptable flight rules. I recommend that the USG rapidly
develop a new approach, encompassing both a plan to fly through the air
space reserved by the Soviets and a negotiating package of trade-offs
intended to meet both allied and Soviet concerns.
3
SECRET
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Attachment #1
TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING WITH MCFARLANE
BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR RESERVATIONS
I am concerned about the lack of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to
deal with the unilateral reservations the Soviets are imposing in
These reservations not only contravene the normal way of doing
business in the Berlin Air Safety Center but force aircraft to
adopt undesireable landing patterns.
-- So far our protests to the Soviets have produced much sweet talk
but have not deterred the Soviets from imposing new reservations
whenever they wish.
-- I suggest that you initiate rapid action to develop a comprehensive
strategy for countering the Soviet actions. The strategy should
include both a plan to fly through the Soviet-reserved air space
and a negotiating package intended to meet both Allied and Soviet
concerns.
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Berlin Air Corridor Altitude Restrictions
t -vof~a
W e S t Compulsory flight corridor
Mittellaodkand Flight restricted _
below 4500 feet
Some Approaches to Tegel,a,
S.soO Ft New approach.
Lower limit with Allied safety factor
4,500 Pt
Lower limit of now Soviet restriction
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